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EDITORSIAL

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Aileen A. Espiritu

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Moving forward: Strengthening cooperation in today’s Barents Region

AILEEN ASERON ESPÍRITU

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When the 1993 Kirkenes Declaration was ratified, the governments of Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Norway “expressed their conviction that expanded co-operation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) will contribute substantially to stability and progress in the area and in Europe as a whole.”(Kirkenes Declaration 1993). Over 20 years later, and as we move forward, this goal is even more important and urgent as Europe and Russia find themselves on opposite sides of a geopolitical conflict in Russia’s southern borders with Ukraine. Economic sanctions employed by both sides have placed a significant halt to the trading and economic exchange between Russia and the rest of the Barents Region – the Northern municipalities of Norway, Finland, and Sweden. These have had significant impact on small and large communities that have relied on the economic, social, and cultural interrelationship across the Schengen-Russia border zones.

There have been very real economic impacts on communities within and beyond the Barents region – from Murmansk to Kirkenes, from Joensuu to St Petersburg, from Kaliningrad to Gdansk. The developmental goals that constitute the heart of the Kirkenes Declaration initiatives seem very distant indeed. Thus, for those of us who live and work in the Barents Region space at the local level, it is even more important to engage the values at the foundation of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region initiative.

How do we do this in the face of high politics and geopolitical conflicts? The answer is that we must go beyond questions of geopolitics and to focus on local-level actors and their everyday lives. The challenges may seem insurmountable. But, even if small, there are numerous pockets of ongoing relations that have been fostered over the last two decades, and that have not been summarily terminated. There are, for example, continuing and strengthening student, research, and academic exchanges between
Russia and the Nordic countries and other parts of Europe; capacity-building research projects funded by the EU under its European Neighbourhood Policy; and ongoing art and cultural exchange between Russia and Northern Europe. Moreover, Kolarctic programmes have also promoted very necessary and practical projects including the “Oil Spill Response System” project that tries to find solutions to the eventuality of oil spills in the Barents Region; the “A School for All” project on creating inclusive education; among many others. Nor have the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish research councils and the Norwegian Barents Secretariat stopped programmes of cultural, social, and academic exchange funding despite the sanctions. Russia also continues to finance cross-border cooperation programmes at the local level and to committing to the co-financing of Kolarctic projects (Russian Ministry of Economic Development, 2015). Indeed, the bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia at the local level is poised to increase with greater funding to the Norwegian Barents Secretariat. (Nilsen 2015)

These mechanisms of exchange lead us to find synergies and commonalities across borders despite sanctions and high stakes politics. The cooperation between people and among organizations in Russia and Northern Europe must continue to capitalize on the strengths and the enduring foundations that have been built since the early 1990s. Only then can we fulfill the eminently important goals of the region-building initiatives that define the relations between Russia and Northern Europe: that “confrontation and division that characterised the past would be replaced by cooperation and partnership” (Kirkenes Declaration 2013) and to foment peace in the region. Another enormous challenge that will mark the next decade of cooperation is the question of sustainable development: how do project participants sustain the gains made during the funded periods of Barents projects? How do we translate what has been learned or created into long-lasting success and impact?

Research and academic exchange, and public engagement, I argue, are some of the most effective ways of continuing and strengthening the important cross-border relations in the Barents Region. The Barents Studies journal, a refereed publication that showcases the intellectual academic exchange in the BEAR continues to do this with this third issue of Volume One. The four double-blind refereed articles, one book review, and the four young scholars featured here exemplify the cooperation in the region and also its international character. While all of the articles and research communications that we have published thus far in Barents Studies have been refereed, we now proudly call more attention to them by using the Finnish symbol denoting peer-reviewed beside each refereed article and on the journal itself. Over the next few months we hope to also earn a ranking for peer-reviewed publications in the journals ranking system in Norway.
The refereed academic articles published in this issue represent the salient and relevant questions facing the BEAR as it undergoes economic, political, and social transformations brought about by climate change, globalisation, and geopolitical decisions extant in the individual countries of the region. One theme that unites these very different articles is that they all reference economic region-building that has preoccupied the member regions of the Barents Region since 1993, and what that may mean for its future regional- and socio-economic development. The importance of the article by Marina Nenasheva, et al. cannot be overstated as the Barents Region countries intensify exploration and exploitation of natural resources on land and at sea. Environmental impact assessments will become the norm for the Barents countries as local communities become engaged in the debates and conversations about extractive industries and their impact on the environment, everyday life, and health of Northern populations. Complementing the article by Nenasheva, et al. and closely related to environmental impact assessment is that of Leena Suopajärvi’s on the social impact assessment of local communities where mining is taking place. Suopajärvi focuses on the discourse analysis of three recurring story lines in their study in order to elucidate the voice of the local-level actors in Northern Finland. While predictably regional and local economics and politics play a great role in the developmental ambitions of the Barents Region, these goals are inextricably linked to world markets and global concerns. Tuomas Suutarinen’s article gives us a detailed analysis of the attitudes towards foreign direct investment (FDI) in a small one-industry town, Kovdor, on the Kola Peninsula. He analyses how Kovdor’s “local life-worlds” affects how communities form opinions and make decisions about how they will participate in globalisation. To round out the collection of refereed articles, Monica Tennberg challenges us to see that politics and region-building in the BEAR is inextricably entwined within questions of economics. She interrogates the collusion of scholars in building the Barents Region and how that has led to a conflation of political governance and economic development. Tennberg cogently demonstrates that knowledge about the Barents Region is necessary for it to be governed rationally, and yet, expert knowledge about this vast region is limited. What we need as scholars, community members, decision-makers, and curious bystanders is more detailed expert knowledge about the Barents Region.

One of the major themes of research in the BEAR is the question of cross-border exchange and relations between and among border regions in the municipalities and countries that make up the Barents Region. Of particular interest is to question how the local population negotiates the hard border between Russia and Norway. Tatiana
Wara offers a review of Arvid Viken and Bjarge Schwenke Fors’ edited volume *Grenseliv* (2014). This is a book in Norwegian which elucidates some of the complex and varied cross-border relations between Russia and Norway.

Tennberg (ref) argues that in building the Barents Region we must recognize the importance of creation of knowledge and expertise. Thus, it is of great significance that we again present four young scholars living and studying in the Barents Region, and engaging in research relevant to the BEAR. It is decidedly a multidisciplinary group of young scholars who are passionately engaged in their research. I am happy to introduce them to you here.

And so we move forward with the Barents Studies journal, with the ambition to strengthen the scholarship on the Barents Region, and also to solidify the ongoing people-to-people relations between and among the Barents Region countries.

I would like to thank the eight anonymous reviewers who expertly and constructively reviewed one of the refereed articles published in this issue. I thank you for your freely given professional service to the academic community. I also thank the meticulous and excellent copy-editing done by Pirkko Hautamäki lending a consistent style and language to the articles. I am very grateful to Gaute Svensson who translated the book review from Norwegian to English, and who edited the young scholars’ brief biographies, and to Marjo Lindroth for patiently answering all of my questions. And importantly, I would like to acknowledge my co-editors Monica Tennberg and Larissa Riabova for their enduring collegiality, support, and friendship.
REFERENCES


ARTICLES
Legal tools of public participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment process and their application in the countries of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region

ABSTRACT
The article focuses on research of existing legal tools of public participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process and on practical issues of their application in the countries of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR). The EIA is mandatory for projects which can have negative impacts on the environment and/or human health. Public participation in the EIA is one of the instruments used both on the international and national level that helps prevent or minimise the negative consequences of the project for the environment and human health. This article is based on research of national EIA legislation and on the analysis of the findings from interviews conducted with private and public organisations during benchmarking visits and fact-finding trips to the northern regions of Finland, Norway, Sweden and Northwest Russia. In addition, feedback was collected from participants during four seminars. Participatory methods, focused on public-private communication and participation during the environmental impact assessment process, provides the theoretical basis for the article. This research results from work in a two-year strategic project funded by the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation Tekes.

Keywords: Arctic, environmental impact assessment, public participation, law, regulations, legal tools, best practices.
INTRODUCTION

During the last twenty years, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region has endeavoured to be among the most dynamic developing regions in the world. Rich mineral and bio resources and the transport potential of the Northern sea route make this region attractive and economically profitable for companies planning or already realising large-scale national and international business projects. According to estimates by the Lapland Chamber of Commerce, investments worth tens of billions of euros are expected in the northern regions of Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia in 2013–2017. The main investments are associated with projects in the oil and gas industry, mining industry, hydro and wind energy, and bio and nuclear energy (European High North business Yearbook 2013).

Increasing business activity no doubt promotes the economic growth of the BEAR. At the same time, it contains a potential hazard to the environment and public health. This is why it is crucial already in the economic planning stage to assess as much as possible the impacts and eventual consequences of the planned project for the environment and human beings. While there are emerging economic opportunities, there are also significant concerns about the levels of change which the region shall gradually undergo due to the development of the area. The levels of change will have a huge impact on the lives and livelihoods of many recognised indigenous peoples, who are important regional actors in Arctic resource governance. Given that international law provides a basis for both resource governance (Loukacheva, 2013) and the rights of indigenous peoples (Hanna and Vanclay, 2013; Koivurova, 2008; Anaya, 2005), the development of international law applicable in the Arctic will play an increasingly relevant role. Arctic governance is widely identified as a complex system of fragmented international and regional regulations, of which Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is an example. The goal of this assessment is to gather information for analysis of risks to the environment and, in some cases, to people, through social impact assessments of a proposed project. It must be noted that societal perceptions of risk may differ from those of the industry. In general, it is more complicated to communicate probabilities than to describe potential consequences. The goal must be to attain sufficient knowledge so that all relevant stakeholders are able to make their decisions, weighting the downside risk against the benefit of the activities in question. Thus, more and better knowledge and improved communication among the various stakeholders are important factors to bridge perception gaps among the impacted groups of people. Enhanced harmonisation and multilateral cooperation on risk-acceptance criteria are needed (ONS Summit, 2012).
The Environmental Impact Assessment is one of the legal instruments available. It is a legally required assessment process where the company planning a project with foreseen impacts on the environment, must evaluate the project in terms of the levels of impact significance and create options for the proposed project (Environment, 2013). Prno and Slocombe (2012) argue that developers require widespread approval for their projects by local community members to avoid potentially costly conflicts and business risks. They therefore have to employ the concept of social licence also in the governance structure, but there is currently no legal instrument requiring SLO of developers. Other principles that help guide public participation in EIA processes include the principle of free, prior and informed consent, which is also included in the United Nations declaration on indigenous rights (UN, 2008).

One of the main goals of the EIA is to assist stakeholders and decision makers involved in the process to make an environmentally-oriented decision about the proposed project’s realisation. A significant role in this process belongs to the local people and public organisations. According to many researchers, public participation in project discussion at each stage of preparation is a key legal instrument which aims to minimise and prevent the possible risks of the proposed project to the environment and human health (Brinchuk, 2005; Holder and Lee, 2007; Public participation in ecological decision-making, 2006). Reference can also be made to the assessment of social impacts. As Vanclay (2003) explains, the process of social impact assessment (SIA) involves analysing, monitoring and managing the intended and unintended social consequences of planned developments and any social change that could be caused within or by the development process. SIAs’ primary purpose is to bring about a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment. For the purpose of analysing the public participation methods in EIA, social impact assessments could be seen as a part of this process, but in many countries such as in Sweden, the SIA is currently not required as part of the EIA and when conducted it focuses more on health aspects than on human considerations.

On the international level, the right of the public to participate in environmental decision-making is set out in both hard- and soft-law instruments such as the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992); Convention on Access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (Aarhus, 1998); Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (Kyiv, 2003); the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN, 2008); and in the International Labour Relations Organization Convention 169 (ILO, 2009).
All of these documents highlight the following principles:

- the importance of public participation in the EIA,
- free access to information about the environmental consequences of the planned project, the right of people, especially indigenous members of the communities, to participate in discussions and comments on the EIA materials. The principle of free, prior and informed consent should be applied.
- In most countries, national legislation is based on these main principles. However, the methods and tools of public involvement in environmental decision-making vary. Worth mentioning, along with the regulatory framework, is also the concept of social licence to operate (SLO). Developers are recommended to obtain a social operating licence in order to gain acceptance and buy-in from the local community where the proposed development will take place and have an impact on. Prno and Slocombe (2012) note that there is now widespread recognition that developers, specifically mineral developers, need to gain a “social license to operate” (SLO) from local communities to avoid potentially costly conflict and exposure to social risks. They also state that because the concept is relatively new, there is only a limited body of scholarship around the SLO.

Below we will consider existing legal tools of public participation in the EIA and their application in the countries of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. Interviews in the northern regions of each BEAR country were conducted. Typically one area / town was selected as the interview site in each country, with the exception of Russia: here, the vast expanse of the country led us to choose five areas in Northwest Russia for the interviews (Figure 1).

**LEGAL TOOLS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE EIA: THEORY AND PRACTICE**

In the 1960s and early 1970s there was a need to increase public participation in planning and policy-making, which resulted in this major social movement spreading from North America to Europe and elsewhere (Sewell and Phillips, 1979). The International Association for Impact Assessment defines public participation as “the involvement of individuals and groups that are positively or negatively affected by, or are interested in, a proposed project, program, plan or policy that is subject to a decision-making process” (André, Enserink, Connor and Croal, 2006). The methods and tools of public participation can be different, but they should guarantee the right of people to a favourable environment.
To assess the level and type of public participation, semi-structured interviews were conducted during the course of this two-year project in all the BEAR countries with representatives from private and public sectors. The interviews were conducted on site as a result of benchmarking and fact-finding trips to each country. Feedback was also collected in four seminars held during the same period where representatives from both private and public sectors were present.

FINLAND

EIA emerged gradually in Finland. For example, an extensive, inclusive and highly accepted assessment on the Iijoki river (*Iijoki-selvitys*) was conducted in Northern Finland by the regional planning authority of Northern Ostrobothnia (Pohjois-Pohjanmaan seutukaavalitoto) in 1981‒1984 in cooperation with universities and other organisations. The assessment was published in several volumes in the mid-1980s before EIA legislation was officially introduced. The requirements of the 1991 Espoo Convention and the 1985 original EIA directive (now 2011/92/EU, amended 2014/52/EU), in conjunction with Finland’s becoming party to the European Economic Area agreement, resulted in the adoption of the EIA Act in 1994. Environmental Impact Assessment in Finland became law with the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment (468/1994, EIA Act). This was last significantly reformed in 2006 (Act 468/2006) with the Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment (713/2006, EIA Decree).

One of the contributions of EIA to the development process is the provision of a mechanism to notify and consult the public about their opinions on a project that could potentially have significant consequences to them environmentally, socially and/or economically. According to the evaluation of the Finnish EIA system in 2009‒2010 (Hokkanen and Jantunen, 2012), EIA legislation in Finland has made project assessment more democratic, especially in terms of public participation, scrutiny (in that it improves implementation) and transparency. While there are always informal participatory opportunities, there are two points during the EIA process in which the public can officially participate: 1) once the Assessment Programme, e.g. the contents of the future EIA Report specified in Section 9 of the EIA Decree, are determined (scoping phase) and 2) when the draft EIA Report is released. The EIA Act requires the public to be given early and effective opportunities to participate in the environmental decision-making process. The public can be consulted for the first time on the information gathered by the developer for the Assessment Programme (AP), which is a plan for the necessary investigations, their scope and arrangements
for the assessment procedure (including public participation). Once the draft AP
is ready for review, there is an announcement by the Coordinating Authority (CA)
of its availability for public comment. It is also the CA who organises the meetings
for the interested public, municipalities and relevant authorities to provide their
views and comments. (Sec. 8a, EIA Act). Their main purpose is to compile com-
ments, which are typically written statements and opinions. In practice, anyone can
participate. There are also voluntary briefings (for all participants) and/or meetings
often supplementing the formal hearings. The deadline to hold the hearings and for
the submission of written comments is within 30‒60 days. On the basis of our in-
terviews with government officials and companies operating in Lapland1, it appears
that even with up to two months of broadly advertised public consultation on the AP,
the public tend to comment less during the scoping stage than in the latter draft EIA
Report stage discussed below. Primarily it appears to be the relevant agencies who
comment on the Assessment Programme.

The second opportunity for public consultation comes with the preparation of the
EIA Report itself, which provides a comprehensive analysis of impact predictions
and must include a well-articulated public participation component. Once the draft
EIA Report has been prepared, an announcement by the Coordinating Authority of
the availability of the Assessment Report (AR) for public comment is made. (Sec. 11,
EIA Act). The CA organises meetings for the public to express views on the Report
and collects all opinions and comments submitted from other permitting authorities.
On this basis, the CA issues its own opinion. The assessment procedure is over when
the Coordinating Authority hands over its Statement on the Assessment Report to
the developer and permitting authorities. At this point the formal EIA process in
Finland ends, which also means there is no more chance for public input on the EIA
Report.

Attendance by affected stakeholders at meetings on the Assessment Report can
vary widely depending on how controversial a project is and if it is located next to a
populated area. While public consultation intrinsically is positive because it encour-
ages transparency and provides a forum for public opinion, too much consultation
can actually become a negative factor for both the public and the companies. This is

1 Interviewees in Finnish Lapland: one regional and one municipal government official, two tourism-based
companies, three companies each in the mining and wind power sectors, three EIA/engineering consultan-
cies, one business each involved in peat production, shipping and hydropower.
expressed in the term “meeting fatigue”. It is a major problem in the Finnish EIA process, cited by all stakeholders: there are simply too many meetings to participate in, and the aims of the meetings are lost. This is compounded by the fact that Finland’s EIA and permitting processes come in two overlapping stages. There are thus multiple hearings for both processes, and interviews during a project for Tekes2 revealed that the majority of the public (and companies) feel there are far too many hearings as a result. Many civil society actors are unaware as to which hearing they are in or what sort of questions they should be asking. That said, the companies still tend to host additional meetings in impacted communities.

Without question, the intent of public consultation is to engage the affected public; however, companies also benefit. For them, these meetings provide the opportunity to gauge whether or not there is popular support for their project and, if not, how far they have to go to win public support. Because social licence appears to have gained more traction in Finland than in other countries within the Barents Region, companies appear to strive harder to obtain a community’s acceptance. The concept of social licence originates from community opposition to mining projects but now the concept is being applied in a broader context. It is understood not as something granted by government, but rather as an intangible that is renewable daily and granted by the people only when their needs are met. Patience and constant attentiveness to the aspirations of the local people are necessary (Gunningham et al., 2004). The normative components of social licence imply that the companies must know and understand the norms of the community (Black, 2010). The form of this varies and can range from merely holding more meetings, to signing compensation agreements with reindeer herders, to providing different project design options at the consultation meeting and allowing the public to choose the option to be implemented. Interviews conducted in Lapland validate this and also point toward an increasing tendency to link the concepts of social licence and public engagement. Thus, the import of public hearings to companies is likewise increasing as they not only open a window into public opinion but also provide a venue for companies to try and win community support and the much coveted social licence.

Even if public participation is such an entrenched part of the EIA process, given the unique climatic, biophysical and cultural characteristics of the Barents-Euro Arctic

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2 Tekes-funded project entitled Testing Improvement Processes of Finnish Environmental Impact Assessments and the Modes for Application in Arctic Regions of Finland and Russia. (2012–2014)
Region (e.g. rapid and significant climatic transformation of the Arctic, fragile ecosystems with long recovery times, sparse and widely scattered population, etc.), there is actually very little guidance for the region on how to engage with the public or incorporate stakeholder concerns. Companies have therefore taken it upon themselves to try and involve the public in a meaningful way, i.e. bringing in experts to explain the more technical aspects of projects, etc. It was noted by one of the mining companies interviewed in the north of Finland that there is no comprehensive method for identifying all potentially affected stakeholders. It should however be noted that focus groups and semi-structured interviews are both widely acknowledged methods specifically to identifying stakeholders (Reed, et al. 2009). To remedy the perceived deficiency in tools, the company is developing new stakeholder mapping tools to ensure all potential stakeholders are contacted.

Clearly without public participation opportunities, the public would be less able to influence large-scale industrial activities. However, the extent to which companies and government value the public’s input cannot only be legislated, it must be a societal norm that gives value to public participation in and of itself. Interestingly, when public hearings first started as the result of EIA becoming law in Finland, there was actually very little participation, as it took a while to overcome the reticence of the Finnish culture to speaking in public. In some sense, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction with meeting fatigue now a common complaint. It is nevertheless essential for the public to have opportunities of participation to ensure a transparent and “fair” development process. With the increasing importance of social licence, public participation has become more than having meetings and commenting on documents. This can be seen with tools such as voluntary compensation agreements with reindeer herders becoming the norm in Finland. Thus, in a country in which social licence is a strong determinant of a company’s success, voluntary measures can have strong influence on public opinion even if they do not ultimately decide whether the public lends its support to a project or not.

**NORWAY**

Unlike any other country in the Barents Region, Norway has three completely separate EIA systems: the “national” EIA system, which applies to large-scale onshore

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3 Phone interview with an executive of a water utility company operating in Lapland. (2013)
projects and is the subject of this article; EIA legislation for offshore projects; and a completely separate EIA system that applies only to Svalbard. With respect to onshore projects, while there are sectoral legislative requirements, the focus here is on the requirements contained in the Appendix to the Planning and Building Act, the most widely applied legislation. Laid down by Royal Decree on 1 April 2005, Environmental Impact Assessment is incorporated into Norway’s legal system through the Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment (amendment no. 72 to the Planning and Building Act of 24 September 2004), which was subsequently updated in 2009 (Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment effective 1 July 2009). Although Norway is not a member of the European Union, it is part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and therefore party to the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, which binds it to the European Union EIA Directive (Lesser and Koivurova, 2013). Like in Finland, then, the EU EIA Directive forms the basis of Norway’s system, and the processes are quite similar.

Public participation occurs early and often in the Norwegian system and it is clearly an important component of the process. The Norwegian Ministry of Environment’s summary of the purpose of EIA states that “Norwegian provisions emphasize public participation and participation of relevant authorities in the early stages of an EIA” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2003). The first opportunity for public participation occurs during the scoping stage, which like in Finland, requires the developer to prepare an Assessment Programme (AP). This needs to be approved by the competent authorities and serves as the basis of the EIA Report. In the 2009 update of the Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment, Chapter III, Section 7 discusses the public consultation portion of the AP, which must be a minimum of six weeks. Public consultation at this stage is well defined and essentially as broad as the public consultation for the review of the draft EIA Report. The AP is circulated to the relevant authorities and special interest organisations for comments, in particular in relation to issues and options that should be addressed in the EIA Report, and needs to be formally approved by the competent authorities and made available for public inspection. There are two comment rounds for the Assessment Programme, and the two drafts go to both the public and the government at the same time. The developer must then revise the draft and address all of the comments. On the basis of the proposal and comments, the Competent Authority prescribes a programme for the assessment work, which usually occurs no later than 10 weeks after the deadline for public comments. A copy of the prescribed programme is sent to those who have submitted comments.
The AP actually functions more like a mini-EIA Report than a scoping document given the requisite two rounds of public comments. Interviews with EIA consultants\(^4\) showed that once an AP is approved, a project is very rarely denied. This is a sign of trust: what is put forth in the Assessment Programme will be carried through in the EIA and the project itself. Unlike most other EIA systems based on the EU EIA Directive, Norway has the majority of its public consultation at an early stage of the process, i.e. when the Assessment Programme is being prepared. Most effectiveness studies (Sadler, 1996) that look at EIA systems in general indicate it is preferable to have more public consultation at the beginning of the process than at the end largely because it affords the public an opportunity to influence actual project design and potential mitigation measures at a very early stage. Although no explicit reasons were cited during interviews, it was clear from the responses that most people feel Norway’s EIA system is fair and provides plenty of opportunity for public consultation.

Chapter III, Section 10 addresses the public’s review of both the EIA Report and the project application. Applications and the EIA jointly are to be circulated to authorities and special interest organisations for comments (minimum of six weeks) and made available for public inspection. A public meeting, the main focus of which is whether or not the impacts of the project have been satisfactorily assessed, must be held with both the developer and responsible authority present.

In the benchmarking interviews conducted in Tromsø in September 2013 to determine best company practices in EIA, the interviewees\(^5\) provided some examples as to how public participation worked well in Norway, but many also said that the success of public participation is more of a perception than reality, as the public is rarely engaged in an EIA process. Even so, developers themselves insist on the need to hold very early and frequent public consultation meetings, emphasising that they always attend these meetings and welcome the opportunity to discuss projects, answer questions and to talk about potential mitigation measures.

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\(^4\) Interviews in Tromsø were conducted in September 2013 as part of the Tekes project on EIA best practices (Testing Improvement Processes of Finnish Environmental Impact Assessments and the Modes for Application in Arctic Regions of Finland and Russia).

\(^5\) Interviewees in Norways: one company, two government officials, two university professors, four research institutes/EIA consultants and three engineering firms/EIA consultants.
It should be noted that the discussion on legal tools of public participation in Norway has not directly addressed the participation of indigenous peoples, because the legal framework in Finnmark County differs somewhat from that in the rest of Norway. Finnmark is home to the main Norwegian population of Sami, and with the adoption of the Finnmark Act of 2005, the Sami gained more rights and decision-making power over uncultivated land. This in turn affects the manner in which EIA functions if not the actual process itself, i.e. the Sami Parliament has to be heard when their area of influence is impacted. While some interviewees (especially the EIA consultants) said that they believed that Sami conflicts tended to be resolved in a good way, evidence also points to the Sami becoming better organised and more astute negotiators. A recent example is the Sydvaranger mine agreement with the Sami Parliament (Skogvang, 2013). Although this focused on reindeer grazing lands, it is clear that a written, legally enforceable agreement entails taking public participation to another level with respect to the Sami people.

The three opportunities for public consultation in the Norwegian EIA system – two during the Assessment Programme and one when the draft EIA Report is released – appear to be adequate to ensure the general populace feels they have a say in large-scale development projects which could potentially adversely affect them. Most Norwegians interviewed felt the government had their best interests at heart and that there was adequate opportunity for public comment and input – and most importantly that this translated to changes. There is very little momentum to change the EIA process in Norway, and unlike in Finland, the necessity for companies to obtain social licence is not nearly as strong. Interestingly, social licence appears to have the strongest impetus in Finnmark County, where the companies have to negotiate with the Sami people. For the most part, it is the legal tools of public participation that dominate the EIA system in Norway and these are also seen by most people as being acceptable.

**SWEDEN**

Environmental Impact Assessment was introduced gradually in Sweden and has resulted in provisions for EIA to be included in more than 20 different acts. The overall Swedish objective is to increase the consideration of environmental and management issues in decision-making (National Board of Housing, Building, and Physical Planning...
et al., 1997). In 1981, a limited form of the EIA was introduced in the *Environmental Protection Act*. This legislation was noted as being more concerned about the individual details of each impact, such as emissions, rather than impacts on the environment as a whole. This initial Act also did not include demands on alternatives to be developed. In 1987, EIA regulations were incorporated into the *Swedish Road Act* (Swedish Code of Statutes 1987c). In the early 1990s, EIA regulations were enacted on a larger scale. For example, in 1991 provisions for EIA were incorporated into the *Natural Resources Act* (Swedish Code of Statutes 1987b), and more detailed provisions regarding the implementation of the EIA were issued in the EIA decree (Swedish Code of Statutes 1991b). In 1992 complementary regulations were added to the initial legislation (Swedish Code of Statutes 1992a). As a result of the EEA treaty, Sweden incorporated new provisions in the *Planning and Building Act*, enacted in 1994 and extended in 1996. This more sectorial division had an effect on the public involvement as well. Since every act has its own provisions for publicity, demands and regulations for public consultation differed between acts (Hilden et. al., 1998). The current *Environmental Code* (Miljöbalk) is based on the EC Directive 85/337/EEC (97/11/EC). In 2004, Sweden implemented the *SEA directive* 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment.

The systematic process of conducting environmental impact assessments involves a number of steps as stated in Chapter 6 of the EC. These include project screening, scoping, consideration of alternatives, description of environmental baselines, identification, prediction and evaluation of impacts, public consultation, mitigating and monitoring of impacts, presentation and documentation, and review and decision making (Hedlund and Kjellander, 2007). EIAs are divided into small and large EIAs. Small EIAs go through the County Administrative Board (CAB), while the larger ones are initiated there, but must then go through the Environmental Court for approval. In focusing on public involvement, the EIA regulations are integrated in the formal licensing procedure for projects; that is, EIAs are not separated from other foundations of decision making. It is the developer who must consult with the CAB regarding the planned project, followed by a consultation with additional stakeholders at the project’s screening stage. Another consultation is conducted after the planning proposal, or draft EIA stage. It should be noted that the Environmental Code states which categories (for example of organisations and communities) should be consulted during the consultation process, but the developer must still make their own interpretation of the requirements. During the initial meetings with the CAB, the CAB must ensure the focus and the scope needed for the EIA is in line with the state requirements. For example, based on
the projected impacts the number of stakeholders to be consulted will increase, as the projected impacts to the environment and human health increase. This initial consultation process aims to minimise the risks of delays or ineffective solutions in carrying out the EIA process. The methods used to communicate with the public and stakeholders are written communications and public hearings. Public consultation is perceived as the most important tool in Sweden to ensure quality of the EIA but there are no regulations as to how the consultation should be carried out (Hedlund and Kjellander, 2007).

The Swedish consultation process aims to achieve better quality throughout. The scope and effectiveness can be hedged, and the process provides for a more democratic planning process (Hedlund and Kjellander, 2007). The form of the consultation for a project is decided by the nature, type and scope of the project, and who the target audience for this consultation is. Hedlund and Kjellander (2007) also write that consultation can be useful in the preparation of background data, delineation of the EIA, identifying alternatives, prediction and assessment of environmental impacts, and in identifying preventative measures. The consultations with the stakeholders must be included in the EIA, which should indicate where and when the consultations took place, what information was discussed and the opinions brought forth. For certain environmentally hazardous activities, Chapter 22 of the Environmental Code states additional requirements for consultations.

An interesting case study assessed the process and quality of public participation during the environmental impact assessment of the Örebro-Bofors Airport in Sweden, noting that a traditional perspective on planning and participation was too narrow and that there was a need for larger participation and communication between the general public and decision-makers beyond the EIA consultations (Soneryd, 2002). It is suggested that improved and collaborative planning during the public participation processes, as was done in the Örebro-Bofors Airport case, would potentially lead to improved SLO and quality of decisions, as open communication and collaboration between stakeholders would increase the interest and buy-in of the stakeholders.

During benchmarking interviews to determine best company practices in EIA, conducted in Luleå in September 2013, many interviewees provided examples as to how public participation worked in Sweden. Many felt that it worked well. On average

7 Interviewees in Sweden: one company, two government officials, three university professors and three engineering firms/EIA consultants.
everyone felt that they had a say in the process and project in question. Everyone’s
voice is heard. The EIA process is developer-initiated by a meeting with the CAB where
the details of the plans for the consultations are determined. An example comes from
the wind power industry, where the public was routinely being informed prior to the
project’s application. This is not required by law but is voluntary practice among many
wind farm developers and mining companies. It emerged in the interviews that public
hearings were on average well attended, especially for mining, forestry, hydro and wind
energy development projects. Most companies always hold extra meetings as well or
take the initiative to show stakeholders the site or the company land/processes, some
even beyond the approval of the EIA. An example was given regarding the LKAB and
the Kiruna community where the company routinely communicates with the local
community members and stakeholders and has thus made itself an active member
within the community. Interviews with EIA consultants and government officials
pointed out that it was on average seen as a positive practice of public participation in
Sweden that anyone can have a say during the EIA process public consultation period,
but this also means that anyone can protest against a project and potentially delay its
realisation. Another point that was noted in several interviews in Luleå was the issue
of meeting fatigue in certain areas. These issues have now forced companies to rethink
strategies of public consultation methods in order to attain efficient and effective results
from the consultations.

NORTHWEST RUSSIA
In Russia, the right of citizens to a favourable environment and first-hand information
on its state is set out in the Constitution of the Russian Federation (The Constitution
of the RF 1993). Companies planning to realise projects which can have negative
impacts on the environment must conduct an environmental impact assessment (On
Environmental Protection, 2002). The companies should act with the consent of local
people, whose interests might be infringed during the project realisation. In effect,
local people have the power of veto on project realisation. Interviews were conducted
in five different sites in Northwest Russia as shown in the map below (Figure 1).

On the legal level, the main requirements of an organisation on public participa-
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On the legal level, the main requirements of an organisation on public participation in the EIA are described in the Regulation on the Assessment of Environmental Impact approved by Order of the State Ecology Committee of the Russian Federation of 16 May 2000 No.372 (from now on Russian Regulation on EIA 2000). Today the requirements of the Russian Regulation on EIA do not cover all the projects that can have negative impacts on the environment. In 2006, some changes were made in the Town-Planning Code of the Russian Federation (Town-Planning Code 2004) and the Federal law “On Ecological Expertise” (On Ecological Expertise 1995). After these changes took effect, the conducting was repealed of public hearings for construction-related projects except for those connected with construction on the continental shelf, in the exclusive economic zone, territorial sea and contiguous zone of the Russian Federation, and in natural protection areas.

According to the Russian Regulation on EIA, companies are responsible for providing public participation in the preparation and discussion of EIA materials (Russian Regulation on EIA 2000, item 2.5.). Companies should give timely and full informa-
tion on the planned project, conduct the preliminary consultations with stakeholders and together with local authorities provide free access to EIA materials.

The companies should provide the opportunity for public participation at each stage of the EIA process (Russian Regulation on EIA 2000, items 2.5., 4.1.). In the first stage, the responsiveness is addressed by collecting, analysing and summarising public opinions, comments and suggestions. Anyone can come to the local administration and study the notifications, declarations of intentions and terms of reference and submit comments, suggestions or proposals in writing. In the second stage of the EIA process, the main tool for public participation is public hearings. This involves the compulsory organisation and conduct of the hearings. The results of public hearings are issued as a protocol of public hearings, which is included in the EIA materials. The local authorities compile the questions received from the public, collate the official representatives’ answers and list the topics which have raised controversies in the discussions between the public and the developer (Russian Regulation on EIA 2000, item 4.9). Without a protocol of public hearings the project documentation cannot be submitted to the State Ecological Expertise, which is a mandatory part of the permit process.

In practice, local people and public organisations (NGOs, public associations and other forms of public organisation) very seldom take part in the project discussions at the notification stage and when terms of reference are drawn. This is because companies do not actively communicate their planned activities. As a rule, they confine themselves to publishing brief announcements in official newspapers, thereby formally fulfilling the legal requirements. Nor do companies typically conduct preliminary consultations with local people whose interests may be affected by the project. As a result, serious conflicts between local people and company representatives are far from rare in the public hearings of EIA materials. For example, in the Republic of Komi an uneasy relationship has emerged between inhabitants of Izhemskiy and Usink districts and Lukoil Company. According to the information received during the interview with the chairman of the NGO on interregional public movement Komi-Izhma “Ishiwata”, Nikolay Rochev argued that Lukoil Company grossly violated the requirements laid out in environmental legislation as to the planning and realisation of projects connected with oil extraction. Lukoil Company has been notorious for not conducting public hearings and preliminary discussions with the local people. The violation of the ecological standards and rules has resulted in frequent oil spills, the presence of oil in water wells and water pollution (Polyakov, 2014) and growth incidence (including cancer) among the local people (Increased incidence of cancer in Usinsk, 2014).
The relationship between local people and the oil company has now produced direct confrontation. People call for discontinuation of Lukoil activities in the Republic of Komi. The official representatives of Lukoil Company claim that the main reason for the current situation is the lack of public information about the company’s activity (Usov, 2014). Not so, say the locals. Nikolay Rochev maintains that the locals are open to dialogue with Lukoil Company if only the company would plan and realise its projects by taking into account the interests and needs of the local people, phase down/stop the consumer attitude to the environment and start to follow the requirements of environmental legislation.

The situation in Arkhangelsk region is somewhat better. Public organisations there take an active part in informing the public about planned economic activities. According to the head of the Arkhangelsk branch of the All-Russian Society of Nature Protection (VOOP) Valentina Tsvil, it is in many cases impossible to stop the operation of large companies. Therefore, it is vital already at the stage of project discussion to establish dialogue between companies and local people, so that they can together come to a decision that would satisfy all stakeholders. In her opinion, public organisations can and should provide this support. Practice shows that companies in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions often appeal to public organisations for support in informing people about the planned project and public hearings. This collaboration is very effective and gives positive results.

In accordance with Russian legislation, public organisations may initiate and conduct the public ecological expertise (PEE) of the EIA materials. This right is set out in the Federal Law “On Ecological Expertise” (On Ecological Expertise 1995, articles No. 20–25). To do this, the organisations should apply to the local authorities and inform the public about the public ecological expertise (On Ecological Expertise 1995, article No. 23). Some of the local administrations have specific regulations on organising and conducting the PEE.

The result of the PEE is the conclusion that should be sent to the authorities conducting the state ecological expertise as well as to the developer who makes a decision on project realisation (On Ecological Expertise 1995, article No. 25). While public ecological expertise is an effective tool of public participation, in reality it does not work in Russia. First, unlike state ecological expertise of EIA materials, the process of public ecological expertise is voluntary (Brinchuk, 2005). Companies are not required to get a positive conclusion of the public ecological expertise to be granted.
permission for project implementation. Second, “the conclusion of the PEE gets legal force after its approval by the state authorities only” (Bogolubov, 2006; Brinchuk, 2005). The state authorities therefore decide whether the results of the public ecological expertise will be considered or not. As Professor Bogolubov says, if public ecological expertise were mandatory for companies, it would create a barrier for project realisation, because the conclusion or decision of public ecological expertise is often made by people who do not possess the appropriate qualifications for conducting such expertise. Their conclusion may thus contradict the findings issued by state ecological expertise (Bogolubov, 2006). Third, the public organisations do not have funds to organise and conduct public ecological expertise. According to Sergey I. Gabov, chairman of the NGO “Interregional public movement Komi Voityr” (www.komivoityr.com), this is because the Russian state does not support the conducting of public ecological expertise and the public organisations do not have the funds to hire qualified experts.

The brief analysis of the tools of public participation in the EIA shows that the Russian legislation contains the main principles of the international documents on public participation in environmental decision-making. At the same time, in practice, public participation often amounts to a formal execution by the companies of the requirements of Russian legislation. Companies do not aim at an active dialogue with the local people, nor do they inform people enough about the planned activities or their consequences for the environment and human health. As a result, in some Russian regions the people and public organisations are practically/actually deprived of the possibility of influencing environmental decision-making.

CONCLUSIONS
While the Russian EIA system is based on more generalised international standards and the Nordic countries are guided by the EU EIA Directive, the actual mechanisms and even the rationale for public participation are essentially the same. In all four systems, there are two points during the EIA process for the public to receive information about the project and try to influence its design via submitting written comments and/or attending hearings. In terms of the rationale, by providing a forum for all affected stakeholders to both listen and be heard, ideally the potential adverse social and environmental impacts of large-scale activities can be minimised to the greatest extent possible.
The Russian and Nordic EIA systems differ in implementation and practice. In Russia, although it is the responsibility of the companies to inform affected stakeholders about projects, this rarely happens in reality. The companies tend to view transparency as detrimental to their business interests. Without governmental pressure to ensure a more genuine form of public engagement, the companies have little incentive to expose themselves and potentially put their project at risk. There are, however, examples of business conduct that show the concept of social licence beginning to take root. Companies in the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions appeal more and more frequently to public organisations, which act as intermediaries between the companies and the public, for outreach support in communicating to stakeholders the details of the project and in organising the requisite public hearings.

As to the practice of public participation in the EIA systems of Finland, Sweden and Norway, it is clear that all the actors within the Nordic systems (government, companies, public) value active engagement. For the tools of public participation to function well, the government and companies must value public input, and the public must value inclusion in the process. There are numerous examples in Finland, for instance, of companies voluntarily holding additional public consultation meetings and even one example of a company giving the public (during a hearing) an opportunity to choose from two alternatives their preferred design solution for a facility upgrade. So, although the legal tools of public participation in Russia and the Nordic countries are conceptually the same, in practice they manifest themselves very differently. Differences arise from both the legal framework and the stakeholders’ expectations as well as from the cultural background of the people involved.

Because the EU EIA Directive serves as the basic framework for the EIA systems in Finland, Sweden and Norway, the requirements for public participation are quite similar. In Finland, the public can comment once at the scoping stage and again once the draft EIA Report is released. In Sweden, the first public consultation occurs at the screening stage and the next one at the draft EIA stage. Norway has two public comment rounds, one during scoping and the other for the draft EIA. Of the three systems, Sweden’s is the most different, as much is left to the developer’s discretion and governmental interpretation. This does not, however, necessarily translate to better public

8 Kemijoki Oy presented two equally viable plans for a facility upgrade for the Valajaskoski power plant to the public and allowed them to choose. The local residents chose the main river option, which was executed in the year 2003.
participation. Based on the interviews conducted in these countries in 2013, Finland and Norway both have an increasingly active public that correlates with companies pursuing their approval.

Thus, while mechanisms that allow public participation in EIA are necessary, they are not sufficient to guarantee that the public truly is engaged in the process. Whether we compare Russia and the Nordic systems or limit ourselves to the Nordic countries only, public engagement comes in different forms that are themselves constantly in flux. The overall trend is nevertheless clear: in all of these countries, public participation is on the rise and there are existing tools within all of these EIA systems to ensure this trend continues.
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The right to mine?
Discourse analysis of social impact assessments of mining projects in Finnish Lapland in the 2000s

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ABSTRACT
Lapland, the northernmost county of Finland, has promising mineral deposits and over half of all Finnish mining operations. In the 2000s two new metallic mineral mines were opened in Lapland, while three projects are undergoing the environmental impact assessment procedure (EIA). This process also involves a social impact assessment (SIA) that reports on the expected impacts of mining on the host communities. SIAs influence the permit process and the ensuing activity and officially represent the views of the local people in the planning and decision-making process.

In this study, social impact assessments are examined by discourse analysis introduced by Maarten Hajer. The document analysis identified three recurrent story lines shared by all the investigated SIAs. A story line combines elements from different domains and suggests a common understanding on an issue. The second phase of the discourse analysis was to analyse these story lines in the context they were produced.

The first story line sees mines as the only way to develop the remote regions of Lapland. Large-scale mining projects are seen as a solution to economic problems, unemployment and out-migration. The second story line stresses the importance of mines in supporting the “general interest” of the whole province. After the Second World War, the intensive use of natural resources was justified by national interests; now it is justified by the interests of the region. The third story line argues that nature has no intrinsic value – it is merely a resource to be used. With the help of such story lines, SIAs grant the right to mine in Lapland.

Keywords: mining, social impact assessment, story line, discourse analysis, Lapland.
INTRODUCTION

It has long been known that Finnish Lapland is rich in minerals. The first gold rush swept through the northern parts of Lapland already in 1868, but large-scale mining did not start to develop until Finland joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994 and the EEA treaty allowed international mining companies to start operations in Finland. Since then, promising mineral deposits have been found in Eastern and Northern Finland and in Finnish Lapland in particular, the northernmost county of Finland, covering almost one third of the Finnish land area (Regional Council of Lapland 2013). According to the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (2013), the surveillance and permit consideration authority in mining in Finland, more than half of all Finnish mining operations are located in Lapland. In the 2000s, five new metallic mineral mining projects have started an environmental impact assessment process in Lapland and two of these have already started production: Agnico Eagle opened the Kittilä gold mine in 2009, while First Quantum Minerals launched the Kevitsa copper and nickel mine in 2012.

The expectations are even higher. The Regional Council of Lapland estimated in the regional industrial programme in 2012 that the mining industry’s revenue would rise by more than tenfold and the number of jobs would more than triple in a decade. Since then, the mining industry has faced financial problems, mineral prospecting has decreased and there are currently no ongoing mining construction projects in Finland (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2014). Despite this recent downturn, it is likely that the mining industry will continue to expand in the long run. For example, the European Union needs to increase domestic production of critical raw materials such as metallic and high-tech metals (COM, 2008; COM, 2013).

A metallic mineral mine is a huge industrial project. It demands immense investment, hundreds of employees, and the building of infrastructure and new services. Mining as a new industrial project brings inevitable changes to the host communities. These changes are analysed in social impact assessments (SIA) that focus on “intended or unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by those interventions” (International Principles for Social Impact Assessment 2003).

Currently in Finland, social impacts of large mining projects are assessed as a part of the environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA Act) came into force in Finland in 1995. Since then, it has been obligatory to
assess the environmental impacts of large projects such as open-pit mines with an area of more than 25 hectares or if extracted material amounts to more than 550,000 tonnes per year (Hokkanen 2001, 110–111; Kokko et al. 2014, 21; Pölönen et al. 2011). Project developers, such as mining companies, draw up an assessment programme where the overall frame of assessment is reported. Authorities may give statements and other stakeholders opinions about the plan, followed by a statement on the assessment programme by the coordinating authority. The results and findings of the process, typically conducted by a consultant firm, are published in an assessment report. It is possible to submit statements and opinions also after this. The statement issued by the coordinating authority ends the EIA procedure as such and is followed by a permit procedure making use of the data produced in the EIA process. (Kokko et al., 2014, 21‒23.)

What this procedure means in practice is that social impacts are assessed before the mining permit process and the ensuing activity. In this sense, the whole concept of a social impact assessment is misleading. SIAs do not tell us about real impacts in the daily lives of people and communities in different phases of the mining project (see Kokko et al., 2014, 21–40; Suopajärvi, 2013). Instead, they are about local people’s expectations of the mining project; hopes and fears of the changes caused by the project in local life.

Despite this inadequacy, SIAs have a substantial role in the decision-making process of a mining project. Whether or not a mine opens is decided in a permit process where the social impacts are not assessed. Hence, social impact assessments come to represent local people in the decision-making process. “There are no longer any innocent words”, says Pierre Bourdieu (1991, 40), referring to the importance of symbolic constructions. Although he discusses language and symbolic power on a more general and abstract level, the idea that an understanding of the world and thus the world itself is a result of symbolic struggles (or domination) is a relevant frame to keep in mind also in this case study. Social impact assessments are instruments of knowledge and communication, which suggest legitimate understandings of meaning of the mining projects for the local people. They are legitimate because the SIAs are the work of specialists and they are part of a legally defined environmental impact assessment procedure, which in Bourdieu’s language could be seen as a relatively autonomous field of production and circulation – the field of academically-trained experts and consultants, authorities and a mining company, which funds the whole procedure. (Bourdieu 1991, 163‒170.) It
therefore pays to ask what kind of representations are given to mining projects in SIAs that have the power to speak for the local people in this relatively autonomous planning process. The article is based on discourse analysis of social impact assessments in all five metallic mineral mining projects launched in Finnish Lapland in the 2000s.

The article is structured as follows: the next section introduces the cases, the discourse analysis method developed by Maarten Hajer (e.g. 1995; 2003; 2006) and the data used in the research. I will then briefly describe the economic development of Finnish Lapland in recent decades before moving on to discuss the three main story lines that frame the general meaning of mines: (1) mines are the only way to keep remote regions alive, (2) mining is in the “general interest” of Lapland, and (3) the natural environment is a mere resource for economic development. The last section contains the conclusions.

CASES, DATA AND METHOD
In this article I analyse social impact assessments of five new metallic mineral mining projects launched in Finnish Lapland in the 2000s. Of these five projects, two have led to the opening of a mine: Kittilä mine and Kevitsa mine. Both of these have already conducted new EIA processes with regard to extending production capacity. The Kittilä gold mine (formerly known as the Suurikuusikko mine) opened in 2009. It is run by Agnico-Eagle Finland, which completed an EIA on expanding operations in 2012 that would increase the production capacity from 5,000 kilograms to 7,500 kilograms of gold per year. The Kevitsa multi-metal mine was opened in 2012, but even before this, Kevitsa Mining, part of First Quantum Minerals, initiated an EIA linked to increasing the size of the mining concession and boosting output. Until 2005, Arctic Platinum Partnership was engaged in planning the Suhanko mine to extract platinum group metals in Southern Lapland, but the project was postponed because of feasibility problems (Helsingin Sanomat, 29 April 2005). In 2012, Gold Fields Arctic Platinum started a new EIA process concerning the expansion of mining in the Suhanko area. The process was completed in March 2014 by the statement of the coordinating authority (Regional Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment in Lapland). Also the Hannukainen iron mine, planned by Northland Resources, has completed the EIA process, but the project was put on hold in 2014 because the company had financial problems. Near the Russian border, Yara International is planning a phosphorus and niobium mine Sokli (see e.g. Nurmi 2010).
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINE</th>
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<th>MUNICIPALITY</th>
<th>EIA REPORT</th>
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<td>Suurikuusikko -&gt; Kittilä mine</td>
<td>Riddarhyttan Resources Ltd</td>
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Table 1. Research cases.
The data consist of 97 pages of eight environmental impact assessment reports in five mining projects (see table 1). The analysis concerns the chapters titled *Social impact assessment* or *Socio-economic impact assessment* in the EIA reports. The data were analysed using Maarten Hajer’s discourse analysis approach (Hajer 1995, 2002, 2006; also Hajer & Versteeg 2005). Social impact assessments may be seen as discussions as any other oral or literal utterances. Discussion is the object of analysis, whereas discourse is an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices (Hajer 1995, 60; Hajer 2002, 63; Hajer 2006, 67; also Hajer & Versteeg 2005, 175‒176). Hence, discourse analysis has two tasks: (1) to analyse the content of the discussion and (2) to analyse the practices where the discourse is (re)produced.

In this article, I will not analyse discourse practices as such. In the SIAs examined, the data used in the reports are gathered by means of questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions among local people, but it would demand a study of its own to grasp, for example, the democratic quality of the SIAs; how inclusive, open, accountable, reciprocal and sound the SIA processes in different cases have been (Hajer & Versteeg 2005, 176). Instead, the focus of the article is in identifying discourses or general argumentative rationalities and meanings that are given to the mining projects in the SIAs. As Marten Hajer and Wytske Versteeg (2005, 176) argue, “for interpretative environmental policy research, it is not an environmental phenomenon in itself that is important, but the way in which society makes sense of the phenomenon”.

The first phase of the study was document analysis. Because SIAs are written in a scientific style, there was no use to search for myths or metaphors as suggested by Hajer, but instead there were recurrent *story lines* going through all the SIAs. A story line is a construction that answers the question: what is this all about? They are “narratives on social reality through which elements from different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding”. (Hajer 1995, 62; 2003, 103–105; 2006, 69.) Different domains were indeed combined in the data. The discussion about a mine, about a concrete industrial project, was not a discussion about just a single mining project. It drew on different domains of the social world such as regional development, natural resource management, periphery-centre dichotomy, division between private and general interests, and so on. In the document analysis I have read the social impact assessments in environmental impact assessments, mainly posing this simple question: what is mining about? What kind of meanings are given to mining in these discussions and how? What kind of argumentative
regularities are repeated in the different SIAs? What kind of “condensed statements” summarise such a complex phenomenon as mining and its impacts on local communities and environments (Hajer 2006, 69). Three identified story lines are described in the next sections with examples from the studied EIA reports.

The second phase of the discourse analysis was to examine story lines in the context they were produced; “what is the historical, cultural and political context in which a particular account of ‘truth’ arises?” (Hajer & Versteeg 2005, 176). Discursive constructions emerge in socio-political practices and they also vary and change (Hajer 2006, 66‒67). Hence, I have attempted to explain why these story lines could arise in mining SIAs in Finnish Lapland in the 2000s by using research literature and regional statistics. But before an analysis of the story lines, I will briefly discuss economic development in Lapland in recent decades.

**RESOURCE EXTRACTION, TOURISM AND PUBLIC SERVICES: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN LAPLAND**

Nature and natural resources have been the foundation of economic development and well-being in Lapland. After the Second World War, forestry and the forest products industry took a leading role in the Finnish economy both regionally and nationally, and Lappish forests provided timber for production (Lehtinen 2006, 33; 215; Raitio 2008, 27–32). Further, one of the largest hydroelectric power projects in Europe was launched in Lapland immediately after the war. A scheme for harnessing the river Kemijoki started at the end of the 1940s and is still underway. Kemijoki Ltd., a state-led company founded in the 1950s, is planning its 17th hydropower plant in the river basin, and there are two large water reservoirs in the upper reaches of the river system. Logging and the construction of hydropower have historically provided a living for Laplanders, along with small dairy farms, reindeer herding and a subsistence economy based on fishing, hunting and berry-picking. (Suopajärvi 2003.)

At the end of the 1960s, Finnish Lapland underwent a rapid restructuring of its economy: mechanisation of logging and construction reduced the need of labour, and small farms could not provide a living for the post-war baby boom generation. Industry and refining did not develop significantly in the region because of long distances, a small market area and a lack of capital. Hence, the modernisation of production did not lead to new employment opportunities; instead, Lapland became
a province of out-migration. During the so-called Big Move of 1966–1970, almost 5% of the Lappish population emigrated to work in Swedish factories or out-migrated to Southern Finland (Kerkelä 1998; Regional Council of Lapland 2011b; see also Snellman 2005, 99–101).

While the extractive industries declined, the service sector began to grow from the 1960s onwards. The structures of the welfare state were put in place, and municipalities developed their services, but throughout the 1970s Lapland was an area of unemployment and a declining population. Better prospects emerged during the 1980s, when large-scale tourism started to emerge. Since then, tourism has been the fastest-growing private-sector industry in the province, thanks to the pristine environment, which is the main reason for travelling to Lapland (Jokimäki et al. 2007, 13; Regional Council of Lapland 2007, 2011a).

In the 2010s, Finnish Lapland is an example of an Arctic region where the traditional economy is in decline (about 5% of the employed population mainly in agriculture, in milk production in 2010) and the service sector dominates (72%). The share of industry is 20%. The public sector, consisting mainly of municipalities, is a major employer, offering almost 40% of the jobs in the county. (Regional Council of Lapland 2014; see also Duhaime 2004, 69–84; Megatrends 2011, 58–65.) Hence, mining as a developing industry is welcomed to the county in regional programmes and strategies (Regional Council of Lapland 2012, Regional Council of Lapland 2014).

**MINES ARE VITAL FOR THE FUTURE OF RURAL LAPLAND**

The main story line is that mines are essential as a livelihood and in terms of the future of the remote regions of Lapland. The reasoning is that mines bring new job opportunities, increase migration into the region and give a boost to all sectors of business and industry. Mining projects also support the maintenance and development of public services.

Without substantial investments and development it is difficult to increase employment and promote economic growth. Thanks to new jobs and increased purchasing power, the pressure to reduce services will diminish. New production activity will also reduce the willingness of active and skilled workers to move away from Kittilä municipality. (Suurikuusikko EIA report 2001, 86.)
Potential increases in the number of employees and in the size of the population brought about by the mine are expected to profoundly affect the local way of life at the municipal level, as well as to improve the provision of and access to municipal and commercial services. (Kevitsa EIA report 2006, 292.)

This reasoning stems from the fact that Finnish Lapland has been and still is an area of unemployment and weak economic development compared to the rest of the country. Unemployment has consistently been several percentage points higher than the Finnish average. The average unemployment rate was 13% in 2011 and 2012, compared with nine per cent in Finland as a whole. High unemployment rates have led to out-migration: young people are moving to the more prosperous South where there are better job opportunities. Lapland has been a region of out-migration for decades. The population number was at the lowest level since 1953 at the end of the year 2012, with under 183,000 people living in Lapland and the share of elderly people rising. (Regional Council of Lapland 2011b; Regional Council of Lapland 2013.)

This story line also has a historical background in Lapland. In the last phases of the Second World War, during the so-called Lapland War, the retreating German troops applied a scorched earth tactics, destroying infrastructure such as roads, bridges, electricity and telephone lines, burning homes as well as public buildings. In some regions, 90–95 per cent of all buildings were destroyed (Tuominen 2005, 152). Hence, life in post-war Lapland started from zero. The Finnish government was anxious to get the wheels of industry turning again and needed Lappish natural resources for economic development. Because of a lack of private capital, the state took the leading role in the utilisation of natural resources in the North. As a result, Lapland became a significant producer of timber and hydropower. Large logging sites and the construction of hydropower plants to harness Europe’s largest river, Kemijoki, were the main employers for decades after the war, alongside small-scale farming, reindeer herding and a subsistence economy (see Suopajärvi 2003, 209–213).

The story line is therefore a logical continuation of modern thinking: large-scale utilisation of natural resources is seen as the only way to develop a sparsely populated Lapland. Nature is understood as a resource, industrial productivity is the mode of production and the idea of development is based on rational calculations concerning workplaces, employment rates, population development, tax revenue and the creation of economic growth (see Beck 1992, e.g. 200–201; Beck & Lau 2005, 525–540; also e.g. Egri 1999, 59–61). In sum, the story line about mines bringing vitality is not only
familiar but also attractive and inspires a sense of optimism about the prospects of a region currently in decline.

In the immediate vicinity of the project area are several village communities that are at risk of withering away if no new jobs are created in the region. These villages include Portimo, Narkaus and Mauru-Peurajärvi. (Suhanko EIA report 2003, 201.)

According to the SIA, the perceptions of what is desirable vary, but no positive effects will be realized if the mine does not come into being. Overall, it is likely that the independent development of the region as a residential and working environment will continue to change for the worse because of a shortage of farming and other rural sources of livelihood. (Kevitsa EIA report 2006, 149.)

In this story line, there are no opportunities for positive development in rural Lapland other than mines. Some SIAs state that mines will harm reindeer herding, one of the region’s traditional occupations, but reindeer herding is considered to offer a minimal number of jobs.

There has been little discussion on how mining and the associated increase in heavy vehicle traffic will affect tourism, the fastest growing industry in Lapland since the 1980s. For example, between 1993 and 2004, registered overnight stays increased by 2.7% per year, reaching a total of more than 2 million in 2005. Since then, the number of registered overnights has remained at the level of 2.1–2.2 million per year, thanks largely to the pristine environment that draws people to the region (Jokimäki et al. 2007, 13; Jokinen & Sippola 2007; Regional Council of Lapland 2007; 2011a; Suopajärvi 2003, 211–213; Tuulentie 2007). Clearly, one reason for the lack of debate about the possible impact of mining on tourism is that the planned Hannukainen iron mine is the only mine to be situated within a short distance (10 km) of an important tourist resort, Ylläš, which hosted about 324,000 overnights of tourists in 2009 (Regional Council of Lapland 2011a).

Story lines are not fixed. There may be variations in the way in which a story line frames an issue (e.g. Hajer 2006, 69). For example in the case of the Sokli mine, which would be sited near the Russian border, the SIA expresses doubts about the mine’s potential benefits, given especially that there was an alternative site on the Russian side for processing phosphorus ore, the Kovdor concentrator plant.
In the SIA, a fear is expressed that the project will have a minimum impact on employment on the Finnish side. Summarizing the social impacts of the alternative reveals a strong suspicion that "natural resources are profitably exploited elsewhere, while the pollution remains in Finland". (Sokli EIA report 2009, 10.)

This case-specific story line ties in with the discussion that Lapland may become nothing more than a supplier of raw materials to the mining industry and that hopes of a prosperous future will be crushed. This theme also emerges in general discussions about the uses of natural resources in the North: critics claim that the benefits of resource extraction will not stay within the region. Hence, local people will become increasingly dependent on decisions made outside the region (e.g. Arctic Human Development Report 2004, 71–72; Lehtinen 2006; Strauss 2012, 96–99).

There is also a concern that mines will employ mainly non-resident workers, who will never belong wholly to the community. This fear is expressed especially in cases where the lifetime of the mine is assumed to be quite short, 20 years or less.

The problem may present itself if jobs are not reserved for the people who live in the municipality but [are] instead given to non-resident workers, who are feared to cause social problems. An important way to reduce problems and strengthen trust is open communication between the mine owners and local people. (Kevitsa extension EIA report 2011, 292–293.)

To conclude, the story line about mines bringing prosperity to rural Lapland stems from the fact that Lappish people and authorities of small rural municipalities have been struggling with economic problems. It appeals to communities that for decades have suffered from unemployment and out-migration of young people. Hence, new employment opportunities and tax revenues become the most valued aspect of a mining project. On the other hand, non-resident workers are opposed and there is a concern that global mining companies do not employ local people or care for the future of the communities in which they operate. Despite these concerns, the main idea of the story line is that mines offer hope and trust in the future to local people, communities and small rural municipalities.
MINES SERVE THE GENERAL INTEREST OF LAPLAND

Social impact assessments report the concern of people living in the vicinity of a planned mine that the mine could pollute the surrounding area. Such by-products of mining as noise, dust and possible toxic substances may have negative impacts on water systems and pose risks to people’s health.

On the basis of this study, the most significant drawbacks of the mine are health and safety risks. The residents have a lot of uncertainty about the effects of the mine on the surface and ground water in their residential area. (Suhanko EIA report 2003, 168.)

A story line not only defines the issue in question but also creates the social and moral order of a situation (Hajer 1995, 64). The story line of general interest encourages – and even obligates – local people to sacrifice their natural environment and private interests for the sake of the general good. In the studied SIAs, general interests refer to the provincial level, that is, to the region of Lapland.

In summary, based on the results of the interviews, it can be concluded that the beneficiaries of the Kevitsa mine are not only the employees of the mine and the business community, but also a strengthened regional economy as a whole. Naturally, the mining company will draw benefit, but the benefit will add to the common good via a number of channels. (Kevitsa EIA report 2006, 148.)

The mining industry will create long-term jobs, and mainly so that negative impacts are local and positive impacts at the least regional. “The mining industry will be a pillar of Lapland’s industry in the future.” (Kevitsa extension EIA report 2011, 292.)

The general interest story line has undergone a change since the early post-war years. In those days, general interest referred to the national interest; to rise from the ravages of war, Finland needed natural resources and the contribution of all citizens for the sake of the fatherland (Poropudas 1998). In the 2000s, national interest has been replaced by regional interest: mines were to be built for the sake of Lapland. There are several reasons for this shift: globalised production chains, changes in the role of the state and regionalisation created by the European Union. The globalisation of production, finance and markets affects not only nations but also resource regions that may be termed peripheral (see Franks et al. 2013). For example, mining is a global business,
which means that changes in the prices of ore or global economic fluctuations directly affect the operating conditions of northern mines. During post-war industrialisation, the state was the guarantor of the development of business and industry in Lapland. Northern Finland was heavily dependent on state policy. In recent decades, the state has withdrawn from industrial activity in Lapland. Moreover, Finland joined the European Union in 1995 and the European idea of a “Europe of regions” has spread to the North: regional competitiveness is a catchword in Lappish discussion, as elsewhere (Kerkelä 1998).

To conclude, the general interest story line refers to the general interest of the province, that is, Lapland. It pertains to the region beyond the vicinity of a mine. The general interest represents the mining company, its employees, business and industry, municipalities, the regional economy and hence all who live or operate in the region. It is apolitical in nature: it constrains real political debate about burdens and benefits of mining and a discussion about the goals and impacts of the industry. The opposite of general interest is private interest, namely the interest of people living in the immediate vicinity of a mine. They are expected to understand the advantages that the mine brings and to sacrifice their home area for “others”, whoever they may be.

**NATURE AS A NATURAL RESOURCE**

Mining changes the local environment once and for all. It turns forests and marshland into industrial sites. Nevertheless, few expressions of sorrow for the loss of the environment are to be heard. The third story line emerging from the data holds that nothing of value is lost even though mining projects change the natural environment.

*The mining project would narrow down but not prevent the opportunities of inhabitants e.g. to go fishing, snowmobiling, berry- and mushroom-picking, etc.* (Suurikuusikko EIA report 2001, 88).

*The mining project can be carried out without causing irreparable harm to the environment* (Suhanko EIA report 2003, 201).

In this story line there is no intrinsic value to nature. The environment is also regarded as replaceable: local people are expected to find other places for their nature-based activities. One reason for this argumentation is that Lapland is a large province (100,369 km²), making up about 30% of Finland’s land area, yet its share (182,856 on 30 October 2012) of the Finnish population is only 3.5%. The population density in the region is
two inhabitants per square kilometre. (Regional Council of Lapland 2013.) A phrase commonly heard in the province is, “[T]here is plenty of room in Lapland.” Thus, it is assumed that there is space for all nature-based livelihoods and practices, be they mining, forestry, tourism, reindeer herding or subsistence economy.

The story line continues the Western tradition of modernisation: nature is something “out there”; it is to be controlled and tamed for human needs. Nature is a resource for economic growth and material progress, having neither intrinsic value nor other meanings to people. (E.g. Dryzek 1997, 12–13; Egri 1999, 59–61; Macnaghten & Urry 1998, 7; Sutton 2007, 59.) In the case of the North, the modern story is perhaps even stronger than in other places around the world. It is the idea of man conquering Northern nature, the fight against nature in harsh conditions that is described both in tales of the North and in scientific research (e.g. Moss 1994; Shields 1991; see also Haila 1999, 50–51).

The approach to nature also describes much about the human world and the premises of the organisation of society (see Haila 1999, 56–57). Two important factors characterise the relationship between people and the environment in this context. First, a specific feature of Lapland is that the state owns most of the land area, 67 per cent, and its ownership was even larger, almost 80 per cent, after the Second World War (Kankaanpää et al. 2013; Suopajärvi 2003, 210). The management and utilisation of natural resources have traditionally been in state control, leaving local people without much say. Second, forestry and mining are nowadays run by global companies. There is no local (and increasingly less national) ownership in these fields, with the result that all decisions are made in the headquarters of companies, and Lapland is merely a resource region. Moreover, an increasing volume of European Union legislation and an interest in Northern issues among global environmental groups and international media mean that Lapland is most often dealt with from an external viewpoint. This can easily be regarded as Southern colonialism: “it rises from the experience of humiliation based on marginalization (from the central information flows) and deep, heritage-like experiences of injustice” (Lehtinen 2006, 62, see also 63; 207–208; Ridanpää 2003, 107–108). The only remedy for the feeling of powerlessness thus engendered may be to depreciate the meaning of nature and nature-based traditional practices.

To conclude, in this story line nature is something “out there” – it is the Other that should be tamed to satisfy human needs. Nature is a merely natural resource in a modern sense. Nature has no intrinsic value, and there is plenty of room also for mining in Lapland.
CONCLUSIONS

In Finnish procedure, social impact assessments (SIAs) are made as a part of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in the planning phase of large environmental projects. In mining projects in Finland, EIA is obligatory if an open-pit mine is being planned with an area of more than 25 hectares or if extracted material is more than 550,000 tonnes per year. The EIA process informs the permit procedure, which decides whether a mine can be opened and on what conditions. The article has analysed the social impact assessment sections in the EIA reports of all metallic mineral mining projects launched in Finnish Lapland in the 2000s. The study has sought to analyse what kind of meanings were given to mining in the social impact assessments that formally represent local people in the planning phase of a mine.

By using a discourse analytical approach introduced by Maarten Hajer, I have identified three main story lines in the empirical analyses. Story lines are summaries of a kind – they are narratives that make sense of complex issues such as mining and its impacts by simply answering the basic question of what mines are all about. While story lines change and there may be variants of them, the dominant narratives are shared stories that gain force by continuous reproduction.

The first story line maintains that in rural Lapland, mines bring hope of a prosperous future to small communities struggling with unemployment, economic problems and out-migration. In the second story line, mines are important because the general interest, namely regional development, requires local people to sacrifice their home areas and traditional practices for the good of the many. “General interest” is a label that prevents political discussion about the burdens and benefits of mining by evoking a simple dichotomy between small local and broad general interests. The third story line argues that there is plenty of room in sparsely populated Lapland. Nature has no value or meaning per se; it is only a resource for economic development. There are some critical tones, but the dominant story lines tell us that using the riches of the soil will bring a prosperous future for communities in rural Lapland and that mining also supports the regional development of Lapland in general. Based on the analysis, it may be claimed that SIAs are giving the right to mine in Lapland.
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Glocalisation of global market forces and the repositioning of a peripheral Russian mining community

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ABSTRACT
Increasing globalisation and global market forces shape the development of resource peripheries in the Barents region. Foreign direct investments are concrete examples of global market forces. Their glocalisation forces the locals to evaluate their consequences for the local development and reposition their communities in global context. This article studies glocalisation of global market forces and preferred directions of repositioning of a peripheral single-industry mining community in the Russian Barents region. The study is based on a case study of local opinions about actual and potential external actors in the economic development of Kovdor, located in the Murmansk region. The paper analyses the preferred owner of the town-constituting enterprise and the local opinions about the EU, USA and China as potential investors to the case study community. The study reveals how local opinions about external forces in the local development are related to local life-worlds. Moreover, the paper shows the impact that economic, political, cultural, historical and technological factors have in forming these opinions about potential foreign investors. The study shows generally positive local opinions about FDI. However, significant differences were found in opinions about different investing countries.

Keywords: Russia, globalisation, glocalisation, mining industry, single-industry town, FDI
INTRODUCTION

Private and foreign investments are immensely important for the technological modernisation, increasing competitiveness and overall growth of the Russian economy (Kontseptsiya... 2008, 151; Connolly 2011, 428–429). During the 2000s, however, Russia has responded to foreign direct investments (hereafter FDI) with several restrictions, which has led to an institutionally semi-closed economy (Hanson 2010, 632) and the continuation of policies that discourage FDI (Kuznetsov 2012). While some sectors of the Russian economy have clearly grown more ambivalent about FDI and foreign influence (e.g. Liuhto 2008; Fortescue 2009, 169), the domestic market has also tended to favour Russian firms which have shunned foreign investors and business activities abroad (Staalesen 2013). The natural resource sector in particular, including the mining industry, serves as an example of an investment atmosphere which needs improving (McMahon and Cervantes 2012, 17). Moreover, according to Rukavishnikov (2012, 9), the militaristic and anti-Western policy of the elite in power has been an obstacle to attracting foreign investors. The Ukrainian crisis has also brought new tensions between Russia and the West. It has led to decreased interest of foreign investors to invest in Russia, while the escalated world politics sanctions by the EU and USA have rekindled anti-European and anti-American attitudes among Russians (Levada 2014). In addition, regional-level attitudes have been an additional barrier for foreign investors and an important factor in determining the current Russian investment trends. The largely protectionist business climate in the natural-resource regions of the Russian North (Tykkyläinen 2010, 256) has created obstacles for FDI in Russia and has kept the northern natural-resource regions unattractive to foreign investors.

State-level FDI policies, the attractiveness of Russia as a target for FDI and the Russian investment climate have all been much studied (e.g. Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 83; Fabry and Zeghni 2002; Liuhto 2008; Kuznetsov 2012). Similarly, a number of studies have examined the state-level response to foreign participation in Russia’s natural resource industries (e.g. Bradshaw 2009; Fortescue 2009). Previous studies have shown that the economic nationalism in general and the so-called natural resource nationalism in particular were on the rise in Russia in the 2000s (e.g. Liuhto 2007, 2;
Bradshaw 2009; Bremmer and Johnston 2009; Domjan and Stone 2010; Liuhto 2010, 142). Moreover, the influence of foreign capital on the Russian economy and the arrival of foreign companies have been mainly viewed negatively among Russians (Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 40; Vtsiom 2006).

State-level FDI policies, which constitute the official response to foreign investors, often see FDI differently from the local opinions, based on the interaction of global forces and local life-worlds (Bandelj 2003, 376, 378). This study analyses the glocalisation of global market forces and the preferred directions of repositioning of a community. The analysis is based on a case study – a survey – of local opinions about actual and potential external actors in the economic development of a peripheral mining community of Kovdor, located in the Murmansk region in the Russian Barents region. The study highlights local views about the glocalisation of external market forces and actors in Kovdor’s economic life. The research question posed in this paper is: How does a peripheral Russian mining community reposition itself under impact of global forces in the local life-world? The survey mostly involved workers of Kovdorskii GOK (later KGOK), which, as the town-constituting enterprise of Kovdor, is responsible for the creation and current existence of the town. The data is analysed with quantitative methods by frequency measurement for numerical data.

The study continues as follows: the second section introduces the theoretical approach of the paper and the hypothesis of the research question. This is followed by an analysis of the FDI inflows to the Murmansk region, restructuring of the mining industry of the region in the 2000s and the special characteristics of the Murmansk region and Kovdor that influence the perception of foreign actors and potential FDI in the local development. Local opinions about potential FDI and preferred ownership of the town-constituting enterprise are then examined on the basis of the case-study data from Kovdor (Figure 1). The town has so far not received any FDI, but the main mining company KGOK is owned by a Russian company of Eurochem, a global player. This section answers the research question by utilising the empirical fieldwork data. The final section recapitulates the findings and draws conclusions.
THEORETICAL APPROACH

GLOCALISATION OF GLOBAL MARKET FORCES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, globalisation has forced Russian single-industry towns and resource peripheries to reposition and restructure their economic spheres (Rautio and Round 2008, Kortelainen and Rannikko 2015). Crucially, in resource-based single-industry towns, the social development, which depends on the competency of the local economy, has become vulnerable to the volatile global resource economy. Globalisation shapes the development of the Barents region as a whole and of the Murmansk region in particular (Myllylä 2007). On the local level, it is a mixture of
global forces and local specifics (Swyngedouw 2004). This meeting of global and local forces – the coming together of foreign investors and the local economic sphere, for instance – produces glocalised outcomes of globalisation. FDIs are a concrete example of global market forces. Such glocalisation forces the locals to evaluate the consequences for the local development and to reposition their communities in a global context. The study of local opinions about foreign investors shows how the locals reposition their locality and how they evaluate existing and potential external actors in the community.

FDIs are a major investment form to stir up emotions and to determine the general image of foreign investment in the receiving countries, regions, communities and enterprises (see more about definition of FDI in Russia in Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 17; Fabry and Zeghni 2002, 290). FDIs are also the most visible type of foreign investment and are reflected in the corporate image in different ways, through new names, policies or visual images, for example (Kulyasova 2010, 273). The main role of FDI as shaping opinions about foreign investments is related to their often politicised character and profit-seeking role, which may take place at the expense of the host country, community or enterprise. Potential FDIs are evaluated in relation to the balance between perceived advantages and disadvantages (Jones et al. 2000, 192). FDIs have an impact on the employees, institutions and legal environment in the host countries (Zashev 2007, 153). What FDIs seek to do is generate profits for foreign investors and influence the decision making of the target enterprise, which in turn can influence the business plans and strategies of the target firm (Hirvensalo 1999, 6).

According to a study by Nina Bandelj (2003, 383–384), public opinion has the potential to affect policies toward foreign investors if, for example, there is significant resistance towards FDI or foreign ownership. Local opinions about potential FDI have an impact on local and regional competitiveness and on the location selection strategies of foreign investors. In order to attract FDI there needs to be a good investment climate in the target area (Åslund 2002, 434). An analysis of the local opinions on potential foreign investors can therefore highlight the potential of a region or locality for economic growth by means of FDI. Also, in countries and regions with investment-friendly policies, many multinational corporations pay attention to local opinions about their investments when making decisions about potential investment targets (Humphreys 2013). Local opinions can probably hinder FDI, but they are less likely to have a positive effect on foreign investors’ investment decisions. Hence, the importance of local opinions to potential foreign investors is secondary related to the general investment atmosphere in the target country and region (Figure 2). This is especially important to bear in mind in countries such as
Russia, which needs to improve its general attractiveness in the eyes of foreign investors. Studies in Kostomuksha have shown the importance of positive local-level experiences in the formation of positive local opinions about foreign investors and FDI (Kosonen et al. 2009, 13–14; Prokhorova 2014). One also has to acknowledge that FDI in Kostomuksha has diversified the local economy instead of targeting its main industry. Therefore, it has not created a threat to the community’s stability. This stability is guaranteed by the town-constituting enterprise owned by a Russian parent enterprise. The local opinions about FDI are formed in an interaction between local life-worlds and global forces (Bandelj 2003, 376). The opinions are rooted in such factors as the cultural, historical and political circumstances of the host country, region or community (Jones et al. 2000, 191). Pre-existent negative images of potential investors, or their countries of origin, and the locals’ fear of losing current positions as a result of incoming investors impact negatively on local opinions about FDI (Bandelj 2003, 387). Other central factors include the potential foreign investors’ cultural affinities, political alliances and pre-existent networks. The locals will bear them in mind in evaluating potential foreign investors (Bandelj 2003, 387). If members of a culturally distant ethnic group are viewed as beneficial to the local economy, interaction with them is more likely to be accepted (Alexseev 2003, 96–97).

The various positive impacts of FDI and their importance to economic growth in target countries and communities are evident (Fabry and Zeghni 2002). Recent studies have shown that FDIs are beneficial for the receiving countries and communities through a range of positive economic effects, such as increased nominal wage levels, new productive facilities and job skills, management expertise and employment without a cost to the taxpayer as well as technology transfers (Bandelj 2003, 375; Suganuma 2011, 1; Meunier et al. 2012, 1). FDIs can also boost international trade, domestic investments, economic growth, and upgrade and expand social capital (Suganuma 2011, 1), and offer better salaries than in similar jobs in domestically owned enterprises (Meunier et al. 2012, 1). In addition, the financial benefits are complemented by technological and managerial benefits (Bandelj 2003, 375). Moreover, such indirect benefits as technological and managerial improvements are positive spillovers to domestic firms, even if they are shadowed by problems of decreasing efficiency, which domestic firms may encounter at the entrance of foreign enterprises into formerly uncontested markets (Yudaeva et al. 2001, 4–5).

Findings from previous studies suggest that the formation of opinions about FDIs in the target country, region, community or enterprise is informed by different factors. These can be classified into the following categories: economic (see e.g. Jones et al. 2000; Fabry...
and Zeghni 2002; Bandelj 2003; Liuhto 2008; Bremmer and Johnston 2009, 150; Domjan and Stone 2010, 58; Kulyasova 2010; Liuhto 2010); political (Zashev 2007, 157; Tarr and Volchkova 2010, 20; Humphreys 2011, 12); cultural and historical (Bandelj 2003, 385–386; Kortelainen and Nystén-Haarala 2009, 164; Kosonen et al. 2009, 3; Kulyasova 2010; Fortescue and Rautio 2011); technological (Hanson 2010, 648; Jensen and Skedsmo 2010, 446); and environmental factors (e.g. Suganuma 2011, 19; Jartti et al. 2012). Figure 2 shows the formation of local opinions about foreign investors and external forces in the local economy.

**Figure 2.** Formation of local opinions about foreign investors and external forces in the local economy in resource-based, single-industry towns of Russia, and the significance of local opinions about foreign investors.
Attitudes towards FDI vary between different regions of Russia (e.g. Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001; Rautio and Round 2008; Zimin 2010). These differences are particularly notable between centres of trade and natural-resource peripheries (e.g. Vtsiom 2006; Rautio and Round 2008, 130): the centres of trade clearly pay more attention to FDI-friendly policies. Regional differences also exist in terms of the opinions about certain countries as investors. For example, the Chinese–Russian cooperation and relationship is for the most part positively evaluated in the Russian Far East, especially among the younger generations (Larin 2011, 89), whereas in the European part of Russia images of China are mostly based on stereotypes and myths. The attitudes of the central government and central media, located in the European part of the country, play a great role in reinforcing negative images and in feeding a fear of the “Yellow Danger” (Larin 2011, 24, 89, 103).

European-oriented Russians who are integrated in the common European and Russian diplomatic, economic and political interests and who are open-minded to cooperation with European countries, are well represented in Northwest Russia (Hønneland 2010, 56–57, 76–77). At the same time, the cross-border cooperation has also highlighted several conflicts of interests between the Murmansk region and Western countries. The conflicting interests have fostered mistrust toward Western countries and their motives in economic and environmental cooperation (Hønneland 2003).

FORMATION OF OPINIONS ABOUT FDIs IN SINGLE-INDUSTRY RESOURCE COMMUNITIES IN RUSSIA

The formation of local opinions about potential FDIs is crucially shaped by the local life-worlds and the working environment. In single-industry communities, the residents’ local life-worlds are connected with the main enterprise and field of industry, either directly or indirectly (Prokhorova 2014). In such communities, FDIs may give rise to negative reactions when the investments are expected to impact on the town-constituting enterprise. FDIs are often seen as threatening the symbiosis of the town, the town-constituting enterprise and the socioeconomic stability and well-being of the residents. These sharp reactions in single-industry towns in Russia are explained by the deep dependence of the communities’ economic and social spheres on the town-constituting enterprise. In the Soviet business culture, major town-constituting enterprises traditionally supported the surrounding community and company towns (Kortelainen and Nystén-Haarala 2009, 151; Prokhorova 2014). In single-industry communities, then, town-constituting enterprises created an environment of trust around them by
taking care of these communities. The role of the main town-constituting enterprise in determining the local opinions about potential FDIs is therefore crucial in Russian single-industry communities.

The industrial field also matters in the formation of local opinions about foreign investors. In natural resource communities, resistance to FDI can also be awakened if the key resource happens to be one that is seen as strategically important (e.g. Liuhto 2008). Single-industry communities may easily turn against FDIs which seek to influence the main town-constituting enterprises or main industries. Potential FDI is a threat to the stability and well-being of these communities. The views held by the main company or its external owners is often carried over into the town through the directors of the firm as well as through major policy-makers, such as the mayor, who are often connected with the major enterprise. Therefore, it can be especially challenging for external or foreign investors to be accepted as investors in the main town-sustaining industry in these communities if this enterprise itself has a negative attitude to such investment. Potential foreign investors should respect the rules of the game, including the practice of taking care of the social services of the communities, in order to increase the level of acceptance among the residents (Kulyasova 2010).

According to Liuhto (2008, 34), official resistance to foreign ownership of strategic branches of the Russian economy is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to resisting foreign influence over the natural resource sector. This is supported by recent findings. Most Russians have expressed negative opinions about FDI in militarily sensitive industries as well as in manufacturing industries, such as raw materials and heavy industries (Vtsiom 2006). Furthermore, the state is a central player in the natural resource industries alongside big private enterprises, the so-called national champions (e.g. Liuhto 2010). Trust in the Russian state as the backbone of these industries, rather than private firms, can thus culminate in resistance to foreign actors and their decision-making power.

In the natural-resource sector in particular, the role as a supplier of raw materials to a foreign country (Humphreys 2006, 11) is especially sensitive. Foreign enterprises are allowed to gain economic benefits but their political control of natural resource businesses is resisted by the state (Liuhto 2007, 26). Increasing nationalism in a society usually promotes resistance to foreign ownership of natural resources (Bandelj 2003, 377) and to FDI in this sector. An increased potential for resistance to FDI also exists at the local level if the superpower identity of Russia is threatened by the prospect that Russia
might simply become a supplier of raw materials for foreign countries. This resistance may be particularly virulent if the FDIs are thought to come from countries which are imagined or regarded as Russia’s enemies or competitors in global politics. Chinese investments in particular in the natural resource sector are viewed as increasing Russia’s subordinate position as a mere supplier of raw materials for China (Blank 2011, 2). Therefore, the growing role of China as the world’s economic superpower (Jacob 2013) might be seen as a reason for resisting its influence alongside the influence of the United States.

FDI TO THE MURMANSK REGION

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND THE MURMANSK REGION
The impact of FDI on the regional economy of the Murmansk region has been limited. The Murmansk region received a relatively small amount of FDI after the collapse of the Soviet Union until 2004 (Didyk and Riabova 2012, 20, 39, 134). Generally the amount of FDI increased significantly in the period 2005–2013 when compared with the pre-2005 period, except for the crisis years of 2009–2010, as can be seen in Figure 3. The amount of FDI was especially low in the crisis years of 2009–2010 but has since been restored to its pre-crisis level.

Figure 4 shows that in 2006–2013 the leading investor in the Murmansk region was Norway. It is likely that many of the investors included in the investment figures from Cyprus, the Virgin Islands, the Netherlands and Estonia, which follow Norway as the main sources of FDI inflows, are in fact Russians. Cyprus and the Virgin Islands both have a reputation as sources of round-tripping FDI, and it is clear that the round-tripping origin of FDI is clearly significant in the Murmansk region. Apart from Norway, the role of “real foreign investors” without a Russian background is very low (see more about “real foreign investors” in Ledyaeva et al. 2013, 14).

The mining industry is crucially important in the economy of the Murmansk region, but the role of FDI in this industry is almost non-existent. The poor quality of the assets has been cited as an obstacle to foreign investors investing in the mining industry of the region (Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 68). Mining and quarrying received only $31,000 FDI in 2004–2012 (FSGS, 2014).
Figure 3. Annual inflow of foreign investment and FDI to the Murmansk region in 2005–2013 (thousand USD) (Murmanskstat, 2013; FSGS, 2014; Murmanskstat, 2014).

Figure 4. FDI in the Murmansk region in 2006–2013 by accumulated sum of FDI by the investing countries (thousand USD) (FSGS, 2014).
RESTRUCTURING OF THE MURMANSK REGION’S MINING INDUSTRY AND KGOK IN THE 2000S

The lack of domestic investors in the transition period of the 1990s has been pointed out as a reason for a potential demand for foreign investors in the mining industry of the Murmansk region (Rautio 2003, 118). KGOK was also in a critical situation at the end of the 1990s, as it did not have the stability offered by an external parent company (Kvitko and Telen’ 2001) and because of the general crisis in Russia in 1998. In the economic meltdown of the 1990s KGOK reduced the level of all types of production, especially the production of iron ore concentrate (Kovdorskii raion 2011, 23). However, despite the obvious need for foreign investors during the economic bust period at the end of the 1990s, there was a great deal of suspicion about foreign investors among the workers in the mining industry (Rautio 2003, 118–119) and the inhabitants of the Murmansk region in general (Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 69).

Socioeconomic developments in the 2000s have led to significant changes in terms of the need for FDI. In the 2000s the restructuring of the regional mining industry created an element of stability in the form of parent companies for some of the town-constituting mining enterprises of the region, such as KGOK. This was a private local company after the privatisations of the 1990s with a limited ability to finance the necessary technological restructuring. The financial opportunities available to Russian holding companies to fund significant investment projects and programmes in their daughter companies in the Murmansk region have boosted the economic prospects of these subsidiaries. Such Russian investments have also obviated the urgent need for foreign investors to come and rescue the mining firms of the Murmansk region.

KGOK produces iron ore, apatite and baddeleyite concentrates. KGOK is a major producer of apatite concentrate, an activity at the beginning of Eurochem’s production chain (Pilipenko and Sapuntsova 2007, 19–20; Strezhnev et al. 2007; Tsvetinskii et al. 2007). KGOK’s production volumes of iron ore, apatite and baddeleyite concentrates have also increased significantly in the 2000s (Tsvetinskii et al. 2007, 91). The apatite is used by Eurochem, while the iron ore concentrate is sold to other Russian firms and baddeleyite is predominantly sold abroad (Kovdorskii raion 2011, 23). Moreover, KGOK has produced stable annual net profits (Tsvetinskii et al. 2007, 91; Kovdorskii raion 2011, 24).

KGOK serves as an example of the restructuring of the regional mining industry in the 2000s. The investment policies and decisions related to KGOK are implemented on the
holding level in the Eurochem headquarters. The acquisition of KGOK by Eurochem in 2001 has led to improvements in the finance-economic situation of KGOK and also brought stability and possibilities to finance KGOK's modernisation programmes and long-term development projects alongside the holding-level planning (Pilipenko and Sapuntsova 2007, 20; Strezhnev et al. 2007; Tsvetinskii et al. 2007; Kvodorskii raion… 2011, 23). The position within the holding has boosted the economic competency of KGOK (Tsvetinskii et al. 2007), which has led to steady annual increases in its workers' salaries (Pilipenko and Sapuntsova 2007, 20).

FORMATION OF OPINIONS ABOUT FDI IN THE MURMANSK REGION AND IN KOVDOR

Previous studies have reported that there is a very suspicious attitude regarding the motives of foreign investors in the Murmansk region (Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 69). It is therefore not surprising that the role of the government of the Murmansk region in promoting and attracting FDI in the 1990s was unsatisfactory (Didyk and Riabova 2012, 20). However, although FDI and technology were generally accepted, foreign workers and enterprises were mainly opposed (Rautio 2003, 117). Moreover, foreign cooperation and FDI have been resisted because of zero-sum game arguments (Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 69) resting on fears that foreign firms will utilise the cheap raw materials and cheap labour of the Murmansk region, will stop progress in the region's industries and stop them competing with the domestic industries of investing countries (Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 69). The Russian territories of the Barents region have also been selective about foreign investors, offering them mostly underdeveloped fields of industries, which has led to conflict between foreign investors and regional administrations (Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 79). The main causes behind these conflicts sprung from the collision between the foreign investors' profit-seeking motives and the wider objectives of the regions, which emphasised a more comprehensive approach to socioeconomic development (Hirvensalo and Lausala 2001, 79). This reflected a clash between the business cultures of the foreign investors and the expectations of the regional administration.

The selective promotion of certain underdeveloped fields of the regional economy to foreign investors continues. The interview with the deputy minister in the Ministry of Economic Development of the Government of the Murmansk region V. Gorbunov (2012) revealed that the Murmansk region promotes foreign investments especially in such underdeveloped industries as road building and tourism.
Gorbunov also agreed that the region’s investment climate needed to improve in the mining industry. In turn, the complex legislative environment as an obstacle for foreign investors, the need to improve both the friendliness of the region towards investment (Popova 2012) and the FDI policies of the Russian state (FG-1, Dombrovskii) were mentioned in discussions during the author’s fieldwork in the region.

In each region and locality the formation of the opinions about FDI and investors is influenced by several regionally and locally specific factors. The Murmansk region has many unique regional characteristics which affect the formation of opinions about potential FDI in the case-study community. The natural resource industries as the dominant industries of the region and as the main industrial enterprises are important in the local life-worlds of the residents of the industrial communities of the Murmansk region. The town-constituting enterprise KGOK is a central player in the local life-worlds of the residents of Kovdor. The high level of interdependence between the town’s residents and the town-constituting enterprise (Suutarinen 2011, 135) indicates the importance of the enterprise for all the residents. A central factor for the workers of the main firm in opinion formation about potential FDI is trying to evaluate how such FDI would affect their local life-worlds and their socioeconomic well-being.

The closed history of Kovdor (Suutarinen 2013) as well as the resource and economic nationalism related to local strategic industries (Kvitko and Telen’ 2001; Suutarinen 2013, 332) are potential reasons for resisting foreign investors. Protectionist views linked to the dependence of the community on the main town-constituting enterprise may also promote opposition to foreign actors, as the local mining industry is their most obvious target. In Kovdor as in the Murmansk region in general, there is a host of potential reasons to evaluate European actors in particular in a positive light, including the geographic location near Scandinavia and the West, personal cross-border contacts and the sharing of more European values and identity than on average in Russia (Hønneland 2010, 85, 97, 102). And yet, the construction of trust in the Russian Barents region towards European neighbours takes time, for the “real” motives of economic cooperation are easily questioned (Hønneland 2003). The Murmansk region has an established strategic role, and views of the region as targeted by hostile foreign forces because of its strategic importance (Hønneland 2010, 45–46) can also spread to localities with strategic industries and a sense of strategic meaning. This has been strengthened by the closed history of the place.
Conversely, some factors support positive evaluations of foreign investors in the area. KGOK's parent company Eurochem is a global company, which values global cooperation (FG-1, Dombrovskii). These attitudes are potentially spread among the company workers. KGOK also has positive experiences of foreign technology (Strezhnev et al. 2007, 7–10; Togunov et al. 2007, 40–44).

LOCAL OPINIONS ABOUT POTENTIAL FDI IN KOVDOR

CASE STUDY AND DATA
The empirical data of the paper is a survey conducted by the author in Kovdor (see Fig. 1) in September 2010 in cooperation with the town-constituting enterprise KGOK. The survey involved 356 respondents of whom 298 were employed by KGOK while the others were employed in other fields of the Kovdor economy (for more details on the survey, see Suutarinen (2011) and Suutarinen (2013)). Additional data was provided by semi-structured interviews with various focus groups in Kovdor on 16 May 2011 as related to the results of the survey. There were three focus groups: representatives of KGOK administration (FG-1, L. Dombrovskii (former mayor of Kovdor District, Head of KGOK’s department of work and industrial safety)), local deputies of Kovdor District Council (FG-2, A. Oleinik and A. Sorokin) and workers of KGOK (FG-3). The answers to the multiple-choice questions of the survey were analysed with quantitative methods. The focus group discussions provided qualitative and explanatory support for the quantitative findings.

The research question of the paper asks how a peripheral Russian mining community repositions itself under impact of global forces on its local life-world. The empirical material consists of the survey data from Kovdor. The data measures opinions about preferred owner of KGOK and about potential investors in the local economy. The author hypothesises that the opinions about potential foreign investors and FDI are formed predominantly on the basis of economic factors, which are closely related to personal life-worlds. The paper further hypothesises that the experienced or expected impact on the well-being of the community and the respondents’ personal lives plays a great role in the formation of local opinions. In addition, the paper hypothesises that the FDI policies in the town-constituting enterprise play a central role in forming the attitudes of its workers.
FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDY

The survey questions measured attitudes to Eurochem and to foreign investments generally (Figure 5). The respondents expressed their opinion about the ideal owner of Kovdor’s town-constituting enterprise. As FDIs are the most visible type of foreign investment, it can be assumed that the respondents were giving their opinion about FDI. Therefore, what was being discussed in particular was FDI rather than foreign investment generally. According to the hypothesis, the level of acceptance or resistance may increase for several different reasons, given that several economic, political and cultural factors support either acceptance of or resistance to FDI.

Questions 3–5 concern the local opinions about potential FDI from the EU, the United States and China. European Union countries are major investors in the Russian economy and, alongside Norway, are the main source of FDI in the Murmansk region. China and the United States are the world’s leading economic superpowers and major investors in world markets with a general interest in the regions around the Barents Sea and the Arctic (Jacob 2013; Solli et al. 2013, 5–6). According to a survey in 2013, Russia’s preferred political partner was the EU rather than China and the US (Vtsiom 2013) because of the negative images connected to the two rival superpowers in global politics and economics. The author therefore hypothesises that these factors also affect the Murmansk region and that the region’s military characteristics also play a role in the increased resistance of the influence of, and investments from, the US and China.
in comparison with those from the EU (Hønneland 2010, 45–46). It is hypothesised that when answering these questions, the survey respondents evaluated FDI in Kovdor primarily in terms of investments in the mining industry even though the questionnaire did not refer to or suggest which industries would be potential targets for foreign investors. However, in the absence of alternative attractive industries for foreign investors in Kovdor, the respondents probably answered these questions with their own mining-industry-based life-worlds in mind. Therefore, the answers to these particular questions can be generally taken as revealing local attitudes towards FDIs in Kovdor’s mining industry.

LOCAL OPINIONS ABOUT ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL EXTERNAL FORCES IN THE LOCALITY

The answers to the first survey question revealed that only a fifth of the respondents were happy with Eurochem as the owner of KGOK. Eurochem has invested to modernise the plant and has thus guaranteed its competency in the post-Soviet era, but the level of satisfaction still remains relatively low. According to the third focus group, the dissatisfaction may be partly explained by the fact that a great share of the profits of the local mining industry were taken away from the locality by the parent company (FG-3). The second survey question showed that FDIs in KGOK were accepted by 67% of the respondents. This indicates that the ideological basis for resisting FDI was very weak among the respondents, as only 8% of them categorically resisted FDI in KGOK. Questions 3 to 5, which sought to ascertain local opinions about potential FDI in Kovdor from the EU, the US and China, reveal significant differences on these different sources. There was a significant gap between the relatively positive opinions about potential FDI from the European Union countries and relatively negative opinions about potential Chinese and American investments. These results can be interpreted in light of the preconceptions on the investors and their countries of origin (Bandelj 2003, 387). However, the large number of respondents who were unsure about the issues raised by these questions implies what might be regarded as a natural uncertainty about the likely impacts of FDI from these countries, such as the consequences of FDI for the local community and the unspecified character of FDI. The relatively unreserved opinions about potential FDI from the EU also suggest an ideological acceptance of economic cooperation with EU countries.

To a certain degree, American and Chinese investments are viewed as a threat. The answers to this question made it clear that suspicion about FDI from these countries
was largely down to economic factors related to the local life-world (FG-3). American investments were resisted because the locals feared losing their jobs with the imposition of new high requirements from American investors, while Chinese investments raised the fear of job losses to Chinese migrants. What lies at the heart of the matter, then, is the fear of losing one's job, either because of the efficiency-seeking policies and the anti-paternalistic working culture of American firms or the concern that Chinese investments would bring in cheap Chinese workforce to replace, to some extent, the current Russian workers (FG-3). Such resistance reflects the respondents' concerns about their own personal well-being and that of the community. Unemployment was seen as the biggest threat to Kovdor and its residents. Therefore, it is understandable that this fear was also expressed as the main reason for resisting American and Chinese FDI: their arrival would turn this potential threat into a real one. In addition, previous studies have shown that Russians are afraid that labour agreements will be undermined if the number of immigrant workers in Russia's industrial sector increases significantly (Mukomel' 2006, 108). This may feed resistance towards Chinese investments.

Cultural factors also emerged, such as the image of demands for effectiveness in the American working culture, identified previously by Kärnä (2007, 20). The KGOK workers (FG-3) pointed out that any foreign investors would probably use the local workforce. In turn, the positive attitudes towards European investments reflected a closeness between Russian and European values and working culture (FG-2, Sorokin) as well as a geographical and cultural proximity (FG-2, Oleinik and Sorokin) with the local life-worlds (Hønneland 2010, 56–57, 76–77) in comparison with China and the United States. The relatively higher acceptance of FDI from the EU was probably partly explained by the fact that most of the FDIs from the EU are round-tripping Russian investments, which are therefore more readily welcomed.

Geopolitical factors or the political tensions between Russia and the United States, caused by the long-lasting and escalated rivalry in geopolitics and military matters were also suggested as a potential source of suspicious attitudes and resistance towards American FDI (FG-1, Dombrovskii; FG-2, Oleinik and Sorokin). The general image of the United States as hostile to Russia dominates the attitudes of the residents of Kovdor and serves to foster resistance to the US as an investor (FG-1, Dombrovskii). These attitudes are also carried over into evaluating specific potential investors from this country. However, no geopolitical factors for resisting Chinese FDI were identified by the focus groups, although technological factors did come up as a source of resistance to Chinese investments. Images of low-quality and old-fashioned Chinese
products and technology dominated the mental images of China as a whole (FG-1, Dombrovskii; FG-2, Oleinik; FG-3). According to the expectations of the workers of KGOK (FG-3), potential Chinese investors would introduce Chinese technologies to the invested industries, and because the equipment would be low in quality, this would have a negative impact on the productivity and efficiency of the enterprise.

The suspicious attitudes and resistance to FDI from the United States and China were partly explained by the lack of experience of FDI from these countries and therefore by the absence of positive first-hand experience. Such experiences are important in the formation of positive local opinions (Kosonen et al. 2009). Although there has not been
European investment in Kovdor, the acceptance of such investment is promoted by the fact that there is a positive attitude toward economic cooperation with European firms. This stems partly from positive personal experiences of European countries gained from individual cases of cross-border acquaintance and travel, and from favourable experiences, and thus opinions, about the quality of European products. Limited experience of Chinese influence in the European part of Russia is replaced by mainly negative myths and stereotypes (Larin 2011, 103). The fact that the industry of the locality is concentrated around the exploitation of natural resources and the fact that a general nationwide resistance towards FDI in raw material and heavy industries is reflected locally (Vtsiom 2006) strengthens the resistance to FDI from these rival countries. However, the crucial factor in the formation of local opinion about foreign investors was the evaluation of the consequences that they could cause to the socioeconomic well-being of the community.

The results of the survey question that measured the preferred owner of KGOK are shown in Figure 6. Domestic actors (the Russian state and big domestic enterprises) that possessed the best investment capacities to invest in KGOK were viewed as ideal owners. That the Russian state was identified as the ideal owner by 42% of the respondents suggests that the locals wish to maintain the paternalistic tradition in the community under a state-owned enterprise (Prokhorova 2014). Foreign ownership was preferred only by 5% of the respondents, while only 29% of those who preferred a big domestic enterprise expressed their satisfaction with Eurochem.

**CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION**

The study shows how the residents of a historically semi-closed community evaluate the glocalisation of global market forces in their community. Answers to the research question, which sought to analyse how a peripheral Russian mining community repositions itself under impact of global forces on its local life-world, indicated that the locals preferred domestic external actors rather than foreign actors as driving the local development. Potential foreign investors were ignored as preferred owners of the main town-constituting enterprise and were relegated to the margins of the community as providers of local economic diversification. This is in marked contrast to Kostomuksha, where the foreign investors have brought much life to the local economy. Protectionism and preservation of Kovdor’s economic stability and its town-constituting enterprise were reasons to push the potential foreign investors and the potential uncertainties to the margins of the community. This is where glocalisation is tolerated, while the core
of the community, which is based on the town-constituting enterprise and its competency, is rather protected from the impacts of globalisation with regulated glocalisation. Consequences for local economic well-being were the main arguments which encouraged the residents of Kovdor to reposition their locality in the face of actual and potential external actors.

While the study showed generally positive local opinions about potential FDI, there were great differences as to the potential investing countries. In the Barents context, the local actors are relatively open-minded to economic cooperation with the neighbouring countries, whose potential investments are mostly welcomed. However, the local sentiments about potential FDI also include plenty of doubt, which could turn into either positive or negative attitudes, depending on several factors, such as the target field of the FDI and the country of origin of the investing firm. Limited experiences of FDI and, therefore, the limited connections between FDI and the local life-worlds of the survey’s respondents can be pointed out as causing uncertainty in the respondents’ opinions. There also appears to be considerable capacity to resist potential Chinese and American FDI in particular, simply because of specific concerns regarding these two countries. The fear of losing one's job emerged as a factor in local resistance to Chinese investment and Chinese workers.

The study demonstrated that the formation of local opinions about potential FDI is mainly based on economic factors as previously hypothesised by the author. Economic factors, including the expected socioeconomic impacts of FDI, are also highlighted in the local opinions about potential American and Chinese FDIs. These factors are further boosted by political considerations, such as the anti-Americanism in society as a whole and opposition to what is regarded as American imperialism. Cultural factors are in turn connected with economic factors. American working culture and specifically the optimisation of labour in enterprises with American ownership are feared for the effect they might have on the personal life-world of KGOK’s workers. All these factors taken together result in a relatively low acceptance of American FDI compared with the opinions about potential investments from the EU, which generate the most positive local opinions. Resistance to Chinese investments is the product of a combination of economic factors, including the fear of losing jobs to Chinese workers, and technological factors, such as the general perception that Chinese technology is of poor quality. Given the absence of experience of Chinese FDI and therefore the lack of any hard evidence as to what its economic impact would be, these low expectations regarding the consequences of Chinese investment are based largely on prejudices commonly found in the western part of Russia.
The political tensions in 2014, which have led to economic sanctions from the European Union against Russia can change the situation and the attitudes among Russians towards foreign investments from the EU. Moreover, the growing nationalism in Russia may increase resistance to foreign investors in general. Hence, a time series analysis would be especially useful in showing how the volatilities of international relations impact on local evaluations of foreign investors. A new survey could bring to the fore the role of political factors in the local opinions towards certain countries as potential investors. A new study could disclose whether the European-oriented values in the Murmansk region are deep enough to resist the anti-European attitudes which have currently much potential to grow in Russia. The current political situation inspires the author to ask whether today’s political circumstances would lead to more negative attitudes towards potential foreign investors in general. Moreover, in the Barents context the study leaves an open question on whether the deteriorated international relations also affect the way in which the locals prefer to reposition their communities in the Barents region.

This study has encouraged the author to hypothesise further that the reserved attitudes to foreign investors are also partly related to the potential threat posed by the potential investments in the main enterprise of the town and how this would impact on the community well-being. Hence, a comparative case study in a Russian small town with a more diverse economy could reveal if the locals are less reserved about foreign investors. A comparative case study of this kind would improve our understanding of the role of economic factors in the local repositioning and evaluation of glocalisation. Moreover, a comparative case study in a non-natural resource single-industry town could tackle the role of resource nationalism as explaining reserved attitudes to foreign investors.

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The need to know: Governing a region and its economy

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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the ways in which the economy has been incorporated into the political reasoning and practice of region-building in the Barents Region among experts. While economic regionalism has been a key strand of studies on historic regionalism, this is not the case for the Barents Region. Yet, the natural resources of the region continue to raise high expectations about cross-border economic cooperation and development. Full appreciation of any regional development is underpinned by research and knowledge combining both political and economic considerations, but this basis is somewhat less solid in the Barents area. The knowledge base about the region and its development is therefore fragmented, limited and partial. This is an obvious problem, as many of the recent developments in the Barents Region, and also in the larger Arctic context, relate to economic opportunities, cooperation and development with implications also for political cooperation and governance. The paper analyses the development of political Barents studies from early 1990s until today, in particular its relation with economic developments in the region.

Keywords: Barents Region, governmentality, knowledge, regionalism, economy

INTRODUCTION
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region was established in 1993 on political grounds as a region for cooperation on security and sustainable development in Northern Europe. It is a product of the 1990s era of “new regionalism”, which advocated comprehensive, multi-sectoral and inclusive region-building (Hettn and Söderbaum 2000). Knowledge and expertise on the region was essential for the establishment of the Barents in the early 1990s, and the relationship between scholars and political region-builders in the Barents Region was “intimate” (Tunander 2008, 171). Experts participated in region-building
through publications, networking, conferences and exchanges with decision-makers supporting intellectual practices “integral to the processes of regionalism” (Larner and Walters 2002, 423). In general, regional political studies were characterised by a geopolitical approach combined with constructivism (Tunander 2008; Moisio and Harle 2010).

One of the defining features of Nordic academic endeavour in the 1990s was the interest in identity politics, evident in political Barents studies as well. The integration of economic and more cultural, identity-based explanations into studies of regionalism has been a controversial issue. An example of these difficulties is the exchange between Christine Ingebritsen (1998) and Nordic scholars in the early 2000s (Tiilikainen 2001; Neumann 2001), who disagreed about the use of cultural and economic factors in explaining the Nordic states’ integration to the European Union. In Barents Studies, analyses of economic cooperation and development are often kept as a feature of functional cooperation, as a topic separate from other forms of regional cooperation such as administrative and cultural collaboration (Dahström et al. 1995). In the larger context of Arctic studies, it is also a current challenge to combine administrative, cultural and functional aspects of regionalism. Arctic research is mostly dominated by geopolitical and governance perspectives in tackling regional development.

This paper explores the ways interactions between political and economic aspects of regionalism have been described, discussed and constituted by regional experts. This combination of economic and political dimensions of regionalism can be discussed within the framework of “governmentalisation of a region”, which emphasises the contribution of knowledge and research in region-building. In order to govern a region, one needs knowledge about the region as a whole, its main elements and characteristics and connections between various developments in and outside the region. Governmentality studies (Foucault 1991a; b) provide both a theoretical approach and a methodology to study knowledge about regional governance.

The material studied in this paper covers primarily Nordic academic literature on the Barents Region from the early 1990s until today. Russian literature has not been included. Over the years, academic interest in the Barents Region has varied. In the 1990s, much of the research material was published in collections of articles, in multidisciplinary books such as The Barents Region: Regional cooperation in Arctic Europe, edited by Tunander and Stokke (1994); The Barents Region: Security and economic development in the European North, edited by Dellenbrant and Olsson (1994); and The East–West Interface in the European North edited by Dahlström, Eskelinen and Wiberg (1995). The
books represented and combined knowledge produced by historians, political scientists and geographers and many others. The connection to everyday political developments was a close one, and the experts followed these developments carefully. Several books on the economic geography of the region were also published at the time (Seppänen 1995, Jumppanen and Hyttinen 1995; Lausala and Valkonen 1999; Statistics Finland and Goskomstat 2001), constituting the region as a rich resource region with potential for economic cooperation and further resource use.

In the 2000s, possibly reflecting a general change in academic publishing practices, most of the contributions directly related to the Barents have been single articles in peer-reviewed international journals. Another feature of the 2000s is that the books dealing with the Barents Region are connected to the overall political development in Northern Europe, examples being Remaking Europe in the margins: Northern Europe after the enlargements, edited by Christopher Browning (2003) and The European Union and the making of a wider Northern Europe by Pami Aalto (2011). The driving force for this literature is academic debate, concepts and theories, not a connection to political developments – perhaps because those developments have been more modest than in the 1990s. The only exception here is Norway, whose new High North policies since the mid-2000s have attracted the interest of political scientists (Jensen 2013).

It is striking that the Barents Region is not analysed in economic terms in the recent literature discussing the nature and development of Arctic economies (Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2006; 2008; Political economy of northern regional development 2010; Megatrends 2011). There is a multitude of assessments, studies and reports tackling the Barents Region and different aspects of its development, such as energy and transportation. These reports are called “grey literature”, but they benefit from and use political science expertise. The political expertise on the region has focused on the effectiveness of the existing institutions (Aalto et al. 2011; Aalto, Blakkisrud and Smith 2009a; 2009b). A recent development, under the auspices of the Arctic Council and Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), is to produce a pan-arctic integrated assessment report, including a Barents-focused sub-report, by 2017. In this “Adaptation actions for a changing Arctic” (AACA) report, the aim is to assess both environmental and socio-economic changes in the short term (2030) and long term (2080), to produce scenarios for regional development, evaluate impacts and adaptation to them, and identify adaptation measures needed. This is a report that seeks to combine multidisciplinary and multi-sourced lay and indigenous knowledge – including scientific knowledge – and to produce policy-relevant information for support adaptation measures.
GOVERNMENTALISATION BY KNOWLEDGE

One of the intriguing aspects of Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality is his description of it as the “introduction of economy into political reason” (Foucault 1991a, 92). For political scientists, the economy is often understood as a pre-political, clearly definable and separate area of activity from the sphere of politics. The idea of governmentality challenges this separation. Goede (2003) suggests that the economy should instead be seen as socially and discursively constructed, and closely connected to the political sphere. Most importantly, from this perspective the economy is not an organisation or a process outside of or at odds with the state and regional cooperation. From the point of view of governmentality, the “economy” appears as “an inextricable, but also very invisible part of modern political rationalities” (Tellman 2009, 5). At issue is not a particular economic fact, theory or approach by economists, but “the very structure of association established between political reason and truth” (Tellman 2009, 15). The economy should be seen as “a machine for seeing, whose epistemological privileges, lines of exclusion and technologies of knowledge need to be dissected” (Tellman 2009, 8).

The role of experts is important here, as they translate the relationship between politics, economy and region through language. Language works as “a translation machine”, establishing a kind of identity and mutuality between political rationalities and regulatory aspirations (Miller and Rose 1990, 6). Governmentality relies for governance on intellectual practices, which are based on knowledge, research and experts. This being the case, governmentality directs our attention to specific kinds of knowledge and experts in governmental activity – not only within the territories of certain states, but beyond state boundaries. Governmentality requires or must articulate some knowledge of the reality in which it seeks to govern (Gordon 1980, 248; Miller and Rose 1990, 6–7). The region needs to be known in order to be governed. Therefore, knowledge plays a fundamental role in “rendering aspects of existence thinkable and calculable and amenable to deliberated initiatives” (Miller and Rose 1990, 3). Governmentality works through the “particular way in which it conceptualizes the space, objects and subjects of the domain in which it is to operate, such that they become governable at a distance” (Donegan 2006, 31).

Governmentality is relational: it is about organising things and their relations, such as territory, region, resources, people and wealth (Foucault 1991a; 2009). The need to govern these relations has to be established to justify intervention. Miller and Rose (1990, 6) note that “before one can seek to manage a domain such as an economy it is
first necessary to conceptualize a set of processes and relations as an economy which is amenable to management”. Discourse on the economy – made of objects, subjects, concepts, strategies and enunciative modalities – should be conceived of as doing something, as a practice “in a describable relationship with a set of other practices” that entail an art of government (Foucault 1991b, 63–64). The relational approach in governmentality makes a region into “a vibrant entity” instead of a static terrain, but also an object of calculation (Elden 2007, 575). This is much the case of the Barents Region, presented often as a rich resource region with potential to fulfil the needs of international, even global markets. Governmental reason is related to a particular way of thinking, reasoning and calculating.

The governmentality approach focuses on the identification of an issue as a problem, in this case as a combination of economic and other considerations; the need to engage and network between various governmental and societal actors to solve the issue, and the production of identities and agencies in connection to the efforts to solve the issue (Colebatch 2002). My analysis discusses material produced by regional experts, mostly political scientists but also some others such as economic geographers, to discuss regionalism in the Barents Region, political developments and future of the region. The material is restricted in the sense that: 1) the material chosen to the analysis had to discuss the region as a whole, not any particular part of it; 2) the material chosen for the analysis did not deal with only one sector of economic activity, such as oil and gas, forestry or something else and 3) the material chosen for analysis was written in English, not in any national languages in the region. This meant that the material analysed was manageable in size and discussed the region and its development as a whole. These restrictions also meant that a large part of existing literature on Barents Studies was left outside of the analysis, but this literature did not focus on the relationship between political and economic aspects of regionalism.

I claim that regionalism in the Barents Region should be understood as a very limited mode of governance, as an example of “neoliberal regionalism” (Larner and Walters 2002) with specific requirements for knowledge about the region. A region in the neoliberal sense is built both politically and economically as a part of the global economic space through free mobility of goods, people and capital and in the frames of global markets and international competition (Larner and Williams 2002; Larner 2000; Cotoi 2011). According to Larner and Walters (2002, 415), “neoliberal” regions govern themselves from a distance by interaction, communication and reform within and between authorities, companies and non-governmental organisations.
Using a governmentality approach, two discourses can be identified in Nordic Barents research: the need to be governed and the need to have an identity. These needs are in my interpretation indicative of neoliberal regionalism and governmentalisation of the region by intellectual practices. The problems of establishing regional governance over an economy result in governance through self-identification. The efforts to govern regionally need to be justified by knowledge, that is, by turning issues into political and governable problems with the help of knowledge and experts. The mismatch with the needs for knowledge for governance and political aims at distant governance are at odds: the result is that we know very little exactly what is happening in the Barents Region as a whole. Although the Barents Region has a relatively strong educational and research basis with many universities and other educational institutes, even today knowledge about the region is fragmented, partial and limited. It is difficult to obtain an overview of the region and its development. This is for a reason, I argue. The limited knowledge base about the region serves a neoliberal agenda of regional development and cooperation based on the idea of governance at a distance, non-intervention and self-identification.

THE NEED TO BE GOVERNED – AT A DISTANCE

One of the early academic ideas for regional cooperation in the Barents Region was “transregionalisation” (Svensson 1995; Wiberg 1996). A trans-region is an integrated political and economic region which has strong internal networks yet is connected to global markets. Transnational regionalisation is a political-economic process involving actors from both the political and economic domains whose relationships are important to the outcome of the process (Svensson 1995, 58; Aalbu and Wiberg 1997, 87‒88). There were doubts about the opportunities of transregionalisation in the Barents Region. Rune Castberg (1994, 112) warned that “the complementarity of the economies of the various parts of the region is only partial. This puts a limit on the scope of such cooperation”. Economic cooperation between the northern parts of these countries is limited “due to structural similarity, export specialization and established patterns of integration in other geographical directions” (Dahlström, Eskelinen and Wikberg 1995, 2). The economic connections between the northern and southern parts of each country in the region are far more significant than those across the region and its boundaries.

The transregionalisation of the Barents Region would have required strong regional governance, in particular regional agency. Castberg (1994, 111) has pointed out that
“there is a strong need to control, direct and release the cooperative forces in the region”. Svensson (1995, 70) stresses the importance of the regional level in supporting economic cooperation, observing that “in the Barents Region, the regional level is the dominating operative level”. Lacking financial resources on a sub-national level makes the development of cooperation difficult. In Svensson’s assessment, at the inter-regional level the Barents Regional Council has not yet managed to find or even identify its role, particularly in relationship to transnational business (Svensson 1998, 259). According to the experts, regional cooperative bodies have invested their resources in matters on which they have very little influence instead of seeking a more problem-solving function in relation to firms in the region in the early phases of cooperation. Svensson (1998, 260) argues that “an indirect, even passive government role in matters of transnational business, is thus not a solution good enough for accomplishing true economic integration in complicated cross-border contexts”. Lausala and Jumppanen (1998, 78) conclude that the political nature of Barents cooperation has led to the “political interests of states [being] combined with the mainly economic, functional interests of the region. This has not been easy in the Barents cooperation”.

In the mid-1990s, it was noted that “the possibilities of economic integration and cooperation remain limited and little progress has been made so far” (Lausala and Jumppanen 1998, 80). The experts were divided on the issue of the best regional strategies: to be self-sufficient or to open to global markets (Lausala and Valkonen 1999; Lausala and Jumppanen 1998, 75). In this sense, the fear in the late 1990s was that the region faced the threat of becoming “increasingly marginalized in the global economy” (Lausala and Jumppanen 1998, 75) due to slow and vulnerable economic development that relied on natural resource extraction. The concern remains in the 2010s whether the region is too vast to be integrated as whole; partial integration may be possible, however, whereby the Barents Region would be seen as comprising sub-regions, more or less integrated to the world economy (Wiberg 2013).

In the late 1990s, the Nordic countries discussed integration in the European Union context as an option for the Barents Region. In Wiberg’s (1996, 204) view, “The EU policy to support functional integration programs for transnational regions could be the most useful reference and guide to similar integration efforts”. EU programmes promote a neoliberal agenda of economic growth with diverse regional effects (Filstenberg, Gänzle and Johansson 2002; Johansson-Nogues 2009). Wiberg concluded in 2002 (82) that the accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU and the development of the EU’s Northern Dimension “added more political and administrative capacity for dealing...
with the complicated needs for restructuring of local and regional economies” in the Barents Region. However, he went on to point out (Wiberg 2002, 83) that the role of regional bodies depends to a major extent on the financial resources and degree of decision-making capacity given to them by the governments of the four countries and the EU. He continued (2002, 83) that “up to now very limited financial resources and decision-making power have been decentralized directly to these institutions”. The effort to Europeanise the Barents Euro-Arctic Region did not succeed after 2006, when the EU’s attention was turned toward the Arctic (Palosaari and Möller 2004).

Svensson (1995, 68) notes that in the Barents Region dependency on national governments and international institutions is high: “In other words, the fate of this region is to a great extent decided elsewhere, mainly confirming a long tradition of these peripheral areas’ dependency on subsidies from central governments”. For example, federal policies have affected the Russian regions and their possibilities for regional cooperation: “all federal political changes, for instance concerning foreign relations and policies on promoting foreign investments and trade, will also greatly affect regional development in the Barents territories” (Lausala and Valkonen 1999, 227). Indra Øverland (2008) points to the fact that some of the most important economic developments in the region have been “irrelevant to the multilateral cooperation in the region”. A case in point is the development of the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea. Øverland concludes that “all discussion about Shtokman and other major petroleum developments in the north is generally disconnected from the Northern Dimension, the Barents cooperation, the Arctic Council and other multilateral frameworks for collaboration”. Many of the most important political and economic changes have happened outside the region. Slow progress in Russian negotiations for WTO membership, the past and current complications in EU-Russian relations, domestic disagreements on sharing power and resources for regional and environmental cooperation, among other things, and increasing international interest in the Arctic have influenced the way Barents governmentality has developed over the years. The region is seen as part of the global economic space, but is governed “at a distance”.

THE NEED TO HAVE AN IDENTITY

One distinctive trend in Nordic IR research is a “tidal wave of identity studies, which swept over the Nordic region in the early and mid-1990s” (Friedrichs 2004). This is also true for studies on the Barents Region (Tunander 1994; Hønneland 1995, 1998; Tunander 2008). The constructivist approach to regionalism, typical of the
Nordic scholarship, claims that “regions are defined in terms of speech acts; they are talked and written into existence” (Neumann 1994). In economic terms, the “Barents Region” has multiple meanings, but is most often described as a resource region. A bold Finnish statement from 1995 claims that “the Barents Euro-Arctic Region is today one of the world’s most interesting regions economically” (Seppänen 1995, 3). This attraction lies in “the huge economic potential offered by the natural resources of North-West Russia” (Seppänen 1995, 3). The region was depicted as comprising resource regions that serve global markets, complementing rather than competing with each other. Castberg (1994, 103) described the Barents Region as made of “open economies, with undiversified production structures and high dependence on externally produced goods and services”. In his view, the region was “marked by a balanced asymmetry: an uneven but partly complementary distribution of various material and non-material resources”. Moreover, this asymmetry could be “the key driving force for economic cooperation in the Barents Region” (Castberg 1994, 104).

From the perspective of neoliberal governmentality, as “a rich resource region”, the Barents Region serves European and global markets, making the feature a regional marker (see Larner and Walters 2002, 413). As an exception to this general view, Lehtinen (2003, 37) has provided a positive interpretation of the Barents Region: “It has been established as an arena formulating economically feasible alternatives to the postcolonial regional division of labour”.

While the natural resources of the region were identified as the basis for cooperation, the state of the Barents environment was a common concern. This was closely linked to the need for investments to upgrade production facilities and infrastructure (Lausala and Valkonen 1999, 17; see also Brunland et al. 2004, 65). There were many reasons for investors to steer clear of the region rather than to invest in it (Lausala and Valkonen 1999; Jumppanen and Hyttinen 1995, 159; 172) if they calculated the risks and benefits: unclear ownership rights of natural resources and the principles governing their exploitation; the need to develop and harmonise commercial and economic legislation, especially legislation on foreign investments and projects; incomplete and underdeveloped infrastructure; and the lack of support for new enterprises and collaboration. The development of the Barents Region was viewed by some writers as being very dependent on Russian developments: “The future development of the Barents territories is very dependent on general economic and political conditions prevailing in the Russian Federation and also partly on cross-border cooperation in North Europe” (Lausala and Valkonen 1999, 19).
However, despite its economic potential, the Barents Region is not seen as a market. According to the experts, the attractiveness of the territory as “a market” for imported goods and services is limited due to the dispersed population, low level of economic diversification and weak buying power of consumers (Aalbu and Wiberg 1997; Wiberg 2002, 83). In Wiberg's view, “the comparative advantages of the regional economies are based on the presence of natural resources, which serve markets far away”. In a similar vein, Brunland and colleagues (2004, 57) note that the Barents economy is based “mainly on isolated pockets of natural resource exploitation and primary processing, including minerals, forestry and fishing [and that] due to low population density, dispersed location of resources, limited infrastructure, and the legacy of the socialist planning, it is difficult to speak of ‘the Barents Market’”.

In the 2010s, the Barents Region has expanded to include the Barents Sea area, which is not covered by the frame of cooperation. The economic focus has been redirected from the Barents Region itself to the Barents Sea, most likely because the delimitation agreement between the Norwegian and Russian governments in 2010 made economic use of the Sea possible. The Barents Sea is depicted as a site of varied economic activities, such as oil and gas exploration and fisheries (Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2006, 2008; Megatrends 2011). According to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment report (2009, 75), the Barents Sea has “the highest concentrations of marine activity in the Arctic region”, including bulk cargo carriers, oil tankers, LNG carriers, coastal ferries, fishing vessels, cruise ships and other smaller vessels. The calculative logic of the region focuses on the assessments of when the Arctic Ocean will be free of sea ice and the Northern Sea Route will open for shipping year round. Instead of being viewed as a territory filled with valuable resources, the Barents Sea, with the opportunities it offers, now constitutes a site of activity, furnishing the basis of a calculative logic. With the heightened interest in its marine area, the Barents Region is seen in a global context as offering transportation routes as well as natural and human resources for the global economy (Kazantseva and Westin 1994; Nijkamp and Rodenburg 2011).

We therefore see the Barents Region described as a resource region, a region to be developed, a transregion and a European region – and many other characterisations of the regional identity are on record. Scholars have debated whether it is a functional, administrative or identity region (Dahlström, Eskelinen and Wiberg 1995; Wiberg 2013; Castberg 1994; Wiberg 1994; Svensson 1995) or some combination of the three. The economy is considered to be a central part of a region's functional identity. These discussions play a role in governing the region, its resources and people through a process
of regional identity-building. Experts have contributed to inventing and operationalising regional governance, first by being involved in attempts to implant such identity-building practices and, second, by promoting self-regulation in a way that minimises the need for direct political intervention (Miller and Rose 1990, 14-15).

NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALISATION OF THE BARENTS REGION THROUGH KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge – in various forms such as maps, statistics and interpretations of available information – helps us to know the Barents Region and render it an object of governance. However, knowledge about the region and its development is partial, limited and fragmented. It is very difficult to have an overview of the region and its development as a whole. This allows us to maintain the view of the region as “a rich resource region”. The scholarship has furthered this self-identification in the name of a European or global resource region, which makes this particular feature of the region a regional marker (see Larner and Walters 2002, 413). Most importantly, the academic debate about regional identity helps the self-identification of the region: governing operates through agencies committed to the regional idea of a “resource region”. The fragmented nature of knowledge and knowledge production in the Barents Region supports non-intervention. Knowledge is needed for governmental intervention, but neoliberal governmentality promotes non-intervention. In terms of governmentality, a region emerges as a site of competing political strategies and as an instrument of government (Larner and Walters 2002, 423) such as the needs to be governed, practices of distant governance and regional identity politics. I claim that the best way to understand the region is through the idea of neoliberal regionalism and its relationship to knowledge production as a means of governance. From this perspective, the Barents Region is not necessarily only a rich resource region, but a region made up of fragmented peoples, resources and territories linked by many asymmetrical relations, flows and networks of political and economic power (refer Larner and Williams (2002, 411). The research should reflect this multitude of issues, connections and developments in the region better than before.
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Border Life

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Arvid Viken & Bjarge Schwenke Fors (ed.):
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The book’s title Border Life is poetic as well as providing a good indicator of its contents. The book offers what the title implies – reflections of people’s lives along the border where ‘border’ means many things for people living there. ‘Border’ connotes a limitation, bounded territory, obstruction of movement and political institutional legitimization. It is through its inhabitants along this Norwegian-Russian border region that stretches over 196 km., that the region is filled with meaning, emotions, and human activities.

The book is the result of a research project The Construction and Negotiation of borders: Discourses related to the border between Norway and Russia, at the University of Tromsø The Arctic University of Norway (UiT). The book is multidisciplinary with various theoretical, methodological perspectives, written by 11 scientists from several scientific and disciplinary traditions. The book consists of 10 chapters, an introduction and epilogue. The chapters are organized into three thematic sections: 1). Border crossings (four chapters) 2). Frontiers on the borderline (three chapters) 3). Stagings on/off a limit (three chapters).borderline (three chapters) 3). Staging borders (three chapters).

The book is edited by Arvid Viken and Bjarge Schwenke Fors. Viken is a Professor of tourism at UiT. He has a research interest in destination development, location change, northern tourism, and border issues. Bjarge Schwenke Fors is a social anthropologist and border researcher. Schwenke Fors is affiliated with the EU-funded research project European Regions, EU External Borders and the immediate Neighbors Analyzing Regional Development Options through Policies and Practices and Cross-Border Co-operation (EUBORDERREGIONS).
Border Research is a broad field which originates from limology. Traditionally limology reduced a given geographic unit and its function to passive markers of the government’s spaciousness. Many scientists have been reproducing what is called a “territorial trap” that limits their research to legitimate political institutions and the so-called territorial materiality that the border represents. Later researchers have directed the attention towards those processes that constitute the border, where the border is understood as something circular and overlapping.

In the introductory chapter the editors give a general contextualization of the data presented in the chapters Border and The great political content. The book’s main ambition is to illustrate how communities socially and culturally relate to the Norwegian-Russian border that is constantly changing. Globalization, politics, historical events as The Cold War, perestroika, Barents politics, new visa practices, and increased border crossings as a result of this constitutes a necessary context to understand what goes on at a micro level. The section “Border Research and border discourses” presents a general theoretical anchoring that falls under Scott’s four border-categories: 1. Discursive, 2. Material/territorial manifestation, 3. Perceptual / emotional / border 4. Mediating border (art, culture, dissemination). Another central reference is Lefebvre (1991) and De Certeau (1984). Their models are not particularly clear and not fully implemented in the analysis, but works rather as a frame for further reading.

All in all this book is a collection of interdisciplinary studies that are well-written. These contributions highlight the border not as a given geographic entity, but rather as a construct that comes to life through the inhabitants’ practices. The questions cover the importance of politics in the light of border residents’ everyday lives, how they handle personal border issues, limit traffic and neighbouring citizens. The book discusses how the proximity to the border represents both a central dynamic and dysfunctional elements of community development.

The book focuses on negotiable aspects like art, culture, language, visa requirements, student exchanges, joint projects, tourism – anything that constitute human everyday life -- organizing, reconstructing, challenging, and constructing the “new” border. The border is here understood as the framework for life and work, culture, and society. Peter Haugseth’s chapter twin city in the Norwegian-Russian border zone underlines explicitly how the Barents Region as a constructed place has become a brand and a laboratory for cooperation. Haugseth discusses how specific practices for cooperation enforce new place identities. Such questions can easily lead to answers that
underpin political strategies that work to cultivate some “special” identities. Anne-Marit Rasmussen’s data in the chapter ”Suppose you do not find anything special here, then! Enough border focus” shows how young people want to be perceived as “normal” and will distance themselves from a stereotyping of Kirkenes as an exotic frontier. However, it is obvious that some practices and experiences are symptomatic for border cities, while some features are constructed. This is also what Viken and Espiritu contribution in ”Border Regimes and Russification of Kirkenes” argues. Viken and Espiritu made a regression analysis of the population of Kirkenes in light of variables such as sex, age, knowledge, contacts, and threat perception. The study has a number of exciting discoveries. They argue that although public awareness helps against prejudice and fear, there is no correlation between close relationships and attitudes towards border neighbors.

Kjell Olsen’s chapter entitled ”Gendered border stories” are among the most fascinating analysis in the book. It presents people's interesting and entertaining stories and how this underpins certain politics. Stories are complex cultural expressions, which refers to global, national, and local discourses. Olsen’s contribution can be read as a critique of how different understandings and representations of the border, also produces various gendered reproduction of a master narrative of this region.

The concluding chapters are written by the editors. Arvid Viken’s ”Barents spektakkel; Aesthetisation and sublimation in border policy” is questioning the manipulative powers, the exercise of soft power and regimentation. Bjarge Schwenke Fors’ chapter ”The Samovar Theater - Drama at the border” represents the Samovar Theater as an actor that performs as a cultural bridge for the Norwegian Foreign Department (UD). The Samovar theater is an artistic and socially interesting case not only for analytical reflection on rhetoric and marketing of Kirkenes as a ”real border” but also how artists’ creative forms meet more invisible forms of power. Schwenke Fors says among other things that, ”[A] border focus has been requested, sponsored, and stimulated centrally”. This is also, in my opinion, the book’s unifying theme. This should have been elaborated more explicit in the final chapter.

All in all, the book Border Life is for the most part both interesting and informative. The book delivers what it promises and provides an introduction to the phenomenon of border life. It brings forth how contact is an ambivalent processes and a social and symbolic construction of the border. The book is recommended! My overall impression is that the book is an important contribution to everyone working to-
wards Russia both students and researchers who are concerned with perspectives on borders generally and descriptions of the Norwegian - Russian Border particularly. The book is a multidisciplinary collection of contributions coming from sociology, anthropology, folklore, history, pedagogy and linguistics. It therefore shows the diversified and complex epistemological anchoring of border studies today. I do not know of any similar books on the Norwegian-Russian border and hope it will also be translated into Russian.

(Translated from the original Norwegian text by Gaute Svensson.)
YOUNG RESEARCHERS OF THE BARENTS REGION
I am a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Lapland. I am affiliated with the Northern Political Economy team within the Sustainable Development research group at the Arctic Centre. I have previously worked with the Barents region in various projects like CAVIAR II, MISTRA Arctic Futures and NEO-BEAR. These projects have included Norwegian, Swedish and Russian partners concerning local and regional adaptation to river floods, and economic development and transitions in Barents’ communities. My PhD study’s objective is to study the socio-political dimension of the Arctic performed in the science communication service environments.

As a child, when asked “what are you going to be when you grow up”, I had a keen idea of becoming a natural scientist and a wildlife protector. This was most likely due to my great affection for beautiful illustrations in zoological literature representing exotic forms of life and their various environments. It is quite evident that the artistic way of bringing ‘nature’ into one’s own living room was not the least of the reasons for my growing fascination for the world of science. Through education my focus shifted and I became more interested in history and social issues. Moving from Eastern Finland to Rovaniemi to study International Relations at the University of Lapland therefore represents a clear continuum for human, state, and society-centred studies.

An internship at the Arctic Centre during the autumn 2011 surprisingly brought these two elements together in this new multidisciplinary work and study environment. I found myself listening and discussing, not only anthropological approaches, but I was also learning about biology, physiology, and glaciology. This is why my early career has been shaped, not only by the questions concerning the Arctic and especially the Barents Euro-Arctic region, but also the different disciplines, which try to understand and describe its complexity while simultaneously inevitably shaping it.
In my dissertation the questions scope are on the represented objects of science: the technological involvement in perceiving the environment, what comes between the described object and the viewer, and what kind of phenomenon their interrelation creates. In my research I apply the performative approach to science communication. Performativity does not refer in this context to a ritual or artistic performance, but to the post-humanist approach in which the ontology, epistemology and ethics are inseparable pieces of the same puzzle. By applying such an approach, one would hopefully enable the development of socially sustainable ways of producing and presenting 'knowledge' of the Arctic.

In my opinion, the importance of material and visual culture of ordinary objects should be more profoundly emphasised in the field of political science. Such taken for granted terms as design, which is spreading from industrial design to service and co-designing, is very much bound to societal ideologies as well as discursive material practices. These ideologies and practices can only be decoded from the everyday objects and from their operating with the bodies. Rather than claiming that the design research is lacking a critical perspective in finding its political meanings, I would point out the need to combine the research methods of art & design and social sciences in analysing this matter.

“In my opinion, the importance of material and visual culture of ordinary objects should be more profoundly emphasised in the field of political science.”
The empirical part of my work is based on science exhibitions that describe the Arctic. The current attempt is to developed analytical concepts for sustainable, affective and effective science communication emphasising the socio-political dimension of the Arctic. Part of this work is based on the data focusing on a critical approach to animal and nature documentary. This can be seen as means of political activism and alternative ways to express the phenomenon of human-animal relations; to study the relation between constructed environment, landscape and body in learning and memorising; and to evaluate exhibition object's affectivity by means of distance. Hopefully as a joint effort the final result could be translated into a range of applications for developing science communication service spaces to support the continuity and sustainability of Arctic research.
My name is Susana Goytia Casermeiro and I am a LL.D. (Doctor of Laws) student at Luleå University of Technology, which is located in northern Sweden, in the Barents Region. I commenced my doctoral studies in 2012, two and a half years after moving to Scandinavia from my hometown of Salta, Argentina.

I currently work within EU FP7 project STAR-FLOOD (http://www.starflood.eu/) whose overall aim is to develop policies to better deal with flood risks in urban areas of Europe. The project builds on the assumption that flood vulnerable areas will be more resilient if, instead of relying solely on structural defences, they implement multiple flood risk management strategies - e.g. spatial planning, warning systems and insurance - in a simultaneous and aligned manner. However, the successful implementation
of a resilient set of strategies in a certain area is dependent on it being properly institutionally embedded. My main role in the project is to analyse and evaluate the legal framework for flood risk management in Sweden, including the implementation of the EU Floods Directive. The project includes three case studies per participating country. For Sweden, these are Karlstad, Gothenburg and Kristianstad, three of our most flood vulnerable municipalities. These studies would be highly relevant for flood vulnerable areas in the Barents Region, such as Haparanda and Rovaniemi.

Today, I focus my research on water as a hazard. But water is also a source of life and susceptible to multiple uses including drinking, agriculture, fishing, energy production, navigation and recreation. Water often crosses borders, lacing together the people and communities in its path. Because of its features, water resources require different legal approaches and solutions than those applicable to other natural resources. Water Law is therefore a challenging discipline, which moreover is undergoing a period of reform, following an international recognition of the increasing pressure on water resources. Sweden in particular is debating substantial modifications to its long-standing regime of water operations in favour of fundamental environmental principles. Water resources need to be wisely and equitably managed if they are to sustain. This is obviously easier said than done. It is towards issues such as these where I hope my future research will take me.

In addition to research, my position as doctoral student requires me to teach at undergraduate level. Most of my teaching is on Constitutional Law and Administrative Law, but this fall I will get an opportunity to dive into Public International Law – a personal favourite. While I am writing my thesis in English, all teaching in the Jurisprudence programme at LTU is done in Swedish. In this matter, I find that each year that passes leaves behind a more confident teacher.
Sander Goes

Postdoctoral Fellow
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nordland
Bodø, Norway
"My research interest is primarily related to environmental management practices."

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION
My research interest is primarily related to environmental management practices. After obtaining a Master-degree in environmental sciences at the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands – with public management as my major topic of interest – I moved to Norway and received my PhD in political science from the University of Tromsø in 2013. My dissertation illustrates first of all how international financial institutions, environmental NGO’s as well as public authorities put pressure on international oil companies after their violation of environmental norms and regulations. Secondly, the dissertation illustrates how foreign actors understand law enforcement practices in the Russian Federation, and thirdly, the changing relationship between the oil-producing state and oil companies during a specific political era characterized by President Vladimir Putin’s first two presidencies. This third perspective is especially interesting due to the rising oil prices during that particular period. Besides my academic work, I gained experience in the field as enforcement official and as consultant in the private sector where I implemented and monitored environmental management systems. This valuable practical experience was and still is helpful in my contemporary work where I try to understand and explain the world around me.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
I illustrate not only how environmental regulations are enforced in practice, but also how regulations turn out to be a tool for public managers to make sure that particular objectives are being made. The sanctions that the Russian authorities imposed on international oil companies and their motivations for doing so – as illustrated by describing two conflicts between the Russian authorities and oil companies where the former were effectively able to pressure the latter to give up control over major oil and gas projects – are examples of such practices discussed in my dissertation.
NORRUSS: UNDERSTANDING COOPERATION BETWEEN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN THE BARENTS REGION.

I am currently involved in two research projects. My contribution to the NORRUSS project, financed by the Norwegian Research Council is aiming to study cooperation between higher education institutions in the Barents Region. This is partly based on the findings of my PhD: how foreign actors understand the rules of the game in Russia and that Russian society, as many other societies, is a system of interconnected formal (including the formal decision-making process of education institutions) and informal levels in which the informal level is regarded as dominant. Formal and informal contacts between representatives of higher education institutions are often a result of years of close cooperation with regard to student exchange, research projects and joint academic programs. Informal networks, however, are assumed to be understood different in Russian society compared to Norwegian society. Understanding different theoretical concepts with regard to informal networks is, I argue, a first essential step before identifying informal networks across education institutions in the Barents Region and valuable if we seek to explore the outcomes of such networks or identify its participants in an international perspective. Informal networks are interpreted differently because of the impact formal structures have on daily lives of citizens and institutions; whether we speak of complicated legal structures or hierarchical procedures as discussed in my contribution to the NORRUSS-project or enforcement practices as outlined in my PhD-dissertation.

‘GREEN MINING’ IN THE ARCTIC?

Regarding the ‘Green Mining’ project, I analyse the degree to which environmental norms are established within the Norwegian mining industry. Like most companies operating in environmentally sensitive industries, mining companies are struggling to meet the rising demands by society in terms of transparency and corporate social responsibility. Mining companies, especially those operating in the Arctic, are by society no longer regarded as “responsible” as long as they make a profit and avoid sanctions for breaking the law. Nowadays, society demands compliance with environmental norms that go beyond legal obligations, for instance, by disclosing the ecological footprint of production processes or a well-functioning – and by third parties certified – environmental management system based on international standards. The aim of my contribution to this project is to examine whether such developments have taken place in the mining industry in Northern Norway. Could we, for instance, speak of a green development of the Norwegian mining industry, ‘legitimizing’ business or simply ‘window-dressing?’
Karolina Banul

Doctoral Student
The Barents Institute,
The University of Tromsø The Arctic University of Norway
My name is Karolina Banul and I have been a doctoral student at UiT the Arctic University of Norway since August 2014.

The last five years I have been an exchange student living in different Scandinavian countries. As a part of the exchange program I spend one semester at the University of Tampere in Finland in 2010. In 2011 I had an internship at Arctic Centre, University of Lapland and at the International Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes, Norway. During that time, I was working on my thesis titled “The governance of renewable energy in the Barents Region”. In autumn 2011 I completed my MA in political science at the University of Warsaw. After graduation I came back to Rovaniemi and continued to work in Arctic Centre as a planning assistant. This work gave me valuable experience in writing funding applications for academic projects as well as being part of a research team. Being a researcher in international environment opened my eyes to new possibilities that changed my future working life.

“My research goal is to provide data with a comparative potential that could offer some insights for urban development in selected cities in the Arctic.”
In 2012 I was selected for Erasmus Mundus Master of Science Course in Geoinformation Science and Earth Observation for Environmental Modelling and Management (GEM). Two years scholarship allowed me to get education from Lund University and University of Iceland. In my final master thesis project – “Bathymetry of Reykjanes ridge: A methodological approach” – I analyzed time separated, multi-beam data collected along the crest of the Reykjanes ridge. I definitely enjoyed learning about cartography, GIS and mapping and I found those disciplines very useful for potential future work in both academic and commercial sectors.

My research interests include various topics that touch upon social and natural science. I have especially focus on regional and urban development, spatial planning, using GIS in planning and decision-making support, environmental impact assessment, and science – policy interface.

Currently I am a doctoral student working at The Barents Institute in Kirkenes. I am involved in a research project called Arctic Urban Sustainability in Russia project (ARCSUS) that aims at evaluating climate and socioeconomic factors related to sustainability of urban communities in the Arctic. The project analyses what kinds of urban settlements and their related infrastructure are best suited to ensure sustainability.

In my PhD project, I address questions about the urban sustainability in the Arctic cities in the context of globalization, state policies, and local conditions. In my research project, titled “The urbanization in the Arctic: socio-economic transitions and sustainability of urban systems”, I want to investigate the quality of life and well-being of the population of this region, environmental sustainability, and governance in selected urban settlements. I intend to assess urban sustainability in quantitative and qualitative terms.

While living and visiting various cities in Northern Europe: Rovaniemi, Tromsø, Kirkenes, Reykjavik, Tórshavn, Murmansk, I have observed how arctic cities differ in terms of population, socio-economic characteristic, main industries, administrative, and educational functions. At the same time, urban settlements in the Arctic are facing similar problems: migration and population change, economies dependent on primary industries and public administration, peripheral and remote locations. Therefore, my research goal is to provide data with a comparative potential that could offer some insights for urban development in selected cities in the Arctic.
EDITORIAL

Moving Forward: Strengthening cooperation in today’s Barents Region
Aileen A. Espiritu

ARTICLES

Legal tools of public participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment process and their application in the countries of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region
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The right to mine?
Discourse analysis of social impact assessments of mining projects in Finnish Lapland in the 2000s
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Glocalisation of global market forces and the repositioning of a peripheral Russian mining community
Tuomas Suutarinen

The need to know: Governing a region and its economy
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BOOK REVIEW

Border Life (Tatiana Wara)
Book review: Arvid Viken & Bjarge Schwenke Fors (ed.): Grenseliv

YOUNG RESEARCHERS OF THE BARENTS REGION

Joonas Voola
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