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THE BODY OF FEAR

Critical History of Thought toward the Political Uncanny

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This study examines, describes and conceptualises the politics of fear. Fear and politics are in many cases connected but the nature of their relation is often inaccurately explained. The aim in the study is to find and develop analytical tools for deeper understanding of the fragmented phenomenon of the politics of fear. This is done by combining different methods and theoretical approaches to discover the varieties but also to find comparable features which enable to achieve more holistic understanding.

The core of the research is constructed around Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge and genealogy including Sohail Inayatullah's Causal Layered Analysis. The research is framed into the eventalized body where the fear and power relations are localised and made visible. Fear is argued here to be based on the understanding of causality which relates it to memory. In socio-political context the collective memory is constructed of different documents forming the representative and simulative reality which is set under the analysis.

The analysis is divided into the concepts of *symbolic violence*, *the silence*, *breach in social reality* and *trauma* which are seen as the constructing processes of the formation of the objects of fear. The study shows that the objects of fear are formed in interactive relations between *the subject* and *the object* which *emerge* in the context framed and interpret by the *heritage* as discursive practices, sign systems and symbolic exchange. Outcome of the power and resistance materialises in the human figure which is transformed it into *the body of fear*.

Avainsanat: Politics of Fear, The Archaeology of Knowledge, genealogy, CLA, uncanny

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If the only prayer you ever say in your whole life is "thank you," ...

Leea, Matti, Suvi and Johan-Eerik

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1. INTRODUCTION

“It's still fear versus hope; the past versus the future. It's still a choice between sliding backward and moving forward.”¹ What Barack Obama said in his speech in Ohio 8th of September 2010, could be understood as a statement toward fear. Fear opposes, fear has a temporal and spatial existence, and fear can be chosen. Here fear is made political. It is a conflict which can be located and which requires committing oneself.

“37 black boxes with the word ‘Fear’ on them [...] which spread panic and caused the police to shut the station for hours and call in the bomb squad, turn out to be the work of Clinton Boisvert, a 25-year-old freshman at the School of Visual Arts in Manhattan.”² In this example the word *fear* itself became a reason for immediate intervention of authorities of state, and a cause for *panic*, behaviour regarded as irrational and harmful both for individuals and especially in a large group of people. Here the relation between word *fear* and the fear it caused, appeared as misunderstanding, but where the reactions and consequences themselves reflected fear which would be odd to assume to origin from the art work, which as such can not be understood as any form of threat. It rather reflects some form of uncanny experience which is framed by the concept of fear in the context of specific event.

What makes the both cases significant in relation to fear is their context. Obama’s speech is a rhetoric statement under the elections; it is official, planned, strategic and targeted to be presented in a familiar environment. The case of black boxes is sudden, exceptional, unplanned and uncontrollable and it appeared in an environment outside art, in a context where it appeared as uncanny. *Fear* in this context didn’t appear as unchanging and without history but as *palimpsest*. A series of events, writing and rewriting of social reality, had a fundamental impact on how a sign is read, and to the sign itself.

Fear is one of those things, which define but which can not be defined accurately and ultimately. It appears as obvious but hidden, biological and philosophical, material and immaterial, as illness and natural behaviour, psychological and evolutionary, and experienced but still unknown. Some conclusion or more likely hypothesis can be drawn from presented examples which accuracy is tested in theoretically and empirically within this thesis. Here

¹ MarketWatch 2010.

² Altheide 2003, 40–41.

politics is understood to exist as a relation between things. To be able to discover political it has to appear as activity or influence which relates politics to power, the ability to move and affect or allow and maintain. As a relation it has to happen between two things, which in their most simply form are the one who acts and the one who is the target of the act. These are *the subject* and *the object*. When this is related to how the meaning of context is understood in order and appearance of things a following hypothetical research question can be formed of their relation to politics.

How does the politics of fear appear as a relation between the subject, the object and the context?

Locating and timing the fear into relation and context is problematic approach. Different time theories have various concepts for time which would be the first dilemma to solve before one could even enter the fear itself. Time escapes us. When this is related to *palimpsest* it comes problematic to frame the research without cutting out this element by setting the issue into one spatial and temporal space. One could try to find the answer from memory, but this might limit the experience to one individual or group of people and to one generation in one geographical area. Guy Debord shows that the emergence of linguistics created non-personal memory, memory of social governance consisting of documents³. This leads us to framing the research into documentation of an event where the actual focus lies on the representative power of the research object. Then what should lie in the focus of this representation? Jean Baudrillard necessitates that the abstractions must be localized into precise point of time and place, which is *the body*⁴. Body on the other hand in the eyes of genealogy is a history of those powers which invest into it⁵. The body is the location for fear but also for power and politics. To avoid formalization and simplification of the multiplicity of fear attention should be turned away from “vast unities [...] to the phenomena of rupture, of discontinuity [...] incidence of interruption”⁶ as Foucault argues in developing archaeological approach to knowledge. Based on these arguments the research question must concentrate on:

How does the representation process of the body in the context of an event affect to a formation of the objects of fear?

³ Debord 2005, 122.

⁴ Baudrillard 1993, 159.

⁵ Ojakangas 1998, 22.

⁶ Foucault 1974, 4.

When these themes are recognized, one should estimate the dynamics of the question without oversimplifying or losing its focus and maintaining the research frame. Preserving the central concepts from genealogy, social representation and archaeology of knowledge, *body*, *event*, *process* and *knowledge*, the research question can be drawn as:

How does eventalized body transform into the object of fear?

1.1 ANATOMY

To understand the processes of the embodiment of fear one has to gain knowledge concerning its structure. In our knowledge fear appears to be organic rather than inanimate ways in which objects of fear are linked to each other, how they may be born, evolve, strengthen and die. To understand how an organism works and what is its condition and quality, information can be attained by approaching central pieces of it or proceeding to a cell level to understand the functioning of the basic units which form the organism. Because the whole is not just the sum of its parts, it has to be also looked at as a complete interactive and interrelated process. In *anatomy* one has to separate (*ana*) and to cut open (*temnein*), to enter the research object and to understand the complete structure.

The approach to research can be compared to the procedure which Ralf Kauranen and Pekka Rantanen have drawn in their work where their aim is to use both Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods. What they underline in their approach is that there is no clear Foucauldian method but rather an aspect to both research topic and to research making itself.⁷ Kauranen and Rantanen note that even Foucault uses historical documents in his work his main interest lies in the present⁸. As Foucault notes "if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present"⁹. His genealogy is strongly connected to Friedrich Nietzsche where the focal points are the body, the event and the perspective¹⁰.

⁷ Kauranen and Rantanen 2005, 217.

⁸ *ibid.*, 218.

⁹ Foucault 1991a, 31.

¹⁰ Kauranen and Rantanen 2005, 221.

One main reason for using genealogical approach is the concept which Foucault calls eventalization¹¹. Transformation can be captured in a series of “frozen pictures”¹². The event itself is a construction of multiple processes and other separated events. It allows understanding an event as singularity but also the *palimpsest* or layered causality. These series of events have their order and limits which allows one to discover the continuity without tiding oneself to presupposing of the origin and evolvment, but a continuity which is build up from singularities and ruptures.¹³

Here we come to the critic which Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge presents for traditional research methods of history. Long periods and continuity, certain aims and tools, and patterns made between disparate events are something where the attention should be drawn away and instead approve the importance of ruptures and discontinuity in history¹⁴. This is relevant also in political research because history “organizes the document [...] orders it [...] distinguishes between what it relevant and what it not” which also sets the limits for knowledge concerning what is political. Even more Foucault claims that history transforms documents into memory¹⁵. This notion is very important because it fits well together with Debords idea of non-personal memory, memory which should be called as collective or cultural memory, something which isn’t based on primary and personal experience but in something which is transformed into document, a form of representation and abstraction. Although it must be noticed that neither Foucault nor Debord despites individual experience. On the contrary what collective memory does is processing and of reinstating the experience. Even though Foucault tempts to problematize structures he also notes that archaeology is not entirely strange for structural analysis for example in relation to what questions are made and which analytical tools are used¹⁶.

Archaeology can be used and interpret as a method, but as such it is not very clearly drawn. How this concept is treated within the thesis is an internalized attitude, guiding philosophy of science which helps one to question petrified models of knowing which are blind spots for researcher’s analytical eye. More practical approach is used in the selection of case studies and documents and especially how they are seen as the different aspects and manifestation of

¹¹ Foucault 1991b, 76.

¹² Kauranen and Rantanen 2005, 226.

¹³ *ibid.*, 226

¹⁴ Foucault 1982, 3–4.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 7.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 8.

the same phenomenon. Foucault's way to describe time and history is found most appealing and functional in relation to the content of the thesis.

Archaeological method is also followed in the ways in which it understands the discourse as wide and varying by its nature. The elements of *discursive formations* appear as object, mode of statement, concepts and thematic choices which conditions of existence, coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance are controlled by the *rules of formation*¹⁷. The *surfaces of emergency* are spaces or contexts where some discourses appear first time¹⁸. In these conditions object doesn't pre-exist but it appears under the positive conditions of complex group of relations¹⁹. These discursive relations also limit the discourse by offering the objects of which it can speak and characterize discourse itself as a practice²⁰. *The enunciative modalities* express who is speaking, how the institutions affect and how the position of the subject appears for example as seeing, listening or observing²¹. *The formation of concepts*²² and strategies expresses discourses which are formed on the basis of the same rules, conditions and where their appearance is identical²³. *Link points of systematization* present the sub-groups of discourse²⁴. Even though these terms are presented here, they are not written open in the case study but they are recognized in ways in which the discourse is understood.

1.2 TOMOGRAPHY

Having a certain level of understanding concerning the *anatomy* and the capability to choose the *biopsy* it is needed to find a proper analytical instrument for the research. Because the *anatomy of fear* anticipates a complex system reminding of living organism with inner and outer organs and regenerating and mutating *genome*, to be able to penetrate the object and to understand the supporting processes and mechanisms one needs to have subtle method to carry out the analysis. *Tomography*, where *tomes* stands for part or section and *graphy* for writing or presentation on some surface, seems a proper term when it is compared to what is

¹⁷ Foucault 1982, 38.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, 41.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, 45.

²⁰ *ibid.*, 46.

²¹ *ibid.*, 50–52.

²² *ibid.*, 56.

²³ *ibid.*, 65.

²⁴ *ibid.*, 66.

recognized in relation to *anatomy*. A method which penetrates the object layer by layer drawing a presentation of each section used for such sciences as archaeology and biology would seem proper approach before proceeding to *diagnosis*.

When one talks about archaeology of knowledge instead of archaeology, genealogy instead of genes, eventalization and surface of emergency instead of biopsy, and social representations and discourses instead of writing, Sohail Inayatullah's Causal layered analysis (CLA) seems well oriented instrument as a replacement for *tomography* in social sciences. Inayatullah calls CLA as a new research theory and method²⁵ where the research subject is divided into analytical layers and where these layers are understood to have a causal relation. These four analytical levels are *litany*, *social causes*, *discourse/worldview*, and *myth/metaphor*²⁶. CLA doesn't only appear as multilayered but as a combination of multiple theoretical approaches²⁷ or even as a methodological framework with a certain guidelines.

According to Inayatullah CLA integrates empiricist, interpretative and critical modes of knowing. It is usually related to post-structuralism, macro-history, postcolonial multicultural theory²⁸ and critical theory, but it is officially listed as a method of Future Studies²⁹. Still it differs from the usual definition of future studies because it doesn't concentrate on predicting the future but in creating transformative spaces for the alternative futures³⁰ and to avoid superficiality of conventional social science research and forecasting methods because they often are unable to unpack discourses, worldviews, and ideologies, and exclude often archetypes, myths and metaphors³¹. The goals of CLA appear as highly practical and solution-oriented when it is targeted to develop more effective, deeper, inclusive and longer term policy³². Within this work the potentiality of CLA is used and estimated as analytical framework and method in the context of the politics of fear, the capability to conceptualize, model and interpret it.

²⁵ Inayatullah 2004, 8.

²⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ *ibid.*, 10.

³⁰ *ibid.*, 8.

³¹ *ibid.*

³² *ibid.*

What is important to knowledge in CLA as a method is that it focuses less on horizontal spatiality and more on the vertical dimension³³. Inayatullah explains this as a thought derived from Indian philosophy where mind is understood as vertical construction and where the inward process realises truth. This differs from the mainstream post-structural notion of alternative horizontal discourses.³⁴

CLA and also the future studies have decisively moved from ontological inquiry to epistemological concerns about the knowledge³⁵. Post-structuralism within the CLA framework has not diminished the data-orientation or meaning-oriented research where data is seen in the context of meanings, within the context of episteme³⁶. What may cause a problem is Inayatullah's alignment and notion concerning "knowledge parameters that structure meanings; for example, class, gender, the interstate system" and "myths and metaphors that organise the deep beliefs, the traumas and transcendence that over time define identity"³⁷. It doesn't clearly occur how stable he claims these classification and identities to be. This is a concern in relation to Foucault's application of genealogy which Inayatullah uses as one element in CLA³⁸, because it doesn't explain phenomena just as a cause of heritage but also as a process of emergence. Such issues as identity may transform, politicized or appear and disappear several times. Furthermore one should be careful to lean *knowledge parameters*, which are also a forms of discourses and could easily lead to a situation where the analysis is already limited according to dominating concepts. In this light also the categorization of different CLA levels should be understood primarily as methodological tools, not to exist as ontology, but as episteme. Already the reason that these levels are understood as continuum of each others and a process between these is recognized, shows that they can not be considerate as closed systems and that no fundamental difference between these levels exists.

Even a greater problem arises in Inayatulla's presumption considering politics. He point out well that "freeing methodology from politics is a never-ending task" but he argues that "it can be accomplished not by controlling for these variables but by layering them"³⁹. This assumption seems to presume that politics can be placed for a specific layer and that it is

³³ Inayatullah 2004, 8.

³⁴ *ibid.*, 11.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 8–9.

³⁶ *ibid.*, 9.

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ *ibid.*, 10 - 11.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 9.

separable from other social phenomena. It looks like returning to sector-politics from aspectual politics⁴⁰ which especially in the case of politics of fear appears as much more suitable approach than trying to place fear into certain layer or sector. Recognizing political aspect is not the same as layering or categorising it.

A couple of the most influential theorists behind the CLA's theoretical framework is named by Inayatullah. First of them is Johan Galtung. According to his *civilization theory* there are foundational similarities in terms of codes for example towards nature, others and women, and also in the macro-historical trajectories. Also CTM syndrome (civilization, trauma and myth) was developed to enable to reach beyond the visible actions of nations, to the historical causes of action.⁴¹ The other one is Michel Foucault largely through the interpretation of Michael Shapiro. According to Inayatullah historical frames of knowledge are the key to understanding how particular nominations of reality becomes naturalised, and genealogy makes multilayered methodology possible to emerge.⁴² A notion that "In terms of research, politics and methodology [...] are not only institutional but also civilizational"⁴³ is relevant when it is related to Galtung's theory, but to speak about something as institution or civilization makes one to ask why to make statements according to specific structures and not to talk about discursive formations, practices or genealogical terms as foucauldian approach would probably reasonably require.

In CLA language is constitutive matter of reality which differs from empirical domain wherein language is seen as transparent and neutral. A text is an open concept which recognizes "a movie, a book, a worldview, a person [...] something or someone that can be read" as proper material.⁴⁴ Ways to approach the object of research Inayatullah names deconstruction, genealogy, distance, alternative pasts and futures and reordering knowledge.⁴⁵ Deconstruction is something that well defines the method as such. Genealogy is understood here as a type of discourse analysis which concentrates on "a history of paradigms [...] which discourses have been hegemonic and how the term under study has travelled through these various discourses"⁴⁶. On the other hand Inayatullah asks which

⁴⁰ Linjakumpu 2005, 15– 21.

⁴¹ Inayatullah 2004, 10.

⁴² *ibid.*, 10 - 11.

⁴³ *ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 13.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 14.

discourses constitute present and how have they travelled through history⁴⁷. Between these two statements is a small but important difference which must be acknowledged within the frame of the thesis in process. In the research the focal point of genealogy is interpreted as the *heritage* and *emergence* of phenomenon in different discourses, practices, contexts and events, not as tracing down how a certain historical heritage as a discourse emerges from time to time in different surfaces. This is the difference in a way of understanding discourse not as a stable but as an organic thing, and this is the main reason not to talk about the origin, *Ursprung* but to recognize what is the importance of heritage, *Herkunft* and emergence, *Entstehung*⁴⁸.

Inayatullah's idea of distance could be related to Foucault's eventalization. The meaning of distance is to recognize scenarios which make the present remarkable, unfamiliar, strange or denatured⁴⁹. Here the scenario of the future can be replaced by an event from the past related to present. This leads us to alternative past and futures, which concerns the problematization of present. This opens not only the present for analysis but also the past and how the knowledge of the past can reshape the present and future. *Reordering knowledge* reminds Foucault's archaeological method. Inayatullah compares it to deconstruction and genealogy in undoing particular categories by disturbing conventional categories, and making them problematic⁵⁰.

Where these principles form the guidelines for the analysis the vertical levels are the core of CLA as a method. More detailed description of each level is given during the first case study where it is tested in practice. Still some notions are needed to reveal the basic structure. First of the four levels is the *litany* characterised as *official unquestioned view of reality*. It appears as superficial view to issue in process and represents it as a quick, simplified and emotionally charged statement. Appealing would be to compare it to a headline of a news or magazine which aim and importance is to capture one's attention effectively. Here the information must appear in simple and easily absorbed form, otherwise it will be bypassed. Inayatullah remarks that this type of conventional level can create politics of fear in the future research⁵¹.

⁴⁷ Inayatullah 2004, 14.

⁴⁸ Foucault 1998, 72.

⁴⁹ Inayatullah 2004, 14.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ *ibid.*, 16.

Peter Bishop has pointed out that the most significant problem in CLA is that the deeper values are considered ‘better’ than the *litany*. Inayatullah answers to the critique by placing the *litany* in historical and cultural contexts where it appeared as the only truth.⁵² Why the *litany* should be considered important is most likely the reason that it is usually the level from where to enter into social and political questions because it is “the most visible and obvious”⁵³. It can be understood as the *surface of emergence* for the other levels of CLA.

The second level *the social causes* is systemic perspective, including quantitative data and it highlights institutions as information providers and political actors. The data is often questioned but the used language is not contested, the paradigm within which the issue is framed remains untouchable.⁵⁴ In political research this level well presents the field of *institutionalism*, where states, institutions and international and governmental organisations are understood as political actors and the subjects of power. Social status is also something which could be captured under the *social causes*.

The third level is *the discourse/worldview* concerning unconscious presupposing based on ideology, worldview and discourses. Basis of its analysis is in linguistic and cultural processes. Compared to the *social causes* it doesn’t concentrate on *who* or *what* are the actors or the systems. It investigates how the discourse affects on our framing of the issue.⁵⁵

The fourth level is *the myth/metaphor*. Because this dimension of knowledge is understood as unconscious and emotive,⁵⁶ it requires commitment from the researcher on how one comprehends the relation of emotions, rationality and activity. Inayatullah lists the access to myths and metaphors via *the deep stories, the collective archetypes, and the unconscious and emotive dimensions*⁵⁷. These seem to be some possible ways to approach and not the specific requirements from the method. At first sight they seem quite strange for the political science but they can be equated to *narratives, identity politics* and *politics of emotions*.

Two forthcoming arguments are the most crucial in relation to the study in process and they concern the research object and concept of time. In the myth/metaphor level the language is

⁵² Inayatullah 2004, 15.

⁵³ *ibid.*, 16.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, 8, 17.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 8.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 17.

less specific and more concerned with evoking visual images⁵⁸. This notion of visual approach should be regarded in choosing the document under analysis. It doesn't require only use of textual material but as well drawings or photographs. The second argument concerns the different concepts of time which is crucial in future studies which theorize time. These vary from divine guidance to organic being and chaotic state⁵⁹. The understanding of time has an affect to the ways in which surrounding reality and one's own possibility to affect to it exists. This is something that doesn't appear as politically neutral and culturally unchangeable and by then it is also inseparably linked to the formation of the objects of fear.

1.3 DIAGNOSIS

What is drawn from the *anatomy via tomography* is then interpret *dia gnosis*, through knowledge. In *diagnosis* the objective is to supplement the interpretative framework with theoretical and methodological knowledge. This is done to fill the possible gaps and to answer questions which have remained unknown. The aim is to improve the CLA-method by offering some other analytical concepts to clarify also the importance to recognize the differences between its levels and by then make it meet the requirements of answering to the research question.

Inayatullah doesn't clearly tell how the different levels should be deconstructed and analysed. Probably *the myth/metaphor* level appears to be the most complicated where the others are more clearly related to linguistics like discourse and rhetoric. What can be understood from Inayatullah's work and how its importance is understood within the thesis is that it can and should be used as a methodological framework for different separate approaches. To gain knowledge of fear in a context of myths and to be able to systematise metaphors, it is done by using structural anthropology and semiotics. Furthermore to understand their role in the interactive process in the context of event their dramaturgy and representative nature is estimated.

The semiotic analysis is done according to Umberto Eco's theory of semiotics. Eco has very practical approach in his work which also combines many earlier traditions of semiotics and

⁵⁸ Inayatullah 2004, 18.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

famous writers such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles S. Peirce⁶⁰. Eco notes that “semiotics studies all cultural processes as processes of communication”⁶¹ which is one approach to semiotic research. Eco underlines that even everyday life is full of signs it is incorrect to say that every act of inference should be understood as semiotic act. Act should be understood as semiotic when the association is culturally recognized and systematically coded.⁶² Eco presents the two competing hypothesis of the nature of semiotic research which are “the whole of culture must be studied as a semiotic phenomenon” and “all aspects of a culture can be studied as the contents of a semiotic activity”⁶³. Here the latter is more proper because it doesn’t understand semiotics as fundamental but more as an aspect. Approaching social sciences as purely semiotic phenomenon could lead to serious distortions where all the activity would be understood only as process of signs.

Foucault draws a wide picture of historical knowledge concerning signs in his work *The Order of Things*. They have been understood as something placed upon things or as something that can be constituted only by an act of knowing⁶⁴. An important remark is that the analysis is what brings to the sign apparent⁶⁵; without analysis the sign doesn’t exist. The artificial or man-made signs owe their power to their natural signs and transform imagination into memory, attention into reflection, and instinct into knowledge⁶⁶. There exists also separation between what is understood as the signifying element and the sign. Signifying element can become a sign only on condition that it manifests, and relation that links it to what it signifies.⁶⁷

Anthropology allows understanding how the semiotics appears in cultural practices. Claude Lévi-Strauss understands myths as explanatory, ordering and describing entities which, as science, theorize reality⁶⁸. He argues that if there is a meaning in mythology, it resides only as a combination of elements not as isolated units⁶⁹. Also in language certain sequences of sounds define meaning but their content may be completely different in other language,

⁶⁰ Eco 1979, 14–16.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, 8.

⁶² *ibid.*, 17.

⁶³ *ibid.*, 22.

⁶⁴ Foucault 1980a, 59.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 61.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 61–62.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, 64.

⁶⁸ Lévi-Strauss 1989.

⁶⁹ Lévi-Strauss 1972, 210.

which shows that it is the combination of sounds which provide the significant data⁷⁰. Still myths withhold more complex information than any other linguistic expression⁷¹. According to Lévi-Strauss myths can be discovered and analysed in higher levels than for example distinctive features so that they could be separated from other kind of speech⁷².

Serge Moscovici presents the view that knowledge is never a simple description or a copy of a state of affairs but produced through interaction and communication which is always linked to human interest⁷³. Social representations are related to social relations, the objects produced and consumed and the exchange of communication⁷⁴. Moscovici believes in the variation and diversity of collective ideas which greatly differs from Émile Durkheim who considers collective representations as a stabile form of understanding⁷⁵. This can be seen as a link between Foucault's approach and Moscovici's theory. Moscovici claims that something visual may appear as invisible to us because pre-established models and classifications affect to the ways how we interpret the information which our eyes capture⁷⁶. The representation constitutes a social reality *sui generis*⁷⁷. According to Moscovici "*Social representations should be seen as a specific way of understanding, and communicating, what we know already*"⁷⁸. They are specific to our society⁷⁹ and their purpose is to make something unfamiliar to familiar⁸⁰. At first this claim seems to be something to disagree with because it seems to argue that all representations are understandable and that they even would have some kind of mission. Moscovici specifies his argument by explaining that this important quality of representations is an awareness of what is unusual and abnormal and enables to process this information by comparing it to what is understood as familiar.

Another question of CLA concerns the time span of different layers in relation how they may transform. Here one should look to the Foucault's definition of the structure of *discursive formations*. Foucault argues that these *formations* can not be deconstructed and constructed in a single moment. Related to CLA the changes appear first in the *litany* where they can be

⁷⁰ Lévi-Strauss 1972, 208.

⁷¹ *ibid.*, 210.

⁷² *ibid.*, 211.

⁷³ Duveen 2000, 2.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 7.

⁷⁶ Moscovici 2000, 19.

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 27.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, 31.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 36

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, 37.

discovered. *Myths* change and disappear slower. This would also mean that what appears in the *litany* might be overcome in short time and appear as singular exception, which importance would be revealed only in the case where it would appear again. Transformations in myth level would be rare but also more fundamental in the case where they appear as radical.

How then this kind of transformation might occur? Can new myths be born? Levi-Strauss claims that a myth always refers to a distant event but which operational value is timeless. When this is related to archaeological method a following hypothesis can be presented: *An emergence of sudden and dramatic event, which appears as chaotic within the system, and is experienced as rupture in reality, requires explanatory model and by then enables a formation of myth.* Again, one should be careful not to claim this to be the origin of the myth but rather a transformation which reconstructs the already existing reality.

Also the role of agency or where Inayatullah uses word *stakeholders*⁸¹ is a detail to pay some attention. Kauranen and Rantanen interpret Foucault by saying that a certain actor is not responsible of emergence of phenomenon but they are caused by different relations and processes⁸². This is also the way how phenomena are approached in this thesis. For Inayatullah stakeholders seems to play quite important role, but not so much in the deeper levels of CLA. This is a valid notion from him, which should also be understood in relation to the practical problem solving aspect of his work.

Genealogy offers one very important element for a dynamic research. This is a *disposition* which allows adopting a new approach which evolves through the analysis. *Disposition* has a central role in answering to a certain question where it exists primary as strategic function⁸³. Description of the events and *dispositions* is the genealogical way to approach research. Finding similarities between the elements makes it possible to recognize relations between different practices⁸⁴ and most importantly to locate power relations and make them visible.

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⁸¹ Inayatullah 2004, 8, 20, 29.

⁸² Kauranen and Rantanen 2005, 224.

⁸³ *ibid.*

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 225.

The traditional concepts and categorizations are put under doubt but not completely abandoned partly for methodological reasons and their use in comparative literature. Such things as punishment, torture, racism, criminality, terrorism, dictatorship, genocide and war are approached by using different articulations. In the case study these phenomena are set under the concepts of *symbolic violence*, *the silence*, *breach in social reality*, and *trauma*. The content of these terms is not totally different but more likely the same elements occur in each of them. They all present a different emphasis of the same phenomenon of the politics of fear and only by separating them and bringing them together their function can be understood.

Inayatullah characterises the terms of the approach to research as patterned and chaotic, known and yet unknown, or explained but not accurately predicted, 'both-and' perspective where we should not try to discover a theory of everything but rather we must include many variables and many ways of knowing⁸⁵. What might be gained here may not appear as compact and clear but it allows one to enter the complex and chaotic phenomenon and at the same time have knowledge and understanding and multiplicity of socio-political nature of the politics of fear.

2. RATIO, PASSIO, ACTIO, POLITIKA

If it is still *fear vs. hope*, what is opposed when one talks about *politics of fear*? With which phenomenon or system fear can be related? Fear could be recognized as a basic emotion. This on the other hand is not a conclusion of the nature of fear but a beginning for a long tradition of philosophical debates. If these debates are connected to politics, the main question would lie in the division between rationality and emotions, and furthermore how this affects to political acts and behaviour. How our knowledge concerning the dichotomy of rationality and emotions is formed? In framing the research one has to make short archaeological excavation into emotions.

The etymology of emotion, Latin *emovere*, expresses moving something which moves us or engulfs us. Similar bodily location of emotions appears in English word *to feel* and *feeling*.

⁸⁵ Inayatullah 2004, 11.

Latin verb *afficere* expresses *to affect* and *affection* which relates emotions to activity.⁸⁶ Etymology reveals that emotions are related in system of language into physical sensors which can captivate us and lead our actions. They appear almost as reflects, innate or leaned form of muscle memory. Partly compatible to this finding, classical understanding shows them opposite to action, Latin *action* is opposite to emotions as passive, *pathos* (a disease) and *pati* (suffering).⁸⁷ Interesting etymology of passive is also a position of the word empathy⁸⁸, where one sets oneself into the position of other, which describes emotion as a social phenomenon, something which can happen between to persons and affect to their actions. Here emotions are something else than passive. They may be closed outside from active decision making, but not outside social activity.

A.J Greimas' semiotic school started using term *modality* instead of emotions where existentialists inspired by Sartre considered them as evaluations and talked about the *logic of emotions*. Cognitivism similarly interprets emotions as a linking believes between us and the world but does not recognize them as logic but cultural and social constructions. These theories present emotions much more as immaterial, something that lies for example in language but which doesn't focus on the bodily reactions. Physiological approach sees emotions only as physical changes and reactions, or as temporal or stabile patterns of behaviour as behaviourists like Gilber Ryle calls them. Furthermore in physiological approach these reactions are reflected into mind as emotions which makes the process vice versa; we do not have certain physical reaction because of emotions but our emotions are activated by certain physical reactions.⁸⁹ Psychological approach sees this relation as bidirectional interaction. Also Baruch Spinoza considered emotion as something which appears as a bodily condition but where conscious experiences existed. Emotion is an *affect* which moves both mind and body.⁹⁰

Strong and fundamental difference is traditionally seen to exist between emotions and rationality which is also one of the central dogmas of the Western philosophy. As hardly any knowledge can be claimed to be objective, also the philosophical debates reflect a strong differences in evaluating these concepts into good and bad, and not only to discuss about

⁸⁶ Niiniluoto 1996, 7.

⁸⁷ *ibid.*

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 9.

⁹⁰ Pietarinen 1996, 46.

their structure, manifestations or existence. Either rationality is considered as good where the emotions appear as irrational uncontrollable affects, or then rationality is dangerous and ruthless when the emotions are humane and safe. Such authors as David Hume and Sigmund Freud considered the rational mind to be enslaved by passions.⁹¹ It can be claimed that Hume saw the importance of emotions quite marginal because he argued that emotions do not contain any information and are irrational.

Augustine of Hippo's approach to the question can be defined as philosophic-theological psychology where he shared some principles with Plato-stoics philosophy. He argued that emotions are spontaneous cognitive-affective conditions which direct one to certain kind of action, a *suggestion* which can be rejected or end up to *consensus* when the emotional impulse transforms into *intention*. Thomas Aquinas relied to Aristotle's opinions where the emotion is divided into *cognitive-evaluative* part and experienced psychophysical change *affective* part, which directs the person to act according to certain *operational paradigm*.⁹²

René Descartes didn't believe in Plato's radical *substance-dualism* but to a combination of mind and body as Aristotle understood it⁹³. Passions were psychological and mental conditions, which differed from thoughts because of their unclear and confusing appearance. He assumed them to be physiological phenomena which were supposed to inform mind of the state of the body and its needs. This also meant that emotions evaluated the importance of all the beings and object outside one's own body.⁹⁴ This means that even emotions and sense perception are different from thoughts they are all elements of thinking⁹⁵. Still Descartes kept in his work crucial to maintain the division between *actions* and *passions* where the goal was to overcome the effect of *passions*.⁹⁶ Emotions he claimed to be most moving and shocking of all forms of thinking. His notions of the connection between mind and body as a process where memory reawakens via certain bodily experiences and on the other hand where memory affects to bodily functions⁹⁷ reminds later experiments of Ivan Pavlov and his theory of the *conditioned reflexes*.

⁹¹ Niiniluoto 1996, 109.

⁹² Knuutila 1996, 17–19.

⁹³ Alanen 1996, 25.

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 26.

⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 27.

⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 30.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 33.

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While questioning the dichotomy between emotions and rationality one should look the theories which, if do not make these categorizations disappear, tries to find interaction between emotions and knowledge. In cognitive theory of emotions, emotions are information. Double-aspect theory sees that in conditions of consciousness it is related to both cognitive and emotional aspects.⁹⁸ Irrationality exists only in situations where emotions are in conflict with rationality by offering incompatible believes and models of action. These models and believes as emotions are something which psychologies argues to be social constructions produced by cognitive processes⁹⁹.

Emotions require cognitive factors as perception, believe or information¹⁰⁰. If the emotions appear as similar to beliefs they can be considered as rational but this doesn't classify them as true or untrue. Martha Nussbaum believes that also emotions are directed to certain objects. This orientation is not internal and independent to emotion but the emotions inherit it from beliefs. This separates bodily experiences like hunger from emotions which have only causal relation to world without orientation. Sara Heinämaa and Martina Reuter oppose this claim by pointing out that intentionality can appear in emotions without existing only in relations to belief.¹⁰¹ Here they refer to Maurice Merleau-Pont's approach where he explains the relation between bodily sensation and emotions by using the concept of the *body-subject* where by body is not meant purely physiological appearance of human. Orientation or intentionality is dependent on the position of the *body-subject* in relation to surrounding environment. The difference between what is seen as bodily sensation or emotion is not based on the intentionality but on the quality of the object.¹⁰²

Merleau-Pont criticises both cognitive theory and psychology from trying to understand world as clear field of phenomena where the obscurity of world is only seen as confused state of mind. He claims that the world in itself is obscure which is denied in theories which try to narrow down the diversity of experiences into abstractions made for scientific needs.¹⁰³ He also argues that sensations, moods and emotions are part of the same continuum. Here

⁹⁸ Niiniluoto 1996, 110.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 111.

¹⁰⁰ Heinämaa and Reuter 1996, 136.

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*, 137.

¹⁰² *ibid.*, 141.

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, 141–142.

emotions which are related to specific object change in time being into moods which do not appear only in relation to certain object. Merleau-Pont refers to Martin Heidegger's hypothesis that all the emotional conditions are related to holistic understanding of world instead of separate beings.¹⁰⁴

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Aristotle named fear as one of the emotions which all are connected either to pleasure or suffering. Emotions exist as motivational factors which are the source for activities and make to avoid things which endanger one's existence.¹⁰⁵ Hobbes divided emotions into direct and indirect emotions where fear was classified as one of the eight direct emotions. O. Harvey Green argued that all the other emotions were made of these basic emotions.¹⁰⁶

For Descartes affect of fear is followed by certain physiological changes which prepare body for action. Affect is not awakened by rational consideration of threat. The physiological consequences happen because of *automatic* response to perception of the source of threat. These changes are then experienced as emotion¹⁰⁷. Fear is a form of knowledge considering one's own condition.

While estimating the relation between emotion and action, Olli Koistinen presents one possible hypothesis where a combination of desire and belief are the causal preconditions for fear. Koistinen describes this as a process where the subject has a certain desire but the conflicting signs of obstacles to reach the object of desire make the subject to fear the signs.¹⁰⁸ If the desire would vanish, also the object would disappear and beliefs as conflicting signs would lose their importance.

Ilkka Niiniluoto highlights that in the formation of theory of emotions one should look to all these approaches. He also makes one important notion considering the connection between body and emotions which do not appear as *pure* thought. Appreciation is given to phenomenology and feminist philosophy which have claimed that the philosophy of

¹⁰⁴ Heinämaa and Reuter 1996, 142.

¹⁰⁵ Sajama 1996, 258.

¹⁰⁶ Oksanen M. 1996, 77.

¹⁰⁷ Alanen 1996, 36.

¹⁰⁸ Koistinen 1996, 272.

emotions is the philosophy of human body.¹⁰⁹ Early description of this connection made already Plato who divided soul in three parts and located it into head, chest and stomach¹¹⁰. This should be recognized especially in relation to genealogical analysis where the body and the mentality considering the body is in focus¹¹¹ and furthermore where it is not relevant to find only what can be recognize as *truth* but also to recognize all those mistakes and falsified claims which have affected to what exists now and how things are valued¹¹². This emerges as central statement when one looks to the dichotomy of emotions and rationality.

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How are emotions related to politics? In the field of politics and international relations emotions are often marginalized and disdained phenomenon. Politics is commonly understood only as rational and strategic activity where the emotions are considerate as problems which need to be solved.¹¹³ Rationality is dominant compared to emotions and good political decisions are based on logic where the emotions present irrational malfunctions¹¹⁴ not something with which power is involved¹¹⁵.

Thomas Hobbes estimated the relation between emotions and power. In his work *On Man* Hobbes presented emotions as disordered state of mind¹¹⁶. In the case of fear this could either be seen in constructivist aspect as something which makes the people to obey law and order, where on the other hand in analytical approach it is a source of problems¹¹⁷. Emotions, especially fear has traditionally held an interest among realism¹¹⁸.

Aini Linjakumpu presents an opposing view to marginalization of emotions by referring to Ian Burkitt's argument that any analysis concerning power, governance and politics which doesn't recognize emotions is failing¹¹⁹. Jonathan Mercer argues that without emotions there is no motivation, orientation or creativity. Emotions function as evaluations of norms and

¹⁰⁹ Niiniluoto 1996, 9.

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*, 8.

¹¹¹ Ojakangas 1998, 22.

¹¹² Foucault 1998, 74.

¹¹³ Linjakumpu 2007, 77.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, 78.

¹¹⁵ Ost 2004, 229.

¹¹⁶ Airaksinen and Vuori 1996, 169.

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*, 179.

¹¹⁸ Ross 2006, 198.

¹¹⁹ Linjakumpu 2007, 77.

ideals¹²⁰. There are also disagreements if the emotions appear only in individual level as Theodore Kemper argues or if they should be considered as collective. David Ost connects the debate to Carl Schmitt by arguing that anger is central to *normal* politics as well, not only in violent bursts¹²¹. Linjakumpu points out that emotions locate in social relations where they appear as part of interaction, strengthens in a group and also affect to ways in which one response and orientates one self to own emotions and reactions.¹²²

In her own work Linjakumpu relates politics to terrorism and to the acts of al-Qaeda. According to her analysis politicized emotions lead to state which is out of negotiations and consensus. They also partly construct the group identity.¹²³ This way emotionally charged beings or objects can be also targeted in order to cause suffering among the group¹²⁴. Andrew A. G. Ross also recognizes the importance of emotions in relation to norms and identity which he sees as a serious lack among constructivists who have otherwise well oriented to these phenomena¹²⁵. Politicizing past is also a key to reawaken and construct emotional conditions which may then appear as motivational sources for political activity¹²⁶. Linjakumpu's hypothesis is that *collectively expressed emotions orientate and affect to political activity including terrorism*. She also highlights that even though al-Qaeda is related to emotions this doesn't make it irrational actor.¹²⁷

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Aristotle explains in his work *Rhetoric* that "fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future"¹²⁸. A new release from Jussi Viitala concerning human brain research, it is pointed out that fear is a quality which decreases rationality and increases authoritarianism¹²⁹. Both definitions emphasizes different context. Where Aristotle's description is based on individual experience, Viitala's approach

¹²⁰ Linjakumpu 2007, 78.

¹²¹ Ost 2004, 229.

¹²² Linjakumpu 2007, 77.

¹²³ *ibid.*, 79.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, 80.

¹²⁵ Ross 2006, 198.

¹²⁶ Linjakumpu 2007, 84.

¹²⁷ *ibid.*, 76.

¹²⁸ Neuman and Levi 2003, 29.

¹²⁹ Palmroth 2010, 23.

concentrates more in social interaction. This might be the actual reason which makes fear such a difficult phenomena to understand and manage.

The literature review is not clearly divided into different named sections. This is because the topics are mostly overlapping. Still a clear storyline can be found. The review starts with classical writers and theories which present mostly realism, rationalism and normative approach. Following section shows some new approaches based on the same models of politics. Next section concentrates on memory and direct violence. Further sections deals first with risk and uncertainty and largely with social and cultural constructions such as identity, discourse and representation. Before that last part that presents field exams and behaviour psychological theories, some of the most vital parallel terms and theories for politics of fear are listed and shortly described. The aim is to form a large overview about the terminology and different contexts where fear has been traditionally or experimentally connected.

3.1 POLITICS OF FEAR

Daniel Béland analyses Corin Robin's work *Fear: The History of a Political Idea*. Corin is arguing that political fear operates in two ways by defining what they feel to be the public's main object of concern and by dividing any group or society in to different hierarchies. Fear is seen as political tactics that makes one group maintain power at the expense of another group. Fear is shaped by political and cultural elites and these dangers require a society to mobilize against the threat on behalf of its political values.¹³⁰

Béland concentrates in Robin's analysis also to the tradition of international relations classics Hobbes, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Arendt and reconstructs the history of the idea of fear in modern political theory. According to Robin Hobbes "theorized fear as a central aspect of politics that state and civil society institutions can shape and reshape in order to serve the sovereign's needs" and "as something persisting in politics and society, within and beyond the state of nature". For Hobbes fear is a tool of political order, serving ruler and ruled alike and essential to the maintenance of political and social order.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Ginsberg and Lyche 2008, 14–15.

¹³¹ Béland 2005, 1–2.

In his later work *Behemoth* Thomas Hobbes argues that all civil order depends on a motivational balance of fear and hope. He also claims that fears that is based on sub- or supranational enemy has to be transferred to an abstract conception of individual human beings as equally dangerous and endangered. The new fear of human beings must be balanced by a new hope in the efficacy of depersonalized political institutions. When fear is individualized and internalized, hope must be systematized or institutionalized. “The new fear alone would produce shallow, vituperative cynicism”¹³². This can be compared to Francis Bacon idea of balance between the fear of punishment against the hope of pleasure. According to Hobbes too much fear is paralyzing, rendering subjects useless to themselves and others.¹³³

The object of fear will differ depending on an individual’s physical constitution, education, and experience. For example fear of death may lead to peace, but fear of dishonour or damnation can overcome it. In his terminology *sovereignty by acquisition* is an immediate, unreflective fear of violence causing individuals to subject themselves to the one whose power they fear. It is a natural but relatively unstable response to external physical threats. *Sovereignty by institution* is a fear of all individuals, understood as equally dangerous and endangered. It can be described as artificial, internal, and relatively constant state of mind.¹³⁴

Montesquieu doesn’t consider fear as a part of political system but as a political weapon of despots. The fear of despotic terror is the foundation for the liberal political order and security. It also justifies the division of power presented in *The Spirit of the Laws*. For Alexis de Tocqueville a danger of the tyranny is grounded in a personal anxiety which is caused by the lack of traditional authority and integrative structures that characterize democratic modernity. This modern anxiety as a new type of fear could lead to a tyranny of the majority.¹³⁵

In Arendt’s work Robin concentrates on totalitarianism. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* argues that ideology and mass anxiety favours the emergence of totalitarian terror. *Eichmann in Jerusalem* on the other hand expresses that fear is rooted in the idea that mundane behaviour and personal ambition can feed terror. Judith Shklar turns terror to negative

¹³² Abosch 2009, 26.

¹³³ *ibid.*, 17–19.

¹³⁴ *ibid.*, 18 – 19.

¹³⁵ Béland 2005, 1–2.

foundation for liberal institutions, which are legitimate because they protect citizens against this threat. Robin interprets that depicting terrorism as an external source of political fear legitimizes institutions which actually constantly generate fear themselves.¹³⁶

* * *

Rick Ginsberg and Bruce S. Cooper connect the term *politics of fear* with political campaigning and as a way to appeal to voters and to denigrate political opponents. Even though they find examples from the past, fear has become commonplace which at some parts is connected to wider audience via media in United States.¹³⁷ They also consider fear as the political climate of educational politics and it covers all its fields from students' fear of failing tests or being bullied to teachers and school leaders to be unable to reach their standards and to loose the whole concept of public education. The authors find fear as a useful pivot to show changes in political processes, forces, actors and also weaknesses and vulnerability.¹³⁸ Politics is understood as a "system for resolving conflicts and differences within a democratic, legal, standardized system"¹³⁹ which I see as too narrow approach to understand such a complex social structure as politics of fear only through institutions and democracy.

Rick Ginsberg and Leif Frederick Lyche refer to "hostile myths" when they describe the present educational landscape.¹⁴⁰ It could be understood as a shift from direct hostility between states in to economical competing between nations which also includes the level of education and knowledge of its people. They also refer to Barry Glassner's *culture of fear* which appoints how misplaced fear "has gripped the American psyche and underlies the politics of education"¹⁴¹ and how instead of "single defining event [...] a constant promotion of culture of fear"¹⁴² can be seen in the education policy. The authors view to politics is about gathering support and diminishing the support of opponents in order to control and conflict centric¹⁴³. Glassner's culture of fear -theory sees the fears in American society as false and

¹³⁶ Béland 2005, 1–2.

¹³⁷ Ginsberg and Cooper 2008, 5.

¹³⁸ *ibid.*, 6.

¹³⁹ *ibid.*, 7.

¹⁴⁰ Ginsberg and Lyche 2008, 12.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*

¹⁴² *ibid.*, 13.

¹⁴³ *ibid.*

overblown and the media, monetary and political power as responsible for this as they try to affect to agenda setting and shaping public opinion. This comes close to propaganda¹⁴⁴.

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Christy Newman and Asha Persson recognize the connection between fear and cultural memory. They refer to Australian three weeks lasting *The Grim Reaper* campaign advertisement against HIV/AIDS in television which audience responded with fear¹⁴⁵ and after two years over 70 percent of the viewers could still remember it. It seems that the campaign is remembered much more widely than its original scope, which is possible because of a continuous and active process of public reflection.¹⁴⁶ This could be seen as an example of shared collective experience or trauma. The authors refer to Paul Kidd who describes the ad campaign as *fear tactics*. In this context fear is seen as a strategic instrument to solve problems but it also seems to have negative side effects like culture of blame and *demonizing*¹⁴⁷ particular groups and as one presented example shows, *unfounded fear* which could lead even to mental breakdown and suicide¹⁴⁸.

For Beatrice Mtetwa the “cycle of fear” is something much more concrete than fear’s role in communication. For her fear means a constant threat for people who are part of media, juridical organizations or anyone who opposes those in rule in Zimbabwe. She describes how the violence against journalists have had “a chilling effect” and how independent newspapers are consciously or unconsciously doing self-censorship because of the “fear of prosecution”. Police, judges and Magistrates are also “afraid for their own safety” which leads to the situation where “nobody is safe”. This vicious cycle of fear as she calls it means that the basic freedoms, which are seen as something that has nothing to do with politics, are unreachable to Zimbabweans in the present situation.¹⁴⁹

Jane A. Margold notices that state terror has got wider recognition in international relations and can be known as *bureaucracies of death, killing fields, dirty wars, ethnocide*,

¹⁴⁴ Ginsberg and Lyche 2008, 14.

¹⁴⁵ Newman and Persson 2009, 11.

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.*, 14.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*, 13.

¹⁴⁹ Mtetwa 2007, 14.

disappearances and everyday violence.¹⁵⁰ Michael Taussig calls these phenomena as notions of a *culture of terror* or *culture of fear* as it is written in more recent texts. It can be defined as “a relentless assault upon a civilian population in which menace, torture, forced labor and imprisonment become endemic forms of socio-political control”¹⁵¹.

Fear is totalizing conditions that affect all the activities of daily life. For the victims the world is chaotic and irrational. Hypothetical presumption is that terrorized are not only victims but that they also are implicated in sustaining violence as a way of life.¹⁵² Because fear is assumed to be equated with culture it seems impossible to form a clear idea how resistance can emerge or does the intensity of repressing atmosphere vary.¹⁵³

Rosemary Barbera links fear with the collective memory. Her research concerning Chilean society after dictatorship shows that the memory of fear creates sense of vulnerability and distrust in people which also limits political activity. Fear limits self expression and the ability to give things meaning. Barbera also refers to Cathy Schneider’s discovery that according to Chilean psychologists living under constant threat has lead to a *state of numbness* which causes isolation and heightened anxiety.¹⁵⁴ The idea of numbness reveals an interesting counter embodiment of fear compared to the concept of spectacle. It also draws together some of the most important arguments from Mtetwa, Margold and also from Newman and Persson in one concrete example.

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Analysing *uncertainty* in the case of conflict solution shows that when the intentions of other side are unclear it is more likely that fear will start to control the future sight. Erik Melander claims that fear rises from what is known but also from uncertainty. He comes to a conclusion that open and transparent societies are less uncertain and also less fearful. Melander’s approach also highlights the importance of institutions by expressing that in

¹⁵⁰ Margold 1999, 63.

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*, 63–64.

¹⁵² *ibid.*, 64.

¹⁵³ *ibid.*, 65.

¹⁵⁴ Barbera 2009, 81–82.

democratic societies they lead to peaceful articulation and regulation.¹⁵⁵ This relates to the central ideas of institutionalism's theoretical aspect.

For Peter Gale the politics of fear focuses on racism which in Australia has become part of the media debate and political discourse during the last decade. According to Gale the fear is not just vital for building and keeping up identities and *otherness* but also for the institutional structures and practices. These present the Australian culture and identity which is based on disadvantage of indigenous people and ethnic minorities and privileges of white Australians. Because racism is vital part of the constructed system, getting rid of it causes fear and threats concerning the social order.¹⁵⁶ It seems that fear has a double role but in single context. On the one hand it is fear between groups and on the other it is fear of disorder. In both cases fear is something productive and maintaining.

Barbara Hudson claims that the sense of shared risk and shared responsibility has disappeared. Constant scanning of social environment is needed to be able to recognize whether or not they pose a threat by adopting stereotypes of safe and risky people.¹⁵⁷ This comes close to the other examples considering fear of crimes and racism.

Arun Kundnani argues that to be able to maintain its security United States feels that it has to have full spectrum dominance across the globe. Neo-conservative approach appeal to concept of asymmetric warfare which claims that military might is vulnerability because it highlights its position and makes it the primary target. This conclusion is based on the end of Cold War and unanticipated technological developments combined to fear which leads to a situation where unknown future and unknown present forms a threat. The new enemy is *unknown, uncertain, unseen, and unexpected*.¹⁵⁸ Kundnani also talks about the new ways in which the home front is taking part to the warfare. The American population has become the imagined frontline of the hidden war. The war on terror doesn't happen on international or national level. It has become personal.¹⁵⁹

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¹⁵⁵ Melander 2009, 106.

¹⁵⁶ Frith 2007, 107.

¹⁵⁷ Mythen and Walklate 2006, 132.

¹⁵⁸ Kundnani 2004, 117–118.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 118.

Peter Shirlow and Rachel Pain claim that fear has been constructed. It is formed around certain groups to certain political interests. Examples like *stranger danger* for children, disorderly and dangerous young people, racial minorities, travellers and homeless people are part of this discourse¹⁶⁰ Demonised groups are actually more likely to be victims than perpetrators of crime, but most policymakers have ignored such findings.¹⁶¹

They also seem to criticize the ways in which rational debate considering terrorism is obscured via media. Organised violence is presented in political platform and there seems to be no explanation for terrorist acts. Shirlow and Pain claim that the individuals who executed the suicide attacks feel invulnerable because they embrace their very own destruction. Death becomes a symbolic intent and a weapon to control those who fear them most.¹⁶² The authors also recognize a link between group-based violence and western domination in post-colonial world. Bali bombings demonstrated mobilized despair as a political weapon to stimulate western fears and to oppose hope as a political programme. In this process fears and despairs of non-westerners are transformed into violent acts.¹⁶³

Governments use discourses of fear of crime to control and containment through punitive crime control policies. Even though fear is not known or wholly measurable and that's why it differs from risk Shirlow and Pain criticise that it should not be simply dismissed as an irrational response to a threat. It is also usually presented by geographers to be only limited to particular spaces and places. The authors see this as a false claim and they see the fear of crime as *diverse, dynamic and open to interpretation*.¹⁶⁴

They also give critique to Chris Hale's categorisation of fear as a product of victimisation, individual ability to exercise control and prevent victimisation, and as a product of environment. These approaches are individualistic and deterministic and don't recognize the social structures and power relations between offenders, victims and those who fear crime.¹⁶⁵ Shirlow and Pain write that fear works in a different levels. In territorial politics fear divides

¹⁶⁰ Shirlow and Pain 2003, 17.

¹⁶¹ *ibid.*, 20.

¹⁶² *ibid.*, 17–18.

¹⁶³ *ibid.*, 18.

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 18–19.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 20.

communities from nation and in social politics it separates gender, age, ethnicity, race, sexuality, ability and class.¹⁶⁶

Fear of crime is used in the exercise of power and not to question its hegemony, but it also has an affect to the politics of resistance. Individuals and communities create different strategies in response to fear. Because the geographies of fear are clearly bound together with the politics of marginalisation and dispossession these strategies might be damaging to some members of communities.¹⁶⁷

Shirlow's and Pain's approach to political aspect of crime of fear is appealing because they recognise the complex and situated power relations and their reflections in the social reality. On the other hand they express their concern how "powerful groups use this association between fear and place in order to dominate via the threat of violence, harassment, surveillance and other means of exerting power over the spaces of others"¹⁶⁸ but they also emphasise how this is constructed through the patterns of fear and how it can be seen in the historical, political, social and economical circumstances which different places reflect.¹⁶⁹ This expresses that politics of fear is exercised through political actors but also via societal and cultural structures and practises.

Comprehensive part of Hille Koskela's work on fear concerns urban city space and criminology. She claims that the urban security politics is related to politicization of fear¹⁷⁰ but also notices that the link to fear is not simple and direct¹⁷¹. The fields of this policy are authorities, security design and technologies, security companies, marketing and media, and everyday practices¹⁷². Koskela refers to Mike Davis's argument that fear doesn't grow from violence as much as it grows from the acts done in the name of security¹⁷³. She also refers to Nan Ellin who claims that city planning and housing construction are related to post modern fear where the fast changes of modern time strengthens the uncertainty and insecurity which could be seen in the architecture of that time but which now have been noticed and shifted to

¹⁶⁶ Shirlow and Pain 2003, 22.

¹⁶⁷ *ibid.*, 22–23.

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 23.

¹⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 24.

¹⁷⁰ Koskela 2009, 234.

¹⁷¹ *ibid.*, 237.

¹⁷² *ibid.*, 228.

¹⁷³ *ibid.*, 187.

less frightening architecture¹⁷⁴. According to Koskela the main source where the fear origin is hate¹⁷⁵ and the culture of prejudices can be overcome only by the culture of tolerance¹⁷⁶. To a question if the fear is real or false in relation to its source and justification Koskela gives a crucial aspect by arguing that the most essential thing in fear is that it is real for the one who experiences it¹⁷⁷. Fear is a hermeneutic variable.

Douglas Kellner gives a strong critic to media, how it failed to produce coherent picture of 9/11 attacks. Instead of speaking of politics of fear he uses terms connected to identity politics and discourse analysis and how they are constructed by each other. Kellner defines the nature of discourse which George W. Bush used while speaking of the war against terrorism as Manichean which is usually understood as a struggle between a good spiritual world of light and an evil material world of darkness. It means a strong dichotomy which limits and narrows the way in which situation can be presented and understood. The *evil Other* is not only constructing *the enemy* but also creating a *hero image* and the identity of *us* which legitimates and defines the means for resistance against the enemy. Kellner refers to Michael Moore's films argument how *symbolic Other* is vital for American way of exploiting fear and dramatization of threats from within everyday life. In the case of 9/11 discourse via media led to *war hysteria* and to a military solution to solve the problem of global terrorism.¹⁷⁸

Fear can also be found in cultural practices like religion. Jason Bivins has observed the intersection of socio-political conservatism and Evangelical Protestantism and has noticed that since the 1960s Conservative Evangelicals have moved from the margins to a central place. Religious *fear talk* promotes an image of an American culture in decline due to demonological influence and moral permissiveness. Religious horror has come to characterize the political discourse of the New Christian Right and mixes religion, politics, and media.¹⁷⁹

Richard Jackson highlights the use of a rhetorical trope of *good and evil* in the construction of identity and discourse. The strength of this kind of rhetoric is based on American

¹⁷⁴ Koskela 2009, 189.

¹⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 346.

¹⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 350.

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 249.

¹⁷⁸ Kellner 2004, 44, 46–47.

¹⁷⁹ *Contemporary Sociology* 2010, 101.

traditions and religious life. In the case of terrorism the opponent becomes a part of *civilization-barbarism meta-narrative* and is presented as satanic in immoral being.¹⁸⁰ De-contextualizing, de-historicizing and de-humanizing the actions of the opponent¹⁸¹ can be seen as part of construction of discourse of fear.

David Altheide has also similar kind of findings concerning discourse of fear, cultural beliefs and identity but he draws a picture of politics of fear more clearly. In his analysis fear doesn't concentrate so strongly only to certain events and actors but he also aims to describe the nature of fear. According to Altheide "fear is cumulatively integrated into topics over time, and indeed, becomes so strongly associated with certain topics that, upon repetition, is joined with that term—as with an invisible hyphen—and eventually the term fear is no longer stated, but is simply implied"¹⁸². The politics of fear is claimed to be an instrument for decision-makers to use audience's fears to achieve their goals.¹⁸³ He also approves a definition of terrorism by George Lopez and Michael Stohl as a "purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and or compliant behaviour in a victim and or audience of the act or threat"¹⁸⁴.

Social constructionists argue how mass media accounts of crime, violence and victimization are simplistic and often de-contextualize complex events to reflect narratives that demonize and involve state intervention¹⁸⁵. Altheide connects the victimization to the process of politics of fear by claiming that "Victims are a by-product of fear and the discourse of fear"¹⁸⁶. Being a victim has become a status or a position to people who live in a symbolic environment marked by the discourse of fear¹⁸⁷. Victims also need a protector from crime and terrorism which ads police and military forces to the construction of fear as a symbolical protectors¹⁸⁸. Altheide's quantitative study considering news reports revealed that after 9/11 terrorism and crime are linked very closely with the expanding use of fear and large increase

¹⁸⁰ Jackson R. 2005, 153.

¹⁸¹ *ibid.*, 154.

¹⁸² Altheide 2003, 37.

¹⁸³ *ibid.*, 43.

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 43–44.

¹⁸⁵ Altheide 2006, 417.

¹⁸⁶ *ibid.*, 433.

¹⁸⁷ Altheide 2003, 45.

¹⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 53.

in linking terrorism to victims¹⁸⁹. Still Altheide clearly highlights the fact that the politics of fear did not begin after 9/11 but it already had a long history associating fear with crime¹⁹⁰.

For Altheide the politics of fear has an ability to transform terrorism to a world condition. He also refers to Henry A. Giroux suggestion that “the rhetoric of terrorism is important because it operates on many registers to both address and inflict human misery”.¹⁹¹ His arguments are best drawn in his statements “The politics of fear resides not in an immediate threat from an individual leader but in the public discourse that characterizes social life as dangerous, fearful, and filled with actual or potential victims” and “This symbolic order invites protection, policing, and intervention to prevent further victimization”.¹⁹²

Altheide’s article also has a normative approach. The politics of fear doesn’t only promote attacking a target and victimize but it also curtails civil liberties and stifles dissents. The Homeland Security Office’s advice to buy duct tape and plastic sheeting for chemical protection¹⁹³ also expresses how politics of fear has become part of everyday life activities. This kind of reactions can’t only be explained by irrational behavioural but more likely as a placebo effect. When people try to protect themselves against some threat like disease they are given a false medicine which makes them feel more healthy and secured even though it has no actual effect, only in one’s imagination. But in the same time as it produces a feeling of being secured the “medicine” also presents an existence of threat and a need for protection.

* * *

As simply as it may sound when one tries to define *fear* the attempt meets some great difficulties. This is probably because it can be found from common talk to scientific debates. This makes its variations wider than usual and a difference between the contexts where it is presented. Even though it is a great challenge John R. Gold and George Revill have done a good work by trying to find an answer while they are exploring landscapes of fear.

¹⁸⁹ Altheide 2006, 415.

¹⁹⁰ *ibid.*, 426.

¹⁹¹ *ibid.*, 416.

¹⁹² *ibid.*, 423.

¹⁹³ *ibid.*, 433.

Fear can be seen as irrational dreads, reverences and superstitions of the pre-modern world based on mythologies, beliefs and rituals that explain surrounding phenomena. In a modern world context according to sociologists, fear dominates and operates at every scale from the level of the individual to that of the global economic system. This could be seen as a product of the increasing rationalisation and secularisation of modern westernised societies.¹⁹⁴

Gold and Revill have also listed academic writings and approaches which refers to fear but have some different emphasis. Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash write about *anxiety* which can be seen as a commodification of personal insecurity in a world of individualism. Neo-Heideggerian approach *awe* is connected to religious and aesthetic sensibilities. *Phobia* on the other hand is the secularised and medicalised version of the religious concepts of guilt and shame in which for example Michel Foucault refers. *Insecurity and uncertainty* is linked to debates about Ulrich Beck's risk theory. In this case a source for fear is a perceived or actual lack of control concerning events and resources and coping with this social mistrust. *Threat* for Edward Bryant and D. M. Chapman is a behavioural response to perceived hazards or other environmental stimuli and fear is concerning the rationality and irrationality of decision-making. According to Michael Ignatieff *hate* is generally treated as an atavistic throwback to pre-civilised societies and fear becomes linked to debate over the nature of social progress. In the theories of post-colonialism *loathing* and fear connects with anthropologies of purity and impurity and the concept of otherness. For Susan Sontag and Wolfgang Schivelbusch *trauma* explores the cyclical, crisis ridden economic relations and technologically driven stimulus overload experienced by people in capitalist modernity.¹⁹⁵

Besides connecting fear to phobia as medical terminology Foucault also connected fear, danger and security to liberalism and liberal state. In his lecture concerning biopolitics Foucault explained the problem of security where the interests of individual, collective and enterprises are in continuing conflict because they have to protect their liberties in relation to others. Individual's life where it appears as illness or old age must not endanger either the individuals or the society. *The economy of power* is interplay of freedom and security. In liberalism one is constantly exposed to danger or experience of danger. Stimulation of the

¹⁹⁴ Gold and Revill 2003, 29.

¹⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 31.

fear of danger is the internal psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism where there doesn't exist liberalism without a culture of danger.¹⁹⁶

Deborah Lupton and John Tulloch in their approach deny dichotomy of real threats and imagined fears which is similar to Koskela's notion. They also don't accept that fear is immaterial social construction as such but they refer to Richard Sparks' discursive approach. He opposes the idea that fear has been caused by a specific event nor to examine *fearfulness* solely in terms of the objects to which it is attached. Peoples' fears have serious effects because they constitute the worldview and decisions making. Gold and Revill support the way how Lupton and Tulloch question the rhetoric of legitimation linked the concept of fear, which is alternately framed as rational and irrational.¹⁹⁷ Fear is not only a product or stimulus but also an arena of conflict.¹⁹⁸

Gold and Revill connect fear and spectacle when they are defining relations between landscape and fear. Spectacle forms a medium by which cultural representations of threat are reinforced and remade in the social memory. Spectacle is created by "consciously manipulating space, landscape or objects to produce displays that draw a powerful emotional response from spectators, whose participation is part of the experience of spectacle".¹⁹⁹

The authors argue that the politics of fear has a double role. It works between nature and culture and also emotion and rationality. They feel there is a need for research rhetoric, social practices, particular uses of the concept of fear and also social and institutional interests. These are connected to both aesthetic and material practices of landscape where fear works and affects through specific historical and geographical circumstances.²⁰⁰

* * *

A National Field Experiment which used the *appraisal- tendency theory* from Jennifer Lerner and Dacher Keltner has found out that anger triggered in one situation evokes more optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices in unrelated situations and that fear does

¹⁹⁶ Foucault 2008, 96–98.

¹⁹⁷ Gold and Revill 2003, 33–34.

¹⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 45.

¹⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 38.

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 45.

the opposite, evoking pessimistic estimates and risk-averse choices.²⁰¹ The field experiment had similar results when it scaled both the terror and non-terror related risks. According to the authors examining, specific emotions can be seen even more relevant than estimating global moods.²⁰² The research and the theory it uses draws a picture of fear as a phenomena which paralyzes and leads to passivity which in this case is seen as pessimism. It also rises up the importance of individual level and also how the moods can reflect to wider public opinion. This shows that as an experiment it doesn't have just psychological but also political value.

Darrell M. West and Marion Orr have made a research study considering peoples fear of urban terrorism. They claim that emotion are usually ignored or thought to be dangerous to democratic polities. Voters decisions based on fear or anger are seen as unreasonable or unfair reactions based on affective instead of cognitive reasoning.²⁰³ Their experiment shows that there might be a connection between local officials' actions and elevation of reasoned discourse. If the officials can stimulate conversation and deliberation considering volatile subjects it will diminish negative emotions and help reasonably thinking. Opposite to this is television which is described to be "a major stimulant to raising feelings such as anger and anxiety in public life".²⁰⁴ Emotions are identified as unreasonable or irrational thinking and behaving.

Yair Neuman and Mor Levi define *fear appeal* as "a tactic of persuasion [...] an attempt to influence the attitudes or the behavior of a person by presenting him with the threatening consequences of a refusal to accept a suggested attitude or behaviour".²⁰⁵ They also claim that fear appeal is a common rhetorical strategy in political, religious, and military context.²⁰⁶ They bring out three different kinds of traditions in fear research from I. L Janis, Howard Leventhal and R.W. Rogers.

I. L. Janis's Drive Model suggests that fear is a negative drive, which a subject is motivated to reduce. The level of drive is proportional to the level of fear, and change of attitudes is positively associated with the level of fear. However,

²⁰¹ Lerner, Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff 2003, 144.

²⁰² *ibid.*, 148.

²⁰³ West and Orr 2005, 94.

²⁰⁴ *ibid.*, 103.

²⁰⁵ Neuman and Levi 2003, 29.

²⁰⁶ *ibid.*, 32.

*the model suggests that the function associating fear and change in attitudes is not a positive linear function. That is, a low manipulation of fear is not effectual enough to evoke the drive to reduce it. On the other hand, a very powerful manipulation of fear might result in a defensive avoidance, known as the “boomerang effect.” In this case, the subject might ignore the message.*²⁰⁷

In Janis’s model the biggest unsolved problem is how the strong manipulation of fear can be measured. Howard Leventhal conceptualizes fear appeal in his *Parallel Response Theory*.

*[...] when a subject encounters a threatening stimulus, he is cognitively evaluating the threatening event. This evaluation results in emotional arousal and behavioral response. The emotional response is produced by fear control, a process in which the subject becomes aware of his emotional response to the threatening event. This process causes the subject to take control over the fearful event [...] The behavioural response involves danger control, a decision-making process in which the subject gathers information from the environment and chooses the best response to take control over the threat.*²⁰⁸

For Leventhal controlling threat is control over danger and feelings. Changes in behaviour are linear to the rate of fear so the more the subject is afraid the more the subject is willing to change behaviour or attitudes.²⁰⁹ R. W. Rogers has similar approach but it concentrates more to cognitive processes that mediate persuasion through fear appeal in *Protection Motivation Theory*.

*It assumes that fear can be manipulated if the given information includes three components.(a) the seriousness of the expected consequences, (b) the probability that the undesired consequences will take place, and (c) the usefulness of the action the message recommends in order to avoid the threat. These components create three corresponding cognitive processes: (a) the appraisal severity, (b) expectancy of exposure, and (c) belief in the efficacy of coping responses.*²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Neuman and Levi 2003, 31.

²⁰⁸ *ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *ibid.*

²¹⁰ Neuman and Levi 2003, 31–32.

Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate concentrate mostly on the modes of communication between institutions and individuals. “Instead of appealing to collective desires for the good life, the language of politics increasingly taps into individualized insecurities and fears”²¹¹. By these institutional practices security duties that are traditionally connected to state are suddenly shifting to responsibilities of citizens which process the authors call responsabilization²¹². Murray Lee uses Foucaultian methods governmentality and genealogy in his analysis which has similar results compared to the concept of responsabilization. For Lee fear is used as a tactic of governance because an individual has to govern one’s risk of becoming a victim. Via self-governance individual becomes shaped by pictures and narratives which eventually leads to *fearing subject*.²¹³

Anxiety toward terrorism is constructed via cultural and linguistic interactions and it becomes real through physiological and psychological processes. According to Andrew Tudor fear is a macro and a micro response. Macro response consists of everyday habitat, cultural practices and social structures and the micro level considers bodies, personalities and social subjects. If the nature of fear is wanted to be analysed properly it is vital to understand the cultural networks through which fears is constructed and actualized and how it works in relations to self-resources, individual experiences and the formation of coping strategies.²¹⁴

3.2 DETERRENCE POLICY

When the concept of politics of fear is tried to be clarified it comes to a question what is *deterrence policy* and does it in some ways differ from it. If fear works as a deterrent, should they be separated or spoken as one phenomenon? Do these two concepts share the same field of study, participate the same debates and same methodological and theoretical approaches? These questions will be estimated based on the latest discussion among the published literature of deterrence policy.

Classical deterrence theory can be divided into structural and decision-theoretic theory. The literature focuses on different units of analysis but the assumptions, conclusions and the

²¹¹ Mythen and Walklate 2006,124.

²¹² *ibid.*

²¹³ Lee 2001, 481–482.

²¹⁴ Mythen and Walklate 2006,133.

policy prescriptions are essentially the same. In structural deterrence theory the international system constitutes the principal unit of analysis. This *self-help* system is anarchic and the nature of its units is rational and egotistical. According to Hans Morgenthau units are driven to maximize power. For Kenneth Waltz their goal is to reach maximized security.²¹⁵

Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider and Marc L. Hutchison concentrate on arms races and strategic rivalry. They refer to Morgenthau's traditional international relations theory which sees the deterrence as a show of strength which causes tense but peaceful relations between the political parties.²¹⁶ A successful deterrence leads to a peaceful state in world politics. The authors use the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States as an example of possible reason for Cold War peace but also acknowledge that even small changes are a risk and might have led to a failed deterrence²¹⁷. Simon J. Davies refers also to similar findings which claim that fear of nuclear escalation prevented the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan during the 1990 Kashmir crisis²¹⁸. The image given of deterrence here is a type of balance of power, which aims into positive results in preventing conflicts. It is a shared logic between political actors which are primary states.

Also Ursula Japser and Clara Portela share some of these same elements in relation to descriptions of deterrence policy. They strongly connect the deterrence policy into nuclear deterrence where the subjects and targets for the deterrence are nation-states and their regional defence.²¹⁹ Frank C. Zagare notes that early decision-theoretic deterrence theorists' conclusion of structural deterrence theory was that war in the nuclear age is irrational²²⁰. These claims are based on traditional approaches and a geopolitically oriented worldview. Compared to politics of fear the political concept of political actors and environment are very different in deterrence policy. Politics of fear can have similar functions as forming borders between different actors and to limit their freedom to act but it doesn't theoretically or methodologically limit itself to questions concerning geographical borders or threats formed by certain weapon technologies. This kind of debate doesn't concentrate on such phenomena as terrorism, international criminality or state terror and it follows the traditional model of

²¹⁵ Zagare 2004, 109.

²¹⁶ Gibler, Rider and Hutchison 2005, 131.

²¹⁷ *ibid.*, 132.

²¹⁸ Davies 2004, 66.

²¹⁹ Japser and Portela 2010, 145–168.

²²⁰ Zagare 2004, 111.

international system where the non-governmental organisations, civil society and individuals are not recognized.

Patrick M. Morgan examines a special case where the deterrence is not created by single state but produced by collective-actor. He claims that this type of deterrence credibility is more suspect than that of national governments and that the credibility is based on the institutionalized nature of the actors. Its effectiveness also consists of general security management and threats to fight instead of retaliate.²²¹ Morgan's approach recognizes more complicated system of international relations than just *self-help*, but it is fundamentally based on institutionalism. Even politics of fear can be linked to institutions; they do not form a fundamental base on the research.

Jeffrey D. Berekjian criticizes the assumption of the rational nature of states based on empirical research of decision-making²²². He also claims that the academic literature on deterrence is large, but the number of core arguments remains small²²³. Findings of cognitive psychology oppose international relations theory and call for new models of international politics grounded in the capacities of actual decision-makers²²⁴. Based on his theory Berekjian classifies deterrence into three types: mutual deterrence, unilateral deterrence and extended deterrence²²⁵. In mutual deterrence states confront a choice between selecting the known benefits of the status quo or pursuing a gamble intended to further improve their position through defection²²⁶. In unilateral deterrence one state is satisfied with the status quo and another is not²²⁷ where in the extended deterrence involves a state to defend an ally against aggression²²⁸. Threat credibility lies in rival perceptions about the hidden costs of action where the lower hidden costs cause greater actual strength of a state and willingness to implement threats. To maintain credibility is to manipulate rival perceptions about hidden costs.²²⁹ These notifications present the system of deterrence as a type of game theory, which the states participate and where the analysis concentrates on the examination of rules. This kind of work aims to build a model which would explain the relation between deterrence and

²²¹ Morgan P. 2006, 135.

²²² Berekjian 2002, 165.

²²³ *ibid.*

²²⁴ *ibid.*, 166.

²²⁵ *ibid.*, 165.

²²⁶ *ibid.*, 173.

²²⁷ *ibid.*, 176.

²²⁸ *ibid.*, 178.

²²⁹ *ibid.*, 167.

decision making but it seems to understand these as non-historical activity. This approach could be criticised, as stable mathematical and behavioural model, to be also apolitical.

The research of deterrence policy searches an answer to *question in what kind of circumstances does conflicts escalate*²³⁰ where the nature of deterrence is as *military deterrence*²³¹. The way how deterrence policy and politics of fear select and approach their research is quite different. The conclusion is that these concepts can and should be kept separately from each other based on their different tradition in pre-assumptions of theory, methodology and the setting of research problem. Understanding of spatiality, temporality and agency in mainstream is fundamentally different and the interest of research doesn't express strongly a need for a combining these two concepts.

3.3 SECURITIZATION

When one talks about the politics of fear it is easily related to securitization theory. Is this just a way to speak about the same phenomenon with two different concepts, which would look in one's eyes as intellectually dishonest? Securitization theories have also variations within their tradition but they are mostly based on the hypotheses of Copenhagen School, so the comparison between securitization and the politics of fear is made mostly based on the traditional mainstream approaches.

Andrew W. Neal bases his analysis of securitization on theory of Ole Wæver²³². It argues that security is a process where issues are securitized by security elites and state agents through speech acts²³³. These securitizing actors may be states, international organizations, non-governmental organisation or other similar actors²³⁴. Jocelyn Vaughn adds that the framework of securitization is to answer why some of the issues are treated in the security agenda and some are not which also dependents of the target audience²³⁵. Because securitization can't be simply imposed argumentation is needed²³⁶ to convince the audience

²³⁰ Zagare 2004, 134.

²³¹ Berejikian 2002, 168.

²³² Neal 2006, 32.

²³³ *ibid.*, 33.

²³⁴ Jackson N. 2006, 301.

²³⁵ Vaughn 2009, 265.

²³⁶ Vaughn 2009, 266.

of the issue as security problem and threat to cause social and political mobilization²³⁷. Usually these issues are claimed to be urgent and exceptional²³⁸. Paul Roe points out also an important part of the process which are the legitimacy to deal with the threat²³⁹.

Neal argues that these features highlight the discursive, strategic and socio-political nature of security and doesn't see it as a metaphysical phenomenon which means that any events or issues can be treated as such²⁴⁰. Nicole J. Jackson refers to similarly of the nature of security as *constructivist/realist* approach where security is defined as non-objective condition of specific social process²⁴¹. A threat is presented as existential by its nature but the theory itself doesn't concentrate on what is security but how something is presented and successfully recognized as a threat²⁴².

According to Neal state is usually the political actor that securitizes. Such authors as Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde including Wæver claim that securitization is not limited to the states. Olav Knudsen argues that the Copenhagen School has actually tried to shift the security apart from the states and the study of war and that Wæver, Buzan and de Wilde consider the *military core* as something to be avoided²⁴³. Joselyn Vaughn criticises them by breaking this rule by referring to *political action* which they in their own applications privilege to a state-dominated reading of security. Even if security is not directly related to state it is still tightly connected to governmental institutions or intergovernmental organizations.²⁴⁴ Even the non-governmental organizations are build on and act according to international law and politics produced by states. Claire Wilkinson describe this as *Westphalian straightjacket* which sets the frames of the nation-state for theoretical and empirical securitization research even when one talks about societal security and identity threats²⁴⁵. Jackson claims that state-centrism exists probably because the act of securitizing is generally understood to be the responsibility of the state²⁴⁶.

²³⁷ Neal 2006, 33.

²³⁸ *ibid.*, 34.

²³⁹ Roe 2008, 615.

²⁴⁰ Neal 2006, 33.

²⁴¹ Jackson N. 2006, 300.

²⁴² *ibid.*, 301.

²⁴³ Roe 2008, 615.

²⁴⁴ Vaughn 2009, 266.

²⁴⁵ *ibid.*

²⁴⁶ Jackson N. 2006, 301.

Vaughn blames the Copenhagen School's securitization framework from not paying enough attention or providing proper analytical tools for researching the audience²⁴⁷. This leaves the analysis torso. Jackson supports this criticism from another perspective where he doesn't concentrate directly on recognizing the right audience but the problem of having a narrow understanding of political communication beyond the speech-act²⁴⁸. Furthermore Neal finds the way how securitization treats discourse problematic in relation to constructivism. Formalising the discursive process in certain frames makes security a special category which at the same time distinguishes it from politics.²⁴⁹

If we now take a look of these findings, we can see several reasons to keep the concepts of the securitization theory and the politics of fear as separated categories. Discursive nature, the audience and a formation of objects as a socio-political process are examples of approaches which these two concepts can hypothetically share. On the other hand the critique given to the securitization should be avoided in the conceptualization of the politics of fear which at the present political debate has remained still quite unclear and loose. Still at this state of research following arguments can be formed. Security as a concept already is related to state and security organizations such as police, army and private security actors. Security expresses rather a condition of the object instead of experience or emotion. It is rather quantitative than qualitative term even though securitization theory as such do not lay on existentialism of security. As an emotion, fear doesn't necessary has to be related to the fact of being safe or secured. Fear can exist in spaces where security can not, which also closes the possibility for securitization out. Politics of fear doesn't have to emerge in relation to legitimacy because it can exist as a form of oppression without any legality or ethical norms. In some cases the politics of fear could be understood as a precondition for securitising.

²⁴⁷ Vaughn 2009, 267.

²⁴⁸ Jackson N. 2006, 301.

²⁴⁹ Neal 2006, 33.

4. HISTORIES OF VIOLENCE

History of the body is inseparable from the history of violence. Violence has been described to have many varying forms. It has been examined for example as direct, structural, cultural²⁵⁰ or sexual violence. In the context of some events violence appear as exaggerating, brutal and unreasonable where also the following responses have appeared as obscure and uncanny. These events and acts of violence seems something which can not be understood or explained but which as such are something central the *formation of the objects of fear*.

The forms of uncanny violence under different methodological and theoretical headlines are set in this research and following case studies under the concept of the *symbolic violence*. It is understood here as something which doesn't only understand the act of violence and it's representation as direct violence and its documentation. The symbolic violence is a form of violence which works and affects in the symbolic level, a violence which do not only affect to our body but to our knowledge of the body. It should rather be linked to the body politics where the body is turned into object of knowledge²⁵¹. Histories of violence trace how the concept of body is transformed by violence into an object of fear.

²⁵⁰ Galtung 2003, 199.

²⁵¹ Foucault 1984, 175–176.

4.1 VULNERABLE US



Picture I



Picture II



Picture III

In 1996 Osama bin Laden stated that a death of one American in Mogadishu led to withdrawal of United States from the peacekeeping operation, which more importantly, revealed their *impotence* and *weakness*. He referred to the case of U.S. Staff Sgt. William David Cleveland who was killed during the fights in Mogadishu and the immediate decision of US president Bill Clinton to abandon the mission of the pursuit of General Mohamed Ali Farrah Aidid and to withdraw from Somalia by March 31, 1994.²⁵² This claim would seem unreasonable if one would compare it for example to the casualties of US troops in The Vietnam War which makes one to ask, what made this case different. What caused the transformation of a single body of a soldier into an object of vulnerability and death, and its appearance as unbearable in presented political context?

The answer lies somewhere in the three Pulitzer Prized photographs taken from the event by Canadian photographer Paul Watson²⁵³. It is a question of the representation of the event with the extension of global audience, a process where a set of photographs affected collective knowledge, emerging as a rupture in what is understood as continuity in history.

²⁵² Iconic Photos 2010.

²⁵³ *ibid.*

The content of these pictures are something which Judith Butler could point out as something which “brings us close to an understanding of the fragility and mortality of human life, the stakes of death in the scene of politics”²⁵⁴.

Based on the assumed political effect and exceptionality related to violence and collective consciousness, the case of Mogadishu is set under analysis in relation to its representation. The documents used are Paul Watson’s three photographs²⁵⁵. In the analysis to avoid confusion it is important to note that the word *body* is used to express both a living and a dead body. Word *corps* is only used in the case where it is essential to draw a clear line between the state of life and death, and the transformation from one to another.

Before the analysis is started, it is also important to acknowledge what is meant by the *Western* aspect or perspective. There is a great variation how this group or socially oriented perspective is formed and what kind of material it holds inside, but some main principles can be stated at least in methodological sense. The perspective formation is not based on short term interest and daily politics but it is similar to “socio-cultural *code* of civilization”²⁵⁶ as Galtung has named them in his *Civilization Theory* which divides cultural spheres into six *cosmologies*. The *cosmology* of a civilization is the *collectively held subconscious ideas about what constitutes normal and natural reality*, where the subconscious mean shared assumptions of reality. Here the *Western* sphere comes closest to the cosmologies *Occident I* and *Occident II*, where the focus lies mostly in the first one as Greco-Roman and modern sphere. In the case of Mogadishu according to these *cosmologies* there doesn’t exist a conflict between two civilizations because the both *Occidents* share the same Semitic-Abrahamitic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam.²⁵⁷ Galtung notes that cosmologies present broad view and characterize macro-cultures²⁵⁸ which mean that they don’t necessary explain well all the socio-cultural phenomena.

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²⁵⁴ Butler 2009, 96.

²⁵⁵ Picture I, Picture II and Picture III also referred as first, second and third picture. The colours have been changed to black and white by the writer of the thesis

²⁵⁶ Galtung 2003, 212.

²⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 211.

²⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 212.

The *litany* level of the three photographs is challenging to catch because it only includes visible and obvious messages and it excludes highly analytical capability²⁵⁹. It can also be found as momentary and quickly changing from its temporal nature which requires a different approach than the latter levels which are more stabile. To be able to catch the essence of the *litany* it is divided into *statement* based on a set of visible characterizations, rising *emotions* and projected *actions*.

The statement for the event can be drawn as *our soldier has been killed and his body has been brutally mistreated by the African enemy*. The statement expresses the perspective to the event and defines it in a simple stereotypical form of ‘us’ and ‘the other’²⁶⁰ and a causal relation between the event and these two parties. It also valued the nature and ethics of the actions including to the event and refers indirectly to its spatial location. Temporality on the other hand is rare in the *litany* because the event is usually seen as discontinuous²⁶¹ and the event is taking place in its own separated cluster in time.

The emotions which easily rise are disgust, anxiety and fear which are followed by confusion, distrust and hate. The first reactions are caused by the unpleasant sight of the body and the second one is mostly based on the actions done by the ‘other’. Confusion is also caused by the two conflicting messages from the ‘other’ in the same context, hostility and celebration. This leads to a situation where the ‘other’ seems unpredictable which leads to uncontrollability and furthermore distrust in the interactive relations.

The risen emotions are mostly negative because they can be seen causing stress, aggressiveness and deconstructive atmosphere in relation to the ‘others’. This can lead either to direct conflict or active isolation. Projected actions in the context of peacekeeping could mean an authorisation for wider scale of use of military power to be able to answer to the threat caused by the enemy or retreat from the conflict area to secure the lives of own military staff. Even in the surface level like the *litany* lie already signs of interruption in temporal dimension, a historical discontinuity in discursive constructions. The conclusions drawn from the event are that *we can be killed by the enemy* and *we are not safe anymore*. This leads to the awareness of *violence* and *vulnerability* which manifests in the dead body.

²⁵⁹ Inayatullah 2004, 16.

²⁶⁰ see e.g. Harle 2005, 102.

²⁶¹ Inayatullah 2004, 16.

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The analysis of the *social causes* level concentrates on questions of *status*, *institutions* and *aims*. 'Us' of the *litany* level is defined here more carefully and projected to social context, which then is transformed into social and political *status*. The identification of the 'other' comes also central in this level but no clear status is recognized or expressed. The *institutions* contain similar qualities as status put in more formal, public and legislated appearance, but the main difference is the authorization. The *aims* describe the ongoing political movement for a certain cause which is strongly based on the dominating discourse and worldview, but which has a strong manifestation on the *social causes*.

The status of the person can be shortly defined as a member of the Western military personnel (or a soldier) and a peacekeeper. This status embodies dominance, protection and stability and creates human shield to protect itself and the others and furthermore, to protect the other from each other. The last one is especially significant in the status of peacekeeper and separates it from soldier. The photos break the social order in the event and the protector becomes a victim and the ones who need to be either protected or blocked become violators of the order. Social causes for 'us' is that *our present status doesn't guarantee our safety*. Africa(ns) in the role of the 'other' gets the form of uncontrollable power and danger for themselves and others.

The uncertainty that is expressed toward the *status* has inevitable effect to institutions. Institution authorizes and gives the status for the individual who becomes the representative of the institutional power. The event shatters images of such highly valued and recognized institutions as US army and United Nations as monolithic, invulnerable and irresistible powers. In social level the institutions are usually seen as the main or only capable actors to solve different situations and problems. The event shows them as disabled in their mission and even as targets for the violence, the power which they should be able to monopolize, control and use to reach their collective aims. Institutes are in terms of philosophy of law *father substitutes* which are understood as protectors and authorities and share the same category as parents in family and god(s) in religion. A threat for institution can be seen as more threatening than direct threat for individual because it presents a danger for both the individual and to the collective, the socially constructive core of the individual.

Social reasons and the effort to reach vital aims are not guaranteed and their foundation seems fragile. *To prevent killing* has turned into *to be killed*. The casualties doesn't necessary have to mean a failure of the mission in the eyes of social community, but it is a matter of *symbolic exchange* and the event can be successfully transformed into energy as Jean Baudrillard argues²⁶². If the death person and the death itself can be presented as a meaningful sacrifice for the community's aims and values, they can be experienced as "*socially symbolic events*"²⁶³. This process seems most likely failed because publishing photographs seemed to have an important role in the change of public opinion against keeping the US forces in Somalia²⁶⁴. Failing in the glorification of the casualty is most likely based on the presented reaction of the crowd, which celebrates the death and does not appear as something vulnerable and protectable, and makes the event of death at the same time meaningless, unreasonable and horrifyingly performed.

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When the *discourse/worldview* level is under analysis it is crucial to question the dominating, controlling and leading representative practices. In the case of news pictures a deeper understanding of the essence of photographing is needed. Furthermore the recognition of the discursive practices in photographs, a worldview which sets the aspect for the analysis of the event behind the photographs is needed. Both are important in acknowledging the processes which lead to the representation of visual signs, and on the other hand the processes of how these signs are read and understood.

The main questions can be drawn to the informative nature of the photograph in relation to our cognition and to the participation of the photographer how this knowledge and understanding is formed. Judith Butler disagrees with Susan Sontag's view that photographs can affect us but not provide understanding²⁶⁵. For Sontag the photographs are only small fragments of reality and may shock us and cause emotional reactions but they are not itself interpretations or informing and moving us politically²⁶⁶. Butler argues that there lies "a

²⁶² Baudrillard 1993, 165.

²⁶³ *ibid.*

²⁶⁴ Seppälä 2005, 210.

²⁶⁵ Butler 2009, 66.

²⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 66–69.

persistent split between being affected and being able to think and understand”²⁶⁷ in Sontag’s writings which seems to reflect a wider debate with long philosophical tradition concerning the different ontological nature of emotions and rationality questioned in the introduction. It seems quite confusing to claim that ability for empathy or sympathy would be unable to mobilize politically or acknowledge the event from subjective perspective via simulated experience.

Butler questions Sontag’s argument that narratives are more effective instrument to affect people’s mind and behaviour than photographs and she also criticises Sontag’s way to accept the evidential nature of the photographs²⁶⁸. Her critic is based on the idea of interpretative nature of photographs²⁶⁹ or as she formulates it “The photograph is not merely a visual image awaiting interpretation; it is itself actively interpreting, sometimes forcibly so”²⁷⁰. A *frame* and *framing* seems to be the central act which produces and reveals the interpretation according to Butler’s arguments. All the images are framed and not without a purpose²⁷¹ because the act of photographing doesn’t happen in a socio-political vacuum. For André Bazin a photographic image is rooted in reality but one needs to ask what lies beyond the image²⁷². As in Jacques Lacan’s analysis of gaze and voice, *objet petit a*, in the picture can not be placed to *the subject* but rather to *the object*. Gaze is a place in the picture where the object is looking at you; the frame of the aspect of gaze is already coded into the content of the picture.²⁷³ Misjudgement can be easily done if the process of representation is artificially separated from the world of cultural phenomena and sign systems. The argument considering the political nature of photograph is based on the role of photographer as an actor choosing the techniques of representation and the discursively orientated practices how this can be done.

Even the fragmented reality which is produced by photographs as Sontag claims can have a similar effect as narrative via montage. Russian film director Sergei Eisenstein is widely considered as the creator of montage theory. Montage’s expressional strength is based on the low density and strong contrast between the structuring elements which is opposite to clear

²⁶⁷ Butler 2009, 70.

²⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 69–70.

²⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 66.

²⁷⁰ *ibid.*, 71.

²⁷¹ *ibid.*, 70.

²⁷² Carroll 1996, 43.

²⁷³ Žižek 2009, 12.

continuity which is the basic principle in narrative. To be able to maintain the causality and the logic of what is seen, this “empty space” is filled with the material from the viewers mind, based on one’s own thoughts, cultural connections and worldview. This ultimately changes the nature of what is seen. Instead of a monologue the relation between representation and the viewer becomes interactive. The viewer transforms into participator and from passive to active constructing element of the representation. Montage technique creates a strong experience and illusion of reality. Hardly any other technique can manipulate and preserve the experiential space so effectively.²⁷⁴ As Kari Pirilä and Erkki Kivi concludes the essence of montage, in the film *take one* and *take two* are not a sum of the two but a *third expressional reality*²⁷⁵. Notions made considering the montage theory have similarities to Sontag’s view about photographs. She claims that the sentiment forms around the photographic image instead the actual event and structures memory more effectively than understanding or narrative²⁷⁶. This comes close to the notions of manipulative and preserving nature of image production of montage technique.

As the viewer becomes the one who makes the interpretation and at the same time he/she becomes part of the process as a participator of the representation, not a separate objective party, it comes crucial to ask how or who selects and produces the fragments that are used. As Butler puts it, we cannot only concentrate on the content but also what is left outside and how this is done in silence without clear recognizable visual sign²⁷⁷. Also montage creates order and structure into chaos by leaving out elements which are unimportant for the ability to form a bigger picture²⁷⁸. This argument clearly shows the importance of selectivity and that things that are seen as unimportant and less valuable are left outside because they are not useful (or maybe even harmful) for the image which is under construction process. To be able to understand the interests, values and power relations which lead to certain kind of selections, it is crucial to recognizing the elements which for some reason are left outside. A simple conclusion from the process which leads to montage is not coherent because the reasons are not formed from one clearly definable phenomenon. Decisions can be made unconsciously without a clear reason which is based on dominating practices and ways of thinking and not because of individual or group interests. Something that is left outside as

²⁷⁴ Pirilä and Kivi 2005, 11–12.

²⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 14.

²⁷⁶ Butler 2009, 70–71.

²⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 73.

²⁷⁸ Pirilä and Kivi 2005, 18.

unimportant is more difficult to recognize and acknowledge than what elements are included to montage.

If what is said about interpretation, framing and montage is put into practice in analysis of the three photographs, some remarks or more likely questions can be drawn. At this point it is important to notice that a montage can be inside a take (single photograph) and between the takes (a set of photographs or a film) which means that the analysis of framing needs to be done inside them separately and together. The actual questions would be then *what is actually seen and what is presumed to exist outside the frame; how does the order of the pictures change the dramaturgy of the documented event; what happens before, after and between the pictures; who is there behind the objective and all together what kind of causality this constructs.*

The framing of the pictures sets the body in the centre of the picture which draws the attention to it and makes it the dominating element of the documented event. The event is about the body and the surroundings of the body. The framing also sets the photographer in the middle of the event and heightens the feeling of *being there*. The actual physical distance might have been different but the “zooming in” to the body draws the perspective in the immediate proximity of the heart of the event. Close framing also leaves the exact place and participators of the event unclear. Depending of the chosen picture the estimated number of people varies between 20 and 30 persons and only about one third can be presumably identified. The framing closes some people outside the picture which doesn’t necessarily diminish the size of the crowd but together with the close distance creates impression of being surrounded by the crowd which enlarger the location (and the assumed number) of the crowd from less than 180° to 360° around the standpoint of the photographer.

In montage the elements can appear at the same time or follow each other. Constantly chancing harmonic and conflict, dominating and diminishing, power and counter power relations are constructing the dramaturgy in the event.²⁷⁹ Also the impression of the event may vary depending on the structure of the representation. The three photographs are the variable elements which create the montage in relations to which pictures are used and in which order. The montage elements inside the pictures are analysed later in the semiotic

²⁷⁹ Pirilä and Kivi 2005, 21.

analysis of metaphors. The first photograph shows a close picture which emphasizes the nudity. The second photograph gives the clearest overview of the event because the framing is the most distant from the body. Third one expresses most efficiently the different emotional conditions of the people. Choosing between these highlights a certain quality and aspect to the event. Butler also refers to the meaning of changing context and that there are always selections made in relation to what is shown and how it is shown for example considering the size of the imprinted pictures²⁸⁰.

What is unknown for the viewer of the photographs is what happens between milliseconds that it takes from the camera's objective to close and capture a moment on the film. The three photographs present estimated one second of the events timeline, which reveals a great gap in the idea how long the actual event lasts. Also what has happened before the pictures which would mean the actual act of killing and moment of dying remains unknown. Furthermore documents do not show what happened to the body after the photographing. The situation which led to the death is incomplete and leads opportunities to give varying answers without real validity to estimate their coherency.

Similar findings that Butler makes considering the embedded reporting²⁸¹ which also means involvement from outside the actual reporting can be found in the case of Mogadishu. The Time magazine decided to cover up the soldier's exposed genitals when they published the photograph²⁸². For some reason the sexual elements were considered more harmful for the public audience than the presented violence. This reflects a dominating sexually oriented normative discourse which affected the principles of what can be shown.

Next step in the analytical focus of discourse and worldview is to capture the discursive supporting framework on how the pictures are read through Western perspective and what kind of interpretative models it includes. Sarah Ahmed argues that we can locate the origins of fear to the past narratives which are connected to the present²⁸³. Also Foucauldian view can be seen supporting her in the context of archaeological method. Foucault claims that discursive formations can not be interrupted and reconstituted in a single moment²⁸⁴, which

²⁸⁰ Butler 2009, 80.

²⁸¹ *ibid.*, 66.

²⁸² Iconic Photos 2010.

²⁸³ Ahmed 2003, 190.

²⁸⁴ Neal 2006, 37.

means that the past knowledge is affecting to the present thinking. Instead of archaeology Reinhart Koselleck uses layers from geology as a metaphor for the analysis of time. These time layers consist of events which are separated from each other based on their unpredictability. The accumulation of experience leads to a situation where one estimates and concentrates on events which possibly will appear again. Events can produce innovation but the worldview consisting of magical, religious or philosophical presumptions and attitudes can not change immediately, because the language doesn't transform or disappear. Describing new phenomena is done by using old words which leads to the existence of long-term pre-condition, *Vorgaben*.²⁸⁵

The presumptions of the 'other' are build on *Vorgaben*, old *discursive formations* which can be shortly named as *negro/necro* discourse. This term carries two meanings which are *black* and *death*. Describing Africa as black area doesn't necessary mean a visual sign referring to the skin colour but also and most likely the presumed state of the geographical and cultural area²⁸⁶ based on all the historical knowledge, events, assumption, misunderstandings and debates. *Black* in this context expresses primitivism, immorality and instability, a *cultural blackout*. Culture defines humanity which makes 'Africans' less humans and their lives less recognizable as *grievable* and *precarious*²⁸⁷.

Necro as a word for death expresses uncertainty and untrustworthiness. Continent with unknown areas, wild life and lethal diseases seems uncontrollable culture of death, a *necro culture*. Colonialism, ethnic conflicts, civil wars and humanitarian crises constructs the image of the area as violent and a great danger for the life of others, and even to itself. The meaning of death has also a metaphysical dimension when it is set into religious context. Historical idea of unchristian Africa before the Christian missionary, which has later on transformed partly to Islamic Africa, means fundamental difference not only in physical appearance but also the difference as spiritual being. In *necro culture* death dominates life, and life exists only in the context of dying, precondition of death. Without salvation and eternal life the culture of death leads to damnation of immortal soul, death of the spiritual being. Hobbes's claims, that it is impossible to have a covenant with *brute beasts* because they can not

²⁸⁵ Koselleck, Narr and Palonen 2000, 28–29.

²⁸⁶ The way of talking about 'Africa' as one homogenous being is already a discursive formation which oversimplifies and defines a continent and its people via stereotypes.

²⁸⁷ *Grievable and precarious* are terms which Judith Butler uses in her book *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (2009).

understand our speech and accept any translation of rights²⁸⁸ describes this fundamental difference existing in *negro/necro* discourse. The destruction and casualties that the *black death* causes, needs to be limited to a certain areas and with certain means.

One very appealing example of affective politics of fear which Ahmed presents is a *fear fantasy* of a Western child which is named in the context of race and racism as *Cannibal Negro*²⁸⁹. This term describes well the essence of *negro/necro* discourse because it expresses in two words primitive behaviour, violence, break of moral norm and taboo, non-human, threat to life and ethnicity via skin colour. In the *fear fantasy* a human transforms into a beast which aims and nature of behaviour is to cause death. In the discursive formation a *Negro* is categorized in to the same group with creatures like trolls and wolfs in fairytales, where the other is human-like creature with qualities of a beast and the other is beast with human abilities. What makes these creatures extremely dangerous is that their visual appearance does not carry the meaning of humane behaviour but the immorality of beast. Still they carry the capability of human action like making strategies (even they are less intelligent than humans) and using tools which makes them more threatening. Also 'our' inability to recognize and separate a *human being* from a *human beast* makes us more vulnerable to their attack. A *Negro* is unusually dangerous because it reminds us but is not one of us.

A *Negro* differs from us because it presents the *savage life* which is defined as similar to *animal life*. According to Arendt, the savages were understood to be as human beings but they are lacking the human character and the human reality, because they are part of nature which is their only sovereign. In our understanding this kind of half-humans or human formed beasts are seen as unreal and ghostlike which leads to horrifying and alien experience beyond imagination.²⁹⁰ What can be concluded here is that the *politics of fear is constructed from clearly indefinable objects, which appear as frightening because their true nature remains partly hidden*.

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²⁸⁸ Hobbes 1962, 109.

²⁸⁹ Ahmed 2003, 191.

²⁹⁰ Mbembe 2008, 163.

Without the textual supporting context the series of pictures seems to carry a small amount of information. The *litany*, the *social causes* and the *discourse/worldview* levels are more likely constructed from elements outside the pictures, a group of predominant assumptions. When the series of pictures are taken to a closer and deeper semiotic structural analysis, different signs and their relation can be discovered.

To describe the relations inside the picture each of them is divided to three main roles. These are *the subject*, *the object* and *the viewer*. *The subject* is active, dominant, participating, visible and connected to *the object* which is passive, dominated but can be also involving and visible. What needs to be immediately clarified is that these roles are not stable or clearly separated from each other. For example the third and usually the most complicated role *the viewer* can have both remaining roles but it also may just appear as passive audience for the event. *The viewer* is the one who reveals the context and gives the physical perspective which is crucial in understanding the aspect which it produces. The pictures are divided into four analytical units: *death*, *nudity*, *violence* and *emotional expressions*.

The body in the pictures is non-responsive. Pictures don't show any major damage like open wounds, mutilation, missing limbs or bleeding, so there can not be made a clear diagnosis concerning the present state of *the body* and any clear reason for which could have lead to death. The position of *the body* tells us more than other messages of its condition. *The body* is tied up from its hands and right leg is twisted over the left leg. This uncomfortable and painful position even without other use of violence should cause immediate response or even woke up unconscious person. Also all the muscles seem to be languished. The face doesn't have any expressions while eyes are closed and mouth slightly open. This non-responsiveness transforms the sign of *the body* into the sign of *the corps*. The picture series doesn't present the existence of *the body* but the existence of *death*. In its most passive form *the body* has become *the object* and sign of death.

Nudity has several meanings which are valued in their relations to the context in which it is presented. In this case they consider mostly *status*, *humanity* and *taboo*. These can be seen much more clearly connected to the case than for example sexuality which is usually easy to link to nudity. What is meant by the *status* is actually in this case the lack of signs which could express the social group, nationality, wealthy and even the ethnic background. Wrestering the clothes and soiling the skin hides the symbols of status and power of *the object*.

Military uniform is a sign-vehicle for certain semantic units. It is a symbol of power. It places the person carrying it above the civilians or illegal combatants because he or she is the representative of sovereign power, institution which has power over individual freedom. It may mean either protector or opponent and vanquisher depending of the situation. Either way uniform usually gives a dominant role in relation to the persons without it and also creates a hierarchy inside the ones carrying it by using status expressing symbols. Fabric presents the monopolization and institutionalization of violence.

Wresting the uniform has also another meaning which has roots deeper in history than the using of uniform. I call this practice *symbolic skinning*. In warfare the skinning of the enemy appears as spectacle of violence but also as an ultimate act of power over the life of the enemy and even his/her existence as a human. Nudity and dirt expresses uncivilised behaviour, poverty, sickness and makes the nude person savage and animal-like. The sign is even stronger because of the contrast to the crowd which is well dressed and almost all the body parts are covered with clothing. That is how the nudity also separates the person from the other people in the same context. Clothes are the *other skin* that is ripped of to diminish the personhood.

If the viewer of the representation of the event is Western or Christian, *nudity* has a mythical dimension originated to the Holy Bible. In the Creation man and woman were described to be naked. Nudity meant belonging to the nature and to its moral sphere. Breaking against the God's command and becoming aware of their human existence nudity became a taboo. Dressing up meant a creation of camouflage to hide ones presence, armour to protect one self from the vulnerability of the body and to create a physical sign to identify human and socially separate him/her from the animals. *Nudity* can be simplified to be sign of sin. Sin on the other hand symbolises weakness, vulnerability, death, shame and separation. By showing a naked body these culturally constructed cognitive models can be reawakened which connects the event into wider historical and social context. The content of this specific cultural cognition is completely negative which has a major impact to how the event is seen. Especially the first picture is extremely difficult because it shows the genitals of the man which highlights the totality of the *nudity*.

The relationship between *the object* (the body of the soldier) and *the subject* (the crowd) is dominated by *violence*. What is seen in the pictures can be partly explained by looking to

Michel Foucault's work *Discipline and Punish* and its parts considering torture. Description of the execution and preceding torture of Damien in 1757²⁹¹ shows a practice of "thousand death" where the life is maintained and subdivided²⁹² to several acts of killing. This kind of practice of punishment-as-spectacle caused confused fear²⁹³. Foucault defines it as *an exercise of terror and a policy of terror* which makes one aware of the presence of the sovereign power through the body²⁹⁴. The body has medically speaking already transformed to a corps but the violence directed to it actually presents it still as a person who is punished and humiliated. Foucault present similar example of "paradoxical ceremony" where it took place after death as "magnificent theatre, the ritual praise of its force, on a corpse"²⁹⁵. Corps has no sense of pain or emotional response but the behaviour of the crowd makes the clear division between body and the corps wavering. This leads to a situation where the nature of violence is symbolic and it produces the sign of vulnerability, pain and death to prove and present the absolute power of *the subject* over the existence of *the object* as living or dead being. As Baudrillard argues "Violence in itself may be perfectly banal and inoffensive. Only symbolic violence is generative and singularity."²⁹⁶ The body/corps becomes a scene of power usage.

The body is treated with both physical and mental violence. Because the transformation of the person into corps leads to the situation where he is unable to response or reacts to mental desecrating violence, it can be recognized to affect in the same symbolic level as physical violence analyzed before. All the three photographs show dragging and the latter two of them also hitting with stick or trampling with sandal. The one in the middle in the series also shows a woman pointing the body with her middle finger which can be recognized as sexual insult. In this non-sexual context it has rather a desecrating meaning, which is also internationally easy to recognise because of its familiarity.

Findings of the *symbolic violence* lead to a question if the event has a ritual dimension. In this case the violence directed to the body can not be seen purely as spontaneous burst but as carefully and normatively regulated sacrifice. René Girard's main argument considering sacral and violence is that the social group needs to control violent behaviour which is

²⁹¹ Foucault 1991a, 3–6.

²⁹² *ibid.*, 33–34.

²⁹³ *ibid.*, 9.

²⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 49.

²⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 51.

²⁹⁶ Baudrillard 2003, 29.

natural for human species by targeting it to a suitable object, a sacrifice. This is necessary to maintain the cohesion of the group. Choosing of the sacrifice is regulated by some main rules. The victim has to be dispensable for the community so it wouldn't cause any severe harm to it²⁹⁷. On the other hand the sacrifice has to be at some level able to be identified to the members of the community so that the replacement of the victims of violence doesn't seem unattached but the disconnection between the two can be linked and the feeling of rational continuity between the secured object and sacrificed object exists²⁹⁸.

In the cases where the sacrifice is not a human, the features of the sacrificed object are similar to humans. For example in the nomad communities animals are sacrificed because they are closely linked to human life and the nature of relation between the herd and the nomad community can be described as symbiotic²⁹⁹. The way the body is dragged on the ground and how it is "skinned" brings it closer to the features of animal butchered or hunted down, a similar notion which Foucault made considering mutilation of the body and removing organs "as one does with an animal"³⁰⁰. The body of the man is transformed into the body of sacrificed animal.

What is a curious and important detail is that the corps is never directly touched by the crowd which is in the role of *the subject*. The corps is dragged by using ropes, hit with rods and stomped with sandal³⁰¹. There can not be seen any direct physical contact to the body. Two arguments can be made considering this detail. First, if the nature of the event is seen as a ritual it can be estimated through the concept of *impurity*. Contact with impure thing makes one impure and this becomes *a fortiori* in the cases where the impurity is caused by acts of violence³⁰². The soldier as a subject carries the meaning of violence. As an *object of violence* the body also symbolises the presence of violence. That's why the direct contact must be avoided, because touching the body of the sacrifice would lead to a physical spread of the sign of violence in to the community which tries to close it outside. The person who touches the body would become a sign-vehicle for violence and would then carry the meaning of unwanted and negative behaviour. This is especially easy in the situations where the

²⁹⁷ Girard 2004, 18.

²⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 61.

²⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 17–18.

³⁰⁰ Foucault 1991a, 51.

³⁰¹ Touching a body with foot or footwear which is functionally connected to foot and ground is extremely insulting symbolic act.

³⁰² Girard 2004, 47.

sacrificial body is bleeding and the blood can leave a physical mark to skin or clothes because the visual sign of blood carries already the meaning of violence. The instruments that are used are contaminated but they allow *the subject* to have the necessary distance to *the object of violence*.

The other argument is based on the idea of transformation of *the object* of violence to *inhuman*. To be able to carry out the act of violence against another human being *the subject* needs to avoid the humane interaction with *the object*. Direct physical contact and non-violent act like touching, holding or moving are denied. Instrument cuts this contact and also changes the experience of the contact because it happens through the instrument.

In terms of semiotics the sign of the members of community and the sacrifice are similar and there can be made a *symbolic exchange*. As Jean Baudrillard put it “The symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor a ‘structure’ but an act of exchange and *a social relation which puts an end to the real*”³⁰³. What can be taken from Baudrillard’s argument is that our thinking is based on symbolic systems and that “the opposition between the real and the imaginary”³⁰⁴ is actually misleading. According to Baudrillard’s theory it can be claimed that in the case of Sgt. William David Cleveland we can not witness the death as an event but as a myth. Myth is needed to identity formations which covers both the origins of *the subject* and the end of *the subject*³⁰⁵. Still this doesn’t lead to a situation where the case in hand would be meaningless in the analysis of *symbolic violence* and power over life. Baudrillard claims that the death must be conjured up and localised precisely and that this place and time is the body³⁰⁶.

The concept of the body as a sign-vehicle for sacrificial dying can be examined through one of the most profound myths in the western and global context, the crucifixion of Jesus. By looking closely the set of photographs some of its special features can be connected to the ways, rules and regulations of representation in Western art considering especially the suffering body as sacrificial object.

³⁰³ Baudrillard 1993, 133.

³⁰⁴ *ibid.*

³⁰⁵ Baudrillard 1993, 159.

³⁰⁶ *ibid.*

The body is framed to the centre of the pictures which draws the attention to it. This kind of representative balancing visually points out the dominating element and its message. It is used commonly in church art to present the essentiality of the divine order. The position of the body where the hands are raised over the head and the other leg is straight has similarity to the body of a crucified person. The exception is that the body is in a horizontal not in a vertical plane. Instead of nailing the body into forced position from its legs and hands it is bounded with ropes. Nude or half nude and slightly externally injured body has similarity to tortured and executed Jesus. Surrounding violent crowd and the road which takes the body into unknown destination identifies with *Via Dolorosa*, the Way of Suffering.

Because of the perspective of the viewer the event gets a western analytical context. There the sacrificial body carries the positive meaning and the crowd has a negative connotation and it is seen as sadistic and demonic subject. If the sacrifice is understood as having a good cause and meaningful end, it has a social content³⁰⁷ which draws a link between the *social causes* and the *myth/metaphor* levels. Symbolic similarities between the religious and historical myth and the news event causes a reflection from the cultural models in to the new event and represents it in a wider temporal and spatial context. It is also typical that the myths or their expression and presentation can change during the changes in history. The process of representative practises and social reality are not in dominative but interactive relation. For example the way how Crucified Jesus is presented changes during the time. In Byzantium Jesus didn't have a beard because being beardless was typical for emperors, and later Jesus got a blond hair to remind less the people of the Middle East. During the plagues in medieval time his body was also corrupted by the abscess to reflect the essence of mythological suffering in secular context.

The sadistic nature of *the subject* is highlighted because of the emotional expressions of the members of the crowd. Charles Darwin discovered in his work concerning expression of emotions, that people are highly sensitive to identify with the feelings they interpret from other persons face³⁰⁸. In the first picture there can't be seen any expressions of emotions because the crowd is backward to the photographer. In the second picture strong facial and bodily expressions of furious joy is recognizable. Raised hand and closed fists in the air express power and draw attention, and exposed teeth mean either a joy or rage. These

³⁰⁷ Girard 2004, 165.

³⁰⁸ Darwin 1965, 304.

overwhelming feelings are at the same time distant and close to each other in the ways of expression and in the picture where both are experienced in the same spatial and temporal situation. This leads to confusions and a feeling of distance from the motives of the crowd.

The viewer in this case is not only in the role of a witness but also as a *participator*. When Foucault describes the painting *Las Meninas*, he recognizes the relation between the viewer and the picture. He claims that the images observe us³⁰⁹ and that the spectator is forced to enter the picture which is privileged and inescapable³¹⁰. The photographs were taken in the middle of the crowd surrounded by *the subject*. Because of the physical perspective and location of the photographer *the viewer* is taking part to the event. The feeling of ‘being there’ is strongly built and sets *the viewer* to a role of *the subject*. The third picture is the turning point of the roles. Two of the men in the crowd have directed their attention to *the viewer* and the other one on the left has an expression of hate and rage in his face. *The viewer* has become a possible *object of violence*. This potentiality of vulnerability at least erases the impartiality and the fear of violence becomes real in the representation.

According to Edith Kurzweil, Claude Lévi-Strauss concludes that life and death are fundamental and ultimate oppositions of structuralism. This claim was criticised to be based on metaphysical assumptions and not to scientific analysis.³¹¹ Analysis used in the case study of Mogadishu also seems opposite to Lévi-Strauss’s approach. Structure consisting of semiotic signs and discursive representation systems actually shows that the difference between presentation of life and death is extremely “thin” and that’s why the line between the two is hard to draw clearly like when trying to draw the edge of a shadow. The spectacle of *symbolic violence* creates a mixed message where *the viewer* is unable to discover the reasons and causality because of conflicting signs. Distortion leads to the experience which is obscure, strange and frightening. *In the politics of fear the assault of the body reaches such extent that the act of violence is not limited to the concept of life, but beyond it.*

³⁰⁹ Foucault 1980a, 4.

³¹⁰ *ibid.*, 5.

³¹¹ Kurzweil 1980, 29.

4.2 IMMORAL US



Picture 1



Picture 2

In the first statement of George W. Bush concerning the photographs of the event of AbuGhraib he described it as “disgusting”.³¹² Short, simplified and immediate reaction reveals in a useful way the *litany* level of the representation. *Disgust* is breeding from the aggregation of sexual and violent behaviour, a break of cultural taboo. Pornographic, homosexual, sadomasochistic and filthy visual elements draw a scene of perversion and an emotional respond of disgust.

The event can be stated in three different ways, as an event of punishment, pornography and torture. Aspect of punishment is formed based on the visual surrounding, the spatial dimension of prison. This states the people in the picture as prisoners and prison officers. Imprisonment is a consequence of crime which presents the prisoner as morally and socially incapable person. Officer on the other hand is a representative of the law and order, with the authorization to limit the freedom of others. What ever is presented in this context between the officer and prisoner should be an act of legal punishment.

Pornographic scene is constructed of nudity. Nudity alone doesn't make an event pornographic; it could be as well and more likely interpret as sexual event. The lack of intimacy which can be seen in the picture would make it an orgy but the photographing and

Butler 2009, 87.

the publishing of the pictures turns it finally into pornography. Pornography usually includes at some level dominance and violence and the scene is always built up and the event is scripted. Instead of witnessing an intimate and spontaneous event *the viewer* witnesses a breach of personal immunity and forced and manufactured scene. This makes the event *unnatural*.

The event of torture is a fusion of the previous events. The unnatural and unpleasant sight produced and commemorated by the officials who should produce order and protection, transforms the clear line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ into something unrecognisable. This leads to questions *why are we torturing? Can it be allowed? What does it make of us?* In simple terms *what are the social causes of the event?*

* * *

Butler offers interesting point of views to the analysis of the *social causes* especially concerning the normative and functional approaches. She sees the photographs as evidences of war crimes and working in legal proceedings against those who have been blamed for acts of torture and humiliation³¹³. Here the photographs have revealing aspect and a documentary value to the institutional proceeding. Legal institutions can be estimated to have exceptionally important position in the *social causes* level because it is communal by nature.

Opposite to Butlers notion of normative aspect which can be interpret as revealing is her example of the *Newsweek*’s publishing policy which on the other hand presents “useful”³¹⁴ hiding. Instead of *jus in bello*, the approach of political realism which has adopted the discourse of fear, transforms the *jus ad bellum* into shape of *the War on Terror*. Legitimacy of war becomes dominant compared to the legitimacy of means in war.

If there is a breach between usefulness and legality, another breach emerges between public and personal. Butler claims that the photographs don’t have an effect only as evidence, antiwar propaganda, but also as potential items for blackmailing. Social causes for *the objects* of torture might be devastating if their families would see their public humiliation³¹⁵

³¹³ Butler 2009, 79.

³¹⁴ *ibid.*, 80.

³¹⁵ *ibid.*, 85.

caused by forced breaking of cultural taboos, organized production of personal shame and fear.

* * *

Discussion concerning the event and photographs of AbuGhraib is strongly based on the moral and ethical evaluation. Even though the event seemed to be somehow unique, even the photographs as original as they might have thought to be, seemed somehow familiar, like if they would be carrying illustrative tradition within, as if they would be multilayered ‘texts’, *palimpsest* where the images are actually imitating something which has already been seen. The illustration of Abu Ghraib ‘talks’ with both the language of *abandoned moral* and *punishment of immorality*. The discursive formation of intersecting historical fact and fiction is named here according to visual orientation, interpretative frame and foreknowledge as *the illustrative practice of Salò*.

Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom is a film written and directed by Italian director Pier Paolo Pasolini. What makes reasonable to use the dramaturgy as a disposition and name a discursive formation according to a single film, is based on the historical and cultural background of the text, the central themes of the film, its critics and the public reactions awoken by the film. The core of the script is a hybrid of two fictive novels which both are cornerstones of the European cultural history even though the other is widely presented and the other is marginal and usually kept in silence. Still both have similar effect. Themes and elements of the film are based on the two novels but also to latter historical events which have a strong political and moral background. The film includes highly controversial visual material and has been banned in many countries. Provocative nature of film leads easily to the conclusion that the film is cherishing the themes it presents instead of criticising them. Calling this to an error in interpretation should be avoided, because in genealogical analysis of the *heritage* doesn’t only consist of great stories and evolvement but as well of mistakes, miscalculations and coincidences and doesn’t recognize a truth without a possibility to criticize³¹⁶.

The second part of the films headline and many central elements from the script comes from the book of Marquis de Sade. His writings and personality where strong enough to give a

³¹⁶ Foucault 1998, 74–75.

name for phenomena which is called *sadism*. Sade's main principle in his writings was to abandon the conservative models of morality especially the norms of sexual behaviour which he saw rather as an illusion and synthetic than as natural order. Sexual violence and dominations are in important role in his storytelling. Where Sade's *The 120 Days of Sodom* presents abandoned moral, *The Divine Comedy* from Dante Alighieri describes detailed, organised and hierarchic punishment system based on divine order of moral norms. Even though *Dante's inferno* has a strong symbolic dimension and also the mental condition of the punished is in some cases described, the core of the punishment is the body of human and the production of physical pain which are very concrete by their nature. In the artwork and illustrations of *The Divine Comedy* the inhabitants of hell are also nude which highlights their loss of status and physical protection.

The film shows four fascist men who represent political, economical and religious power. During the fall of Benito Mussolini's Italy in 1944 they kidnap a group of teenage boys and girls and subject them to four months of extreme violence, sadism, sexual and mental torture.³¹⁷ The film is noted for exploring the themes of political corruption, abuse of power, sadism, perversion, sexuality and fascism.

In the case of Abu Ghraib the place and time for the acts of violence can be specified. The same thing exists in the case of *Salò*. The connecting elements are *naming*, *isolation* and *infrastructure*. Where the photographing of torture happened in the prison of Abu Ghraib in Iraq which came to publicity in 2004, the film takes place in the Republic of Salò a part of Italy occupied by fascists in 1944. Both events (historical and fictional) are named according to the physical location instead of the date of the event or the features of the acts.

In both cases the spatial dimension is isolated from the outer world. The process can be related to Achille Mbembe's description of *occupation* which requires seizing, delimiting and asserting control over a physical area and creating new social and spatial relations³¹⁸. The isolation is based on the infrastructure; in the case of Abu Ghraib it is the prison walls and in Salò the walls of the mansion. Infrastructure and the architecture are needed to create and maintain the physical isolation which allows also the social, political and normative isolation from the outside world. Physical turns into mental. "You are beyond all laws. Nobody knows

³¹⁷ Pasolini 1976.

³¹⁸ Mbembe 2008, 164.

you are here”³¹⁹. Naming, locating and organizing transforms the event of Abu Ghraib into a *scene of power* and a *spectacle of violence*. It is set, documented, framed and represented through a specific interpretative practice where it stops to be just an event and becomes a *discursive monolith of fear*.

Salò is divided into three parts which loosely refer to the structure of Dante’s *Inferno*. These *circles* present also the dominating visual elements of the photographs of Abu Ghraib both in direct and symbolic level. The circles are called *the Circle of Manias*, *the Circle of Shit*, and *the Circle of Blood*. *The Circle of Manias* presents the obsessions, desires, experiencing and emotions. Nudism (publicly nude and posing for camera), role play (dog on the leash), sadomasochism (domination and humiliation), homosexuality and rape (penetration between men) are different examples of denied and morally condemned sexual behaviour in certain cultural and social contexts. The persons who are in the role of *the object* are forced to break the binding social norms and taboos. The persons in the role of *the subject* on the other hand are the one’s who are producing the spectacle and taking part to it. Their emotional expressions are signals of joy and excitement which refer to a success of their acts and not to a neutral and passive condition. *The Circle of the Manias* expresses break of the normative line which divides *pain* (mental or physical) from *pleasure*.

The Circle of Shit works in the level of humiliation and animalization. In some of the photographs a naked man is entirely covered with brown filth which is or at least is interpreted to presents feces³²⁰. Where the perversion of different kind of sexual behaviour is relative, the covering of entire body with filth is more likely universally recognized as such. This shows that *the Circle of Shit* has a deeper negative connotation than *the Manias*. Filth refers to physical and mental regression. Excrement describes loss of retention which refers to infancy, old age and sickness. Animal living in pigsty probably comes closest to the visual nature of the man covered by assumed feces. Feces are also connected to insanity, to a lower level of humanity where a human has lost one’s personhood and become more like an animal but exists in the form of a human. Still the mental condition of animal leaves marks to the physical appearance. A forced sign of regression expresses a great power over the representation of mental and physical condition of *the object*.

³¹⁹ Pasolini 1976.

³²⁰ Appendix 1.

The Circle of Blood refers to visual elements of direct violence and killing which means causing physical pain and physiological death. Because the question considers impression constructed by representative technique and it is not tried to prove the actual nature of the event as such, also the violent scenes are interpreted as symbols of physical violence. Symbols of physical violence are for example situations where the tension in the photographs lets *the viewer* to assume that the event will lead to violence. Furthermore it is not only a question of the causal model of predictive violence but the symbols are signs which can be interpreted to imitate physical signs of violence for example mutilation. "Blood" as such doesn't have to be seen in the picture but it works as a universal sign for death, a *protosymbol*³²¹ as Vamik D. Volkan argues. *The Circle of Blood* presents intentional and arbitrary causing of pain and death, a power over one's life.

In the analysis of power relations it is important to acknowledge the difference between visible and invisible power which separates the instruments of power from the subjects of power. Dramaturgic analysis of Salò can be used as a reflecting interpretative model for the case of Abu Ghraib. In the photographs the setting of the figures, framing and retouching forms the roles of *the subject*, *the object* and *the viewer*. In a wider discursive frame the same roles are not coherent. According to the dramaturgy of Salò *the subject* of power transforms into instrument of power usage and *the subject* of power becomes something that reminds more *the viewer* than traditional subject, an invisible author which's power *allows* or more strongly argued *passively constructs* the whole event. This claim needs to be clarified via closer look to the set of characters of Salò and Abu Ghraib.

The visual power actualizes in *the instruments* which are the representatives of power. In Salò they are soldiers and female prostitutes, where the soldiers keep up the order by (the threat of) physical violence and the prostitutes lead the activities of *the objects* and create the visual elements of the event and partly produce them by their own central appearance. In Abu Ghraib the male soldiers are participating in the event but the main constructive element in the pictures is the female soldier who as the female prostitutes of Salò also is an important constructive visual element especially in *the Circle of Manias*.

³²¹ Volkan 2009.

Relating a female soldier and a prostitute is not a unique phenomenon but more likely a discursive practice. According to Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry a woman whose sexuality is debauched and foul and who manipulates and corrupts is far deadlier than men, and actually isn't a woman at all³²². Already Niccolò Machiavelli assumed that all women within an army were prostitutes³²³. Also the female soldiers in Abu Ghraib were related to *erotomania*³²⁴.

The instruments are in direct contact to *the object* which makes them visible and their role recognizable. Because of the representation, the context shows them not just as *the instruments of power*. Being in the same frame with *the object* of power in the context of torture transforms them in to *the instruments of violence* and according to the theory of Girard contaminates them and closes them outside their community. *Instruments* are not source of the power of *the subject* but rather its replaceable tools.

In Salò the sexual experiments, torture and killing are done in the authorization of the rulers, *the subjects of power*. Even their actions have produced the event they avoid direct contact to *the object* especially in *the Circle of Blood*. Surveillance happens from the distance and through window and lenses of binoculars, and the shedding of blood is done by *the instruments* or by the nude rulers, where the concrete nudity symbolises anonymity and *the subject's* hidden real presence. *The subject of power* remains 'pure' and maintains its position as a legitimate ruler of the community. As Foucault notes about *Las Meninas* "sovereigns in so far as they stand outside the picture and are therefore withdrawn from it in an essential invisibility, they provide the centre around which the entire representation is ordered"³²⁵.

Also the concept of pornography creates distance between *the subject* and the violence directed to *the object*. When the event is interpreted through *the Circle of Manias* a sexually oriented physical and mental violence is stated as perversion, not as abuse of power. As Butler claims the aesthetics of pornography protects the person behind the camera from blame³²⁶. Here it is also vital to knowledge the difference between actual sexual act and pornography where the first one is real act and the latter is simulated, synthetic and produced

³²² Sjoberg and Gentry 2008, 5.

³²³ *ibid.*, 8-9.

³²⁴ *ibid.*, 11.

³²⁵ Foucault 1980a, 14.

³²⁶ Butler 2009, 86.

unspontaneous act. If the act of forced penetration is estimated in the context of legal system it is stated as a rape but if it is seen through the concept of pornography it transforms into sex fantasy or fetish.

The role of *the subject* reveals a great dilemma in the interpretation of the case of Abu Ghraib. If the assumed subject of the event suddenly transforms into replaceable *instruments of power*, the actual subject of power escapes the analysis and becomes invisible. The ‘distance’ or ‘lenses’ of Salò are the frames of the Abu Ghraib which are also the key to finding and making *the subject* visible. *The subject* can not be located from the photographs but behind them, it doesn’t appear in front of the camera but behind the lens. This leads us to another dilemma which is, how can we separate *the subject* from *the viewer* in the context of representation?

The confusion between *the subject* and viewer reflects in a very concrete way the third culture-historical source of the discourse of Salò which is fascism. Fascism questions the relation between morality and power. “We fascists present the only truth, anarchy. Only true anarchy is the anarchy of power”³²⁷. Who has the power to act has also the legitimation for it. The existence of such spectacle of violence as what happened in Abu Ghraib was not a sudden and spontaneous act but it was made possible to happen by producing a certain surroundings considering institutions, people and technologies and allowing it to happen either actively or passively. What was condemned later in a juridical procedures and trial was the acts of the military personnel who personally carried the consequences and the punishment, not the system as such. If *the subject* of power which stayed untouched by the legal process is seen as a representative, an image of the people, what does it make of ‘us’ the people? It shows the present society as a moral vacuum, a state of exception as the Republic of Salò where the human life is dominated by the perversions of the rulers which are selected or allowed to exist by ‘us’. ‘We’ transforms into a threat to our own society and ‘the enemy’ rises from within, or as Butler refers to Sontag “the photographs are us”³²⁸. The fear is not only manifesting in the bodies of the others but *we have become the source and embodiment of the politics of fear*.

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³²⁷ Pasolini 1976. Translated by the writer of the thesis.

³²⁸ Butler 2009, 99.

In the semiotic analysis the first picture is divided into five metaphorical signs which are the building blocs for *the subject*, *the object* and *the viewer*. The metaphorical signs are *gender*, *identity*, *leash*, *nudity* and *value perspective*. This is done to reveal and clarify the power relations and cultural conventions presented in the photographs.

The role of *the subject* in the first picture belongs to the *female soldier*. The given name for *the subject* already reveals conflict within the sign of *the subject*. Qualities which are given in both Islamic and Christian cultural traditions to female are in many ways opposite to the qualities identified with soldier. The question of the definition of *gender* concerning *the subject* comes vital and the concept of gender as a sign-vehicle for secondarily qualities.

Womanhood (or female gender) is a sign for different social roles like mother, wife and daughter. In the present context where the conflicting qualities are under analysis the roles are chosen and named as *caretaker* and *sexual object*. As a *caretaker* woman is identified with things as protecting, feeding and supporting. Here she is a subject and a producer of life, creating it, maintaining it and securing it. This makes her an authority. In the role of *sexual object* woman on the other hand is an object for desire and domination, *a weaker sex*.

Soldier presents *violence* and *domination*. Even soldier can be seen as protector but the instruments and means are in both cases connected basically into the use of violence. The privilege of violence is a dominant quality and makes soldier a subject of violence. The soldier destroys life and protects life by destroying life of others, those who threaten life.

In short statements the conflict between the dual roles could be described as following: *Males are soldiers. Females are not males. Females are not soldiers. Female as a soldier is not a female. Female soldier is something different from a female and a soldier.*

Uniform which the female soldier carries is originally designed for men and doesn't anyhow bring out the body shape or conventional clothing (in neither of the cultural spheres) which expresses of being a woman. Also the hair of female soldier is short which refers more to male gender than female and on the other hand it is not covered with scarf which breaks the concept of female dressing code in many Islamic countries. Appearance and disappearance of certain conventional features of manhood and womanhood makes the female soldier an androgen, unrecognizable non-sex 'thing'.

The sign of the female soldier carries mixed messages of the roles of protecting subject and destructive subject. In the case of androgen subject it is impossible to recognize the social roles and to use stereotypes to recognize possible motives, patterns or capabilities. Emotions as presumptive cognitive structures do not offer a consistent model for possible action which leads to uncertainty and confusion which is emphasised especially in the situations where there is a lack of information considering the existing context which is supportive element in the process of constituting image of *the subject*. The signs of both female and soldier connected in the same subject seems strange and unknown which can lead to uncanny profile of *the subject*. Structural paradoxes of culture such as this play a significant role in the formation of *the objects of fear*. The eventalized female body transforms into something different from itself while still remaining practically unchangeable.

As noted earlier, according to Darwin the human face is central in the process of expressing and interpreting emotions. Also the identification of person is based on the features of face in the most common situations like recognizing a familiar person from the group of people or more technical and regulated situation like proving nationality or age from passport. In the process of identification the face becomes the semiotic sign of *identity*.

In the first picture the man who is lying naked in the ground is *the object*. His face is censored by retouching the picture and making it partly blurry. *The viewer* becomes unable to recognize and identify the man. The function of the retouching is explained by protection of the victim's dignity and security by hiding his identity. This is done because of the own good of the victim. On the other hand if the photograph is analysed without the argument considering the security of the victim by hiding or alternately depriving his face, it appears to have some significant similarities with the *symbolic violence*. Censored face appears in the visual aspect as a loss of face or head. Instead of taking the head off physically, the practices representation creates an event of *symbolic beheading*. The identity and personhood of *the object* is diminished, stolen or destroyed. Censored object is presented as non-person, a faceless body.

Butler has similar outcomes about the meaning of face in representative practices when she refers to philosopher Emmanuel Levinas.

*it is the face of the other that demands from us an ethical response, then would seem that the norm that would allocate who is and is not a human arrive in visual form [...] our capacity to respond with outrage, opposition, and critique will depend in part on how the differential norm of the human is communicated through visual and discursive frames.*³²⁹

Instead of protection of dignity erasing the face can be seen as an insult. Photographing is immortalising of the presented person or event in a similar way as any other artistic method of illustration. It has been usual to destroy the pictures of the opponent to erase it from the culturally oriented collective memory. The most efficient and least consuming way is to destroy the most recognizable signs which are usually the name and the face of the person³³⁰. Presenting a prisoner and a possible terrorist in a world widely spread picture could offer a face for the resistance and martyrdom.

Censoring the face also has an effect in relations to the montage. To be effective visual storytelling requires possible targets for identification where *the viewer* can project and replace one's own experience. The missing face can be replaced in the process of montage with a familiar face or even with *the viewers* own face. This leads to a situation where *the object* can be identified with *my husband, my father, my brother, my friend* or even *me*. In any case the montage connects the identification with *the viewer's* personal relations which are directly or consequentially connected to one's own existence.

The leash has a multiple meanings in the picture, but first and foremost it is an instrument of power. The function of the leash is to control the movement of *the object* which can be produced as a mild twitch to a certain direction but also a strangling grip which then gets the function of torturing and killing. What is peculiar is also the fact that the leash allows a distance between the dominating subject and dominated object. This might have a similar signification as in the case of Mogadishu where the direct contact to the sacrifice must be avoided to prevent impurity produced by the sign-vehicle of violence, the tortured body. The leash works as an instrument for violence caused by *the subject* but because it exists between *the subject* and *the object*, only the leash becomes contaminated by the violence which the

³²⁹ Butler 2009, 77.

³³⁰ In the case of group, flag or other symbol.

injured body presents but which can not be seen from the body of *the subject* if it is separated from the context.

The third sign function that the leash carries is directly linked to the sign of nudity. Here the nudity is also seen as part of the process of animalization but the leash gives even a stronger signal transforming the body of a man into body of a dog. In the western world dog presents the role of a servant but a negative connotation of the sign of dog exists especially in Islamic cultural tradition. For example the dogs are not allowed to enter the house or to be kept as pets because they are impure and after touching a dog religious activities are not possible without washing oneself³³¹. Also the position of the man is vital. He is lying on the ground instead of standing with two legs and his bare skin is touching the ground. Incapability to stand and stay off the ground signals inhuman behaviour and weakness or sickness. Representation transforms *a prisoner* into *filthy dog*.

Even if the content of the event is interpret in the context of sexual act where the nudity and the leash are understood as a signs for sadomasochism, the presented meanings do not disappear but they get a stronger basis. The dominating subject is then seen sadistic and achieves desire from causing mental or physical suffering for another person. The dominated object in this case is masochistic and enjoys humiliation, binding and physical assault. If the act is interpret to be done willingly the photograph presents a sexual behaviour but if it is understood as forced act or as a set up for such an act it becomes a presentation of power in the form of torture. The significance of the leash and nudity as a process of animalization do not diminish, on the contrary it just ads the humiliation and fades the sexual identity of *the object*.

Because the prisoner is laying on the ground and the framing cuts part of his body outside the picture, he is notably lower and smaller than the female soldier. This detail can be interpreted in the context of *value perspective*. In this representative technique the figure's size is based on the social, political or religious status of the person which it presents, and not to the actual physical size. The composition of the picture sets *the subject's* value higher than *the object* which is literally on the ground. The traditional Islamic culture (and also historical traditions of Christianity) value men higher than women which highlights the subversion of the male object and the breach against the social code.

³³¹ Linjakumpu 1999, 200.

The presence of *the viewer* in the picture is minimal. There can not be found any strong connection of *the viewer* with *the subject* or *the object*. Such signs as an eye contact or emotional expressions and responses directed to *the viewer* are totally missing. Possible reason for this lack of contact can be partly produced by the censorship which erases the face of the prisoner and hides possible facial expressions and communicative signs. The whole photograph seems to be really 'clean' picture where *the subject* and *the object* are at the same horizontal line and clearly visible from the background. The whole event doesn't seem spontaneous but rather the figures in the photograph are posing and the whole situation seems staged. The feeling of 'being there' is weak; *the viewer* is just looking of a picture, not participating the event. Instead of documented event the photograph becomes a statement.

The second picture has many similarities to the content of the first picture. Still there are some important differences which either raise new messages or strengthen the previous ones. In the case of *the subject* these consider *personification* of the female soldier, and for *the object's* repeated *symbolic beheading* and *censorship castration*. Also the role of *the viewer* changes and it adopts qualities of *the subject*.

The viewer is not outsider anymore but it is participating the ongoing event and becoming a part of it. The angle of the picture gives a strong impression of three dimensional spaces which is constructed of the line of the naked men and the corridor where one of them is not fully in the picture which creates continuity outside of the framed photograph. This visual order sets *the viewer* in the middle of the spatial reality instead of looking the event 'behind a window'. There is also a clear and strong connection between *the viewer* and *the subject*. The female soldier in the role of *the subject* is not only having a direct eye contact to *the viewer* and a smile on her face but she also directs the attention of *the viewer* by pointing the genitals of the men with her both hands. This is also the only act of *the subject*; it is not clear physical assault but a bodily expressed message that affects to the framing and changes the tension and balance in the picture which now concentrates on the suppressing relation between *the subject* and *the object*, and the vulnerability of *the object* in the event.

The nature of *the subject* comes more clearly presented in the second picture. It is constructed in physical being but also in expressional signs which were missing in the first photograph. The qualities of the habitus of *the subject* are divided to *male habitus* and

sadistic habitus. *Male habitus* is constructed of the form of the female soldier figure, including short hair and male measured uniform, but also of smoking tobacco. Smoking doesn't have any clear and continuing norm or tradition in both Muslim or Christian religion and culture. In some cases it is seen as a corruption of body and soul and in others all bodily functions and needs are seen as subordinate for spiritual side which makes them meaningless. Also division between the two genders is varying. Still the dominant tradition shows the smoking as a habit of men and a smoking woman as a taboo. Smoking female soldier's *male habitus* strengthens while she also turns into a violator of cultural taboo. The cheerful smiling face of the female soldier forms the *sadistic habitus*. The emotional message of the facial expression is conflicting with the context of torture which highlight the wickedness of *the subject*. The nature of *the subject* can be understood only by examining its relation to *the viewer* which reflects the context and reveals the power relation between *the subject* and *the object*.

In the photograph the men's heads are covered by plastic hoods. This has a similar effect as censoring the face but in a more assaulting way because the covering is done in the actual event, not afterwards in the representations via media. Losing of a head leads to losing of identity. The act of beheading in an actual or symbolic event is extreme because it plays with the concepts of death, hostage taking, identification and sorrow.

While explaining the concepts of *natural death* and *artificial death* Baudrillard estimates the effect and meaning of the hostage-taking³³². Because the hostage is symbolically superior to the accidental death and natural death based on its executive, political and collective nature, it has more powerful message³³³. Baudrillard expresses the case of hostage-taking only as an event for death and killing in relation to *symbolic exchange* of death but not the fact that it is also an ongoing event where the situation between life and death is constantly chancing. Potentiality to both exists, and the power to choose is in the hands of the hostage taker, not only in relation to the ability to cause death, but also to allow life.

The connecting link between the hostage-taking and beheading is based on the concept of grieve work in catastrophe psychology and violent practices of Taleban in Afganistan and Pakistan. For the relatives of the dead person it is important to see the physical location of the

³³² Baudrillard 1993, 164–165.

³³³ *ibid.*, 165.

place where the death occurred which allows to form a concrete starting point for the grief work³³⁴. A sudden death usually means a lack of information and inability to form a meaningful and understandable image of the event which makes the processing impossible to achieve any positive results. Where the need for information is linked to individual experience, the funeral rituals express a socially oriented way to express emotions³³⁵. Also the possibility to see the body of the death person is extremely important in the cases where the death has occurred fast and unexpectedly³³⁶. Again these notions connect the experience and expressions of life and death to the sign of the body. If the event of death (especially in the case of violent death) is connected to the body, (the identification of the body is connected to the face of the death person and the burying of the body at one level ends the event of death) what does it mean to have a body without a head?

Members of Taleban have been acknowledged in the cases when they have killed local police officials to return the body of the death person but not the head which has been cut off³³⁷. The returning of the body to the community is clearly a spectacle of violence which proves the power and capability for violence, which is serious warning for the people. Keeping the head on the other hand doesn't purely present the ability to use force but also to stop or make the grief process of the socially related people more difficult. There exist an unidentified body and partly buried person which lead to an incomplete event of death. In the semiotic sense there is no complete sign mechanism to achieve a reasonable exchange. Taleban's practice of power is not only based on the ability to cause trauma but also to affect to the healing process.

Similar way as the heads also the genitals of the men are censored in the second photograph. As noted earlier the motive for censorship is to protect the victims of torture, in this case not from recognition but from shame, and the audience from sexual sign which is seen as immoral. As noted, the practice of covering genitals from sight can be understood as community's way to control the sexual behaviour and activity by stating it as a taboo. Uncovered genitals are commonly understood as a sign-vehicle not only for sexuality but also for vulnerability. The covering doesn't necessary only mean protection from the sight but also from physical contact, not in a sexually orientated context, but in the function of

³³⁴ Dyregrov 1995, 79.

³³⁵ *ibid.*, 81.

³³⁶ *ibid.*, 82.

³³⁷ Lebovich 2010.

harming one's health and physical condition. Genitals are relatively vulnerable body organ and their function is crucial for the ability to produce offspring.

But does the censorship actually protect in the context of representation? If censoring the face means loss of identity then doing the same for genitals would mean a loss of sexuality. Protection of victim's honour and vulnerability turns into *censorship castration*. The men who by symbolic beheading have transformed into non-person, by nudity have turn into inhuman now by symbolic castration turn into non-male. Personal, cultural and sexual identity is liquidated by representative techniques. As Butler claims "'humanness' is a shifting prerogative"³³⁸.

Showing or making the sign visible repeatedly is not meaningless in the photograph where the tortured men are almost uniformed in their visual appearance according to their nudity and hooding. Regardless of the complex cultural formations of the prisoners they are constructed through the torture and the anthropological texts and compelled to embody the cultural reduction³³⁹. The appearance of the second time is not the same as the first time. It isn't a coincidence anymore but a pattern, a discursive practice and cultural formation. The power of sign is based on the established, layered and unconscious nature and becomes one only by repetition.

* * *

Violence and the threat of pain and death as such are causing emotional response of fear, but do not necessarily make it a political phenomenon. *Symbolic violence* is not the same as spectacle of violence and violation of the life of an individual. Symbolic level works on the collective level of knowledge and that is where violence becomes political. Setting, framing and presenting an event circling around assaulted human body makes violence political because it doesn't only happen, *it is constructed*. In the process of *symbolic violence the subject* affects not only to the ways, *how the object is*, but more over, *what the object is*. How one is treated, defines what one is. It manipulates the appearances as being alive, in pain or dying, even one's appearance as a human being. The possibility to enter and transform one's existence reveals the true vulnerability of *the object*. Manipulation of *symbolic exchange* in

³³⁸ Butler 2009, 76.

³³⁹ *ibid.*, 126.

the level of the *representative double* of the body changes it to something unrecognizable and dreadful. This violates the fundamental core of humanity, *the idea of human*.

Furthermore it is not just a question concerning *the object*. If *the subject* can be captured and recognised via it's relation to the condition of *the object* inside or outside the physical frame, it doesn't remain neutral thing but becomes part of the formation of knowledge of the event. When the event is understood as a form of violence *the subject* inevitably becomes part of the process of the *symbolic violence*, and is contaminated by it. When the role of *the subject* is related to our institutions, our politics, and our culture and at last to ourselves, the knowledge is not concerning the existence of *the object* anymore but also the deepest forms of the existence of *us*. The violence done in the symbolic level to *the object* also reveals the source of the violence, *the immoral us* where the source for fear hides within. In the politics of fear the *events of violence* via representation and symbolic appearance becomes *histories of violence, living and constructing myths of social reality*.

5. THE SILENCE

A spectacle of *symbolic violence* and *the silence* have similarities in the ways in which they can affect. Still for the empirical analysis they seem quite different, especially how *the silence* can be approached. In the politics of fear a spectacle is something that is meant to be seen if not understood, but *the silence* on the other hand is not meant to be broken, which in that case would most likely to loose its effect. *Symbolic violence* is a multilayered text which in the photographic document forms two dimensions, one interpretation inside the frame and one supporting and directing discursive dimension outside the actual document. In the case of *the silence* a direct documentation of its existence are hard to imagine. In *the silence* the body is absent, the contextualising event does not take place and the object of fear can be sensed but not seen or named. Here the analysis of eventalized body seems impossible. How can one see the invisible or hear the unsaid? In the socially constructed reality a phenomenon which is capable to move politically can not exist as a closed system but it must come perceivable in the process of interaction. These reflections are *visible communicative signs* which express the existence of *the silence*, and the *parrhesia*, the fearless speech as a resistant act under the risk of death.

5.1 SUFFERING

*“In the Orthodox church there are two places where you light candles, depending on whether a person is alive or dead. Half of the group lit candles at the place for the dead, and half went to the place for the living.”*³⁴⁰

*“I need to know the truth,” says the grieving mother. “Even if it would be too bitter for me, it would be the end of my suffering.”*³⁴¹

Presented statements are given by a Georgian Ketii Apridonidze, who works in the Tbilisi office of the ICRC³⁴² recalling a time when she accompanied twenty families of missing persons to pray.³⁴³ The event is based on the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia in years 1992–1993 which lead to a ceasefire and situation where there are estimated 1,800 Georgians and 135 Abkhazians missing, half of them civilians. This case as such is not the most radical example which can be found when one needs to present a situation where *the silence* becomes political. Still by using Foucault’s the method of eventalization a deeper meaning of the case can be found. The statements of social practices connected to mythological/metaphorical signs and individual and collective experience are the key factors to describe the essence and effect of *the silence*. The event is analysed via *categorizing signs*, *fading existence* and *continuing dying* which as an interpretations construe the semiotic and affective system of *the silence*.

The religious institute of Christian Orthodox Church approaches anxiety and grief by a practice where the conditions of person being *alive or dead* are located to *two places* for prayer which are separated from each other. The division is not only metaphysical and abstract categorization of life and death but a spatial line which constructs a physical sign of the existence of these categories. As much as this division is fundamental, it is problematic for the families of the disappeared people. The *categorizing signs* of life and death are directly linked to the body where these conditions are located and which is the only expressional sign and prove of such categories of existence. In the case where the body is missing these categories are intact and do not allow a coherent way to deal with the social

³⁴⁰ ICRC 2007, 13.

³⁴¹ *ibid.*

³⁴² International Committee of the Red Cross

³⁴³ ICRC 2007, 13.

reality and to form satisfying causal models or precede *symbolic exchange*. Disappeared person can as well be alive, dead or in most extreme case one's existence can be completely denied as one had never been alive if there is no possibility to link one's existence into physical, temporally and spatially oriented world. This leads to a *fading existence* where one's personhood can't moor into any semiotic sign-vehicle. *Fading existence* also concerns situation where rituals, traditions and practices of memorising are silenced which stops the process of reproducing the sign of *the object* and deconstructs the collective knowledge concerning the disappeared person, his or her memory.

Disappearance is not just a violent act against the structures of knowledge, even though it sets up a conflict situation, but for the people themselves. To *know the truth*³⁴⁴ as a statement expresses the lack of coherent information to be able to construct a meaningful picture of the reality, but *the end of my suffering*³⁴⁵ refers to real experience of pain. As noted in the case of beheading, those who have survived and the families of the dead need to find an explanation for what has happened and this processing might take a long time if there is no access to relevant information³⁴⁶. Concrete place for the dead especially in the case of sudden death, practical procedures concerning everyday life and the burial of the body³⁴⁷ are main elements of debriefing in catastrophe psychology, which are missing in the case of the disappeared person.

The *suffering* in this context is not just a rhetoric expression but a relation between the family member as *the subject*, missing person as *the object* in *the context* of death. Like the montage theory points out, fragmented information is combined and reconstructed with one's own experiences, memory and culture. The experience of *suffering* can be analysed as a causal and social construction process where *the subject* reproduces and deconstructs *the object* depending on the interpretation of the fragments. *The subject* doesn't have any effect to the medical condition of *the object* but in the case where the actual sign-vehicle of *the object* is missing and out of reach, its existence for *the subject* is entirely dependent of *the subjects* cognitive processing in relation to surrounding social reality. Where the connection between the existing and missing person, *the subject* and *the object*, are socially and emotionally close, the moods of hope and desperation are varying. This varying of existence and non-

³⁴⁴ ICRC 2007, 13.

³⁴⁵ *ibid.*

³⁴⁶ Dyregrov 1995, 37.

³⁴⁷ *ibid.*, 79–82.

existence, life and death in the context of violence refers to pain, which via empathy is also experienced by *the subject*. Instead of *fading existence* caused by uncertainty, *continuing dying* expresses an ongoing process of death and resurrection. This categorical line can not be broken without pain (as in the process of birth and dying) which in the case of *continuing dying* transforms the pain of *the object* into suffering of *the subject*.

Sarah Ahmed also describes fear as future oriented prediction of pain and damage which is projected as an intensive bodily experience³⁴⁸. Her claim seems convincing and relates to the experience of *suffering*, but at the same time while highlighting the future perspective it seems to disqualify the time dimensions of present and past. This would disqualify the past trauma as a suitable element in the analysis of the politics of fear. To be able to define fear in a coherent way the presented question concerning time needs to be taken into closer analysis.

If the fear would exist only in a situation which is called present, it would more likely be an immediate reaction, a reflex caused by some phenomenon of physical environment. This kind of fear has no history and that is why it could only be recognized as biological, physical or biochemical process without any social, political and conscious relation. If fear would only concern the predicted events of future, one needs to ask, where these predictions comes from. As Foucault notes in his analysis of Nietzsche's genealogy, the origin, *Ursprung* is not clear process continuity and unity but a complex system, and divides it into *Entstehung*, emergence and *Herkunft*, heritage³⁴⁹. The analysis of the *symbolic violence* and disappearance so far, and also Ahmed's own claims considering fear existing in and between the bodies and waking the past narratives, highlights the centrality of the body and the histories of body³⁵⁰. In *Herkunft* the body carries the signs of the past events by combining and dismantling its fragments, where the body also origins the desires, failures and mistakes³⁵¹. It can be claimed that *the body in genealogy binds together past, present and future* (through motivation and drive) and that *the origins of fear can not be located into specific time and space*. Fear appears as a *chimera*³⁵², a hybrid of different conflicting qualities which escape specific timing and locating when one tries to capture it.

³⁴⁸ Ahmed 2003, 192.

³⁴⁹ Foucault 1998, 72–73.

³⁵⁰ Ahmed 2003, 190.

³⁵¹ Foucault 1998, 77.

³⁵² Foucault 2007, 41. Foucault explains becoming a chimera as something which cannot exist and when it exists it is unreal and artificial.

Our understanding of causality and time are fully based on to our memory. I claim that *the concept of fear can only exist in relation to the concept of memory*. Here the memory is not limited only to consider the experience of an individual which then is saved into one's memory, but to the semiotic sign systems, to the discursive practices, and into the culture. The culture is a collective memory which affects strongly to the experience and knowledge, and constructs the ways of interpretation and representation which affect to our actions and behaviour. Without the collectively shared memory, fear becomes a plain reaction of muscle memory or an individual experience as non-social and non-political phenomenon.

5.2 RESISTANCE

*“Here, Stalin!; Lie down! Play dead!”*³⁵³

*“I didn't love him [...] but he had the right first name.”*³⁵⁴

Mihail Afanasievits was a prisoner in BBK- camp and took part in the Stalin's channel constructions during the years of Gulag. He named his dog after the Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin “so we would never forget what that great criminal Stalin did”³⁵⁵ as he noted it. The *naming* is a part of memorizing process in non-narrative form³⁵⁶ where the event is recreated in representation by expressing the central constructing sign, *the subject* of the event. This claim for the motivation of the naming is made based on Afanasievits' own comments but they seem only to reflect one side of the function of *the naming*.

Relation between *naming*, *sign* and *source* is a disposition which can be found useful here and it can also be compared to anthropological research of myths. In the case of dangerous animal species they are usually given nicknames. In mythological sense this is done because the animal recognizes its “true name” and would appear when it is called. To avoid this, a nickname is needed to be able to talk without danger. In semiotic sense the name of the animal becomes so strongly identified with the concrete animal that producing the sign has similar cognitive and emotional response as the appearance of the source. Eliminating the

³⁵³ Oksanen S. 2009, 94. Translated by the writer of the thesis.

³⁵⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵⁵ *ibid.*

³⁵⁶ *ibid.*

source or redefining the sign is more difficult process than naming which leads to a situation where the original name needs to be forgotten or remained silent.

If Afanasievits' statements are taken into a closer linguistic analysis it can be acknowledged that they are all imperatives, commands in a simple and short form. A command is a *speech act* which when taking place between two beings transforms the one who gives the command into the role of *the subject* and the target of the given command into *the object*. A command as such doesn't necessarily have the power to change ones position but it constructs precondition and potentiality for the relation between the beings or actors. Imperative expresses a relation where the other one is in a dominant role.

Roles of *the subject* and *the object* are also dependent of the sign-vehicle in which the qualities of *Josif Stalin* are connected in the naming and representing process. In this case a dog functions as a sign-vehicle. What can be noted from the analysis of the *symbolic violence*, a dog is not socially and culturally neutral being and that the transformation of a human into an animal has many metaphorical and cultural meanings and linkages. What the main qualities which this hybrid of a dictator and a dog has are on the other hand *inhumanity* in the process of revealing transformation and *controllability* in the context of relations between a man and a dog.

Calling a dog with the name *Stalin* doesn't wrest the human qualities from the historical person Joseph Stalin, but rather gives an interpretation of his true nature. An animal acts without moral in conventional sense, and a dog is also related to wolf which categorizes it to the group of beasts. The interpretation of Stalin's political acts as inhuman represent him as a violent beast and even more, as something different from us, a source for bad qualities which can not origin from 'us', from humans. The dog embodies the nature of Stalin. The transformation's function is to reveal the true form of the person where the qualities are not connected to *the object* but where *the object* exists as manifestation of the qualities.

A dog as a quality for *controllability* is based on the relation between the master and the servant. Here the dog does not present the negative connotations of inhumanity and violent beast, a mad dog, but a harmless pet, trustworthy companion and dominated servant, all positive qualities of a dog. This might seem obscure and conflicting at first sight in relation to the previous arguments, but it can be better understood when it is seen not only as a

rupture but as continuity in the naming and representation process. Revealing of the true nature is followed by de-demonizing, transforming the knowledge into manageable form. In the *naming* process *the silence* is “broken” by making the source of fear visible by connecting it to the sign-vehicle which by then becomes a sign of fear. Now the sign of fear can be a target for further processing. The fear is localised and concretised but still remains as fear. Yet, it is not as unmanageable as in the form of *the silence* and through certain practices it can be de-demonized. These practices can be identified from the nature of the commands.

“Here, Stalin!” as a command allows *the subject* to move *the object*, which in the case of Afanasievits is a sign of fear linked to his dog. The ability to move the sign is to control its appearance and disappearance. This command makes it possible to face the sign of fear every time when the command is given. The dog is only a sign-vehicle in the naming process but does not cause fear us such. The fear is faced every time when the name *Stalin* is said at loud and when the unsaid norm of commanding *Stalin* is broken. “Lie down” is even more powerful command because it allows one to transform active object into passive object. The sign of fear does not appear or disappear but it changes form in front of *the subject*. This power allows *the subject* not only to change *when and where* the sign of fear is but also *how it is*. Lying down is also a sign of repression of a dog for its master which expresses the importance of this physical gesture. To “Play dead” is the most powerful of these given commands. It shifts from the passive condition of lying down into its extreme form. To command one to die voluntarily (even though it is playing) proves an ultimate power of *the subject* over the life of *the object*. “Playing” may not have only a neutral meaning in this game of signs and meanings. It changes the seriousness of death into a play which also allows reviving the dead because the event of dying wasn’t ‘real’.

According to Jehanne M. Gheith’s interview, Mihail Afanasievits took care and fed his dog *Stalin*³⁵⁷. In the sense of analysing de-demonizing and violence this notion has great importance. The relation between Afanasievits and the dog *Stalin* could be based on causing suffering or death instead of taking care and maintaining life. Using violence against the sign-vehicle of fear would in symbolic sense be the same as harming and desecrating Stalin and revenging his acts. When the life of *Stalin* becomes dependent of the life of Afanasievits,

³⁵⁷ Oksanen S. 2009, 94.

Stalin doesn't threaten Afanasievits's life anymore and their relation starts to remind social symbiosis. The sign of fear doesn't disappear but it becomes manageable and the demonized figure of Stalin transforms into a vulnerable and mortal being, equal to Afanasievits's existence.

Taking care can also have another interpretation in relation to *sign of violence* and *resistance*. For Foucault the power alone doesn't determine history because power doesn't exist without resistance. The struggle is not a sum of these two but happens between them as a continuing process. A soul can be the outcome of the discipline of the body but only in certain events via conflict relations.³⁵⁸ Resistance is a process of attack and counter-attack. Foucault shows an example of resistance in the case of the pastorate where the power of conducting men is a method which allows to direct and affect the behaviour and how one conducts oneself. Foucault thinks that the movement of *resistance* appeared in correlation with what could be called *specific revolts of conduct*, where *conducting* is understood as ambiguous³⁵⁹. Defining the way for each to conduct oneself³⁶⁰ can be understood as resistance if the defining is done by the conducted individual.

By using violence against defenceless Stalin, Afanasievits would act in the same way as Stalin did and by then, in a symbolic sense, become Stalin himself. Compared to the act of sacrificing, Afanasievits in the role of direct subject of violence would be infected and contaminated by the violence and transform into a sign of violence and a sign of fear. Furthermore, his "pacifistic" act in relation to *Stalin* also can be interpreted as a resistant act. Power doesn't always have to be repressive but it can take a certain number of forms. Afanasievits doesn't approve Stalin's methods of governing and controlling his subordinates, and by taking care instead of repression he resists the practices of violence. By not repeating the dominating practices and by promoting discursive practices of non-violence he deconstructs the culture of fear at the individual level and in relation to those who know and participate in his representation of the violent dictator Joseph Stalin.

Nina Ivanovna Rodina's case is also strongly related to the trauma of Gulag and is expressed in the process of *memorising*, *naming* and *resistance*. Rodina named her daughter according to

³⁵⁸ Ojakangas 1998, 26.

³⁵⁹ Foucault 2007, 194.

³⁶⁰ *ibid.*, 195.

her dead mother Zoya Mihailovna who died in the siege of Kiowa. She also explained that she decided to marry her husband Mihael because he had “the right first name”³⁶¹ to be able to give *Mihailovna* surname to the daughter. Gheith explains this act of naming as respecting the memory of Zoya Mihailovna and protesting against her death³⁶². Still the deeper meaning of the act of naming in relation to loss of life under a violent regime and resistance (not only protesting) against it stays unclear because the interview concentrates on the ways of memorizing and experiencing without highlighting the political aspect and power relations.

Rodina’s ability to produce an offspring, a daughter is a power to produce life. This new life is set to a context of future prospects. Humans have as biological beings the ability to produce life but this is only possible in the event of giving birth and the continuity of life exists in the genes. Giving birth doesn’t undo the event of death. When the act of naming is set to context of social construction, *symbolic exchange* and cultural genes, the greater variation of the concept of life appears. As noted earlier the name has a major effect in the mythological context. The name is not just a way to express one’s relation to another being; it is an access to the existence of the being; it defines the being. By marrying a man with the right name and naming her daughter according to her dead mother, Rodina didn’t only create life but revived or recreated life. The name Zoya Mihailovna became the sign of her mother and by replacing the sign into newborn, her daughter transformed into reborn. The trauma of loss as the sign of fear in the case of Rodina did not disappear but it became manageable. The event of death doesn’t only present a rupture but also a continuity in Rodina’s and her family’s life where also the death is part of *Herkunft*, the heritage which is represented in the living body of Rodina’s daughter as a sign-vehicle.

Afanasievits’ and Rodina’s act of *naming* are complicated forms of resistance and as a counterforce they can be interpreted as a reflections and demonstrations of the existence of *the silence*. The ways of resistance differs between them at some ways but in both cases it happens in symbolic level where they redefine the construction of their social reality’s sign system. Power is changed into vulnerability, threat into harmlessness, death into life, loss into achieving and the relation between *the subject* and *the fear* into *social symbiosis*, manageable memory. They both are also localized and represented in the bodies of a dog and a human child in the event of *naming*. Afanasievits’ resistance is a protest against the regime

³⁶¹ Oksanen S. 2009, 94.

³⁶² *ibid.*, 95.

during the Gulag and by its nature it is more public and easily recognisable³⁶³ which also makes him more vulnerable as a protestor. Still this act is more like a statement of disrespect and mockery than for example a blame. Rodina's case is more personal and doesn't necessary show any signs of resistance outside her private life. Still her act as a protest against the lost of loved one³⁶⁴ seems quite weak claim in the frame of political resistance. While expressing her loss she is also asking for atonement from the perpetrators. Blaming someone from the loss of life is normatively, ethically, socially and politically powerful statement and at this sense even braver than desecrating a dictator. The name Zoya Mihailovna *emerges* as political resistance when the *heritage* is represented and recognised.

5.3 PARRHESIA

A *non-event*, as Baudrillard defines it, consists of military force, bogus information, technological deployment and brainwashing. It is an event that does not really take place.³⁶⁵ The military coup of Chile came in power in 1973 and its regime lasted 17 years. In 1996 *the National Corporation for Reconciliation and Reparation* concluded that 3197 people died or disappeared during this period and 1102 of these were classified as "disappearances".³⁶⁶ Even though Baudrillard's definition doesn't originally refer to Chile, the concept of *non-event* describes extremely well the special features of the *culture of silence*. Where the facts are unreachable, the history of fear can only be approached and disclosed by creating, representing an interpreting the event via fiction.

*Cayetano Brulé [...] skeptical and politically disenchanted [...] He is devoted to the search for truth and justice and to the investigation of violations of human rights, although he acknowledges that members of the dictatorship have remained in office during the transition [...] Brulé distrusts the Chilean police, whom he accuses of corruption and collaborating with the secret service during the dictatorship.*³⁶⁷

³⁶³ Oksanen S. 2009, 95.

³⁶⁴ *ibid.*

³⁶⁵ Baudrillard 2003, 34.

³⁶⁶ The Washington Post Company 2000.

³⁶⁷ Waldman 2009, 124.

*Heredia [...] explores the city streets, suburbs, slums, and dens of iniquity and comes across security services, torture houses, and other centers of corruption in what is an ongoing dialogue with Chile's political and social life. [...] behind the scenes are the guilty parties of yesterday, still unpunished. He cannot become part of the new political project of the transition: he is not moved by its new discourses because they fail to mention many names that he has not forgotten.*³⁶⁸

Noir genre as classical detective novels has a tradition in Chile but it was reformed to question national history in Latin American countries after the end of military regimes³⁶⁹ and became a counter discourse for *the silence*. In the analysis this is called the *noir discourse*. *Noir* represents a society that is corrupted judicially, politically and morally, and where the institutions are connected to the criminal acts. According to María Cristina Pons this form of *new historical novel* emphasizes the bumps, ruptures, and discontinuities in the history¹ which are the targets of the archaeological method. What *noir* is first and foremost about, is not legality, justice or atonement but a discovery of *truth*. To be able to flourish, *the truth* must be produced via collective memory, politicization of time and *parrhesia*.

Quotes are descriptions of the characters created by Roberto Ampuero and Ramón Díaz Eterovic. Nature of these characters is vital in political sense because they play central and multiple roles in the representation. The political and representative power in the context of a book becomes outside of its frames, from the writers who draw and describe a certain kind of reality and also offer a growing ground for different kind of interpretations. This process of creating a second reality consisting of experience and memory is not produced only by the writer but in relations to the reader. Book in a shelf doesn't construct a full scale representation but it only happens in a reading process. As in the montage technique, the reader is not outsider but a participator. In this role the writer plays the role of *the subject*, where the reader has the qualities of the viewer but he/she also shares qualities of *the subject*.

Inside the textual frame the detective has a role of *the subject* but when the context is extended outside the frame this role becomes problematic. It would seem like the character has a life on its own without the existence of the writer and the reader. Here it is needed to

³⁶⁸ Waldman 2009, 125.

³⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 124.

return to the discourse of *Salò* in relation to *the instruments of power*. When the subject creates a fictional subject and sets certain qualities, motives and goals for it, it becomes *instrumental subject*, an instrument which carries the role of *the subject* in a limited context, a frame which *the subject* has produced.

The *instrumental subject* doesn't only have the ability to act inside the frame, but it also works as a sign-vehicle for *Herkunft*, a symbol for different historical events which brought out in this form affects to the interpretation of the historical narrative. Character Brulé and Herida are both orphans and castaways of the society, which condition is interpreted to be a metaphor for the 1973 rupture which meant the end of the utopian values which they both present³⁷⁰. Being orphan emphasises the alienation of the system but also the concrete loss of family as captives, executed or disappeared. Sceptical and politically disenchanted Brulé emphasises resistance not only because of his quest to find truth and bring justice, but the fact that he acknowledges that he is trying to do this in a situation where the members of the dictatorship have remained in power. Same way Herida opposes the new political project which targets the critic not only toward the past's dictatorial authority but also to reveal the latter fragile democracy³⁷¹ which apart from the societal changes is still continuity of *the culture of silence*.

By representing the military regime and post coup society as continuity the novels politicizes time. Politicizing means deconstruction of the "natural" time³⁷². Time in politics is always relative and struggle of different kind of time orientations and models between the actors. Time is also a tool in political struggles, not only consuming phenomena.³⁷³ Using different concepts of time to legitimate certain type of politics is known as *rhetoric of time*³⁷⁴ but Ampuero and Eterovic go even further. What "exists" refers in the context of time always to what doesn't exist and how things could be otherwise³⁷⁵. In Walter Benjamin's thinking political activities are explicitly connected to the problematization of chronology and disconnecting the idea of continuity³⁷⁶.

³⁷⁰ Waldman 2009, 125.

³⁷¹ *ibid.*, 124.

³⁷² Lindroos and Palonen 2000, 14.

³⁷³ *ibid.*, 15.

³⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 16.

³⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 17.

³⁷⁶ Lindroos 2000, 65.

The novels play with the concept of time by reopening the past by memorizing. Memory and memorizing are a process as Gilda Waldman refers to Nelly Richards's argument that memory, as an open process of reinterpreting, events and understandings can be replayed providing the static past with new open-ended meanings³⁷⁷. *The subject* is unable to enter the past events to reawaken the forgotten memories but *the instrumental subject* which has no real physical appearance because of its fictional nature, is not bounded to the present and can be placed to historical narrative to change the dominating practices. *The instrumental subject* questions the status quo maintained by *the silence* and politicizes the time of the military coup and post coup society.

Entering the past and reawakening the memory is able to break *the silence* but doesn't necessary mean successful resistance against fear. It could easily reframe the past events as a threat which roots still exists in the societal order and become part of the future prospects, a future constituted by fear. Here for the characters' aim to seek for *the truth* becomes necessary to oppose the culture of fear. The *instrumental subject* resistant role transforms into *parrhesiast*³⁷⁸. The *parrhesia* has in this context strongly political nature.

The *noir* genre provides a context with which to re-create and trace the criminal background of impunity surrounding the dictatorial era³⁷⁹ but via the character of detectives also to *speak freely* and to *speak the truth*. Finding *the truth* and stating it at loud as such is not *parrhesia* according to Foucault's analysis. He states that *parrhesia* has a rhetorical nature where it can arrange the elements of discourse³⁸⁰ but it differs from pedagogy because it can appear in violent form³⁸¹. Even more central and defining element of the *parrhesia* is "the relationship between the truth-telling and the risk of death"³⁸². In *parrhesia* the person who states the truth accepts the risk³⁸³ which cost is unspecified³⁸⁴.

Parrhesia is not a form of the politics of fear. Still the definition is conventionally related to the concept of fear. It differs from institutionalized *freedom of speech*³⁸⁵ because as an act it

³⁷⁷ Waldman 2009, 122.

³⁷⁸ Foucault 2010, 56.

³⁷⁹ Waldman 2009, 127.

³⁸⁰ Foucault 2010, 53.

³⁸¹ *ibid.*, 54.

³⁸² *ibid.*, 57.

³⁸³ *ibid.*, 66.

³⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 56.

³⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 299.

or its consequences are not protected but it shares a great risk, a risk which as an uncountable is experienced as fear. To acknowledge the risk and still speak out is *fearless speech*. In the context of *noir* it appears as a counter force which in that role expresses the existence of suppression and the *culture of silence* where the *parrhesia* as a resistant act also becomes political. In the *noir* the novel is the context where the *parrhesia* can take place as a form of scene³⁸⁶ which is central element of its way of appearance.

The personal “history” and surrounding social and political atmosphere of the detectives are the defining element in the transformation from the *instrumental subjects* into the *parrhesiasts*. Those who have already experienced the power of the junta and the costs of resistance, knowing the risk stand up and speak freely to express *the truth*. Parrhesia doesn’t originate only from their statement and actions but they have become the embodiments of parrhesia emphasising the silenced truth by their bare existence. Parrhesia may appear in ways of being and behaving.³⁸⁷

A key to the collective memory in *noir* is the sign of the body. The bodies of murdered and disappeared form the impenetrable silence where the defeated and exposed bodies of the living are territories for the exercise of power and control³⁸⁸. To be able to penetrate *the silence* the invisible disappeared bodies must be found and made visible, to recognize and name them. The *parrhesiast* exercises *parrhesia* by hearing and solving the cases of murdered and disappeared and revealing *the truth* in an antipathetic and violent environment.

Eterovic’s first novel, *La ciudad está triste* (1987), tells the story of the murders of Beatriz, a university student, and Fernando, a student and activist who is opposing the regime³⁸⁹. By naming and expressing the social status and political background the writer makes the object of violence visible and a disappeared person transforms into murdered person. A murder has a revealing function in the context of dictatorial past and it becomes a metaphor of organized violence and repression³⁹⁰. The murder is central, not the way how it was committed³⁹¹. Presenting an event of taking life and describing it as a criminal act is extremely strong statement when it is interpreted as metaphor for the past regime and surrounding social

³⁸⁶ Foucault 2010, 64.

³⁸⁷ *ibid.*, 320.

³⁸⁸ Waldman 2009, 126.

³⁸⁹ *ibid.*

³⁹⁰ Waldman 2009, 124.

³⁹¹ *ibid.*

reality. It doesn't only claim the existence of absolute power over life but also the illegality and immorality of the system. Murder is classified as an ultimate crime which is motivated by negative expressions of aggression or inhuman mercenary. The bodies stop to be individual bodies and are redefined as *the social body*, disappeared society which is unable to speak or act to affect its own condition because of the murderer regime.

As Reinhart Koselleck notes, the research of history is rewriting of history (*Umschreibung*), which aims to deconstruct and revise the previous interpretations that also affects to the state of experience³⁹². *Umschreibung* breaks Jean-Paul Sartre's graphic illustration of *Temporality and World's Time*³⁹³ where the past is shown as closed and the time as one directional phenomenon. If the knowledge of history changes, it affects our understanding of present which also has an effect to the formation of predicted futures. Still it must be noted that Sartre doesn't describe time as static but that the temporality, time and history are processed in a conflicting context³⁹⁴.

When collective memorizing happens through art, it shifts into the discourse level where historical narratives start to shape shared worldview via interpretation. Narratives are not only a repository of memories of life under the dictatorship but they also construct alternative forms of memory and exposing, emphasizing and giving names to experiences that could not be voiced in the language of official truth³⁹⁵. Here the *non-event* is replaced by the process of reconstructing the memory where the event can be localized and named, which makes it possible to approach and becomes a *true event*. A fictional event might be more 'true' than a real event if it expresses the social reality of that certain time better than any documentation. Describing a person having a dinner based on a real experience does not necessary reveal so much of his/her character than a tag or a phrase which expresses his personality but which he/she never really said or did. A 'false' event which reflects the elements of *the truth* can express the collective experience better than proving the existence of one separate documented event.

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³⁹² Lindroos 2000, 61.

³⁹³ Subra 2000, 90.

³⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 94.

³⁹⁵ Waldman 2009, 122–123.

Naomi Klein argues that in the case of Chile "disappearances turned out to be an even more effective means of spreading terror than open massacres, so destabilizing was the idea that the apparatus of the state could be used to make people vanish into thin air"³⁹⁶. According to Waldman this paradigmatic mark of dictatorial terror is imposed in order to guarantee the operation of the mechanisms of social control through the disciplining of the body³⁹⁷. When this is compared to ICRC protection coordinator Samuel Emonet's notion of lacking dialogue between Georgia and Abkhazia in solving the cases of missing persons³⁹⁸ the presence of *the silence* in the institutional level is apparent. It is also a breach against norms of international humanitarian law where Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions article 33 orders to "search for the persons who have been reported missing by an adverse Party" and "Such adverse Party shall transmit all relevant information concerning such persons"³⁹⁹. Many people feel great need to talk about what has happened in relation to a catastrophic event which also helps them to process and understand the situation⁴⁰⁰. By forcibly denying this, a possibility to recover from trauma is made harder or even impossible. Forcibly forbid collective consciousness of certain things closes them into unconsciousness where they can transform into models of inner control, *a governing of the self*, shaped by mental violence. While the destinies of disappeared remains unknown, it is like if the war would never had ended. The *suffering* and *dying continue* while *the silence* is maintained.

How the relation between the formation of objects of fear and *the silence* should be understood, is based on the maintenance. Which makes *the silence* in some ways even more complex than *symbolic violence* are the *non-event* and the absence of the body, while it still remains a question of eventalized body in relation to the objects of fear. *The silence* is a phenomenon which hides, mutes and closes the political violence from processing as well as from analysis, which maintains the *status quo* of fear. Still it is not just covering the objects of fear but becoming the object of fear by itself. This can be clarified with an example which I call *the effect of the closed door*. In dramaturgy of story telling a door closes a terrifying and threatening secret behind it. This threat is sensed but the nature of it is unknown. Because the door remains closed, so that the source of fear behind it could be avoided, the idea of threat is connected to the door, the only existing sign which is related to the threat.

³⁹⁶ Klein 2007, 90.

³⁹⁷ Waldman 2009, 126.

³⁹⁸ ICRC 2007, 13.

³⁹⁹ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Art. 33, 1.

⁴⁰⁰ Dyregrov 1995, 27.

The door is *the silence*, which in this process transforms from secondary into the primary *object of fear*. The silence as itself has become fear and it replaces the body and event, which only now exist as *the silence*. Also if a name, word or gesture becomes dangerous and transforms in a social context into taboo, not only the original source of threat remains dangerous but the linguistic or visual sign as such becomes a sign of death and an *object of fear*.

I claim that *forbidding the speech by threat makes speech fearful, the object of fear. The silence emerges from fear and becomes the secondary object of fear, a palimpsest. The silence causes oblivion of the primary object of fear, where the silence adopts the significance of the primary object of fear. The silence emerges as the primary object of fear, as non-palimpsest origin. A non-event is responded as spectacle of violence. What does not happen, what can not be heard and what remains invisible or non-existing can be interpret as dangerous. The silence can be deconstructed by resistant act when it emerges as memorising in political context, as fearless speech. Fearless speech bypasses the silence and by entering the forbidding threat deconstructs the fear into palimpsest, a reflection of the object of fear. The analysis of the silence can only be done by recognizing its existence from communicative signs and entering the objects of fear via resistance and parrhesia.*

6. UNREAL REALITY

The Malmö airport was closed, air traffic stopped and a bomb threat reported on the radio because of an arrest of a female passenger. The arrest was caused by a situation where after multiple transilluminations of small luggage the female passenger tried according to her own words loose the atmosphere by asking *if they were looking for a bomb from her luggage*. This led to immediate arrest and alarm, two hours investigation and accusation of causing a false alarm. The news concerning a bomb threat caused serious worry and moments of horror in the Stockholm airport among the people who where waiting for the arrivals.⁴⁰¹ An event where a joke appeared as a serious threat, where an act of lowering a tension suddenly upraises it dramatically, seems in many ways absurd and strange. The female passenger's profile doesn't obviously seem correct for a *suicide bomber*: 39 years old, Scandinavian, blond and professional horse athlete. Here the context is the profound factor.

⁴⁰¹ Pelkonen 2010.

In the *litany*, the event is drawn as *misunderstanding*, *overreaction*, *bad sense of humour* and *bureaucracy*, and in the *social causes* these statements are estimated as a conflict and breach between the security institutions and individual liberties where the relation between social etiquette and jurisdiction are in question. These debates and descriptions concerning dilemma of individual rights and sovereign authority doesn't really seem a correct base for the interpretation of the obscurity and importance of the event.

The event as such doesn't share any special interest in the field of research of politics but in a closer look it is a good example of *palimpsest* of past events and their relation to present state of political reality. Obscurities of this specific case can be seen as a *Herkunft*, a heritage, of previous *Entstehung*, emergences, which plays more significant role in the international relations. Here the analysis is based on the cases of Sana Khyadali as the *shahidat* and 9/11 terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center.

6.1 DANGEROUS ORDINARY

While describing the case of the first known female suicide bomber Lebanese Sana Khyadali, Fatima Lahnait uses the expression of *emergence of the shahidat*, young women suicide bombers,⁴⁰² which importance as a statement is easily ignored. The *emergence* makes the event of Khyadali's suicide attack different from the continuity of earlier female fighters, assassins and attendants. On 9th of April 1985 she targeted an Israeli military convoy with a truck bomb⁴⁰³ in Lebanon killing five⁴⁰⁴ soldiers. *Entstehung* expresses the moment and principle of emergence⁴⁰⁵. Foucault notes that *Entstehung* is often misunderstood as final destination of emergence⁴⁰⁶, as a certain thing would have a static and primary function, which would stay us such disregarding the surrounding phenomena. As if the female suicide attacks would be described only as a new militant strategy or extreme religious act or as a question of social status of women in Islamic countries. The emergence of the *shahidat* is a

⁴⁰² Lahnait 2008, 74.

⁴⁰³ Joyner 2006.

⁴⁰⁴ The exact number of the dead may vary depending on how they are classified, as soldiers or as military personnel of Israel.

⁴⁰⁵ Foucault 1998, 78.

⁴⁰⁶ *ibid.*

historical and unique event which can be quite specifically placed into the time and space, but the *shahidat* can also appear several times, not only as continuity of several similar cases, but as a new phenomenon depending of the context where it is presented. The dominating discursive practices affect to the ways in which our knowledge of female suicide bombers is formed.

* * *

*“I can not take a shower, because it never downed on me, how vulnerable and defenceless one is. It never entered my head, until I saw that.”*⁴⁰⁷

Statement above was given by Janet Leigh the leading actress in Hitchcock’s film *Psycho* concerning the famous shower scene. More precisely it is not a description of the filming process but the moment when she actually *saw* the edited scene at the first time. This part from the interview gives surprisingly efficient explanation of the strongly affective experience which has made the scene so well known. Key words here are *vulnerable* and *defenceless*, and expression of something entering one’s head which means *to acknowledge* something, and *to see* something, as an expression for experiencing the representation, not the original event which in this case is the filming of the scene. Also the effect of the experience of the representation which leads to a change in one’s behaviour where one *can not* continue as usual is a vital notion when the analysis is set into political frame.

How can one’s suicide be related to an attack? How can a death of a person become political act of violence? Here we also have to take a closer look the Achille Mbembe’s concept of *necropolitics*. Necropolitics describes the relation between sovereign power, biopolitics and death or “contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death”⁴⁰⁸. In the case of suicide bombers Mbembe estimates the difference between the use of war machines and with one’s own body⁴⁰⁹ which is used here as supporting concept in the disposition.

⁴⁰⁷ Bouzereau 2003.

⁴⁰⁸ Mbembe 2008, 176.

⁴⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 173.

Slavoj Žižek uses popular culture, especially films, in his analysis to clarify the essence of different theories and to structure of central concepts⁴¹⁰. A film doesn't function here as evidential but as analytical tool. They are used as a disposition for dramaturgical analysis, the aesthetics of drama, and to explain the order and affective nature which appears as an experience of uncanny and fear. In the analysis of the *Entstehung of the shahidat* the event is interpreted through the theoretical framework of modern and post-modern horror movie where the case research is based on the shower scene from Hitchcock's *Psycho*⁴¹¹. The affective nature of the both cases is based on the variation of the *symbolic violence* and *the silence* which as dramaturgical elements manifests as *closed* and *disclosed*. The inter-textual scenery consists of *stage*, *curtain*, *revealing*, *deceptive character*, *disappearance* and *mutilated body*.

The *stage* for the scenery is related to everyday activity so it can be understood as *ordinary*. The bathroom and the military convoy are "targeted [...] spaces of everyday life"⁴¹² for the victims. Because the nature of the *stage* is related as ordinary it also expresses the unexpected emergence of the unordinary. Here the nudity of a person taking a shower is the metaphorical condition of the unprepared person. Where the *ordinary* is understood as *safe*, it leads *the object* into *defenceless* condition. Sudden demonstration of destructive power transforms civic social spaces into potential death zones⁴¹³.

The *curtain* is an element of *closed* and in both sceneries it manifests as visual and audio, material and immaterial element. In the bathroom the shower curtain is a visual object which makes it unable to notice and identify the nature and predicted aims of the attacker in an early stage and to be able to prepare oneself. A truck or clothing has the same function of hiding the nature of the event; it prevents the becoming victim to recognize the bomb where the attacker has "to come as close as possible to the body of the enemy"⁴¹⁴ without being identified as one. In the shower scene the sound of the sprinkling water has as important effect as the physical curtain. The water creates a sound barrier which mutes the sound from the background. A crowd of people or traffic creates an element of *closed* which is *disclosed* only by the explosion of the bomb. The physical curtain has also a normative function

⁴¹⁰ Žižek 2009, 11.

⁴¹¹ Hitchcock 2003.

⁴¹² Mbembe 2008, 173.

⁴¹³ Beck 2009, 40.

⁴¹⁴ Mbembe 2008, 174.

besides of protecting the room from water or the body from contact and changes in temperature. It hides one's nudity which is a social and religious taboo. In this context the protector of modesty and special features of religious and cultural community transforms into a sign of potential danger and death.

The attack is the *revealing* act, an element of *disclosed*. It is the actual emergence of the event, *Entstehung* which reorganizes the meaning and importance of the previous elements and moments. Without the discovery of the *revealing* the event can not obtain its political potentiality. *Revealing* is the element which penetrates the layers of social constructions from the *metaphor level* to the *litany* where it is in time scale most easily noticed and recognized as an attack. *Revealing* is the most important element in *Entstehung* but it can not exist without the previous element, the *stage* where it happens, or the *curtain* which separates the moment of *Entstehung* from other events. To be able to be disclosed one has to be closed in the first place.

The *deceptive character* of the shower scene works in three metaphorical levels in relation to the *shahidat*. At first, the attacker appears in the form of *the Mother*, an old woman, an ordinary figure in an extraordinary context. Both qualities of *woman* and *old* are not related to a violent actor, and when the sign of violence (the knife) is connected to the sign-vehicle of an old woman, it leads to a situation where the signs are in conflict. It shows the expected nature of the character as false and deceptive. The body is a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon, an invisible weapon carried in the shape of a body⁴¹⁵. The analysis of the conflicting signs also works in the case of the *shahidat* where a young girl is also qualified as passive in relation to militant activity and extreme violence. Secondly, the real attacker behind the figure of *the Mother*, is a man with an obsession which shows that the figure of and old woman is a disguise. Still it plays crucial role because the man can't fulfil his obsession without the figure of *the Mother*. Compared to previous analysis of the *Salò*, *the Mother* is *the instrument of violence*, not the real *subject of power*. In the case of suicide bombings the attacker is not the *subject of power*, but an instrument for those who use suicide attacks to achieve their politically oriented goals, their obsessions.

⁴¹⁵ Mbembe 2008, 173.

The *disappearance* appears in two levels, in physical bodily existence and in normative level. When the detonation annihilates the body of the attacker, it conceals the weapon but also transforms it into a weapon in ballistic sense⁴¹⁶. In this total transformation the sign of bomb overtakes the sign-vehicle, the human body, which after the explosion has become unrecognizable. The person *disappears* both in semiotic sense and physically. It stops being a human being in a single moment. This leads to the normative disappearance and discontinuity in the *social causes*. In the attack homicide and suicide are committed in the same act⁴¹⁷. The *disappearance* makes it impossible to condemn a person from the act and exercise legislative power to maintain *symbolic exchange*. The signs of his/her existence disappears and becomes one with the remains of the victims and they share the pain, death and physical space and condition in the same event. The ability to produce the conflicting signs of dead person and killer in one event are the core of the event of suicide attack. The suicide bomber possesses the power to decide not only of the lives of the others but also one's own life which is in the core of the *necropower*.

As in the case of murder, the body of the victim is the defining sign of the act and event, the *mutilated bodies* of the victims are the scenery of the exercise of *necropower*. The bodies of the victims become the symbol for everything that is under threat⁴¹⁸ and the bodies of individuals change in the language into numbers, status, location and time. This form of bodies is not a group of individual bodies but one wounded *social body*, which leads easily to a delimited group identity as a social cause for the event. *Mutilated bodies* present a form of violence where “our own beds, ravaging the life we take for granted, staging the spectacle of the ruined body”⁴¹⁹. Murder cases are often named according to the victim, but in the suicide attacks the event is named according to the attacker. The event which makes the body, the physical sign of the *instrumental subject*, to disappear and mutilates the bodies of *the objects* into unrecognizable as *someone* and rather recognized as *something*, allows one to reshape the meaning of the event. “Stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus”⁴²⁰; *Yesterday's rose endures in its name, we hold empty names*. This *emptiness* doesn't mean *meaningless* name, but a sign-vacuum which can be filled with chosen qualities in a representative act. As

⁴¹⁶ Mbembe 2008, 173.

⁴¹⁷ *ibid.*, 173.

⁴¹⁸ Ahmed 2003, 207.

⁴¹⁹ Magistrale 2005, 101.

⁴²⁰ Eco 1996, 624.

Lahnait notes, the *shahidat* has been glorified, but also a demonized, phenomenon⁴²¹ which endures *emergence* in many different contexts.

The question asked here concerning the *emergence* of female suicide bombers doesn't ask what kind of image the event gives of the women who has committed it but, what kind of image the women gives about the event. In the context of politics of fear the *shahidat* appears as a change in *the ordinary*, a dual effect of hiding and revealing. It exposes vulnerability in an event which is understood as ordinary and is transformed into dangerous.

6.2 RE-CUT OF REAL

Baudrillard classifies 9/11 as an absolute event, “the pure event uniting within itself all the events that have never taken place” where the “play of history and power is disrupted”. One can strongly agree with these arguments as an expression of culmination point of the *heritage* of violent imagination and the *emergence* of the event of *unreal reality*. 9/11 plays so important part in the modern political debates that it is correctly recognized as a rupture in history, but it is not often carefully analysed what it ultimately changed in the construction of social reality and which parts in this structure actually shows it as continuity instead of discontinuity. The world may have changed, but there was already a world which to change.

* * *

There is a constituting difference between the first and the second plane contact to the World Trade Centre's north towers and south tower, but the second contact is different only because of the fact that there was the one before. The first one in the actual event is a *plane crash* but the second one is a *plane strike* which also ultimately changes the interpretation of the first hit into strike. This difference is not simply a word game but a technique to provide culture, a practice to transform the existing meaning of signs. The interpretation of the event's effect to the structural order of social reality differs depending on which CLA-level is in hand. This provides different possibilities to approach the meaning of the event and also to criticize them at some level.

⁴²¹ Lahnait 2008, 74.

The moment of first plane hitting the tower is a preparing act for the *revealing* of the hostile act. It *appears* and is stated as a plane accident in the *litany*. The documentation of the first hit is a filmed news report from the street view⁴²². Here the picture is framed to the interviewed person and is turned toward the tower just at the moment of the crash. In audio the sound of the approaching plane can be detected in an earlier stage. The framing to another target and its sudden change is the visual *curtain* which is lifted up to *reveal* the accident on the *stage* of the ordinary daytime street view. The loud sound of flying plane doesn't necessary express the unordinary nature of the situation but rather a condition of *low flying plane*, not *crashing* or *striking plane*. It also illustrates and frames the event as *ordinary* before the exact moment of the hit and the turn of the camera.

The *social causes* in relation to the event draw the attention immediately to the human casualties and material damages. *How many passengers where there in the planes? How badly are the towers damaged and can they be repaired?* The news report expresses the appearance of social institutions in the form of the media reporter and the fire fighter who is captured in the frame in the moment of the first hit. They embody the *social causes* in relation to the questions of responsibility of information and rescue operation. This question of surveillance institutions and modern technology leads the analysis to Ulrich Beck's theory of *world risk society*⁴²³.

According to Beck "Risks are social constructions and definitions based upon corresponding relations of definitions"⁴²⁴. In risk society the world is confronted with large-scale threats which originate from modernisation and which do not respect the borders of the nation states. The national institutions are incapable to manage the risks and they react by hiding or denying them⁴²⁵. *Conditio humane* of twenty-first century is marked by *incalculable risks* and *manufactured insecurities*⁴²⁶. In his later work Beck also connects the concept of terrorism into the debate of the *risk society*, which has earlier concentrated mainly on risk relation between society and global environmental questions. Beck doesn't claim that terrorism is a by-product of worlds risk society or its manifestation but rather it can be

⁴²² YouTube 2010.

⁴²³ Beck 2009, 191.

⁴²⁴ *ibid.*, 30.

⁴²⁵ *ibid.*, 30.

⁴²⁶ *ibid.*, 191.

interpret toying with its symbols and metaphorical level, and producing an image of permanent condition of catastrophe⁴²⁷.

If this relation is taken into a hypothetical experiment in Eco's semiotic theory of sign-vehicle, the situation can be more carefully explained. In the experiment a car is used as an example of sign-vehicle and the transformation of meaning. A car expresses many qualities but in the context of social order it can primarily be seen as a sign of modernity. Wider range of activity, greater amount of *horse power* where 'horse' in modernity exists only in metaphorical sense, new technologies, materials and industries, and global trends and imagos are semantic units which a car carries.

In the context of risk society a car will fail. A car transforms into car accident, produced by the risk which exists in the relation between people, society and modern technology. This risk has been tried to be managed by norms, pedagogy, surveillance and technology but still it continues to fail and lethal accidents still happen. Furthermore the bare existence of a car has transformed into environmental risk even without concrete accident because of limited resources of fuel, pollution, global warming and in the future even the lack of agricultural farmland for production of food consumed by production of biofuel. In any case the risk produced by the symbol of modernity seems to escape all the possible answers by creating new risks. A symbol of modern carries the sign of risk.

In the context of terrorism a car transforms into a car bomb. An explosion of a car bomb is not an accident produced by high risk. It is produced by a person or group of people intentionally to use fear, *terror* for political purposes. A bomb is not a by-product of modern era but it is covered with the sign-vehicle of modern. It doesn't only change our understanding as a way to confuse an act of terrorism to accident, but also to recognize an accident as a possible terrorist attack.

With this knowledge the vitality of the second plane contact can be explained. The second plane changes our knowledge about the causes of the first hit and the nature of the entire event. It was not an accident but a pattern, intentionally produced act of terror. The global aviation and the twin skyscrapers are strong statements of modernity and material

⁴²⁷ Beck 2009, 40.

manifestations of economical and technological supremacy, dynamic and monolithic products of modernisation and globalisation. The *deceptive character* is hidden inside the sign-vehicles of modernisation and is able to provide an interpretation of the event where it is seen as a clash of *risk society*, where the semantic units of modern crash and collapse to their own impossibility. Beck describes aims of terrorism to “transform the peaceful symbols of civil society into instruments of dread”⁴²⁸ and Baudrillard as a use of “American everyday life as cover and camouflage”⁴²⁹. Compared to the case of the *shahidat* and interpretation provided by *necropolitics*, the attack of 9/11 transforms passenger airplane into a cruise missile concretely and symbolically.

The totality of this transformation happens in the doubling of the sign⁴³⁰; two attacks to the two towers in a multiple representation changed collective knowledge in irreversible way. Establishing a new function, calling it with a specific way and recognising it according to this function and name even without repeating its established use is a semiotic process where a certain form of culture is born⁴³¹. All these rules are accomplished in the event of 9/11 where the planes crashed into the towers establishing their use as missiles, calling it as a terrorist attack and repeating this multiple times via media.

Beck defines the event as spatially, temporally and socially fixed and having a well-defined beginning and end⁴³². Even his description seems accurate; it can be disagreed with Beck’s notion of the clarity of the beginning and the ending. The event can be claimed to begin from the first plane crash, a driving force which triggers the spectacle. In dramaturgical sense the situation is more complicated. The beginning of the representation is sudden, dramatic and culturally charged based on the myths and metaphors. These features change the interpretation of the mundane into a supernatural, divine and apocalyptic. A sudden, unexpected and implausible change in the story, *deus ex machina*, is driven by a divine force which fundamentally changes the narrative. *Deus ex machina* as a supernatural appearance is not a temporal and spatial phenomenon but a myth, disconnected from time and interprets the event in a metaphysical level. A myth has an operational value because its pattern is timeless

⁴²⁸ Beck 2009, 40.

⁴²⁹ Baudrillard 2003, 19.

⁴³⁰ *ibid.*, 39.

⁴³¹ Eco 1979, 22.

⁴³² Beck 2009, 39.

and by then it is able to explain as well present, past than future⁴³³. *Deus ex machina* is not a well-defined beginning, but a mysterious, illogical, unclear and inhuman intervention and rupture in the everyday reality. This considers the lack of meaning where no clear or acceptable reason or motive is given for the event. Like Tony Magistrale describes Hitchcock's film *The Birds* "no apparent justification or logic associated with the sudden ornithological assault [...] in a God-abandoned universe where rational order and benevolence [...] replaced by an absurd principle of cosmic chaos"⁴³⁴.

The complete collapse of the towers can be seen as some kind of end for the event but there also are some major problems to be able to explain it as closed end. The complete disappearance of *the objects* of violence, the twin towers and the falling human bodies, and *the vanished subjects* of violence, the planes and their pilots, can not provide a satisfying ending. We do not see the *mutilated bodies* of the wounded towers or the killed people. Everything is covered under a dense dust cloud. There is no clear point of reference for the processing of the event, which makes the event to be able to approach only through the repeated representation of the crashing planes, falling people and collapsing towers, manifestations of *continuing dying*. As Butler comments the representation of Abu Ghraib, the "image allows the event to continue to happen and, indeed, thanks to these images, the event has not stopped to happening"⁴³⁵. This forms an open end, which was not closed even in the killing of the embodiment of the attack, Osama Bin Laden. His represented death was a *non-event* constructed of simulated *stage*, temporal and spatial distance as *curtain*, a *posteriori revealing*, silenced identity of the *characters*, disappeared *mutilated body* and forbidden photographic proves. As Beck himself notes of the representation of 9/11 "It exploded everywhere, in every living room in the world"⁴³⁶ which separates the event from its material location where the beginning and end could be permanently attached. Even the naming the event as 9/11 doesn't refer to a place or specific time because 9/11 takes place every year, figuratively and literally.

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⁴³³ Lévi-Strauss 1972, 209.

⁴³⁴ Magistrale 2005, 74.

⁴³⁵ Butler 2009, 86.

⁴³⁶ Beck 2009, 68.

“The symbolic collapse of a whole system came about by an unpredictable complicity, as though the towers, by collapsing on their own, by committing suicide, had joined in to round off the event”⁴³⁷. Baudrillard’s argument seems absurd or even offensive and can widely be accepted only in purely semiotic sense. Still his argument must be reevaluated when the collapse of the towers is equated to *The Falling Man*⁴³⁸.

The Falling Man is a photograph taken by Richard Drew at 9:41:15 a.m. on September 11th of 2001 of an unknown man falling from the World Trade Center. Many people find the image disturbing and horrific which has led to a situation where in most American newspapers, the photograph ran once and never again because of hard criticism from the readers. Still it is considered as *digitalized Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* which symbolises also other victims of that event.⁴³⁹ The fact that the identity of The Falling Man remained unknown leaves empty space which can be filled with projection of personal experience and knowledge, when the Unknown Soldier gets the face of familiar person or viewer’s own. The ongoing representation of *The Falling Man* also captures the event of dying, a short moment, where a living person who’s in a position where he’s inevitably going to die, could almost be considerate as already dead. *The object* is in the process of *continuing dying*, without clear beginning or end, a structural paradox between concepts of life and death.

One very important detail which must be noticed when the relation between Baudrillard’s claim and *the Falling Man* is tried to be explained is that, the falling people where called as *jumpers*⁴⁴⁰ in the news press. This expression presents that the falling people where not actually falling off from the building but jumping from the windows. Difference is that falling is a passive condition but jumping is active and is related to subjects own decision. People who were trapped on the upper floors of the skyscraper apparently jumped rather than suffocated to smoke and fire. Still their assumed decision of jumping would lead evidentially to certain death which would be the same as *committing suicide*. An act which could be interpret as *suicide* in the *social causes* would be false in the case of 9/11 where the outcome would have been the same in a matter of minutes, but in metaphorical level it can be seen as such. In the same level of deep cultural codes of Christianity, suicide is a taboo, a crime against nature, community and God. Suicide has also normative consequences, because a

⁴³⁷ Baudrillard 2003, 8.

⁴³⁸ Marin, 2009.

⁴³⁹ Marin, 2009.

⁴⁴⁰ Marin 2009.

person who had committed or tried to commit a suicide was or is condemned of crime and possibly even sentenced to death. What makes the situation even more complicated is that the act of terror escapes the *social causes* of normative rules in the context of *symbolic exchange* where the victim has committed suicide and not being murdered by the attackers, who are not contaminated by the act of killing.

The case of *the Falling Man* is a form of a *forced self-destruction* and *breaking of a taboo*, similar to Baudrillard's interpretation of the collapsing towers and earlier notifications of cultural taboos and power relations in the case of Abu Ghraib. It shows an absolute power to transform *the object* into immoral character by presenting it as *the subject* which is willingly destroying oneself. These victims are not martyrs but cowards and criminals without sustainable moral and who have met their inevitable end just like the Western order and domination which the WTC towers present. The interpretation of the attack represents it as a revealing act of the vulnerability of the system which is based on inner construction of spiritual emptiness. Falling of the towers symbolises the falling of the man.

Covering of the statue of falling woman⁴⁴¹ in one way expresses the dominating framing of the eventalized body in the context of 9/11. The nude female figure presents long tradition of sculpturing and captures the traumatic vision of the event into bronze body⁴⁴². Conventionality makes it parallel to the long line of Western history of traumatic events and their illustration. By *concealing* new artistic interpretation to the event, it is framed to the official documentation, but also separated from the traditional narration. By conserving and limiting the representation and interpretation, the event is clustered and *emerges* as a rupture in history. This transforms 9/11 to the beginning of *the new era of terror*, an event which ways of understanding are not allowed to evolve, it keeps repeating again and again, but not *emerging* as new knowledge, only as the day the world stood still. It is not only about representing the event, but formalizing and privileging one fundamental interpretation.

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⁴⁴¹ Roth 2002.

⁴⁴² Appendix 2.

Beck's notion of the representative nature of 9/11 offers important glue to the event. He describes the event as a media spectacle.⁴⁴³ This is also one conclusion where Baudrillard ends up, that there is no interpretation for the meaning of the event and that it is purely a spectacle of violence and cruelty⁴⁴⁴. Here it needs to be asked what is meant by *spectacle*. C. R. Pramod identifies the specific features of a spectacle as sights which "appeal to the eye by their mass, proportions, colour or other dramatic qualities" and it "institutionalise the roles of actors and audience, performers and spectators" appearing as "a dynamic form, demanding movement, action, change, and exchange" awakening "a broad range of emotions"⁴⁴⁵. Pramod refers to Foucault's analyse of the spectacle as having a role in the reactivation of power and creating order where for example the public executions have not been understood only as a judicial but also as a political ritual⁴⁴⁶.

Pramod also refers to Guy Debord's work *Society of the Spectacle* which is probably the most famous interpretation of the concept of spectacle. According to his interpretation, a *spectacle* provides justification for a specific programme, it differentiates and divides the ruler from the ruled, and it express the practice of a particular economic and social formation and the historical moment of being governed. *Spectacle* is not a collection of images but social relationships mediated by images.⁴⁴⁷ In Pramod's own application *spectacle* is shown as a tactic or technology of governance and politics. Even his approach can't by any means be claimed as incorrect, it narrows Debord's works spirit which should rather be understood as description of existing *meta-reality*, a fundamental change in experiencing social.

Debord claims that in the era of modernity the reality is experienced via representation⁴⁴⁸. In representation reality transforms into images of reality, where they stop to be just images and become real beings, but within the representation they are out of reach for interaction and dialogue⁴⁴⁹. This doesn't necessarily mean that the *spectacle* is opposite to the montage which is an interactive process of formation of knowledge via representation, but rather the *spectacle* sets a dominant interpretative frame. It is a centrepiece of drawing attention and

⁴⁴³ Beck 2009, 68.

⁴⁴⁴ Baudrillard 2003, 30.

⁴⁴⁵ Pramod 2008, 115.

⁴⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 116.

⁴⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ Debord 2005, 30.

⁴⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 35–36.

formation of knowledge⁴⁵⁰. First and foremost it is a structure of social relations which should not be understood as intentional falsification. It is a *worldview* turned into material reality and as such inseparable from the *true*.⁴⁵¹ In a way a *spectacle* is *real* and to be able to talk about it, it is necessary to use a language which is part of the spectacle itself⁴⁵².

The society which Debord describes and criticises is industrialized society without any other goals than growth⁴⁵³. His work seems to be criticism of materialization as a form of production and knowledge. Still his argument concerning representative experience and accumulation of spectacle⁴⁵⁴ seems beneficial even outside the original context and reminds in many parts discursive formations which determine ways of speaking and areas of knowledge. Also his remarks of what could be called as *meta-reality* instead of *spectacle*, is something that should be taken into consideration when the effect of the representation of 9/11 is estimated. His theory of *Society of the Spectacle* is examined and evaluated here together with Baudrillard's concept of *simulations*.

“Simulation is no longer [...] a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal.”⁴⁵⁵ Baudrillard's simulation has also a representative nature which constructs hyper-reality via artificial resurrection of referential in sign systems⁴⁵⁶. Reproduction is made possible by construction of multiple different memory units⁴⁵⁷ which can be artificial memories like linguistic, visual or audio documentations or informal models of practices. Simulation is “substituting sign of the real for the real itself [...] to deter every real process by its operational double”⁴⁵⁸ and even Baudrillard doesn't consider it as *true power* it is *the object of social demand*⁴⁵⁹. This complicated relation of power and reality is well drawn into concrete in Baudrillard's example of Iconoclasts. If the icons, the pictures of God would become a source of divine power, a god themselves, the existence of God would be captured into these produced visual signs, artificial gods. When a God becomes just a picture, he exists as a *simulacrum* of himself.⁴⁶⁰ This doesn't mean that

⁴⁵⁰ Debord 2005, 30.

⁴⁵¹ *ibid.*, 31.

⁴⁵² *ibid.*, 32–33.

⁴⁵³ *ibid.*, 34.

⁴⁵⁴ *ibid.*, 30.

⁴⁵⁵ Baudrillard 1983, 2.

⁴⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁶⁰ *ibid.*, 8.

God is unreal, but a simulacrum⁴⁶¹, something comparable to Debord's concept of *spectacle*, where the concept of real and unreal, true and referential, original and simulation becomes recognisably inseparable. This process of production of reality must be taken into more careful and critical analysis of its visual nature by using Foucault's concept of discursive formations of archaeology of knowledge and genealogy's *Herkunft* and *Entstehung*.

Baudrillard highlights to uniqueness of the appearance 9/11 as the pure event⁴⁶². Still there is one important detail that can be captured from the *litany*, and which ultimately changes the whole representative nature of the event. People who saw the event from television wondered *why they are showing movies in the morning*. This actually expresses that something that was beyond our imagination to happen, was actually something we had already seen before, but in a different context, as fictional event. Baudrillard claims that "we have dreamt of this event"⁴⁶³ but he means it as envy, glee or resistance against hegemonic power. More important notion is when he refers to the series of *disaster movies* as reflections from this fantasy⁴⁶⁴. To be able to fully understand the symbolic meaning of the event, discourse and worldview must be captured from the most widely produced and spread form of public imagination, different from the images of international news media, which is *popular culture*.

High ground, a borderline and linkage between earth and sky, temporal and eternal, secular and divine, is in mythologies crucial crossing points, end and beginnings for mythological eras. Žižek calls these as *Things*, manifestations of libido, the energy of our mind⁴⁶⁵. Mountains, hills, towers or high trees are stages for central events. They present the relation between continuity and discontinuity. In Christian cultural sphere the tower of Babylon and the battle of Armageddon are probably the most well known examples and which the event of 9/11 and the destruction of WTC towers is commonly referred. The man trying to reach the sky (separating oneself from the nature) and the battle between the true believers and forces of evil (Manichean worldview) transform into the risk of modernisation and the clash of civilization.

⁴⁶¹ Baudrillard 1983, 11.

⁴⁶² Baudrillard 2003,4.

⁴⁶³ *ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁶⁵ Žižek 2006, part 3.

What these examples lack of is representative power in modern word. That is why the influence of these myths must be analysed in relation to popular culture. One of the oldest examples is a classical adventure and horror movie *King Kong* (1933). The most well known scene is the one where the gigantic gorilla has climbed to the top of the Empire State Building holding a blond woman as prisoner while the airplanes are battling against it⁴⁶⁶. Here the high tower is the final stage for the epic battle where the embodiment of human beast, *King Kong* a hybrid of man and nature, human's primitive and violent form is fighting against modern technology surrounded by artificial environment. Witnessing this conflict between primitive and secular subject and civilized superman subject (breaking the biological and geographical boundaries by flying and changing the landscape) is *the object* in the role of a vulnerable victim, who on the other hand is trying to be saved and held, but whose life is at the same time put into a great danger. The body of the victim is the second battlefield of the scene. *The object* of the white female is identical to the role of the *Falling Man*, a body in which according to Ahmed's Freudian analysis the fear is projected⁴⁶⁷ and has become a symbol for everything that is under threat⁴⁶⁸.

Fail Safe (1964)⁴⁶⁹ is a political thriller which presents a situation where in the safe system of nuclear deterrence fails and accidentally activates the nuclear war between the parties of the Cold War United States and Soviet Union. Story leads to a situation where the Empire State Building is chosen to be the *ground zero* for the bombing of New York. The *ground zero*, a military term related to the targeted explosion point of a bomb, became a name of the ground where the WTC twin tower used to stand. The complete destruction of the metropolis was culminated on one building which used to be the highest at that time, destruction which scale is supernatural. The story expresses that the material loss was not comparable to the symbolic loss, which is strongly present in the event of 9/11 and which both Beck and Baudrillard emphasises.

Towering Inferno (1974) is a classical catastrophe movie where a fire burst wild in a skyscraper, causing a situation where its height becomes the major problem for the rescue operation. The film describes a situation where a modern groundbreaking building technology turns into uncontrollable risk and a spectacle of death, horror and destruction.

⁴⁶⁶ Appendix 3.

⁴⁶⁷ Ahmed 2003, 195.

⁴⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 207.

⁴⁶⁹ Lumet, 1964.

The most important connection between 9/11 and *Towering Inferno* is purely their visual appearance where a high tower building is on fire under the upper floors capturing the people into a situation where they cannot escape⁴⁷⁰. Both films *Towering Inferno* and *Fail Safe* reflect the idea of *techno-horror film* even they cannot be purely categorized as such. Techno-horror has only appeared in Western civilization and Japan, and it reflects anxieties related to transformation driven by technological advances with uncontrollable speed⁴⁷¹. This type of fear is similar to Beck's vision of uncontrollable risks.

“**YIPES! IT’S HEADING FOR MY BREAND-NEW TWIN OFFICE TOWERS! LOOKS LIKE YOU JUST LOST TWO RENTAL PROPERTIES! HM ... BUT MAYBE I GAINED A NICE TOURIST ATTRACTION?**”⁴⁷² Presented dialogue happens between comic book characters *Uncle Scrooge* and *Donald Duck* in a story *Attack of the Hideous Space-Varmints* (1997) from Don Rosa in a situation where a floating money bin controlled by alien technology hits the middle part of twin tower buildings destroying them. The look of these towers is almost identical to the WTC –towers with their minimalistic architecture. What makes this even more important example of popular culture related to the event of 9/11 than *Fail Safe* (symbolic naming and targeting) and *Towering Inferno* (catastrophic nature of high profile architecture) is that these fictional presentations were shared by a limited amount of people based on their age. Comics of Donald Duck are not abandoned from children and they present mainstream of popular culture unlike many other examples. Still it forms as strong cultural recognition of the possibility of destruction even though the comic presents the office tower as empty which leaves the casualties purely material, but the risk for high human suffering remained. Even in the story artist has emphasised the spectacular nature of the event by highlighting the words ‘LOST’ and ‘TOURIST ATTRACTION’ where the event is a process of *symbolic exchange*. Lost of something is turned into a collective experience.

The crossroads of news event and popular culture leads our understanding of reality into a puzzling situation. Where the simulation and spectacle, a representative phenomena which have slowly replaced the real and direct experience and as such have become inseparable from each other, in the interpretation of precognitive visual culture, the reality seems to simulate fiction. Even so, the concept of simulations does not have to be abandoned but

⁴⁷⁰ Appendix 4.

⁴⁷¹ Magistrale 2005, 82.

⁴⁷² Appendix 5.

rather estimated its reversible potentiality. The relation between what is seen as real, simulation and fiction, has to be seen as interactive process where it is not simply semiotics but where the politics is involved.

The political intervention into presentation can be examined via two examples. The original cover of a popular hip-hop group *The Coup's* upcoming album was replaced with a new design. In the original cover “morning skies, the towers of the World Trade Center stand engulfed in flame from the impact of twin explosions. Clouds of smoke spew from the upper stories”⁴⁷³. The design of the cover was done much earlier than the event of 9/11 happened but the actual printing was going to start on that specific day. The release date of the album, entitled *Party Music*, got pushed back in the light of 9/11 and opinions of several who took contact considering the cover.⁴⁷⁴ *Spider-Man* movie's original trailer was released in 2001. After 9/11 it was removed from theatres. The trailer showed a group of bank robbers escaping with a helicopter, but they get caught into a giant spider-web between the two towers of the World Trade Center.⁴⁷⁵

Politically provocative cover image was either self-censorship, condemned by public or prohibited by authorities as where several unreleased movie scenes where the WTC towers where shown. This could be partly explained by appealing to the ethical questions of offensive material. On the other hand many scenes are not showing WTC towers in unordinary way, mostly just on the background. This shows another example of extending control over the representation of an event and monopolizing it where also the time becomes political. If the fiction is linked to real, to be able to control the reality, the fiction needs to be set under control too. Simulation is not a stabile order of signs but related to complicated political processes.

How does this change experience of social reality and how it turns into political? Debord argues that the *spectacle* erases the borderline between *me* and *the world*, the presence and absence, real and unreal. People are condemned to accept the strange everyday reality passively, a form of insanity where the possibility to affect one's own existence is trying to

⁴⁷³ Glasner 2001.

⁴⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁷⁵ Marvel database.

be controlled by magical technologies.⁴⁷⁶ Magistrale calls the post-9/11 time as *culture of paranoia* where the source of threat is in distance but the consequential impact is felt among our cities, citizens and us directly.⁴⁷⁷ Beck talks about *unknown unknowns* and the collapse of ontological security in relations to terrorism⁴⁷⁸. These arguments from Debord, Magistrale and Beck include some valuable notion of socio-political transformation. Debord expresses a situation where the subject loses its autonomy and transforms into the object which existence is defined in relation to abstracts. Magistrale's *culture of paranoia* and Beck's indefinable sources of threat on the other hand express disrupted social order where there is a lack of trust and security, and where the experience of *exceptional* situation is politically confronted with *exceptional* measures.

Giorgio Agamben in his research on the State of Exception relates this historical concept into the post 9/11 era⁴⁷⁹. Benjamin Morgan summarises Agamben's State of Exception not just as a connection with the state of war and particular law, but as a suspension of the juridical order itself⁴⁸⁰. Agamben also opposes Carl Schmitt's claim of the state of exception as a dictatorship but sees it more likely as an empty space and anomie in law where common oppositions between norm and application, justice and violence, public and private are erased⁴⁸¹. In short the distinction between law and life disappears and every human action suddenly acquires legal significance⁴⁸². As in Debord's *spectacle, me and the world* can not be clearly separated anymore and where the control over concrete of life, the everyday reality, is based on normative abstraction of exception, controlled by magical technologies. Both Morgan and Erin Kruger highlight Agamben's claims that after 9/11 attacks the state of exception has reached its maximum planetary dispersal, a permanent state of exception⁴⁸³. How this relates to the politics of fear depends on if there exists a normative state of *jus in bello*, in which case the politics is understood as warfare, censorship and propaganda; or a state of emergence during peace time when it can not be included in *jus in bello*. When a state of war becomes rhetorical and discursive practice without a coherent referential object it can be understood as the politics of fear where the knowledge and experience of war is maintained in civil life. When exceptional becomes permanent it can no longer be understood

⁴⁷⁶ Debord 2005, 179–180.

⁴⁷⁷ Magistrale 2005, 101.

⁴⁷⁸ Beck 2009, 40.

⁴⁷⁹ Agamben 2005.

⁴⁸⁰ Morgan B. 2005, 264.

⁴⁸¹ *ibid.*, 265.

⁴⁸² *ibid.*

⁴⁸³ Morgan B. 2005, 266; Kruger 2005, 338.

as exception but as a replacement in social order. It can't be seen as a referential being anymore but a model of a real, a hyperreal production of *simulation*⁴⁸⁴ a process where normal is replaced with exceptional which then becomes normal.

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The event of 9/11 pictures to us as complex relation of real and unreal, as an experience of being awake and dreaming. The question is about the moment of shift between these two, a rupture in ontological. While interpreting a structure of moving image story telling Žižek described this middle space as nightmarish and ontological perversion⁴⁸⁵. The interpretations of the effect of the event also vary greatly and there can't be formed a homogenous analysis. The event must be interpret in relation to it's own dynamics within the event itself but also to later socio-political phenomena and estimate them as a possible *heritage* from the event and as spaces for the *emergence*. Also the understanding of the past knowledge and the *imagination of violence* related to the elements of the event should not be left untouched. The dynamics between knowledge and experience of past and present is something where we should look analytical tools from psychoanalysis and its theory of temporality, causality and memory.

Through his works Sigmund Freud used the concept of *Nachträglichkeit*⁴⁸⁶ as a central element of psychoanalysis⁴⁸⁷. Freud's main question was to understand how the temporality is constructed in relation to causality and memory. Because of this complex relation, the term has been found most difficult to translate (for example to *afterwardsness*) without giving a false or narrowing meaning to the concept. Freud's basic arguments are that the events from the past are estimated and interpret via later experiences. Here the time is not a linear model but more likely a spiral, bidirectional causality, and by then an ongoing process.⁴⁸⁸ This is also the reason why the influence of an event to the understanding of past and present can not be explained only as *Herkunft* or *Entstehung*, because in *Nachträglichkeit* an *emergence* changes understanding of the nature of *heritage* which by then doesn't only manifest as *heritage* but also as a form of *emergence*, a new way to understand the meaning of the past.

⁴⁸⁴ Baudrillard 1983, 2.

⁴⁸⁵ Žižek 2006, part 2.

⁴⁸⁶ Saraneva 2008, 1.

⁴⁸⁷ *ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁸⁸ *ibid.*

Not only the influence of old experiences are under examination but the new ones which affect to the ways of remembering past experiences. Memorising is not historical reality but a process of constructing memory in the present moment⁴⁸⁹.

The effect of *Nachträglichkeit* can be traced inside the dynamics of the event of 9/11 and also in a wider time spandex. As noted in the very beginning the chapter, there is a fundamental difference between the crash into first and second tower. The first one is a manifestation of *the risk society* and the second one of *the clash of civilizations*⁴⁹⁰. Here the first traumatic event doesn't remain static but the interpretation of the second strike transforms it also to a becoming of *the remaking of world order*⁴⁹¹. But as claimed, the causality is bidirectional and also *the clash of civilizations* transformed into something different, something close to the *clash of risk cultures*⁴⁹².

Nachträglichkeit happens also in relation to *fiction, reality and simulation*. In 9/11 at that exact escaping moment when the tip of the airplane pierces the glass and steel wall structure, the clear and thin difference between what is understood as real and what as imaginary shattered. What used to be understood as harmless imagination became a possibility and a forecast for a serious threat. The catastrophic events and mythical conflicts of western imagination transformed into reality which led to a state where what could be imagined, could also be dangerous. The distance which allowed one to see something frightening but which could not happen in reality disappeared in 9/11. *The politics of fear is not based on the countable risk but to the possibility, where possible is limited and divided from impossible only by imagination and retrospective knowledge*. In the politics of fear *real* and *unreal* are overlapping entities as the cases of the *dangerous ordinary* caused by the *shahidat* and *noir* discourse as *parrhesia* also emphasises.

⁴⁸⁹ Saraneva 2008, 2.

⁴⁹⁰ Huntington 1998.

⁴⁹¹ *ibid.*

⁴⁹² Beck 2009, 67.

7. TRAUMATISED BODIES

The etymological meaning of the word *trauma* is a *wound*. The word is used to describe both the physical and the mental condition.⁴⁹³ It is also defined regarding to following features where a person:

1. *have been exposed to an extreme event that lies beyond usual human experience,*
2. *repeatedly re-experience the event or parts of the event*
3. *attempt to avoid stimuli that give rise to recollections of the event (avoidance) or experience general emotional numbing, and*
4. *continuously be in a state of psychological alertness (arousal).*⁴⁹⁴

Definition of trauma seems to share some of the main elements of the study of politics of fear so far. These are eventalization as a method for the analysis of the sources of fear, representation as a formation of sign, montage as interpretative process of the event, *the silence* as avoidance of the threat and the knowledge of the state of vulnerability in the ordinary. In this study it is estimated how a trauma caused by violence can actualize as individual and collective behaviour and where the actual political impact of fear into people can be discovered. Trauma is a condition caused by an event where the knowledge becomes materialised in the body, diagnosed genealogy of fear.

7.1 GHOSTS

*We saw a man, who was still moving, even though his organs were falling out. We saw so badly burned bodies that one couldn't be sure in which side the face used to be.*⁴⁹⁵

Around us was silent ... actually it was terrifying silence, as if all the people and all the trees and even plants would have been dead. [...] Hands where in a terrible pain and the only way was to keep them raised in front of us as ghosts

⁴⁹³ Montgomery 1998, 8.

⁴⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁹⁵ Hautamäki 1988, 14. Translated by the writer of the thesis.

*have, so that they wouldn't touch our body ... everyway around the people looked ghostly.*⁴⁹⁶

*Everybody looked like the same, everybody heard like the same [...] Half or completely naked they walked with strange, slow steps [...] They looked white [...] their faces where like masks. It felt like I would be seeing a dream when I looked these terrifying ghosts passing by slowly. [...] If there would have been only few of them, it may have not affected so strongly. But I met them everywhere – I can still see them – walking ghosts [...] I couldn't make any specific decision ... I followed the others ... I lost my self and drifted away ...*⁴⁹⁷

Man with deadly injuries but who is still alive, a living environment without sound, human formed beings with unnatural appearance and bodies without mind. These impressions are collected from psychoanalyst Robert Jay Lifton's interviews of survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atom bombs after 17 years of those events⁴⁹⁸. Nuclear bomb explosion targeted against civilian population problematizes again the relation between the politics of fear and warfare. Even further the descriptions of the event questions the fundamental structural division between *life* and *death* when it is related to human experience and semiotics. Even how different they might look, the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have many similar constructive elements as presented in the case of Mogadishu, Abu Ghraib, *Shahidat*, *the silence* and 9/11, which are not just direct violence and death.

The appearance of badly injured people was shocking. The living could not be recognized from the dead⁴⁹⁹ in a situation where their physical appearance was identical. The only difference was that the others were still functioning under a collective pattern of behaviour, as living dead, zombies without own mind. The living were related to dead not only by the observing outsiders but also in their own experience⁵⁰⁰ because there was no clear understandable causality why the people who experienced the same mystical flash *pika don*⁵⁰¹ had different destinies. The diseases caused by the radiation led to the death of others, when the others survived without any separating visual sign. The difference between living

⁴⁹⁶ Hautamäki 1988, 15. Translated by the writer of the thesis.

⁴⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 16.

⁴⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 14.

⁵⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 35.

⁵⁰¹ *ibid.*, 11.

and dead stayed unrecognisable because of “an invisible and sneaking radiation death”⁵⁰². How this differs from the case of *Shahidat* is that the *mutilated bodies* did not disappear but remained as living sign-vehicles of death among the living. These people are called *Hibakusha* stigmatized by *keloid scars* from the fires⁵⁰³. Word *Seizonsha*, a survivor, is not used because the *Hibakushas* are socially related permanently to the status of victim. The *social causes* are seen in the discrimination and belonging to the lowest social group.⁵⁰⁴ Other stigmas appear also in later generations. Most important symbol besides *keloid scars* is *microcephaly*, a malformation of small head which also leads to lower mental capabilities. *Mutilated* and *deformed* bodies form the *genealogy of fear* and where the *heritage* has become both social and genetic phenomenon.

Discrimination of *Hibakushas* can be explained as socio-cultural phenomenon related also (at least in the level of speech) to economical reasons⁵⁰⁵. It is also strongly related to semiotics and anthropology. People didn't only die immediately when the atom bombs exploded but they kept dying⁵⁰⁶ during the next hours, days and years. Victims of the explosion shared almost identical resemblance and *Hibakusha's* carry same physical signs. The descriptions of the witnesses of the event of Hiroshima and Nagasaki express that there didn't exist anymore individuals but a one body of *Hibakusha*, a mass of clones which kept on dying. In collective sphere of bereavement which is caused by radiation appears as *continuing dying*, as the *heritage of pika don*. In a way *continuing dying* exists at least as long as the generation of *Hibakusha's* is alive. *Hibakushas* have transformed into sign-vehicles of semantic units of *pika don* which is done via recognizing, naming and numerous repetitions.

The cloning of the *Hibakusha* body began in the moment of explosion. Shock wave denuded the clothes of the victims and burned their skin. The result can be seen in the descriptions of eye witnesses of the endless lines of nude and burned bodies, *the ghosts*, where the individual differences and social status is lost. Repetition makes the illustration technique special. Repeating creates rhythmic line, where the *open-closed* or *light-dark* binomials erase the material appearance and strengthen the abstractive and associative meanings⁵⁰⁷. It can be compared to the *symbolic violence* presented in Abu Ghraib as *symbolic beheading* (loosing

⁵⁰² Hautamäki 1988, 25–26.

⁵⁰³ *ibid.*, 39.

⁵⁰⁴ *ibid.*, 36–37.

⁵⁰⁵ *ibid.*, 37.

⁵⁰⁶ *ibid.*, 27.

⁵⁰⁷ Lotman 1989, 51.

ones face) and animalization which also appeared in the case of Mogadishu (nudity), an act which wrenches all the semantic units of social status and personal and collective identity, forming a model of *one body*.

The explosion transforms the people into a state which Agamben calls *bare life* both in symbolic and material sense. The word *bare* is related to Greek *haplōs*, philosophical term of pure Being⁵⁰⁸. Bare life is something which is excluded from politics⁵⁰⁹, something which is pure of politics and what transforms from nature to culture, from *zoē* to *bios*⁵¹⁰ when it is set under sovereign power and becomes politicised. Their later emergence as *Hibakusha* sets them into a form of *homo sacer*, where they are partly considered as outsiders but where they still remain within the social order⁵¹¹. Agamben defines it as “*Life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life*”⁵¹² The logic of the impurity of life⁵¹³ can be better understood in relation to *Hibakusha* if it is related to what has been told about Girard’s claims concerning sacred and violence. *Hibakushas* are impure because they have become the sign-vehicles of semantic units of violence and death, blood and wounds, and by then contaminated by violence. *Homo sacer* is character of the double exception⁵¹⁴. On the one hand *Hibakushas* where given medical care but on the other hand they have remained discriminated in the society.

The explosions did not only led into loosing one’s social status but also loosing oneself. Soili Hautamäki notes that after the recovery many people still had the permanent feeling that their bodily functions had for some reason become distorted and strange for them⁵¹⁵. Also the reflections from social relations affected to this feeling of strangeness. A young woman abandoned by his husband, and a girl whose parents where unable to recognize her from her face⁵¹⁶ are examples of a situation where one’s appearance has changed so dramatically that she is not understood as the same person one used to be. The shattered image of self was by own experience and social environment changed from *me* to a *stranger*. Here *bare life* appears as a fundamental condition, as a pure life without identity, social relations, normative

⁵⁰⁸ Agamben 1998, 102.

⁵⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 11–12.

⁵¹⁰ *ibid.*, 102.

⁵¹¹ *ibid.*, 52.

⁵¹² *ibid.*

⁵¹³ *ibid.*, 47.

⁵¹⁴ *ibid.*, 52.

⁵¹⁵ Hautamäki 1988, 28.

⁵¹⁶ *ibid.*, 40.

support or secured future. It also shows the ultimate form of repression in a form of psychological, physical, social and normative regression, bare and wounded life.

Traumatic event may lead to a victimization and identification as *the other* which is conformed by naming. This process doesn't necessary mean a process of marginalization, a social amputation where the wounded are violently cut off from the society. It may also lead to a formation of new group identity. Volkan's empirical study shows an example of five Palestinian children survivors from the Sabra and Shatila massacres in Lebanon on September 15th in 1982 committed by the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia. The children's real identities were unknown, so they were given the last name *Arafat*, which was used in the orphanage. The children's behavior appeared as what is understood as *normal* when they acted together as a *team*. When one of them was separated from the others, he or she would behave *abnormally*; either becoming extremely agitated or hallucinating. The *abnormal* behavior disappeared when the children were reunited. In Volkan's analysis this showed a difficulty in their sense of personal identity and that individual identity was replaced by *team* or large-group identity⁵¹⁷. Similar to the case of the *Hibakusha*, traumatic event causes serious human casualties and leads to a formation of a group of survivors and victims which then are named according to their status and identified as one homogenous being, not as individuals. The shared experience of traumatic event and the following recognition and social interaction constructs a *social body*, where the physical boundaries of individual body has disappeared and one can only be *normal* as a part of something, without experiencing distortion and strangeness

*Blinding ...flash divided the sky [...] I saw gigantic cloud mass [...] it looked like a monstrous mushroom [...] the shape ...the colour ...the light ...it lived and changed constantly.*⁵¹⁸

*I saw that the Hiroshima had disappeared [...] Hiroshima didn't exist – I didn't see anything else – Hiroshima didn't definitely exist.*⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁷ Volkan 2009.

⁵¹⁸ Hautamäki 1988, 11.

⁵¹⁹ *ibid.*, 17.

The explosion of atom bomb, *pika don* was something that was not experienced ever before in such a massive scale. The impressions comes very close to the *Thing*, a gigantic object of power which seems to have a mind of its own, and that it really present the energy of our mind in its most terrifying and lethal form. It presents the *spectacle* in its purest form appearing as mass, colour, dynamic form, change and awakening range of emotions⁵²⁰. What here really appears problematic is that the impressions of the explosion do not seem to reflect pure terror. What was experienced on that moment was something unbelievable, a grand rupture in *normal* even it took place during the war. There was no clear sign or knowledge of such a possibility in the case of Hiroshima, in a city which didn't have any special strategic importance and which happened in a day time in a clear sky where the destruction was brought only by single plane. Atom bomb appeared as *deus ex machina*, unpredictable intervention of divine power which as in dramaturgy, also orders the outcome of the conflict.

If we look the emotional range of spectacle and the divine and exceptional nature of *deus ex machina* together we end up to a concept of *Thambos*. It is a term known from the era of Antiquity where it expressed *holy fear*, a religious feeling, and respective fear aroused by supernatural power or being.⁵²¹ A source of *thambos* appears as unreachable for human understanding and control. It can not be approached or entered because it is not humane from its nature, it can be arbitrary or schematic and regarded only with fatalism. The source is out of reach but the feeling remains, the knowledge of possible and uncontrollable destruction.

The original term of *ground zero* was taken into use after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. It seems suitable name not only as a coordinates but also in the scale of annihilation. The areas targeted as ground zero became the spaces of total *disappearance*. Like in the case of the twin towers of World Trade Center there was no referential object left of the cities which inhabitants as the only sign of the explosion after the disappearance of the mushroom cloud had transformed into unrecognizable homogenous group of ghosts. Entire space of social relations, economy and living had vaporized away in a single moment. Agamben argues that the sphere of the *domus* is the originary political element which defines the very model of *natural life* and *life exposed to death*⁵²². The disappearance of *domus* means a fundamental rupture and discontinuity in social reality and political space. The lack

⁵²⁰ Pramod 2008, 115.

⁵²¹ Flacelière 1995, 182.

⁵²² Agamben 1998, 55.

of referential object and possibility to understand the sudden and extremely radical change was also reflected in the death silence, *the silence* which expressed the total emptiness and incapability to process such an event⁵²³. Total disappearance of visual sign appeared as non-existing vocal-signs. The visual and auditory spaces become referential objects to the traumatic event.

7.2 RESPONSIVE BODIES

Similar results of change in homely spaces can be found from the research concerning the effect of war and political violence in post-traumatic stress disorder. Living in the midst of fighting including bombardment and home demolition, which takes place in own well known environment, has led into severe and widespread post-traumatic reactions.⁵²⁴ Post effects can appear as *super-memory* which reproduces the event back to knowledge via all senses. Memories can appear in situation where a person is awake or sleeping as fragments or as complete event. To be activated these memories sometimes need a trigger. For example a survivor from flight accident had two fragments of memory considering the event. The first was a visual memory where a line of trees are passed by with high speed when the plane was falling, and the second was a smell of fuel in the plane after the crash. These memories could return automatically but they were also triggered by driving through forest roads and while refuelling. Also audio memories can spontaneously appear as banging, shouting, screaming or unnatural silence.⁵²⁵ In the context of trauma the representation of the event is not brought directly but re-experienced by a sign-trigger, *conditioned reflex*⁵²⁶ reconstructing the event from the memories.

*The two oldest children [...] sleep poorly at night, and wake up with frequent nightmares. Furthermore, they panic when they hear shooting from the military training camp nearby or the sound of aeroplanes.*⁵²⁷

*When the girl sees a weapon or a person in uniform, she thinks her family is going to be killed. Sudden sounds startle her, a reaction that her parents feel is related to the bombings during the war.*⁵²⁸

⁵²³ Hautamäki 1988, 15. Translated by the writer of the thesis.

⁵²⁴ Thabet, Abed and Vostanis 2002, 1803.

⁵²⁵ Dyregrov 1994, 29.

⁵²⁶ Pavlov 2010, 136.

⁵²⁷ Montgomery 1998, 74.

*An Iraqi man who had been imprisoned three times because of political activities. [...] He has difficulties falling asleep and staying asleep and has frequent nightmares about the torture. He suffers from anxiety attacks, palpitation, and a feeling of suffocation, often triggered by the sight of policemen in uniform or by certain sounds.*⁵²⁹

Described situation are from Palestine, Kuwait in a time of Iraqi occupation and Iraq, which all message a breach of human rights and also humanitarian law which recognizes civilians as a group under special protection. These are reactions to bullets which are not targeted, aeroplanes which do not carry bombs and officials who are not ordered to kill or torture. They are reflections of previous violence which doesn't exist in their present position but which is still experienced as potential threat. Fear as future oriented phenomenon is problematic when it is related to trauma where the expected pain and suffering is not traced from the future but from the past. Repressing violence transforms a human, the political subject, into *bare life* a produced objects of fear. In the culture of fear, *trauma is a structuring element of self-governance*.

Trauma reminds in many ways internalized form of discipline and punishing. *Panopticon*⁵³⁰ does not locate in surveillance technologies but in *technologies of the self*. It is not formed between monitoring subject and monitored object. In internalized *panopticon* the object becomes the subject of self-governance. When the emotional memories are traumatic, they become permanent; dissociate fears toward everything which could remind from the traumatic situation. Traumatic stress maintains the symptoms by preventing their processing.⁵³¹ The sensors (eyes and ears) of the subject form the physical part of the *panopticon*, where the passive sign-vehicles of power (visual or vocal) trigger the punishment mechanism which is based on the knowledge, either conscious or unconscious. Here trauma doesn't appear only as medical question but as an *instrument of power*, produced by the *subject of power* and governed by *the self*. A situation where a visual sign of governance, a uniform can produce either, a knowledge and strong possibility of being treated with serious violence or actually physically experiencing violence where *the subject*

⁵²⁸ Montgomery 1998, 77.

⁵²⁹ *ibid.*, 34.

⁵³⁰ Foucault 1991a, 200.

⁵³¹ de Mause 2003, 97.

and sign of violence remains passive, shows an ultimate form of governance, *violence without violent act*. As in *panopticon*, the whole idea of governance is based on the knowledge of possibility of being noticed, captured and punished⁵³².

* * *

Study on trauma verifies certain elements of the politics of fear and it also have brought out some new aspects. One is the concept of materialized *social body* the *one-body*, a form of group identity which in its purest form overtakes personal identity and which is not only social but also as bodily experience, a stage where the mental becomes physical and the knowledge transforms the body. *Social body* in its most fundamental form as experienced limits of one's existence can only be reformed from *bare life*, a form of human life which exists without recognition and socio-political status. The *social body* is real in the sense that Foucault argued the king's body to be, not a metaphor but a political reality. The *social body* is constituted not by the universality of wills but of the materiality of power operating on the bodies of individuals.⁵³³ In the context of politics of fear the will of the *social body* exists, but in the way which Foucault also abandoned, not as universal consensus, but as repressed reaction caused by material power which has entered the bodies of individuals treating and operating them as one being. *Social body* is the manifestation of genealogy of fear, a rule for the formation of the objects of fear. *Fear can be constructed in collective memory only if the eventalized body can be acknowledged also as a social body, a representation of one's own existence.*

The other phenomenon is a process where the body and knowledge transforms into *panopticon*, an internalized surveillance and punishment mechanism constructed of conditioned reflexes activated by sign-vehicles of violence. This shouldn't be recognized only as self-governance but also as a *silent casualty*, disabling mechanism which is not commonly recognized as such in the political debates. Producing fear is not recognized as a crime and there doesn't seem to be any effective international treaties or practices controlling this type of indirect violence. Serious negative effects on mental health of children in the conflict areas⁵³⁴ are not related to problems such as land mines as a threat for civilian

⁵³² Foucault 1991a, 200–202.

⁵³³ Foucault 1980b, 53.

⁵³⁴ Thabet, Abed and Vostanis 2002, 1803–1804.

population. In both cases the acts of violence, either direct or indirect, are causing harm for health and prosperity which actualises the *silent casualty* as a regression of the population. Foucault interpret the assertion of Carl von Clausewitz that war is politics continued by other means in the context of political power and understands it as a form of unspoken warfare in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language and in the bodies themselves⁵³⁵. This concludes very well the nature of trauma in relations to political power. *In trauma the knowledge of fear materialises in the body as experience of violence and patterns of pathological behaviour, which socially emerges as seclusion and repression.*

8. CONCLUSION: THE UNHEIMLICH

“One is curious to know what this peculiar quality is which allows us to distinguish as ‘uncanny’ certain things within the boundaries of what is ‘fearful’.”⁵³⁶ In the light of the research so far, Sigmund Freud’s question or note seems most important. What can be summarised from the case research is the appearance of ordinary things which are set under a context, frame and interpretation which makes them fearful. Freud’s note concerning *uncanny* and *fear* are part of his research on the *Unheimlich*⁵³⁷, a German term which comes close to the meaning of the *uncanny* and is usually translated this way. Research on the *Unheimlich* is a question considering the subject of aesthetics, where it is understood as a theory of the qualities of feeling, not as purely visual subject⁵³⁸.

*The German word unheimlich is obviously the opposite of heimlich, heimisch, meaning “familiar,” “native,” “belonging to the home”; and we are tempted to conclude that what is “uncanny” is frightening precisely because it is not known and familiar. Naturally not everything which is new and unfamiliar is frightening, however; the relation cannot be inverted. We can only say that what is novel can easily become frightening and uncanny; some new things are frightening but not by any means all. Something has to be added to what is novel and unfamiliar to make it uncanny.*⁵³⁹

⁵³⁵ Foucault 1980b, 90.

⁵³⁶ Freud 1919, 1.

⁵³⁷ Also written as Das Unheimliche and Unheimlichkeit.

⁵³⁸ Freud 1919, 1.

⁵³⁹ *ibid.*, 2.

To avoid confusion it must be clarified here that the word *uncanny* is used to describe the feeling itself where the *Unheimlich* is the expression for the concept which appears to be more complicated. Freud relates the impression of *uncanny* to the objects and events which depend on how well one is oriented to this environment⁵⁴⁰. Freud admits that the *uncanny* can be understood narrowly as “nothing else than a hidden, familiar thing that has undergone repression and then emerged from it, and that everything that is uncanny fulfils this condition”⁵⁴¹. According to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, everything is uncanny that “ought to have remained hidden and secret, and yet comes to light”⁵⁴² which makes it already much more complicated phenomenon related to process of appearance and disappearance. Freud finds it possible to approach the *Unheimlich* by “proceeding to review those things, persons, impressions, events and situations which are able to arouse in us a feeling of the uncanny in a very forcible and definite form”⁵⁴³.

It is reasonable and useful at this point to compare the findings of the *symbolic violence, the silence, breach in social reality* and *trauma* to the concept of the *Unheimlich* in terms to form a coherent understanding concerning the politics of fear and possibly to summarise the various phenomena under this concept. The supplemented new hypothesis is: *The modern politics of fear is similar to the appearance of the uncanny*. In the concluding section the elements of the *Unheimlich* are estimated in relation to case studies. After testing, the new hypothesis is put under question in which ways one can approach the concept of politics of fear.

* * *

Ernst Jentsch originally used the story of E. T. A. Hoffmann *The Sand-Man* to describe the experience of the uncanny⁵⁴⁴. He and Freud divided different elements which they presumed to cause the feeling of uncanny. Freud also complemented these according to his own experiences and previous researches. These elements are used here as structuring concepts to formulate a hypothetical theory of the politics of fear in relation to the *Unheimlich*.

⁵⁴⁰ Freud 1919, 2.

⁵⁴¹ *ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁴² *ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁴³ *ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 5.

The characters of *Olympia* is a reference to *animism* which will be presented as the first model of appearing as the *Unheimlich*. This feeling is produced by the uncertainty whether a lifeless object might be animate.⁵⁴⁵ If the content of *Olympia* is generalized, the argument could consider any *object which holds the potentiality to appear to be something different to its present appearance*. *Animate* doesn't only refer to *life* but also to *movement* and *imitating life*. This would mean that the animated object can have motivation to move in relation to other objects and that imitating appearance is covering the prediction of this movement which leads to the conclusion of the deceptive nature of *the object*. The potentiality to appear as something extraordinary and different also *moves the animated object* to the role of *the motivated subject*. The concept of animism can most closely be related to the *shahidat* where a passive female figure or a lifeless automobile achieves a radical and explosive movement unexpectedly and changing *the subjects* via *necropower* into *the objects* of violence. The act of violence alone does not establish the concept of *animism* but the knowledge which is achieved concerning the possibility of *the object* to appear as *the subject*. Same knowledge affects the experiences concerning aeroplanes and luggage as penetrating missiles and exploding accessories. *Olympia* expresses *a hidden potentiality to emerge as a rupture in the order of the object and the subject*. It is radical, sudden and unpredictable which makes it destructive and impossible to control, a phenomenon of the *Unheimlich*.

Furthermore the animism can be interpreted to appear in a more complicated process, in the *simulation*. An event which takes place on the silver screen, a projection of film which is the representation of an event which didn't ever happen as such, suddenly invades reality. *Olympia*, a doll as a referential being of the woman, becomes real being when it moves. It is the same process as where the simulation becomes real, a breach in social reality.

Another concept in tracing the *Unheimlich* which relates to *simulation* is the *double*. There are two different ways to approach it where one is presented by E.T.A. Hoffmann and other by Otto Rank. For Hoffmann the *double* expresses identical visual appearance. Here one can identify him/herself so closely to his/her *double* that they transfer mental processes as in telepathy. Less dramatically expressed one possesses knowledge, feeling and experience in common with the other which leads to a situation where one identifies oneself with another person.⁵⁴⁶ At least two links can be drawn to the case studies; to the prisoners of Abu Ghraib

⁵⁴⁵ Freud 1919, 5.

⁵⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 9.

and the lines of *Hibakusha's* in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Abu Ghraib presented a situation where the uniformed representation of the prisoners and complicated identifying made them possible targets for identification. *Hibakusha* on the other hand produced identical biological and visual appearance which then became similarity in social status. The victims of the explosion transformed into the *double* of each other where the identification to group appeared as collective pattern of behaviour immediately after the explosion. Completely disappeared surrounding social order, a space of *bare life*, lead to shared identity and formation of the *social body*. For outsiders their visual presence as endless lines of wondering ghosts also was like looking a copy or a *double* of one person, *one-body*.

For Otto Rank the *double* is a reflection in the mirror, one's own shadow, guardian spirit or soul. It is regarded as part of ones own existence. The most concrete ones, reflection and shadow, are natural signs of our physical appearance where the light reacts to our existence and forms an image. The abstract ones are as Rank calls them "reinsurance against destruction to the ego" and "energetic denial of the power of death" where the soul is the *double* of the body. This argument is compared to the ancient Egyptians and their art of making images of the dead in lasting material.⁵⁴⁷ What is not noted here is that also the destruction of these images was an absolute act against the person which they presented and in the case of seizure of power the faces and names were destroyed from the wall paintings and statues to prevent their resurrection and to erase their existence and access to power completely. The violence against the *double* has to happen in representation where the symbolic process affects the collective memory, exposing the one who's related to the *double* to symbolic violence.

In the case of Abu Ghraib this destruction of the *double* was done in erasing the faces of the prisoners. Furthermore the *double* can be transformed into "ghastly harbinger of death" what in history has happened to characters of previous religions. In Abu Ghraib the representative *double*, physical and social image, is corrupted in the same way. Classical example which Freud doesn't use is Oscar Wilde's novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. In the story artificially produced *double* of Dorian Gray is the portrait made of him. In the story all corruption caused by age, sickness and immoral life doesn't appear in *the subject* Dorian Gray but in his *double*, the picture. The picture projects the real nature of *the subject* and his actions. As in

⁵⁴⁷ Freud 1919, 9.

the story when *the subject* and his *double* are set into same context, the corruption will transfer back to *the subject*.⁵⁴⁸ The immortalized part of human being, the knowledge or idea concerning oneself is corrupted producing the image of *immoral us*.

In Abu Ghraib the prisoners were forced to participate in an event which representation, *double* of the event, corrupts them by breaking of the moral and cultural taboos and repressing them by *symbolic violence*. Here the direct violence transforming the person into *the object of violence* is not relevant in relation to the *double* but the way how the representation transforms it to *the immoral subject*. Žižek notes that in idealistic tendency of hylozoism *death* doesn't exist as such but it appears only as deconstruction of certain system or structure of living particles when life itself continues. He also argues that Sade's absolute crime deems to destroy this second part of life.⁵⁴⁹ It can be claimed that this second part of life is the manifestation of the *double* and that the illustrative and interpretative discursive practice of *Salò* presents them in the context of this absolute crime which corrupts and destroys their *double*, which can be understood here as their public image, their social status and their understanding of oneself. The immortal nature of the *double* can also be seen in reversible role in the case of Rodina's daughter. Here the name of the dead mother remained as her *double* which was then via *naming* transferred to her grandchild which became then the sign-vehicle for her *double*, indestructible biological and cultural form of life, a living picture.

Representation doesn't appear as part of the *Unheimlich* only in the context of the *double*. It should first and foremost be related to *involuntary repetition*⁵⁵⁰. "That factor which consists in a recurrence of the same situations, things and events [...] what I have observed, this phenomenon does undoubtedly, subject to certain conditions and combined with certain circumstances, awaken an uncanny feeling, which recalls that sense of helplessness"⁵⁵¹. Continuing representation constructs the even as endless or reoccurring. Images are related to memory and the representing images activates the same conscious and unconscious experiences which occurred in the actual event or when the representation was seen first time. Relation of *involuntary repetition* to trauma is obvious where the representation does not have to come from some outer source but where it can reactivate from one separate sign.

⁵⁴⁸ Wilde 1982.

⁵⁴⁹ Žižek 2009, 90.

⁵⁵⁰ Freud 1919, 11.

⁵⁵¹ *ibid.*, 10.

The *omnipotence of thoughts* is imagined situation where one's wishes come true. Freud argues that "an uncanny effect is often and easily produced by effacing the distinction between imagination and reality, such as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the full functions and significance of the thing it symbolizes"⁵⁵². In this context it doesn't recall any effort from *the subject* but the wishes appear spontaneously.⁵⁵³ In the case studies this concludes two different phenomena, *the Circle of Manias* and the *breach in reality*. *The Circle of Manias* illustrated an immoral space of sadism and perversion, a manifestation of uncontrollable desires, which break all the conventional norms. In this context the sexual fantasies appeared as violent pornography and change from personal to public which appears as a repressive power relation. Žižek describes this phenomenon as the *id-machine*, a place, subject or situation which makes the unconscious dreams come true but where they will evidently tier away from one's hands and drift into a conflict situation with ones ego⁵⁵⁴. *A Breach in reality* in relation to *omnipotence of thought* forms a *catastrophe fantasy*, where an ability to imagine impossible threat makes it possible which comes close to Baudrillard's harsh argument that we have been dreaming of the destruction of WTC-towers. The ability to imagine destruction and illustrate it in the context of fiction can turn into reality. This claim can be completed by the arguments of Žižek concerning the nature of *real*. According to him we forbid our real desires and fantasies. When they emerge the social reality becomes fragile, which can be tier down by the intervention of the *real*.⁵⁵⁵ Here the *real* stands for the reality in it's most bare form without mitigating images, ideas or believes, a space which exists without society and norms. Žižek continues by arguing that the emergence of *real* exterminates the borderline between reality and the *real*.⁵⁵⁶ The danger of the *omnipotence of thought* seems to lay in the discovery of the *real* nature of human being, the *immoral us* and in the potentiality of harmless imagination to change into nightmarish reality.

The character of *Sand-man* is the leading element in Freud's analysis of the *Unheimlich*. As in animism the real existence of Sand-man remains unknown; his presence or appearance can be projected to living subject but the actual being seems only to exist in the idea or myth

⁵⁵² Freud 1919, 15.

⁵⁵³ *ibid.*, 12.

⁵⁵⁴ Žižek 2006, part 2.

⁵⁵⁵ Žižek 2009, 19.

⁵⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 21.

level. This makes impossible to enter his character. Real *Sand-man* exists only in the level of text also in the Hoffman's story but even so knowledge concerning him has a great effect to child's behaviour.⁵⁵⁷ *Sand-man* can be described as violent, sadistic and malignant. His aim to steal the children's eyes⁵⁵⁸ is the *vocal sign* which activates the narrative and causes the projection of the semantic units concerning *Sand-mans* qualities and transfers them into sign-vehicle. This can be recognized as the same phenomena as the child's fear fantasy of *Cannibal Negro* where the visual sign of dark skin triggers the qualities presented in *negro/necro discourse*. Both are narratives of extremely negative stereotypes which do not exist as such but which live in the level of text and may *emerge* in various situations. Also the characterization of the *female soldier* can be identified as *Sand-man*-effect in the context of the *Unheimlich*.

Sand-man also appears as deceptive character. In the story the *Sand-man* is presented in a form of different men. Here the dramaturgy of appearance is similar to the *shahidat* because of the *deceptive* nature, but also because the men in the role of *Sand-man disappear* and leave *mutilated bodies* after them and as in the case of the *Falling Man* the madness caused by *Sand-mans* last appearance leads to a suicide of the main character⁵⁵⁹. Explosion, loosing one's eyes and jumping down from the tower are all related to *Sand-mans* appearance. Dramatic event related to the textual origin of the character makes *Sand-man* a form of *palimpsest fear*, a discursive formation of unexpected and intervening death and violence. *Sand-man* as a concept or *thing* is something that exists in memory and culture as a cognitive model and discursive formation. Freud notes that we can call a living person uncanny when evil motives are ascribed to him/her but only in the case where we believe that this person possess some special powers to achieve his aims⁵⁶⁰. A suicide bomber possessing *necropower* or imagination which can change planes into missiles could be considered as such powers. Its ability to cause suffering also relates *Sand-man* to *responsive bodies* which experience the terror and physical pain by only sensing the signifying sign of the source of threat, where *Sand-man* exists as a trauma. Because *Sand-man* exists as a text, also the resistance happens in the level of naming. In Afanasievits' case the dog carries the linguistic sign of the uncanny *Sand-man*, Stalin, and where his demonic character is transformed into form of a familiar dog.

⁵⁵⁷ Freud 1919, 5–7.

⁵⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁶⁰ *ibid.*, 14.

The fear of loosing one's eyes Freud relates to both rational fears of injury but also to fear of castration⁵⁶¹. At first sight such an idea feels difficult to relate to the politics of fear but still both features can be captured from the second photograph of the case of Abu Ghraib, earlier described with terms of *symbolic beheading* and *censorship castration*, connects these both in the same frame. Censored faces and genitals are the expressions of vulnerability which by covering them actually makes them more visible and more vulnerable. *Power to expose the vulnerability is a constructing element of the politics of fear.*

“Many people experience the feeling in the highest degree in relation to death and dead bodies, to the return of the dead, and to spirits and ghosts”⁵⁶² More commonly recognized fear connected to bodies of the death doesn't appear so important in relation to the *Unheimlich*. In the case studies a clear representation of death in its purest form does not exist. How *ghosts* and *returning of the death* should be understood here is done according to their relation to structuralism where they appear as *structural paradoxes* of the condition of life. The dead body of the soldier in Mogadishu under public punitive violence is an example where the behaviour of *the subject* shifts the concept of *the object* between corps and body. Another example is the disappeared people who do not fit either the classification of dead or alive because the sign of the body is missing. These people who are assumed to be dead could really return if it would be discovered that they are still alive. Also *The Falling Man* is a *structural paradox*; in the short moment where the man is falling he is *very much alive* but *as good as dead*, captured into an event where his life can not be saved. Clearest example of ghosts concerns the *Hibakushas*, people who appeared looking like corps but were still moving in mechanic pattern without individual mind, and who kept on living but could still get sick and die any moment. *Hibakusha's* resurrected from the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but could return to death all the sudden. Also Rodina's resistant *naming* act has the uncanny appearance as the returning of the death mother. The cases show the paradox of life and death which lies in Levi-Strauss's constructivism. The concept and efficacy of *necropower* is also strongly built on the lack of political capabilities in relation to this paradox. Observations done here bends the illustrating line of life and death into a circle where they are not in the extremes of the line but only separated by thin borderline which can be crossed in semiotic sense and by means of *symbolic exchange*.

⁵⁶¹ Freud 1919, 7.

⁵⁶² *ibid.*, 13.

“Dismembered limbs, a severed head, a hand cut off [...] all these have something peculiarly uncanny about them, especially when [...] they prove able to move of themselves in addition”⁵⁶³. Freud interprets these as associations of castration-complex⁵⁶⁴ which in the context of politics of fear could be seen accumulating from the *vulnerability* and *structural paradox*. On the other hand this would make no difference to these previous concepts. Here one should look to a case which Lotman presents in his work concerning the problems of framing. Lotman describes the experience of young educated Russian woman who saw a film first time made with montage technique. She was chocked and told that they showed people who were torn into pieces. Similar reaction happened in movie theatre in Hollywood where a close picture of face was shown first time. The audience fell into panic when they saw that the ‘cut off’ head started to smile.⁵⁶⁵ In the context of representation (film or picture) what is seen is considerate as real because of their identical visual appearance. When the representation is in conflict with the knowledge of how these visual objects should function, they appear as an element of the *Unheimlich*. This confirms the importance of the framing in the representation as interpretation. Only by gaining knowledge of framing technique enables one to question what is shown.

Freud concludes his research by saying that his collection of examples is certainly not complete⁵⁶⁶. But what it does is that it reveals the multiplicity of the *surfaces of emergency* of the phenomenon which is called *fear*. It also shows the objects of fear as *palimpsest* or *layered* phenomena, where the *origin* of the fear is hidden and where the *sources* are identified with the signs and these signs as a *simulation* replace the source. How the body turns into object of fear is not a question of simplicity, but multiplicity. Thereby I claim that the appearance of politics of fear as the *Unheimlich* is a *continuity of separate emergences and fixations of heritage*. In this way one can understand the unity of differences, the archaeology of genealogies. Versatile topic such as the politics of fear is easily misunderstood if one tries to describe it based on the assumed origin. It should rather be understood as field of phenomena which by limiting and oversimplifying analysis loses its meaning and significance. The analysis on politics of fear is not to understand it as *an sich*, as ontological, but a process of episteme.

⁵⁶³ Freud 1919, 14.

⁵⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 14.

⁵⁶⁵ Lotman 1989, 36.

⁵⁶⁶ Freud 1919, 15.

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Furthermore than collecting different forms of fear under the same concept, the *Unheimlich* as originally psychological analytical tool offers some crucial remarks for the formation of the object of fear. It highlights the role of aesthetics, narratives and context, but most importantly the experience. If one tries to draw a line of *rules of formation* for *the objects fear*, some hypothetical principles can be concluded here to be used and tested in further research.

Risk or threat an sich does not constitute the existence of fear.

Uncanny threat, acknowledged as unclear and uncontrollable, leads to fear.

All that is related to threat for human's life, health and status can not be directly referred as fear. Threat is a specified object and the risk is the measured or estimated possibility for threat to emerge. When the threat becomes existing and evident, but not clearly recognizable, the subject loses the focus and the ability to handle the threat.

Fear is an experience, and as such considerate as real.

Fear is localised and materialised in the body.

Fear as an experience, feeling or emotion can not be stated as real or unreal, true or false. Experience of fear exists as real fear. Emotion is located to the body, where the effect can be verified. Strongest statement of materialized fear is the trauma, embodied fear and enforcing control. Even though the fear can be localized to the body it emerges between the bodies⁵⁶⁷ as knowledge. Fear, when reflected from individual to collective level, becomes social.

Body expresses the conditions of life and death, the vulnerability.

Non-existing body is a structural paradox, an ongoing disturbed process.

The origin and demise of human exist in relation to body where responding body expresses life and non-responding body death. Predisposition of the shift between these conditions is

⁵⁶⁷ See e.g. Ahmed 2003, 191.

the vulnerability which is expressed in the context of the body. Disappeared body fulfils neither one of these conditions. When the physical sign of the body does not exist it exists only in the level of knowledge. Knowledge as a process is continuing where the understanding concerning the condition of the body is unstable. Referential object for knowledge can replace the missing body, such as marked grave, identified clothes or spoken, written or illustrated narration.

Representation of the body is a simulation, replacing sign of the object, the double.

The simulative double is a unit of collective memory.

Projected identification to the double forms the social body.

Body appears as a representation of the collective.

The body exists not only as a direct observation but as a document, a representation considerate as real. The *simulation* of real, *the double* of the body, forms the knowledge concerning the body. As a representative, reproductive and repeated unit *the double* forms the existence of the human in the level of collective memory. The existing body and the simulated body are identified as expressions of the same existence. *The double* is an expression of 'us' where the one's existence can be projected and identified and it becomes the representation of the collective.

Represented violence exists as symbolic violence toward the referential body, the double.

Symbolic violence affects the collective in the level of knowledge.

Presented subject in violent event is associated with violence.

In the representation the violence can not be considered anymore as direct violence but as a simulation of violence. Because the simulated violence is targeted to simulated body, violence emerges as the *symbolic violence* against *the double*. The *symbolic violence* deconstructs and transforms *the double* and constructs the knowledge of vulnerability. It also transforms *the double* of the subject into *the subject of violence*. Because *the subject* appears as similar body compared to *the object, the representative social body*, but because it deconstructs *the object*, it is acknowledged as something different from *the object*. The

violence separates *the subject* from *the social body*, while it still reminds 'us'. This makes 'us' potential objects of fear.

Negative connotations as histories of violence are located to the body, the surface of emergence for heritage.

Power as practices form the relation between the subject and the object where fear becomes political.

The body transforms into the object and the subject of the politics of fear, the body of fear.

Different semantic units of negation are situated to sign-vehicle which can appear for example as symbol, name or sound. When located to body, these myths reform the subject into demonic character of *the Sand-man*. Practices control the processes of identification and power forms the relation between *the subject* and *the object*. This process should not only be understood as a reflection of myths but also as a relation which creates and reform myths continuously and interactively. As political phenomena power and practices which affect to formation of the objects of fear, makes fear *emerge* as political. The politics of fear affect to the representative body, body as a social being and bodily functions. The body also appears to produce fear. It reaches the potentiality of both *the subject* and *the object* of the politics of fear and becomes *the body of fear*.

The paradoxical existence of *the body of fear* can be at some level be examined by Flacelière's writings of *thambos*. He notes that the gods of ancient Greece transformed into polytheistic family of gods after the period of animistic gods⁵⁶⁸. When the knowledge as science debates and common experience started considering human as primary subject, inventor of god, creator of modernity, the nature of war and the cause for changes in the environment, he/she also became the biggest threat for one's own existence, uncanny for the *self*. When *the object* and *the subject* share the same existence, what is considerate as *familiar* appears as *the Unheimlic*, *the body of fear* which nature is revealed in the moment of *emergence*, something which *ought to have remained hidden and secret, and yet comes to light*.

⁵⁶⁸ Flacelière 1995, 182.

If the politics of fear is described as use of power, one must also look for the counter force, the appearances of resistance. *The body of fear* must not be understood as purely repressive phenomenon but as well as the ground for the conflicts which finalizes the political nature of fear.

The resistance emerges in context of the double as practices of representing, naming and memorising.

The resistance of the politics of fear appears as normalizing, coping and expressing the existence of fear.

The strongest statement against the politics of fear is parrhesia which transforms the object into the parrhesiast.

Opening the meaning of parrhesia instead of hypothesis can be done maybe better by the voice of a *parrhesiast*.

*This is pre-eminently the time to speak the truth, the whole truth, frankly and boldly. [...] So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself -- nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.*⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁹ Roosevelt 1933.

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