

The Physical, Moral and Spiritual:

A Study on Vitalist Psychology and
the Philosophy of Religion of Lars Levi Laestadius

Kosti Joensuu

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LAPIN YLIOPISTO
UNIVERSITY OF LAPLAND

Rovaniemi 2016

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 **KONEEN SÄÄTIÖ**



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Abstract

Lars Levi Laestadius (1800–1861) is commonly known as an influential North Swedish Lutheran revivalist and a multidisciplinary scientist. His work in botany, Sámi mythology, theology, and his strong influence on North Scandinavian spirituality and culture have been widely studied. The studies on Laestadius' theology agree that anthropology forms the core and basis of his theological and religious thought. In his main work, *Dårhushjonet: En Blick I Nådens Ordning* (*The Lunatic: An Insight Into the Order of Grace*), a grounding anthropology is conceived as having a holistic and vitalistic psychology in its character. However, the fundamental role of anthropology and vitalist psychology as a founding “insight” of Laestadius' systematic theory has never been a topic of academic philosophical research.

In this offered dissertation, *The Lunatic* is approached holistically as a philosophical and scientific-psychological apology for North Scandinavian pietism. *The Lunatic* proved to have a strong tendency to rationalize religious views via scientific-conceptual systematization, especially vitalist psychophysiology. As a basic philosophical study, utilizing philosophical analysis and phenomenological interpretation as its method, this effort confirms the vitalist character of Laestadius' theory and points out the central philosophical and psychological insights that underlie the “system” of Laestadius' religious and theological views. Through the use of historical contextualization, the study argues that the criticism of Enlightenment rationalism, German idealism, and Western metaphysics overall forms the counterpole for all of Laestadius' theoretical elaborations. In this regard, Laestadius sought to overcome classical Cartesian mind/body dualism and its intellectualistic emphases. Thus, the study carries out an interpretative task to analyze the ways in which the human person and its faculties of soul are redefined within the vitalist frame in Laestadius' theory. The specific objective was to follow and analyze how Laestadius sought to hold the physical, moral (psychic), and spiritual (metaphysical) spheres of human existence together, especially in relation to the psychophysiological foundation adopted from the vitalist tradition. In this respect, the focus was placed on the psychophysiological explanations of morality and spirituality and on the idea of intentionality as such.

In the end, Laestadius' critique of metaphysical rationalism and transcendental philosophy was raised for more discussion. The question of whether Laestadius' critique and vitalist philosophy and psychology can be attached to the more general critique of Western metaphysics is discussed with special reference to the tradition

of phenomenological philosophy, the aim of which is overcome the prevailing stance of “constant presence” (substance) found in Western metaphysics.

In the main chapter, Chapter 4, *Person and Intentionality*, Laestadius’ vitalist conception of person and intentionality is analyzed. Chapter 4 deals with the analysis of the central concepts, including the soul, the principle of life, passions, body, the mind, the Self, reason, will, understanding, and imagination. As a result of this research, Laestadius’ anthropology is interpreted as being firmly attached to medical vitalist theorizing and especially to Xavier Bichat’s vitalist medical philosophy. Driving back to vitalism from the prevailing metaphysical rationalism and idealistic metaphysics the effort includes a clear critique of the classical concepts of “substantia” and “essentia,” wherein Laestadius developed a vitalist redefinition of essentiality (*väsendet*) as a vital force for indicating the actual human condition of existence without being simply *substantial* or essence/being (*existentia sine essentia et sine substantia*) in terms of classical metaphysical meaning.

This deconstructive redefinition was the groundwork for Laestadius’ further psychological and theological elaboration and an alternative to the metaphysical rationalistic and simple mechanistic idea of man and worldview. Emphasizing embodied experience and the processual dynamic event of life in a pre-phenomenological way, Laestadius’ analysis constituted a holistic idea of man, and it sought to overcome a simple Cartesian mind/body dualism with the concepts of the principle of life (*livprincip*), organic life, and sensory life (*nervliv*). In Laestadius’ theory, the faculties of soul, such as reason, understanding, and will, were redefined in vitalist terms as more or less organic sensible functions of the human organism, not as distinct and autonomous faculties of the soul. Chapter 4 thus argues that Laestadius’ vitalism forms a psychosomatic theory of the constitution on a human being and human existence. The passions and their impacts on the physiological organism laid the groundwork for all other higher faculties and functions of the organic-embodied soul, including the possibility of spiritual faith and a living relationship with God. The notion of consciousness, including its objective and subjective dimensions, was determined as embodied intentionality based on a psychosomatic constitution and the vitalist-panpsychistic idea of emergence. The holistic notion of person was thus inextricably attached to the organic body and its surrounding world, thereby constituting a viewpoint of *personal embodied intentionality*.

In the second main chapter, Chapter 5, Laestadius’ theory is viewed from the perspective of the common Enlightenment vitalist concept of *physical/moral*, which sought to replace Cartesian body/mind dualism. In this respect, the psychophysiological origins of morality and spirituality are analyzed in more detail through notions of the soul as the principle of life, passions, heart, conscience, perception, awakening, reconciliation, and redefined notions of faith and God. The general conclusion is that Laestadius aimed and managed to overcome the body/mind dualism in the level of

origin and cause. His monistic conceptions notwithstanding, he created a different kind of dualism that manifested itself in the cognitive-psychological sphere as *a dualism between sensuous “natural” feeling and “moral” feeling.*

This distinction derived its roots both from the notions of natural and moral passions and the twofold physiological functions of neural and humoral impacts. Laestadius sought to elaborate on the view of different levels of sensible experience on a physiological plane, so that “moral feeling” would distinguish itself from the mere sensuous natural and more immediate relatedness to its object. Here it was clearly seen how Laestadius’ psychophysiological anthropology turned into onto-theology. This insight was based on the idea of the corrupted nature of the passions that set the vital basis for the faculties of soul, constituting a dissonant turbulence in human experience, and also on the idea of the transcendental character of the flesh itself. Both psychopathological dissonance and the need for reconciliation indicated that natural sensuous intentionality does not fulfil the proper moral and spiritual prerequisites and remains as an objectifying relationship to the “object.” This natural egocentric condition further entailed the necessity of a religious experience of awakening (*väckelse*) as an initial precondition for reconciliation, and thus also the living dynamic relation to God, existence, and moral way of being in the world. The psychosomatic contradiction of awakening formed the groundwork for the need to conceive a reconciliation as the experiential “psychic” justification of morality and genuine spirituality (psychic reconciliation). Here the moral feeling was conceived to transcend the mere objectifying sensory relationship.

Through the vitalist deconstruction of the notions of man and God, Laestadius’ whole ontotheological system aimed to form a correlation (kinship) between the triadic constitution of human beings and the Trinity of God. The initial constitutive condition of that union is psychic reconciliation. According to Laestadius, genuine spirituality or a “living faith of the heart” is seen as the fundamental of genuine practical morality and spirituality. This emphasis of inward faith signified that conscience has the capability of moral and spiritual judgment to ground the functioning of practical reasoning in matters of life and faith.

At the end of Chapter 5, Laestadius’ critique of metaphysical rationalism is discussed, as it relates to a more general critique of Western metaphysics of substance. Laestadius’ anti-metaphysical stance, combined with the theological insights of psychic reconciliation, included the idea of faith as an un-objectifying intentionality and contrasted with the metaphysical objectifying approach toward being (in their beingness; substance, and essence). Here the “embodied” intentionality of faith and psychic reconciliation was conceived to relate with Luther’s *Theology of the Cross*, which is generally seen as one of the main sources of the phenomenological critique of Western metaphysics (Heidegger). Laestadius’ vitalist psychophysical manner of analysis gave a reason to define Laestadius’ philosophy and psychology as *physiological*

transcendentalism. A conclusion of Chapter 5 indicated it was possible to interpret the living faith of the heart as embodied *un-objectifying intentionality*.

These concluding remarks propose that Laestadius' physiological transcendentalism and philosophy of religion can be considered as a vitalist existentialism or pre-phenomenological approach to the question of Being, God, faith, and human existence. As such, Laestadius' holistic ontotheological system could be interpreted as a reversal of absolute idealism and its dialectical process of spirit into psychophysiological event of factual life. In this way, Laestadius' elaboration opposed the intellectual and idealistic tendencies of anthropology and theology and was conceived as a philosophical theology that "makes space" for experiential religiosity and spirituality (utilizing vitalist existentialism).

At the end of these concluding remarks, the more general philosophical question concerning ontological and theological realism in Laestadius' theory is taken into a preliminary discussion. It is pointed out that the questions of realism were problematic in terms of Laestadius' theory mainly because Laestadius' metaphysical and pre-phenomenological presuppositions constitute a vitalist "naturalistic" stance within which the physical and psychic-experiential realms as well as immanent-humane and transcendental-spiritual realms are conceived as co-existing, or constituting a single unity reality. Further, it was proposed that Laestadius' notions of God and Evil as personifications of passions execute a naturalistic anthropological reduction within the vitalist frame. Accordingly, spiritual-moral experiences and perceptions were interpreted as vital-natural psychophysiological phenomena having, however, a distinct transcendental aspect as a calling "voice of God" which calls a human being to the connection and likeness of God and coincidentally to one's original soul [or the Self]. The categorical questions of realism were overcome by Laestadius' vitalist presuppositions and the holistic notion of existence having coincidentally both organic material and vital transcendental dimensions, and the experiential reality being conceived as encompassing both psychophysiological and natural spiritual-transcendental aspects.

Key Words: Lars Levi Laestadius, Laestadius' philosophy, laestadianism, religious philosophy, vitalism, physiological transcendentalism, Christian apology, Lutheranism, critique of Western metaphysics, Protestant metaphysics, intellectual history of North Calotte.

1 Introduction

1.1 Who was Lars Levi Laestadius?

Lars Levi Laestadius (1800–1861) was a Swedish Lutheran priest and multidisciplinary scientist. He is commonly known as a Protestant revivalist and apologist for marginalized North Scandinavian Lutheran-pietism. Pietism, which emphasize personal devotion and inward religious experience, had already spread into North Calotte in the 18th century, and Laestadius had had close contact with the pietistic currents through relatives, vivid social relationship, and the pietistic literature. Laestadius had strong sympathies toward pietism, and as a Christian apologist he defended broadly pietistic forms of Christianity.¹ His religious preaching and writings had a strong influence on North Scandinavian religiosity, and indeed, he later became a leader of the Laestadian-Lutheran movements, which are generally interpreted as reinforcing and redirecting pietistic religiosity.²

Academically, Laestadius is especially well known for his research on botany, theology, and Sámi mythology. Laestadius' interests in natural history and natural science coloured his thinking, starting with his early botanical work and moving on to later theological and philosophical anthropology. Despite his natural scientific interests, Laestadius did become a Lutheran priest. However, he continued his multidisciplinary scientific work throughout his lifetime, first in botany, soon after in the history and mythography of Sámi culture and religion, and finally to theology, anthropology, and the philosophy of religion.³

Laestadius began his academic studies in Uppsala in 1823, where he studied and worked intensively in botany under the supervision of Göran Wahlenberg and also became known as the most diligent student of Carolus Linnaeus. His botanical research included several field trips to North Calotte, the collection of approximately 10,000 plant specimens and several botanical research publications. *Loca Parallela*

1 See further Sandewall 1951, 142–164. (On Laestadius' relationship with pietism)

2 See further e.g., Larsson 1999; Talonen 2001, 53–59.

3 See, e.g., Pentikäinen, J. 1998. Lars Levi Laestadius Revisited: a Lesser Known Side of the Story. *Journal of Finnish Studies* 2: 103–135.

*Plantarum*⁴ was his most extensive publication on the subject. *Loca Parallela Plantarum* was completed in 1832 and was first published in 1839. The book was coolly received and considered to be conservative by the majority of Swedish botanists, as it focused on the different variations of species and argued against the prevailing trend of endlessly finding new ones. Laestadius' strikingly original considerations concerning the influence of light, climate, and environment on plants forms were little regarded⁵. In *Loca Parallela Plantarum*, Laestadius also emphasized the relationship of organic life to its geographical environment and seemed to indicate there were both vitalist and monistic tendencies⁶.

Laestadius also wrote a major work on Sámi history, culture, and religion at the request of the French expeditioners for whom he worked as a guide in 1838.⁷ The book, *Fragmenter i Lappska Mythologien* (later, *Mythology*), was written between 1838–1844, but it was lost soon after he delivered it for publication and thus only partly published posthumously in 1959 in Swedish and in its full extent in 2011 in Finnish⁸. In this work, Laestadius studied the early lappological theories (early Sámi studies) and critically examined them in terms of the horizon of his own experiences and field research. In this work, Laestadius emphasized the empirical first-hand experiences of Sámi life to understand its “inner economy”⁹. Laestadius generally criticized the objectivistic approaches toward Sámi way of life and spirituality, arguing that spiritual matters demand a different kind of hermeneutic methodology distinct from a strictly mathematical method¹⁰. Altogether, Laestadius used a clear scientific approach to explain and understand the psychological phenomena of Sámi

4 *Loca Parallela Plantarum, seu animadversiones physiologico-botanicae de variis plantarum variationibus, praecipue in Svecia boreali observatis [...]* (Nova acta Regiae societatis scientiarum Upsaliensis, Ser. 2, 11: 205–296). Upsaliae, 1839. In Swedish *Loca parallela plantarum* (ed. G. Gripenstad) Tonedalica 51. Luleå 1993. In Finnish *Kasvikirja* (2001) *Loca Prallela Plantarum*, translation. Larry Huldén, Pohjolan Painotuote oy, Rovaniemi. See more about Laestadius' publications in Rydving 2000.

5 Franzén 1973, 295–300.

6 *Loca Parallela Plantarum*, Reminder, see §1 about the sensitive capability of a plant. Laestadius has empiric method but holistic tendencies; see §32. General idea is that plants are sensitive organic beings that may transform in a period of time depending on the geographical conditions.

7 See: Marmier, Xavier 1840. *Letters sur le Nord: Danmark, Suède, Norvége, Laponie et Spitzberg* 2. Paris: Bibliothèque choisie 2. (about Laestadius, p. 133, 148–154, 166–168); Willers 1949, 51–56, 67–69; Hallencreutz 1985, 174.

8 L. L. Laestadius: *Fragmenter I lappska mythologien*. Ed. Grundström, H. (Swenska landsmål och svensk folkliv, B 61. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. The full Finnish edition, Laestadius 2011 (*Lappalaisten mytologian katkelmia*). Eds. Juha Pentikäinen ja Risto Pulkkinen. Helsinki: Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Tietolipas 231). Partial English edition, Laestadius 2002 (*Fragments of Lappish mythology*. Translated by B. Vähämäki. Ontario: Beaverton).

9 Laestadius 2011, Part 1. (*Mythology*)

10 Laestadius 2011, 279. About distinction to mathematical truths and methods see, Laestadius 2011, 280, §17.

spirituality. It is worth mentioning here as well that Laestadius started focusing on spiritual experiences and phenomena (the spirit-world) as an object of study for the first time when he was writing about Sámi mythology and history.

Laestadius' depiction of mythology as a socialization¹¹ of strong individual experiences was explained in psychological terms as an "aroused imagination," which has clear similarities to his later vitalist psychological ideas¹². In Part 3 §1 of *Mythology*, Laestadius discovered the phenomenon of the "spirit-world" and elaborated on a view of their relationship to the embodied life of human beings. Part 3 §13 also showed that more general questions pertaining to the relationship of the soul to the transcendental spirit-world were already present. In Part 3 §14, Laestadius stated that the aroused condition of the imagination allow the mind to receive images more quickly and intensively¹³; this aspect is important, as he later conceived of Christianity as being based on passions and "noble feelings" and high images¹⁴. Vitalist interpretations were also present when Laestadius dealt with the effects of beliefs on the vital functions of human organisms¹⁵. Thus, Laestadius' *Mythology*, as it tried to encounter the problem of how to research spiritual experiential phenomena, could be conceived as a step toward his later psychology and philosophy of religion. Laestadius' *Mythology* has clear connections to *The Lunatic* on both the phenomena and the method¹⁶.

While he had multidisciplinary scientific interests, Laestadius was also an influential revivalist and awakener of Lutheran church in North Sweden. General characteristics of his preaching emphasized pietistic personal spiritual experience. He was also a strong critic of Lutheran orthodoxy and the phenomena of modernity that he saw as corrupting the way of life in the north. These dimensions are clearly present in his pastoral dissertations, *Crapula Mundi*¹⁷ (*Delirium of the World*) and

11 Laestadius 2011, Part 1, 45.

12 Laestadius 2011, Part 1, 44–45. Laestadius' definition of mythology highlight psychological perspective as he conceives mythology as the socialization of individual mythical experience. Individual experiences may become a part of general mythology. See, Laestadius 2011, Part 1, reminder, 42–45.

13 Cf. Laestadius 2011, 279.

14 e.g. Laestadius 2015, §721.

15 Laestadius 2011, §67.

16 Laestadius on the transcendental experiences of Sámi religion (inner economy) see, Laestadius 2011, Part 3, §16. Laestadius' polemics of Descartes' Cogito ergo sum and embodied consciousness or soul see, Laestadius 2011, 278–279.

17 Lars Levi Laestadius, *Crapula Mundi, seu morbus animicontagiosus* [...]. Harnoesandiae, 1843. In Swedish: *Crapula mundi: världens rus, eller själens smittosjuka*. [Red.] H. W. Hackzell. Luleå 1973.

*Tidskriften Ens röpanandes röst i ögnen*¹⁸ (1852–1854) (*The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness*). The Laestadius biographies quite commonly hold that Laestadius turned to stronger religious preaching, theological elaborations, and philosophy of religion after his personal religious experience¹⁹. It seems obvious, therefore, that Laestadius was convinced on many levels that pietistic spirituality was an authentic Christian faith. However, his focus on religious matters during this period by no means signifies that Laestadius gave up his scientific and theoretical interests. Rather, the social phenomena of awakenings that spread in North Calotte in the mid-nineteenth century and his personal religious experiences further directed his theoretical interests in philosophical theology and the religious character of human beings.

In the last thirteen or sixteen years of his life²⁰ (1844–1857), Laestadius wrote an extensive philosophically oriented book titled, *Därhushjonet: En blick I nådens ordning*²¹ translated into English as *The Lunatic – An Insight Into the Order of Grace*²², to ground and scientifically explain his own and common pietistic-religious experiences and views (I refer to *The Lunatic* using the section mark [§] and the number of its sections [x§]). In this book, Laestadius defends the pietistic emphasis on subjective experiential faith and living Christian faith in general. Simultaneously, Laestadius

18 Lars Levi Laestadius, *Tidskriften Ens röpanande röst i ögnen* (1852–1854) (Genomsedd, ordnad och utgiven i bokform 1908 av J. F. Hellman. Granskad och språkligt reviderad och ånyo uttgiven 1979 av S. Wettainen.) Norrtälje, 1979. In English: Laestadius, Lars Levi 1988. *The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness (1852–1854)*. Trans. The Old Apostolic Lutheran Church of America, August 26, 1988: USA.

19 Laestadius met a Sámi woman who was part of the pietistic reader movement in 1844; this meeting led to Laestadius' personal conversion. (Laestadius 1988, 36.) There has remained continuous interest concerning Laestadius' personal religious experience and spiritual progress. Laestadius' himself tells in few occasions how he realized the proper "order of Grace" via Sámi woman called Maria (Milla Clemensdotter). See, e.g. Hallencreutz 1985, 176–182; Wikmark 1980. More literature concerning Laestadius' personal spiritual progress and other Laestadius-studies can be found in Rydving 2000.

20 Bäcksbäcka 1938, 48.

21 Posthumously published in 1964 in Swedish as *Därhushjonet. En blick I nådens ordning* systematiskt framställd under form as betraktelser öfwer själens egenskaper och tillstånd, i enlighet med de bibliska författarenas psykologiska åsigter, med afseende på christendomens högsta idé – försoningen, 2–3 (Inl. E. Bäcksbäcka.) Suomen kirkkohistoriallisen seuran toimituksia 50:1–2, 1949. Helsinki. *Därhushjonet. En blick I nådens ordning* systematiskt framställd under form as betraktelser öfer själens egenskaper och tillstånd [...] 1. (Inl. B. Åberg.) Suomen kirkkohistoriallisen seuran toimituksia 50:3, 1964, Helsinki.

22 Translated into English in 2015 as *The Lunatic: an Insight into the Order of Grace – Systematically presented in the form of observations of the characteristics and states of the soul, in accordance with the psychological perspectives of the biblical authors, pertaining to the highest idea of Christianity – reconciliation*. In my study all the references are to the English edition translated by Anders Strindberg. I refer to *The Lunatic* using the section mark [§] and the number of its sections [x§], and a term "Note" if referred to the appendix later added by Laestadius; thus the citations referred are easy to find from all other editions.

delivered a harsh critique of the Lutheran orthodoxy, claiming their views were adulterated with “unchristian” metaphysics and rationalism. Laestadius also intended to participate in multidisciplinary discussions on religion. His theoretical critique was grounded in the Church’s political context of Sweden in the 1800s when pietistic movements were marginalized and even criminalized by a State law known as The Conventicle Edict (konventikelplakatet).

Laestadius’ scientific work in theology and philosophy of religion were written and elaborated on outside the academic world, but he had vivid epistolary connections to academic scholars from Sweden, Norway, Finland, and France²³. He was also well aware of the currents in the history of ideas and scientific developments of his time. It has been stated that *Dårhushjonet* is probably one of the most remarkable and interesting products of 19th-century Swedish theology.²⁴

In *The Lunatic*, most of Laestadius’ philosophically and psychologically interesting elaborations are formed as they related to certain religious and theological questions and problems. Especially he aimed the vitalist deconstruction and redefinition of the notion of person and faculties of the soul to elaborate on the psychologically emphasized insight into reconciliation. The whole system climaxed in the notion of reconciliation. Religious goals and emphases, however, do not exclude the possibility that his theoretical elaborations would be important and interesting as such. Quite the contrary, having the notion of a “living God” and “psychic reconciliation” as a horizon increased the interest and awakened the holistic philosophical questions concerning life and existence. Specifically, what is the ultimate horizon and intentional object of an existing human person and mind, and how are they structured and explained in terms of Laestadius’ theory? What moral and religious indications emanated from Laestadius’ holistic theory?

Laestadius is definitely not speaking against reason and reasoning in *The Lunatic*. As a successor of the Enlightenment and Romantic ideas and leaning on medical vitalism, he demanded a more concrete ground and a more holistic notion of reasoning as the basis for proper philosophical-psychological and theological thinking. One of the main concerns for Laestadius was that philosophical, psychological, and theological reflection and theorizing had lost the physiological and holistic experiential fundamentals and been turned into mere intellectual reflection. For that reason, he argued that the idea of man, and the concept of reason, will, understanding, and the whole notion of human intellect had become empty and abstract and, therefore, had produced to a false and narrowed understanding of the nature of proper reasoning and authentic faith.

Laestadius put forth the vitalist notions of human organisms as the foundation of human cognitive abilities and mind. According to him, all of intellect functions under the dominance of organic passions and worldly intentions. This is the fundamental

23 See a list of Laestadius’ letters in Laestadiusarkivet: <http://laestadiusarkivet.se/>

24 Hallnencreutz 1985, 180.

fact that should be recognized and admitted to in order to enable a holistic manner of reflection and reasoning. It also allows for conceiving of human existence and faith as an embodied and dynamic relatedness (intentionality) with the world, others, the Self, and God, or in other words, all of existence. Behind these elaborations, Laestadius held to the common Enlightenment ideas of the precedence of anthropology in relation to theology as well as the idea of knowing oneself as a prerequisite for knowing the Christ – to gnoti seauton, to gnoti Christo (§1384, Cf. §1394). As we will later see, for Laestadius, knowing one’s self – To gnoti seauton – signified knowing one’s own fundamentally passionate and sinful embodied character (Cf. §1040).

Laestadius did not exclude the spiritual domain from his naturalizing theory, but he did include it into the vitalist psychophysiological analysis. In the following analysis, I reveal how Laestadius’ theoretical stance can be conceived as “physiological transcendentalism²⁵.” Altogether, Laestadius drove into serious philosophical problems to formulate a different kind of conceptual distinctions and dualisms to achieve his own goals.²⁶

* * *

The popularly given picture of Laestadius, however, is mediated through examining of the colorful history of Laestadianism. Therefore, it is understandable that Laestadius himself is often seen as a passionate awakener who did not care about anything but proselytizing Sámi’s and the settlers of North Calotte into his pietistic view of Christianity.

This study of Laestadius’ philosophy, psychology, and his critique of Western metaphysics reveals another picture of Lars Levi Laestadius by setting aside the given popular picture of Laestadius’ person for a while and focusing on his written theoretical work on anthropology, psychology, and religion. As his botanical and mythological scientific works have already been brought into the focus of academic study and have been recognized as systematic scientific studies of his times, it is now important to recognize and begin a discussion on Laestadius’ anthropological and philosophical work and do so in an academic fashion.

Laestadius was a systematic and critical writer in his later research on the idea of man and the essence of religion. His magnum opus, *The Lunatic* (Dårhushjonet:

25 A branch of physiological thinking that elaborated on the theory of the relationship of the brain and soul. See e.g. Hagner 1992.

26 Cf. Åberg 1997, 24. Åberg mentioned a vitalistic dualism. In Laestadius’ theory dualism does not emerge between the mind and body but instead between the destructive natural forces and vital forces. Natural vital forces such as drives and natural passions are viewed as causing destruction and degeneration in human life while moral passions are viewed as vitalizing forces. These distinctions manifest itself in many levels, also in psychological level (Cf. § 167), in Laestadius’ theory as we will see in this current study.

En Blick I Nädens Ordning, 1844–1857) of over 800 pages represents the core text of Laestadius’ philosophy; however, it still awaits precise scientific editing and publication. That posthumously published book is the main source of this study. The early motifs of *The Lunatic* were theological and church political, but through various rewritings, the book has been extended into a holistic consideration of the idea of man and the essence of religion. In this study, the philosophical interpretation of Laestadius’ thought and work is justified by contextualizing and reconstructing Laestadius’ thought in terms of the horizon of history of ideas. That focus shows that Laestadius was aware of the philosophical currents and the scientific knowledge of his time toward which he intentionally then formulated his own theories.

Using both historical reconstruction and contextualizing analysis, my approach to examining *The Lunatic* as a philosophical work is supported by a chosen metaphysical frame, used here to interpret and analyze Laestadius’ thoughts as the holistic theory of human existence. My perspective emphasizes the holistic ontological view within which I look at Laestadius’ disciplinary and detailed analysis on different themes in his whole project. I see that it is not necessary to make disciplinary distinctions, for example, between the theological and the philosophical, but rather see different parts of Laestadius’ thought as separate dimensions constituting his holistic psychophysical and psychosomatic constitution theory on human beings and human existence.

This study shows that Laestadius was a committed and serious academic scholar in the field of anthropology and philosophy of religion who formulated an interesting critique of Western metaphysical presuppositions.

In present day philosophy, especially in French phenomenologically oriented thought, philosophical and theological traditions are moving closer to each other again when one is dealing with foundational metaphysical questions. In Laestadius’ case, there is not a sharp distinction between the theological and philosophical or the anthropological, as he grounded his theology on anthropology and seems to view the theological as a genuine “love of wisdom”. It is also worth noting that Laestadius’ thought leaps historically over and thus theoretically overcomes the dualistic and theoretically totalizing metaphysical epoch of the Western intellectual tradition by leaning on the theological anthropology of Luther, Augustine, and also scientifically on French physiological medicine and its vitalist philosophy.

Laestadius’ psychology, theology and philosophy of religion deserve to be taken seriously in academic philosophical research as well. Philosophical research does not necessarily produce any new scientific innovations. Its meaning is elsewhere; it is idea- and theory-historical and the basic philosophical study of the theoretical thinking of one of the most influential persons in North Calotte.²⁷ By studying

27 See e.g. Raittila 1976. Also Lohi 1997, 771–783 (English summary for Doctoral dissertation: Northern Christianity. The Expansion of Laestadianism in Finland between the Years 1870 and 1899.)

Laestadius's notion of human being, the concept of religion and God, faith and the whole of his philosophy of religion, this research effort releases Laestadius' thoughts into philosophical existence and offers a background for deeper understanding of the intellectual-existential roots of Laestadianism. The fact that Laestadius really worked theoretically through the religious and spiritual atmosphere and experiences that were presented in Northern Scandinavia in the 1800's, offers a unique possibility for widespread and ambiguous religious traditions to understand their roots from theoretical perspectives and reach forward to the future by critically attaching to their own theoretical and dogmatic history. Beside its philosophical, psychological, and theological innovations, it is generally important to know Laestadius' theoretical thoughts on the research concerning North Scandinavian history of ideas, spirituality, and culture. This study hopes to reveal Laestadius thought as an interesting example of the vivid intellectual life of 1800's Northern Scandinavia.

1.2 The Current State of Research in Laestadius Studies

Lars Levi Laestadius' person and multidisciplinary work have been widely studied in both academic research and popular writing for a long period of time (1876–2016) in various disciplines and languages, especially Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian²⁸. Laestadius' writings, including his religious sermons and scientific publications, are continuously translated into new languages, especially into English. However, there are not many scientific studies concerning Laestadius' theoretical thought (neither his theological nor anthropological nor ethnography) in English despite the fact that his thinking has continuously remained of international academic interest and research. In late 2015, Laestadius' systematic theological and philosophical main work, *Därhushjonet: En blick INädens Ordning*, received its English translation under the English title, *The Lunatic: An Insight Into the Order of Grace* (2015). This translation presumably marks the start of broader international discussion on Laestadius' theoretical thinking.

A common agreement remains in the Laestadius studies that the core of the philosophical-theological theory presented in *The Lunatic* is the anthropological theme concerning human existence in accordance with the common Enlightenment line of thought.²⁹ In the eighteenth century, human nature became a dominant concept in philosophy. In the Enlightenment era, anthropology also was set into the core of

28 See e.g. Raittila 1967; Rydving 2000

29 Cf. Zidbäck 1937; Juntunen 1982, 17. An informative presentation concerning to the birth, purposes and early research on *The Lunatic* is given in Bäcksbäcka 1938 (Lars Levi Laestadius' Religionfilosofiska Arbete "Därhushjonet": Dess Tillblivelse och Syfte.)

theology; it was common to think that the correct concept of man was a prerequisite for the correct understanding of God. The central role of anthropology is also seen to have coloured the entire theological and philosophical thought of Laestadius, especially in *The Lunatic*.

The vitalist character of Laestadius' anthropology has also been noticed in the studies of Laestadius³⁰. Likewise, the strong critique and evaluation pertaining to the Enlightenment rationalistic emphases of reason, freedom, and autonomy, as well as the tendency of Romantic thought to emphasize experience, emotion, and regional life and provincial locality has been pointed out³¹. Further, the spiritual character of Laestadius has been interpreted to be pietistic³², influenced by Sámi culture and history, and in the broader sense, inflected toward mysticism³³, simultaneously meaning the ineffable nature of life, the anti-intellectualistic character of religiosity and religious experience, as well as the impossibility to grasp and reach God by relying on mere use of intellect or reason³⁴.

Generally, Laestadius' theoretical thought is seen to be interlinked with the Enlightenment and Romantic heritages, especially via his anthropology³⁵. Laestadius' thought relates particularly to the philosophical heritage of medical vitalism in the Enlightenment. From that perspective, he presents a criticism against the rationalistic (intellectualistic, mechanical) idea of man and the notion of faith and God. Simultaneously, Laestadius elaborates on his own views concerning the general questions of the Enlightenment and the Romantic era, questions that pertain to social-political life, morality, and the philosophy of religion. Problems concerning the relationship between revelation and natural religion, the character and meaning of education and social convention, the nature and position of religion in society, and free will are all found to be present in Laestadius' theoretical thought³⁶.

From a theoretical point of view, the inwardness, ineffable and mystical dimension of religious experience, and the vitalist-animistic tones of Laestadius' thought have been highlighted, and several valuable presentations and summaries have been published on his theoretical thinking³⁷. Nearly every of the more extensive study sketches the main ideas and "principles" of Laestadius' anthropology as a necessary part of its

30 See, Åberg 1997/1964; Dahlbäck 1950; Zidbäck 1937; Juntunen 1982.

31 See, Laestadius 1946; Dahlbäck 1949; Cf. Pulkkinen 2002; Zidbäck 1937; Pentikäinen & Pulkkinen 2011.

32 Sandewall 1951; Brännström 1962, 33–39, 66–73; Juntunen 1982, 12–14.

33 In theological context especially Zidbäck 1937, 130–210, 211–231.

34 Dahlbäck 1949, 53–66 and 1965, 267–294; Also Kristiansen 2004; Zidbäck 1937; Outakoski 1991; Østtveit Elgvin 2010

35 E.g. Juntunen 1982. For the general history of Natural history, See, Sloan 2007, 903–938.

36 For the prevailing philosophical discussions in Laestadius' times, See e.g., Antognazza 2007, 666–682.

37 e.g. Englund 1881; Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982; Kristiansen 2004.

thematic research and interpretation³⁸. However, most of the dissertations have been theological, church historical, or religious studies. In other disciplines, mainly there are studies on article forms, and the best philosophical studies concerning Laestadius' thought are shorter presentations³⁹.

In the first academic study of Laestadius' theology in the end of 1800's, Laestadius was interpreted as a materialist⁴⁰. Subsequently, the philosophical character of Laestadius' anthropology has been labelled contradictorily as materialism, spiritualism⁴¹, parallelism, and vitalist monism. The difficulty in situating Laestadius' philosophical thought in a single conceptual category or school derives mainly from the multi-disciplinary, holistic, and ambiguous character of Laestadius' thought itself. While it has religious motifs and thus a Biblical and theological background, the thinking is simultaneously attached to natural and scientifically emphasized vitalist theories and Romantic psychology⁴². *The Lunatic* is not a completely detailed scientific work, however, as it was never finished by Laestadius in the sense that it would have been edited and published in a scientific manner. However, its variegated sources are also interpreted by Laestadius for his own purposes, so that they receive theological, existentialistic and pre-phenomenological meanings and indications. The fact that Laestadius' thought had different levels and dimensions has not been fully recognized as yet. Indeed, he held the views of Biblical authors and reformers as religious truths of human life, the vitalist medical science, and Romantic psychology⁴³ as a rationalizing explanatory basis, and his own experiences and the experiences of his fellow human beings as the phenomenal experiential horizon for theoretical thematization.

38 Within Laestadius' holistic theory theology and vitalist anthropology are inextricably attached with each other in a way that Laestadius' dogmatic views are impossible to analyze without first knowing its anthropological argumentation. Neither does the vitalist anthropology becomes fully understood without its theological purposes. For this reason, for instance, Zindbäck's (1937) Dahlbäck's (1950) and Juntunen's (1982) dissertations have analyzed Laestadius' anthropology as part of their theological and church historical studies.

39 See, Dahlbäck 1964; Dahlbäck 1949; Kristiansen 2004; Rossvaer 1997.

40 Englund 1881, 435–465; Cf. General introduction to Laestadius—receptions in Bäcksbacka 1938, 7–9.

41 Cf. Zidbäck 1937, 73, 211–231.

42 Cf. Bichat 1815; Carus 1989. Especially the Enlightenment vitalist, Xavier Bichat, and the romantic psychology of Carl Gustav Carus are the authors that Laestadius' agrees with concerning the understanding of the nature of life and in basic presuppositions concerning anthropology. However, Laestadius' thought has also broader theory historical connections to enlightenment and romantic currents as will be shown later in this current study.

43 Readers of Laestadius can hear the romantic tone through the emphases of “emotion,” “feeling,” and experience overall. Laestadius also considered Carl Gustav Carus' romantic idea of the divine soul as coinciding with his own ideas. However, Laestadius' relation to romantic naturphilosophie is complicated, as he tries to distinguish his own ideas from the pantheistic and panpneumatist currents of his times.

Because of these natural scientific tendencies, it is understandable that Laestadius' thought may have led some to interpret his theory as materialism. On the other hand, Biblical and reformatory emphases on subjective faith, the ineffable character of life, and religious experience have led others to interpret his thought as one of spiritualism. These interpretations are not fully satisfactory, as Laestadius also criticized empiricistic-materialism⁴⁴: Laestadius viewed that rationalists ended up with spiritualism while rational empiricists ended up with materialism. Therefore, Laestadius accepted neither the simplistic idealistic stance of conceiving a human being as spiritual (possessing a [self-given] pure transcendental spirit or rational soul) in its primal essence nor the mechanistic notion – that all movements of soul and human action are only movements of “inert matter” – which lead to a raw materialism. Laestadius sought a third alternative, and so the question is how would Laestadius have found a way between idealism/spiritualism and materialism that were indeed the dominant currents of his time?

From a philosophical perspective⁴⁵, the most extensive overall presentations that include an analysis of Laestadius' anthropology are found in Zidbäck's (1937), Dahlbäck's (1950), and Juntunen's (1982) dissertations⁴⁶. In addition, several research articles have been important and inspiring for this study. Bengt Åberg's (1997, orig. 1964) introduction to an archived manuscript of *Därhushjonet* and Gustav Dahlbäck's (1965) extensive article on Laestadius' philosophy are valuable early introductions to *The Lunatic*, as they reveal the context for interpreting Laestadius' thought in the early 1900's. Common to these studies is that Laestadius' thought is most often referred to as “psychological-philosophical,” “philosophical,” “psychological,” and “philosophy of religion.” Åberg's editorial introduction to *The Lunatic* traces the immediate scientific multidisciplinary contexts, relationships, and the central ideas of the sources of *The*

44 However, Laestadius accepted many of Hobbes' ideas – for example, the material-physiological basis of human cognition and action (§27Note1) as well as the idea of fundamental corruption and the incapability of natural humans to live a peaceful communal life.

45 Cf. Bäcksbäcka 1938.

46 Zidbäck's dissertation is purely theological and the first overall presentation of Laestadius' theoretical system in relation to the idea of following the Christ. His dissertations include many influential and interesting interpretations of Laestadius' philosophy such as Platonic-Catholic idea of soul, parallelism of body and mind and immanence and transcendence. Juntunen's dissertation is Church historical, and it studies Laestadius' ecclesial views and concept of church in relation to the Lutheran Church. Juntunen also presents a tight overview of Laestadius' anthropological theory. The more interesting point is, that Juntunen also discusses and criticizes some of Zidbäck's influential views concerning Laestadius' notion of a freedom of will that does not seem possible from the perspective of Laestadius' own anthropological principles. Philosophically it's most valuable work is a quite detailed idea historical and theory historical attachment in footnotes. Zidbäck and Juntunen both also attach Laestadius' thought to the enlightenment tradition and points out important connections to the history of ideas.

Lunatic and is one of the most detailed interpretations to use for contextualizing Laestadius' theoretical thought within the Swedish history of ideas.⁴⁷

Regarding such philosophical research, Gustaf Dahlbäck's (1965) article is worth mentioning. Dahlbäck compared Laestadius' critique of rationalism to Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy by analyzing their similar *intentions* to thematize the necessary prerequisites/limits of the pure, genuine, and moral concept of reason as well as the fundamental conditions of moral reasoning. The article is also insightful as far as it reveals how Laestadius' vitalism and emphasis on emotional or anti-intellectualistic character of human being in contrast with the Kantian Enlightenment rationalistic stance.

Altogether, Dahlbäck presented the idea that Laestadius' intentions were the same as Immanuel Kant's in searching for the purified basis for and proper concept of reason even though their theoretical standpoints are different. Both Kant and Laestadius could be seen as looking for the initial conditions for pure reason, religiosity, and morality. While Laestadius saw intellectual capabilities, such as reason, will, and understanding, to be corrupted by natural passions, at the same time, he tried to formulate initial conditions for the possibility of pure and moral capabilities of the soul. Here Dahlbäck emphasizes the same problems and intentions between Kant and Laestadius even though they grounded their views on a totally different theoretical basis and argumentation⁴⁸: Kant on idealistic transcendentalism and Laestadius on medical psychophysiology and the vitalistic psychology of the Enlightenment.

However, did Laestadius really have the same intentions as Kant⁴⁹ since he criticized the Enlightenment notion and the emphasis of human reason and freedom as imaginary postulates? While Kant was looking for the pure concept and purified phenomena of reason and its conditions for epistemological purposes, Laestadius was taking the whole phenomena of reason and will into consideration in a more fundamental way, emphasizing the "dirty" passional and embodied characteristics of reason. This analysis will also reveal that Kant and Laestadius drifted apart because of their different purposes and theoretical standpoints [Transcendental idealism vs. Transcendental physiology]. Should we then think that Laestadius tried to find a more plausible and concrete basis for the "practical reason" of Kant's?

More recent philosophical articles have been written by Norwegian researchers. The most distinguished and informative research on Laestadius' philosophy is Roald A. Kristiansen's article. Kristiansen precisely analyzed Laestadius' line of thought, emphasizing Laestadius' physiological explanations and emotivistic emphases. The

47 Åberg 1997/1964, 14–43. Åberg highlighted similarities between Laestadius and Fechner. The comparative analysis of their theories is a task of another research. For this analysis see e.g. Fechner 1946a and 1946b.

48 Dahlbäck 1965.

49 See, Kant 1998. (*Critique of Pure Reason*) Available in www: <http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf>

article summarizes the most important themes of *The Lunatic*, interpreting Laestadius' philosophical thought as a "philosophy of heart." However, Kristiansen does not pay much attention to the context of history of ideas that are present in Laestadius' thought and partly bypassed, for example, Laestadius' vitalist worldview and the holistic structure of his philosophy. However, Kristiansen's article is also one to recommend, as it offers an interesting interpretation of the legitimacy of Laestadianism by questioning Laestadius' idea on the possibility of autonomy.⁵⁰

Viggo Rossvaer's essay⁵¹ proposed viewing Laestadius as one of the most significant philosophers of the 1800's North Calotte. Rossvaer related Laestadius' holistic philosophy to the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas: Certain points of contact may be found on the concept of the Self, personhood, embodiment, ultimate responsibility in front of an [ultimate] Being, existence, or God, to mention just a few.⁵²

In Finland, only a few articles have commented on Laestadius' philosophical dimension. Kari Sallamaa noticed Laestadius' relevance in Northern philosophy and related Laestadius' thought to the later French and German vitalist philosophies and assumed that Laestadius' could have been considered as great a philosopher as Kierkegaard or a successor to vitalism as Bergson and Nietzsche were if he would have written in French or German.⁵³

The way in which Laestadius' philosophical-anthropological thought is taken into consideration also reflects its time and theoretical atmosphere. From Englund⁵⁴ to Juntunen, the interpretations of Laestadius vary from materialism to parallelistic⁵⁵

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- 50 See, Kristiansen 2004, 65–82. (Religious Philosophy for Fools: On the Philosophical Basis for L.L. Laestadius' theology. University of Tromsø, Faculty of Social Sciences: Department of Philosophy /Department of Religion.)
- 51 Rossvaer 1997, 269–283. (Zappe eller Laestadius? Universitetsbiblioteket I Tromsøs Skriftserie, Ravnetrykk nr. 12)
- 52 See further especially Heidegger 1992 (Being and Time) and Levinas 2007 (Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority). Also Theunissen 1986.
- 53 See, Sallamaa, Kari. *Lars Levi Laestadius filosofina*. AGON 4/11, pp. 13–15. In www: <http://agon.fi/pdf/AGON-32-2011-4.pdf>
- 54 Englund 1881, 435.
- 55 In earlier studies, Laestadius is most often interpreted as an empiricist who emphasized in a naturalistic way human physiology and psychology based on anatomy. However, he also re-interprets the concepts of anatomical research and vitalism into the dimensions of theology, metaphysics, and even existentialism and phenomenology (Cf. Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982; Joensuu 2013). Also, in earlier studies, Laestadius' position regarding to the question of substantiality and emergence of soul has been seen as parallelism, the notion that either matter and spirit, body and soul or man and God are the different dimensions of the same vital principle (lifprincipe). However, this parallelism –interpretation resonates with Laestadius' contemporary history of ideas, but it is not a satisfactory interpretation in Laestadius' case. What is not fully recognized is that Laestadius emphasizes vitalist and panpsychistic interpretation of organic matter – signifying the principle of life as the intensive core-force of the embodied soul – as a constitutive ground. Rather this stance seems to form the philosophical explanatory basis and a theory of [psychophysiological] constitution for his philosophical and psychological monistic vitalism.

idealism. Parallelistic interpretation dominated the earlier Laestadius –studies. The concept of parallelism functioned as a technical term very generally from the 1800s to the present day. Parallelism works as a simple heuristic term to govern and comprehend complex system theories. Within the ethos of idealistic thinking, it was also typical to develop alternatives to rough dualism: Kant Hegel, and Leibniz’s philosophies in general, and certainly the Swedish philosopher Swedenborg’s correspondence theory affirmed the parallelism interpretations based on idealistic dualism. The term “parallelism” fits well with the schism between metaphysics (theology) and progressing natural science; the core problem was the relationship between transcendence (God) and immanence (Human being) and the thematization of the constitution of it. However, the use of the technical term “parallelism” does not mean that the philosopher in question would definitely be a simple parallelist. What is problematic when using such a term for Laestadius’ thought, is that it overlooks many of the constitutional elements within Laestadius’ theory. “Parallelism” does not open a heuristic view of the holistic way of thought, and it neither follows nor discusses constitutive elaborations and problems of psychophysiology. In the worst case, it only dogmatically states that matter and spirit or body and mind are in parallel to each other, giving no hermeneutic or explanatory information in that respect, and thus preserving, replicating and legitimatizing the dualism.

In the light of earlier Laestadius studies, it seems clear that Laestadius’ thought was influenced by currents of Enlightenment and the Romantic era, Lutheran-pietistic emphases of inward faith and piousness, the deep significance of an animated nature, and the place of man as part of that nature inherited from the ethos of the Sámi tradition. In particular, the pietistic (readers’ and Herrnhutian) view on the *ordo salutis* is a commonly agreed upon theological doctrine in Laestadius’ theology. This view emphasizes the classical Lutheran idea of grace, while an objective part of the reconciliation, and the psychological dimensions of contrition, repentance, and rebirth signify pietistic as a subjective emphasis of reconciliation (order of grace)⁵⁶. It can be suggested that Lutheran and pietistic emphases are not necessarily contradictory in Laestadius’ theory, but may be combined as the subjective and objective dimensions of the more holistic view of reconciliation.

It could be also pointed out that Laestadius’ theoretical elaborations were influenced by the classical conceptualizations of the faculty psychological doctrine of the soul that he combined into his interpretation of the vitalist theory. The latter, as well as the pietist-Herrnhutian conception of the “order of grace,” will be further interpreted in this study, as they seem to form crucial aspects of Laestadius’ “insight” that was already stated in the headline of *The Lunatic*. However, this study does not evaluate Laestadius’ views from the perspective of a history of the theological doctrines, but

56 See further e.g., Juntunen 1982, 77-95.

instead it seeks to interpret and clarify how Laestadius explained his dogmatic and religious views using vitalist psychology and family psychological examples. This study naturally deals with the theological-philosophical interpretation of religious experience, and it simultaneously takes cognizance of some theological-historical aspects concerning Lutheranism and pietism. Further still, beside interpreting Laestadius' thought on the horizon of vitalism, the present study argues that Laestadius' theory also has existentialistic and pre-phenomenological dimensions.

1.3 Research Task and Research Questions

Despite the fact that anthropology is commonly seen as central for understanding and evaluating Laestadius' theoretical thought, the founding character and "insights" of Laestadius' anthropology have not been closely studied from a philosophical perspective. This lack of philosophical research signifies that Laestadius' philosophical starting points and psychological views have been relatively disregarded with respect to the formation of his theological, moral philosophical, social-political, and religious views. The absence of a closer analysis of Laestadius' vitalist perspective is also part of the difficulty when trying to comprehend Laestadius' systematic and relatively coherent theory. Partly for this reason, both popularly and academically, there has remained a quest and indeed a need for studying the philosophical and psychological bases of Laestadius' ideas about man and life.

The main task of this research then is to analyze and interpret the philosophical and psychological standpoints, ideas, and elaborations of Laestadius' theoretical thought. The research primarily focuses and delimits the analysis and interpretation on *The Lunatic*, which is the main source of Laestadius' theological, philosophical, and psychological thought. In *The Lunatic*, Laestadius' theoretical insights and notions are also the most clearly presented. *The Lunatic* is approached as a scientific-psychological apology of North Scandinavian pietism, as we will later see when contextualizing Laestadius' thought in relation to Lutheran orthodoxy and metaphysical rationalism in Chapter 2. In particular, the medical vitalist character of Laestadius' theorizing and its application for theological, psychological, and apologist purposes frames the perspective of the interpretation.

As a basic philosophical study, this study points out the central philosophical and psychological standpoints that constitute the underlying insights of Laestadius' anthropological and theological "system," and particularly discusses Laestadius' intention to deconstruct classical Cartesian dualism and the general intellectualistic emphases of the Western philosophical-theological tradition. Roughly, my intention is to analyze Laestadius' holistic account of the human person as an alternative for intellectualistic accounts that restrict the evidence of the human experience to the capacities

of intellect [reason, will, understanding; perceptual and judicative dimensions], thus dismissing the psychophysiological foundation of experience. Therefore, the main task of the present study is to provide an interpretative analysis of the metaphysical, philosophical, and psychological standpoints of Laestadius' theory and their indications when applied to the classical philosophical themes, such as character of soul and body/mind, faculties of soul, notions of Self and person, explanation of nature, significance of religious experience, and explanations of morality and spirituality.

In this regard, the study also provides historically tenable accounts and interpretations of Laestadius' thought that coincide with Laestadius' intentions. The study analyzes the ways in which a human person and its faculties of the soul, morality, and spirituality are redefined within the vitalist psychophysiological framework. Simultaneously, the study carries out an interpretative task by analyzing the phenomenal references and indications for a better understanding of the phenomena in question.

Chapter 2, Historical Contextualization, briefly depicts the historical context, including the spiritual and intellectual background, of Laestadius' theory. In this chapter, I analyze and depict the historical conditions within which Laestadius' theoretical thought is attached and interpreted. My intention in this chapter is not to present a detailed analysis of specific theories and ideas to which Laestadius' thought can be related, but instead describe more broadly the detailed background that will help us understand Laestadius' thought in terms of a philosophical horizon.⁵⁷ Therefore, the quest of Chapter 2 is to find the grounding ideas of Laestadius' thought so as to posit Laestadius' intentions and theoretical thought within the broad history of ideas.

In Chapter 3, The Creation and Initial Condition, I question the theological, dogmatic, or ontotheological starting points of Laestadius' thought. Here Laestadius' idea of the creation and the created is discussed as *the origin problem*, and thus a precondition for the possibility of anthropological and theological thinking and theorizing. The aim is to disclose the broad extent of Laestadius' thought and assess the possibility of its philosophical interpretation. Therefore, the problem is to find the most primal metaphysical stance and initial conditions within which Laestadius deals with the questions of existence, the idea of man, and the notion of God.

Chapter 4, Person and Intentionality, is the first main chapter of the study, as it discusses Laestadius' vitalist account of person and intentionality and presents the main philosophical anthropological ideas for Laestadius' further theological and moral philosophical elaborations. I discuss and thematize Laestadius' vitalist explication of embodiment and the faculties of soul that constitute the core of his psychology and philosophy of the mind. I interpret how precognitive states, especially passions, emotions and drives, and the whole subjective consciousness as a pre-reflective ground, lay

57 For a detailed interpretation of the close history of ideas and theories in regard to *The Lunatic* see, Åberg 1964/1997.

the constitutive basis for the functions of the mind and higher cognitions and thus constitute the human/world relation [disposedness, situatedness, and stationedness]. This discussion includes an analysis of the central concepts, such as the soul, passions, body, mind, self, reason, will, and understanding. Here is questioned how Laestadius stated the notion of a person within the world and what kind of epistemic and ontological significances of the subjective consciousness is received in human existence. This chapter aims to uncover Laestadius' notion of person and the character of embodied intentionality as the basic structure of human-world relations or human existence.

In the second main chapter, Chapter 5, Laestadius' theory is viewed from the perspective of the common vitalist dual conception of the physical/moral which sought to replace or overcome Cartesian body/mind dualism. In this respect, Laestadius' elaborations on the psychophysical origins of morality and spirituality are analyzed in greater detail. The relationship between the physical, moral, and spiritual are discussed by analyzing the notions of soul, passion, heart, conscience, perception, awakening, reconciliation, and the deconstructed notions of faith and God. Here the particular question is how Laestadius explained the spheres of morality and spirituality on a physiological plane and how the constitution of the moral and spiritual is thematized. In this chapter, the vitalist-psychological notion of faith and the ontotheological reconstruction of the relation between the Trinity of God and the constitutive triadic of the human person (the principle of life/lifprincip, organic life/organlif, and sensory life/nervlif) are discussed by exploring the intentional character of faith in God.

At the end of Chapter 5, Laestadius' critique of metaphysical rationalism and transcendental philosophy is raised to a more general level of discussion in order to apprise whether it offers insight to criticize Western metaphysics in a way that is consistent with the more common phenomenological criticism, for example, the attack on the metaphysical stance of a "constant presence" (substance) and its implications.⁵⁸ Here Laestadius' critique of the classical metaphysical concepts of substance and essence is discussed in relation to the wider context of metaphysical rationalism and idealism. This more general analysis seeks to relate Laestadius' vitalist notion of faith to Luther's *Theology of the Cross*, commonly seen as one of the main sources of phenomenological critique of Western metaphysics⁵⁹. Does Laestadius' notion of man and faith constitute a non-metaphysical elaboration on the existence of the human? And what are the epistemic and ontological consequences?

In the Concluding Remarks, I summarise the conclusions and implications of my

58 See, Heidegger 1992 (*Being and Time*); Kisiel & Sheehan 2007 (*Becoming Heidegger*); Heidegger 2010 (*Phenomenology of Religious life*); See further, Stanley 2010; Adluri 2013; Marx 1982; Backman 2015.

59 Heidegger 2010; Kisiel & Sheehan 2007.

interpretation and analysis and simultaneously lift up themes and questions to a more general philosophical level. This discussion points out the more specific problems and questions present in my interpretation, but not systematically analysed. In this respect specific questions, such as those on ontological and theological realism, are preliminarily discussed as possible directions for further Laestadius –research.

1.4 Method and Conceptual Perspective

The method of this study is philosophical analysis and phenomenological interpretation. Therefore, both the ontological basis and the methodological perspective were a phenomenological understanding – namely, phenomenological hermeneutics⁶⁰ – which is an interpretative way for explicating Laestadius’ ideas in relation to the phenomena of lived experience. In a broad sense, this “ontological basis” indicates that the experiential *lifeworld* (*lebenswelt*, *Dasein*) is an initial condition for experiencing and understanding.⁶¹

Phenomenological interpretation differs from mere textual exegesis or an analytical conceptual analysis which take the linguistic system and its conceptual relations as its main objectives. The analysis of relations and references to certain concepts and thoughts did not suit Laestadius’ case, as he himself criticized formal rationalistic and metaphysical analyses as “speculation” and “mere reflection” by insisting on an approach that would encounter the special character of experiential phenomena. In contrast to semiotic and analytical analysis, phenomenology takes *existence* as the broad horizon of philosophical understanding and explication. Through phenomenological interpretation, it is possible to open up Laestadius’ concepts and thoughts in relation to phenomena and those things that are indicated and meant. This method is important for this study, as it focuses mainly on philosophical and psychological elaborations, namely on *the way* in which Laestadius explained his views, not primarily on Laestadius’ religious and theological views as such⁶². This approach allows

60 Phenomenological interpretation always takes necessarily the first person perspective for its primal stand point (see, e.g. Zahavi 2006; Shoemaker 1996). Interpretation is always an endeavor where the researcher has to posit itself in the text, and thus interpretation is always the elaboration or “better understanding” (Gadamer) than the authors in a sense that it is interpretation from a different situation. Phenomenological interpretation is always “more” than just exegesis because it reaches toward phenomena that has been thought through lived experience, and thus possibly reachable for the interpreter. This is because of the phenomeno-logical dimension of hermeneutics that demands things, themes, and phenomena that are experienced to be investigated in the first place.

61 See further e.g. Dreyfus 1991; Theunissen 1986; Hodge 1995; Bernsen 1986; Zahavi 2006 as an introductory texts to Heideggerian phenomenological philosophy.

62 I want to loosely refer to Russell’s thought here, as he thought that *the views of the philosopher are not necessarily interesting – more interesting are the reasons why someone thinks as he does.*

the philosophical and psychological dimensions of Laestadius' thought to rise to the surface⁶³.

Using philosophical analysis and interpretation, I determine the meaning and indications of Laestadius' central notions. Through phenomenological interpretation, I thematize the content and intentions of Laestadius' conceptions and interpret them in the wider context as they relate to the phenomena given by experience and dealt with using other theoretical perspectives. Therefore, the method also extends to the experience of the interpreter and thus includes my own experience as part of the research. In phenomenology, *the first person perspective* signifies a certain kind of psychological empathy toward the studied author's thought, while it simultaneously holds a reflective distance. The presupposition, therefore, is that any kind of genuine understanding – whether critical or emphatic – is possible only through first having a personal grasp of the phenomena given in one's own most lived experiential relationship to the studied subject. Thus, phenomenological interpretation presupposes and respects Laestadius' theoretical thought in such a way that it deals with the subjects and phenomena available to any other researcher, although in a different situation.

For this study, the emphatic relation to Laestadius' writings and the phenomena on which he focused does play an important role and does not deny their inner truths. However, as a theoretical interpretation, the present study leans on its own theoretical insights and conceptualizations in order to reflect and evaluate whether Laestadius' theory includes fruitful and interesting views, elaborations, and solutions that relate to classical philosophical and psychological themes.

Laestadius held philosophy to be conceptual and theoretical thematization that belonged to the sphere of mind (intellectualization) while matters of life and faith belonged more holistically to the experiential sphere of subjective consciousness or heart. Is it then still possible to conceptually and theoretically study matters of life and faith without violating the experiential phenomena that were in question? Given that phenomenological analysis is primarily an analysis of a pre-reflective constitutive basis and Laestadius' intention was to thematize that same constitutive basis in vitalist terms to include the idea that pre-reflective ground will never become transparent in its varying content. Indeed, the whole task is actually paradoxical or a dead end. However, the impossibility to thematize pre-reflectivity in reflective [conceptual] terms does not necessarily signify that the "use of reason" can be dispensable.

Instead, phenomenological analysis can very well clear the existential or psychological initial structures of human existence, life, faith, or God-relation, leaving the

63 Through contextualization and close interpretation of *The Lunatic* in terms of the history of ideas, I open up the possibility for a philosophical analysis and interpretation of Laestadius' thought. In a philosophical manner I will set more specific questions in regard to the theme and problem in question while proceeding forward with my own analysis.

individual content of experience untouched (as such) for the subject of experience in question. In Laestadius' words, this aspect could be said to be in the form of apologizing for the *exercise of mind (förståndet) at the expense of the heart* by adding that "feelings and moral passions reflected in this work [*The Lunatic*] are not only those of the author: judgements and conclusions also draw on the experiences of simple Christians, but my own heart, not entirely unfamiliar with these experiences, approves of them unreservedly."⁶⁴ The question of life and faith is endless, but not impossible and indeed vain in the sense that we should reject it. On many occasions, Laestadius also seems to view rational thinking and philosophical reflection as fruitful for human life, faith and especially, he sees philosophy as possible for apologetic purposes. However he also emphasizes that philosophical reflection should be based on moral emotions and passions. Altogether then, philosophical and psychological theorizing plays an important role in matters of faith and life even though they can never replace them as matters of life and faith itself constitute the actual substantial ground for all theorization.

The central technical concepts used in this current research are *constitution, intentionality, existential, and formal indication* elaborated on in the phenomenological tradition, but used also in different ways within phenomenology. These concepts and their meaning are briefly depicted for the way they are used in this current research.

The idea of constitution is a classical phenomenological concept that is closely attached to the starting point of phenomenology, which is an emphasis on the first person lived experience. Generally, it signifies that the way to approach the phenomena in question is not as an object-like entity, but experientially, seeking to find the initial constituents of a being or a meaning whatsoever⁶⁵. There can also exist many "constitutions" such as physiological, psychological, psychophysiological, social-cultural, historical, and others. In this study, the notion of constitution is mainly approached as a psychophysiological embodied constitution with respect to Laestadius' way of thematizing the physiological-vital basis of living organisms and also the constitution of consciousness, morality, and spirituality. Herein, constitution signifies the endeavour to thematize and explain the initial conditions of the "higher" manifestations of physiological constituents, especially consciousness, states of mind, self-knowledge, moral feelings, and spirituality.

Intentionality is also a classical philosophical concept that is closely related to the concept of constitution. It generally means that the character of consciousness as is always "reached out" from itself "towards something" that is transcendental to

64 Laestadius 2015, *The Lunatic*, Foreword, p. 14.

65 The constitutive perspective is often seen as an alternative for categories and categorial thinking. For the constitutive significance of embodiment in classical phenomenology, see, e.g., Taipale 2009 (Incarnate Subjectivity: The Constitutive significance of Embodiment in Husserlian Phenomenology. Department of Philosophy. Helsinki.)

the [sometimes assumed capsulated] mind itself; consciousness is always considered to be the conscious “of something,” i.e., *intentional*. Thus, intentionality signifies a “directedness” of mind, consciousness and – in a more fundamental ontological or holistic sense – body, when the mind is conceived to be corporeal and embodied. Thus, intentionality signifies a “directedness” of mind and body. In the phenomenological tradition, intentionality refers broadly to the interrelated character of subject and object, whether that character is a question about mind’s relationship to the world or, more holistically, man’s relation with the world. Hence, intentionality signifies the intertwined character of man and world; as well as how man is in the world, how the world is in the man; or how the perceived is always perceived of some particular person in a specific situation and from a particular embodied intentional state. In other words, intentionality means that the object or horizon of an experience and perception is always pulled into the midst of the embodied experience or perception itself; the object whatsoever cannot be conceived as being absolutely distinct from the agent and its embodied situation of the experience, as the object itself is included or comes along with the perception.

For instance, the theory of intentionality signifies man’s situatedness in Heidegger’s philosophy. He expanded the idea of intentionality so it pertained to the whole existence (*sorge*), meaning that the structure of human existence is ex-istence, always already reached out or outside of itself, for example, coincidentally directed into the future or/and being historical.⁶⁶ In the phenomenology of the body, the notion of intentionality is not limited to pertain only to the intentionality of consciousness or mind, but rather refers more holistically to the tacit or habitual way of being in a world of embodied consciousness. Further, in this current study when discussing the intentionality of body, intentionality refers to more of a holistic view on habituality, namely, a tacit or unconscious dimension of humane being in the world. In this study, the notion of intentionality is primarily used as a perspective to analyze Laestadius’ notion of passions, consciousness, perception, and faith as they bridge the human mind and body to the world outside or to the Divine and existence as such in varying ways. With respect to my use of the term “intentionality” as a perspective, I also use the term “existential” in a similar manner to depict how human beings relate to the world, God, and existence. With regard to Laestadius’ vitalist psychophysiological approach, it will be shown that Laestadius himself elaborated a specific vitalist existential stance.

Formal indication is developed in Heidegger’s philosophy to use concepts in an unsubstantial, un-objectifying, and non-nominalistic sense⁶⁷. This formal way to use

66 See, Heidegger 1992.

67 See e.g., Heidegger 1992, §25, 15. In *Being and Time*, for Heidegger already has the notion of *Formale Anzeige* in use, but it is elaborated on earlier. See further of the formal indication through Index p. 592 in Kiesel 1995, 592. (*The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time.*)

concepts theoretically means that certain concepts are not closed in a sense that they would refer to their objects in terms of content (contentually); they do not grasp the content because the manifold and ambiguous meaning-content is always a matter of lived experience and existentiality. *Formally indicative* concepts are needed, especially when depicting the existential structures of experiential life and world because the singular and individual experiences initially vary from their content (with regard to person, situation, etc.) All of the existential concepts, such as time, attunement, language, togetherness (co-existence) (Mitsein), and being-in-the-world actualize in their contentual existential meaning or significance in different ways depending on the individual, the situation, culture, and spatio-temporality overall.

In this study, the notion of formal indication offers an applicable perspective, as Laestadius used his primary conceptions, such as passions and all the faculties of the soul, as indicative significance. Even if they have organic physiological ground and vital content in an actual event of life, they refer formally to some psychological-experiential phenomena that are not strictly defined in their content. For instance, passions are conceived as vital-ontological, or to be specific, vital-existential structures and correlates that characterize the particular kind of intentional relatedness with the world, others, existence, and God. Yet their actuality (experiential content) always depends on the situated individual in question, indeed on how the passion or combination of passions manifests itself in the individual's mind or embodied thought and action in relation to the "object"; and the unique situations of the world. The basic idea of Laestadius is that passions lay the groundwork for the directedness and content of reason, the will, and understanding; therefore, it was consistent for Laestadius to depict the notion of faculties of soul in a "formally indicative" manner as they will receive their continuously varying phenomenal-vital character based on the individual, the situation, passion, etc., in question. Formal indication serves as a perspective also for Laestadius notion of Life as the ineffable principle of life (lifprincip) that can be reached and studied only through its manifestations in the actual and experiential human life and world.

2 Historical Contextualization

Researchers into Laestadius' thought have to recognize its multidisciplinary nature, which makes his thought both multilayered and ambiguous. His thought has theological, scientific, psychological, philosophical, and political dimensions and motifs. Also, the historical context and connections to history of ideas are manifold. Currents of history of ideas, local Sámi culture and milieu, the spiritual context of 1800's Sweden as well as the deep tradition of religious and theological writings are all present and integrated in his theoretical thought.

2.1 The Spiritual Situation in 1800's North Sweden

In 1686 the first church law after the Reformation was settled in Sweden. It defined Sweden as an evangelical nation and required Swedes to confess to the evangelical faith. The power of the monarch also extended to the church, and he or she was responsible for ensuring that God's law applied to the realm. Foreigners with business in the realm who wanted to practice another form of Christianity or another faith were bound to and obliged to worship in privacy in their homes.

Already in the first decades of the 18th century, the religious monopoly was threatened by pietistic influences from Germany and later also by "Swedenborgianism." The Swedish scientist and philosopher, Emanuel Swedenborg, founded the New Church to which the authorities reacted strongly. In 1726, the Conventicle Edict, which prohibited worship in private groups, was enacted.

Enlightenment and romanticism influenced the spiritual and intellectual life in Sweden in 1800's. Enlightenment and romantic ideas were the intellectual tools for reforming national Lutheran religion. On the other hand, pietism had spread to Northern Calotte and formed a counterforce for the ethos of enlightenment and modernism. Besides its religious intentions and aims within Christianity, early Laestadianism has also been interpreted as a reaction to the Enlightenment.⁶⁸

In 1800 and 1900's Sweden theology was again looking for help from philosophy for integrating the dogmatic system of Lutheran faith. This endeavor was part of the political interest in forming unifying conditions in the Kingdom of Sweden. During that time, church and state were not divided into their own regimes as strictly as

68 Minde 1998, 16–17, 21; Pyysiäinen 2004, 180.

today, and the church was thus naturally a structural part of the governance of the state⁶⁹. Traditionally the power of the monarch also extended to the church. Even if Lutheranism disliked and shunned the use of philosophy in matters of theology and faith, soon it was again willing to apply it, first Aristotelianism⁷⁰ and later in the 1800's rationalistic and metaphysical idealism in the spirit of enlightenment and romanticism⁷¹. The theological standardization of dogmatic views was also needed for the diagnosis of religious heresies. Reforming theological doctrines into a more coherent whole was seen as a possibility for creating shared ground for a common faith and, therefore, a homogeneous nation. Especially Hegel's philosophy seemed to serve national monarchic purposes in 19th century Sweden⁷².

In the broader picture, the theological result of the political-ideological unification process was Lutheran orthodoxy as the official religion of the State. There remained a high governmental trust of Lutheran orthodoxy as a unifying and morally enlightening religion in Sweden. However, during the 18th and 19th centuries, Swedish church history was characterized by several evangelical revival movements.⁷³ Different pietistic movements, born in Europe to fight against the (rationalistic) reformations of Lutheran orthodoxy, were spreading into Sweden, Norway, and Finland, and most often through Denmark from the beginning of the 17th –century⁷⁴. Major pietistic movements appeared in Northernmost Sweden, Laestadianism in the Torne Valley (inspired by L.L. Laestadius, 1800–1861) and Rosenianism in Västerbotten (C.O. Rosenius, 1816–1868), and on the West Coast, Schartauanism (H. Schartau, 1757–1825).⁷⁵

It is interesting that 17th –century pietism is often interpreted as a movement that paved the way for the Enlightenment and especially romanticism. However, when pietism spread into North Calotte, pietistic theologians and philosophers attacked Lutheran orthodoxy strongly, as it was seen to combine “unchristian” enlightenment rationalistic and metaphysical elements in the Lutheran faith.⁷⁶

As a result of tensions between the church leadership and the revival movements, as well as for theological reasons, some groups left the Church of Sweden and formed “free congregations,” despite several laws that were prohibiting secession.

Within Lutheran orthodoxy, different religions and religious practices caused suspicion, so especially pietism remained under the surveillance since Swedenbor-

69 See, Westman 1943.

70 Cf. Knuuttila 2010a.

71 See, Juntunen 1982

72 See, e.g., Osselaer and Maurits 2011, 63–94, 79. See further, Wallgren 1959, 80–101.

73 See further, e.g., Lenhammar 2000; Jarlert 2001; Bexell 2003; Jarlert 2010, 225–241.

74 See, e.g., Juntunen 1982; Lohi 1989.

75 Especially of Laestadius see, Hasselberg 1935, 107–226.

76 Debates concerned Lutheran confession books, meaning of reason and freedom of will in matters of faith, etc.

gianism. This political-ideological ethos also formed an explanatory background for the criminalization and prohibition of religious devotions and services in Sweden. The *Conventicle Edict* of 1726, which prohibited private devotions, was also enforced in the 1800's. The re-emphasis of the *Conventicle Edict* can be seen as being caused by the rise of new pietistic revival movements. Even though the Edict could not prevent the pietistic revivals, its reinforcement strongly expressed the attitude toward Pietism. It was not their religious "enthusiasm" as such that was under suspicion, but rather the possibility that it might lead to "separatism," i.e., doctrinal innovation that threatened the authority of the Lutheran Church and, thus, the whole State⁷⁷.

Practically the Conventicle Edict⁷⁸ (1726–1869) signified that religious devotions were not accepted without the presence of an official priest of the Lutheran Church. Thus, the freedom of religion or religious tolerance was quite limited in Sweden during that time. Everything that differed from the official Lutheran orthodoxy was often seen as Christian heresy and an actual threat to a nationally unified state. Only in the late 1800's was greater freedom of religion allowed in Sweden. However, full religious freedom was not guaranteed to everyone by law until 1951.

Pietism was the preferred form of Christianity especially among Sámi people⁷⁹ partly because it left more space for inner and mystical religious experiences which resonated with the Sámi existence and way of life⁸⁰. Pietistic emphasis on inwardness and a personal living faith as well as resistance to both ideological and economical currents and changes of early modernity fit well with the Sámi "worldview" and situation of life in the 1700's and 1800's. Laestadius was Sámi himself and had strong sympathies⁸¹ for the Sámi people⁸². It can be assumed that there was also a pietism-Sámi –combination, as they both had occasionally separatist, and sometimes

77 e.g. Sulkunen 1999, 22–26; Pyysiäinen 2004, 181.

78 Laestadius tells that Conventicle Edict was extended to pertain also to the so-called Readers (*läseriet*) which was a more moderate form of pietism. (§§1069–1070, 1073.) However, early Laestadianism practiced religious teaching, as it was an important part of school teaching; a part of the so-called catechetical teaching which meant that a teacher travelled into villages and the homes of people. (e.g. Hallencreutz 1985, 172; Lohi 1989)

79 See, Hallencreutz 1985. Lars Levi Laestadius' attitude to Saami religion. In Ahlbäck T. (ed.) *Saami Religion*. *Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis* 12, 170–184.

80 See, e.g., Outakoski 1991; Østtveit Elgvin 2010; Pentikäinen 1995.

81 It is interesting that Laestadius as an official priest of the Lutheran Church considered the "pagan" Sámi religion sometimes better and more authentic than the faith of the official Lutheran orthodoxy [corrupted by foreign philosophical ideas and losing its concrete experiential basis of faith]. For instance, Laestadius' argues in *Mythology* (Laestadius 2011) that the Sámi people are not worshipping *Seitas* (Sámi "totems") as Gods but rather the sphere that *Seitas* disclosed for Sámis; in these parts Laestadius' also seems to have conceived of *Seitas* of having vital significances for the Sámi people. It could thus be assumed that Laestadius was collecting and writing Sámi mythology and defended pietism as the Sámi religion partly in a romantic tone.

82 e.g. Laestadius 2011 (*Mythology*).

radical, tendencies that may have increased the governmental-ideological suspicion towards pietism and Sámis.⁸³

Altogether, common religion, Lutheran orthodoxy as supported by rationalism and metaphysics, was seen as the core of national consistency. In this historical situation, Laestadius wrote his apology of pietism, arguing that pietism was a theologically genuine Christianity and practically even better in the sense that it was able to awaken the authentic Christian faith and genuine morality. Therefore, Laestadius saw that pietism also served the national interests with regard to the unitary and moral conditions of the State⁸⁴. Laestadius seems to think that the Lutheran orthodoxy, combined with metaphysical rationalism and reflective speculation, missed the proper Christian understanding of man and, as a consequence, also the full understanding of faith and God.

Laestadius claimed that it was actually rationalism and speculative metaphysics that led to the mystification of Christian faith, because both ignore the experiential and emotional basis of faith. Laestadius seemed to be warning authorities in the Church and state that Lutheranism was in danger of being replaced by rationalistic religion and thus losing both its civilizing and spiritual-moral significance. (§1082.) Without a living religiosity, “politics becomes its most sacred interests,” which will lead to violations against the state, and Laestadius thus opposed the secular politicization of religion. (§1085, see also §§1158, 1189.)

Altogether, Laestadius attacked the Church harshly, stating that pietism “could breathe life into the spiritual cadaver” (§1155) as he saw that pietism was rather living Christianity while the faith of the State Church is already “dead” and “useless” because it does not “provoke” moral habits and a living Christianity among the citizens. The Church had traditionally played an educational role which was naturally emphasized in the spirit of enlightenment and romanticism. Thus, Laestadius points to the original task of the Church, saying, “We have many educational institutions aimed at the memory and intellect, but none aimed at heart. The church, which was to be an educational institution for the heart, is transformed into an educational institution for the belly.” (§1075.)

It is evident that Laestadius’ work had a political dimension. The opposition of the Conventicle Edict, the Church’s support for the government’s alcohol policy and hostility against the priests who preached for sobriety⁸⁵, and the general apology of North Scandinavian pietism can be seen as the main political motifs of *The Lunatic*.

83 See e.g., Zorgdrager (2000, 188–207) and Franzén (1999, 24–29) for further analysis about political and spiritual situation in the confrontation of West and Sámi people (and Laestadius’ role in it). Lehtola (2004, 30) has pointed out that the rejection of state religious authority by the Sámi was partly a response to the Sweden had over Sámi territories.

84 Laestadius 2015 (*The Lunatic*); Joensuu 2013; Juntunen 1982.

85 Cf. Boëthius 1952, 92, 137, 273, 276.

The apologetic intention of *The Lunatic* becomes evident all through the book. The last words of the book are even addressed to the State's leaders:

“But the world is strange. Trajana, the best monarch in the world, persecutes the Christians! Charles XI, an excellent monarch, persecutes Pietism! If the monarchs of the world ever have their eyes opened, they themselves will realize the folly of intolerance. Then they will not be blind tools of the bloodthirsty inquisition!!” (§1630.)

Laestadius states that religious intolerance is also bad religious leadership, which actually gains enthusiasm that later backfires against the leaders and institutions of the nation in the end. (§§1073, 1074.)

2.2 The Rise Against Metaphysical Rationalism

Beside its political-apologetic motifs, *The Lunatic* had also broader theoretical –theological, anthropological and even philosophical – intentions. Here it can be asked what were Laestadius' motifs for criticize rationalism, transcendental philosophy, and speculative metaphysics, and, what did he sees as an alternative for the prevailing currents. In this respect, the general ethos of enlightenment and romantic ideas and their presence in Swedish spiritual and intellectual life became the background for Laestadius' thought⁸⁶. In a wider picture, the shift from the earlier Aristotelian paradigm to enlightenment and the Romantic era, had enormous cultural and spiritual impacts. The autonomous and individual use of reason signified an emancipation of the views interpreted as representing prejudice and superstition. External guidance and the domination of reason as well as superstition were more often seen as religious⁸⁷. Thus, the exhortation of the individual use of reason, as detached from all authorities, formed a common chant of enlightenment and modernity. Within the intellectual atmosphere of enlightenment, the idea was formed that the human being does not have to build up his worldview on religious revelation, but rather could trust and lean on the light of reason.

86 In Sweden, Enlightenment ideas colored both the spiritual and academic life. Aristotelian philosophy was traditionally harnessed into the service of theology, but the enlightenment had pressed Aristotelian tradition out of the center. The closer union between theology and philosophy that prevailed in the middle Ages begun to crack and get new dimensions. This signified a critical relationship with Aristotelian thought on the communal nature of human life. Instead, the autonomy, individuality, individual freedom, and independent use of reason were strongly emphasized in the Enlightenment. See, e.g., Keskitalo 1997.

87 Keskitalo 1997, 23

The word of the Bible as a main Canon was weakened concerning both the relationship between man and God and man and existence. Also, Kant's ideas of "the maturity" and independent use of reason are enlightenment rationalistic notions. The self-defining (and self-justifying) subject was further theoretically developed and elaborated in enlightenment rationalism; now, however, the basic problem was how to reconcile the experiential faith based on revelation with the re-formed ideas of reason and freedom, or with the whole transcendental domain of reason as being relatively distinct from corporeal being in the world.

In general, Laestadius carries out a broad, partly explicit, critique of metaphysical rationalism with respect to both the theological and the anthropological theories. Cartesian dualism and rationalism, as well as further metaphysical-rationalistic speculations of Spinoza, Leibniz, etc., about being, God, trinity, reality, and ethics loomed in the background. Descartes' philosophy had laid the new basis for western thought and intellectualism. Descartes had explicitly argued that the body is something completely different from consciousness and something that consciousness could also do without.⁸⁸ Building on that view Cartesian tradition identified the field of *prima philosophia* with the indubitable sphere of a disembodied consciousness. By conceiving the subject of consciousness as a mundane being, the empiricist tradition proceeds in the opposite direction. Whereas rationalism ultimately opened the door to absolute idealism that reduced the body to consciousness of the body, empiricism eventually culminated in a type of naturalism that on the contrary reduced consciousness to the body (or, to a certain locus in the body, e.g. the brain).⁸⁹

Enlightenment ethos and its philosophical ideas re-formulated theological doctrines that were more suitable for the demands of human reason and were called neology on the continent and deism in England. In general, God was believed to be reached through intellect as the "highest Being". One of the most influential figures was Christian Wolff (1679–1754) who laid the groundwork for rationalistic philosophical theology. Neology and deism were harnessed for political use, as they became, especially in France, the official rationalistic religion of the State⁹⁰.

In *The Lunatic* Laestadius generally uses the name "philosophers" to refer to the wide range of philosophical rationalistic, idealistic metaphysicians and theologians, and other intellectuals who held rationalistic or idealistic metaphysical expressions as their views. Laestadius was familiar with philosophical ideas naturally through

88 Taipale 2009, 5. "I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it." (Descartes 1984, 54, 119; Descartes 1970, 87.); "the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, [...] and even if the body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is." (Descartes 1967, 101.); "this I which is thinking is an immaterial substance with no bodily element". (Descartes 1970, 84.)

89 Taipale 2009, 6.

90 Cf. Juntunen 1982, 112–120.

his studies at the University of Uppsala (1820–1825) but he referred to philosophers mainly through the commentaries of Petrelli's *Psychologie*⁹¹ and Heinroth's *Anthropologien*⁹². Laestadius often referred polemically to Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Spinoza, Leibniz, Fichte and Goethe. They were often Laestadius' targets as philosophical rationalists and metaphysicians even if there were certain similarities between their thought that could be found. He also used the term "philosopher" when referring to Petrelli, whose study book delivered his interpretations of philosophical ideas. Yet the name "philosopher" is also used for theological metaphysicians Laestadius read such as Hans Lassen Martensen, Möhler,⁹³ Ignelli⁹⁴ and Semler (§1147)⁹⁵ whom he also called "free thinkers"⁹⁶.

Behind all the critique of the rationalism of famous thinkers are various dogmatic-theological questions concerning human nature, the role of intellect and free will, and the threat of pantheism and panpneumatism.⁹⁷ More broadly, he expresses general disagreement against mere intellectual speculation which leans on metaphysical reflection both in anthropology and theology. His conviction was that enlightenment rationalism and later romantic metaphysical speculation that was based on it constituted a fatal wrong track for theology and anthropology.⁹⁸

Laestadius' academic studies and work as a botanist, priest, and ethnographic and theological anthropologist belong to the era of romanticism. Romanticism is often seen as a counterforce to the enlightenment emphases on the significance of human

91 Petrelli, Carl Magnus Joachim. *Menniskosjälens natur: Försök till psychologie* 1–2. Lindköping 1845–1846.

92 Heinroth, J. C. A. *Lärobok I Anthropologien*. Öfversatt af E. Rancken. Stockholm, 1837.

93 Möhler, J. A. *Symolik eller framställningar af de dogmatiska motsatserna emellan Katoliker och Protestanter enligt deras offentliga bekännelsekrifter*. Översättning. Norrköping, 1842.

94 Ignell, N 1842 and 1846. *Grunddragen af den Christliga Sedeläran*. Band 1–2. Stockholm. And Ignell, N. 1850. *Christendomen Huvudläror*. Populära föreläsningar. Stockholm.

95 Laestadius mentions also Schleiermacher, but does not seem to be familiar with his thought.

96 General critic is that these thinkers have wrong idea of human being when using the notions of substance and essentia, and do not conceive the passional or sinful character of human personhood, and by their intellectual emphases do not come down to the lived experiences of ordinary people.

97 Cf. Kristiansen 2004, 77.

98 Laestadius does not explicitly debate with philosophers, but by forming his holistic theory and defining his own philosophical notions, he clearly pointed out where his views differed. For Laestadius, the anthropological and theological critique went naturally hand in hand because of his holistic insight. He did not distinguish between the different aspects of human life, especially the vitalist idea of man and the theological insights concerning faith and spirituality. This is partly comprehensible as the moral, spiritual, psychological or physiological health and wellbeing were not strictly separated spheres within the common cultural ethos of 18th century. Basically because of his holistic insight Laestadius strongly opposes dualistic and rationalistic, as well as philosophies and theologies that bend over speculative and idealistic ways of thought. See further Caputo 2006 about the relationship between theology and philosophy, and about the influence of enlightenment rationalism.

reason and autonomy. It is true that the emphasis were shifted back to emotion and human communality and historicity. However, in the broader picture, romanticism kept the rationalistic emphases of enlightenment and combined them with more idealistic-metaphysical systems. The philosophy of “transcendental subjectivity” first determined by Descartes, but then fully elaborated by Kant (both for epistemological and life-philosophical purposes) opened up the possibility for romantic natural philosophy (naturalphilosophi) and absolute transcendental metaphysics. In the humanistic sciences particularly Hegel’s philosophy of spirit (Geisteswissenschaft), but also Schelling and Herder’s philosophies came into fashion⁹⁹. Hegel’s philosophy influenced the intellectual and spiritual life of Sweden strongly, and his ideas were put into the service of the nation.

In the times of romanticism, European intellectual life was longing for the lost original unity found within original Divinity. Theology led often into the abstract philosophy of spirit within which the Christian idea of God was undergoing transformation. The romantic-idealistic conceptions of man and God were often seen as a threat to genuine Christianity. Indeed, Laestadius wrote:

“In these enlightened times ... we have acquired entirely different understanding of world. New social conditions have arisen with the ascendancy of the Enlightenment, to the point that these new times demand new reformation ... Enlightenment and civilization is the mare on which reason rides. But it is almost too late to construct a religion of reason, since the world has been Christianized for almost two thousand years.” (§545.)

Within theology, Hegel’s philosophy spread through Sweden, thanks to the work of the Danish theologian and philosopher, Hans Lassen Martensen, a recognized Hegelian, who taught philosophy and whose work was translated into Swedish. Martensen’s dogmatic insights, philosophical theology, and moral philosophy were formed mainly from Hegel’s metaphysical rationalism (Idea, Absolute, Dialectics). Martensen was also Sören Kierkegaard’s teacher, and it is commonly known that Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel and metaphysical rationalism was elaborated on in relation to Martensen’s Hegelian philosophy and teaching.

Laestadius also read Martensen’s work and elaborated on his critique of rationalist-metaphysical theology with a special reference to Martensen’s thought. It is noteworthy as well that through Martensen there was a genuine link between the two influential Northernmost pietistic philosophers, Kierkegaard and Laestadius. We can point out many similarities between Kierkegaard and Laestadius’ thought. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on subjectivity, the idea that subjective truth does not demand

99 Cf. Juntunen 1982, 41.

objective evidence, the distinction between the stages of existence (esthetic, ethical, and religious) and the subjective “Leap of faith,”¹⁰⁰ can be compared to Laestadius’ emphases on the precedence of “subjective consciousness,” the conceptions of religious modes like “carefreeness (sorglöshet),” “awakened state,” “death faith,” and “living faith,” culminating in the idea of “testimony of feeling” as evidence of a heart but without objective proof. The more specific quest on whether these similarities were constituted from a shared pietistic background or derived from a shared critical relationship to Martensen and Hegel is a task for another study.¹⁰¹

Altogether, it can be stated that Laestadius’ critique of Martensen, particularly as a metaphysical rationalist, is one of the main intentions of Laestadius’ *Lunatic*.¹⁰² However, instead of an explicit Martensen-critique the holistic critique of metaphysical rationalism is inscribed into the whole system of *The Lunatic*. Through this focus, the critique is expanded to pertain to the whole range of academic and spiritual scholars who followed the currents of rationalism and idealistic metaphysics. Laestadius’ holistic critique pertained also to governmental metaphysical idealism; for instance his polemics also tackled Jacob Boström’s (a philosophy professor at the University of Uppsala) speculative social philosophy and anthropology.¹⁰³

In 1800’s Sweden, during the expeditious rise of natural science, a general discussion of the relationship between natural science and metaphysics took place. Did metaphysics have significance during a time of natural science? For what purposes were metaphysical speculations and theories necessary? This discussion derived its roots from the classical problem between empiricism and rationalism. We should highlight that Laestadius’ theoretical thought was particularly attached to these problematics, as he generally denied the validity of metaphysical rationalism, while simultaneously as a natural scientist, he connected his anthropology and philosophy of religion to a natural scientifically oriented medical vitalism. Actually Laestadius’ endeavor to deny the validity of metaphysical rationalism or transcendentalism and ground his theory in vitalism for his philosophy of religion constituted the context within which his elaborations then were formed.

In regard to the relations between developing natural science and new metaphysical elaborations, we can note that Locke’s (1632–1704) and David Hume’s (1711–1776) empiricisms posed crucial problems of the possibility of obtaining absolute knowledge of nature by empirical and mere rational means. Hume claimed that certain concep-

100 See, Kierkegaard 1974 (Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Orig. 1846); Cf. Liehu 1990.

101 See, e.g., Stewart (ed.) 2012. (Hans Lassen Martensen: Theologian, Philosopher and Social Critic.) and Stewart 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series: Kierkegaard and His Contemporaries: The Culture of Golden Age Denmark). The more detailed analysis of the relationship between Kierkegaard, Martensen, and Laestadius is outside the frame of this study.

102 See, Zidbäck 1932; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982.

103 See, e.g. Boström, C. J. 1859. Grundlinier till den filosofiska statsläran. Uppsala.

tualized phenomena that we lean on in our everyday empiric perception proved to be problematic; especially causality was such a phenomenon¹⁰⁴. Further, Locke posed a similar kind of problem¹⁰⁵. Even though the problems highlighted by empiricists did reveal their restricted concept of experience, the ideas had an enormous impact on philosophy and intensified the controversy between empiricism and rationalism. The relationship between empiricism and rationalism was crucially important for Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).

Kant started to formulate his transcendental insight that sought to synthesize empirical and rationalistic approaches. Kant's solution was simply that all perceptions are possible only through the schematic capability, categories and concepts of mind¹⁰⁶. As is well known, Immanuel Kant formulated a satisfactory synthesis of empiricism and rationalism in his transcendental idealism where empiric perception is structured and mediated through categories and the concepts of mind which produce the initial transcendental conditions for real and possible empirical perception¹⁰⁷.

Now, jumping over all the logical problems and their solutions in Kant's transcendentalism, we do notice how transcendental philosophy orientates philosophical enterprise; it is a way of thought that turns to *the subjective sphere* in order to find a satisfactory explanation *as proof and evidence* of the thing or condition as it *is* for our experience. In this sense, Kant formulated a broader concept of experience that pays attention to empirical sense perception, but also to the characteristics of the rational capabilities of mind.¹⁰⁸

However, it seems evident that Kantian transcendentalism, when emphasizing the capacities of "transcendental mind or reason" abstracts the analysis of the empirically given experiential phenomena and leads to idealistic theorizing; the transcendental sphere of mind is found, and philosophical reflection turns to a focus for exploring the laws of thinking mind. This transcendental turn could be conceived as a further elaboration of Cartesian subject-ontology or epistemology. The road is then open to

104 Hume argued that when seeing, for instance, the moving ball hitting the other static ball and making it move, we presuppose that the moving ball causes the movement. But what is this cause or causality to which we refer? What we perceive are regularities and different events and changes in that situation, but we do not perceive the causality itself. In regard to the epistemological question, it seemed that man cannot trust empirical perception or rational capability. How can we then explain the experiential reality that is present to us and that we trust in our actions?

105 How can we generally define a triangle by empirically comparing different triangles? It seems that empirical perception alone cannot constitute the "image" of a general triangle; it is impossible to draw so that it pertains to all variable triangles.

106 See, e.g. Määttänen 2013, 78–87. For instance, we have a scheme of triangles in such a way that "it is three points that are connected with the line," or we have a concept of causality through which we perceive all causal effects in the world.

107 Kant 1998. (*Critique of Pure Reason*) Available at [www: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf](http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf)

108 Kant 1998

phenomenalism, methodological solipsism, etc., and the lived existential-ontological, or psycho-physiological, world-relation is bypassed as only secondary in favor of transcendental epistemological interests. Generally speaking, this line of thought led to the classical tradition of philosophy with Hegel and his phenomenology of Spirit as its end point:

“The redefinition of ‘anthropology’ and the refocus of attention on the questions related to ‘natural history of man’ in latter part of Enlightenment reflected this new level of concern. Kant, for example, inaugurated his own lectures on anthropology in 1772, splitting these off his own lectures on physical geography. Furthermore, he was concerned to distance his project of transcendental and ‘moral’ anthropology from the growing ethnographic and physical approach generated by the work of the philosophical physicians and natural historians.” (Sloan 2007, 930.)

Henceforth Kant was seen as the one who drew a distinction between the transcendental and physiological domains of study. Transcendental philosophy was distracted from physiological research: Kant emphasized that research into the matters of soul and mind did not belong to the field of physiology, but rather to transcendental philosophy.¹⁰⁹ Thus, medical physiology was philosophically limited to a mere study of organism, organs, and their functions as such. Kantian distinction influenced the general ethos in philosophy and later in psychology and anthropology wherein the physiological study of the human organism was not applicable in anthropology. Kant’s denial of using physiological knowledge in matters of the soul made a strong impact on the multidisciplinary investigation of human being and human life. The distinction between the domains of moral philosophy and the philosophy of mind was now forming (Locke, Kant).¹¹⁰

On the other hand, Kant seemed to empower common belief for the power of reason, both to reach and gain knowledge and also orient oneself morally via reason and free will. In general, Kant’s intention was to limit sense-based empiricism and draw the limits of reason precisely in order to make “room for faith” but his ideas simultaneously indicated an intellectualization of religious faith and ethics¹¹¹. Within

109 e.g., Hagner 1992. From that distinction, the romantic idea of the parallelism between soul and nature can also be interpreted to be born. Schelling is one of the most famous romantic parallelists and natural philosophers whose thought became into fashion. Medical [sense]physiology, natural philosophy and transcendental philosophy formed a rich intellectual field in 1800’s Europe (encounter between natural science and metaphysics).

110 See further, Reill 2005. (*Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment* (1). Berkeley: University of California Press.)

111 Kant 1998, *Critique of Pure Reason* (orig. 1781); Cf. Kristiansen 2004; Keskitalo 1997.

the emphasis of epistemological interests, faith was more often conceived as a matter of individual and transcendental consciousness. Even if Kant's early work dealt with physiology and anthropology¹¹² he later distanced his thought clearly from physiological anthropological research, and thus he shifted the soul and the questions concerning both faith and morality to the domain of transcendental philosophy and ethics. This shift created a problem for how to talk about a transcendent God without restricting oneself to merely the practical reason and ethics of the categorical imperative¹¹³. It followed then from his epistemology and metaphysics that the essence, animated nature of embodied human beings, consciousness, and henceforth religiosity could not be approached within empirical means or by emphasizing the physiological corporeality of human beings (schematicism, categories, concepts were transcendental prerequisites for meaning and being whatsoever). Henceforth, Kant coincidentally undermined the aspects of factual corporeal experientiality and world-relation within anthropological research, ethics, and theology¹¹⁴.

Contrary to the emphasis on rationality and transcendental metaphysics Laestadius points to the direction where he was heading, i.e., "man's true nature cannot be perceived as thought, but as drive and feeling." (§699) This claim is exactly the opposite claim to what we find in Martensen's *Moralfilosofiens system* (p. 13), namely, that "man's true nature cannot be perceived as drive and feeling, but as thought." (§§699, 700.)

Laestadius had clear opinions about certain philosophers' ways of proceeding:

"The philosopher has created for himself an entirely wrong image of the relationship of the rational soul to the body. He cannot accept the physical-psychological opinions. He considers reason as the ruling principle within man. Although he assumes that all faculties of the soul are autonomous and mutually independent, he nevertheless considers reason to be the most important and claims that moral ennoblement should proceed from reason." (§698.)

112 See further, Kant Immanuel 1995-. *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. Translated and edited by Guyer, P. and Wood, A. W. Cambridge University Press. (e.g. *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte*, 1749); *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* (1755); *Untersuchungen über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der Natürlichen Teologie und der Moral*, 1764); *De Mundi Sensibilis Atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis*, 1770).

113 Kristiansen 2004.

114 Cf. Taipale 2009, 5–20. Taipale states that Kantian philosophy orients according to "transcendental cognition: Kant investigates the general 'conditions of possibility' for empirical experience, and thus thematizes the ultimate consciousness with a priori structures. ... he never constructed a general and concise argument about the constitutive, transcendental significance of embodiment, and in his main work he explicitly considers the body as a mere external thing: 'I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (to which also my body also belongs). (Kant 1998b, 409)'" (Taipale 2009, 6.)

However, not all the disciplines did followed transcendental philosophy. For instance, young biology and physiological medicine placed their focus strictly on the organism and pursued to find ways to explain organic function and also human beings by different [anti-intellectualistic] means.

From the present day perspective, it can be seen that the medical physiological science of 1700's within which vitalism was elaborated formed an important counter theory to Kant's transcendentalism, or in other words, Kant's transcendental idealism was formed as a critical relation to empiric and physiological research of soul or subjectivity. I see it important in regard to this study to point out the shift in the history of ideas within which the phenomena of morals and spirituality were moved from the empiric and anatomical studies of medical physiology into transcendental philosophy due to the strong influence of Kant's transcendentalism¹¹⁵.

The medical science of man that holds a holistic approach to human beings, including vital movements, organs, organic functions, cultural factors, religious and spiritual dimensions, the environment, natural-geographical conditions, was marginalized first because of the efficacy of positive explanatory power or rationalistic and mechanical thought in natural science and in medicine, and later because of the prevailing transcendental philosophical and idealistic ethos. However, in medical circles Kantian notions were quite soon replaced by the notions of F. J. Gall (1758–1828) who proposed a theory of different cognitive functions that were closely related to specific parts of the brain, and stated that natural science maintained its own distinct insight into the human mind as organic function¹¹⁶.

Enlightenment rationalism and its emphasis of reason and metaphysical reflection led often to a mechanistic worldview and idea of man. With regard to the idea of man's rationalistic dualism led to conceiving of the human being as analogical to a complex machine. Within theological metaphysics, the world as a whole was more or less approached as being a complex clock-work. Rationalistic metaphysics and rising natural science explored the laws of the whole mechanist system that was set in motion by God, but right after creation was left to its own fate. In human life, reason was seen as an initiator, and it formed the central foundation for criticism in the area of religion. Enlightenment ideas signified – also in Sweden – both the criticism of the theological doctrines and belief in the power of human reason and [natural] virtue. Thus faith, as it related to God, was more often seen as constituted through reason, not mediated through emotion, experience, revelation and miracles.

115 Even if Laestadius' was familiar with the transcendental philosophy, rationalism and holistic metaphysical systems emerging from that tradition, he chose to attach his theory to earlier medical thought, because he saw that it coincided better with actual lived experience and the idea of man and the notion of God given in the scriptures.

116 Hagner 1992

Laestadius was aware of the natural philosophic that was constructed on the grounds of Kant's philosophy but also seemed to consider it as being way too intellectualistic and idealistic leading to pantheism.¹¹⁷ He neither followed the transcendental philosophical metaphysics nor the natural philosophical Hegelian tradition, but rather held tight to the theological and Biblical tradition, explaining it using the vitalist psychology and philosophy.

Laestadius recognized the danger alienating of transcendentalism and metaphysical rationalism. As an educated natural scientist and, above all, a passionate botanist, Laestadius had a genuine interest in and love of plants and the phenomena of nature. Nature was something real and actual for Laestadius, nothing schematically or conceptually constituted as phenomenal experience. Plants were unique in nature and in his hands; the smell and touch of the petals of the flowers immediately disclosed the existence of a unique organism, even if only partly, thereby never revealing its deepest secrets. We can imagine that Laestadius was simultaneously interested in the empirical and transcendental character of the organism itself. Contrary to enlightenment rationalism, transcendental idealism, and romantic metaphysics, Laestadius found medical vitalism to be a more plausible ground for beginning to elaborate his understanding of organic and spiritual existence and justifying the pietistic ideas of man and religiosity¹¹⁸.

Given the general depiction of Laestadius' background and situation, we can now summarize both by highlighting that Laestadius' critical attitude toward the prevailing currents had both anthropological and theological dimensions. Laestadius saw that the modern philosophical and metaphysical understanding of human beings, life, faith, and God was alienated from experiential reality and the experiential basis of faith. In the theological dimension Laestadius resisted the national interests to empower Lutheran orthodoxy by means of metaphysical rationalism as a State religion. Philosophical-theological and anthropological reflection were influenced by rationalistic, metaphysical and wolffian philosophy and the light of reason and virtuous life, as noted above. In the religious dimension Laestadius found pietistic emphases of faith of the heart and a living God more truthful than the intellectual emphases of Lutheran orthodoxy. In relation to the prevailing anthropology, Laestadius found vitalist physiology, philosophy, and psychology more truthful as they all clearly denied the autonomy of rational soul and emphasized the vital movements of corporeality, physiological, but simultaneously animated, organism as a basis for human existence, consciousness, morality and spirituality. Laestadius also saw the "physiological ground" offered by the prevailing medical vitalism as consistent medical knowledge, fitting together well with the Biblical and Lutheran understanding of human beings.

117 See further on the relationship between vitalism and Kant in Reill 2005

118 Joensuu 2013

Laestadius saw that rationalistic and idealistic philosophy as applied in theology was the actual reason for the mystification of Christian faith (§546, 553); intellectualistic emphases do not help people understand the experiential psycho-physiological basis of man and actual Christian faith. For Laestadius, metaphysical rationalism led to a false optimism in religion and theology and did not enable one to grasp the embodied human condition properly. It also constituted an illusion of religious, scientific, technological, cultural, and political optimism and disconnected man from the proper relation to nature and life in the world (§1099, 1102, 1105, Cf. §1120).¹¹⁹ According to Laestadius, 18th century rationalistic reformation was revolutionary and political and did not consider human nature, morality, and essence or religion deeply enough (§1132).

A denial of the metaphysical rationalistic explanations of the human soul, consciousness and ego and the grounding of his own theory in medical vitalism were Laestadius' basic philosophical issues that he dealt with in detail all along in *The Lunatic*, and therefore, I return to this subject continuously in my analysis.

2.3 Toward Medical Vitalism and Psychology

Laestadius wrote *The Lunatic* during the time when natural science¹²⁰ and philosophy progressed in many fields. Linnéan influence at the University of Uppsala in 1800's was strong, and his taxonomy was in use then as it is today. Natural historical and natural philosophical interests, especially in botanical theories, were notably present in Uppsala during the time of Laestadius' studies in 1820–1825. Much happened in biology, medical science, zoology, and different fields of physics. Darwin's evolution theory was not published yet, but ideas of change and the variety of organisms are being presented. Climate, geographical location, the environment, and surrounding conditions of living beings are generally conceived as central factors of the biological functions of life. Laestadius' botanical theories leaned on these ideas and he even insisted that certain Northern plants did not constitute an owned species, but rather geographical variations of particularly general species.

119 See Heidegger's analysis of the essence of technology for further analysis: Heidegger 1993b, 311–314.

120 Among the numerous references to philosophers and influential persons in Western political, cultural, religious, and scientific history, we find many references to contemporary scientific inventions from Laestadius' *The Lunatic*. Laestadius refers to the law of constancy, embryology with speculations concerning the emergence of self-consciousness in fetus, and the hypothetical theory of the determination of sex within which Laestadius' offers his own hypothesis for the origin of hermaphroditism (e.g. §163). He even seems to hold it as natural that life exists on other planets as well ("inhabitants of other planets") (e.g. §1598). Together with his strict commitment to physiology and medical vitalism, Laestadius was an exceptionally open-minded religious scientist and philosopher, both a successor and a critic of enlightenment and romantic thought.

Progress in anatomical and physiological research offers a new insight into human organism which modifies the prevailing ideas of the human soul or actually turned back closer to the more traditional Aristotelian idea of soul. Organic functions, neural systems, blood vessels, brain investigations, and many empirical observations inspired discussions on the human organism, body, soul, human behavior, and spirituality. The relationship between brain and soul was widely discussed and the soul was often seen to be located in the brain. Knowledge of anatomical and physiological research was used in explaining the human soul, and thus, also in this same direction, the monopoly of theology on the matters of soul was weakening. In the situation where medical science with its many debates progressed, romantic natural philosophy, together with idealistic insights of an animated nature, became the prevailing current; also psychology as a distinct discipline was emerging.¹²¹ In its dawning days, psychology was naturally considered a “border-science” as it was still searching for its own field located between other different disciplines.

Vitalist thought was also common in Uppsala also through its direct epistolary connections with Montpellier, the center of vitalism as suggested by Williams:

“The unfolding of Sauvages’s career illuminates the existence of a shared Protestant medical culture – sustained chiefly by epistolary connection with Uppsala, London, Halle, Geneva, and Lyons – that linked Montpellier to physicians throughout Europe who refused the dualism of mind and matter, soul and body, that undergirded the mechanist medicine articulated by followers of Descartes.”¹²²

121 From the 1600’s to 1800’s there was growing interest in physiological and anatomical research as well as natural philosophy (*naturphilosophie*) strengthening in the intellectual life of Europe. Philosophical problems and elaborations were often connected to new ideas and views on human physiology and anatomy. The problem of the substantiality and location of soul had arisen when materialistic medicine began to focus on human embodiment. The complex history of anatomical research brought forth new views of the origins of the movements of the soul and action of body, and these conclusions started to compete with the accepted philosophical ideas of autonomy and distinct soul. Partly on that basis, psychology was born in the 1800’s. The ideas of human physiology and a living organism were applied to question the nature of the soul. It was no longer only theology that could question and theorize on the human soul. It is understandable that this confrontation between traditional theology (considered as metaphysics) and modern physics (psychology and anthropology) new psychological views and theological understanding led to many debates. The questions about the nature of the soul, emotions, passions, instincts, drives, and the unconsciousness were again lifted up in the cross-examination of these different disciplines. See, e.g. Åberg 1997/1964.

122 Williams 2003, 9–10.

Laestadius' became acquainted with vitalism in his early botanical work¹²³. Further, in his work on Sámi history and mythology, Laestadius explained the Sámi beliefs and spirituality partially in vitalistic tone¹²⁴. Also, Laestadius criticized the mathematical and mechanistic approach in matters of spirituality, religiosity, and psychological phenomena, a topic he had already dealt with in *Mythology*.

Laestadius personally became properly acquainted with vitalist thought by studying vitalist physicians. After writing *Mythology*, he turned to “more important” questions of religion, which finally lead to the birth of his manuscript, *The Lunatic*. Therein Laestadius names several vitalists and romantic psychologists as authoritative sources that he relied upon to elaborate his theory.¹²⁵ Laestadius also admitted explicitly leaning on enlightenment “doctors,” “psychologists,” and “physicians” and their notions of the soul. He referred to these scientific authors and highlighted their psycho-physiological approach and considered it as more plausible than the position of metaphysical rationalism held by philosophers, rationalists, metaphysicians, and “rationalistic priests”. Therefore, Laestadius can be posited in the very broad sense in the scene between mechanism and vitalism and the field of vitalistic anthropology.

In line with the basic enlightenment trend, Laestadius elaborated an anthropological theory to ground his theological views; his anthropology is theoretically based on vitalistic medical thoughts on enlightenment, deriving from the Montpellier vitalist tradition. Laestadius mentions that his most important scientific authors¹²⁶ were in enlightenment medicine, such as the anatomist and father of histology, Xavier Bichat (1771–1802); the father of psychosomatics, Johann C. A. Heinroth¹²⁷ (1773–1843) and Carl Gustav Carus (1789 – 1869), known as a developer of the earliest formulations of psychoanalytic unconsciousness¹²⁸; and Felix Descuret (1795–1872) known as a physician and doctor who interpreted physiology and the theory of passions in

123 Laestadius 1839 (*Loca Parallela Plantarum*); Franzén 1973.

124 Laestadius 2011 (*Mythology*)

125 It is assumed that Laestadius was introduced to French medical vitalism by the French explorers for whom he worked as a guide and an expert on the Sámi culture and flora of North Calotte. Yet it is also possible that Laestadius became familiar with vitalism in his student years and studied the medical and psychological literature used in *The Lunatic* already at Uppsala 1820–1825. Cf. Bäcksbäck 1938.

126 The philosophical and philosophical theology sources for Laestadius were primarily Hans Lassen Martensen's (1808–1884), C. M. J. Petrelli's (1806–1889) and Marcus Wöldik's (1699 – 1750) writings and with whom he discussed and that offered him interpretations of philosophical thought and problems. See more on Laestadius' sources from Juntunen 1982, Chapter 2.1.1.; Åberg 1997/1964; Zidbäck 1937.

127 See further on Heinroth, e.g., Allen 2009. (*Revels in Madness: Insanity in Medicine and Literature*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.)

128 Further on Carus see, e.g. Brown 2014, 5, 6 and 75; Bell 2010, 156–172.

a spiritual and religious direction¹²⁹. All these authors developed anatomical research and medical psychology to create theories of vitalism and psychosomatics from which Laestadius adopted these central ideas and “guides” for his own theory and purposes:

”These are the psychological ‘guides’ used by the author, and while he has been unable to approve of any of these works, he has nevertheless found in them some starting points and points of reference in his efforts to reach an accurate comprehension of spiritual matters.” (*The Lunatic*, Foreword p.15–16.)

Laestadius especially followed Bichat’s theory and vitalist principles in his depictions of the principle of life, vital functions and passions, and he also attached these concepts to theological ideas, and re-interpreted them in an existential and phenomenological direction. Especially Bichat’s book *Research on Life and Death* that gathered the most important notions of vitalist philosophy was the main source of Laestadius’ vitalist theorizing.¹³⁰ Laestadius read Bichat closely and grounded his anthropology and philosophy of religion on his thought¹³¹. Xavier Bichat was linked to the Montpellier tradition through his father, who studied with Barthez and also took his medical degree from Montpellier in 1769.¹³²

The Mechanism-Vitalism –debate formed during the Enlightenment and Romantic era and was partly related to the more general schism between speculative metaphysics and natural scientific thinking. Descartes’ thought had laid forth a strong basis for mechanistic-rationalistic anthropology. Newton’s successful investigations inspired and strengthened a mechanical worldview, which was dominant thinking in medical science,

“that the physical body is a complex mechanism which operates in accordance with the laws of matter and motion. It was assumed that willed and

129 In Laestadius’ use: Descuret, J. B. F. 1847. *Passionerna uti deras förhållanden till sjukdomarna, lagarne, och religionen*. Översättning av A. Ekström. Norrköping.

130 Bichat’s *Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort* was originally published in 1800. In Laestadius’ use: Bichat 1805. *Undersökning om Lifwet och Döden*. Stockholm: Öfversatt af Gustaf Wallenberg. In this current study I have used the same edition as Laestadius and the English translation: Bichat 1815. *Physiological Researches on Life and Death*. Translated by F. Gold. London: Longman. WWW-access available for several editions: e.g. <https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/catalog.nlm:nlmuid-2543052R-bk> and <https://archive.org/details/physiologicalre00bichgoog>

131 Cf. Bichat 1815/1805; Gonzales-Crussi 2008; Rey 2006, 206, 265. Bichat also elaborated on important distinctions, such as that of “animal life” and “organic life” that Laestadius interpreted and applied directly in *The Lunatic*, as we will see later.

132 See, Haigh 1975, 77; Haigh 1984; Williams 2002, 75–76.

conscious activity derive from a rational, immaterial principle located in the brain or the soul.”¹³³

Vitalist revolution of the late Enlightenment marked the crucial transition from the assumptions of the ‘mechanical’ philosophy to those of nineteenth-century philosophies of nature¹³⁴. Vitalism, which emphasized the concrete physico-biological starting point, emerged as a counterforce for rationalistic intellectualism and mechanistic worldview.

Mechanistic viewpoint, contrary to vitalism, holds that all forms of life can be explained entirely by physical causes. Life is seen as no more than a special case of physics and chemistry, even though it is one of enormous complexity. Mechanists assert the similarity between phenomena in biology and those in the world of inert matter. Today, mechanism has triumphed, which has very important implications for medicine.¹³⁵

Vitalism was not a unitary current, and it is impossible to be defined precisely. Vitalists based their research on empirical observation, and theoretical reflections and postulations were also based on concrete anatomical-empirical research and observation. Philosophically central were those observations through which classical dualism was challenged, e.g., different organs like glands seem to function independently and autonomously and did not seem to demand any “distinct outer” soul-principle as the explanatory basis for their functioning. The function and the pulse of the heart were also seen as independent and autonomous movements. Different organs were related to each other via tissues, fibers, blood vessels, nerves, etc., and thus, they constituted the integrated human organism.¹³⁶

Vitalist theories were united by the conclusions that said that the inert conception of matter assumed by Cartesians, and some versions of Newtonian natural philosophies were inadequate to account for important areas of biological function. *In the most general sense, vitalism assumes that the study of organic phenomena cannot be reduced to a branch of physics or chemistry.* While vitalism resisted the Cartesian notion of soul as an autonomous and immaterial principle, it affirmed that the living body possesses a unique entity, a soul, a force, a capability or principle which causes it to transcend the realm of inert matter.¹³⁷

The most central philosophical thesis of vitalism was the notion of a principle of life or vital force (*vis essentialis*, *Le princip vital*, *livprincipe*) that was seen to super-

133 Haigh 1977, 3.

134 Sloan 2007, 924.

135 See, González-Crussi, 2008, 52; Williams 2002 and 2003; Haigh 1984.

136 See e.g. Haigh 1984.

137 See, e.g. Sloan 2007, 925; Haigh 1984; Williams 2002.

sede the idea of the soul as independent of an organism¹³⁸. This view fundamentally opposed the prevailing tendency among the rationalistic medical theorists that a living body is a complex mechanism¹³⁹.

Vitalists also insisted that life and non-life should be studied using different tools and means. Among vitalists it was accepted to make a distinction between laws of nature that were invariable and laws of life and its organic functions that were conceived as *variable* in their nature. Vitalists held that the natural activities of the body are directed by a special force, one that is unique to living beings and permits them to go on living.¹⁴⁰

In place of the mechanical models of an organism, living beings were re-conceptualized as governed by new powers within matter in various ways: *Vis essentialis* (Caspar Friedrich Wolff); *Lebenskraft* (Friedrich Casimir Medicus); *Bildungstrieb* (Johann Blumenbach); *Anima* (Stahl); *sensibilité* (Théophile Bordeu, Paul Joseph Barthez); and ‘*matter of life*’ (John Hunter).

Altogether, thoughts of physiological medicine constituted an alternative ground for philosophical anthropology, as it related rationalistic-mechanical, and metaphysical-idealistic conceptions.

The Vitalist Xavier Bichat, also the main scientific source for Laestadius, defined the vitalist notion of life as follows:

“Life consists in the sum of the functions by which death is resisted. In living bodies, such in fact is the mode of existence; that whatever surrounds them, tends to their destruction. They are influenced incessantly by inorganic bodies; they exercise themselves, the one upon the other, as constant an action: under such circumstances they could not long subsist, were they not possessed in themselves of a permanent principle of reaction. This principle is that of life; unknown in its nature, it can be only appreciated by its phenomena [...].”¹⁴¹

Vitalists often believed that the vital or living/animated principle operated in opposition to physical laws. It was typical for them to reason that the processes necessary to life could just as easily end it. Living organisms were viewed as being subject to death and decay. Therefore, the human bodies would also crumble in a matter of seconds were it not for the organizing energy, the vivifying spark, that keeps them going.¹⁴²

138 e.g. Haigh 1984

139 See, Haigh 1977, 1.

140 See, González-Crussi 2008, 51.

141 Bichat 1815, 20–21.

142 González-Crussi 2008, 51–52; Cf. Normandin & Wolfe 2013.

Vitalism became particularly influential in the seventeenth century due to the German physician and chemist, Georg Ernest Stahl (1660–1734). Stahl argued that all the functions of a body, unwilled as well as those willed, unconscious as well as conscious, are the result of the activity of a soul or *anima*. He intended for his arguments to go against the prevailing mechanist theory and its idea of animal clock-work. Stahl conceived the soul as sheltering the body from corruption. The immaterial, rational, and spiritual soul existed in a situation of mutual dependence on the material body.¹⁴³ He also called people’s attention to the chemistry of the human body in health and disease, believing that the organs of the body were subject to the laws of physics but proposing that the soul also regulated and harmonized their functions. Thus Stahl’s view is commonly seen, as was Aristotle’s, as a form of animism. The implications for medicine were very important, and much attention was devoted to the *passions* that agitated a patient’s embodied soul. Also, his view of the harmonizing ability of the soul led him to conclude that this “soul” had the power to heal; from this view, Stahl revived the ancient thesis of *natura medicatrix* (Nature as physician). As there was a healing vital principle within the body, the medical practitioner should simply be an assistant of Nature’s curative potency, not a mechanic repairing a broken machine.¹⁴⁴

Stahl’s ideas had great influence throughout Europe. Especially physicians at the Medical University of Montpellier further evolved Stahl’s ideas, creating their own brand of vitalism. Particularly, the Montpellier vitalist physicians resisted the mechanical interpretation of rationalistic philosophy (Parisian physicians) within which a human being was conceived as a complex machine¹⁴⁵. Francois Sauvages (1706–1767) adopted the vitalist notions that then re-directed the whole Montpellier school from mechanism to vitalism. Sauvage’s ideas had an especially strong hold on his disciples, Théophile de Bordeu (1722–1776) and Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734–1806), and reached their highest expression in Marie-Francois-Xavier Bichat (1771–1802).¹⁴⁶

Bordeu proposed that there was a “sensibility” (*sensibilité*) that belonged to the matter from which all living structures are made. Many of the Montpellier physicians also contributed to the development of a theory concerning the vital role of the force of sensibility. “Sensibility” was a force or principle that was considered to be inherent in and inseparable from the very substance of [living] matter. This view made living motion a *function of the body itself* and not the consequence of some other force or substance separate from it and possessing a different nature¹⁴⁷. As a vitalist concept,

143 Haigh 1977, 3.

144 González-Crussi 2008, 55.

145 See, Haigh 1984, 14

146 See, González-Crussi 2008; Williams 2004; Normandin & Wolfe 2013.

147 Cf. Haigh 1977, 1.

“sensibility” was not reducible to physicochemical terms. This idea clashed with the mechanist theory that saw the body as a conglomerate of inert parts cleverly assembled (like a clock in which the gearwheels keep turning as long as it is wound)¹⁴⁸. Bordeu expanded the notion of sensibility by proposing that each organ had its own individual life, distinguishable from the life of the total organism¹⁴⁹.

The phenomena of sensibility and irritability seemed to be confirmed by a wealth of experimental evidence, and it is easy to see how these ideas may have originated. “Anyone familiar with a biology laboratory or the receiving room of pathology laboratory or any place where freshly removed organs and tissues are examined knows that the movement and contractility are the most striking hallmarks of life.”¹⁵⁰ Anatomical and pathological observations as well as their experiential affirmation in the lived experience must have inspired the vitalists with the idea that life resides in the constituent of the body and is an integral part of their being. The vital force and its variable functions were present everywhere in organic life; in plants, animals and the whole of nature around them.

The most influential Montpellier vitalist was Barthez who attributed the function of the living body to the action of force that he referred to simply as the vital principle (*le principe vital*). For Barthez, this vital principle coexisted in the body with a rational soul. The role of the rational soul was limited to overseeing that small proportion of body activity which was due to the will and which was conscious. The vital principle, on the other hand, governed the functions that had traditionally been assigned to the vegetative or lowest soul in the Galenic system. Barthez could not define whether this vital principle was material or immaterial substance although he thought that all the evidence pointed to its existence *separate from matter* of the body itself. He assumed that the vital principle was not part of the matter of the body although it controlled it throughout the span of its life. He also thought that an organism carries out its functions as long as it remains attached to the body in some way. This dualistic notion that the source of motion in a body is outside its matter pushed Barthez out of the vitalist mainstream in the 1770s¹⁵¹. Barthez thought that “all the functions which Bordeu and others had assigned to a multitude of organic sensibilities could be more accurately attributed to the faculties of [a] single principle.” Thus, Barthez considered it probable that the vital principle has an existence separate from that of the body. He also held that this vital principle can be destroyed or leave the body, for example, when the body was drowned.¹⁵² The debate between vitalist dualism and monism influenced in later anthropological and psychological elaborations in many ways.

148 See, Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 56.

149 See, Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 57

150 See, Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 57.

151 Haigh 1977, 1.

152 Haigh, 1977, 8–9.

The speculations concerning the nature of organs that rest and those that do not was developed further by Grimaud in Montpellier. Xavier Bichat adopted the distinction and made it the basis for his distinction of the living functions of animal and organic categories.¹⁵³ In medicine, Bichat is seen as the father of histology. He is known to have combined and systematized an enormous amount of earlier medical knowledge and notions. He expressed his ideas in a simple and comprehensible manner, which is why he became known as the leading advocate of vitalist persuasion; he became known as the vitalist par excellence¹⁵⁴.

Bichat's definition of life was celebrated by the philosophers and intellectuals of his time, and his work widely inspired further human scientific and philosophical research. Contrary to mechanistic medicine that often admired the Newtonian way of formulation in biology, Bichat emphasized a phenomenological, rather than a realistic, conception of vital agencies¹⁵⁵. Bichat's manner of combining physiological knowledge and views, together with his holistic way of thought and holding the question of human existence as a horizon, gives a phenomenological dimension to his thought. We find many philosophically interesting elaborations in Bichat's *Life and Death*: The emergence of mind, relation between mind and body explained in vitalist terms, psychosomatic relation between organic life and animal life, experientiality, perception, habituality, and morality viewed from the vitalist-existential perspective to mention just a few.¹⁵⁶

It has been recognized that some versions of the vitalist theories were able to escape the charges of inserting occult forces into passive matter¹⁵⁷. Insofar as the "vitalists" did not postulate irreducible occult 'vital forces' as much as they emphasized the specificity of the phenomena of life and emphasized autonomy of life, and criticized the mechanism and reductionist theories, it has been suggested that instead of calling the Montpellier physicians "vitalists", it would be more appropriate call them "holists" or "organicists."¹⁵⁸ Overall, Bichat was neither an occultist nor fully reductionist when holding onto the notion of the principle of life; he also relied on empiric and experiential phenomena given in the lived experience¹⁵⁹.

153 Haigh 1975 and 1984.

154 Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 59–60; Cf. Normandin & Wolfe 2013.

155 Sloan 2007, 925

156 A kind of panpsychistic notion of the human consciousness and a power of subjective consciousness could be found also from Schopenhauer. It is commonly known that Schopenhauer's philosophy is constructed on the metaphysical interpretation on Xavier Bichat's vitalism. (See, Schopenhauer 1995/1819.) In addition to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Foucault and modern neo-vitalists have been influenced by Bichat's theories and thought. For a brief and general philosophical re-evaluation of vitalism and possible significance of vitalism for further philosophical elaborations, see, Kanamori 2005.

157 Sloan 2007, 925.

158 Kaitaro 2007, 312; Cf. Kaitaro 1998, 289–312.

159 See, Bichat 1815.

Bichat's principle of life as the totality of the vital functions that resist death and ground vitality and the motion and activity of human life remains beyond intellectual and scientific comprehension. That is because the vital powers, functions, and their relationships, influences, and manifestations are so variable. As reflective human intellect is part of this same variable and dynamic organization, it follows that the embodied human being is not transparent in and of itself through reflection and conceptualization. Human beings cannot transparently objectify their own passions, affections, and emotions that direct their reflectivity.¹⁶⁰

Especially the Montpellier vitalists persisted in their view that the only true medicine was one that recognized the uniqueness of human beings and grounded its investigations in a genuinely anthropological vision¹⁶¹.

Williams points out that medical vitalism – called as “science of man” – was not united current and could not be precisely defined. However, Williams thematizes the specific thoughts common to Montpellier vitalists and I follow here to summarize her notifications as important broad background to Laestadius' holistic elaborations¹⁶². Williams pointed out four principal nodes of reference for vitalist “science of man”¹⁶³:

1. It was holistic, both in its conception of the human persona as an integral, functionally interdependent whole and ... embrace the myriad, interdependent phenomena of human experiences. Thus, it was not limited to a discrete set of physical phenomena, but instead was extensive and sometimes also comprehensive in its purview.

2. It postulated intimate relations (*rapport*) among separate domains of human experience, such as the physical, mental and passionate, that were later reduced by physicians of the revolutionary era to what was called the *'physical and moral'*. It did not reduce the psychic domain to the physical, and thus was not monist or materialist. Most physicians who worked with the tradition accepted there was some kind of distinction between mind and body and between willed and un-willed action. But they taught, nevertheless, that these realms of existence and experience were still closely interdependent. This signified that *'rapport'* meant, not control or determination of the mind by body or vice versa, but rather a linkage, interrelationship, and reciprocity.

3. The vitalist science of man pushed medicine into society by its own internal logic as much as by any overt ideological or political intention, for it was a medical philosophy that regarded the intellectual, passionate and social phenomena as being intimately tied to the well-being of the body. Also, Hippocraticism held the teaching of health not to be individual, but rather dependent on social practices and milieu.

160 See. Haigh 1984, 85; Gonzáles-Crussi 2008, 60–61.

161 Williams 2002, 14.

162 My summary follows Williams 2002, 8–13.

163 Williams 2002, 8–13.

4. It privileged the problem of discerning human ‘types’ amid the great variety of clinical and social detail (gathered in the course of medical investigations). These types were generally articulated in terms of their variable distribution in individuals of vital energy and, more specifically, in terms of temperament, constitution, age, sex, climate, disease, and ultimately, race. Typologization was rooted in the medical vitalism from which the science of man derived its original encouragement. Vitalism insisted by definition on the variability and diversity of human phenomena. It originally assumed coherence as a medical doctrine by attacking universals in the form of the mechanical and physiochemical constant of iatromechanism and Cartesian conception of the body physics. Rejecting mechanical constants, vitalist physicians looked instead for patterns, regularities, and generalities that would allow them to devise meaningful pathological, therapeutic, and physiological explanations. Thus, the discernment of types that showed regularities different from those found in the physical universe was one of the special contributions that the science of man had to make to the larger scientific enterprise.¹⁶⁴

Early vitalist (medical) philosophy (science of man) was holistic. It did not exclude environmental, cultural-historical, cultural-social, or religious conditions when explaining the normal, pathological or general habits of human beings. Rather, the human organism and its functions, health and illness, and common habits were studied in relation to the existing immanent and spiritual spheres. In Montpellier, vitalism was ineluctably connection with physiological and anthropological problematics. That view was reinforced by the Montpellier concept of “organization”, which, according to Williams, necessarily entailed the investigation of any and all phenomena connected to the life of the organism – internal and external, physical and mental, healthy and pathological: “Nothing could be justifiably excluded since any process or operation might constitute the key to explaining the activities of the interrelated whole. *Physiologically based medicine thus had to take into account any influence, activity, or circumstance that affected general vitality and health*”.¹⁶⁵

Paris doctors adapted vitalist physiology and retained its focus on the human and indeed conceived of it as the fundamental framework for the larger science of man that was to claim authority in diverse areas of human life and experience:

The science of man was to investigate not the body, mind, or feeling in isolation but instead the ‘*relationship between the physical and the moral*.’ It was grounded in physiology, and promised to extract from the study of human ‘organization’ the fundamental principles for a science of human beings as individuals in society. Later, during the late Empire and Restoration, “new anthropology” was identified with “medical Ideology” and provoked strong reactions. The debate took place in medical

164 Williams 2002, 8–10.

165 Williams 2002, 12.

circles between “materialists” and “spiritualists” over the mind/body relation. Marginalization of philosophical medicine happened while physicians were trying to find an ideological free medicine; a holistic philosophical current was marginalized in favor of positive mechanical medicine.¹⁶⁶

“The medical science of man, despite the high ambitions of its early advocates, was not destined to march in step with dominant trends in either medical theory and methodology or the organization of medicine as a social enterprise. By 1850 it was evident that an omnibus, general, anthropological medicine rooted in vitalist holism would not flourish in an era dominated by positive philosophy, reductive and experimental methodology, and professional specialization. ... This discursive framework of the science of man may have disappeared but elements of the science of man survived in diverse and influential forms.”¹⁶⁷

Williams highlights the significance of vitalist anthropology (science of man), which lay in its power to supply the basic and endlessly renegotiable terms of discussion of a problem – the relationship of the physical and the moral – that had, from all ideological perspectives, become inescapable¹⁶⁸. Even if vitalism went into eclipse after the mid-century when its diverse elements gradually sedimented out into a range of emergent disciplinary constructs and medical specialties, and were “forced into a subterranean and muffled existence, it continued to exert powerful influence in the human sciences¹⁶⁹.”

2.4 “The Physical” and “the Moral” in Vitalist Philosophy

With regard to the emphasis of moral significance of religion in Laestadius’ thought, it is worth highlighting the fact that Laestadius saw moral and spiritual overlapping as actually synonyms from the vitalist and religious perspectives. To conceive spiritual and moral as “synonyms” fit well with Laestadius’ conviction that spiritual preaching and awakening were the best channels for re-vitalizing morality. In *The Lunatic*, both the moral and spiritual are actually conceived of as belonging to the same psycho-physical constitution of human life, and are dealt with on the same plane. Laestadius’ elaborations also seem to coincide with the central vitalist idea of a close relationship between the physiological and the moral domains.

166 See Williams 2002, 11–13.

167 Williams 2002, 19.

168 Williams 2002, 6

169 Ibid.,3

“The vitalists’ primary thesis was an affirmation of the unity of man, a being which must always be studied as a whole, and whose *physical* and *moral* aspects are closely conjoined. The belief in this unity, which presupposes a continual interaction between physical and the moral, is reflected in their conviction that medicine and morality are interconnected, in their conceptualization of mental illness, and in their careful observation of the effects of psychological states on the health of the body (the sign of nascent psychosomatic medicine).”¹⁷⁰

Already during the time of P. J. G. Cabanis’ (1757–1808) work, the physiological (physique) and “moral” were commonly seen to conjoin; physiological and moral was thought as overlapping or being dealt with in the same physiological plane.¹⁷¹ “The pair physique/moral had by the date [1769–1801] become commonplace as the pair body/soul a century earlier.”¹⁷² Azouvi offered an insightful analysis of the pair physique/moral and the use of the notions in France¹⁷³ but concluded, however, that the moral in a general sense did not belong to the order of physical reality: “Moral is introduced, it seems, when the necessity is felt to designate a realm of experience which is opposed not only to that of physical nature, but also to that of the soul, in the then accepted sense of the term.”¹⁷⁴ Azouvi assumed that this use of “moral” was needed

“when, as the result of the Cartesian revolution, soul came to designate the opposite of mental reality, designate the realm to which we refer today with the term *psychique* – in English, ‘psychological’ – a term as indispensable as it is vague. Moral, then, would be the ancestor of *psychique*, referring to something non-material, which is nevertheless not pure thought.”¹⁷⁵

In the golden age of vitalism and before there was a rigorous philosophy present to set the intellectual and moral world into a relationship with its organic and vital causes, moral science had no fixed basis” (before John Locke). Azouvi summarized the main point of Cabanis:

170 Rey 2006, 256

171 Azouvi 2006, 267.

172 Azouvi 2006, 268

173 However, it was long before Cabanis when the pair known as physique/moral had made its entry into the French language. Azouvi (2006, 268–269) points out that in the “1721 edition of the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux*, physique as an adjective means ‘real, existing in nature’, whereas moral means ‘that which concerns morals, conduct of life.’”

174 Azouvi 2006, 270. [Later we will see how this relative difference could be interpreted to relate to Laestadius’ distinction made between natural passions and moral passions, and higher cognition thereof.

175 Azouvi 2006, 270.

“The dualism of Descartes dug out a chasm between physical and moral man which subsequent philosophy and medicine have striven to fill up. The discipline called the ‘science of man’ (anthropologie) owes its novelty and its importance to the decision made at its inception to handle together both the science of physical man (or physiology) and the science of moral man (or the study of ideas, or again, ideology). It is in opposition to Descartes, in opposition to his dualism of soul and body, that the science of man defends and cultivates the study of the relationship between physical and the moral.”¹⁷⁶

From this perspective, it becomes clear that during the time that moral philosophy, as we comprehend it today, was not differentiated from physiological study or from the more holistic and fundamental endeavor to thematize human existence in all its various dimensions¹⁷⁷.

Naturally vitalists had to re-formulate the idea of *ego cogito*, the notion of the Self that would correlate with the idea of vital force and sensibility. For indeed,

“Every event occurring in physical man is capable of ‘influencing’ moral man through this common sensitivity. In this passage, Cabanis formulates a kind of anti-Cartesian ‘cogito’ which shows clearly his true philosophical design: ‘From the moment we have sensations, we are.’”¹⁷⁸

Often “moral man” was also conceived as “inner man”, as in Syndeman where “The other name for moral man is interior man, that is, the cerebral organ”¹⁷⁹. In Cabanis, moral is reduced to physical and the problem of the relationship of the moral to physical is resolved, and there is only the relation between the physical and physical. Azouvi highlights the intellectual heritage of Cabanis.

Rey accredits vitalism in the following way:

“In particular, by discarding the identity of sensibility and consciousness, vitalist physiologists and physicians were able to secure access to a collection of phenomena like somnambulism or such dissociative states as catalepsy, which called into question the simplicity and oneness of psychic activity. (It should not be thought, however, that they arrived at the idea of the

176 Azouvi 2006, 270.

177 I have earlier pointed out that it was particularly Kant who made a far-reaching influential distinction by stating that matters of the soul and thus of morality do not belong to the domain of physiology. See further on vitalism and Kant in Reill 2005.

178 Azouvi 2006, 271.

179 Azouvi 2006, 272

unconscious, as has sometimes been claimed)¹⁸⁰. Sensibility, on its side, allowed a progression from confused, undifferentiated, and local sensation to a combination of sensations capable of explaining judgment, memory, and imagination. The contribution of M. F. C Bichat to this division of sensibility into the categories ‘organic’ and ‘animal’ was decisive, as was his idea that there is a transformation from one to the other according to various thresholds of intensity. In the second place, the vitalists were particularly interested in boundary concepts that are difficult to assign clearly to either the physical or the moral sphere – for example, temperament, the effects of habit, the process of sleep, irregularities of activity or energy.”¹⁸¹

Vitalists were highly interested in the application of physiological knowledge to pathological problems or, as we today consider them, “psychological” problems. During that time it was common to interpret mental phenomena based on physiological dysfunction and try to find a balancing intervention for such a problem from that perspective. As a human being was conceived holistically, no human phenomena – whether it was physiological injury, abnormal behavior, spiritual or even an ideological way of thought – was excluded from being an explanatory “cause.”

This holistic approach often explained religious and spiritual dissonance in physiological-vitalist terms. For example, religious enthusiasm was often interpreted as an aroused activity of passion, and the cure for such a “psychic-physiological” dissonance was to look in the direction of religious rituals and practice. For instance, in Sweden, mental asylum workers conceived Christian fatherly care, love, and faith overall as balancing the influence of psychological disturbance.¹⁸² Also Laestadius saw the power of strong religious and poetically figurative preaching as a way to awaken moral passions and thus a way to heal the psychophysiological condition of the human being. Laestadius’ scientific author, Felix Descuret, conceived of the sacraments as harmonizing psychic-physiological means.¹⁸³ From the vitalist perspective Laestadius conceived his own strong preaching in a plausible and justified way, also in the philosophical-scientific sense, so as to awaken the genuine healing spirituality in human beings.¹⁸⁴

Given the general presentation of vitalist anthropology here, I have tried to lay for the general background of Laestadius’ anthropological elaborations, as they seem to color Laestadius’ thought as a whole. Laestadius leaned mainly on the vitalist

180 [Laestadius elaborated on the notion of unconsciousness with the help of ideas of Carl Gustav Carus]

181 Rey 2006, 265.

182 See, Qyarsell 2004, 86–97.

183 Cf. Zidbäck 1937; Also e.g. Szabo 2009, 117.

184 See further on the vitalist account of mental pathology in Rey 2006, 262.

tradition, especially Xavier Bichat's medical vitalism, and adopted the physiological emphasis and the main idea of human soul as a principle of life and the notion of passion as the groundwork of his psychology and philosophy of religion. Also, certain similarities with the thematics of the physical/moral seemed to influence Laestadius' elaborations as well, as we will see later.¹⁸⁵ However, it is not known how widely Laestadius' read vitalist literature or was familiar with it except for the references he offers in *The Lunatic*.

2.5 On the History of the Concept of Passion

The notion of passion and the vitalist notion of the principle of life are the most central notions in Laestadius' philosophical theology and psychology. I want to briefly draw a general background of the notion of passion that has philosophical, psychological and theological significance for Laestadius' theory. In general, the notion of passion is the vital force of human life, but it is also interpreted as the prerequisite of sin.

The notion of passion has been one of the most central concepts in philosophical, theological, and anthropological traditions.¹⁸⁶ The questions concerning the nature of passions have traditionally been considered in varying ways, some of which have emerged as quickly as others have disappeared. Beginning in late antiquity, the theory of passions has changed over time with regard to the demands addressed of it.

The treatment of the Alexandrian Church Fathers, who centered on the Christological problem for how Christ's agony in the garden was possible if He were God, lead to a further study of the passions in Athanasius and Clement's discussions. The former attributed the passion of agony to Christ's body alone, while the latter distinguished passions into bodily areas necessary for the preservation of life, and passions of the soul. These concerns later formed one strand in Augustine's account

185 In Laestadius, there is a relative "transcendental dimension" of morality or spirituality that is actualized through religious experience, which seems to make his notion more phenomenological. The principle of life is not a mere physiological force or law of nature, but also experiential and phenomenal, and in this sense the principle is not reduced to pure "inert matter". For instance Laestadius uses the manifestations of the principle of life, passions, as synonyms of the world; also moral passions are synonyms for the [manifestations of] living faith that signify an intentionality that overcomes being [substance, essence] or the constant presence, or Grace that is the result of a "psychic act" of reconciliation within which human beings and passions are freed from the intimate shackled relationship to the present world or being. We can notice that Laestadius does not formulate "moral" or "spiritual" as a distinct sphere in regard to the physiological plane. However, his interpretation does introduce interesting new dimensions when the moral and spiritual are dealt with on the physiological plane in the pre-phenomenological analysis of faith.

186 About general history of the meaning, use and translations of the notion of passion see, Fitzgerald 2008, 1–25. For comparison with Laestadius' notion of passion see Chene 2012 on Descartes' notion of passion.

of the nature of passions, the influence of which on the seventeenth-century and later discussions became immense.¹⁸⁷

Stoic theory of passions was inherited for Christian theology and philosophy¹⁸⁸. Major change in the theory of passions emerged in Augustine's thought, which contrasted with the stoic idea that passions are not innocent forces. Thus, pre-passions or first movements came to signify a certain kind of pre-reflective ground of cognition, and they became free from only when they were recognized in consciousness, either by denying them or voluntarily accepting their influence. Augustine thought that stoics failed to see that the first movements were corrupted by Original Sin.¹⁸⁹

Gaukroger sees that it could be found a number of issues at the end of the early modern era that formed a core part of the discussion of the passions, but which disappeared from that discussion only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (rationalism and mechanism, natural science), for example, the idea that a theory of the passions might provide the basis for a therapeutic practice. Melancholia as a passion received the greatest attention in this tradition in the early modern era¹⁹⁰. It was often interpreted as an imbalance of the humours associated with genius and profundity. Centrality of passion in psychopathology only extended the multidisciplinary interest toward the passions:

“The combination of physiology, psychology and ethics that underlay the treatment of melancholy was typical of the kinds of considerations that lay behind thinking about passions, and they had always been associated with bodily conditions, bringing them under the purview of medicine and physiology, but they were also given ethical meanings, bringing them under the purview of moral psychology and theology.”¹⁹¹

In the seventeenth century, the Christian moral code still centered on the “seven deadly sins” – pride, envy, wrath, avarice, gluttony, sloth, and lechery – which were not merely the cardinal sins, but also distinct and identifiable passions. Passions were virtually constitutive of sins, and thus passions and morality were closely articulated.¹⁹²

Gaukroger (1998, 4) pointed to two core questions that can be identified in discussion of the passions from antiquity to present: First, passions as a determinant of human personality and human action, and second, the question of the nature of moral

187 See, Gardiner et al. 1935; Gaukroger 1998, 1–14 (*The Soft Underbelly of Reason. The Passions in the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Routledge.)

188 See, Knuuttila 2010b.

189 See, e.g., Knuuttila 2010b, 172.

190 See, Stanley 1986.

191 Gaukroger 1998, 2.

192 Bossy 1988, 214–234; Gaukroger 1998

judgment. For both questions, the central contrast is between reason and the passions. Further, the contrast (between reason and passions) received a new significance in the early modern era, given the question of the control of passions by reason, and states that Christianity worked as a catalyst by taking over and transforming the idea of self-control. Gaukroger indicated that this self-control transformed into a kind of “internalization” of self-control within Christianity, and “it was achieved through the idea of the exercise of self-control, which was construed explicitly in terms of the regulation of [the] passions by the reason.”¹⁹³

When the question is posed between will and the passions, there emerges a third possibility: Is it the will, the combination of the two, or just the passions acting alone that determines the action? This third possibility was raised by Hobbes, and thus, the nature of passions took on a new significance.¹⁹⁴

Within this early modern era, medical and anatomical physiology paid attention to the passions as well and integrated the philosophical and theological insights of passions into its own theory. For example, in Bichat’s theory, the passions are seen as vital functions, which can be conceived as vitalizing or destructive forces. In the nineteenth century, Heinroth also leaned on the concept of passion when creating his psychosomatic theory. Descuret as well as Heinroth were influenced by the theological notions of passions that originated in the notions of sin.¹⁹⁵ In a present day studies Heinroth is seen as an early discoverer of the psychosomatics and psychotherapeutics before Sigmund Freud.¹⁹⁶ Altogether, the concept of passion became in many ways psychologized and theologized in Laestadius’ times. Passions also had a political and cultural significance because they were fostered by different institutions.¹⁹⁷ Laestadius’ ideas and “psycho-therapeutic” approach influenced by the work of Heinroth, Bichat, Descuret and Carus remind us that psychosomatic thinking did not originate as late as the 20th century, but has its roots in medical history far back to previous centuries.

193 Gaukroger 1998, 4–5.

194 Gaukroger 1998, 6–7; See further, James, Susan 2011. Explaining the passions: passions, desires, and the explanation of action. In Gaukroger S. (ed.) 1998. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 17–33.

195 See, e.g., Greenfeld 2013, 474. It is generally known that Heinroth held that the sin causes degeneration. (Accessed on-line: ProQuest ebrary. Web. 27 May 2016.)

196 See, Steinberg et al. 2013, 11–16. (Johann Christian August Heinroth: Psychosomatic Medicine Eighty Years before Freud.) Steinberg et al. highlight the several aspects of Heinroth’s thought: the holistic notion of personality; mental illnesses viewed as the ‘disorders of the soul’; human being susceptible to religious influences and worldly influences. Steinberg views that in Heinroth “mental power was largely conceived in religious terms,” which signified that pietistic religiosity was incorporated into medicine; “For him [Heinroth] the purely medical erasion of symptoms would not bring about cure, for the illness needs to change his whole life and attitude towards it, if he want to be cured.” (Steinberg 2013, 14.)

197 Gaukroger 2008, 5.

The rise of the natural sciences and mathematics in the early modern era marked a change in the interest towards passions. Natural and mathematical sciences were being developed as the model for reason, and as a consequence, the passions became the antithesis of the canons of rational enquiry that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries set up for themselves. As a consequence, the passions received a different kind of treatment; they were re-described, reclassified, explained away, reduced to physiology, used to account for the differences between men and women, and used as a basis for a theory of pictorial expression, etc. Passions became the “*dark side*” of reason which must be understood in order to have any true comprehensive grasp of the scientific rationality (of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries).¹⁹⁸

In this brief introduction to the notion of passion, I have tried to offer a wide horizon within which Laestadius is thinking and using the concept of passions. He uses Bichat, Heinroth, and Descuret but refers also to Paul¹⁹⁹, Augustine, and Luther as well as numerous philosophers that include the Stoics, Socrates, Origen, Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, and Martensen. We can assume that Laestadius was broadly aware of the ambiguous meanings of passions, and adopted influences from different sources. Laestadius received Bichat’s and other medical vitalist notions of passion and combined them with Biblical ideas of sin. Moreover, he uses the term “passion” also in terms of the significance where it is in critical opposition to certain rationalistic-mechanistic and intellectualistic tendencies. He denies the existence of intellectual passion, or passions of reason, but accepts that there are passions of will, demonstrated as desire. Overall Laestadius emphasized classically that passions are the *primus motor* of human action, thought, and the whole embodied intentionality. Furthermore, his idea was for the most part in line with Augustine’s idea of passion, including the stance that said that the passions, despite the fact they are corrupted, could also be moral and thus lay the ground for moral and just action and thought. Laestadius’ notion of passion demonstrates different meanings for different contexts where he is using it; the relationship of his notion of passion to Christian and philosophical definitions becomes clearer when he discusses passions and their relationship to the objective faculties of soul, the sensory life, and when he thematizes awakening as a tension existing between the different passions.

Generally philosophers have seen passions and emotions as disturbing the higher cognitive faculties of human beings; thus, passions and emotions are subsumed under

198 Gaukroger 2008, 5.

199 See further of Paul’s use of passion in Engberg-Pedersen 2008, 238- 266 (The Logic of action in Paul: how does he differ from the moral philosophers on spiritual and moral progression and regression? New York & London: Routledge) And in Aune 2008, 221–237 (Passions in the Pauline epistles: the current state of research. New York & London: Routledge).

the control of intellect and reason.²⁰⁰ However, passions have not always been interpreted as being opposite to reason and rational will. In Augustine, who had important influence on Laestadius, passions and emotions are seen as the preceding level to first emotions. Augustine also saw that passions and emotions could be meaningful for morality. In this respect, Laestadius' theory of passions is close to the Augustinian theory of emotions, as for Laestadius, the soul has definitely an emotional and passionate level, which is significant for morality and genuine spirituality.

However, Laestadius thought, as did Augustine, that because of corruption, the emotional and passionate basis of human mind is disturbed. Laestadius and Augustine also differed in their ideas about freedom of will. Augustine gives more freedom for will but Laestadius gives only negative freedom.²⁰¹ In terms of the broad history of the term "passion", we can orient Laestadius' theory toward questioning what philosophical, psychological, theological, and moral significances Laestadius' notion of passion contained? As mentioned earlier, Laestadius did not conceive passions merely as disturbing factors of higher cognitive life, but rather as fundamental constituents of human action, thought, and life as a whole.

2.6 Summary: Contextualizing Laestadius' Thought

The contextualization of Laestadius' theoretical thought is not an easy task, first of all because of the rich and ambiguous history of ideas and political-cultural situation in which was he writing. However, a generalized contextualization seems to be necessary for constructing a view for how Laestadius' thought relates to Western theological, scientific, and philosophical traditions.

Laestadius' holistic thought was simultaneously church political and multidisciplinary. In the above discussion, I depicted the general background of Laestadius' situation and thought as a marginalization of pietistic movements, the rationalistic and metaphysical currents dominating theology and anthropology, and an expeditious natural scientific progress characterizing his situation. For this reason, it is often hard to see what particular theological doctrines, philosophical or anthropological ideas, or church political tendencies motivated Laestadius' writing.

200 See further of the history and early modern use of the notion of passion in, Cummings & Sierhuis 2016. It is noteworthy that the notion of passion has been commonly conceived as an important factor of the human embodiment, cognition and action in early modernity. There is growing interest on the theories of passions in the modern philosophy and philosophical psychology. See further Airaksinen & Gylling 2016 as a general discussion of the philosophy of desire and will, and therein referred important research literature concerning to emotions.

201 Cf. Knuutila 2010b, 158–160.

Laestadius saw hope in Christian pietism in the moral and political sense. Instead of turning to rationalistic theology and metaphysics, he wanted to make space for an experiential Lutheran faith that he called a “living faith” found in pietism. The theoretical support for his apology of experiential religion of pietism he found especially in Augustine and Luther and anthropologically in French physiological medicine and vitalist psychology. Laestadius saw that medical physiology and psychology offered a scientific plausible ground for anthropology and a Lutheran-pietistic theology and philosophy of religion. In a sense, he was against the intellectualization of faith and emphasized instead its experientiality. In line with the pietistic emphasis on individual piety Laestadius highlighted the precedence of lived experience and feelings over conceptual-intellectual doctrines and dogmas. In faith and life proper understanding is reached through the own-most experience, not via doctrinal knowledge or the use of mere reason.

Laestadius’ thought was controversial in at least two respects: Firstly, he stood against the Lutheran orthodoxy defending pietism, and secondly his vitalist perspective was already being debated in the 1850’s in favor of positive medicine. Thus, both pietism and vitalism provoked suspicion, and there remained no assurance for whether pietism might turn into separatism and vitalism into materialism.

Laestadius as an educated natural scientist and theologian who was having continuous contacts with intellectuals around Europe attached his theoretical thought to the natural scientifically oriented vitalist tradition. He was able to obtain the important sources of the 1800’s physiological medicine and psychology, romantic psychology, and also some general study books on philosophical psychology (Bichat, Heinroth, Descuret, Carus, Petrelli, Martensen).

With the religious, church political and theological motifs, Laestadius formed a multidisciplinary holistic theory of human existence which could be seen as being in relation to all the trends of thought mentioned above. Laestadius’ anthropology and psychology can be connected to the discussions on the relationship between growing natural scientific interests and metaphysics, as well as to the mechanism-vitalism debate.

Regional religious phenomena often were manifested in embodied forms, such as enthusiasm, and moral-spiritual influences of those phenomena that served as the empirical and experiential basis for his thought. Thus, Laestadius’ vitalist thought is not mere theoretical reflection but rather is based on factual everyday observation and experiences.

Eventually, *The Lunatic* became a holistic reflection on the idea of man and the theory of experiential religion and the main source of Laestadius’ theological and philosophical thought. As an apology and the justification and scientific explication of northern pietism, vitalism offers the main perspective on Laestadius’ theory. Laestadius highlights “his teaching”, which was under attack, and Northern pietism

as both being grounded in a clear “system”. By means of vitalism and support of the ideas inherited from his authors, Laestadius objected to the metaphysical rationalism that often led to a mechanical worldview and intellectualistic ideas of man and God (deism). For example,

“The primary purpose of this treatise is to show the psychological perspectives that have provided the foundation for the author’s sermons, which, on the other hand, have been considered Jesuitism, fanaticism (svärmeri), and indecency, but on the other hand, have had a remarkable impact on the hearts of those who have heard it. If the author is able, through these treatise, to convince some of the intellectuals that there is a consistent system of thought underlying this so-called fanaticism, then the semi-educated who are not bothered with thought may continue to call him a Jesuit and say: ‘thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil.’” (Laestadius 2015, *The Lunatic*, Forewords, p. 16.)

The main claim of Laestadius is that pietistic experiential religiosity is not only a fanatic and emotional movement, but also has a clear idea of man and an understanding of Christian faith as its basis. This system is thematized in *The Lunatic* in order to reveal and justify the pietistic idea of man and the character of religiosity – i.e., “the order of Grace” – within the State and State church of Sweden.

In terms of the title, *The Lunatic – An Insight into the Order of Grace*, the choice of the word “Insight” can be interpreted as an implicit reference to vitalism while the “the order of Grace” indicates pietistic-Lutheran and a Biblical understanding of faith that Laestadius wanted to defend and justify in the context wherein pietism was marginalized by the Conventicle Edict.

The development of Laestadius’ philosophical thought can also be seen as extension of vitalistic insight. Already in his botanical research, several monistic and vitalistic tendencies were present; they can also be detected during the period of research concerning Sámi history and mythology where he found the actual phenomenon of spirituality or spirit-life and tried to explain it in vitalist terms; finally in the latest period in *The Lunatic*, he places specific vitalist theories and insights in use when defending, explaining, and justifying the pietistic religiosity of North Calotte. In particular, this vitalist theoretical basis and insight has a crucial significance for the formation of and the explication and justification of Laestadius’ philosophical, psychological and religious views. From this perspective, it can be noted that Laestadius theoretical thought develops from natural historical botanical research to the vitalist philosophy and a psychology of religion.

Altogether then, we can summarize by saying that metaphysical rationalism and its intellectualizing influence on theology and anthropology formed the general back-

ground of Laestadius' combatant writing within which he found pietistic religiosity, medical physiology, and vitalist philosophy as the proper ground for his criticism.

Within the historical context thematized above, I research Laestadius' thought, emphasizing especially its pietistic and vitalist approach toward notion of human being and religiosity. In the following chapters, my focus is to question particularly the vitalist background of Laestadius' thought and interpret his psychological and religious insights using this perspective. How did Laestadius carry out his criticism and what was the result of Laestadius' attack on intellectualized philosophy and theology? Insofar as we can keep open the traditional questions about whether Laestadius was a vitalist monist or dualist, how did he elaborate on his critique of metaphysical rationalism? Also, how does Laestadius' use of "passion" relate to the traditional meaning of the word passion? And more generally, what was the character of his religious vitalism?

3 The Creation and The Initial Condition

Laestadius' thought sought to explain the Biblical myths of God, Evil, and Creation from a vitalist perspective. The tension between given scriptural revelations and vitalist explanation makes his theoretical thought original and gives his analysis its unique character.

The Biblical story of the creation or the origin of the world and human beings tells us that God's spirit wandered above the water and God created the world by the Word (kr. *logos*). Laestadius interprets this view so that the living force, the principle of life is embedded into the organic matter which was seen as the foundation of life. Through the configurations of the principle of life, organic life developed into various forms and created nature. Thus the original creation of life is an act of God but the proceeding creation happens from the inside of animated organic life. Using this idea, Laestadius was able to argue that we can approach the "living God" through nature.

Further still, he also considered the other Biblical myth of the Fall when he dealt with the problem of the origin of evil or theodicy. According to the Biblical myth, God and Evil are in constant tension, and as a result of the first and "most original" combat, Lucifer was driven from Heaven into the world. For Laestadius, however, this tension not only takes place in the metaphysical sphere of a "spirit-world" but is also part of earthly life. Lucifer was not able to bring revenge directly to God, so he decided to revenge God via his firstborns by seducing them. In terms of the human Fall, passions of human beings became corrupted, and man was driven from Paradise into the world.

Laestadius offers the Biblical metaphysical myths both as a fundamentals and a naturalistic approach through which he believed he could determine more properly the vital characteristics of God and Evil. Thus, the (formal) characterizations of God and Evil were given first premise throughout the Bible, while at the same time, their vital character was approached through the manifestations of their influence on the natural world. In a sense, Laestadius appeared to think that the essential characters of God and Evil cannot be approached directly (as Ideas), and thus man cannot become familiar with or recognize their actual character in other ways than through their actual manifestation, i.e., the ways they are actualized in the natural human world.

Therefore, the process of gaining comprehension of God and Evil was circular. Starting from the Biblical myths where the notions of God and Evil are declared ["first ideas"], Laestadius turns and approaches them in vitalist terms through their manifestations as personifications of both natural and moral passions. Altogether,

from this perspective Laestadius believes he can reach a more substantial (vital) characterization of the nature of the opposing forces indicated in the Biblical myth. This circularity could be also interpreted as a hermeneutic circularity in character. The thought is that God and Evil were given as “first ideas”; however, their actual essential character – what they really are and how they manifest themselves in human life – could only be grasped in relative terms through their manifestations. Therefore, these “first ideas” demanded a temporal-situational interpretation and received their vital substantial characteristics in the actual passionate situatedness of being in the world of human beings.

The third myth is the promise of redemption that Laestadius holds as his fundamental horizon and tries to explain also in vitalist terms. As a consequence of the Fall, man is captured in the world of natural passion[s] and sin. For this reason, an experiential vital awakening as a precondition of reconciliation is necessary for emancipation from the domination of sin and the world.

This Biblical line of thought remains on the horizon for the whole of Laestadius’ system in all of its “anthropological” or psychological elaborations. Laestadius holds that the task of all Christian moral systems should be to show the corrupt nature of human beings and the necessity of reconciliation. In the following section, I go through Laestadius’ elaborations from a philosophical perspective and do not discuss its theological and dogmatic references and implications. I will rather question how the notion of man and existence is opened up further in Laestadius’ theory.

3.1 Animated Nature as Beginning

The grounding idea of Laestadius’ philosophy was that Life itself has to come before all the theoretical and intellectual theories of life – whether theological, philosophical, or scientific:

“The principle of life is, admittedly, obscure and incomprehensible to reason, but it is closer at hand to our eyes, than the abstract idea that the philosopher takes pains to hold up to the world as the first beginnings of all creation. Just the same, an idea without life cannot be thought, but a principle of life without self-consciousness is something that we can see with our eyes, in the nature. From this principle of life emerges creative organic life. And this life is now closest to us.” (§1420.)

This approach indeed signifies the critical attitude to take toward all traditionally given philosophical ideas, dogmas, or metaphysical descriptions of God as *first Idea*; the criticism extends also to the idea of creation as a mere *intellectual act* of God.

Because all the ideas on intellect are basically created and developed on the basis of organic human life (nature), they cannot precede life itself. This becomes *the problem of origin*: Does the Idea or Life itself come first? What principles, philosophical or any theoretical system, are plausibly the beginning?

Laestadius holds, in contrast to the philosophical expression that *nothing comes from nothing (nihil fit ex nihilo)*, that *creation* actually is a genuine *miracle* that has to be accepted and appreciated as such. Creation and life itself is a given in nature and is beyond our conceptual reasoning and thus constitutes the limits of reason²⁰².

“The abstract idea, which is an idea realis, non substantialis, from which it follows that the idea and the substance are not identical. It also follows that the idea and the principle of life are not interchangeable concepts. But which one is the foundation of the other? Has the idea emerged from the principle of life, or has the principle of life sprung from the idea? The wise men of the world are free to answer to this question if they are able to do so.” (§1409.)

Laestadius continues by letting the insolvable problem stay unsolved and takes it for granted (assumes) that the phenomena of life are given and reachable through the experiences of Nature; functions, processes and the phenomena of life are given in Nature right there *before our eyes*²⁰³. It is thus understandable that Laestadius was indeed convinced of the existence of certain vital forces of nature as he, an eager botanist, zoologist and friend of nature, daily observed the vital phenomena in plants, animals, human beings, and the effects that changes in climate, season, etc., had on the vitality of organic life. The vital life of nature is given to humans both empirically and experientially, which means that the principle of life was conceived also as the “*psychic essence*” and *original soul* of the human organism and given as the experience of one’s own lived body.

With regard to the classical question regarding the temporal precedence of life and the Idea, Laestadius was absolutely pessimistic. The problem could not be solved by any rational means (in this context, Laestadius was already discussing the person of God, but the emphasis on the precedence of Life was still apparent):

202 On being and nothingness see, §§1594, 1595, 1596; reason is overcome in the miracle; intellect must be humble before the miracle wherein God created Heaven and earth out of nothing, a affirmed fact that reason cannot comprehend, be held as a real possibility.

203 With these expressions, Laestadius emphasized the distinction of the classical form of transcendentalism, thus emphasizing the empirically and experientially given starting point. I later argue here that Laestadius was forming a certain kind of stance related to transcendental empiricism or physiological transcendentalism.

“On the other hand, ‘idea realis’ and ‘idea realisata’ cannot be counterpoised. The abstract idea is, admittedly, an idea realis, insofar as it is not merely possible, but real; but it is not actualized until it becomes actualized. *We are unable to think otherwise than that of creation, nature, is an actualized idea.* But this only proves that the *idea preceded matter*. Yes, *it even preceded all of that which is referred to as an actualized idea*; but precisely in this lies the *logical knot*: since, according to all human experience, the idea itself is not absolutely without preconditions *in that the ego is unthinkable as merely an idea*, even within the highest personhood – what, then, was the foundation of ego that, according to what has been shown above, cannot be a *persona idealis* only (which is indeterminate and without character) but must be a *persona realis*, which has character and acts according to define propositions and cannot act contrary to its own nature? *Only God* himself may be able to solve this riddle.” (§1230. emphasis added)

Is Laestadius’ idea similar with Descartes’ idea that “we have to assume” God who has given the nature and thus proceed from this naturally given starting point? Laestadius did not accept the traditional way beginning with “first Idea” but instead tried to approach and re-define the first “Idea” anew as a vital force. In this regard “the first principle” is not just a cognitive Idea “that grants” our existence for us, but instead it is present and manifested in the functions and vital processes of nature that human being is inextricably part of. Here the difference laid in the way the created was given to human experience and thought; *whether it is given as an idea reached by intellect or as “something” given to experience that evoke the question of the origin*. In vitalist account of creation the existence of human being is not given to itself in “ego cogito” as pure thought (that reaches the absolute idea of creation and God), but instead *as passionate organic body and vital functions and feelings (faculties of soul)*; human being finds itself always already in this “psychic vital essence” or on the ground of principle of life, that Laestadius called as “original soul” of human being²⁰⁴.

When Laestadius claims that the character of the ego (jag) is “unthinkable as merely an idea,” he was probably not referring only to Descartes’s *ego cogito*, but also a

204 I later discuss more details about the idea of vital organic man as immanent-transcendence.

wider intellectualistic, especially rationalistic and idealistic, tradition of philosophy²⁰⁵. Since Laestadius took the starting point in a given life as being in nature, his view simultaneously brought the body and its functions of soul within the body together. Altogether then, Laestadius' idea is that the vital processes of life are given for empirical perception and vital embodied experience, and this view could be taken as a plausible starting point for philosophical theology and psychology.

For Laestadius, the principle of life signifies the life given by a living God in creative thought/will in *eternity*²⁰⁶; thus, he combines Biblical vitalism and the idea of creation with the classical vitalist thought on the principle of life.

God has given life via creative thought/will²⁰⁷ in eternity, and human beings *must begin* research experientially with empirical observation of the phenomena of nature. *Only in this way* can human beings *reach toward* the [vital] Idea or proper dynamic concept of man and God –keeping in mind that one can still not achieve any strict conception of the creation of the First Idea (God) as such.

”Certainly we have noted that these metaphysical definitions are more physical than metaphysical once we have grasped the principle of life, which is *'existentia sine essentia et sine substantia.'* However, *if the principle of life were an idea, then not only would the crow be able to be a person, but the caterpillar (larven) and the straw of grass on the ground would be able to be a persons.* The materialist and the pantheist are unlikely to go that far in personification. We must therefore remain *within the limits of the possibilities of human thought:* the idea and the principle of life are not identical; *the ego is not a subject, but a predicate. The ego has a foundation for its being, and this foundation is not the ego. 'Existentia non est substantia.'* Since life within man is concurrent with the body, we could, in accordance with common laws of thought, conclude: that *life and substance within God are concurrent.* But we are unable to formulate even a fraction of the concept of the *emergence* of this, the first idea. We are unable to say that *idea realis* came before *idea substantialis*, especially since *idea substantialis* is, to us,

205 For Laestadius, the mind or the self (*jag*) is not a distinct substance in regard to the body, but it is always attached to organic matter, indicating a particular event and happening in life. The principle of life as “psychic essence” manifests itself in a present nature and inwardly as transcendental capacity through perception, mind, and experience, and thus also, the soul “happens” as the “life of the body.” I return to this aspect later. This idea could also be contrasted in many ways with the whole Western metaphysical tradition and its dualities found in Descartes (body/mind dualism), Kant (time-space, transcendental subjectivity), and Hegel (weight of material substance and freedom of the substance of spirit where only spirit can become self-conscious, the absolute idea of freedom).

206 §1230 Note.

207 Not a mere intellectual act but an event of the principle of life as a necessary vital activity of God itself.

unthinkable. *Idea vitalis* is more possible, insofar as the idea cannot exist without life. Here, too, we met by the contradiction of nature: that the life and idea are not interchangeable concepts, and cannot be counterpoised.” (§1229. my emphases added)

Laestadius’ own approach as a whole drove into *paradox* as he simultaneously tried to hold onto an internal vitalist explication and empiric observation and philosophical conceptualization together. His argumentation is *circular* from the beginning: starting from the necessary notion of principle of life within the nature – which is necessarily *just an idea* because it is conceptual human thought (or at least a necessary belief/hypothesis) – and by studying its functions [in nature], he assumes to reach a more proper notion of the “essence” and characteristics of the “first idea”²⁰⁸. Therefore his first principle is a *postulation* and in this sense “an Idea”²⁰⁹. Laestadius recognizes the circularity of argumentation as “the problem of origin” and states that the principle of life is just a “hypothesis”, adding that it is, however, necessary to begin with the hypothesis that “coincides with healthy popular opinion” and experience²¹⁰.

“We freely admit that the idea of a common principle of life (lifepincipen) is a hypothesis, but note that hypotheses are the psychologists’ only point of departure. Hypotheses, however, need to be such that the conclusions (slutsatser) to which they lead are not in opposition to sound popular opinion (folkomdömet).” (§118. See also §58)

In a sense the presupposition of the principle of life is a necessary theoretical horizon that enabled the whole philosophical-theological work: *in itself ineffable, but reachable through its manifestations and functions* that would presumably gain

208 Laestadius offered a specific critique of the metaphysical notions of substance and *essentia* as an abstract incomprehensible notions and pursued it so as to replace the metaphysical concept of essence with his vitalist definition of essence (*väsendet*). I come back to this concept in the chapter on the principle of life.

209 Basically this is the problem of metaphysical foundation of science or conceptual thinking: all investigation remains on particular metaphysical presupposition in regard to the perennial character of their objects and means of investigation (how is the character of language and technology and method conceived as the means to reach the goals.)

210 The coincidence of empirical manifestations of the principle of life in nature and common experience [of one’s own existence] indicate that Laestadius assumed a certain kind of “natural” or intuitive capability of conceiving own embodied existence as a part of the creative nature; man is from the start a part of the common vital organic nature as the principle of life signified the common foundation for all organic beings. Here we could speculate whether the principle of life signifies a certain kind of vitalist re-definition of “thing as such” (*ding an sich*), which furthermore, in onto-theological contexts is the pre-requisite for the necessity of the God’s becoming into flesh in the world.

understanding of its vital-substantial nature. In this way, Laestadius seemed to *lean on common sense and lived experience as the evidential support* (conviction that the nature of man could be reached from this stance, and the notion of God would in this manner become more accurate as well).

Vitalistic approach makes Laestadius' ideas of God and creation interesting. His main purpose was to think in the internalist way, for example the notion of God as the first principle. *God* is not conceived as the highest intelligence, ultimate being or the *first cause*, but a *dynamic creative force*, vital principle of life as the ground of life.

Starting from his first premises, Laestadius tried to deconstruct the objectifying philosophical thematic, criticizing the prevailing philosophical idea of God insofar as it was conceived within philosophy as an absolutely transcendental Idea and separated from [organic event of] human life. Coincidentally Laestadius criticized the idea of creation as a mystical act of some ultimate being or cause, to which philosophy often lead:

“If one imagines creation as an external act, then one will have peculiar notions of the Creator. The Creator will then seem similar to a potter who makes different shapes out of clay. But it has most certainly not happened that way. *All creation, which we now perceive in nature, takes place from within, and has a rather unremarkable beginning. All creation that takes place these days contains a principle of life, which is now a metaphysical force that is incomprehensible to us, originally implanted into the first individuals to proceed from the hand of the Creator.*” (§1590. emphases added)

Laestadius also indicates that the whole of creation has proceeded via the force of principle of life that manifests itself in nature²¹¹. Creation is not seen as an external act of the assumed, ultimate Being/subject absolutely separated from immanence, but rather as an *inner process* within matter itself²¹², indeed, after the creation principle of life works through and within the matter in nature itself and as a vital function and force in human being. Instead of beginning with the philosophical notion of the first Idea (the Deistic idea of God), Laestadius assumes that is possible to proceed toward a more genuine notion of God by starting with the vitalist notion of the principle of life.

Life – in the meaning of living spirit – was originally given to human beings by *blow of God into Adam' nostrils* (Pneuma as the highest objective manifestation of the

211 Cf. §169 Note 1, Nature is an actualized idea, but is completed. However, the life force continues within mankind. See also, §225 Note.

212 Principle of life is also in this respect an independent and autonomous “something” that cannot be defined.

principle of life), which made man an actual human being. Thus the spirit (and later the Holy Spirit) are conceived as a manifestation of God's creative act or conceived of as "Godhead itself" in an immanent world.²¹³

Thus, *all organic beings* are part of the same creative act of God, one common manifestation of the living force of principle of life. Laestadius is critical of rationalistic starting point and notions of God because "reason demands the *first cause*". On the opposite side, he refers to Plato's idea of *anima mundi*, the world-soul, which is not a mere "Idea" for it does not signify the "unconscious force of nature." Laestadius seems to think that to begin with a created nature, the whole *idea of Idea* has to be conceived as substantial in the vital sense. (§1600.)

In earlier studies, Laestadius' idea of soul has been regarded as neo-platonic²¹⁴. The idea of the immaterial soul was an invention of neo-platonic philosophy, which was also commonly applied in early Christian philosophy²¹⁵. However, when emphasizing Laestadius' vitalist notion of the principle of life as an original soul, it has to be understood as connected to (or inextricably of) the human organism, as a constitutive and creative principle. Thus it is not clear whether Laestadius' notion of soul should be interpreted more like the Aristotelian conception of soul²¹⁶. For instance, Aristoteles held that earlier thinkers identified thinking and sensing, and thus conceived of thinking as a bodily activity.²¹⁷ We have to leave open the theory-historical categorization of Laestadius' concept of soul, and come to it here later. However, we can make a rough general interpretation and state that Laestadius' idea of soul is a certain kind of hybrid between Platonic notion of the independent soul (*anima mundi*) and organic vital force, "life of the body". It functions as the basis of all of human intentionality, and thus alludes to the Aristotelian notion of soul (soul is a form of the body) as well.²¹⁸

Because Laestadius' references to the ancient philosophical notions of soul and the theological elaborations of the functions of soul and passions in medieval theories are mostly arbitrary and fragmentary, it is almost impossible to analyze the relationship to them using only Laestadius' own reference. Altogether, as medical vitalism offers

213 See, §225. "Life force is a continuation of that which was originally given at the time of creation; the rudiment of the body is given to man by his parents, but life is given by God." (§225 Note.) Cf. §224, §226, §65; Laestadius does not seem to make a sharp distinction between the spirit of animals and that [of] which is a human being.

214 Zidbäck 1937; Juntunen 1982.

215 See Knuutila 2010b, 258–259.

216 Aristotle 1986 (De anima/On the Soul). See further a broader history of vitalism, van der Eijk 2006, 57–78. (Aristotle's Psycho-physiological Account of the Soul-Body Relationship. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press.)

217 Taipale 2009, 5; Aristotle 1986, 427b (De Anima).

218 For comparing Laestadius' notion of soul with the notions of soul in the tradition of philosophical theology see e.g. Knuutila 2010b, especially p.258.

the closest background of history of ideas, and is the most clearly referred background of Laestadius' theory, it is more justifiable to analyze Laestadius' idea of man and his notion of soul in that respect.

* * *

To contrast Laestadius' vitalist position with the philosophical starting point of the first Idea or rational-mechanical stance one must raise a question: Does it make any difference if one begins to study nature as mechanical clock-work set in motion by an absolutely transcendental God that does not partake to the events of life after its first creative act? Or alternatively should one begin with the vitalist idea of God as a vital force manifesting itself in continuous creative acts in the organic life of nature and thus begin to study nature based on those given manifestations and phenomena (in man and nature)? For sure, we can state that for the former option, God remains absolutely transcendental, and the origins of the movements of organic body and life are distanced into strict law-like structures in a kind of "other-world" of the "true" principles of the life.

In the latter option we face the question of inaccuracy as a law-like structure, and the principle of life embedded in matter itself seems to vary, depending on the body and matter in question. However, the reality of the vitalist is not dichotomized (in a similar way) and the God and soul are not reduced to the absolute transcendental world, but rather are manifestations of the principle of life itself, and are reachable in their manifestations – both empirically and experientially. The latter option fits well with Laestadius' conviction both for scientific-philosophical and religious purposes to proceed from an internal perspective and hold the vitalist-experiential dimension within.²¹⁹

However, despite these monistic tendencies, we note that Laestadius seemed to hold a certain kind of dualistic stance with regard to the metaphysical "first principle" that in a sense God as the first "principle" (Creator) cannot be conceptualized and grasped by intellect and thus remains ineffable and autonomous, but simultaneously only approached by intellect through its manifestations. Therefore, God or the principle of life is simultaneously independent of matter and embedded into matter, as it always functions through matter. Thus, this dualism is not between the (embodied) thinker and the thought (concepts of mind) but instead is seen relatively in the character of the ground itself; yet how could the foundation be simultaneously autonomous and independent (ineffable principle of life) and dependent on

219 Perspective is totally different and creates different contraries: Idea or force, image/theoretical representation or event, glory/intellectual relationship or suffering/existential relationship, reached through cognition or as influence etc.

the nature and human life as it always has to function through organic matter and human body. Furthermore, the ground is intuitively offered for human experience as the “foundation (*υφθου*) or ground of life,” and thus indicates more of a monistic stance than a dualistic one.

3.2 Created Human Being and the Corrupted Power of Soul

Laestadius seems to criticize the Hegelian metaphysical tradition when arguing that the Idea (as God) does not precede the life (principle) and Idea cannot be grasped by mere intellect. What is different in Laestadius’ view with regard to Hegel’s absolute idealism is that spirit does not develop through a mere dialectical process, but rather through the actualization of spirit within the organic life and human experience; it is not an intellectual dialectical process of the absolute spirit, but rather a vital event within organic life and human experience. For Hegel also, creation originated from the necessity of [absolute] *consciousness* to manifest itself via otherness.²²⁰ For Laestadius, God is not *re-presented* as an idea in the first place, but still always already actualized in the *present*. Thus the self-manifestation of God is a continuous creative process within organic nature itself²²¹. For Laestadius, it’s signified a possibility to reach out toward the proper concept of human personhood which would henceforth lay the basis for conceiving of God in a proper living/dynamic sense.

“The first great word in anthropology is ‘*to gnothi seauton*’ [to know yourself] and the second great word in theology is ‘*to gnothi Christon*.’ If we have a skewed and one-sided knowledge of our nature, any conclusion that we draw from it about the personhood of God will be false.” (§1384.)

For this reason, Laestadius proposed an alternative vitalist way to conceive of a human being as a sensitive experiential and psychic being for proper starting point for questioning the nature of God.

However, even though God manifests itself in nature through creative “works” of principle of life, man cannot gain an understanding of God by merely studying nature outwardly. Instead, Laestadius holds to the classical Enlightenment principle, namely, that the proper notion of personal God will be relatively reached by first

220 See, Hegel 1977 (Phenomenology of Spirit).

221 Originally, the principle of life was a creative force actualized in nature and given by God to all organic beings.

forming a proper notion of the human person and approach to the question of God and reconciliation from an experiential point of view²²².

“By assuming common principle of life for both lives, many other sources of confusion will disappear from anthropology and theology, of which the former has generally provided the model for the latter. Note. *Man cannot imagine the Godhead* in any other form than as an idealization of perfect humanity. Drawing a conclusion from man about the Godhead means that it is of utmost importance to acquire a correct knowledge about man. *If one’s knowledge of man is false, then one’s knowledge about the Godhead will also be false*, insofar as man cannot imagine the Godhead in any other form that as an idealization of perfect humanity.” (§115& Note. emphasis added)

As Laestadius modified the principle of life for his own metaphysical [theological-anthropological] purposes, it was typical for him also to modify the whole vitalist psychology into a theological direction. This change could be interpreted as ad hoc postulations, necessary elaborations based on his Biblical fundamentals: As we saw above, the first starting point was recognizing the principle of life as a manifestation of God in nature. This viewpoint also entailed God’s creation being perfect in the beginning which signified that the human was created as an image of God. The *second starting point* for Laestadius was the *corrupted nature of human beings* after the fall (sinful), and *the third*, which he mentions in the headline of *The Lunatic*, is the psychological notions of “the Biblical authors” as well as the church fathers’ emphases on the precedence of experientiality – heart and organic life – as the core of living faith (the order of grace). These emphases or starting points radiate to all of anthropology. For instance, Laestadius holds that the faculties of soul have remained even after the Fall because man was created in the image of God; however the passions that lay the groundwork for the functions of faculties of soul have corrupted.

Thus, the emphasis on a corrupted passional nature is meant to *highlight the captivity of the will and whole intellect*, and subordinate them to organic life and the natural passions. Besides, there is the “unbroken” part of the image – the relationship between the faculties of soul is maintained – as neither the original soul nor the principle of

222 The shift from the emphasis of consciousness also has crucial implications for the notion of reconciliation, as we will see later. Contrary to the Hegelian idealistic view Laestadius emphasized that God functions through an embodied experience (awakening and reconciliation), not through mere consciousness. “The first great word in anthropology is ‘to *gnothi seauton*’ [to know yourself] and the second great word in theology is ‘to *gnothi Christon*.’ If we have a skewed and one-sided knowledge of our nature, any conclusion that we draw from it about the personhood of God will be false.” (§1384.)

life is corrupted, as it is sinless²²³. However, for Laestadius, the Biblical fundamentals are not mere given dogmas, but rather are conceived as existential-vital conditions. These, as well as the relationship between the faculties of soul and the passional character of man is attested/confirmed by public opinion and lived experience. The faculties of soul and passions are experientially given (I come back to this later).

After the corruption, the problem was that the faculties of soul and their relationship were maintained, but the organic life and passions that direct them were corrupted and thus sinful²²⁴. For this reason, the human intellect (the rational soul) is not able to reach God, morality, and reconciliation by its own power. In a similar way, God cannot be comprehended through natural reason. In a pietistic tone, Laestadius emphasizes that reason must be awakened and that cannot happen merely through enlightenment or outer educational development because awakening (*väckelse*) necessitates moral passion. Laestadius emphasized the importance of an embodied religious experience of awakening that changes the passionate ground of activity for intellect/reason. For Laestadius, spiritual and moral enlightenment does not begin with intellectual or moral education or development, but instead start as with a *change of embodied passions*, experience at the level of subjective consciousness that would be the initial (preceding) condition for the enlightenment of reason, and thus also for a genuine relationship with God. As I will analyze in more detail in Chapter 5, Laestadius held that a genuine change of mind is founded on the psychophysiological change of heart.

In order to show this need for experiential awakening and reconciliation, Laestadius constituted his philosophical psychology and theology; his re-definitions of the notions of Self, the person, faculties of soul, and passions are all directed to support the system which demands experiential religious awakening and psychic reconciliation as the initial condition of morality and living faith: “All Christian systems of morality should serve to demonstrate, first, man’s corrupt nature and, second, the

223 §192 Note 2.: “If the idea of the human being were embedded in the life force rather than in the element through which the life force is developed and takes shape, then sin would also belong to the principle of life; to the being of the soul [see, §§226–227]. But Scripture tells us that, ‘I was shapen in iniquity.’ [Psalm 51:5] The source of original sin is thus the seed; throughout Scripture, sin is said to be located in the flesh. *That which is born of the flesh is flesh* [John 3:6], but sensory life, the soul, is contaminated by the sinful element through the passions that arose sinful thoughts and desires in it. Thus, not even the rational soul is as free of sin as the philosopher would like to believe. The philosopher views sin as something foreign to the rational soul, belonging neither to substance, nor that which is contingent. On that basis we could abstract sin from the principle of life and say: sin does not belong to the principle of life, but to the flesh. In reality, the passions do not belong to the sphere of sensory life but to the sphere of organic life. But as the passions affect the organs of sensory life, all the faculties of the soul are contaminated by the sinful element. Intelligence, reason, and will become the tools of passions; when this happens, the rational soul is as holy and sinless as the philosopher deludes himself into thinking.” See also §196 Note 2.

224 Cf. Augustine 1991; See, e.g. Knuuttila 2010b.

necessity of reconciliation.” (§881.) Laestadius saw this awakening as an event of self-recognition of one’s own passional/sinful condition and as the pre-requisite for genuine psychic reconciliation (vs. mere juridical reconciliation).

To put it succinctly, Laestadius follows here a quite common pietistic emphasis of the “order of grace” where one’s own contrition, awakening, guiltiness, sorrow of sin and repentance is required to receive the grace of God²²⁵ as a new vital basis for human life, action and thought. Despite the common Lutheran emphases on “faith alone” and pietistic “subjective” devotion, Laestadius dealt with those themes on a physiological plane in vitalist terms. Thus, Luther’s doctrine of justification (emphasis on Grace) and the pietistic-Herrnhutian demand of subjective “order of Grace” are combined and dealt with on an experiential basis; Contrition as an awakened condition as well as reconciliation are now emphasized as being embodied experiences. For example, repentance is not only a “change of mind,” but first of all, a change of embodied intentionality (I return to this later in more detail).

3.3 Constant Struggle Between Good and Evil

Laestadius’ way of beginning with the vitalist stance created both logical and philosophical problems. How was one to proceed to the nature of a living God if God was not graspable by intellect, and if all the means by which we can approach God were only empirical observing and experiencing the manifestations of God in nature (in the form of vital the forces of principle of life)? Wasn’t it necessarily a vicious circle, proceeding to the conclusion that was actually given in the first premise? What kind of knowledge of human beings and God was gained with this kind of vitalist philosophy? Or how was one to comprehend Evil if it was not created in by God in the first place? Is the principle of life, as a manifestation of God in nature, corrupted in itself? What was the origin of evil? How then could Laestadius arrive to the nature of evil by using vitalism?

In regard to these questions, one could say that Laestadius simply leaned on ad hoc postulations, adding moralistic or religious descriptions to a natural scientific analysis. This focus pertained especially to the notion of passion which was a combination of vitalist and Biblical emphases. However, using Laestadius’ interpretation of the mythical origin of life, Good and Evil was quite comprehensive when viewed in relation to his vitalist-anthropological explanation within which he conceived of good and evil as both personifications of the passions. Here Laestadius deals with

225 For the pietistic “religion of heart” and the emphasis on justifying reconciliation, a short depiction See e.g. Norton and Kuehn 2007, 972. For more detailed analysis of Laestadius’ views in Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982, 11–29.

the classical problem of evil or theodicy in a vitalist way. Laestadius realized that evil has its origin in the ongoing combat between God and Evil in the metaphysical sphere or spirit-world, using the original Biblical myth as the horizon. The existence of earthly evil derives from the fall of the angel Lucifer. Laestadius believed that Lucifer's *egoism* and *jealousy* against God's self-sufficient and omnipotence existence was the original evilness for which God drove Lucifer away from Heaven. Lucifer wanted to revenge that relegation by seducing God's first-borns, Adam and Eve, into committing sin, a plan that made Lucifer an actual Devil (*diabolos*). Thus, evil is an earthly fact. When falling into the seduction of Lucifer, a human being's passions became corrupted, and the passions that are egoism and jealousy captivates the human person. As a consequence of the Fall, egoism especially became the primary human passion.²²⁶

Laestadius conceived of the principle of life as Good in-itself, but simultaneously held that vital forces and functions within human beings are corrupted as a consequence of the Fall. Even if God reveals Himself in nature through manifestations of the principle of life, every human being is under the dominance of corrupted natural passions. By observing and experiencing the effects of natural passions, human beings can gain understanding of evil itself. Although corrupted, natural passions are not usually recognized without an awakening, which actually signifies an embodied reflective relationship to the passions.

Here circular argumentation is present again. Having the Biblical myth as a horizon, evil is first of all depicted as egoistic with a jealous tendency to rise against God. According to Laestadius' interpretation of the myth, the main passion of egoism became a part of human person in the Fall. Henceforth, by analyzing and recognizing those natural passions and their influences on the natural world Laestadius eventually concluded that the personal character of evil could be depicted as a personification of natural passions. Natural passions and their actualizations are predicated to the essence of evil (what evil really is). The same argumentation holds for the personal character of God.

Similarly the nature and personhood of God is revealed in these moral passions and divine manifestations of nature (heart of the loving mother), as far as they are manifested and re-vitalized in the human soul by awakening and reconciliation through the vital force of Grace. From this vitalist-anthropological reduction, Laes-

226 The problem of theodicy is quite similar to Augustine's theodicy. Both see that the existence of evil derives from the fall of Lucifer. However, Laestadius did not emphasize freedom of will and its misuse as a cause of evil in the same way as Augustine did. Laestadius thought a change in the passions in seduction which resulted in the fall into sin. (See, §963b, §964, §1023; Cf. Dahlbäck 1950, 42–46.) God is Good, omnipotent, omniscient, and graceful, but evil happens because of human natural passions and sin. God cannot be blamed for the evil in the world, but for that evil and passion which does governs the world.

tadius states that *God and Evil are personifications of natural and moral passions*²²⁷. (In a sense awakening in and of itself creates the difference [conflict] for the human consciousness)

Laestadius believed that physiological organic passions are not innocent in their ontological character.²²⁸ Furthermore, Laestadius emphasized the point that the faculties of soul (reason, will, understanding, and imagination) naturally serve the satisfaction of natural passions and thus immorality and sinfulness (§275).

“Intelligence (*förståndet*) ponders how the desire may be satisfied and devises instruments for doing so. Reason (*förnuftet*) approves of the act by understanding; reason approves of that which man strives for the most is that which he is inclined to believe. This is the normal state of affairs.” (§275. See also §266)

Due to the fact that Laestadius aimed, using holistic anthropology and psychology, to reveal religious awakening and reconciliation as a necessity for morality and faith, his expanded notion of passion can be interpreted as the *radical vital-ontologization of sin*. This aspect relates to Luther’s radicalization of sin, and seems to be an important part of Laestadius’ manner of elaborating a “proper understanding of the human being” as a pre-requisite for understanding God [in suffering and on the Cross].²²⁹ From this perspective, Laestadius proposed a certain kind of vitalist rationalization of corrupted nature of human beings which is regarded as the initial condition for the proper Christian idea of man²³⁰.

227 I later discuss how Laestadius conceives the man/God relationship in vitalist and family psychological terms as dynamic “psychic” relatedness in the Chapter 5 concerning “Reconciliation, Faith and God”.

228 Laestadius seems to criticize the neutral use of the term “passion”, and all the neutralizing terminology which tries to avoid the sinful character of natural passions (§269).

229 §424 Laestadius’ intent is to show that man’s own will is actually one’s essential will, which signifies a radicalization of sin. Laestadius’ way to radicalize the sinful character of man can be seen as it relates to Luther’s idea that an understanding of God is possible only when there is understanding the sinful character of human beings. This idea is dealt with, for instance, in Heidegger’s interpretation of Luther. Heidegger concludes in his analysis of Luther’s notion of sin that “In summary, all these components show how [1] Luther’s orientation in regard to sin is completely different from that of Scholasticism and how [2] he understands sin as fundamental antithesis to faith. In theological terms this means: [3] ‘Faith can be understood only when sin is understood, and sin is understood only by way of a correct understanding of the very being of the human being.’” (Kisiel & Sheehan (eds.) 2007, 194.)

230 This would also entail initial requirements for genuine reconciliation to understand the “order of grace” properly as an initial constitutive structure of the living human-God relationship, namely living faith.

Laestadius also states clearly that the devil or evil becomes personified through the natural passions of human beings (egoism, ambition, greed, sexual drive, jealousy, hatred, and drunkenness):

”Insofar as the passions are real *‘powers and forces’* within organic life, which can lay the foundation for disease and cause death (Descuret), we ought not to *‘disdain the power of the devil within man,’* but rather fear it as a ‘fatalistic power’ that can produce great changes in the world. The infernal passion, which resides in man’s flesh and blood, may at first seem to be a *‘blind force’* existing as *‘drive,’* instinct, temperament, and passion – which does not allow it to be joined to the concept of a *‘personal devil’* that is endowed with will and intellect. But far from joining Martensen in deluding ourselves that *‘the spirit is the organ of the will,’* we must assume that the *‘human will is the organ of the devil spirit’* (465), through which passion becomes a personal will and the devil, in man’s own flesh and blood, becomes a *‘personal devil.’* The blindly operating force, the drive, instinct, temperament, and passion, attains personhood through the human will.” (§913. emphases added)²³¹

As well as in regard to the question concerning God, the mere idea of Evil is not a satisfactory depiction but demands personal characterization. The devil is conceived similarly substantial and personal as God is seen as manifesting itself in existing event of life – the principle of life, indicating simultaneously the spirit blown into man by God and vital forces influencing in organic life (monism) – and thus they have to be admitted as real existences. (see, §914.)

Actually Laestadius’ “naturalistic” endeavor was to question what God and Evil really are through a vitalist psychological analysis. (Even if both have their own mythical expressions, Laestadius pursues an analysis to see how they are actualized in the natural world, and he concludes the nature of their vital substantial essences from that perspective. In this sense, Laestadius’ theory of the passions functions as his rationalization of the notion of sin. In the wider picture, man dwells in the world in the midst of natural and moral passions. As passions are always awakened by one’s sense perceptions and they also function in the human flesh, the situation is that human being must exist placed in between Good and Evil. However, this tension between the natural passions and the moral passions, can be existentially experienced only through the awakened conscience.

231 Descuret regarded the religiosity and religious sacraments as having a vitalizing impact on passions and thus significant factors for human well-being. For instance Descuret considered hope as a healing passion. (See, Szabo 2009, 117.) These ideas have seemingly influenced Laestadius theoretical convictions.

3.4 The Way: Physiology and Vital Phenomena

In the rich contexts of history of ideas and spirituality of the 1800's Laestadius demanded the more "concrete" and a "real" foundation for metaphysical, theological, and anthropological theorizing concerning the human soul, body, mind, personhood, religion, faith, and God. He blamed philosophers and theologians for grounding their views on mere intellectual reflection. This accusation included a critique of rationalism and metaphysics also in the general sense. While attacking the metaphysical rationalism of anthropologists and leading theologians of his time, Laestadius also grounded his theoretical insights mostly on the medical and psychological views already mentioned above.

Laestadius began his treatise by presenting and criticizing the prevailing concepts of soul and human reason, which he conceived as both dualistic and idealistic in character. In an academic manner, he discussed and pointed out their problems and presented his own alternatives by founding his insights on medical vitalist and psychosomatic theories *and* also lived experience and popular opinion as well. Throughout his treatises, a *combination* of medical psychosomatic theories and common lived experience and popular opinion remains theoretically important for Laestadius' way of thought and argumentation (§§102, 64, 103). This becomes clear especially when Laestadius repeatedly highlights the vitalist presuppositions, for instance, the principle of life as [the original soul and] a unifying principle of mind and the physical body, a view coinciding with common lived experience and popular opinion.

Most often, Laestadius had religious motifs, especially when dealing with the notion of life and God, the role of reason and freedom of the will. However, he also had *philosophical and anthropological intentions* to elaborate on an alternative conception of soul against the Cartesian dualistic or Hegelian idealistic notions, which he saw leading to spiritualism or pantheism. Laestadius' evaluation of rationalism saw it as materialism when it emphasized mere physiological and empiric aspects. He also criticized rationalism for turning into spiritualism when it emphasized the capacity of the mind. His attack extended also to idealistic theories, especially those related to German idealism and natural philosophy, which could be turned into pantheism or panpneumatism. For instance:

"If one can prove that the soul, or life, is dependent on organic conditions, or that '*all supersensory perception is also sensory*' [§189, *intra*. Cf. 139 & Notes, §147 & Note] or that '*the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego that thinks*' (Petrelli [1845], §100); then I hope that both spiritualism and materialism may collapse, and a new foundation may be laid for a correct psychology that more closely agrees with reality. Note. All spiritualists have considered Descartes' forceful assertion (*cogito, ergo sum*) to be an axiom. But

the claim that man thinks without the mediation of organs now requires proof. [See, §192] On the other hand, the materialists have asserted that thoughts are nothing but ‘*motus agiles in cerebro*’ (delicate movements in the brain). But the claim that these ‘delicate movements’ take place without a metaphysical activating force requires proof. [See, §147&Note] The spiritualist must pause to ponder dual consciousness, the *physical* and the *metaphysical*. The materialist must pause to ponder a physical and metaphysical activating force. I believe that, eventually, they will meet halfway. The spiritualist will say: I believe that man thinks through organs. The materialist will say: I believe that the delicate movements in the brain take the place through a metaphysical force. This force is life, which exists but does not consist of any substance (*Existentia, sine essentia et sine substantia.*) [See, §§ 37–43, 90, 130, 227–228.] (§245¬e.)

Laestadius’ “half-way” or “third option” between spiritualism and materialism is the vitalist notion of life. His re-definition of the notion of soul as a principle of life radiates through all of his ideas, so that classic themes like mind/body, personhood, morality, perception, and spirituality, as well as the classical faculties of the soul and its relations and functions are re-envisioned.

Laestadius was not an anatomist or a physiologist, but he had acquired physiological and anatomical knowledge as second-hand information. Still, he did have a close relationship with the phenomena of nature, as he was botanist and natural historian²³².

In his theoretical thinking, Laestadius read and referred explicitly to Xavier Bichat’s *Physiological Researches on Life and Death*²³³, and to Johann Heinroth’s *Anthropologie*²³⁴ both translated into Swedish at the beginning of the 1800’s. It is important to highlight that Laestadius uses enlightenment and romantic medicine as a concrete and precise physiological framework for approaching the human being. The development of the natural sciences influenced humanistic research in such a way that the human organism was put to the center and discussed and debated extensively in various ways; within this anthropological emphasis the human being was often taken into focus in the most radical empiricist way.

Thus, at first glance, Laestadius also seems to hold a naturalistic and empirical approach when emphasizing the physiological constitution of human beings. Partly

232 See, e.g., Franzén 1973.

233 In Laestadius use: Bichat, M. F. X. *Undersökning om Lifwet och Döden*. Öfversatt af Gustaf Wallenberg. Stockholm, 1805. I have also used Bichat 1815.

234 In Laestadius’ use: Heinroth, J. C. A. *Lärobok I Anthropologien*. Öfversatt af E. Rancken. Stockholm, 1837. See further Heinroth 2009/1818, 115–110. (Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life. In Eghigian 2009. New Brunswick, US: Rutgers University Press). See also on Heinroth in Allen 2009, 173–177.

because of this emphasis, Laestadius' way of thought was dismissed in philosophical theology as being roughly materialistic after the first academic studies on Laestadius' thought²³⁵. Laestadius' anthropology was generally taken as bizarre and obscure; it wondered how Laestadius could be a spiritualist as a religious priest, but then be a materialist as a scientist²³⁶.

It is true that for Laestadius human being were constituted of "physiological matter", organs, such as tissues, muscles, inner and outer organs, nerves, blood vessels, blood, humoral liquids, etc., which were in an intimate sensory relationship with the surrounding environment, nature, and world [and God through the conscience]. Different organs are connected to each other by blood vessels, nerves, and humoral activity, and they are in interaction. The human being is conceived from the beginning as a living organism and an embodied entity constituted of certain interrelated organs.

It is understandable then that since the phenomena of life are inseparably attached to physiological organs, Laestadius' theory was sometimes conceived as being biological reductionism or some form of naturalism. However, Laestadius followed the ideas of medical vitalism by conceiving the different organs (first of all) as *sensitive and susceptible seats of different vital influences, affects, and even the foundation of higher cognitive functions*. Organs themselves have the character of *sensibility*, and in this sense they are animated or ensouled in themselves. Altogether, organs are conceived rather as *seats of vital functions*, not mere inert matter.

Vitalist tradition debated mechanical "human machine" harshly—interpretations that derived from Cartesian dualism and mechanism. Also, Bichat drew a clear distinction between the laws of physics and the laws of living organic life, thus distancing medical vitalism from the mathematical argumentation of mechanistic natural science. Bichat stated that the invariability of physical laws that preside over the phenomena of physics, lets us apply the formulae of calculation to all the sciences that have the phenomena of physics as their object. However, he also stated that when "[a]ppplied to the actions of the living body, the mathematics can never give us formulae."²³⁷

Bichat writes of the distinction between vital power and physical law that must be studied with different tools, as follows:

"Attraction is a physical power; it is always in proportion to the mass of brute matter in which it is observed; sensibility is a vital power, but in the same mass of matter, in the same organic part its quantity is perpetually changing." (Bichat 1815, chap. 7, §1, 80.) "This instability of the vital powers, this disposition, which they continually have to change, impress upon all

235 See, e.g., Englund 1881, 435.

236 See, e.g., Hasselberg 1935, 218.

237 Bichat 1815, Chapter 7§1, 10–81.

the physiological phenomena a character of irregularity which particularly distinguishes them from those of physics.” (Bichat 1815, 81)

Laestadius was well aware of this vitalist distinction between the physical laws of nature and the laws that pertained to organic life: One “ought not to forget that the force of life is of different kind than the forces of lifeless nature.” (§155 Note.) This view is evident in many contexts. Laestadius adopts Bichat’s definition of life for his philosophy:

“The forces through which matter interacts with life are physical forces; when the physical forces were to gain preponderance, the body would become immortal. The struggle between matter and spirit is a struggle between life and death; the physical forces are, in this regard, the adversaries of the metaphysical force.” (§ 167)

For Bichat, it was typical to observe and analyze vital powers (fluids) within the whole of an organism’s relational living conditions. This way of thought indicated how Bichat paid attention to the world–relation of the organism in a holistic way.²³⁸

* * *

For Laestadius, organic vital functions and their co-operative action develop and generate innumerable variations of vital forces, creating a complex and endlessly variable totality of the *vital organization* of living organism. This complex *organization* constituted by the interaction of organs and their vital functions forms a ground for human life. Laestadius calls this ground a principle of life (*lifprincip*) and original soul, which also signified the “psychic essence” of the human being.

The organizing totality of the vital functions constitutes the unknown/ineffable nature of the principle of life. Once it has come into existence, the principle of life is not reducible to singular vital functions derived from organic functions (also from the passions). Even if the principle of life functions always through matter (actually), it still remains independent potentially. Laestadius stated that a human being can only know *that* the principle of life exists, meaning that it must be assumed, and yet a human cannot fully know *what* it is (§1205, 1206, 1420). This undefined and ineffable, but simultaneously experientially given, embodied “intuition” of the existence and nature of the principle of life is given as the manifestation of God’s (or Evil’s) creative/destructive act, everyday lived experience (whenever we try to question what and how life is), and theoretical problem (when we try to conceptualize it

238 Bichat 1815, Chapter 7§, 1.

and its functions and principles). The principle of life somehow indicates all the life phenomena that we can only appreciate as such²³⁹.

In the anthropological context, the principle of life is ineffable as such for two reasons-- *first* for its endlessly variable nature, which indicates its infinity and ever-changing character; and *second*, because the reason or intellect in charge of the rational conceptualization of “it” belongs itself in the order of the vital forces of the principle of life, and thus can never be transparent to itself. In other words, the principle of life is never transparent to the human mind because that mind itself is the manifestation of the vital forces of the principle of life. Reason as a faculty of mind cannot fully reflect its own affective roots that direct its action and contents. Mind, consciousness, and spirit as manifestations of the principle of life are reducible to singular organs or vital forces of passions even though some Enlightenment physicians believed that they were able to localize some of the bearers (seats) of passions through empiric and anatomical research.

* * *

By adopting philosophical and metaphysical conceptions like sensibility, passions, and the principle of life and drawing several phenomenal distinctions, Laestadius conceives matter itself in non-materialist terms. Also, the phenomena of life are not to be understood in mere material terms. Laestadius saw organic matter as sensible or “mental” from its fundamental character and refers to panpsychism as his own theoretical stance. Laestadius actually limited his interpretation of panpsychism, as he did not expand the notion of “sensibility” or mentality (psychic) as pertaining to all physical matter²⁴⁰. By referencing “panpsychism” Laestadius only wanted to highlight how his vitalist stance differed from pantheism and panpneumatism, and he delimited the notion of panpsychism to having an anthropological-psychological context. For Laestadius, restricted concept of panpsychism was as technical term that referred to the holistic idea of man²⁴¹. I return to Laestadius’ interpretation of panpsychism in Chapter 4, which is entitled Person and Intentionality.²⁴²

239 Cf. Bichat 1815.

240 See Skrbina 2007 on the Western tradition of panpsychism.

241 A more specific interpretation of Laestadius’ panpsychism is the task of another philosophical study which would demand a radical philosophical interpretation of Laestadius’ notion of a “living God” as proto-panpsychistic principle that simultaneously functions as a source of law-like structures of a physical universe and a source of vitality and the animated character of all organic beings. (Cf. Skrbina 2007)

242 Here it can be noted that panpsychistic philosophy of mind was common during the time. One can consider for a comparison, for instance: von Hartmann, E. 1950/1869 (Philosophy of the Unconscious. London: Routledge).

3.5 Summary: Beginning with Nature and the Flesh

Laestadius' philosophical theology can be interpreted as beginning with his discussion of the nature of God and creation. The philosophical notion of God as a first Idea is discussed as it relates to the question about whether theoretical thinking should begin with the represented Idea or the dynamic processes present in nature. Laestadius chose the second option which led to an anthropological or vitalist psychological theme. God is approached in His dynamic and personal character through the vital manifestations of the principle of life and the vital forces and functions in nature and embodied human experience. However, the principle of life does not yet encompass the personal trinity of God but does offer a first starting point.

This chapter begins with the ideas of creation, fall and corruption. For Laestadius, the fall means the fall into natural passions, and thus the world. As a result of such a fall, only passions, not the faculties of soul and their relationship to each other, were corrupted. Even if Laestadius took a "naturalistic approach", he had the metaphysical "spirit-life" or Biblical myths as a background that actually offered the fundamentals of his views. Also, God is given in the first premise as a vital dynamic force, but then approached through nature or natural phenomena, concluding that a personal God is a vital force but triadically constituted. Similarly, the whole origin of evil derived from the myth of the fall within which Lucifer's passions of egoism and jealousy (disbelief) became part of human nature. However, the personal character of evil is reached through an analysis of natural passions and defined as the "personification of natural passions." Thus, evil is understood as the actualization and manifestation of natural passions within a corporeal personal life.²⁴³ Altogether, in both cases, gaining an understanding of God or Evil, man has to proceed through the natural world to know the real character of these great combating personal spirits, i.e., the positive and negative forces of life and death, which signify [vital-existential] existence without being either substantial or essences (*exsistentia sine essentia et sine substantia*).

Due to this vitalist re-definition, it is not possible to approach God or evil directly via theoretical-intellectual insight, but only through their actual manifestations.

Laestadius' starting point had philosophical and psychological consequences, as God is conceived as a creative force that manifests all over nature as vital functions and forces and material configurations of principle of life. There is no sharp distinction between divinity and the immanent world or between natural and supernatural forces. However, Laestadius distanced his views from pantheism and materialism in

243 This vitalist reduction reveals actually the foundation of sin. Sin actualizes within organic life and sensory life and is a negative vital force. See, §§998, 999, 213, 914, 1203, 1172. For evil as personification of natural passions and its functioning through organs in time and space, see §§611, 913, 461.

two ways: 1) by a panpsychistic interpretation of the vital principle, and 2) by positing the necessity of a religious experience of awakening and (Christian) reconciliation as the initial condition for morality and a living relationship with God. Laestadius conceived the vitalist stance as a common sense starting point and also as being consistent with the Biblical understanding of a Christian God.

Actually, the endeavor to keep matter and life together constitutes the basic character and specific problems of Laestadius' thought I show in this study *First*, he conceived the physical, psychic-moral and spiritual together and explicate them on the same physical plane and demand a detailed analysis of the physiological constitution as well as several circular arguments. *Second*, as human life grounded on the principle of life, there is no problem with the origin of soul. All organic life shares the animated nature and are thus conceived as a continuation of God's creative acts. This latter point is also important for Laestadius' psychology. Especially the development of the organism, human consciousness, its faculties and manifestations are all continuations of the creative functioning of the principle of life in the world. Altogether, Laestadius' idea of God as a creative vital principle becomes theoretically *comprehensible only from a vitalist perspective*.

Further, Laestadius' thought still ends up with the problem of Evil. If there are no innate ideas about God or Evil, and all ideas are constituted through sense perceptions and passions, how can we differentiate the works of God from the works of Evil? This problem finds its solution in Laestadius' insight when he conceives God as the personification of moral passions and Evil as natural passions. Thus he offers a vitalist anthropocentric emphasis on the notions of God and Evil.

Laestadius' approach to the question of existence, human beings, and God could be interpreted as belonging to natural theology and the natural philosophical. However, his thought and explications differ from the general natural theologian way of thought in various ways. His goal is not to explain or prove in the ontological sense the existence of an ultimate reality. Rather, the given ultimate reality (spiritual or spirit world) is explained naturalistically and thus is not "ultimate" but instead an actual and real aspect of the phenomenal-experiential world of immanence. In other words, spirituality is a natural part of the human psychic life. Laestadius' approach differs also from romantic natural philosophy (*naturalphilosophie*), as it does not lean on romantic idealism, but instead on vitalist presupposition. Anyhow, Laestadius starts with the specific philosophical presuppositions of the ontological foundation of nature and proceeds to question the nature of man, morality, spirituality, and the nature of God from that vitalist perspective. Thus, Laestadius does not try to argue for the ontological existence of "ultimate reality" (spirit-life), but rather takes it for granted and elaborates on the *constitution* of spiritual life and faith beginning with the ontological presuppositions of nature and flesh. As long as God and Evil remains ineffable existences in and of themselves, Laestadius, in a way, holds that the

Ideas of them are unreachable, and we must be indifferent about their ontological existence. However as these concepts are reached through nature and the flesh and are determined to be “personifications of passions,” we can interpret that Laestadius makes a certain kind of naturalistic anthropological reduction regarding the notions of God and Evil within the frames of medical vitalist psychology.

Laestadius’ starting point can be conceived as being more dynamic in relation to rationalistic and idealistic beginnings. *First*, it is immediately reachable by empirical and psychological experience and may resonate with the common Christian experience. *Second*, it does not create a mechanistic divide in a way that leaves the immanent world to exist by itself after the creation. God or His manifestation as the principle of life is continuously present, along with evil, in the dynamic events of life.

The panpsychistic interpretation of existence as such (the principle of life, *vis essentialis*) is for Laestadius a way “into thoughts” (Ideelif) that I conceive as the pre-phenomenological grasp of the subject. He is not thinking in terms of substance or essences as a representation of First Idea, but instead inwardly thinking of a constitution of ideas through lived vital experiences (Idélif). As a beginning condition, Laestadius’ position can be put into argument form as follows:

Argument 1: Laestadius’ Argument for Vitalism (From substantiality to vitality):

1. We cannot know whether the Idea of Life (God) or Life itself precedes (the problem of origin)(the problem of what we mean by “knowing”; as we see the knowing of existence is rather a matter of feeling than it is cognition.)
2. The philosophical God as an Idea is defined in substantial terms and signifies a bare abstract and idealized self-identical entity that cannot be comprehended
3. The idealized starting point is not experientially plausible, but rather a vitalist notion of the principle of life that can be reached by empirical and existential experience and affirmed by common sense.
4. Thus, Nature has to be accepted as the initial given condition
5. Nature is animated
6. Thus one must presuppose that there exists a principle of life, a receiving, sentient and acting vital power that is also the core of human experience (affirmed by common sense and lived experience; a solid presupposition by its very implications)
7. By studying the functions of the principle of life research can understand the natural character of an embodied human being (anthropology) and thus move toward the proper [vital] notion of human personhood
8. Through a proper vitalistic concept of personhood, research can proceed toward a relationship with an “absolute” constituting structure as such (Idea or God as an absolute Being)

9. THEREFORE, there must be a Foundation and Ground for all existence that absolute vital Being (Idea/God) that grants life for all organic beings. This Idea has to be conceived as the creative and Graceful Idea presented in all of nature (the living personal character of an immanent God)
10. THEREFORE, Life signifies the vital principle, “animated nature of all things”, as those dynamic vital forces of life that manifest themselves in different configurations and phenomena of existence. Thus, Laestadius is a vitalist who conceives of God as an immanent transcendence. It is distinct from animism, certain sympathies for pantheism BUT still holds that God and original Soul remain partly transcendental and independent and not manifested in-itself in all organic things. God is therefore conceived as the/a vital principle.

Argument 2: The principle of life is the necessary beginning of philosophy

1. Nothing comes from nothing (*nihil fit ex nihilo*)
2. We exist in nature, and thus we must take Nature for granted as our initial condition
3. Nature is animated, and thus we have to presuppose a principle of life that makes Nature alive
4. Through common sense and experience, we can conclude that the principle of life is present in all organic beings
5. Man is an organic being, and thus we can study the functions of the principle of life and proceed toward a proper understanding of man and the functions of life
6. THEREFORE, the principle of life (as a panvitalist principle) is an experiential and necessary presupposition to use to begin philosophy/

If the primary question is about life, then the examination must begin with the principles and aspects of life. In this respect, Laestadius' proceeding is twofold, namely, the principles and aspects of life are analyzed both in an empiric-physiological direction and in an experiential direction within the Christian-pietistic framework.

However, Laestadius' starting point is highly problematic, as its grounding conception is just a presupposition, a belief that cannot be reached or experienced as such by anyone. Thus, Laestadius' philosophy is a *religious philosophy* from the beginning. However it does not include mysticism or occultism, for it has a scientific basis and makes a strict endeavor to explicate the experiential phenomena using the psychophysiological vitalist perspective.

4 The Person and Intentionality

In this chapter, Laestadius' conceptions of person and intentionality are analyzed. I approach Laestadius' thought toward its vitalist background and analyze his idea of man and person relatively independently of his theological purposes²⁴⁴. I also analyze and interpret Laestadius' vitalist explication of embodiment and the faculties of the soul that constitute the core of his psychology and philosophy of mind²⁴⁵. These includes an analysis of his central notions, such as the principle of life being the original soul, body, mind, passions, the Self, reason, will, understanding and imagination. Attaching his vitalist psychological insights to his Biblical and theological

244 This anthropological and psychological emphasis is justified in its special reference to Laestadius' own use of vitalist anthropology for laying the philosophical-psychological groundwork for his further religious elaborations and "system."

245 Laestadius himself does not use the word "mind" in a systematic way. In §§644,645 he uses the word "hug (håg)" to signify "mind". Overall he is critical toward the varying distinctions between reason, intelligence and mind. Thus, in this chapter, I use the concept of "mind" to construct an interpretation of Laestadius' views concerning psychological and the mental sphere of a person for contemporary readers. Laestadius' himself refers to the phenomenal sphere of mind for many different concepts, for instance, *själ* (soul) and *psyke* (psyche) as the most holistic notions, and consciousness (*medvetande*) and understanding (*förståndet*) as the main faculty of objective consciousness. Depending on the context, further the English translation of Därhushjonet "*förståndet*" (objective faculty of understanding) is often translated as "mind" and sometimes as "intellect" (e.g. §1206). This knowledge is enlightening for the contemporary reader in the sense that *förståndet* refers to the capacity of consciousness that encompass and functions as a compilation of the operations of other faculties of subjective and objective consciousness. *Förståndet* as a faculty of objective consciousness signifies "the capability for thinking", as it also operates within the contents of other faculties of soul, such as ideas of reason and desires of the will, and thus signifies the broader function of consciousness. It comes closer to what we nowadays refer to by the term "mind". Therefore, I use the notion of mind as partially parallel to the concept of *förståndet*, but – in regard to the modern philosophical use of the term mind – in a wider phenomenal indication to include embodied subjective and objective faculties and the functions of soul. This is also a way to show how Laestadius' "philosophy of mind" covers a broader sphere than the modern narrower concept of mind so as to encompass the aspects of embodied pre-reflective functions and the spatial-habitual world-relation. My idea here is that the soul (*själ*) and the faculties of soul can be transformed into the "language of mind". The reason for bringing this concept of mind into the analysis of Laestadius' psychology receives clarification when one is analyzing Laestadius' re-definitions of the faculties of soul in the upcoming chapters.

views, he comes to *re-define* all these mentioned concepts for his own purposes²⁴⁶. These central notions are interconnected in Laestadius' theory; the principle of life as the constitutive basis of embodied life is inextricably attached to the physiological body or organic life, while the sphere of mind as analyzed through the term sensory life is not distinct from organic life. The functions of mind are thus viewed in their psychophysiological extent, and the passions signifying a driving and constitutive force of human life are in no way distinct from the embodied mind. In this way, passions become the link between the constitutive basis of the principle of life and the surrounding world. This view creates challenges for the study on the order for proceeding in an analysis from one notion to another. For this reason, the particular analyses are partly overlapping in this current study. The parts of the analysis in each particular chapter have to be read in relation to each other in order to achieve full comprehension of what the different notions mean and how they relate to each other physiologically, psychologically, and phenomenally.

From a wider perspective, the chapter questions how Laestadius posits the embodied person within the world and what epistemic and ontological significances subjective consciousness possesses in human existence. I interpret the *how* of the whole subjective consciousness as *pre-reflective and pre-cognitive ground* that sets forth the constitutive basis for the functions of mind and higher cognition, while moving onwards constitutes the intentional human/world relationship.

The chapter thus aims to reveal Laestadius' notion of person and the character of embodied intentionality as the basic structure of human-world relation or human existence as such. A strong emphasis on physiological and vital embodiment, and a criticism of intellectualistic notions of man and faculties of soul characterizes Laestadius' way of thought. The overarching philosophical themes are the overcoming of a body/mind dualism via vitalism and an intentional relatedness of man to the world.

246 Here again we have to remind one that the re-definition of the person and the faculties of soul seeks to elaborate on the groundwork for Laestadius' insight on reconciliation. (e.g. §247) The re-definitions relate to classical philosophical and psychological elaborations in many ways. Using triadic conception of man as the unity of the principle of life, organic life and sensory life, with the notion of passions partly combined with Biblical and Augustinian notion of passions and the vitalist notion of vital force, by the classical idea of faculties of soul attached to the vitalist system, and finally by forming a theory for the co-existence between triadic man and the Trinity of God, Laestadius comes to elaborate on holistic philosophical-theological insight into the possibility of morality and spirituality with an experiential emphasis.

4.1 Principle of Life as the Core of the Human Person

4.1.1 The Problem with the Metaphysical Notion of Soul

Laestadius' psychology was constructed as a critical alternative to the rational-metaphysical notions of soul and person. In order to criticize the prevailing notion of soul, Laestadius presents a phenomenological²⁴⁷ analysis of the constitution of the metaphysical notion of soul as substance, *essentia*, and *existentia*²⁴⁸. Through this analysis, he paves the way for his own vitalist-phenomenological²⁴⁹ interpretation of the human soul as the principle of life²⁵⁰. (§§33–38.)

According to Laestadius, philosophers have misinterpreted the nature of the soul because they have approached the phenomenon of soul in a problematic metaphysical way. At first, Laestadius states that mind relates external perceptions to some essence (*väsende*²⁵¹) and considers it as the cause of experienced phenomena *before* any theoretical reflective attribution of perceptions are connected to any kind of essence. Thus, Laestadius interprets the concept of essence or being (*wäsende*) as originally referring to matter (*materien*). Therefore, the soul is, in the first place, conceived as *substance*, thus signifying *the element itself* in terms of 'chemical' categories.

“But before man began to relate his inner perceptions to some object or cause, he related all external perceptions to some being (*väsende*) believed to be the cause of those perceptions (*fenomenet*).” (§36.)²⁵²

247 Here I use the term “phenomenological” in terms of a broad significance and to refer to the experiential sphere.

248 “The concept of ‘being’ (*wäsende*, *essentia*) originally referred to matter (*materien*). In the mind’s (*förståndet*) quest to understand everything, it added two metaphysical categories to the concept of being (*wäsende*), *existentia* and *substantia*. Of these, *substantia* denotes the material thing itself (chemistry’s notion of the elements); *essentia* denotes the inner nature of the thing (*tingen*), as characteristics imperceptible to the senses; and *existentia* denotes the outer characteristics of the thing that are perceivable by the senses, or the nature of its manner of acting and reacting.” (§37.)

249 “Phenomenological” refers here generally to Laestadius’ way of holding “feeling” and “experience” as testimony regarding the correct understanding, and to his way of holding lived experience and popular opinion as a horizon when he analyzes *phenomena*. In this sense, vitalism, despite its physiological emphases, turns toward the analysis of experiential phenomena, which is also present in Laestadius’ manner of deconstructing the notion of soul in the following critique.

250 On the principle of life see, §§112–114, 138 Note, 155 note, 159–160, 165, 167 & note, 185 & note, appendix, 192–193, 195, 220–225, 245, 246 & note, 209, 331.

251 Laestadius is not always consistent in his writings. It is unclear whether Laestadius wrote “*väsen*” when indicating his vitalist notion of soul, and “*wäsende*” when indicating the metaphysical notion of *essentia*.

252 Alternative formulation of this notion: Before man began to relate to all of what he perceived as something in-himself, which would include the cause and ground for the perceived, he related all of what he could have perceived via his external perceptions (*sinne*) to some essence (*väsende*), which would include cause and the ground for externally perceived phenomena (*förnibarbara phenomena*).

Secondly, the objective approach toward the phenomenon of soul enabled one to postulate the second meaning of soul as ‘existentia.’ In Laestadius’ use, *existentia* refers to external attributes that can be detected by the objective consciousness and perception when *existentia* is intended to mean the outward manifestations of the soul. (§37.)

Thirdly, metaphysical reflection turns into the inner sphere of the soul, gathering the character of soul directly from the faculties and functions of soul. (§§33, 34.) In this way, the soul receives its third [categorical] meaning, which is ‘*essentia*,’ signifying the inner properties of things or entities not detected by the objective consciousness and external perception.

According to Laestadius, this final metaphysical disintegration of the soul into substance, *existentia*, and *essentia* happens in the following way:

“The mind (*förståndet*) relates all of man’s perceptions to some object (*fenomenet*) that is the cause of that which is perceived, but the philosopher searches for the foundation of all the faculties of the soul *in a subject*, which he refers to as the rational soul.” (§35. emphasis added)

Here Laestadius reveals his presuppositions of “philosophers” and “theologians” and their metaphysical interpretation of the soul. Laestadius objected to the idea of rational soul in its given philosophical significance, claiming that it resides on false metaphysical ground and indicates an abstract immaterial entity or essence.

To transfer the metaphysical concept of *essentia* to pertain to the soul, there are three grounded meanings to the soul as it relates to the physical body, namely, *essentia*, *existentia* and *substantia*. (§38.) First, the soul is conceived as some sort of objectified being. Secondly, it deconstructs the unity of soul into substance, essence, and *existentia*; into the matter itself, the inner characteristics of a thing, and the outer characteristics of a thing. According to Laestadius this approach causes the classical distinction between vegetative, animal, and rational soul, and because Laestadius does not conceive of them as modes of Being, he seems to conclude that they destroy the *unity* of the embodied human person as well.

Laestadius states that the metaphysical approach has caused harm and confusion in theology and anthropology: For the question pertaining to the relationship between body and soul and for the questions of the Trinity and the two natures of Christ. (§42.) In terms of psychology Laestadius finds the metaphysical notion of soul problematic as well because it divides the human consciousness, Self, and will into two distinct parts (inner and outer). Laestadius denies that both the soul and the body could be substances, for that would lead to panpneumatism, and he sought to establish a one and common principle for both the soul and the body.²⁵³ (§44.)

253 Laestadius makes a later distinction for panpneumatism and pantheism using the term, panpsychism.

Laestadius was convinced that the philosophical, and especially the rationalistic, idea of soul that leaned on the notions of substance and *essentia* emphasized and is sometimes limited to the rational part of the soul. The soul becomes conceived to be as large as it is intellectual in its character, and the rational aspect (intellectual and conscious capacities) is then conceived as the highest principle of soul. Henceforth the intellectual life of the soul is understood to determine human personhood, life, morality, and the relation to existence and God. In this respect, human life is seen as governed by both intellect and reason.

Further, Laestadius accused those philosophers who argue that soul is essence (being) of materialism (§129note, §§132, 137, 228note). This criticism indicates that Laestadius saw rational conceptualization as an “objectifying” thematic that does not grasp the proper mode of the being of the soul as simply *the life of the body*. Laestadius also indicated that the substantial notion of soul is materialistic and thus makes the soul mortal (See, §228¬e).

In the broader picture, Laestadius sees the application of the concepts of substance (kr. *ousia*) and essence as pertaining to the human soul and leading to conceiving the nature of the human being as rational and intellectual in its basic character, and thus to the idealistic intellectualization of the notion of person.

Laestadius considers the rationalistic and metaphysical notions of the soul to be problematic because they *single out* the phenomenon of soul from any connection to the physiological basis [of life]; the soul becomes distinct from the functions of organic mind (sensory life neural-life, brains) and the organic body (organic life).²⁵⁴ Philosophers have concluded directly from the functions of the soul to the soul itself, and thus dismiss the spatial, temporal, and organic constitutive basis of soul. According to Laestadius, these philosophers simply dismiss and bypass the organs. Metaphysical rationalism conceives of the soul as either materialistic or immaterial, as mere spiritual or ideal. In both cases, Laestadius argues that the application of the notions of substance and essence makes the soul a “being,” an obscure entity, and a “flowing” essence without any real physiological basis. It is exactly here that Laestadius tries to find a way between materialism and idealism, or materialism and spiritualism, by holding onto the vitalist notion of the principle of life as original soul.

The main problem with the rationalistic notion of soul is that it conceives of the soul as a substance. This means that soul is in one way or another objectified as a categorized entity distinct from organic life and sensory life and distinct from the physiological organizations of human life. Using his critique, Laestadius paves the way for his alternative notion of the nature of soul in vitalist terms as the principle of life.

254 Cf. Kristiansen 2004, 65–82.

4.1.2 The Vitalist Roots of the “Insight”

Laestadius’ principle of life in its general definition is a *vitalist notion*²⁵⁵ that mostly parallels Xavier Bichat’s determination of the “principle of life” or “vital principle.” In the opening paragraph of *Life and Death* that is the most important scientific source in Laestadius’ *The Lunatic*, Bichat defines the principle of life as follows:

*“Life consists in the sum of the functions by which death is resisted. In living bodies, such in fact is the mode of existence; that whatever surrounds them, tends to their destruction. They are influenced incessantly by inorganic bodies; they exercise themselves, the one upon the other, as constant an action: under such circumstances they could not long subsist, were they not possessed in themselves of a permanent principle of reaction. This principle is that of life; unknown in its nature, it can be only appreciated by its phenomena.”*²⁵⁶

Even if Laestadius does not directly refer to Bichat’s definition of Life, it appears to be crucially important for him. We find that Laestadius applies Bichat’s idea of the struggle between life and death to “[t]he struggle between matter and spirit.” Laestadius clearly states that “the physical forces are, in this regard, the adversaries of the metaphysical force.” (§167.) If Bichat is the root of Laestadius’ re-definition of “spirit” (pneuma), then we can gain new light on Laestadius’ notion – the spirit analogical to *vital force signifies the power that resists death and is opposed to natural laws*

255 Dahlbäck states that Laestadius’ principle of life does not suggest any idea-realistic stance. It is rather a 1800 century way of shifting away from the classical philosophical concept of idea (idée, idé) to the more natural scientific concept of force (kraft), which became influential in the anthropological study in vitalism. Human being received a redefined principle that truly “is” or exists. This is no less a metaphysical approach though, but it does replace partly the earlier theological way of leaning on the concept of Idea. (Dahlbäck 1950, 25.)

256 “[A]n habitual alteration of action and reaction between exterior bodies, and the living body, an alternation, of which the proportion vary according to the age of the latter, is the most general of these phenomena. . . . it is then that life languishes, and insensibly advances towards its natural term, which ensues when all proportion ceases. The measure, then, of life in general, is the difference which exists between the effort of exterior power, and that of inferior resistance. The excess of the former is an indication of its weakness; the predominance of the latter an index of its force. . . .” (Bichat 1815, 21–22.)

*of nature*²⁵⁷. Based on these vitalist definitions and views, Laestadius began to elaborate his psychological notions concerning the vitalizing significance of morality and spirituality. Generally speaking, Laestadius sees moral passions and living spirituality as vitalizing, rehabilitating, harmonizing and empowering natural psychosomatic affects that go against the natural corrupting forces of life/death. In this respect, strong natural passions and sin are also viewed as corrupting and destructive powers of an embodied life. The idea of the positive significance of moral and spiritual life for human well-being was common in the 1800's.

In a note added later to the manuscript of *The Lunatic*, Laestadius mentions his debt to Bichat:

“Like Bichat, we are convinced that the soul, referred as ‘principle of life,’ is present in the fetus shortly after birth (Bichat 1805, 53), is the author’s absolute conviction that the same principle of life is present in organic life, or the vegetative life, organic life, or animal life, or however one wishes to refer to the organ-developing force; and that the same principle of life is the foundation for sensory life, or sensitive life, which is identical to the rational soul, although the philosophers strenuously resist such opinions.” (§185 Note, p. 879.)

Laestadius is inspired by thus Bichat’s vitalism, and he follows and elaborates on classical vitalist thought for his own purposes. It is interesting that Laestadius refers to the principle of life also as a certain kind of “genetic code” within organic matter (§221). He also wonders what kinds of laws pertain to the conception:

“[I]t is not known, however, what laws govern this union. It is not known whether it is a *chemical*, *dynamic*, or *crystalline* relationship, or *polarization*, but one could call the law in question a *relationship of vitality* (*vitalfrändskap*.)” (§155.)

257 ”Although body and soul are simultaneous and neither is the cause of the other, it does not follow that they relate to each other as two distinct beings (väsende). The principle of life is not a being (väsende), [but] merely a metaphysical force (kraft). Yet the body is under the influence of many physical forces that the life force is unable to naturalize. A living body is supposedly lighter than a dead body, but the extent to which life force is naturalized by gravity has not been established. The forces through which matter interacts with life are physical forces; when the physical forces gain preponderance, the body dies (footnote 161 Bichat). If the life forces were to gain preponderance, the body would become immortal. The struggle between matter and spirit is a struggle between life and death; the physical forces are, in this regard, the adversaries of the metaphysical force.” (§167.) In terms of the relationship between the opposite forces of nature and the vital forces of life, here Laestadius indicated that the force of life could be ascended/risen by faith in a way could diminish the effect of natural forces. (See, §167Note.)

Here Laestadius holds that all the “relationships are particular types of natural forces” which can be investigated. He highlights a classical vitalist stance that emphasizes the distinction between those laws pertaining to organic life and laws of the mere physical world: Laestadius states that a physiologist “ought not to forget that the force of life is of different kind than the forces of lifeless nature.” (§155 Note.) Laestadius also holds that the soul emerges in the fetus “directly after conception” (§165) which indicates that the soul and the living body are simultaneous and co-existing. In this respect, the principle of life genetically creates the human body. (§166&Note.)

We also find reference to George Ernst Stahl (1659 – 1734) in regard to the principle of life as the proper notion of soul. Laestadius conceives of Stahl’s notion as scientific support for the popular opinion²⁵⁸:

”If one imagines the common life force as the foundation of the expression of both life forms [sensory and organic] in time and place, then the life force itself becomes the real being [essence] within the soul (egentliga väsendet i själen). Thus, the general public could be said to be correct in feeling that ‘the soul is the life of the body’. Note. Some philosophers have shared the notion that the soul is the life of the body. ‘Stahl posited the concept of a creative life force, but meant thereby the soul, which he assumed to unconsciously create and sustain its body’ (Heinroth 1837, 19.)” (§117.)

4.1.3 Original Embodied Soul – the Principle of Life

The most lucid description of the nature of soul is given by the expression, “the soul is the life of the body.”²⁵⁹ Using this statement, Laestadius highlights the non-dualistic and embodied character of the soul, and this statement is continuously used as a heuristic depiction for a more specific explication of the “principle of life.” Principle of life as a vitalist *indicative meta-theoretical hypothesis* is a starting point for proceeding with the research concerning the nature of soul and the faculties of human consciousness.

258 Laestadius seems to propose that the common principle of life resolves the triadic constitution of man as well as the problem of the Trinity in God. (See, §116.)

259 Found also in Petrelli’s study book on psychology. (See, Petrelli 1845, §100)

Despite his harsh critique of metaphysics, Laestadius has to admit that a certain kind of metaphysics²⁶⁰ is necessary for proceeding in psychology²⁶¹. Laestadius defines the soul philosophically broadly as “*existentia sine essentia et sine substantia*”²⁶², existence devoid of being (essence, väsen) and substance (or existence without being an essence or substance). Given this view, the principle of life means the event and process of life to a broad extent.

Through this quite formal philosophical definition, Laestadius aims to free the phenomena of life and soul from its classical metaphysical fetters and deconstruct the metaphysical substantiality of soul. Laestadius states that

“[o]nly the materialist mind is unable to comprehend that, what is not a being may nevertheless *be*, even though it does not consist of some substance.” (§228Note.)

He conceives the notion of the *principle of life first of all as the constitutive basis of the embodied life of the soul*. It is not substantial or essential in the classical metaphysical sense that is described above. Life and soul are something that cannot be objectified or conceptually repossessed as such. He states that the principle of life is original soul, and it has “substantiality” in the psychological vitalist sense.²⁶³ Through the vitalist notion of this principle of life Laestadius claims to find an alternative which

260 The term “metaphysic” is used in various ways in Laestadius’ *The Lunatic*. When Laestadius criticizes classical metaphysical rationalism and philosophical notions, the term is used to refer to the common philosophical way used to study and explicate the fundamental structures of being and Being. Laestadius use the term “ontology” in a parallel manner. When Laestadius uses the term “metaphysics” in the context of the vitalist philosophy that he leans on, the term “metaphysics” to receive a modified significance. First of all, it refers to the domain that is not directly present by sense perception, but is approachable by experience and perception through its manifestations. For example, the main concepts, such as principle of life, passions, and heart have this immanent-transcendental character. In a general sense, Laestadius’ own use of the term “metaphysic” indicates to the “psychic”, “phenomenal” sphere which receives different meanings, especially “psychological,” “moral,” and “spiritual.” Often metaphysical is used as an analogical terms for spiritual or moral.

261 “Although metaphysics has caused great offence in anthropology and theology, we are, nevertheless, unable to entirely dispense with it. It is certainly very convenient to proceed only by means of reasoning, but nobody will be persuaded by it, much less convinced of a truth.” (§185 Note, p879.)

262 “We have assumed a principle of life that does not have substantiality in the metaphysical sense, but in the psychological sense, as being an *existentia sine essentia et sine substantia*. This principle of life is what we consider as real soul.” (§752 Note. See also §§130, 227, 228Note, 245Note.)

263 If we conceive this as a naturalistic anthropological reduction we should note that the vitalist reduction differs from the common naturalistic biological reduction, as vitalism holds to the notion of the principle of life as being “two-dimensional” and having both organic and relatively transcendental independent aspects in the same notion. Vitalist naturalism is indeed a different from physicalist naturalism.

would not divide soul into the “inner” (essentia, being) and the “outer” (existentia) spheres, nor conceive of the soul as an object-like substantiality. This means that the soul exists in a specific way that cannot be conceived as either a distinct and definite essence or a being. (§752 note.)

This presupposition of the principle of life gains various significances and meanings, as Laestadius proceeds in his treatises, simply because he ends up with various philosophical-theological problems in different contexts. We have earlier pointed out that the principle of life signifies/has a divine origin, as it is a vital force given by God, or it is a manifestation of God’s existence within organic life. We have also pointed out that the principle of life offers an empirical and experiential starting point for Laestadius’ theorizing, as it always functions via matter that means the natural vital and “biological” force found within organic life. In this respect, the principle of life also signifies the *generative* creative force within organic matter, and a *constitutive ground* for the development of organs and the *functions* of consciousness. In this respect, as I will note later, the principle of life signifies the “*psychic essence*” of the human person, and it functions through passions and faculties of consciousness within that embodied human person. Thus, the principle of life signifies the common psychological and experiential sphere of the human being and henceforth also has a phenomenological character.

In Laestadius –studies the principle of life is often depicted and accentuated as the *confluence* or unifying principle of/between the physical body (organic life) and the capacity of the mind (neural/sensory life). The soul and the life of the soul are, therefore, generally seen as one and the same; body and the life of the body are not connected as if they were two different substances, but they do coincide in the actuality of the one living human being.²⁶⁴ This concept can be simply expressed as Laestadius often did by stating that “the soul is the life of the body”. These interpretations are helpful when approaching Laestadius’ elaborations, but they often still miss the constitutive phenomenal role that the principle of life plays in Laestadius’ holistic theory.

Kristiansen offers an illustrative view when sharpening Laestadius’ idea: “The soul is nothing but the principle of life expressing itself through body and mind,” thus interpreting that this life of the body signifies “the power to be.”²⁶⁵ For Laestadius, the vitalist notion of the principle of life, as life embedded in organic matter itself, signifies the original soul of human being. He adopts the vitalist idea of organic life as primarily being both vital and sensitive. Generally speaking, this means that the organic being is “alive,” it has “power to be”; it is manifested in various ways through embodied functions that include breathing, perceptions, feelings, emotions, passions, thinking, action, etc.

264 Cf. e.g., Kristiansen 2004.

265 Kristiansen 2004.

The principle of life is not a “thing” or a mere point of confluence – which actually sounds like quite a substantial depiction – but is rather a constitutive force, “a power to be”, an ability to receive action and re-act, have *sensibilité*²⁶⁶ in the classical vitalist sense²⁶⁷. To describe this unique mode of being of the soul, Laestadius insisted that the soul is not to be conceived as extensive, but rather as *intensive*, namely, a force. To go further with this line of thought, we could also say that the “life of the embodied soul” refers actually to the personal way of being or habituality of the human individual; the embodied way of being in the world does not only manifest the physical, but also the psychological-spiritual ensouled condition of the human being.

Laestadius elaborated on the notion of principle of life further *for his own purposes* (*The Lunatic*, Chapter K). In the beginning, he claims once again that the rationalistic ideas of soul and reason are unchristian as they do not pertain to the whole embodied human being (psyche, the flesh). To deconstruct the rationalistic notion, Laestadius draws an analogy between the *principle of life* and a *law* that is its own principle, indeed a necessary principle that, according to Laestadius, should be interpreted *panpsychistically* (§138. See also §§1208, 1218, 1244, 1601). However, Laestadius does not refer to panpsychism in its strict definition in the sense that all entities would be “mental” or “animated” in their fundamental character.²⁶⁸ Laestadius’ Panpsychism is restricted to organic life. Rather, he limits his version of “panpsychism” to the principle of life in the anthropological context as the “subject of ego” and an unifying living “essence” of all the dualities, especially the distinctions between organic life and sensory life, subjective and objective consciousness, “doubled” dimensions of Self (conscious and unconscious) and all the faculties of soul (see, §1218). In this sense, the soul signifies the unifying principle of the person. This holistic vitality and intentional relatedness of the embodied soul is exactly what Laestadius meant by characterizing the soul as *intensivity*. The soul is an “*intensive* rather than *extensive* order – that is to say, force²⁶⁹.” (§138. See also §114 Note.)

266 Cf. Bichat on the difference between organic and animal sensibility. Being within organic life sensibility signifies a capacity to receive or to be susceptible to impressions. Within animal life (sensory life) sensibility signifies a capability to receive impressions and attach a particular impression to the specific center. For example, the stomach is sensitive for ingredients, the heart is sensitive to particular irritation of elements of blood in itself; “In the same way do the eyes, the membranes of the nose and the mouth, the skin, and all the mucous surfaces, at their origin, receive an impression from the bodies which are in contact with them, but they afterwards transmit such impression to the brain, which is the general center of the sensibility of these organs.” (Bichat 1815, §3, 84.)

267 Cf. Haigh 1984; Williams 2002 and 2003.

268 However, it may be possible to elaborate on a strict panspsychistic interpretation if conceiving Laestadius’ God as the proto-panspsychistic principle that grants life to all the entities (law-like structures of innate bodies etc.) (Cf. e.g. Skrbina 2007)

269 Cf. Petrelli’s view in Petrelli 1845/1846, §88.

Here Laestadius gives a constitutive directedness to the embodied soul. The soul as the life of the body is not described as substantiality in terms of its extensive meaning. Actually the soul is neither a merely stable “existence” but rather has “intensive” character as a passional force. In other words, the soul does not exist in an abstract space such as a whatever object-like entity, but is instead inextricably attached to organic matter and relates to the organic world in terms of vital forces, such as passions²⁷⁰. Generally speaking, Laestadius shifts from the objectifying thematic of soul to the vitalist, and thus, the soul is not extensive substance, essence or being, but rather an intensive force functioning in and through the human organism.

Here again, Laestadius criticizes the notions of *essentia* and *substantia*, for they would make the soul mortal. Essences could be destroyed when they were conceived materialistically (§137). In this regard, he indicates that the principle of life is an energetic principle that does not necessarily *dissipate* when matter ceases to be²⁷¹. However, because this aspect cannot be proven, he leaves the problem alone by concluding that

“[w]hat is certain is that the metaphysical force (life) does not stand in proportion to substance in a way that physical forces (such as gravity) do. The force of life can be as its most potent in the smallest of things, such as the seed, the egg, the fetus, and so forth.” (§138 Note.)

It is also worth noting that Laestadius holds the principle of life to be *independent* and free potentially (*de potentia*), for its power (*kraft*), but not actually (*de actu*) for its activity/action. This view is because the principle of life functions via matter. It

“operates freely as a force, but the law governing its activities is embedded in its conductor. Matter is the conductor of the life force, but physical forces that inhibit the life force from operating freely are also active within matter.” (§195.)²⁷²

Laestadius gives an example of the relationship between the principle of life and its manifestation by stating that we cannot conceive the actual sense-perception of heat as the principle of heat itself. This illustration works well as an example both of the independent aspect of the principle of life and its “law-like” character:

270 This distinction could also be understood as grounding the life of the soul and thus the human person fundamentally to the existential world-relation. The soul and man do not exist in the world as distinct objects, but instead are inextricably part of the full/entire constitution of the world.

271 Laestadius refers to the definition of *existentia sine essentia et sine substantia* as a possible proof of the immortality of the soul, and he also flirts with the physical law of constancy. I come back to this idea at the end of my study. (See, §228Note.)

272 See also §167, and of unconscious activity §193–4. (the rivalry within the matter)

“[W]hen heat is perceived, its conductor is viewed as its principle (as an organ), although heat is its own principle. Likewise, the principle of life is nothing other than life itself, but the materialist mind cannot comprehend that the two are one. The mind gropes for something that it can grasp with its sense (förståndet famlar efter någonting, som finns I sinneverlden); this is the real reason why the philosophers are entirely unable to imagine that the life of the soul and the soul itself are one and the same.” (§130&Note.)²⁷³

Thus, Laestadius holds that the principle of life can be conceived as autonomous and distinct “as a power”; however, its freedom is relative since its functioning and action is determined by matter, which actually means that matter functions as the “causal” mediator and modifier of the manifestations of the principle of life.²⁷⁴

For Laestadius, the monistic vitalist notion of the principle of life seems more coherent, heuristic, and even experientially a more plausible starting point. This experientially given, but metaphysical, notion is a necessary *hypothesis* for the anthropological-psychological context as well as for onto-theological elaborations²⁷⁵).

“We freely admit that the idea of a common principle of life is a hypothesis, but note that hypotheses are the psychologists’ only point of departure. Hypotheses, however, need to be such that the conclusions (slutsatser) to which they lead are not in opposition to sound popular opinion (folkomdömet).” (§118. See also §58)

273 See also §§227, 228Note, 245Note. On the soul as the principle of life, see §§153–168.

274 In §580Note, Laestadius deals with the relationship between the principle and idea: “An idea realis non substantialis (see section F.F.F.) is, to be sure, freer than idea substantialis. And if the idea is mistaken for substance, then it is as if the idea was entirely free and independent of the organism. However, it is merely an illusion that the idea is not dependent on its principle. Through death, the idea is not torn away from its principle = the soul. Thus it does not come freer after death. But that the soul itself, or the substance, is freed when it is torn from its bodily bonds is something that can be considered. See section F.F.F. wherein the doctrine of the relationship of the idea to its principle is dealt with. Generally in metaphysics, theologians and philosophers have skipped over this point and, therefore, fumble around in ignorance about the cause and foundation of freedom; they do not draw distinction between the idea itself and the foundation, the principle, of the idea. If the idea is dependent on its principle, that is to say, merely an expression or product of life, then the idea is not free – its principle is free. This is what the spiritualists claim: that the soul or ‘the spirit is free.’” Here Laestadius’ theory can be interpreted also as a certain kind of monistic functionalism.

275 What happens in the body happens in the soul and vice versa – the conscious or transcendental experience and physiological experience, which is based on sensory perception, are both different dimensions of the same perceptual whole wherein it is not possible to make a distinction between the outer and inner perception, or even draw a sharp distinction between ego and the world.

The principle of life is a metaphysical force (Kraft) that intellect cannot comprehend in a similar manner as the intellect cannot comprehend all the forces of nature. However, feeling and emotion can grasp and experience *the function* of the principle of life:

”We can imagine that the principle of life is a metaphysical force (kraft) that the mind (förståndet) is unable to grasp (att fatta); there are numerous forces (kraft) in nature that the mind has sought in vain to understand (att fatta). *Feeling* perceives the activities of the principle of life, but the latter cannot itself – as hidden life – be grasped by anyone; neither with the mind (förståndet), nor through feeling. All our knowledge of the principle of life must derive from conclusions (slutsatser).” (§159.) However, principle of life is a necessary hypothesis for proceeding in investigation (§1420).

Thus, the ineffability of the principle of life itself becomes evident. However, Laestadius states that the “conclusions” – referring to the results, but also to the manifestation of the principle of life – opens the possibility of evaluating the truth about the notion of the principle of life. Laestadius wants to highlight the notion that *there is not any kind of Idea that would generate “forms,”* only the functioning principle of life within organism creates organic forms. The principle of life as a genetic creative principle generates organs and the whole system of organic life, and is thus a creative force (§166). Furthermore, organs constitute the spirit (pneuma) in both time and place, and they cannot be created in any another way (§227).²⁷⁶ Laestadius emphasized that soul does not function in time and place without organs. The soul manifests itself in the vital organic functions.

“There is only one middle road for us to choose, between ideal and substantial [notions of] personhood. If we follow the guidelines of nature itself, in the fashioning of human personhood, we find that we are given a principle of life in the seed, in the egg, in the fetus shortly after conception [...] [W]e must believe that our origins come from this obscure natural foundation. Yet life is not lawless; it is bound by physical necessity. [...] *psyche and pneuma are branches of common principle of life. If we now were to posit the principle of life in the place of the soul, we have, within this principle of life, the foundation, or the subject, for our self-consciousness.* But since this

276 By this notion, we can conclude that Laestadius’ notion differs from the Aristotelian *hylomorphic* notion of soul that conceives soul as a *form of the matter* and the Platonic conception of soul as the highest Idea (§195). The soul is not a result of mere influences of sense perceptions; it is also an intensive force, embodied life, that reacts intentionally (via passions) to the world and existence as such.

principle of life has not yet been defined by any thinker as ‘being (väsén) or substance,’ we are, within psychology freed from metaphysical necessity and thus able to move a little bit freer in the sphere of subjective personhood.” (§1205.)

By this general definition, Laestadius draws the distinction between vital principle and the idea of *ego cogito* or metaphysical Idea or Being as a grounding substance. For him, they are intellectualistic, abstract, and thus problematic starting points. Laestadius sees the principle of life as a better starting point than pure Ego Cogito or Idea, for it resonates with lived experience and popular opinion (§118).

* * *

In the “ontological” sense, the principle of life means a vital force which is a panpsychistic presupposition about all organic beings. The principle of life signifies the vital “psychic essence” of a human being and the “original soul” on which all the physiological and mental processes of life are based. In other words, the principle of life is the *constitutive foundation* of the human person and its life. Thus, the principle of life is a *monistic principle*, embedded in organic life, but possessing the transcendental character, the ineffable, and the invisible dimension. This immanent-transcendental character is to be conceived in the following way: The principle of life as such is transcendental, but present in its manifestation and functions, common ground for the life of the body and the mind, a necessary ground for uniting all vital processes, the origin of the physiological and spiritual constitution, and the initial horizon for vitalist theorizing.²⁷⁷

Laestadius believed that vitalism offers a way that is *between idealism and materialism*; the soul is the life of the body, it exists devoid of *substantia* as well as *essentia*. To conceive of the principle of life as a “psychic essence” of a human being and the basis of the vital event that is life is Laestadius’ alternative way out of the gap between *idealism* and *materialism*, the dominating currents of 1800’s anthropology and theology. Laestadius’ purposely leans on the vitalist tradition even though a vitalist critique of rationalistic mechanism was mainly superseded in philosophy by the 1850’s. Laestadius chose to rely on this early anthropological tradition, and chose not to follow the problematic metaphysical rationalism or transcendental philosophy.

277 Heuristically we could refer to the phenomena of nature, which hides its processes from empirical perception, or to the otherness of the other person that remains infinitely something other than myself and never comes transparent for my experience, etc., which thus discloses the epiphenomenal character of the present nature or the Other.

On the basis of the notion of the principle of life, Laestadius started to develop his own psychological and theology theory that included a wide range of re-definitions and phenomenological analyses of the faculties of the soul, their relationship to each other, the significance of passions in man, life, and faith, and therefore, a re-definition of man and God.

The contemporary reader may wonder how to conceive the conceptual distinctions between the spirit, soul, and mind from this perspective of Laestadius' theory. First of all, we have to recall that Laestadius wanted to hold and elaborate his views to coincide with Biblical notions, while he still respected the medical vitalist knowledge as an adequate possibility for thematizing and proofing Biblical notions as correct. Altogether, we can generally state that in Laestadius' theory the notion of the principle of life coincides with the concept of spirit (pneuma), and its embodied manifestation coincides with the notion of soul (psyche) while the notion of mind (förståndet, hug [håg]) comes to indicate a specific faculty of the embodied soul or consciousness, which is inextricably dependant on the whole embodied soul (psyche). As pointed out earlier, Laestadius did not make sharp phenomental distinctions and saw the relationship between spirit, soul and mind as being constitutive in their structure.

4.2 The Body and Embodied Consciousness and Mind

In Laestadius' theory, the holistic notion of the human person was analyzed through the conceptual trinity of the principle of life, organic life²⁷⁸ and sensory life²⁷⁹. Laestadius' approach is that of the natural historian and natural philosopher in its character, and he views the *constitution* of human organic and sensory life to be developmental.²⁸⁰

278 The idea that passions belong to organic life, but they impact anima life comes from Bichat's theory (Cf. Bichat 1815, §3). It is often emphasized that Bichat was the one to make a sharp distinction between organic life and animal life. From a phenomenological perspective, it seems to me that we should pay more attention to Bichat's way of trying to see these physiological domains as together in their activity. Then we can see that Bichat comes closer to psychosomatic thought and even a phenomenological view for how embodied functions and states constitute the basis of cognitive life and voluntary action, or seeing the wider picture, the embodied way of being in the world of the human being. This psychosomatic and phenomenological way of thought also pertains to Laestadius.

279 On the relationship between sensory life and organic life and the relation between the principle of life and physical force, see the response following §45 (note) and therein cited §§ 56, 111 note, 214, 215, 222, 223, 246, 260, 266, 267, 275, 392. On the relationship between life force and the physical forces, see §§138 note, 155 note, 167 note, 185 note.

280 Laestadius' way of theorizing was that of a strong natural historian and natural scientific ethos. Man is approached as a growing and developing organism (see §188 about the development of the faculties); all the human phenomena, such as consciousness and spirituality, are conceived in terms of this horizon (generally realistic and solid views, but when going to details, for example, with regard to the emergence of mind or moral, problems do emerge).

This developmental approach seeks to form a psychosomatic insight on the human being, and it forms the *theory of constitution*, i.e., the principle of life as the foundation of organic life lays the constitutive foundation for the living organic human being, including sensory capabilities and the capabilities of a higher cognitive life. In this respect, Laestadius also constructed his theory of consciousness or the human mind²⁸¹.

Laestadius saw advantages in beginning with the vitalist notion of principle of life both in regard to the Biblical notions of psyche and pneuma and in regard to the problem of body/mind dualism. He claimed that Scripture knows only two forms of life, namely, psyche and pneuma. According to Laestadius, “philosophers” however refer to three life forms; first, there is organic or vegetative life; second is animal or psychological life; and third is rational soul. Laestadius pointed out that philosophers struggle with deciding whether these three forms of life constitute one single or three separate beings (§47.²⁸²) Further, Laestadius claimed that the notion of rational soul (nuus, kr. nūs) is just the philosopher’s imaginary postulation that is not known by scripture or by physicians (§48).

According to Laestadius, the principle of life corresponds to lived experience as original soul, and thus is theoretically worthwhile and a more plausible “ontological” starting point. He sees that by using the means of the principle of life, the Cartesian and general dualism between the soul/mind and body can be overcome:

“By assuming a common principle of life (lifprincip) for both lives, most of the difficulties in which the philosophers have entangled themselves, by assuming the substantiality of both the body and the soul, disappear. When only one force is active in both lives (except the natural forces of the body) and serves as the common foundation of the life of the body and of the soul, none of the three hypotheses concerning the correct relationship between the body and the soul are needed. Nor is there any need for any of the three hypotheses about the creation of the soul, since the principle of life is present in the fetus shortly after conception” (§114.)

281 Methodologically Laestadius seems to have both the empiricist objectifying and the experiential pre-phenomenological perspective of the body. These could be referred to as organic body and lived body. For instance in §45, Laestadius refers to the co-existence of organic life and sensory life. This is not a thematization of body and soul or mind, but rather the vitalist conceptualization of the psychophysiological basis for the functioning of body and soul. These lives are conjoined, but not parallel, and the relationship between organic life and sensory life is totally different than the relationship between soul and body or spirit and body. Laestadius states that organic body falls under the laws of nature which are the same in form, e.g., gravity. Here Laestadius thinks of body as a matter (object), not as an organic passionate life or lived body. When the analysis turns to talk about the original soul as the principle of life and the functioning and significance of passions within consciousness, it can be interpreted that Laestadius emphasized the experiential lived body more.

282 See further §§ 56Note1, 83, 85, 86, 89

More specific analyses of human consciousness and functioning mind are dealt with under the concept of “faculties of soul.” Laestadius uses the term ‘soul’ to refer to the human mind and consciousness in a broad extent that covers both organic life and sensory life (which he coincided with the Biblical use of psyche and pneuma). When elaborating on his views Laestadius refers to the principle of life to the soul as the common basis and original vital principle of all organic beings²⁸³. The notion of the principle of life is needed to unit organic and sensory life. Further, the principle of life as original soul (the actual living phenomenon) refers also to sensory life at a higher developmental level which signifies the individual and the singular manifestation of soul, and thus is more personal. “Faculties of soul” is an umbrella concept for the all pre-cognitive-organic as well as for higher conscious and cognitive manifestations of a co-existing body-mind in the world. Within the faculties of the soul Laestadius makes several distinctions to explicate how sensitive embodied mind (encompassing the psyche and pneuma) dwells in the world. Such distinctions include especially the distinction between objective consciousness and subjective consciousness as well as the distinction between the faculties of subjective and objective consciousness.

4.2.1 Organic Life and Sensory Life as the Basis of Psychophysiology

The main distinction in Laestadius’ anthropological conceptions, was the one that was dividing the vital functions into *organic life* (*organliv*) and *sensory life* (*nervliv*, *nerv-life*), both of which have their own, but interrelated, domains of organic structures. This conception formed the basic psycho-physiological foundation for Laestadius’ manner of analyzing the constitution of human existence in the world as embodied human being and psychological person facilitated by specific pre-cognitive, cognitive, and intellectual capabilities. This distinction is adopted from Xavier Bichat’s *Life and Death* (1805) within which Bichat made his groundbreaking and influential distinction between organic life and animal life²⁸⁴.

The relatively differentiated domains functioned as physiological seats and structures and they aggregated the different psychophysiological functions, faculties, vital forces, and capabilities into an integrated human person by the power of the principle of life. The triad of the principle of life, organic life and sensory life forms the conceptual and phenomenal basis for Laestadius’ *theory of the constitution of a human person*.

283 Laestadius seemed to think that we can also understand animals and their functions of soul using the vitalist psychophysiological perspective. Even if animals possess the undeveloped organs of sensory life compared to humans, they actually have the same basic structures. Animals possess the common principle of life, including original soul, sensitivity, perceptible relation to surroundings, and even higher cognitive capabilities, such as feelings, thinking, desiring, etc.

284 See Bichat 1815; e.g., Haigh 1984

“But it is at least not unthinkable that these two life forms may have a common principle that operates through the organs, in both directions, in such a way that the organs – serving as the conductors of the life force – determine both lives. *We may initially suppose that there is a ‘common principle of life’ for both lives* (see §13 and §§ listed in footnote 21). The conclusions to be drawn from this will show whether the hypothesis is more unreasonable than the plethora of other hypotheses upon which psychological systems have been constructed.” (§112. my emphasis)

One common principle united the trinity (§223). The whole distinction between organic life and sensory life rested on the principle of life, as it signifies the primary living essence of the human organism by being capable of sensibility for acting and receiving action. The principle of life functions as the creative force within the human being, and it functions as the origin of growth and development and the core of the “psychic essence” of a human person.

“[T]rinity as it exists within man’s own personhood. There we have real ‘*hypostases*,’ or realities within single substance; namely, first, the principle of life or ‘*abstract life*’ which is able to subsist without organic life and without sensory life. Second, ‘organic life,’ which has its foundation within the principle of life; one cannot say that organic life is absolutely necessary for the existence of principle of life, but the principle of life is absolutely necessary for the emergence of organic life. *The principle of life relates to organic life as foundation relates to effect or as cause relates to consequence ...*” (§1408. my emphases added)

Thus, the principle of life functions as the constitutive origin of the unity of an embodied conscious human being.

As noted above (Chapter 4.2) the principle of life functions as the generative force affecting first movements, vital functions, growth, development and the life of the human organism, but as a general hypothesis and a “law-like” constitutive basis (and “subject”) of human existence, it gains various meanings depending on what kind of vital process is in question. This animated organic function signifies a *physiological constitution* and the development of organic as well as a sensory life. It lays the basis for a conscious life and the individual personality of the human being. Laestadius calls organic life and sensory life different *life forms*, and they are the branches of the principle of life as psyche and pneuma (spirit).

Laestadius saw that physicians agree that man has no more than two forms of life, “that is, the *vegetative soul* – also known as the *organic* or *vegetative life* – and *sensory life*, also referred to as *animal, psychological, or sensitive life* (See Bichat [1805], p. 3).”

(§56.) Laestadius saw the possibility to explain the Biblical notions of the psyche and pneuma in terms of organic and sensory life, as “*psychae* corresponds most closely to what is nowadays referred to as *organic* or *vegetative life*, while *pneuma* corresponds to *sensory life* and denotes the immortal spirit.” (§56Note1.) According to Laestadius “*psychae* originally denoted organic life,” and the life of the senses ought to be considered as being synonymous with sensory life. (§56Note2.) Similarly, as organic life and sensory life are vital developmental aspects of the principle of life, Laestadius also viewed psyche and pneuma as separate branches of the *common* principle of life²⁸⁵.

Thus, it is obvious that Laestadius did not see the relationship between body and mind as simply correlated with the relation between organic life and sensory life. Rather, we should interpret the body/mind –relation as analyzed using the notions of the principle of life, organic life and sensory life to expand the notion of mind and cover the embodied organic and even unconscious sphere of human being as well.

These domains have their own organic structures, but they also form a whole and specific functional totality together. Indeed, an embodied physiological organization and vital functions lay the groundwork for the emergence, *constitution*, and functions of mind. Thus, mind is conceived as embodied phenomena, inextricably attached to the totality of corporeal and organic processes. The mind is not an independent cognitive faculty, for Laestadius refers to whole vital processes and functions of the human organism as “*psychic*”, and it becomes evident that “mind” also has to be conceived as a particular embodied [panpsychistic] *emergent phenomena* of organic functions.

Laestadius actually accused Petrelli for not demonstrating the basic terms of a conjoined existence of the body and soul. (§45.)

“The relationship between body (kropp) and soul (själ) is commonly confused with the relationship between organic and sensory life, yet the relationship between the two former is wholly different from that which obtains between the two latter. The body is under the influence of homogenous and constant laws of physics, such as gravity. The relationship between body and spirit (ande) would therefore be the same as the relationship between physical forces and the force of life, whereas the relationship between organic and sensory life is of an entirely different nature.” (§45Note. emphasis added)²⁸⁶

Proceeding in terms of psychophysiological constitution is crucially significant, as the temporal order of creation, growth, and development of organs radiates also

285 See, e.g. §§1205, 1172

286 For the relationship between organic and sensory life, see §§ 56, 111Note, 214, 215, 222, 223, 246, 260, 266, 267, 275, 392. For the relationship between life force and physical force, see, for instance, §§ 138Note, 155Note, 167Note, 185Note.

to the relationship between the psychological faculties of the mind. The temporal precedence of the creation of organic life in relation to sensory life and the organic connections formed during the creative process and development determines the hierarchical order of the *functioning* of organic life and sensory life. It follows then from the temporal precedence of the formation of organic life that sensory life has to function under both the dominance and influence of organic life and its vital impacting forces²⁸⁷. (§436, 437.)

The domain of organic life contains all the internal organs – heart, lungs, liver, kidneys, genital organs and so forth, which belong to organic life and form an organic basis for organic vital functions. What is characteristic is that humoral activity, neural and blood vessel connections between different organs, and their varying activity relate to each other to constitute the total structural basis for vital functions and phenomena.

For Laestadius, Bichat’s theory serves as scientific proof that animal or sensory life – the seat of the mind and the individual soul that the brain is – functions under the dominance of the organic functions. The neural impulses directly and different combinations of humoral “matters” mediated through blood vessels *via the heart* to the organs of sensory life affect and dominate its functioning. Thus, the sensory life is *submissive* to the organic life already because of both genetic and anatomical development. Generally speaking, the organic functions and vital forces, such as *passions*, instincts, and drives are brought to the organs of sensory life by nerves and blood where they manifest as feelings, emotions, and cognitions. This same physiological structure has remained in the creation, formation, and development of sensory life.

* * *

The sensory life then is divided into two interlocking spheres – inner and outer – according to their physiological relationships. The center of sensory life (*nervliv*) is our two brains:

The little brain (*cerebellum*) receives stimulation from the inner “world” of organs and passions and is, therefore, the organ of subjective consciousness. The big brain (*cerebrum*) receives influence and impressions from the outer objective “world” using the five senses, and is, therefore, the organ of objective consciousness²⁸⁸.

287 Laestadius is highly interested in developmental theory and its perspective which reveals his natural scientific and natural philosophical character.

288 “We may call the part of the brain affected by red blood the organ of subjective consciousness or the organ of the inner senses (*inre känslornas organ*); while the objective part of the brain may be called the organ of objective consciousness.” (§ 181. See also §§ 180, 239).

Thus, the experiential sphere of the sensory life (consciousness) is a manifestation of the totality of organic functions and vital influences based on the principle of life, the ineffable and basically undefined totality that is also called the original/real soul, indicating that it covers all the original functions and forces of the organic life. The conscious sphere of the sensory life (nervlif), is called the *genuine soul*, which indicates the individual aspects of the life of the soul, and has to be conceived of and viewed as the “higher developmental stage” of the original soul.

“[S]ensory life defines the individual[ity] (bestämmer individualiteten) while organic life defines personality.” (§473.) “Sensory life is apparently fashioned for this world, and may rather be called individuality, than personhood.” (§711.)

This whole of these organic and sensory vital functions constitutes the organic and neural foundation of the *psychological-physical* existence of man, a fully embodied basis of experiential life. *At the formal level* we have then Laestadius’ idea of the common principle of life, which is the shared animated and constitutive basis for all organic beings and the idea of a more individual sphere of soul as the manifestation of the organic functions that exist within the sensory life.

With regard to the sensory life as a genuine individual sphere, we have to be more precise. The sensory and neural life has its physio-neural basis within the body functions, but the sensory life refers also to the whole psychological sphere of consciousness. Moreover, the sensory life covers both subjective and objective consciousness, as it is not only (a domain of) the manifestation of inner organic passions, but also receives influences and impressions from the objective sensory world.

“The passions belong to organic life: thoughts, or intelligence, reason, memory, will, and so forth belong to sensory life. Yet the activities of sensory life depend on vegetative life; that is to say, the will is dependent on the heart, or the passions. The passions have their organs in the sphere of organic life. We refer to the passions as subjective faculties of the soul due to the position and nature of their activity; not because they are subject to the will, but because their organs are located beneath the organs of sensory life. Intelligence, reason, will, and others, we may refer to as objective faculties of the soul, similar to the objective senses that receive impressions from the sensory world in a more direct way.” (§222.)

The sensory life is simultaneously both a domain of outer impressions moving through the senses and the receptive domain of inner influences coming through nerves and blood. Objective consciousness is made up of sense perceptions’ receiving

impressions from the outer world and simultaneously modified and influenced by the states of subjective consciousness²⁸⁹, namely, organic functions such as passions. Thus, the individual manifestation of the soul (principle of life) is always a matter of (or due to) how the individual in question *relates* to his/her *particular surrounding* world with his/her subjective characteristics based on his/her unique organic constitution and vital organization. Generally speaking, the individual soul that covers both subjective and objective relatedness (body, world, and vital forces) *refers in a way to the structure and constitution of the individual and personal habituality or the [vital] personhood*. I later come back to discuss the “individual soul” and the process of perception in more detail when I discuss the subjective and objective faculties of the soul (Chapter 4.2.3).

From a vitalist perspective then, it becomes understandable what Laestadius meant when he stated that the relationship between the faculties of the soul coincide/equate with the relationship between the organs in responsible of their faculties. He indicated especially the relationship between the *subjective and objective faculties of soul*. Because of the developmental precedence of organic life and its vital dominance, the organic life and thus its subjective faculties dominate the objective faculties of the soul or objective consciousness as a whole. Further, Laestadius also held that the relations between the faculties of objective consciousness, such as reason, will, and understanding, were related to each other in an analogical way as their organic seats. This aspect pertains especially to the order of the influences of passions to the sensory life with the primal *principle here being that passions that function through same organs cannot have conflicting impacts on the objective faculties of the soul*. Only when the passions originate from different organs that are opposite to each other in their influences, can they manifest opposite and conflicting cognitive states in the mind (or in the faculties of objective consciousness). Further, the primal principle is that the *stronger passion* gets its impacts through to the sensory life.

“These physiological observations prove that the faculties of the soul operate through the organs; that the capacity of the organ give rise to a corresponding capacity of the faculty of soul. Or, to put it differently, that the capacity of each faculty of the soul has a corresponding capacity in the

289 Sometimes Laestadius equated subjective consciousness with the subconscious sphere or unconsciousness. It can also be assumed that Laestadius inherited his notion of the unconsciousness from Carl Gustav Carus. However, the states of subjective consciousness are not self-conscious/aware in a sense that they are reflected or lifted up to awareness by the faculties of the objective consciousness.

organs, whereof the faculties of the soul are related to each other in the same way as their respective organs are related.” (§26²⁹⁰.)

Here Laestadius followed the physiological theory of Bichat and constructed a psychosomatic theory of the relation between organic functions and operations of the soul and mind. Laestadius thought that dualist philosophers would argue the soul to be some kind of entity which modifies the organs, but according to Laestadius, the relationship ought to be understood the other way around. He provocatively stated that organs are modifying the soul. Laestadius simply wanted to highlight the primality of organic functions over the condition of “embodied soul” namely, that “the activity of the soul always corresponds to organic activity.”²⁹¹

Here it is enough to point out the physico-psychic triadic constitution of man as an initial constitutive ground for the possibility of higher conscious activity and functions.

“[In] this treatise it has been shown that *the principle of life is the actual being of the soul* (egentliga själs väsendet); that it is free as an active force; that the force of life is not dependent on man’s will. We have also shown that organic life is not dependent on man’s will. We have also shown that organic life existed prior to sensory life or the rational soul; that sensory life springs forth from organic life and has its foundation therein, and that the activity of sensory life is dependent on organic contingencies: that man thinks through organs, will through organs, and so forth.” (§436.)

4.2.2 Subjective Consciousness and Objective Consciousness

In *The Lunatic*, the more detailed analysis of the whole of experiential sphere is worked through using the interlocking notions of *subjective consciousness* and *objec-*

290 According to Laestadius, the precedence of the organic functions pertains also to the supernatural, as the Devil and Holy Spirit must “work in man through the organs.” (§26. reply to Dahl.) I do exclude the last sentence of §26 because there remains some doubt whether it was written by Laestadius. The sentence is not found in Mustakallio’s Finnish translation (1968), but it does emerge in Strindberg’s English translation (2015) with a note that the sentence was added later, “probably by Laestadius.” This sentence states that “Beyond this, they are not related.” Laestadius’ view on the relations between the faculties is ambiguous; even if his vision is based on organicist manifestations, it does not signify that the states of the faculties would not have influenced each other. What he meant is that the relationship between the faculties is always based on physiological processes. These will be further analyzed later.

291 With regard to the primal importance and even the precedence of organic functions with respect to higher functions of the mind and soul, Laestadius’ views can be analyzed in terms of the James-Lange –theory. This analysis falls out of the framework of this study, however. See for further comparison, e.g., James 1890/1950; Cannon 1927; Perry 1935; Redding 2001; Lang 1994.

tive consciousness (medvetande). The distinction belongs to the sphere of sensory life (*nervlif*) and pertains to the phenomena of mind as a domain of embodied consciousness. Generally speaking, it refers to the rather problematic distinction between the inner and outer spheres of experience and is deconstructed from a medical vitalist basis.²⁹² Thus, the two consciousnesses naturally have a physiological foundation and are conceived as particularly sensible capabilities of the human person.

Subjective and objective consciousness (*medvetande*) as phenomena are psychophysiologicaly intertwined, and they form the undivided whole of human experiential reality. Usually, the notions of “experience” are properly disclosed by combining the subjective and objective consciousness. This means that all the *experiences* are always constituted of both subjective and objective consciousness conditions. Thus, the distinction indicates that there is never a mere empirical sense perception that is independent of the conditions of the subjective consciousness. Also, the subjective conditions are always stimulated by sense perception, as will be seen in more detail when analyzing the functions of passions.

Objective consciousness is first of all responsible for the [sensory] relationship to the world outside, or objective surroundings, from where it takes on influences or impressions for the organs of objective consciousness via the five senses.²⁹³ Objective consciousness refers to the realm of consciousness known as cognitive awareness, which is based on the organs of sensory life, namely, the big brain [cerebral].

Based on the grounding principle of the subordination of sensory life to organic life, objective consciousness is seen as conditioned (subordinated) by subjective consciousness. Subjective consciousness is not directed outside in the first place, but “inside” – *or rather it is open to organic life* – as it takes its influences from the organic life and *passions* through the blood and nerves.²⁹⁴ This thus emphasizes the

292 Pressured by a rational-mechanistic worldview and rationalistic-metaphysical theology Laestadius sought for better fitting views to use to approach the phenomena of life and faith. Laestadius realized that matters of life, such as sorrow and joy, as well as matters of faith could not be understood by simplifying and objectifying reason, but rather by using the heart (subjective consciousness, passions and emotions). (See, §§100–104.) In a sense then, Laestadius thematized a distinction between the mathematical natural scientific approach and the more hermeneutic experiential approach. Heart came to signify the whole field of inner and existential experience and perception. The phenomenological-existential field of inner experience and perception differed also from the outer and empirically direct experience and perception. On the other hand, Laestadius was trying to find an alternative for empiricism and a materialistic explanation and also for idealism and spiritualistic explanations. Through applying the notions of subjective and objective consciousness Laestadius thematized his holistic theory of experience and perception.

293 See, §239.

294 For the subjective consciousness [SC] see, §§ 242, 627 [SC is a domain of red blood, mere senses, and the *inner eye*], 744 [SC is the receptive organ of good and evil], 745, 753 [the whole soul constitutes the person, SC is the organ of conscience], 1207 [SC as an authentic self], 1211 [SC as a feeling self], 1582 [SC depends on the organs and covers the emotions of the heart].

common vitalist scheme of things where the domain of consciousness (cognitive life or “mind”) does not restrict/delimit or demarcate only to the animal/sensory life or brains, but rather is intertwined with the internal organs and the whole of the embodied vital organic functions as well²⁹⁵. For Laestadius, this way of thought signified the emphasis of the functions of the internal organs, their relation to each other, and the influences of the vital forces of passions over the entire consciousness. In this sense, both the subjective and objective consciousnesses are *constitutive* manifestations of the physiological organization and functions of the organic life and the sensory life. However, the relation between subjective and objective consciousness cannot be analyzed and depicted without paying attention to the *mediating functions* and actions occurring between the relatively distinct physiological structures. All physiological impacts, such as sense perception and the functions of susceptible organs, are based on neural activity, as well as the organic activity of the humours, *especially excited by the passions*.

The distinction between subjective and objective consciousness is comparable to the physiological organization in such a way that the organs of sensory life are subordinated and passive in relation to the organic life. They have to receive the influences awakened by passions and mediated for the organs of consciousness by the blood and nerves. For this reason also, the *faculties of soul* have to remain in relation to each other as their respective organs also do:

“And insofar as the brain is always physically in a passive relationship to the heart, then the *metaphysical brain* – sensory life, or the rational soul – must also be in a passive relationship to the *metaphysical heart*²⁹⁶, that is to say, the objective faculties of the soul – intellect, reason, will, conscience, memory, imagination – must be passive in relation to passions.” (§437.)²⁹⁷

When referring to the “metaphysical brain” and “metaphysical heart” Laestadius actually focused on the phenomenal and spiritual experiential sphere, which was a manifestation of the functions of the named organs. I come back to this idea later in the chapter on the psychophysiological foundation (Chapter 5). The idea, however, is that the experiential manifestations are also based on the physiological constitutional

295 Cf. e.g. Haigh 1984; Williams 2002.

296 Thus, the *moral and the spiritual* are regarded as based on organic life, namely, on the *moral passions*, but their actualization emerges in the manifestations of the sensory life. Sensory life and the objective faculties of soul are important for executing moral thought and action and directing whole intentionality of the human being, but they still remain subordinated to the passions of heart, which is herein named the “metaphysical heart” to emphasize that heart’s central role as the sensible-susceptible center of passions.

297 “This is the foundation of the passivity of the will.” (§438.)

asymmetrical relationship between the subjective and objective consciousness. In the wider picture, the embodied Self (jaget/ego) is under the influence of direct empiric sensory influences and the mediated influences of the organic functions.

In this way, Laestadius thought that the influences of organic life and its vital forces manifested and “interpreted” in the subjective consciousness were crucial for the emergence, constitution, and functioning of whole consciousness, awareness and experiential phenomena.

In Laestadius’ theory, the experiential core (existence and faith) is moved from autonomous intellect or reason into the holistic organic and embodied subjective consciousness and its faculties. This experiential core is also called the *heart, genuine self and sometime the unconsciousness*, referring to Carl Gustav Carus’ (1789–1869) early invention of the psychoanalytic notion of unconsciousness²⁹⁸ that Laestadius saw as coincidental to his own idea of subjective consciousness (§194Note, §423Note).²⁹⁹

4.2.3 Subjective and Objective Faculties of the Soul

At the beginning of his treatise, Laestadius states that normally all people are aware of the existence of the faculties of soul and that all the faculties of soul have been named while the people were still “inexpert in these matters, long before the philosophers began speculating.” (§4&creply.) By this statement, Laestadius indicates that faculties of soul, such as reason, will, understanding, and imagination, rather than being imaginary postulates, are real and genuinely experiential phenomena. However, he also notes that there is still no agreement on the functions of each particular faculty, and that each is not defined precisely because the psychology still had an insufficient discipline (§4). Laestadius then proceeds to depict these faculties in vitalistic terms and in their critical relationship to their rationalistic and intellectualistic definitions. In general, the re-definitions of the faculties of soul are based on the critique of intellectualistic³⁰⁰ definitions of these faculties as far as they are grounded on the metaphysical notion of soul as substance and essence (distinct faculties of transcendental subjectivity without any physiological basis).

Within the conceptual distinction between subjective and objective consciousness Laestadius also differentiates the spheres of subjective from the objective *faculties* of

298 Cf. Carus 1989. (*Psyche: on the development of the soul. Part One, The unconscious.*) In Laestadius’ use: Carus: *Psyche zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Seele*, Stuttgart 1851. See further Bell 2010. Cf. Sundén 1956, 21–36. (*Sigmund Freud och Lars Levi Laestadius: vid hundraårs-minnet av Freuds födelse.*)

299 As an idea, this one is not original, but its explanatory and interpretative pre-phenomenological formulations make it philosophically interesting: The core of metanoia, conversion, is not in the human intellect but in the heart – the entire embodied human being.

300 I use the terms “intellectualistic” and “intellectualism” to refer to the metaphysical rationalism and transcendentalism that Laestadius criticized.

soul (själsförmögenheterna). In this respect, the sphere of consciousness is structured by fastening the classical faculties of soul – memory, reason, understanding, will and imagination – using the vitalist psychophysiological basis. Thus, the faculties are redefined within vitalist psychophysiological framework. It signifies that these faculties are depicted as more or less *organicist receptive and perceptive capabilities* which are related both to outer empirical influences or impressions and internal organic influences. Overall, the faculties of soul human being are conditioned and situated in the midst of the world. Faculties are sensory capabilities (senses) rather than mere distinct cognitive faculties of “mind” or “intellect”. Laestadius emphasized especially the passions as embodied subjective faculties, which function through organic life driving the forces of human life and laying the ground for certain specific objective faculties and functions of consciousness or mind.

In Laestadius’ theory, the *faculties of soul* are derived from the *relation* between subjective and objective consciousness. Further, he states that faculties are both “distinct and specific.” (§246.) Naturally, faculties are based on the vital sensibility and power of the principle of life, which functions as the “the fulcrum of all faculties of soul,” and is thus a constitutive basis for the unity of man. (§246Note.) Laestadius defines the faculties of soul as follows:

“By objective faculties of the soul are meant memory, reason, will, and imagination, all of which have their corresponding organs in the objective part of the brain. Subjective faculties of the soul are those of the heart; the passions.” (§30Note2.)³⁰¹

Later Laestadius adds *juridical conscience*, which signifies the knowledge of right and wrong, to the objective faculties.³⁰² As well he adds emotions, instincts, character and passions into the subjective faculties. Passions is said to signify heart in spiritual meaning (later *spiritual conscience*) (§246).³⁰³

301 For objective faculties, see Sections N-Q and W-Ö. For subjective faculties, see sections Q-V. Cf. §§ 181, 246.

302 “Juridical conscience” as an objective faculty contrasts with the “spiritual conscience” which belongs to the subjective sphere. With this distinction, Laestadius seems to indicate that man has a natural moral capability objectively, but it is insufficient, as it could turn into moral calculation and does not function on the basis of moral emotions and experiences as spiritual conscience would. This distinction naturally relates to his later distinction made between juridical and psychic reconciliation, which I will analyze later in Chapters 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 and 5.5.4.

303 Juridical conscience as a reflective sense of right and a concept of right and the subjective faculties is said to include “all kinds of feelings, instincts, desires, temperament, and passions; or the heart in spiritual sense.” (§246. See also §246Note: On the unity of man and the principle of life.)

The faculties of objective consciousness are memory, understanding (förstånd) reason (förmunft³⁰⁴), will (önska), imagination (inbillning) and juridical conscience (seat: brains).³⁰⁵ As objective consciousness relates to the world outside or objective surroundings through the five senses, faculties such as reason, will and understanding are also attached and directed toward the present outer objectified world. Objective consciousness indicates the realm of cognitive awareness and factual directedness of a human being (mind and action) that pertains to the phenomena of sensory life, seated on the cerebral.³⁰⁶

Faculties of subjective consciousness are passions, instincts (instincter), drives (drifter), character (temperament), emotions (känslor), and moral-spiritual conscience³⁰⁷. They refer to the influences and impacts of organic functions and indicate the *inner pre-cognitive sphere* seated in the cerebellum, which as the receptive organ, functions as the seat of the manifestations of subjective impacts. We can thus interpret that Laestadius refers using the faculties of subjective consciousness to the lived and ownmost pre-reflective and pre-cognitive dimension of experience on a phenomenological-existential level which have also their own particular physiological constitutive basis. As far as Laestadius states that subjective consciousness is primal within man's relation to existence, *that experience* is not conceived as a cognitive representation in the first place, but rather as an intimate feeling within the psycho-physiological body

304 Laestadius differentiated the notions of reason and understanding, holding that reason is a “faculty of ideas” (§596) and understanding is a “faculty/capability for thinking.” (§625); however, Laestadius also stated that the distinction is relative. For more on the faculties of soul and their organs, see §§30, 33, 34, 97, 98, 112, 139; notes 1, 2, 145, 146, 222, 246. By combining the vitalist notion of heart and Biblical idea of heart as the source of good and evil; see §§ 62, 88, 124note, 128 note, 147, 202, 218 note, 267note, 318, 413, 437, 455, 458, 478, 539, 619, 622, 713, 715–739, 744–747. Sometimes, Laestadius refers to the heart as having “physical, metaphysical and moral significance”; see §§267, 202, 753. Juntunen points out that Laestadius used “metaphysics in two different significances (Juntunen 1982, 56): Classical parallel to ontology; §§40, 43, 56, 78¬e, 79, 90, 185 note, 229, 1179. In this classical philosophical use, metaphysics usually has a negative meaning. On the other hand, “metaphysical” is seen as necessary and indicates an anthropological-psychological constitutional level as a “heart in metaphysical significance,” referring to the whole sphere of subjective consciousness and psychic-physiological sphere: §§407, 425 note, 437, 595, 619, 677, 748, 753, 1177a, 1185 note. Dahlbäck (1950, 36) interpreted what Laestadius meant by the “metaphysical heart” principle of life.

305 Cf. Juntunen 1982, 53–56.

306 In regard to what man is aware of, objective faculties play the dominative role in everyday life. Principles of reason, desires of the will and concepts, ideologies, views and theories of understanding together and in many combinations structure our daily relationship with the world, ourselves and God. In a sense, the contents and intentions of these objective faculties constitute the public sphere of everyday human existence.

307 Laestadius did not make a clear distinction between the moral and spiritual, as he conceived both of them as being awakened by the physiological moral passions.

and thus a presentation of something “touching,” indeed, an embodied relationship with the world with both objective and subjective aspects.

Subjective and objective faculties are interrelated and interactive, but they also have an asymmetrical relationship with each other. The *first* principle is that all faculties function *under the* influence of organic life and passions (psychic necessity). Laestadius’ quest for the organicist description of faculties began by insisting that *inner experiences* must also have a receptive organic basis similarly to what outer senses have with their respective organs (§30). Faculties of objective consciousness have specific *relations to each other*, depending on their position in the organic structure (physiological order). These relationships between the faculties depend also on the influence of different passions on particular faculties.

“We have also shown ... that the organs of sensory life are in a passive relationship to organic life, so that the brain must receive impressions from the blood and the nerves. For this reason, *the faculties of the soul must be in like relationship to each other, as their respective organs are to each other*, wherefore also sensory life is in like relationship to organic life as the brain is to the heart. *And insofar as the brain is always physically in a passive relationship to the heart, then the metaphysical brain – sensory life, or the rational soul – must also be in a passive relationship to the metaphysical heart, that is to say, the objective faculties of the soul – intellect, reason, will, conscience, memory, imagination – must be passive in relation to the passions.*” (§437. my emphasis) “This is the foundation of the passivity of will. However, these pieces of evidence are only physiological, and are not binding to the philosopher who demands mathematical, logical and metaphysical evidence.” (§438. emphasis added)

Faculties have their respective organs as seats, but theoretically/phenomenally they are described *indicatively*; their functioning, character, and content vary in regard to the driving passions and situation they function (these expand the notions of objective faculties into the experiential-phenomenal sphere as will be seen later in the analysis of the notion of passion). Faculties of soul encompass the whole domain of *conscious* and *unconscious* activity that forms the basis for the expanded notion of person.

As will be seen, Laestadius struggled with thematizing the complex and ambiguous relationship between subjective and objective consciousness. The challenge lays in depicting and defining particular objective faculties as distinct capabilities and simultaneously keeping them subordinated to the impacts of organic life. For instance, spontaneity does not pertain to the objective faculties of soul but rather to subjective faculties (§30Note). Given this circumstance, Laestadius highlights the point that a

human being is first of all susceptible – by the nature of having a “sensitive soul” as a principle of life – to the influences of outer sense perceptions and the impacts of inner passions, drives, instincts, and feelings. Objective faculties do not possess the capability for action and re-action and spontaneity *within themselves* without sensory and organic passionate impacts. They also *lack moral quality* in and of themselves, and they only have capability for receiving qualitative influences and functioning according to them. In other words, a human being is subject to sensory impacts and forces of life, known as *passions*, which signify actual and real activity within human existence. Whatever human act and action is possible and determined by this fundamental susceptibility, the autonomous activity that resides in the human mind has only a capability for re-action (receptivity) to the sense perceptions, impressions, and influences and impacts of organic life.³⁰⁸ The whole sensory life, including subjective and objective consciousness and their functions, rest on the basis of the organic life and its functions.

4.2.4 The Passions as Vital-Intentional Correlates (nexus)

Passion is a classical philosophical and psychological term, which refers to movements of the soul, suffering, instincts, emotions, desire, agony, etc. It is a term that has a long philosophical and theological history. Within theology, “passion” is often used for the analysis of the sinful character of man, suffering and also the manifestations of original sin. Overall, “passion” is a term used in philosophy and theology to denote a pre-reflective and pre-cognitive sphere of human existence, conceived to disturb the use of reason and higher cognitive functions. Passions are also conceived as more or less fundamental affective conditions that manifest within a human being’s actual relationship to the world and existence. The passions are thus seen as more fundamental forces that precede emotions and feelings. Because of their fundamental and uncontrollable character, these passions are most often seen as irrational forces of human life which should be subjugated and controlled by reason. However, passions are also seen as the grounding and necessary forces of action, thought, and human life in general, and they are sometimes viewed as having important significance for morality and religiosity.

Together with the principle of life (lifprincipe) passion is *the main concept of Laestadius’* anthropology and psychology. The notion of passion is the most important “faculty” indicating a vital power and the moving force of *subjective consciousness*,

308 Later when dealing with the degrees of freedom from sin (Chapter 4.2.7), Laestadius makes a distinction between acts (handling) and deeds (*gerning*) in the following way: “[D]esires and thoughts are acts for which man is responsible since he has the power or capability to struggle against his wicked desires. On the other hand, a deed is what man does with the members of the body, which are subject to the will.” (§823.)

and it is central to Laestadius' psychological, moral, and religious thought³⁰⁹. Even if the notion of passion belongs to the group of other subjective faculties, including instinct, drive, temperament and emotion, it remains the most central aspect of the subjective sphere, and thus I mainly focus on passions here.

Laestadius tells that he abandoned the prevailing theories of passion because he could not find what he needed – namely, the notions of “grace” or reconciliation – from them, as they erred into objective speculation and depicted man mainly in the natural state. Laestadius indicated that objective speculation of the passions lost the experiential phenomena of the movements of soul. He preferred to lean on the Biblical authors³¹⁰ and compared their views with “the experiments of the unprejudiced physiologists and the reformers’ doctrine of the corrupt nature of man.” (§264) He also claimed that physicians who “base their opinion on physiological discoveries agree with the Biblical authors.” (§1002) Laestadius especially found Bichat’s insights to be important and fitting his own views³¹¹.

309 Cf. Englund 1881; Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982; Kristiansen 2004. The term passion was commonly used in anthropology also in 1800’s Sweden. Petrelli uses the term ‘passions’ as part of the analysis of will (Juntunen 1982, 59). Juntunen assumes that especially Descuret’s conception of passion influenced Laestadius’ notion of it. Descuret particularly dealt with passions and conceives of them as a human being’s affected and influenced state. Human being was the subordinate to the passions. Descuret also drew a distinction between passion and affect, so that the former indicated the fundamental needs (boisons) of existential modes (or ways of being) and the later referred to reactions. (Descuret 1841, 1–9.) The notion of passion was central naturally for Bichat; he used passion as a founding vital force and function of human beings. Laestadius interpreted Bichat’s common idea as that “passions determine the moral character of the human being,” (§§ 258, 260, 261, 405, 771s, 1233, 1243) the thought that is central in Laestadius’ philosophy of mind, morality, and analysis concerning freedom of will. (Cf. Juntunen 1982, 59, footnote 31.) Åberg stated that Laestadius adopted the notion of the dominating position of passions and the heart from Bichat (Åberg 1997/1964, 23–26). Juntunen stated that the distinction between philosophy and theology sat inside the notion of passion; while they were anthropological, Laestadius simultaneously brought in the notion of God and evil which functions via passions in the organic life; for Laestadius then, God and Evil manifested and signified as a personification of the passions.

310 Regarding the philosophical interpretations of Paul’s insights on action and passions; See, Engberg-Pedersen 2008 and Aune 2008. For Augustine’s and Luther’s theory of passions, see Knuuttila 2010b, McGrath 1985. Even if Laestadius attached his theory to vitalism, he freely modified the concept in relation to late antiquity, Biblical and later discussions of passions.

311 Especially, Bichat was one who proved that passions have their seats within organic life, and he viewed the senses as “conductors of the passions” (Bichat 1805, p. 25, 83, 22; cf. §1002.) “Yet one can perceive through immediate feeling that the passions do not belong to the sphere of sensory life.” The desires of reason do not arise in the mind, but rather in feelings. Also, curiosity as a desire (to acquire knowledge) belonged to organic life. Laestadius thus held that there are no pure intellectual passions. (§265) “Just as the senses are the *conductors* of the passions, they [senses] become their *instruments* when the passions impact intelligence, reason and will.” (§266)

Passions have both *theological and philosophical-psychological dimensions*. Overall Laestadius' intention was to thematize and rationalize – or even *radicalize* – the fundamental basis of the sinful character of a natural human being using the theory of passions. By indicating the evil nature of man, Laestadius sometimes referred to passions as “devils” or “spirits” which coincided or resonated with Bichat's idea of passions as the destructive forces of death. Albeit, Laestadius preferred to use the scientifically more acceptable term “passion” in this respect (§249) as that term has become a most important notion for thematizing the whole of human action, thought, mind, morality, spiritual perception, faith, and relation to God. In this respect, Laestadius had to *define the existence of passions* within which they then could receive a broader psychological-philosophical meaning according to Laestadius' theory. Still, passions cannot be defined in classical metaphysical-substantial terms:

”If we refer to these 'powers and forces' as beings (väsenden), [...] we must return to metaphysics and ontology, which is so complex (benig) that modern thinkers must go around metaphysics like the cat around hot porridge. Nor it is our intention to determine the substantiality of these 'spirits' (andars), [...]” (§914.)

Instead, passions have to be conceived in a similar way as the principle of life has been conceived, namely, defined as *existence* without essence and substance:

“[w]e assume only their 'existence' just as the life force or the principle of life is an '*existentia sine essentia et sine substantia*' (section N.). Since we hereby assume the existence of these spirits as a universally valid truth, we have a certain foundation for our judgment about the reality of these forces. We may then, *aided by testimony of feeling*, examine *the effect of the passions* on the living human being.” (§914. emphasis added)

With regard to these citations, passions ought to be understood in the mode of real “existences” that commonly in contemporary popular language were called “living spirits.”

“But since life is nonetheless real, then the spirit must also be something real; an *existentia sine essentia et sine substantia*. It follows that all spirits are real existences, or '*living spirits*,' and in this sense we can say that the passions are real existences, or 'living spirits.'” (§914Note.)

By highlighting the experiential “testimony of feeling” Laestadius referred to the existence of passions as “*idea vitalis*” and an “existential relationship” (existential förhållande).

“In the doctrine of personhood (F.F.F.), we have proven that the idea is not absolutely unconditional, that the idea must depend on its principle. Consequently, the idea must always have its foundation in something that is not the idea itself. *This something, in which the idea as its foundation, is commonly called spiritual life!!* But life cannot be called substance or being, although most philosophers claim that spirit = the rational soul – possess substantiality. But since we have proven in numerous places in this treatise, that life and the rational soul or the spirit constitute one and the same basic force, then also the spirit loses its substantiality. But since life is nonetheless real, then the spirit must also be something real; an *existentia sine essentia et sine substantia*. It follows that all spirits are real existences, or ‘*living spirits*,’ and in this sense we can say that the passions are real existences, or ‘*living spirits*.’ And this *existential relationship* must also be applied to the devil, who is something real, a life, an ‘*existentia sine essentia et sine substantia*.’ But if he is life, or something living, then he is not merely an idea or an empty concept, but a life to which the idea can be ascribed as predicate. It is ‘idea vitalis’ and thus a personhood, something that the ‘cosmic principle’ is not.” ... “A metaphysical existential relationship (existential förhållande), ‘idea vitalis,’ is not an empty concept that can only be actualized and become something real in the material world.” (§914Note. my emphasis added)

This existential emphasis of vitality indicates that passions were conceived as founding psycho-physical moods³¹² that lay the ground for the intentionality of body and mind in relation to the world and existence.

Given the analysis of the notion of the principle of life that formed the unifying constitutive basis – “psychic essence” – for the body and mind, the passions are equally important phenomena, as they function *on the basis* of the principle of life. It could also be argued that passions function as correlates of the principle of life [soul] and signify there is a nexus of passionate human beings and existence. By the power of the principle of life, the human body is sensitive and “alive,” in its basic character. The notion of passion thus play a crucial role in both the grounding notion of the principle of life and the faculties of objective consciousness.³¹³

In relation to the notion of the principle of life, passions signify the primary psycho-physiological functions and primary forces (first movements) in the body-mind and constitute the intertwined relationship between human beings and the

312 Here we can refer to Heidegger’s notion of mood (befindlichkeit der stimmung), which together with language and understanding, is an existential-ontological constitutive structure for the disclosedness of Being (das Sein). (Cf. Heidegger 1992, §§29,34, 38–40, 68)

313 As usual, the discussion concerning passions overlaps with the notions of organic life and sensory life

world. In this respect, passions condition all the higher faculties of the soul and thus are the basis for their intentional directedness.

Even if the concept of passion was used by Laestadius in various ways, the following common points should be recognized. *First* of all, passions signify the forces and powers that a human being is *susceptible to*, and through which that human being lives. In this sense, the passions signify more fundamental and broader phenomena than, for instance, emotions and feelings, and they indicate the fundamental affectivity of human life. *Secondly*, passions are always awakened by sensory stimuli. *Thirdly*, passions influence the human organism and person through organic functions. However, they are not simply reduced to the physical plane, as they also signify a particular kind of psycho-social relatedness to the objective world. In this sense passions³¹⁴ actually situate the human being in the concrete social and material world. They pertain both to the objective sensory and the susceptible inner physiological organs, illuminating the dynamic relatedness between the experiential-psychological and the physical domain. Thus, passions are simultaneously outer and inner, social and private, and fasten human life to the world and other human beings. *Fourthly*, passions characterize the relatedness with an objective perceptible world by being awakened by sensory perception and the [imperceptible] subjective psycho-physiological sphere by having specific and different organic receptive centers or seat-organs for different passions in the physiological organization³¹⁵. Thus, a human being is under the influence of passions from both *outer and inner* spheres. To state it more precisely, in regard to the *phenomena* of passion, the embodied man dwells in the tension of a passional world, and therefore, the notion of passion overcomes the dichotomy that exists between man and the world.³¹⁶

Also, the *primacy of sense perception* illuminates the fact that Laestadius did not reduce passions to the organs. Laestadius wrote, for instance, that

“It is a physiological fact that the *passions alter the components of the blood* and *affect the disposition* (sinnelaget). The passions are *awakened by external stimuli* and in turn alter the components of the blood; and this change impacts the *disposition* (sinnelaget).” (§305Note. emphasis added)

314 In Bichat’s theory, passions are not simply located in the organs in the reductionist sense; they are viewed as “something” that affects and influences and “becomes” into the body, or they are something that relates to the body. In this sense, passions are vital forces that “belong” to the organic *life*, and their origin may vary and pertain to the whole of the various organization of different organs. (See, Bichat 1815, §4, 76.)

315 These structures are cleared up by the concepts of subjective and objective consciousness.

316 The passions posit the sensitive human organism in the world. Passions are the basic vital functions of a human organism, and they mediate the interaction between organic life and sensory life, as well as the human individual and the surrounding world. In this respect, the notion of passion is an important phenomenon to examine to understand Laestadius’ way of conceiving human life.

It could also be noted, with respect to the question of “how experience is constituted”, that the notion of passion broadened Laestadius’ way of thought over mere empiricism; sensory perception and experience are always mediated through sensory impressions as well as subjective feelings and emotions that are stimulated by the passions (always experientially given existential-social phenomena).

The psycho-physic-social extent of the passions becomes evident in all of Laestadius’ text. This is understandable as the passions – together with the notion of the principle of life – are the constitutive ground for all of humane life. The influence of passions thus has to be understood in such a way that the physiological body is at the core or center of the happenings of life, and passions awakened by sense-perceptions influence the re-directing of the sensory and organic life in a circular way³¹⁷. Generally speaking, sense perceptions as well as passions are crucial for the functioning of the faculties of the soul; perceptions (and factual experiences) awaken the passions, which in turn agitate and stimulate the subjective and objective consciousness that then re-directs the senses again.

Laestadius’ psychosomaticism or pre-phenomenological thinking does not seem to entail mysticism.

”We must now consider the immoral element as a substance, of which sin consists. Sin is not the substance of either the body or the soul, but contingency; originally, it may have been, for instance, an idea or a perception that was actualized within organic life, just as immoral perceptions truly are able to awaken passions, such as the perception of a beautiful woman is able to awaken love, the perception of ‘actus venereus’ is able to awaken a slumbering drive to procreate, the perception of red wine is able to awaken a desire within the drinker, and so forth. Thus, a rational idea can be actualized in the sphere of organic life and become a passion. ...” (§ 995. Further, see Chapter ÄÄ.)

Senses are thus conceived as the conductors of passions:

“The effects of wrath and hatred on the heart are well known. We note that wrath is awakened, like other passions through the senses, which are the conductors of the passions³¹⁸. A stimulating perception, a taunt, or some other injury, has a stimulating effect on the fibers of the heart (through

317 This circularity characterized Laestadius’ way of depicting the human dynamic and interactive relation to their surroundings, world, and existence. I come back to this later when dealing with perception in e.g., Chapters 4.2.9 and 5.3.5.

318 Cf. Bichat 1805, 22. See also *The Lunatic* §286.

nervus sympatheticus?). The heart beats faster and propels the blood toward the head; the angered person becomes red in the face. Why is your skin transformed? ...” (§1002.)

Altogether, passions intimately pertain to the physiological body as its sensitive core. Passions can be interpreted as vital existential constituents of those humans who are dwelling in the world. Rather than signifying reductionism, passions indicate the existential phenomena that exist through organic susceptibility:

“The *passions actually belong to organic life* and have their basis therein, but are *perceived (uppfattas) in sensory life as emotions and desires*. They impact the living brain through the circulation of blood and the stimulation of the nerves. Not only the different components of the blood, but also its stronger or weaker circulation, awaken different emotions.” (§310. emphasis added)

As we see later, Laestadius aimed using this perspective to establish the psychosomatic co-existence of the bodily and “spiritual” feelings:

“We imagine that all bodily feelings (känslor) are also the feelings of the soul, and vice versa; that all the feelings of the soul are also those of the body. ‘Because the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego that thinks.’ Petrelli §100.” (§306.)

Here it is already evident how Laestadius sees passions as a constitutive element of higher cognitive functions. The passions are actually primal phenomena that relate the whole embodied human person to the world and its surroundings. We can thus posit a general interpretation, namely, that the individual and sociality co-inhabit in passions, and passions constitute a psychophysiological common ethos.

For Laestadius, passions were vital-ontological facts of being in the world. In this respect, passions could be heuristically compared to the existentials³¹⁹ in the sense that they describe human relatedness, intentionality, or emotional disclosedness of the world and existence.

Altogether, passions also have to be conceived as vital-existential constituents of human life. In the general sense, passions *function as intentional correlates between the subjective consciousness and objective consciousness as well as between man and the world*. This mediation of passions constitutes the holistic psychosomatic whole of the human person, and intertwines the body and mind in an inextricable whole.

319 Cf. e.g. Heidegger 1992, §§4,9.

In the end, it is important to mention that Laestadius was not precise in his *use* of concept while reaching toward phenomena. He used the notion of passion in a broad sense and did not mention when using it in a narrower sense, especially when seeking its physiological seats. Also when he proceeded to thematize and analyze the “psychic” organization of human subjectivity in psychophysiological terms, the concepts often overlap. For instance, Laestadius often uses the term *heart as the synonym for passions*, mainly because the heart is conceived as the center of passions; passions are intimately attached with the heart physiologically because the blood, which mediates the passions to the mind, goes through the heart. In the psychological sense, the heart functions also as a susceptible domain, or “organo lepticon,” for the passions. Such a “moral,” “spiritual,” or “metaphysical” meaning of the heart is not distinct from the physiological heart, but its indications were more significant for Laestadius.

Heart in its psychological (moral, spiritual) meaning also signifies that the “condition of heart” can modify, change, and even resist the influences of the passions that it mediates to the sensory life or mind. The condition of the heart is stated to be the “result of the prevailing passions.” In this respect, the heart is also conceived as determining the moral character of the human person. I later discuss the heart and its moral/spiritual role in chapter 5. Now it is enough to have a general understanding of the definition and function of the notion of passion and the part it plays in Laestadius’ theory and also highlight that Laestadius conceived of the heart as the center of passions in the sense that it is an inner experiential core for the matters of human life.

4.2.5 Classification of the Passions

Despite his broad definition and notion of passion, Laestadius sometimes was *localising* tone when he roughly referred to the seats within which the passions reside or through which they function. These localistic tones are particularly present in Laestadius’ *classifications* of passions within which he in following physiological emphasis of medical vitalism points out the particular organs that are susceptible and sensitive to specific passions³²⁰. Certain localizing tendencies are present also when

320 Passions are closely attached to the physiological organs and organization. Sometimes Laestadius had a *localistic tone* and wrote that particular passions “live” in specific singular organs. This tendency is undoubtedly a part of Laestadius’ vitalist theorizing. However, Laestadius also conceived of particular organs more as a *susceptible seat* for the functions of passions. Thus, the saying that passions “live” in a singular organs does not indicate merely a reductionist way of thought, but rather emphasizes the organic vital functions grounded in organic life. This emphasis is understandably present in the whole treatise, as Laestadius does clear up the difference between his approach and the dualist and idealist positions. However, passions are indicated also as “spirits” when referring to the moral and spiritual character of passions, thus using them for their metaphysical or phenomenological significance.

considering the manifestations of the humoral and the neural impacts [in consciousness] stimulated by passions in different parts of the brain³²¹. It is not just the whole organic body or merely the brain that receive influences from sensory perceptions and the passions, but the various and particular corporeal organic seats as well.

Laestadius goes into more detail and seems to hold that the human organism is rather *pluracentric*: it is not only its brain that is responsible for human thought and action, but the whole organism as well as different centers that are susceptible to different passional stimulations. All passions have their respective susceptible organ or set of organs through which they work. This physiological order also lays the groundwork for the relationship and hierarchy of different passions.

The sensory life receives impressions and influences from the objective world and its center is the cerebrum. Brains as organs of the sensory life receive the influences and impacts that passions have aroused in the inner organs. However, this does not mean that cognitions simply have their foundation only in the sensory life or mind:

“Every organ has its particular functions, which are perceived by consciousness as either feelings or desires. But should one thereof imagine that desires and feelings have their foundation in sensory life? When the passions impact the heart or the liver (organic life), we perceive the effects through the brain (sensory life) where the passions manifests themselves as feelings, thoughts, and desires. This is the reason why an organic defect in the heart may impact the mind and cause madness.” (§208.)

The center of passions and emotions is *the heart* (§202) because all passions are mediated via the heart to the sensory life. Thus, the condition of the heart is of primary importance for the cognitive state of mind. The explanation for that connection is that the heart can actually change and modify the passions that influence the sensory life and also modify the cognitive state of mind. However, the *heart also has a broader than a mere physiological meaning*. It has a “psychological,” “metaphysical”, and “spiritual” significance. To put it briefly, depending on the context, the heart refers also to the whole domain of subjective consciousness and in this sense to the inner psychic life. In this respect, Laestadius uses “heart” to signify a receptive organ that is able to receive impressions and influences of the passions without a conscious awareness of objective faculties (unconsciously). Laestadius highlights the fact that in Biblical language moral emotions are also attached to the heart rather than just to the intellect.

321 Cf. e.g, §606. Also, faculties of the soul are said to have specific organs within the sensory life (*nervliv*).

The passions awakened by the sensory perceptions agitate and stimulate different organs (such as egoism/liver, etc.) which are in different ways susceptible to different influences, impacts, matters, and passions. Simultaneously, particular organs host certain passions and secrete “passion elements” to the blood which then influence the cerebrum as the receptive organ to the passions elements. The cerebellum is also the receptive organ for the subjective consciousness.

Based on physiological organization Laestadius *classified* particular passions and assigned them to their susceptible organs³²². Generally, the passions and their respective organs are *divided by their particular nature and specific status/capacity* into different categories as follows³²³:

First, the three primary passions are 1) egoism (egoismen, egenrättfärdighet, gerighet/liver³²⁴), 2) selfishness or greed (egennytta/ gastric system), 3) ambition or lust for honor (ambition/ spleen).

Four other passions that are independent, but often support and serve the first three primary passions are: 4) hatred and wrath (vreden, hämngerighet, hat / gall bladder); 5) sexual drive or fornication (hordomsdjefvull/ genital organs); 6) jealousy, envy (afunden/ svartsjuka/ liver); and 7) the spirit of lying (lögnenes and/ liver)³²⁵.

Laestadius held that leading and *primary passions*, which he called *chronic passions* (§255), serves natural vital functions like, for example, surviving but manifesting within the human organism in various ways. However, these main passions are conceived as physio-psychic “vital-existential” constituents and have the characteristics of a human person. Chronic passions (§§211, 255, 268, 399–402) are defined as those passions that are perceived through the impact or reactions of *nerves*, by which they

322 To learn more about the organic seats of the passions, see *The Lunatic*, chapters O., U. and V.

323 See §909, §250

324 The main principle is that the primary passions have their seat in the liver. To locate the natural evil passions into liver (§199, 201), certain physiological observation of corpses showed that the liver was most often damaged, and thus its concluded that it was a main organic cause for the death (also the spread liver of the horny ox was a sign of the effect of the natural passions, §200). Laestadius seemed to think that after the fall when the human being was driven from Paradise into the world, death became the fate of human life, and thus, he concluded that primary destructive passions as deathly forces have their seat in the liver. Passions are also able to cause death (§244)

325 “The seven deadly sins or the seven primary passions (huvudpassionerna), are the following: 1. egoism, 2. ambition, 3. selfishness (egennytta), 4. fornication, 5. wrath (vreden), 6. envy, 7. the spirit of lying. Of these, egoism, ambition, and selfishness are devils of the first order, since, as “devils”, they possess natural man from the beginning of life to its end. Wrath, envy, and lying are devils of the second order, since these are the servant spirits (tjenste andar) of the former. The devil of fornication is a singular passion, but it recedes with age. We must now, with respect to the organs and effects of these passions, refer the reader to previous sections, in particular, section QQ, in which we showed, on physiological grounds, that the liver is the organ of egoism, the spleen is the organ of ambition, the stomach is the organ of selfishness, the genitals the organs of fornication, and so forth.” (§909.)

differ from *periodic passions*, “which arise through the circulation of blood or its various components (olika bestånds delar).” (§210) Further still, Laestadius distinguished those passions that are *acquired/learned by habits* and ways of life or are congenital (§§211, 251). Some of these are less vicious/depraved, such as love, sorrow, joy, fear, boldness, friendship, etc.

Some of the acquired passions are also able “to destroy both body and soul, such as, for instance, drunkenness, desire for dancing, and desire for gambling.” (§251) Laestadius tells us that these passions, especially love, grief, wrath, jealousy, and drinking are “comparative examples”, used to examine the relationship of passions to the objective faculties of the soul in which experience shows that a human being is not able to nullify these passions (§251). *The founding idea*, therefore, is that passions do affect through the functions of organs, and thus vital *organic functions play a primal role regarding the functions of mind* or the objective faculties of sensory life.³²⁶

Naturally, *passions strive for their satisfaction*. In a natural state, sensory life, including their faculties – such as reason, understanding, will, imagination – and sensory capabilities try to find ways to *satisfy* and thus serve the passions. Therefore, the sensory life is *not only* submissive, but in a psychosomatic sense is related to the organic life. Especially, the senses function as servants of passions. I later show how sensory-passionate relatedness is circular³²⁷ in character.

The basic psychophysiological principle is that the stronger passion suppresses the weaker one:

“The conflict between passions is perceived within subjective consciousness as a stronger impression on the receptive organs by the stronger passion, compared to that of the weaker passion.” (§280.)

As far as primary passions do impact the sensory life, they are in a dominative relationship with other passions (also their seats have a hierarchical relation).³²⁸ Thus, Laestadius also holds that periodic and habitual-based passions are in a submissive relationship to the primary/chronic passions, and most of all, they function as “serv-

326 Here it could be further studied whether – in Laestadius’ thought – the primary passions are based on neural life, reactionary, and thus more important in the vitalist sense; while other servant passions are humoral.

327 In my interpretation, this circularity signifies that passions and sense perceptions are existential-ontologically equally original. There could not be sense perceptions without the principle of life, and no passions without sense perceptions. (Subjective consciousness and objective consciousness are the necessary aspects of human existence and also lived experience.

328 For the conflict of passions, see §§276–281. “From these discoveries of experience, we are able to draw a rather important conclusion within the doctrine of passions; that is, ‘that one passion can overcome another.’ This is the foundation of the well-known vodka cure (see §§370–374, 376).” (§278.)

ants” for them. For example, jealousy serves selfishness and egoism; the idea is that certain “habitual” or serving passions can reinforce the leading primary passions.

Laestadius uses love and jealousy as examples and highlights the view that man is

“unable to think in ways that are contrary to the inspiration of passion. Man cannot think away passion, nor can he dull it through will power. Passion forces the intellect to think in ways that are entirely opposite to that which had previously been thought.” (§520b.)

Altogether then, the essential character of passions is that they signify a certain psycho-physical law, a vital-existential relationship, which continuously lays down a new foundation for human life, action, and thought:

”If a new discovery on the firmament of the stars is able to bring us new insight into matters that were previously unknown, then *it cannot be beyond the realm of possibility that some new discovery within the human heart could bring us a new foundation for thinking about everything that concerns out internal, spiritual or moral properties*. New and previously unknown passion must be to subjective consciousness what new discoveries in the world of the senses (sinne verlden) are to objective consciousness. *Every new passion within the human heart is a new foundation for thinking, giving the activities of the intellect a new direction*. Passion convolutes the thoughts and forces man to think in ways that are directly contrary to what had previously been thought.” (§520. emphasis added)

And further,

”When we consider the elements of passions from a physiological perspective, we find that these elements are strained from the organs of the passions in the stomach, liver, the spleen, the kidneys, and the genital. These elements of the passions, infused into the blood, first affect the heart, which is the governing principle within man. From the heart, the elements of the passions travel with the blood to the brain and awaken in it the many feelings and desires that we perceive. Just as, for instance, alcohol fumes have a particular effect on the heart and another effect on the intellect, so, too, has the spermatic blood a particular effect on the liver and another effect on the heart; also the blood mixed with bile has a stimulating effect on the fibers of the heart, and so forth, just as gastric fluids mixed into the blood exercises a particular effect on the heart and the brain. *If this approach to morality produces a bad smell in the nose of the philosopher, then at least it has*

the advantage of making man's physical, psychic, and moral nature understandable to the intellect. Thus, we cannot in this be accused of mysticism. We are able to understand the reason why an old crone does not blush and why she does not fall in love, and so forth.” (§1022. emphasis added)

Passion can be interpreted as a border-concept, which comprises both the experiential-existential (psychic/conscious) and a physical aspects. As a particular passion, for example, love is taken into focus, and it is evident from the beginning that it has an experiential-sensory dimension (seeing or hearing something beautiful) and also a physiological dimension as it causes certain physical, neural, and humoral changes in a particular organ and thus in both the organic and sensory lives. Often passions are depicted as “coming into a human organism” indicating the outer objective surrounding, and simultaneously depicting passions as “in the organs” and positing them as subjective phenomena. This “doubled” extension of the concept of passion, covering the immanence and transcendence, is important for Laestadius, as he goes on to discuss how passions – whether greed awakened by sense-perception or spiritual emotion having no sensory object – affects and lays the ground for the human intellect or the individual soul.

4.2.6 On the Objective Faculties

Laestadius thematizes his conception of the human soul and consciousness within a vitalist psychophysiological framework, drawing a conceptual distinction between the subjective and objective consciousness. Further, the Laestadius' endeavor is to revise and re-define the classical faculty psychological notions of the faculties of soul from the perspective of physiological vitalism³²⁹. Laestadius' critical redefining of the faculties of soul is motivated and based on his broader critique of the metaphysical notion of soul as thematized in terms of substance and essence³³⁰. Beside the critique of the general metaphysical approach to the human soul as being (essentia, essence), Laestadius is critical also of the intellectualistic categorization of the faculties of that soul.

329 In my view, Laestadius struggled with this endeavor partly because he does not have a specific analysis of social constitution, but rather two different, often contradictory, theoretical frames within which his analysis was moving. These are classical faculty psychological doctrines which are constituted on the basis of metaphysics (and epistemological interests) and vitalist psychology, which does not primarily have epistemological interests, but rather has descriptive and fundamentally anthropological (and in this sense also ontological) aims. For Laestadius, it is not as big a question for how consciousness or mind is able to know the objects, world, and God transcendent to itself (epistemological interest), but rather, it is an endeavor to show how the faculties of objective consciousness are submissive and attached under the power of the “higher” forces of passions in the present world (fundamental anthropological or ontological interest).

330 See Chapter 4.1.

Even if he sees that within classical faculty psychology the faculties that are often depicted as senses (*sinne*), Laestadius still indicated that faculty psychology narrows the objective faculties into mere faculties of abstract or immaterial soul (substance and essence). In Laestadius' thought that objective faculties were not the capabilities of a distinct and autonomous soul, but rather the inextricable parts of the physiological and corporeal constitution of humans. Thus, Laestadius assumed that faculty psychology most often dismisses the fact that objective faculties also function under the dominance of the organic life and especially the natural passions. In other words, Laestadius wanted to show that the objective faculties of soul also function under the influence of subjective faculties and cannot be ignored if we are willing to conceive of the objective faculties in their proper nature. In terms of re-definitions Laestadius naturally had theological motifs and intentions to posit human reason and the will in a captivity that was organic life, namely, the flesh, and the passional world. Within this tension between classical faculty psychology and the physiological vitalism notions of reason, will, understanding, imagination, and memory were re-defined.

Laestadius' theme has two main characters. *First* he holds that insofar as neither soul can be conceived as autonomous and independent with respect to its physiological basis and passions, nor can any of the objective faculties of soul be conceived as independent from organic life³³¹. He insisted that the objective faculties are not independent and autonomous from organic life and from the faculties of subjective consciousness. *Secondly*, the character of the faculties of soul are viewed and *evaluated from the perspective of everyday life* with respect to their manifestations and functioning within the lived experience, history, politics, morality, legislation, and its relation to religion (Cf. §559). These two aspects – vitalist psychophysiology and the perspective on everyday life – leads one to conceive all the objective faculties of soul as psychophysiological *embodied intentional phenomena*. Instead of conceiving these as absolute and stable intellectual capabilities, they are deficient embodied capabilities that function under the dominance of organic life and varying living conditions and situations. As embodied capabilities are closely related to unstable and varying organic functions and passions, the faculties are also viewed as relative and having easily corrupting capabilities contrary to the intellectualistic ideas of substantial reason, will and understanding that Laestadius criticized. He argued against the prevailing glorification of “divine reason,” or “moral will.” He also fought against the idea of freedom of will, and tried to show that *self-will*, as the “composition of all dominant passions” (§1013), is insufficient with respect to morality and faith. All the objective

331 Laestadius' critical redefining of the notions of the faculties of soul was based on his broader critique of the idea of autonomous soul as defined in terms of substance and essence. Beside the critique of the general metaphysical and rational approach to the human soul and being (essence), Laestadius was critical also of the intellectualistic categorization of the faculties of soul.

faculties are thus conceived as particular higher organic functions, but yet what is definitely common to them is that they all depend on passions.

Despite leaning on the faculty psychological categorization, Laestadius conceived all *these faculties as an interrelated unity*, a domain of human consciousness through which man exists in the world³³². With respect to his holistic approach, Laestadius had a clear intention to show how *the faculties constituted the whole of human consciousness and its intentionality* based on the vital principle, passions, and subjective consciousness. Since both subjective and objective consciousness are not distinct categorical domains, but rather a *psychophysiological relatedness to the existence*, Laestadius also depicted the particular faculties of soul holding that *their relations to each other can derive from the physiological constitution and order*. With respect to the analysis of the notions of the principle of life and passions (as a constitutive ground and an intentional basis) the specific objective faculties of soul are conceived as interrelated and as the higher order cognitive capabilities through which human beings relate to existence. Thus, the objective faculties signify the *experiential-intentional ways of relating* to the world, nature, existence, and God³³³.

With regard to the objective faculties, Laestadius' basic problem was how the faculties in a sphere of objective consciousness or mind related to each other and in what sense the objective faculties can either accept or reject the impact of the organic influences of subjective faculties, especially passions, and henceforth prevent them from erupting into actions or modify them at the organic level³³⁴. Thus, the whole analysis of the relationship between objective faculties was in one way or another related to the question of freedom of will. In a broader picture, it could be interpreted that the problem was a quest for how objective faculties could remain in accordance with the intentionality of the original soul, the [uncorrupted] principle of life³³⁵.

4.2.7 Freedom of Will and the Degrees of Sin

As mentioned above, Laestadius' theory of passions, beside of its fundamental anthropological function, was simultaneously a rationalization of the basis of sin and a radicalization of man's sinful nature as far as man was seen to exist in a natural state

332 Moving in this phenomenological direction, Laestadius struggled to hold the objective faculties together and address the particular frame for each faculty. This problem derived from his physiologically emphasized grounding theory and holistic organic stance.

333 I will analyze how Laestadius conceived, defined and characterized especially the objective faculties that constitute the particular capabilities of human intellectual awareness.

334 Cf. §365. See also §§428–429 where Laestadius refers to the negation of heinous passions as a “negative virtue.”

335 Cf. e.g. §§848–852. Laestadius blamed the philosophical geniuses of this world (Goethe, Voltaire, Tegnér) for believing in the power of reason and the will, but being, however, immoral in their hearts. These concrete examples from the intellectual history of general history are Laestadius' typical rhetoric, which he used to support his views.

under the dominance of natural passions. To show how the theory of passion laid the ground for the theory of the degree of sin and highlight how natural passions and sin actually condition or characterize the fundamental of the objective faculties of soul, I briefly take a look at Laestadius' thematization of the freedom of will and the degrees of sin. The degrees of sin are an inextricable part of Laestadius' analysis of the freedom of will.

Faculty of will received understandably much attention in Laestadius' treatise, for it had dogmatic significance³³⁶. Will is one of the objective faculties of consciousness and thus receives influences from the outer world and the inner subjective consciousness. It is generally conceived as *the faculty that sets thinking (understanding) and action into motion and also directs senses and action*. The will is closely attached to the notion of self, and it is defined as the organ of the spirit which has only a limited possibility for freedom.

“It is lamentable that the state of psychology is still so weak, that nothing can be proven *apodictice*. But if by spirit is here meant organic life (psyche), then the every schoolboy is able to prove, based on experience, that this has never been, and never will be the organ of the will. On the contrary, *with the help of physiology, it can be proven that ‘the will is the organ of spirit’* (§465). But if by spirit is meant sensory life, or ‘pneuma,’ then we admit that this spirit is, to some degree, the organ of will, in that the will is able to control the intellect, *fysice* and *metaphysice, non vere absolute. ...*” (§1191b.)

However, will is not an independent faculty and has no determining power in and of itself³³⁷. First of all, the will functions under the influence of subjective consciousness and is also related to other objective faculties. Laestadius saw its importance in that there remains only one will in man (e.g. §459). That will can receive conflicting passions and manifest itself as varying desiring states. Any desiring, appetitive or the irascible/resistant *state of will cannot be in opposition to the organic life* or the body

336 See, Dahlbäck 1950; Zidbäck 1937; Juntunen 1982. In §624 Laestadius refers to Luther as the one who pointed out how important it is to have a correct understanding of the relationship between the faculties of soul. In a sense Laestadius' elaborations anticipated the doctrine of justification and his evidentialistic affirmation of Luther's Theology of the Cross which will be dealt with later here in Chapter 5.5.

337 Laestadius held that the principle of determination is not found in the will itself. Only power within the will itself is a capability to be determined by the higher powers (passions) (§ 416). In terms of “higher powers” Laestadius mainly meant the susceptibility of human beings to organic functions, passions, and the physical laws of nature.

because the will itself is determined by the same organic and subjective states. That is to say that the resistant power of the will resides in the passion itself, and competing passions precede the acts of will.

Laestadius differentiated between the aspects of freedom of will to show, on the one hand, the fundamental responsibility of man through a particular positive and the negative freedom of will within the sensory life. On the other hand, he wanted to show that will as such is passive in relation to the organic life *which necessitates awakening of the organic level* as a fore stage of spiritual justification (reconciliation).

Positive freedom pertains to the sensory life, but not to organic life, and it signifies the common freedom to have power over all members and actions of the mind that are psycho-physiologically under the volition of one's own will. Positive freedom pertains to the objective faculties of soul. (§§357–364.) Laestadius also used the terms objective and subjective will in such a way that the former indicated the will within the sensory life and the latter, the heart and passions (e.g. §405).

Negative freedom means the capability to resist letting passions manifest themselves as action. This capability is, however, relative given that the voluntary resistance to the manifestations of passions is determined by other natural passions. The foundation of negative freedom is in the combination of passions (§412). However, the negative freedom of will (together with positive freedom) is the initial condition for the freedom of action. Man is forced to have desires and inclinations, in a word, to feel, but he is not forced to satisfy the passion that urges fulfilling a certain desire (§413). For this reason, a human being has a responsibility if he lets his thoughts and actions be determined by an evil natural passion (§424).

Laestadius stated that negative virtues are possible, but that they are rare (§428). Furthermore, negative virtues do not constitute genuine inspired morality, and they actually mean a certain kind of natural relativism because they are based on the rivalry between natural passions. For example, ambition can weaken the passion for alcohol, which nevertheless does not make it moral in the genuine sense because morality demands the passionate heart on that basis. Laestadius also thought that original negative freedom of will, and thus freedom of action, can be corrupted when, for instance, alcohol/drunkenness becomes a passion (§447).

Active freedom signifies man's capability to prevent (and struggle against) passions on their own organic level. Active freedom actualizes only if the sensory life has moral passion as its basis. This notion includes the thought that consciousness does not have power over organic life; the will cannot by its own power prevent³³⁸ passions and drives or cause any organic and subjective state to be awakened and influence the objective faculties of soul. Active freedom does not signify any kind

338 Here Laestadius holds that there is no active freedom in the natural state because human beings cannot by their own powers prevent evil thoughts within the heart. (§425)

of positive freedom in the sense that the will can dominate and govern the organic functions and passions. Because there remains no active freedom in a human being, and natural passions do rule, man is *responsible for everything* that pertains to organic life and sensory life. (§418.)

Passive freedom (§390–405) signifies that the will remains in a passive relationship to organic life and the passions. For instance, the will is unable to forestall the blood and neural impacts to influence the organs of intellect (reason). Human beings do not have freedom of choice between passion or non-passion, and they cannot nullify/vitiate passions because a human being does not have power over the organic life on which these passions are based. For example, an “alcoholic” is able not to drink, but he cannot nullify the passion for drunkenness (§365). The will is in a passive relationship with the influences of the Holy Spirit and also evil spirits (natural passions). Laestadius interpreted that reformators (Luther) referred to the relationship of the will and heart with the term “pure passive” as the capability to receive the influences of passions (§430). In this sense, good and evil do not belong to the essence of the will (§459). Laestadius also referred to Luther and Paul for confirming his conviction that the human will is rather evil in its natural state (§§431,432). Passivity of the will does conform to the logic of the Fall (§448Note). The freedom of will in the sphere of the organic life is void or insignificant (§§454–457). The power to fight against evil, or a moral passion, emerges through the work of grace of the Holy Spirit (*den helige Andes nådeverknningar*) (e.g. §403), and necessitates the religious experience of awakening in the embodied organic level.

Despite of the passivity of this freedom of will, a human being can voluntarily let himself exist under the higher power of passions because of the positive and negative freedom of will. Through a negative freedom of will, man can either resist the eruption of natural passions or go along with their provocations. Fundamental passivity of the will as such does not entail any irresponsibility, but rather expands and radicalizes human responsibility, so it pertains to the whole personhood:

”It is precisely this *passivity* that is the being (väsande, essence) of the will. But now, then, can someone be responsible for his actions? The answer is accountability (tillräkneligheten), which encompasses the entire human person, not only the sphere of sensory life or the rational soul. He is first and foremost responsible for all willful sin involving all members of the body. He is responsible for thoughts, inclinations, desires, drives, and instinct, for feelings, and for temperament. *This is so because he has abused the positive freedom in Adam and the negative freedom in himself.* The positive freedom of the will [power over organic passions] can never be regained in this world, but he does retain the negative freedom, and he acquires

active freedom through awakening, conversion and rebirth³³⁹. Note. Passivity in the sphere of sensory life consists in the inability of the will to shut out all desires; that it cannot liberate the intellect (förståndet) from all evil thoughts and imaginations. Passivity in the sphere of organic life consists in the fact that the will cannot annihilate all passions, drives, and instincts, nor the deformities of the temperament that rule organic life. [...³⁴⁰]” (§448&Note. My emphasis.)

Laestadius highlighted that the will can become good only as active, negative, and passive significance, but never as positive significance (§459). Laestadius summarized his conclusions by stating that the will is passive in relation to passions:

“The positive freedom of the will in the sphere of sensory life is negative in the sphere of organic life. Active freedom of the will is achieved through awakening, which constitutes a moral passion. The will has no freedom of choice in the sphere of organic life, only in the sphere of sensory life. Moral responsibility includes the entire human person. The will has lost its capacity for self-determination through its own determination unto evil. The principle of determination – the motive for man’s actions – is not found in the will, but in the passions. No salvation from guilt and punishment of sin through self-righteousness, only through reconciliation with God, in Christ, through grace.” (§482.)

And further:

“With the assistance of psychology we will show that the wicked self-will (egenvilja) is man’s own substantial will (väsendtliga vilja, essential will) for which he is responsible (ansvarig);not because he has somehow cre-

339 Generally speaking, the changes have to happen at the level of passions in order for Spirit (pneuma) to be free.

340 “We have assumed that the metaphysical composition and internal relationship of the faculties of the soul have not been disrupted by the Fall. We must, therefore, assume that the will was passive also before the Fall. However, before the Fall, Satan had not entered into her. Her passions were at that time ‘moral passions,’ which constitute the active freedom of the will. The Fall thus consisted in the woman, as deceived by the serpent’s cunning intimations and promises of ‘*spiritual wisdom*,’ of abusing the positive freedom of the will in the sphere of sensory life looking at the enticing fruit. Through this perception, a desire was awakened within her = an irresistible and unstoppable desire to taste of the forbidden fruit, she delivered her members into the service of sin. Adam did not have quite as ‘*burning a desire to taste*’ as Eve, but he was ‘*deeply in love*’ with her, and wanted to share good and bad with her. He wanted to partake of her misfortune, if he believed that death was approaching.” (§448Note.)

ated his own evil nature, which is counter to revelation, but because he has abused his free will by allowing himself to be seduced by the devil. We admit that man originally had a free will in spiritual matters, but not only the will claimed by the philosopher – that is, the rational (objective?) will, which belongs to the sphere of sensory life – but also the subjective will, which belongs to the sphere of organic life, originally had positive freedom.” (§424.)

In this passage, Laestadius refers to his own Biblical interpretation according to which the faculties of soul and their relationship to each other are maintained despite the Fall. However, the grounding passions were corrupted or changed in the Fall. After the Fall, all evil passions, such as egoism, ambition, and greed, became the founding characteristics of human flesh and thus embodied life in the world. In Laestadius’ view the condition of Fallenness is maintained when a human being lets himself be led by natural immoral passions. Therefore, an evil nature is not created by man himself, but it is a manifestation of natural passions.

Here it is enough to point out that Laestadius saw that man possesses a naturally positive and negative freedom of will within sensory life, but he does not possess a positive and active freedom of will over the organic life. This naturally signifies that every human being has freedom of action.³⁴¹ In this way, man is free to move his body as he wills and also to resist thoughts and desires to actualize them into actions. However, man is not able to control or resist the influences of passions to be manifested in sensory life. That signifies that man has to feel and experience according to his passions. This incapability to control one’s own passions makes positive and negative freedom relative (as, they are based on organic passions). Man’s will receives its power to resist passions from organic passions as well. However, from the perspective of the doctrine of will, we can see that Laestadius based his doctrine of responsibility on a particular conception of will. He does not deny absolute moral responsibility but rather radicalized it, and furthermore, through his theory of the degrees of sin, he tried to make awakening and reconciliation necessary to gain genuine morality and spirituality.

Laestadius’ theory of sin was based on the theory of the passions:

“Nevertheless, it is with the aid of physiology that original sin may most reasonably be explained, if one necessarily wants to understand how innate wickedness has come about, and of what it consists.” (§892.

341 Dahlbäck (1950) points out that Laestadius held on to the negative and relative freedom of will to highlight the possibility of protecting the faith, the eternal [principle of life] in man.

Note.)³⁴²Henceforth, the degrees of sins are determined by the theory of passions:

“If we were to replace the immoral passions in the place of sin, it is easy to see the different degrees of sinfulness that may attach to man. When then detect 1: a sinful disposition, or original sin, 2: passion in the sphere of organic life, 3: thought and desires in the sphere of sensory life, 4: the eruption of passion into action, willful sin. A sinful disposition, or original sin proper, may be present in the fetus shortly after conception, long before any organ has developed. ‘I was shaped in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me.’ (Psalm 51:5) If we assume that a principle of life is present in the fetus shortly after conception, and that there is an interval of time between the beginning of the principle of life and the beginning of organic life, then we have here the first degree of sinfulness, within mere disposition. The second degree of sinfulness may begin with organic life, which implies activity, a movement of matter; that is to say, something that not merely is, but also does. At that point it is already a matter of sinful act, which goes beyond mere disposition. The sinful act in the second stage of the fetus is presumably ‘unconscious,’ but bodily and spiritual deformities are nevertheless developed in this period.” (§892.)

Laestadius classified sins into four degrees: 1) Disposition (anlaget, [inclination]), which signifies original sin; 2) sinful feeling (syndiga känslan) or passion which occurs in the heart; 3) thoughts and desires (tankarne och begären [lust]) which occur in the intellect and the will; and 4) the deed itself (sjelfva gärningen, som sker med kroppens ledamötter [sinful act]), which occurs through members of the body. Laestadius states that these degrees of sin correspond to *four degrees of freedom from sin* in the following way: a) ‘God’s law demands the absolute purity of the heart’, which presupposes the *positive* freedom of the will; b) holiness of the will and detestation of sin, which presupposes *active* freedom; c) to master one’s sinful desires within the will, and struggle against the wicked thoughts within the intellect, although without detesting them, which presupposes *active* freedom; and d) external decency, behind which desires and thoughts are allowed to roam free, which implies a *positive* freedom, provided that the will is suppressed by the passions and powerless to struggle against wicked desires. (§822.)

Laestadius highlighted that the last degree of *freedom from sin* (d) implies willful sin, insofar as man in this state loves sin and allows it to rule the intellect and the will, although not the body. In this respect, Laestadius drew a *distinction between acts and deeds*. The former indicates desires and thoughts for which man is responsible since

342 Cf. also §893 how Laestadius followed Descartes’s view.

“he has the power or capability to struggle against. The deed is defined as something what man does with the members of the body, which are subject to the will.” (§823) According to Laestadius, “man’s will has a positive freedom in the sphere of sensory life (*nervliv*), wherefore also thoughts – which for the most part are subject to the will and belong *formaliter* to the sphere of sensory life – must be considered as voluntary acts when man allows them to roam free. *Realiter* and *essentialiter*, thoughts belong to the sphere of organic life.” (§823.) Here Laestadius struggled to posit the thoughts: They should belong to the sensory life and to objective consciousness, but as they receive their power (vital force) from organic life, they have to be posited also to the organic life. From the vitalist perspective, Laestadius should not say that thoughts within sensory life are “formal” as they are close to physiological vital phenomena; still by using the terms, *formaliter*, *realiter* and *essentialiter*, Laestadius falls into metaphysical language. What he is trying to say, is that a human being is responsible for thoughts and desires if he allows the influences of natural passions and their manifestation to “dwell” within or to suffuse in one’s mind because he *could* voluntarily quit thinking in a passional way. Thus, Laestadius is trying here to argue that thoughts based on passions are voluntary acts. However, elsewhere, he emphasizes the dominative power of passions on the cognitive life in various ways, thus indicating that thoughts are not voluntary acts. The basic concept is that man has to think according to passions, and feel according to his prevailing passions until the passion ends (Cf. § 610).³⁴³

With regard to degree (d) Laestadius is conflicted on in making up his mind on whether there remains voluntariness within “subjectivity” or whether man’s [negative] freedom of will plays any role in the matter of responsibility or faith because they both reside based on passions. Laestadius cannot solve the metaphysical problem between freedom of will and responsibility. On the other hand we can interpret Laestadius’ intention as choosing to seek a more fundamental initial condition of freedom and responsibility in the first place and not seek a solution for the classical categorical dilemma of freedom and responsibility. In regard to the power of restricting the influence of sin[full passion] over the mind, he seems to hold that man has a relative, but not absolute, capability to struggle against the immoral impacts of natural passions. This fight against immoral representations in the mind, however, demand moral passions, or in other words, deeper motivated conditions of subjective consciousness (heart) so as to restrict the imaginaries or representations already conceived to be immoral. In this sense, the struggle against sin does not take place initially at the level of the sensory life or mind. We can thus see that Laestadius’ analysis sought

343 Here I do not analyze the problematic distinction between acts and deeds further, nor address Laestadius’ contradictory statements. It was typical for Laestadius to draw distinctions and produce definitions for the specific purposes his system needed.

to thematize the initial conditions of the possibility of freedom and responsibility through certain vitalist and theological elaborations. However, Laestadius claimed that “man has the ability to struggle against the desires and inhibit the flights of wicked thoughts” by using the power of the *positive freedom* of sensory life. Laestadius then shifted to vitalist psycho-physiology and emphasized that “the moral element proceeds from the heart to conscience, and from conscience to the will, and then to reason.” (§824) In this way, Laestadius aimed to highlight the view that a “moral element” does not proceed from reason to the will, and thus, the “moral will within reason’ is a great psychological error.” (§824.)³⁴⁴

Augustine believed that human beings cannot fix their corrupted will, and the only voluntary decision concerns the denial or acceptance of the grace which can lay a new passional ground for the will³⁴⁵. This idea is present in Laestadius’ theory as well as a human being can abstain from acting according to evil passions, and man can also deny the receiving of grace. Actually, Laestadius tried to resist the thought that man could be able to reach a moral life through positive and negative freedom within the sensory life, and in the same way, he resisted the idea that man could stand against grace. Altogether, Laestadius states that it is not the man who stands against grace by his own will, but rather the natural passions that can make him unable to receive that grace. However, while struggling with the dogmatic and anthropological significance of the problem of will, Laestadius holds that a positive freedom of will within the sensory life – i.e., a voluntary cognitive life and action – is in certain sense necessary capability for making space for the emergence of moral passions and a work of grace; In a sense, voluntary restraining of the provocations of natural passions is needed in order to make space for moral passions and their influences on human life (§§454–457).

Laestadius’ analysis of the freedom of will and degrees of sin are inextricably attached to his psychophysiological theory of passions. His views can also be analyzed in relation to earlier philosophical theology and the history of doctrines. In terms of the notion of pro-passion, which was used in 12th-century philosophical theology to indicate involuntary desires and applied in the analysis of will and sin, it is notable that Laestadius considered love as the “original passion” (urpassion), and thus a first motive principle.

344 Because there is no positive freedom in the domain of organic life and only negative freedom in the domain of sensory life (nervlif), the human being cannot execute genuine good or virtuous work or act self-determinatively (by his own self-power); Good could be done only negatively, thus by restraining oneself from doing evil acts. The origin of positive Good acts are, therefore, always necessarily somewhere outside the agent/subject, awakened by moral passions, as an effect of the Holy Spirit, etc.

345 See, Knuutila 2010b, 170–171.

It would indeed be interesting to compare Laestadius' insights of passions, freedom of will, and degrees of sin, for instance, to Abelard's, Augustine's and Aquinas views as there are several points of contact even though Laestadius' account does differ in its anti-intellectualistic character. Unfortunately these analyses are outside the framework of this study³⁴⁶. Here we can only note that the general idea in Laestadius' theory seemed to highlight the role of passions as grounding the "first" feelings that direct human thought and action. Laestadius seemed to think that in an uncorrupted state, human beings exist under the original passion (urpassionen) that Laestadius called Love.

"We are not able find any signs of faith in a higher power within the animals. We are, however, able to find signs of love, for instance, love of children, parental love, love of equals, love of benefactors, self-love, from which all other forms of love are derived. Thus, love seems to be the original passion (urpassion), the first feeling that awakens in all living beings; this feeling may thus have been the foundation of faith in the first man." (§1495.)

This original passion of love signified that human beings existed in an original relationship with God in the beginning. After the corruption of the Fall, original passion (urpassion) turned into self-love, which signified that egoism became the dominant primary passion in human life:

"And if love, after the Fall, had been directed toward God, then it would certainly be the right motive for all our actions to this day. However, the right motive for the actions of natural man is not the love of God, but love for the world. If we seek the motive for the actions of natural man in other passions – egoism, selfishness, ambition, wrath, hatred, envy, the desire to procreate, and so forth – they are nevertheless derived from one single principal passion, which is the root of the others; this passion is called self-love, which is the same as egoism within the heart. This passion is deeply rooted in all of the nature; it awakens together with self-feeling, and continues to the end of life." (§1494)

* * *

346 For a detailed analysis of the history and significance of the notion of passion, pro-passion, and their application in the history of philosophical theology, see Knuuttila 2010b, 179–193, 239–254. To compare Laestadius' medical vitalist notion to earlier medical theories, see Knuuttila 2010b, 213–218. See also Fitzgerald 2008.

The argument of sinful individuality: Sin as passion is the category of individuality:

1. The vices and unique configurations of the fetus are developed in the womb and in the later development of a child in the world
2. Sensory life (*nervlif*) and its manifestations signify the individual and the personal life of the soul
3. Individual passion-life affects the individual genuine soul
4. Passions are common vital-existential correlates of natural human intentionality
5. Manifestations of the combinations of passions are awakened in world-relation to signify the individual life of the soul
6. THEREFORE, Sin is the vital-existential category of individuality

4.2.8 The Faculties of Reason, Understanding, and Imagination

Laestadius' strongest criticism was aimed at the *notion of reason* insofar as it was believed to be the highest governing part of the human soul within the prevailing rationalistic and idealistic thought of the 1800's. Laestadius doubted the whole existence of the distinct rational soul, and pursues it to ground it in the psychophysiological basis, which would show that reason and understanding are also necessarily the result of organic growth, development, education and their functions are dependent on subjective consciousness and its impacts. (e.g. §§186–191.)

“I believe that it is far more useful for the friends of religion to allow the rationalists to keep their old reason with the definition that Kant has given it. Then we have a certain point of departure for our researches. We know that *the rationalists are spiritualists*; that *they proceed from assumed hypotheses that lack every foundation in physiology*; that they entangle themselves in contradictions; and that from some rationalist hypotheses, one is able to draw conclusions that are unreasonable. For instance in the doctrine of *harmonia praestabilita* in the doctrine of substantive [substantial] nature of soul, in the doctrine of the free will, etc.” (§646. emphasis added)

In line with the psycho-physiological approach, Laestadius conceived reason as a particular “sense”³⁴⁷ with an organic foundation that can be developed by education and practice³⁴⁸. Laestadius re-set reason in *between feelings and understanding* in order to expand the notion of reason to cover the organic emotional and passionate life also.

347 For reason as a sense, see e.g. §§588, 589, 591 [cannot create ideas of good, beautiful or truth on its own but must receive them from outside], §596 [sense in the physical, psychic and metaphysical meaning; can be influenced by good and evil; can be inspired by God or Devil].

348 Laestadius was convinced that reason was a result of exercise and education.

“Proceeding from the physiological principle that all activities of the soul are transmitted by activities of the organs, we must seek the organ of reason in that part of the brain that is *located in between the cerebrum and the cerebellum*. [...³⁴⁹]The organ of reason should be located at the bottom of the cerebrum, in the lower-most region of the ability to think. This location would accord with the philosophers’ notion of reason’s capacity of ideas; *it is not a capacity of thought, nor is it a capacity of feeling, but something in between feeling and thought.*” (§629.)

This citation indicates that the faculty of reason is a natural function of animal organism, which encompass both the organic conditions and intellectual capacities. Setting the organicist concept of sensory life in the place of the philosophical notion of the rational soul, and then discussing the relationship between animals and human beings, Laestadius stated that *the animals lack reason*³⁵⁰ because of their deficient corresponding organs of reason. Then Laestadius proceeded to define his own organicist notion of reason. Human reason is dependent on the organs of reason...

“_____which can be molded, through which the rational soul emerges, not as being separate from sensory life, but as *an increased ability to exercise the organs and thus rise above animals*. The animals lack reason because they lack the corresponding organs of reason. The rational soul is an organic activity developed through exercise, the imagined automation, autonomy, freedom, or spontaneity of which is in fact based in the common principle of life...” (§309. See also §§146, 221, 243–244.)³⁵¹

349 “Perhaps the organ of reason is located in that part of the brain that has caused a professor in Uppsala [Boström?] to separate mankind from animal kingdom.” (§626)

350 See §630 about animal passions, emotions, and faculties. See also §639 where Laestadius states that for a philosopher this sound materialism and the philosopher “neither wants to admit, nor can admit that all activities of the soul are also organic activities, or that the force that operates is connected to an organ. The spiritual force at work is the capacity of the soul, and certain spiritual or metaphysical capacity is connected to each organ.” See further polemics concerning the relationship between reason and faith e.g. §642 [Ignell and rational religion], §646 [Heinroth’s confuses reason and the heart], §647 [Kant and the correct limits of practical reason], §648 [critic of immaterial and non-substantial ego], §649 [passions cannot be destroyed], §631 [natural reason has some higher ideas, but they are not satisfactory and correct in regard to the life, supersensory matters, faith and they are not compatible with Divine truth], §662 [Bichat’s insight indicating that upbringing cannot change the passions.], §667 [kinship between man and God].

351 Here Laestadius is not precise with his statements, as he elsewhere emphasizes that autonomy and spontaneity do not belong to the sensory life; however, we can be generous and interpret that here Laestadius indicates with “spontaneity and autonomy” to the submissive position of reason in respect to organic life and principle of life. Cf. “reason is not an autonomous faculty of the soul, but dependent on the heart.” (§633.)

Reason is not a distinct independent essence separated from sensory life (*nervliv*). It can be exercised and enlightened, but its autonomy, freedom, and spontaneity are grounded on the common principle of life. Its power of functioning lays on the vital principle and passions. Thus, *reason*, or rational soul, is *conceived as a developmental continuation of principle of life*, which is, furthermore, conceived as “*real soul, or life in its entirety, operating as organic and sensory life.*” (§309. my emphasis)

In this way (See also §§125, 725Note.) Laestadius radically “pulls down” reason into the organic corporeal foundation, and principle of life comes to signify a real, proper, and authentic soul which is the receptive capability of sensory life and which *replaces* the philosopher’s abstract notion of rational soul. (See §1205, §752.)

Laestadius holds that reason is not the actual capacity of thinking, but rather a capacity of ideas. *The ideas of reason originate from sense perceptions, inner perceptions, and partly from the passions:*

“Insofar as the will cannot exterminate the idea of reason, it seems that reason is also incapable of being educated or re-educated; much less so since most philosophers claim that not only dispositions, but also the ideas of reason themselves, are innate, which is a claim that is subject to much doubt. Rational ideas (*förnunftens idéer*) may emerge through perception – be they outer or inner – and through rational deduction (*förnunftsslut*), which is a department within logic. They also emerge through the influence of the passions on reason. [...] The question of whether the idea precedes and awakens the idea cannot be settled without help from sophisticated reflection – which shows at least in terms of morality, that feeling comes from the heart and precedes the ideas. But since ideas can also emerge through external perception, *such an idea often remains unactualized; that is to say, without corresponding feelings.* On the other hand, feelings always result in an idea.” (§849 Note. my emphasis) (cf. idea without experience is blind.)

Laestadius holds that understanding is the capability for thinking, and reason comes closer to subjective consciousness and is a receptive faculty, or precisely, a sense (*sinne*). According to Laestadius, philosophy does not accept the notion that reason can relate to the passions passively because philosophy demands an independent and free faculty of reason. (§626–628.)

In §596 Laestadius refers to Kant’s definition that says that “reason is a capacity of ideas” (from Heinroth). When he starts to analyze reason as a “sense”, he refers again to “the philosopher’s” definition: “reason is a capacity of ideas and the intellect (*förstånd*, understanding) is a capacity of thought,” noting that the philosopher draws

a distinction between intellect (förstånd) and reason.³⁵² (§625.) Laestadius indicates that only intellect (förstånd) is actually thinking, and within reason itself, there is not actually any [pure] logic. (§625–626.)

Laestadius seemed to indicate that reason produces the *objects* for calculations, and understanding processes them through calculations and thinking (cf. §18). For Laestadius, reason was neither an independent organ nor a force separated from passions, but rather a “receptive organ, sense” (perceptions och receptionorgan, sinne), which can be influenced by both moral and immoral elements:

“But experience shows that the intellect, reason and the will must yield to the power of the passions. From this it follows that reason is not an autonomous organ, or a power that is independent of passions. Its organ must be sought in the brain, not in the heart. Thus it is an organ of perception and reception; a sense that can be darkened by heinous passions, and it can also be illuminated by moral passions.” (§611.) “Reason cannot awaken passion, nor can it moderate passions; as a sense, it can receive impressions by moral and immoral elements. If the passions are immoral, then the perception itself will be immoral, and the reason, too, is demonic; if reason is a capacity of ideas, then those ideas are immoral when man is governed by immoral passions, and in this way all his faculties of the soul are immoral. In other words, since reason is not an autonomous capacity, then it must be subservient to the autonomous power (the passion); if the autonomous power is wicked, then reason, the intellect and the will must be the instruments of that autonomous power.” (§612.)

Laestadius expressed the view that the idea of “pure reason” as such is an illusion. He moved to consider the organ of subjective consciousness as reason:

“The organ that receives impressions from subjective feelings is nothing other than subjective consciousness, the organ of which is the subjective part of the brain, which is primarily affected by red blood. If the organ of reason were the same as the organ of subjective consciousness, then reason could be an organ of feeling. But subjective consciousness is *only a sense* that must receive impressions from the heart; it must receive both that which is sweet and that which is odious, both good and evil. It is affected

352 Laestadius also refers to the “subset of logics” as the “logic of reason/conclusion” which seems to be a reference to Kant’s antinomies within which Kant drew a sharp distinction between the logic of pure reason and empirical perceptions, thus holding that they are in contradiction, as these and anti-these. Thus, Laestadius may have had Kant’s transcendental philosophy on his mind.

by moral and immoral elements; *it is a sense for good and evil, for truth and lies*. It is *the inner eye* that sees both light and darkness; it can be inspired by the spirit of God and by the spirit of darkness. It has *no light in itself*.” (§628. emphasis added)

Criticizing the natural law on which legislation is grounded (§876–877), Laestadius stated that

“Reason only contains the idea of that which ought to be done, but does not contain any force to oblige the will. However, if it is God’s voice within the conscience that says ‘you ought’ with a claim to obedience within the will, the this command – which is unconditional and positive – can be actualized in the sphere of sensory life, as soon as the sense of justice or conscience is intensified into a passion through the inscription of the law on the heart’s tablets of flesh. Through the moral passion, a holy desire is awakened within the will, without which no fulfillment of the law is possible,” (§871.)

According to Laestadius, natural reason becomes evil while one is searching for the ways to satisfy natural passions:

“Although the passions are not based in intelligence, reason, or will – that is, in sensory life – the organs of these faculties are nevertheless affected by the element of these passions, so that none of them is free from its impact. Will stimulated by the passions aspires to that which is evil: the satisfaction of the passions in the natural state. Intelligence ponders how the desire may be satisfied and devises instruments for doing so. Reason approves of the act by understanding; reason approves of that which man strives for the most; that which he wishes for the most is that which he is inclined to believe. This is the normal state of affairs.” (§275.)

Evaluation of the significance of natural reason in morality and religion is thus highly skeptic and pessimistic: “Reason then emerges as, first, incorrigible; second, changeable; third hostile; fourth, false...” (§560.) However, the re-defined organicist notion of reason can also work as a receptive capability for spiritual enlightening and guidance³⁵³:

“If the Holy Spirit thus affects the heart, then reason is certainly a sense on which the Holy Spirit’s effect in the heart can make an impression,

353 “The subjective foundation of the activities of the sensory organs is in the heart.” (§627.)

through which an idea of a higher power, an idea of that which is holy, an idea of the *righteousness of God is awakened as a result of the testimony of feeling*. Feeling, however, is *not born within the reason*, but within the heart, and *without preceding feeling, no other idea would emerge other than those that are transmitted from the external senses, or through external observation.*" (§637. emphasis added; the English translation is provokingly deficient³⁵⁴.)

The reason is not independent from the will. Stating that man can exercise and refine his understanding (*förståndet*) by his own will, and giving a mathematical calculation as an example of a voluntary act, Laestadius claimed that the "will has power over the faculty of understanding (*förståndet*). Further, he claimed that "it is also the will that puts thoughts in motion; [...] man generally thinks in the context of wanting." (§334) With this analysis, Laestadius clearly entered the phenomenal domain, as he conceived the idea that conditions of faculties are psychologically interrelated. For example, understanding and reasoning are always conceived as taking place in particular passional and emotional conditions or within the states of wills and desire. Passions agitate reason to action either through a cognitive impact of the desires of will or directly through the mediation of humoral influence (e.g. §207).

Laestadius listed some general ideas which are possible for natural reason such as "the idea of a higher being, the idea of good and evil, the idea of right and wrong" etc. (§864) However he does not consider these ideas as "fixed ideas," self-given, stable and unchangeable truths because they can be "argued away" by false conclusions of reason derived from contingent passions. (§864) For instance, the "idea of personal God can be transformed into an idea of an impersonal God" or "the idea of virtue and vice can be transformed daily." (§864) However, Laestadius also stated that the "idea itself, that there is a higher being, that there is a difference between good and evil, cannot be exterminated. To that extent, reason is independent of the will." (§864.)

354 §637 lacks the following clause, which was in the original manuscript of the *Därhushjonet* : "Sälunda äro förnufts idéerna om moders hjertats ömhet, om kärleken om sorgen o.s.v. ingalunda menniskan medfödda. Det är endast genom egen eller andras erfarenhet, som man kan få en idé om sådana föremål." (§637) Mustakallio's Finnish traslation in *Hulluinhuonelainen* (1968) goes as follows: "Siten ideat äidin sydämen hellyydestä, rakkaudesta tai surusta eivät ole ihmisellä syntyperäisiä. Sellaisten asioiden aate saadaan vain oman tai toisten kokemusten perusteella." Here is my free translation: "Thus the ideas of the tenderness, love and sorrow of the heart of the mother are not self-born/emerged in human being. The ideas of those kinds of matters will be reached only through the experiences of one's own or the others." I see this lacked part very important, as it reveals Laestadius' anti-intellectualistic conviction that there are no self-emerged ideas in the sensory life. Laestadius pursued the naturalization of the emergence of ideas that drew on the testimony and evidence of feeling. Also, religious ideas are reached through religious experiences. Laestadius resisted mere metaphysical emotions and postulated ideas whatsoever.

Laestadius admitted that natural reason possesses certain higher ideas of good and evil and right and wrong but they are founded on passions and are derived (extract) from man's noble feelings (känslor) and, therefore, are not pure (rena) "since the sense of justice itself, in the natural state, is clouded and mixed with sinful feeling." (§631.)

Laestadius sought an extended notion of reason that would "include" or be related to passions and would in this manner signify there was an ontological relatedness with existence and God. This view became apparent when he accused rationalist priests of the common blindness of reason; they did not stimulate and awaken the moral passions on the basis of reason of interlocutors, but rather followed their own natural passions to support the natural interests in people:

"It is certainly lamentable that the priests have enjoyed too much success in fettering reason, in keeping the masses in darkness and spiritual bondage. But do you know wherein the problem lies? In the fact that the priests, regardless of their philosophical upbringing, have not heeded the voice of reason but rather listened to the dull murmur of the stomach and the small intestines, which they have been unable to silence with philosophy. [...³⁵⁵]" (§1116.)

What then is managed by this re-definition? In this way, Laestadius argued that the proper notion of reason has to be intimately attached to the influences of subjective consciousness, while a part of the objective constitutive of the mind. Reason is not an independent faculty, but rather a *sensitive capability* that receives impacts from both the outer world (conventional-cultural, language etc.) and subjective pre-reflective states, which are ambiguous, multifaceted, and variable combinations of the organic vital functions overall.

Understanding (förstånd) is neither independent of the organic life and its varying influences, nor independent from the other faculties and contents of the soul. Understanding is a faculty of thinking, and Laestadius wanted to highlight the distinction of reason, which is only receptive and a perceptive capability and the capability of concepts³⁵⁶. As reason is posited in between objective and subjective consciousness, understanding is conceived as a *thinking capability that seems to contain or re-collect all the varying contents of the subjective and objective faculties of soul*. In this sense, it covers

355 "Thus, they have seen it as necessary, in their sermons, to sympathize with the passions of the people. They have found a reason to caress the people's natural passions, and to soften their natural feelings in order to thus make them cooperative with regard tithing. But the philosopher does not know how to do that. When the philosopher wants to teach people to think and to speculate, he wraps his thoughts in a cloud, so that the masses must stand dumbfounded in amazement at the incomprehensible wisdom flowing from the depository of reason." (§1116)

356 (Objects §18?)

the aware sphere of the mind. Understanding makes a calculative process of the objective concepts of reason. (Cf. §18) Thus, understanding forms ideas, views and insights from all the input it receives [in its empirical-experiential relatedness to existence]. In this sense then, understanding is the primary/main capability of a functioning mind, but it cannot go along by itself, for it receives its power from other faculties.

Laestadius stated that the capability of understanding and memory can be developed by practice, and because it pertains to the brains, it is called “brain-work” (§§22, 25), emphasizing that thinking is an embodied organic function (as are all the faculties of the soul that function by means of the organs). Memory and understanding can be developed by exercise that depends on the power of will (§227). However, the functions of memory and reason are dependent on the will except when passion dominates the memory and puts such thoughts into motion:

“It is known that both memory and mind (förståndet) are refined through exercise, but such exercise depends entirely on the will of the individual. Thus, the activities of both memory and mind (förståndet) are dependent on the will, *with the exception of cases in which passion sustains memory and puts thoughts in motion*. From this one is able to draw the *significant conclusion that the mind, memory, and imagination do not possess spontaneity, insofar as their activities depend on the will and the passions*. That memory and mind can be refined through exercise proves that what takes place is organic activity. It is the organ that acquires greater capacities through exercise; man’s ability to receive instruction and education depends on it. Also animals can be trained and tamed.” (§342.)

And further still,

“Physically and metaphysically, the powers of sensory life are not entirely corrupted. Through the power of the will, intellect (förståndet) and memory may be trained to a high degree of perfection. Yet the heart cannot be refined through the powers of the will. The will must succumb to evil, and this is why man’s will is, in its natural state, evil.” (§458.)

*With regard to the faculty of imagination*³⁵⁷ Laestadius was not so strict with the idea of subordination of the sensory life to the passions. While denying the independency

357 Dahlberg asked in his comment to Laestadius (§4) whether imagination is a separate faculty of soul, to which Laestadius replied that “all the faculties” received their names early when people were uncivilized. However, he also admitted that psychologists do not agree on what functions belong to what faculty.

of an objective will, Laestadius also seemed to consider imagination as a perception that is able to awaken activities – even passions – at the organic level. This view raises a question on whether man can control his organic passions using his own imagination. However, imagination also as an objective faculty that functions under the will, which is, nevertheless, still dominated by passions:

“[B]ut we have already shown that it is the passion that awakens desire, the idea, and the concept, once perception has awakened the passion. *Imagination is also a form of perception, which is able to awaken activities in the organs of the passions.*” (§941. emphasis added)

* * *

Altogether, Laestadius held that all faculties function under the influences of passions, and *reason* is seated in between feelings and understanding; *understanding* is the capacity of thinking; and *will* receives varying depictions depending on how the sphere of its operations are delimited. Will is only one united faculty, but its freedom is delimited to the domain of the sensory life within which it has negative and positive freedom. Thus, volition has power only on voluntary organs, and cognition within sensory life, namely, that man has the freedom to choose what to do, act, and live the life the person in question chooses to live. However the freedom of will is also relative, not absolute, because the will functions under the dominance of passions.

Laestadius depicted the relations between the main objective faculties, so they had their own phenomenal character, but were not separated into distinct domains because first of all, they function under the embodied passions. Reason is the capability of ideas, incapable itself of thinking, and characterized as an objectifying capability. While it receives impressions from the subjective consciousness, reason directs its focus to some being or entity, thus forming ideas. Henceforth, reason “delivers” its objects (supposedly by some psychosomatic interaction) for understanding or intellect (*förståndet*) [sometimes “mind”] which finally receives the objects of reason. It has the genuine capability of calculating and dealing with objects of reason. Understanding also receives and possesses the desires of the will, aptitudes and poetical images, representations, fantasies of imagination³⁵⁸, recollections of memories, occasionally awakened by passions and sense perception. Even if Laestadius struggled with the

358 “But imagination or abstract thought does appear to have its seat in the organs that distinguish natural aptitudes. For instance, the aptitude for mathematics, music, language, order, and so forth, are better developed in some than in others.” (§280Note.)

notion of imagination³⁵⁹ giving it the capability to modify and influence the organic passions, he finally did set imagination under the dominance of will and the ego³⁶⁰ which are dominated by passions. By this means, Laestadius was able to hold with his leading idea that all the functions of objective faculties are conditioned by the organic life and thus rest under the passions and most often remain under the dominance of the natural passions or sin. However, understanding (förstånd) or the mind has an enormous perceptual, sensual, imaginary, and objectified universe made up of the objectives of reason, unconscious inclinations, desires of the will, and re-presented/vitalized memories, etc., so as to calculate, form ideas, concepts, combine them into ideologies, think, meditate, direct its own action (relatively, depending on the desires of will, passions) and so forth. Actually, understanding forms a domain for all the manifestations of man's passionate temporal-spatial relations to existence. Altogether then, we can argue that Laestadius conceived the mind as being inextricably attached, not only to the organic body, but also to the organic and cultural world around it.

4.2.9 Intentionality of Mind and Perception

The above section analyzed Laestadius' way of dealing with the subjective and objective faculties of consciousness. We have seen that all the objective faculties receive their motive force from the subjective sphere of consciousness, especially from passions [that are awakened by sensory stimuli]. Subsequently, we moved onto the sphere of embodied intentionality and paid attention how Laestadius emphasized the pre-reflective factors of passions, will, memory, and imagination as constituents of intentionality. I now move to analyze the faculties of consciousness on a more

359 "Imagination is generally dependent on the will, because imagination is a representation one makes by and for oneself; a product of active will. Nevertheless, the imagination is not always a product of that will, which one is conscious of as being one's will. Imagination generally depends on a passion, which man cannot make by and for himself. Within a person who is afraid of the dark, fear can cause imagination that the ghost is following him around. In many, jealousy is able to conjure the imagination that the spouse is being unfaithful. And so forth. In such cases, the imagination is dependent on a dominant passion. But in other cases, such as poetry, drawing, and other fine arts, the imagination is dependent on the will." (§340.)

360 Also the subordination of the imagination to the ego restrict its capability to modify organic passions freely: "The ego is independent within the sphere of sensory life, insofar as it is able to command all its members, the will, intellect and memory, the power of imagination; but since the ego is right in between organic life and sensory life, of which the former is the higher power that has brought for the ego, and the latter, sensory life, is subordinate to the ego, then the ego is unable to control the will and the intellect to the point that no desire enter into the will, and no thoughts,..." (§1206.)

general level to show that Laestadius actually had a *philosophically interesting theory of embodied intentionality of mind*.³⁶¹

As Laestadius was quite precise in arguing that the human “psychic essence” is given in the experiential realm of the faculties of consciousness and noted that the whole notion of “existence” of an organism could be defined as the “capability to receive action and to be active,” (derived from the vitalist notion of sensibility), one can see that there are similar emphases with the stance of the *first person perspective* elaborated on later in phenomenological philosophy³⁶². Given that phenomenology formed its theory of the constitution on the basis of transcendental ego, but also on the insights of vitalism³⁶³ the connection can be conceived as historically genuine.³⁶⁴ Altogether then, we can recognize that there is a certain kind of “mineness” or “first person givennes” of experience, as the human being finds himself always conditioned by feelings and passions – or a specific situation in general – that then directs his psychic-physiological orientation toward the world and existence.

However, reason, will, and understanding are not absolutely free and independent faculties, for they are attached to subjective faculties and thus receive influences from organic life. The objective faculties of consciousness are independent “de potentia non vero de actu” (§609), as they are themselves autonomous, but nevertheless, always dependent on a force not found in the organ [faculty] itself:

“This is supported by experience and does not need to be proven; much less so since it can be felt. But if a passion – whether it is a passion for vodka or a passion of love – can twist the thoughts and intensify the power of imagination, then it is surely a fact that man’s objective faculties of the soul are independent ‘de potentia non vero de actu.’ They are in and of themselves autonomous, but nevertheless always dependent on a force that is not found in the organ itself. The objective foundation for their activity depends on the qualities of the organs, but the subjective foundation depends on the blood.” (§609. See also §§608, 610)

361 Here we can draw a relative distinction between the intentionality of will and the intentionality of mind (förstånd) which is related to organic life but pertains to more cognitive awareness and its intentional directedness with the world and existence as such. For comparison see Shapiro 2012, 194–216. Shapiro analyzed passionate perception in Descartes and Spinoza, and interpreted that they both view the perception as affective and situational.

362 See e.g., Zahavi 2006; Taipale 2009; Bernsen 1986; Heidegger 1992; Steinbock 2009 and Steinbock 2014.

363 Especially seen in the phenomenology of embodiment in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Cf. Merleau-Ponty 2002 (*The Phenomenology of Perception*. [Phénoménologie de la perception. Gallimard, Paris 1945] Routledge Classics, London and New York). See further of the phenomenological elaborations on embodied intentionality in Lingis 1971, 75–90.

364 See Spiegelberg 1982 for a broader presentation of the history of phenomenological movement.

Laestadius often depicted the objective faculties of soul as “senses” and described them in organicist terms as receptive “organic” capacities. This focus indicates that he also conceived of objective faculties as having a certain kind of sensory and sensible directedness to the world. Reason, will, and understanding are different modes of the human organism to be related to the world and existence and they are based on varying passional conditions and situations.

Laestadius stated explicitly that the faculties of objective consciousness “are not independent and autonomous but are submissive faculties of soul.” (§1516.) Intellect or mind (*förståndet*) must function according to a particular or certain combination of underlying passions. Therefore, the affective states of the subjective consciousness – such as passions, instincts, and drives – constitute the *contents of the concepts of reason, desires of will and ideas of understanding* (§317). Laestadius highlighted especially the fact that understanding is always affected by emotions.

An examination of the relationship between emotion and cognition is important when clarifying Laestadius’ psychology. Catholic intellectualism emphasized the human being as a “rational animal” and elevated human reason and its capabilities to the basis of God-relations. The Reformation emphasized the Grace of God and the awakening and reconciliation received “only by faith and grace” and thus accentuated the passive condition of human beings in redemption/salvation. Consequently, the heart as the center of experience and emotions was elevated to a more important role than human intellect. For Laestadius, this thought was present, as he stressed that natural reason is not pure from sinful passions, and awakening and reconciliation are the initial conditions for proper reasoning and genuine moral action.

Laestadius thought that passions that direct human action are not identical to cognition or thoughts, but rather lay the basis for their content and directedness. Passions manifest themselves in different affectual and emotional states, which in different combinations, henceforth emerge as varying cognitions. *In this sense, passions, emotions, and thoughts are relatively different and distinct aspects of the same intentionality.* Here, it is essential to note that Laestadius seemed to advocate for a negative freedom of will, which signifies that a human being does have the possibility to abstain from the actions agitated by natural passions and emotions (heinous feelings). From this perspective it is possible to interpret that thoughts belonging to the sensory life or mind are relatively independent, at least in their negative significance, and thus, humans are able to restrain from action. If so, reflection, self-constraint, and religious contend are voluntary actions.³⁶⁵ Altogether, Laestadius discusses (in

365 Juntunen (1982, 85) noted – presumably referring to the fundamental subordination of sensory life to organic life, which indicated that cognitions are subordinated by passion-life – that it should not be possible to conclude a negative freedom from Laestadius’ principles (the stance that Zidbäck also holds). Actually, Laestadius was not precise with his analysis, but conflict is possible to understand and even overcome through interpretation; human beings can be open to the mystical experience of reconciliation and grace.

relation to Geijer) the central problem, which is the relationship between emotions and cognition (scholasticism and reformation):

“Geijer also says: ‘Modern Pietism, then, came out against reason, declared philosophy to be bankrupt, and that feeling was the only right thing. It took it as a given that thought could go no further, and feeling proclaimed its sovereignty’; (although the author has nowhere shown the nature of the relationship between thought and feeling; he has assumed that it is settled, that thought is dominant, although proof of this is lacking. Our claim is that this proves that ‘thought is not dependent on feeling.’ *We have proved that thought is not autonomous, but dependent upon feeling; that is to say, the intellect, reason, and will are subordinate faculties of soul and their activities depend on a dominant passion.* This passion is, in the rationalist, self-righteousness, which is the foundation of his slanted opinion about Pietism. These psychological principles are supported by the proofs that have been previously offered in this treatise. Moreover, Pietism has never claimed anything other than that which Luther has already said, namely that ‘*old reason, of glorious memory, is not adequate as a judge in spiritual matters, since natural reason is darkened, blinded, yes made demonic by infernal passion.*’ Section F.F. §538.” (§1516. emphases added)

The basic idea then is that the stronger passions³⁶⁶ have an impact on the sensory life:

“The conflict between passions is perceived within subjective consciousness as a stronger impression on the receptive organs by the stronger passion, compared to that of the weaker passion.” (§280.)

This emphasis on the influence of passions and organic functions on the content of conscious and cognitive acts, was the reason for Laestadius to shunt over the intellectualistic emphasis on philosophical reflection that leans on logical rules and formal laws. Contrary to the idea of rational-transcendental reflection Laestadius highlighted the (vitalist) view that “the laws of understanding (thinking)” are rather based on the “organs of understanding” (§126); with this statement, Laestadius again wanted to emphasize that autonomous or *pure reason, as well as freedom of will are illusions and imaginary postulations* because they exist and function under the dominance of passions. From this perspective then, we can question Laestadius’ insight into the *intentionality of mind and perception*.

366 Compare Bichat’s analysis of passions, affections, and their origin and relationship to cognitive life (e.g. Bichat 1815, Chapter 6, p.60 →)

The functioning whole of consciousness encompasses both a relatedness to the outer sphere (surrounding world) given to senses and the faculties of objective consciousness, *and* the relatedness to the inner sphere (body world) given to subjective consciousness and mediated for the subjective faculties. Here we have to say “mediated”, as the “subjective”/prevailing passions and instincts that cause emotions and feelings are always awakened by sense-perceptions and channeled to the cerebellum or cerebral for “interpretation” where they then combine. Grounding his ideas on such physiological insights, Laestadius’ structuring may sometimes appear as an awkwardly peculiar “systematization.” However, here Laestadius does formulate an interesting circular and interactive insight into the actions of consciousness and perception.

Cognitive or conscious states are phenomenally interrelated (in actual experience). As the human organism is itself animated by the power of the principle of life, it can receive influences by organs; both outer and internal organs are receptive, and particular influences and impressions do resonate with certain organs. For example, the cerebral can receive influences, but the liver and heart can also receive influences (directly) – the cerebral by means of sense organs, and the liver and heart via nutrition and colliquation, and the heart by experiencing something emotionally upsetting (“touching”). This immediate influence passes through the intellect and agitates the passions, instincts, and drives, which henceforth stimulate humoral activity and influence the sensory life. Altogether, sense perceptions agitate and awaken passions and the faculties of subjective consciousness which then influence the formation of states of mind, such as the desires of will, concepts of reasons or rationale, and ideas of understanding, which then co-operate/function together by re-directing the senses, the intellect, and human action.

“Just as the senses are the conductors of the passions, they become their instruments when the passions impact intelligence, reason and will.” (§266.) In this way Laestadius depicts the dynamic and reflective structure of man/world relationship. It is earlier indicated as being the circular character of perception.

“While the *passions* have their foundation in organic life, they nevertheless impact sensory life *through the blood and the nerves*, so that there is not a single passion, instinct or drive that does not impact the mind, reason, and the will; first a bodily impact, in the organs of these faculties, and then, so to speak, *a spiritual impact on the mind*, reason, and the will; an impact on *the spiritual powers active within these organs* (see §1266). Thus the mind (*förstånd*), reason, and the will are affected by the elements of the passions, so that the *passions awaken a desire in the will, a concept in the mind (förstånd), and an idea in reason, all of which accord with the dominant passion.*” (§317. emphasis added)

Circularly, this passionate orientation of objective consciousness (the awareness of mind) and perception continuously re-awakens the passions and states of subjective consciousness, thus laying the re-passional basis for a temporal-spatial directedness of mind and action. Thus, the human mind is intimately attached not only to the organic body, but also to the temporal surrounding environment and the world. Laestadius further held that the will is not passive only as it relates to the heart and conscience, but also to “sensuality” (§820). These elaborations seem to be adopted from Bichat³⁶⁷. It is basically the general constitution and structure of what is here interpreted as being the intentionality of mind and perception.

Even if Laestadius from first glance had quite a deterministic vision of human life as dominated by passions, nevertheless, he seemed to hold tight to the idea of man’s capability to act in accordance with his will and decisions:

“As the passions awaken desires within the will, the mind (*förstånd*) must think in accordance with the dominant passion and eventually *make a decision to act* (*fatta ett beslut till handling*), which, insofar as this *decision is a product of the activities of the mind* (*en product af förståndets operationer*), may be called will or desire of reason, ‘*voluntas consequent*’; not because this is the ‘*substantial will*’ or man’s ‘*free will*,’ which determines its own objects, but because the mind – as a consequence of its being thus prompted by the passion, or the real will – must think in accordance with the dominant passion. It is precisely the ‘*self-will*’ (*egen viljan*) that sets the thoughts in motion (see §812–813). And this ‘*self-will*’ is truly man’s own will – insofar as man has any will of his own – since the real power or force that dominates man’s will is to be found in the heart, or the passions.” (§318. emphasis added)

This structure and the relationship between the faculties of objective and subjective consciousness can be interpreted as Laestadius’ conception of the mind and his theory of embodied intentionality and perception.

”Insofar as man has an organic life and sensory life, we must first draw a distinction between organic feelings and sensory feelings; it is a difference between the passion itself, which belongs to organic life, and the impression of the passion on the sensory organs, which belong the sensory life. The latter is generally seen as the soul and corresponds to the philosopher’s rational soul, although the public most often considers the heart to be the real organ of the soul. However, because the philosopher draws a substan-

367 Cf. Bichat 1815, §2, pp. 61–63.

tial distinction between sensory life and the rational soul – although this distinction must be proven before we can be convinced of it – then we can assume, on behalf of the philosopher, the rational soul as ens simplex, or a being (väsende), that is supposed to be something entirely different than sensory life. This is approximately what the philosopher believes.” (§752.)

We can also notice that Laestadius elaborates on the view that replaces the classical constructivist idea of “theory biased perception” by “passion biased perception.” From Laestadius’ theoretical perspective, it seems evident that passions and emotions have cognitive significance, as he purposely emphasizes the meaning of the passionate pre-reflective subjective sphere. What he wanted to stress was that the pure transcendental sphere of reason, will, and understanding are incomprehensible and also false postulations³⁶⁸.

We can assume then that this elaboration is directed generally against metaphysical rationalism and particularly against Kantian transcendentalism, which was influential at the time³⁶⁹. Laestadius wanted to draw the transcendental domain back to the ground of the organic body and lived conditions in the world. As I show later, instead of the Kantian transcendental sphere of pure reason, for Laestadius, the spiritual level, particularly conscience, worked as a basis for *value-moral or spiritual judgment*. Further, it seems that Laestadius elaborated on the view that the experiential world is not constituted or constructed by intellectual-conceptual means, but instead is based on a *passional experiential* constitution within which the definition of life as such is left open for the dynamic events of life (life as such is but a mystery to appreciate). From examining Laestadius’ positions, it is definitely impossible to construct such a schematic view, namely, that things and the world would be first of all perceptible and experienced merely via concepts and the ideas of transcendental intellect because the mind would then lack a psychophysiological constitution. Instead, Laestadius seems to construct a certain kind of physiological transcendentalist stance that emphasizes the view that organic passionate relatedness, pre-conceptual and pre-reflective in its character, fundamentally precedes all the conceptual, intellectual, categorical and ideological relationships with the world.

Subjective consciousness is also the sphere of spirituality, as it is the domain of genuine spiritual conscience. It always has something to do with “what” and “how” things are revealed for lived experience. In this respect, it becomes visible how Laestadius saw the physiological, moral, and spiritual as being dealt within the same

368 To make Laestadius’ idea more comprehensible, we can refer to the phenomenological notion that the scientific definitions of concepts and theories also get their significance from an interpretative organic and passionate basis; in other words conceptions must also have their constitution. Mere calculation using abstract concepts does not grasp these phenomena whatsoever.

369 Cf. Dahlbäck 1965.

psychophysiological plane. (Actually spiritual man does not signify anything else than the mode of existence disclosed into the psychic sphere through a recognition of the influences of passions.) It is clear that in Laestadius' thought embodied pre-reflective intentionality laid the basis for the "higher" cognitive life, action and human life as a whole³⁷⁰. In this sense, the embodied human life was not under the authority of human intellect in the first place. Altogether then, subjective consciousness – or the heart as the center of passions – was posited as the fundamental constitutive basis for the whole intentionality of objective consciousness.

Laestadius stated that there is only negative freedom of will in the conscious sphere (sensory life), which means that human beings can only abstain from acting according to their passions. However, this freedom is relative because the desires of the will are also based on variable natural passions. The basic vital principle or law is that stronger passions always get through their impressions to the sensory life and thus the whole intentionality of mind. In this way, the natural passions do not offer a valid basis for judgment, but instead actually reveal the relativist human condition (there are no moral values and valid judgments in matters of moral, faith and truth). Applying this emphasis of "subjectivity" or intentionality of heart, Laestadius' thought comes close to Sören Kierkegaard and Max Scheler's existentialistic-phenomenological philosophies³⁷¹ if from another, vitalistic, angle³⁷².

The mind is conceived in vitalist terms on the organic ground, not as an essence/being, but as an active manifestation of organic and sensory lives (relational). The mind functions and is directed toward the present world and beyond it to the existence and God via reason, understanding, will, and imagination.

Especially, imagination caused problems for Laestadius because it seemed to create a possibility to influence the organic passions while functioning under the passions and organic life and all the faculties of the soul. Imagination plays an important role because Laestadius holds that preaching can awaken images and moral passions.

370 In this sense, the embodied human life is not under the authority of human intellect in the first place. He also refers to unconsciousness, indicating there is a subjective consciousness and its faculties that "sleep in the flesh". Laestadius perceived his concept of unconsciousness coinciding with Carl Gustav Carus's notion of subconsciousness. For Laestadius, unconsciousness did not refer to immaterial subconscious historical experiences as in modern psychoanalysis, but rather to organic and embodied pre-reflective states of the human body that grounded both awareness and the cognitive life.

371 Cf. Kierkegaard 1974; Scheler 1973. Comparative analysis between Laestadius' notions of spiritual/moral intentionality and personhood and Scheler's ethical personalism may be a valuable philosophical task.

372 In this sense, the embodied human life is not under the authority of human intellect in the first place. Laestadius stated that "all perception that is not given directly or immediately, is out of the reach of reason because reason belong to the faculty of objective consciousness" everything else has to be understood by the heart, inner perception, because matters of life and faith belong to the domain of subjective consciousness.

It could be further analyzed whether imagination differs from the other objective faculties of soul in its position, i.e., is imagination a mediating faculty between the mind and organic passions?

* * *

The importance of the distinction between the organic life and the sensory life cannot be emphasized enough, as it lay the groundwork for Laestadius' idea of man and insights concerning intentionality. This physiological distinction indicates relatively different anatomical structures, but it also pertains to the foundation of the human person, as it has experiential significances and implications as well. What does this distinction then mean from the experiential or phenomenological perspective?

First of all, the distinction expands the notion of intentionality over the mere sensory life or awareness of consciousness through which man relates to an objective surrounding world. The distinction clearly indicates that the whole intentional relatedness of man can be conceived as being twofold. Man is related to the world through the sensory life (neural life), both with its subjective and objective consciousness (and their faculties), but also through the organic life as such, meaning there is an intimate corporeal attachment of human beings to the world. We can thus view the organic life as a constitutive basis or prerequisite for the sensory life; without organic life, the intentional relationships of the sensory life would not be possible. What is important to point out as well is that a human being is also directly attached to nature and the surrounding world. The corporeal human being is not distinct, but rather a part of the common laws of the organic life of nature through its organic constitution. Laestadius seemed to be well aware of this human intimate relationship with organic nature.

The idea of a twofold intentional structure of human beings can be radicalized by stating that man is simultaneously and intentionally directed through the sensory life and the organic life. It is well known even in modern medical thought that some empirical sense impressions affect directly the functions of organic life without mediating the cognitive processes at the higher conscious level. Some sense perceptions, for instance, smell of something contaminated, may affect the organic functions and bypassing cerebral activation and thus cognitive awareness. This aspect is supposedly neurologically possible, as all the neural connections from sensory organs do not go through the cerebral; sensory impressions may have a more direct relationship to organic life, which henceforth mediates the information of the perceived to the cerebral and thus creates higher cognitive awareness and thinking.

Altogether, it seems obvious that the organic life is related to the world and surroundings directly without having any conscious awareness of what is given to the embodied/corporeal experience in the first place. Can we conclude from this assumed

immediate man-world relationship that intentional relatedness is also unconscious, that something that is given directly through organic life precedes the higher conscious intentionality of the sensory life? However, this direct organic relatedness seems also to have been in Laestadius' mind, as he repeatedly highlighted the founding, dominating, constitutive and preceding position and role of organic life in the vital-personal existence of human being. For Laestadius, it was mainly the functioning of passions that operate via the organs that thus mediate sensory intentionality.

However, it is also a matter of [empiric] sensual-sensuous (sensory) experiences, for example, smell, voice, and vision that affect the organic body without consciously being aware of the substrate and influence of what is given in [empiric] sensuous impressions and experiences. From an experiential perspective, it is always this organic-sensory relatedness that is at work and which signifies that intentionality is constituted of both an organic-subjective embodied intentionality and sensory-objective intentionality. This ambiguity does not necessarily mean that these intentional ways are distinct from each other, but simply that this holistic embodied intentional relatedness always is constituted of organic-subjective elements that are not transparent to the human itself. We could very well talk about tacit embodied knowledge and habits, of intentionality that is always a constitutive part of a human's intentionality and sensory life. Basically, this twofold constitutive structure of human intentionality is what Laestadius thematized in more detail using the concepts of subjective and objective consciousness and faculties of soul noted above.

4.3 An Embodied Vital Personhood

In Laestadius' analysis, the faculties of soul are closely related to his notion of the Self³⁷³ (jaget, ego), which has a specific conceptual position in his theory. Based on the relationship between organic life and sensory life, Laestadius insisted that the notion of Self must cover both the subjective and the objective consciousness and

373 I use the term 'Self' (capitalized as a concept) to denote Swedish "Jag" (I, me, and in English translation, 'ego') while aware that Laestadius' may have had a critical attitude toward the term "själfet" as he once indicated that it would signify "personified egoism." (§1174) However, the Self (själfet) works theoretically better to denote the core of the substantial vital personhood that Laestadius wanted to distinguish from the philosophical notion of ego, which he also criticized harshly. Even if in the English translation, 'jag' is translated as 'ego', I still use the term 'Self' as the translation for 'Jag'. However, I do not change the translations in the referred citations. The word 'Self' functions better for my interpretation, as it fits together well with the first person perspective of 'mineness' without excluding the significance of outer sphere (or "aboutness") of intentionality. In Laestadius' vitalist and pre-phenomenological use, 'jag' also indicated the emphasis on first person experience and its embodied character even though the experiential core of the Self has its proper constitutive subject, not in-itself but, in the principle of life.

their faculties and functions. Thus, the Self is more specifically “located” *in between the organic and sensory lives* and he took the position of the Self having both a subjective and objective consciousness. The Self is the subject of experiences even if the Self itself has its constitutive subject in the principle of life. Laestadius’ notion of Self differed from the mere ego-subject. Laestadius claimed in various contexts that the especially rationalistic notion of ego enclosed unto itself, thus indicating a certain kind of solipsism or “self-closeted” personified egoism (e.g. §108, 233). The critique of the rationalistic notion of ego follows a similar line of thinking with his critique of the rational soul determined in terms of substance and essence. For Laestadius, the Self *was not a subject, but a predicate*; in general this means that the Self is embodied and susceptible to outer impressions and the inner influences of subjective consciousness. Its existence is defined as a self-consciousness that “is acted upon and is being active,” (cf. §37, 170) in such a way that the consciousness of the Self does not possess the motive power (moving first principle) in itself. The Self is not absolutely autonomous, but still it has relatively directive re-active capability because of the negative and positive freedom of the will (self-will, which, however, does not have power over organic life or the heart). The Self (jaget) signifies the experiential *core of embodied subjectivity*, which has its proper grounding in the psychophysiological constitution in the principle of life and in the moving principles of passions.³⁷⁴ From this perspective, none of the faculties of objective consciousness are independent and free with respect to the functions of organic life and the powers of passions.

The faculties and phenomena of reason, understanding, will, and imagination are inextricably attached to the organic functions, or in other words, to the embodied subjectivity or the selfhood. It is always *the I or the me* who thinks, feels, and acts even though the power for these acts resides outside the Self. Thus, Laestadius had to include in the notion of the Self something that was not the Self or “ego” and under its control. Laestadius aimed to expand the notion of the Self (jag) to cover the whole psycho-physiological constitution of a human being and its passionate relatedness to the world that forms the Laestadius’ holistic conception of personhood.

4.3.1 The Critique of Pure Ego and Ideal Personhood

Laestadius’ critique of the concept of person within enlightenment and romantic metaphysics derived from his critique of the philosophical ideas of substance and essence. (§1203–1204.) Laestadius generally criticized the wide range of philosophical elaborations that conceive of the ultimate being (God) as substance, the anthropocentric postulation of God as mere “intellect”, and the idea of the distinct and autonomous individual soul as well as the concept of person as a derivation of that principle.

374 In Descartes’ philosophy, the ego is the basis for the topic on the certainty of knowledge. See, e.g. Alanen 2003 (Descartes’s Concept of Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.).

It is obvious that Laestadius' conception of the Self is broadly thematized in critical opposition to the prevailing dualist and rationalistic notions of the self (ego). Laestadius stated that the rationalists' "ideal personhood" was "hypermetaphysics", seemingly referring to a certain kind of imaginary speculation (§1227). In this respect Laestadius viewed the classical rationalistic notion of ego cogito as a more limited notion of the self, and accused it to drive the nature of sensory consciousness and supersensory consciousness in one of dualism (See, §§191Note, 192, 233).

"The ego is, within ideal personhood, an *'ens liberrimum' sed 'indeterminatissimum'*; there are no *'attributes'*, no defined characteristics, no laws, there is only incorrigibility and capriciousness." (§1204.)

Further, Laestadius' notion of the Self differed from the beginning for both the substance dualist and the function dualist concepts within which the soul and the notion of self were distinctively conceived as belonging to the distinct domain of the intellectual-reflective and often inorganic sphere of the soul with functions distinct from organic functions.³⁷⁵ In this respect, Laestadius' notion does not imply an ontological dualism because organic life and sensory life are seen as only branches/emanations of the common principle of life. However, the conflict between the lived corporeal body and the spirit is experienced within the Self, and hence, Laestadius struggled with the dualism within the Self/personhood. Once he stated that "the closest self" and the "second self" seemed to indicate that different activities existed within them. Nonetheless, Laestadius finally did argue for the unity of Self and mind using the pansychistic argument.

As Laestadius repeated the claim that "what happens in the soul, happens in the body," he also repeated the claim that "the ego (jag) that feels is the same ego that thinks." With these claims, Laestadius highlighted his conviction of the unity and embodied character of the Self and simultaneously emphasized the difference of his stance with the rationalistic and idealistic conceptions of ego and personhood that he conceived as metaphysical. (§185Note, §185.) Laestadius saw that these mentioned philosophical conceptions drove into several dualities which were not correct and do not help us understand the experienced unity of personhood. Such a problematic duality was found first of all within the consciousness, will, feeling, or emotion. Laestadius seemed to claim that substance dualism leads to "dual consciousness," to the problem of two wills, and to distinct emotions that turn into sensory and mere metaphysical feelings. (See, §§191Note, 192, 748, 752.) Here it is elucidative to give voice to Laestadius' words:

375 On substance and function dualism, see Wright 2006, 237–254 (Substance dualism versus Function Dualism in Eighteenth-Century Medicine. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press).

“Reason itself stands in bewilderment when faced with the notion of dual consciousness. Immediate feeling testifies that *the ego (Jag) that perceives through the senses is the same ego that thinks*. Yet the philosopher does not dare to trust his own feelings because he fears the consequences. His beloved freedom would perish if the soul were dependent on organic contingencies. Ergo, he makes a logical leap, declaring: ‘*Cogito, ergo sum*.’ I think, and thoughts are free and the will is free, and cannot be dependent on organic contingencies. [...] His beloved freedom would perish entirely if the rational soul was not autonomous and free. But what is the origin of this rational soul? Does it emerge through speculation? Or does it create itself? Has it emerged in an instant or grown like the flower from a seed? We suggest that the rational soul is concealed already within the principle of life; that it develops gradually in proportion to the organs. It is one and the same force that shapes the organs and propels the thoughts, although it may appear to us as if the soul and life are two different beings³⁷⁶ (väsendet).” (§192.)

Even if there are tensions and conflicting states within the embodied experience of the Self, Laestadius wanted to view them within a single and united holistic psychophysiological experience. Generally speaking, Laestadius saw that the biggest mistake of philosophical ego-philosophy was that it narrowed the notion of the Self by excluding and denying the organic functions from the sphere of personhood. (See, §404. Cf. §§641, 347.) According to Laestadius, “philosophers” tore themselves away from the sensitive or sensory nature of the Self (§307), and the consciousness of the ego became but an “abstract consciousness.” (§233)

Again, Laestadius expressed his polemics against the idealist and rationalist notion of soul³⁷⁷ by which he now paved a way for his own re-definition of the Self.

376 Here Strindberg points out in a footnote (210) that Heinroth emphasized the unified “developmental force” from which an entire being emerges (summation in Heinroth 1837, §27), as well as the gradual development of the entire being, within which there is a constant identity between this force in terms of its outwardly phenomena and its inner foundation (Heinroth 1837, §45). Heinroth rejected “the contradiction between matter and spirit founded purely on abstraction” and sought instead to posit life as the unifying force that maintains a unity between the outer and the inner. (See, Strindberg in *The Lunatic* 2015, Footnote 210, p. 98.)

377 On the harsh critique of the rationalistic notion of ego, seen as the power in itself that maintains the faculties and the whole life of human. (See §647, 648.) On the notion of the ego of the philosopher who believes it is possible to negate passions; “The philosopher has no instinct to procreate, no instinct to produce nourishment, no egoism, no ambition.” The philosopher has forgotten the body. (§649.)

On the further implication of the way rationalistic faith turns into virtue ethics within which one does not need to conceive itself as being subordinated under the “higher powers,” thus lay people become seduced and awakening is made unnecessarily. (See, §650.)

The rationalistic emphasis on pure ego is seen as the manifestation of the passion of egoism³⁷⁸. Thus he polemically wrote:

“Egoism reveals itself within reason as an idea of *the abstract ‘ego’* or the Self, an *emptiness resting on nothingness*, without object or subject. This *great ego* has, within the reason of the philosopher, transformed itself into a great whale that strains at gnats but swallows camels. Within reason, the *ego appears in all its universality*: the ego comes, through reason, *divine*. Through reason, the ego becomes a sun unto itself, its own star. The ‘divine ray’ within reason is the sun of the ego, the fixed star around which the ego revolves. Furthermore, through reason, the ego becomes a freely operating entity, independent of outer and inner forces of nature, and through the free will, the ego acquires self-determination. Moreover, all of this is worked out by the intellect, the organ of which is continually swimming in the element of egoism.” (§1023. emphasis added)

Laestadius also thought that it was mainly because of the influence of the passion of egoism that the Self was conceived as unconditional and autonomical (§1025). Further still, Laestadius claimed that the influence of egoism presents itself in Western rationalism particularly in its manner of positing pure “thinking ego” (*ego cogito*) as the core of thinking and anthropology.

As noted here in Chapter 3, Laestadius thought that Idea and a philosophical abstract ego was not a plausible starting point for anthropology and theology. Ego as an Idea is not given directly within lived experience, or at least in its pure form as philosophers assumed. Instead the Self is given as corporeal, passionate and feeling the flesh:

“[I]deal personhood cannot become a fixed idea, a necessary thought, even though the idea is given within abstract consciousness. Ideal personhood is a possibility. But how can it become reality, when the idea cannot exist without substance, without foundation. The ego cannot exist without subject, without principle. *Existencia sine essentia et sine substantia, non existit.*” (§1203.)

The metaphysical and rationalistic notion of the soul lay the ground for the idealistic notion of ego, which in turn led to the notion of ideal personhood. Within an ideal

378 On egoism and its consequences, see, §§ 1024, 1025 [social-political violence], 1026 [egoistic emphasis of one’s own rights], 1027 [ambition manifests as an illusion of high moral value of oneself], §1036 [summary].

personhood, the ego [itself] is conceived as the highest power in the full sphere of personhood (§§1182, 1183).

Against both rationalism and metaphysicians, Laestadius argued that it is not correct to exclude the subjective faculties of soul from the concept of Self and personality. The philosophical analysis has to accept those powers of passions that are not in control of the Self into the notion of personality (§§1183, 1188). From this critical perspective Laestadius then sought to elaborate on an alternative for the rationalistic and idealistic notions of ego and personhood.³⁷⁹

4.3.2 Deconstruction and the Vitalist Notion of Self

Following the vitalist way of thought, the “emergence” or manifestation of the Self is naturally grounded on the creative and evolving basis of the principle of life that functions via organic life. Thus, Laestadius viewed the Self (jag, ego) also as a manifestation of developmental³⁸⁰ processes. The Self is grounded in the physiological basis of inherited characteristics, such as temperament and unique passionate sensitivity that is specific for every unique human being.

The Self or awareness of the “I” or “me” requires a development/gestation of the sensory life for the phenomenon of Self to be reached by intentional consciousness.³⁸¹ Only when the organs of sensory life, the brains, are developed, and only when there is an experiencing sensory activity (object consciousness), is the Self able to become aware of its own existence³⁸². Thus, Laestadius conceived of an emergence and level of self-consciousness from the *developmental perspective*. Self-consciousness was naturally the initial condition for the existence of the Self as such:

“The first sign to announce the existence of such a substance [the self/rational soul] should be self-consciousness. A soul that does not possess self-consciousness, nor exists in the consciousness of someone else, does not exist. To exist is the same as being active and being acted upon (*agere*

379 Presumably Laestadius’ critique is aimed at Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Laestadius emphasized the organic subjective consciousness instead of a mere transcendental consciousness.

380 We can also see “the emergence of the Self” as an evolutionary process. See the “developmental law of personhood” (§1189).

381 Laestadius also argued that the principle of life preceded the idea of the concept of self (§1196). There is no Ego before vital powers and, therefore, no pure starting point for philosophy. The ego is genetically born from the principle of life (§1189).

382 Laestadius thought that the fetus already had a self-consciousness after the sensory life was developed, but he claimed that a fetus is able already in the womb to experience (sensibility), and there was a short discussion of the emergence of self-consciousness in the fetus. Altogether, the notion of the self is possible to position between the organic and sensory functions only after the human organism reaches a certain developmental stage. Laestadius does not further discuss the self-consciousness of the fetus.

et existere idem est). But that which can neither act nor be acted upon does not exist. *Substantia non existit ante existentiam suam* (a substance does not preexist its own existence); a being (*väsen*) cannot exist until it is capable of acting and being acted upon.” (§170.³⁸³)

Furthermore, based on this definition, Laestadius seemed to hold that “existence precedes essence” also highlighted in existentialistic philosophy as a different meaning. Any being or essence of the ego has its psychophysiological, but also vital-existential pre-requisites; the Self cannot be a vital substance or possess any essence before its “power to be,” before its actual existence by the power of the principle of life, and before existing in the world (of passions). The Self does not have its foundation in and of itself, but rather in/on the principle of life that is conceived the real subject of the ego. (e.g. §§1196, 1218)

For Laestadius, the principle of life signified a “psychic vital essence”, a holistic organization of sensibility³⁸⁴, and its experiential existence was revealed through a passionate nature to the human being itself. This principle of life has to be seen also as the *core of the vitalist concept of personhood*; however, in a way that is a creative and directing totality of the vital forces that create organic life and modify its action, for example, constituting the sensory life, which as seen above, does signify a genuine individual soul.

Hence – recalling the thematic whole of organic life and sensory life and intertwined experiential spheres of subjective and objective consciousness – Laestadius posited the Self (*jag*) in “between the organic life and sensory life.” This signifies that the notion of self is fundamentally attached to both of the embodied organic functions of subjective consciousness and objective consciousness, and also lays the ground for the *holistic notion of the Self*.

Thus, Laestadius shunted over the idealistic and transcendental notions of ego as vague and etheric, and highlighted again the needed shift into the vitalistic paradigm:

“There is only one middle road for us to choose, between ideal and substantial [notions of] personhood. If we follow the guidelines of nature itself, in the fashioning of human personhood, we find that we are given a principle of life in the seed, in the egg, in the fetus shortly after conception [...] [W]e must

383 In footnote 168 of §170, Strinberg suggests that Laestadius opposed Leibniz’s definition and agreed more with Fichte, and thus Laestadius denied the rationalistic idea of the substantiality of soul because it presupposed a point of time within which it does not act or is not acted upon. For Laestadius, that which properly exists has to act and receive action (susceptibility) (Cf. §72Note). Laestadius seemed to reject Leibnizian monadology because it drove into dualism; however, he did refer to the *harmonia praestabilita* as an endeavor for monistic thought.

384 E.g., the irritability and receptivity of organs and sensory life that interact and function together.

believe that our origins come from this obscure natural foundation. Yet life is not lawless; it is bound by physical necessity. [...] psyche and pneuma are branches of common principle of life. If we now were to posit the principle of life in the place of the soul, we have, within this principle of life, the foundation, or the subject, for our self-consciousness. But since this principle of life has not yet been defined by any thinker as ‘being (väsén) or substance,’ we are, within psychology freed from metaphysical necessity and thus able to move a little bit freer in the sphere of subjective personhood.” (§1205.)

The embodied subject-ground of the human Self is the principle of life that is conceived as something that “receives action and can act in-itself”.³⁸⁵ This fundamental starting point derives from the vitalist notion of sensibility, as vitalists argued against Cartesian and the transcendental notion of a pure ego and distinct immaterial soul³⁸⁶, namely, that “to feel is to exist.”³⁸⁷

Laestadius made a distinction between the Self (ego) and its foundation (§1195); the principle of life is able to exist without foundation and independently but the Self is not. The Self and its “subject ground” are not identical. Rather the Self is the predicate of its foundation, a functioning of principle of life and other vital forces within organic life.

When the Self is seen as in between organic life and sensory life, it is obvious that it can never exist as pure ideal ego, but instead manifests itself as a developmental, relational, and dynamic occasion or event of life. The Self is relational first from the embodied internal perspective that is the core of the carnal unconscious variable processes of organic life and functions of mind, and secondly, in relation to the influences of an outer objective surrounding that is directly affecting the organic body. The Self being the experiential core of both outer and inner influences and impressions³⁸⁸, it becomes evident that Laestadius did not conceive of the Self simply as a capsulated subject of experience, in the sense that the Self would be the active ground for occasions of [personal] life. This emphasis was a very important for Laestadius, and he highlighted it in the following way (the destruction of abstract subjectivity):

”Certainly we have noted that these metaphysical definitions are more physical than metaphysical once we have grasped the principle of life, which is *‘existentia sine essentia et sine substantia.’* However, if the principle of life were an idea, then not only would the crow be able to be a person,

385 The self (ego) cannot exist without a subject (§1192).

386 (within which the intellectual cognition [ultimate doubt] becomes an initial proof of existence)

387 See e.g. Williams 2004; Rey 2006.

388 I/the self as the developmental predicate of the principle of life and subject to the influences of passions and world.

but the caterpillar (larven) and the straw of grass on the ground would be able to be a persons. The materialist and the pantheist are unlikely to go that far in personification. We must therefore remain within the limits of the possibilities of human thought: the idea and the principle of life are not identical; *the ego is not a subject, but a predicate*. The ego has a foundation for its being, and this foundation is not the ego. '*Existentia non est substantia*'. [...³⁸⁹]." (§1229. my emphasis added)

According to Laestadius, the Idea and [principle of] life are not identical, and life precedes all ideas (§§1228, 1229). In regard to a human being, this view signifies that the human self (jaget, ego, Person) cannot be conceived as an ideal capsulated subject founded on itself or lying on its own subjectivity. The self has its foundation in the principle of life and its worldly embodiment (as a tension between objectivity and subjectivity). As a consequence, the Self is not the subject – the foundation and cause of its own action and activity – but rather an object of action, a predicate. For this reason, proceeding toward the notion of personhood cannot begin with pure ego, but instead begins with the principle of life and proceeds from there into the [vital]idea, to the Self and personhood (§1187).

This view means that the idea of ego or the Self emerges and is constituted within a vital lived experience. The inscribed critique within Laestadius' alternative notion of Self is aimed at Cartesian and the idealistic notion of the ego. According to Laestadius, a distinct and autonomous ego is simply not possible. Even if it could be imagined, it could not be a genuine and proper Self. The substantial notion of the ego, as well as the soul, do not have any existence (*existentia non est substantia*), and the whole notion of substantiality and the notion of essence (*essentia*) derived from it are only empty, ideal and abstract (Cf. §1203).

In regard to earlier discussions on Laestadius' view on the functions of mind, we can question what the Self *is*. What does the phenomenon of Self embody and how does the Self function in the world?³⁹⁰ Furthermore, what indications did Laestadius'

389 "Since life within man is concurrent with the body, we could, in accordance with common laws of thought, conclude *that life and substance within God are concurrent*. But we are unable to formulate even a fraction of the concept of the emergence of this, the first idea. We are unable to say that *idea realis* came before *idea substantialis*, especially since *idea substantialis* is, to us, unthinkable. *Idea vitalis* is more possible, insofar as the idea cannot exist without life. Here, too, we [are] met by the contradiction of nature, that the life and idea are not interchangeable concepts and cannot be counterpoised." (§1229)

390 How does the experienced self relate to one's own body, others, and to the world? How would Laestadius' "self" answer the question, "who am I?", or how was the problem of identity to be conceived in Laestadius' theoretical frame? A hint toward a Laestadius' answer is given in the theological statement that the self has to encompass both the "old and a new man," which signifies that the actualized redeemed self is conceived as a "redeemed devil" (§1378).

notion of the Self have for the understanding of personhood, moral responsibility, or religiosity?

“Once we have been liberated, through the principle of life, from ontology and metaphysics, we only need the given axiom, the dynamics of life, in order to uncover the elements that belong to the sphere of personhood. Through this logical trick (life), we have moved away *from the being of the idea [ideväsénde, idea of essences] to the life of the idea[s] [idelif]*; from *substantiality* to *vitality*, from the unthinkable idea substantialis to the more thinkable ‘*idea vitalis*’; and even if the idea is not in the principle of life, as Heinroth claims, it is nevertheless present in formed life. We are only able to proceed *through experience* from the principle of life to the idea-less (idélösa) (organic) life; we arrive at the *idea-full* (idéfulla) *life* through the same experience, from the idea-less life.³⁹¹ But precisely because the philosopher is unable to prove it (Petrelli), we are able to arrive at a living personhood, within which the ego, as the center point of personhood, must acknowledge its *dependence on ‘psychic necessity,’* and its *independence of metaphysical necessity.* *The ego is independent within the sphere of sensory life, insofar as it is able to command all its members, the will, intellect and memory, the power of imagination; but since the ego is right in between organic life and sensory life, of which the former is the higher power that has brought for the ego, and the latter, sensory life, is subordinate to the ego, then the ego is unable to control the will and the intellect to the point that no desire enter into the will, and no thoughts, which do not proceed from the ego, are able to enter into intellect (förståndet).* Daily experiences show that wicked desires really sneak into the will, and the ego is unable to prevent this since/ [similarly as] (äfvensom) foreign thoughts (främmande tankar), which the ego cannot instantly expel, also sneak into the intellect.” (§1206. emphasis added)

But how then is the demanded unity of the self thematized and argued in Laestadius’ theory? With regard to the notion of person, Laestadius now interpreted the constitutive principle of life as a panpsychism that would constitute the holistic notion of personhood and unite the dualities. (§1218.)

391 In these statements, Laestadius seems to indicate that organic life can be researched only through lived experience, and furthermore, he claims that only through the same lived experience is it possible to proceed to the study and explication of ideas. This pre-phenomenological approach is clearly based on his fundamental starting point, namely, that life precedes ideas whatsoever. These statements are illuminative in order to understand how Laestadius conceived the way that pre-reflective and pre-cognitive experiences could be studied and how concept, ideas, and theories could be formed in such a way as to coincide with the lived experience.

Laestadius mentions “panpsychism” directly in five contexts in *The Lunatic*: §§ 132, 1208, 1218, 1244³⁹², 1601³⁹³. In these contexts, he refers to the Swedish philosophical and psychological scholar, C. M. J. Petrelli and his book, *Om Människojälen Natur – Försök till Psychologie* (1845)³⁹⁴, wherein he found many discipline and general definitions, e.g., panpneumatism and pantheism. Laestadius’ panpsychism is actually defined by distinguishing his own position from that of dualism, pantheism, and panpneumatism. His refusal of the rationalistic-mechanical and metaphysical tradition³⁹⁵ and the notions of “panpneumatism, dualism, naturalism, and fatalism” (§1601), becomes clear as he saw them threatening the proper understanding of the human being, life, and Christian faith and God.

When questioning Laestadius’ panpsychism, it is important to notice that Laestadius re-interpreted panpsychism by offering a philosophical-theological interpretation of the vitalist notion of the principle of life. Thus, the principle of life comes to signify the fundamental-ontological and living psychic essence of organic matter itself. In this respect, Laestadius’ panpsychism differs from the classical concept of panpsychism known in the classical history of philosophy.³⁹⁶ Laestadius is not arguing – as classical strong panpsychism proponents do – that all matter whatsoever or things are “mental” from their fundamental character. Laestadius delimits panpsychism to pertain to only organic matter, holding that all of living nature and thus organic life is “mental” or vital in the sense that it is grounded on the vital principle.

As pointed out elsewhere as well, it is a task of another study to formulate an argument for Laestadius’ radical panpsychism³⁹⁷. Laestadius did not seem to be interested in such a philosophical project, but rather leaned toward the notion of panspsychism within the anthropological and psychological framework. For Laestadius, panpsychism pertained only to organic life. For him, the panpsychistic way

392 Here Laestadius draws a distinction between his interpretation of panpsychism and panpneumatism.

393 Here Laestadius resists idealism and materialism in favor of his interpretation of monistic panpsychism, which is fastened back to the Biblical (early antique) notion of a transformative vital force.

394 Petrelli’s book [engl. *On the Nature of Human Soul – Research on Psychology*] was a widely used study-book for psychology and philosophy in 1800’s Sweden, and it spread the rationalistic and Hegelian metaphysics and classical ideas of philosophical psychology.

395 It is necessary to reconstruct the idea of an historical background to thematize Laestadius’ theoretical positions, formulations, and intentions. Laestadius’ panpsychism is possible to define in its relation to the views and doctrines to which he objected. Laestadius’ elaborations can be interpreted against the dominating dualistic, rationalistic, idealistic, and growing mechanical explanation of man and the world.

396 See, Skrbina 2007 for the history of Western panpsychism.

397 Such an argument may be possible to form if we go on and interpret Laestadius’ idea of “living God” as a proto-panpsychistic principle that organizes all physical matter and gives life to organic beings.

of thought offered a more correct and coherent view when considering human organism, the emergence of consciousness, and the whole person and avoided the problems of dualism, emergentism, idealism, materialism etc. To avoid the panpneumatist idea of the presence of an abstract spirit or God in everything seems to be crucially important. Human consciousness and personhood should be conceived from the ground up in such a way that the principle of life as a restricted panspsychistic notion constitutes the more complex functions of life and thus through growth and development constitutes the higher functions of consciousness and finally the holistic notion of a person.

He calls the personality that includes both the soul and the body a panspsychism, and conceives that the panspsychistic substance of the person unites the “dual consciousness” and the doubled wills and emotions (§1218).

“Petrelli oscillates between ‘pansychaeismus’ and ‘panpneumatismus.’ But since these two lives cannot be counterpoised, it is clear that they are determined by nature in a way that does not allow for them to be interchangeable concepts. But ‘panpneumatismus’ does not exist, since sensory life only falls within a certain sphere; that is to say, it does not extend to whole body (Cf. Petrelli, §87. 47.) However, ‘*panpsychaeismus*’ does exist since organic life extends even into the hair and the nails. We do not claim that man’s personhood extends that far. *We only claim that pansychaeismus fills the entire sphere of man’s personhood*, in accordance with *universal consciousness*, which is man’s general ego. This ego is voluminous in terms of its compass and contains all of man, both body and soul. *Panpsychaeismus is thus the real personhood*, such as it has been given by the Creator; it is of no avail that concentrated egoism wishes to tear itself loose from its subject, from its principle, from its being, that is to say, from its life, which here appears as being, because metaphysical necessity applies also here: ‘each and every one must act according to the nature of his being.’ This is a universal law in all of nature, and man is subject to this law in physical, psychic, and metaphysical respect. He is bound by physical, psychic, and metaphysical necessity.” (§1208. emphases added)

The passive relationship of the ego to feelings is a psychic necessity. The ego must now acknowledge feelings, passions, drives, instincts, temperament, and so forth:

”But the ego that feels is a passive ego. It is an ego of the kind that must receive what is given to it by higher power. It cannot say to the feelings: I do not know you. The relationship of this ego to the feelings is psychic necessity, which forces the ego to receive both the sweet and sour from the

heart, both evil and good, both love and heat, both grief and joy; ... Psychic necessity is a higher power, which is embedded within human nature. And from this fatalistic power, no egoism is able to liberate itself. The ego must now acknowledge feelings, passions, drives, instincts, temperament, and so forth.” (§1212.)

Laestadius used the condition of child as an example to contrast the way of being the vital Self with the philosophical abstract ego, and simultaneously gave his vitalist-existentialistic definition for "universality." For Laestadius "universality" – rather than signifying formal ideas and a formal logical generality or applicability – signified the vital-existential fullness of life indicating some "generality" and "naturalness" that was common to all embodied human beings:

“Our consciousness speaks clearly on the behalf of the psychic truth that the ego that feels is the same ego that thinks. But *the ego that feels is precisely this subjective consciousness, which is natural and real, not merely thought*: abstract self-consciousness is merely thought, it is self-made. And although it may be fun for the philosopher to live in the abstract, it is nevertheless the case that a child has even more fun, living in the universal, in the consciousness of the fullness of his being. Even if the philosopher likes to live in the prison cell of egoism, in which he believes himself to be truly free and loosened from the world, he is nevertheless, on the whole, miserable, since he does not have anyone other than himself to thank for his bliss. He suckles his own empty teats, while a child suckles the teats of the mother, from which he derives a sense of bliss. If the child begins to cry easily, it also begins to laugh as easily, and generally, joy is predominant within the child. If the philosopher wishes to state his true and sincere conviction, then he must agree that his childhood was the happiest time of his life.” (§ 1211. my emphasis) The full life of childhood means the natural and real life of subjective consciousness.³⁹⁸

Laestadius' elaborations on character and personhood seem to be indebted to Bichat's theory. For instance, Bichat states about the human characteristics and personhood that

“It is this influence of the passions over the actions of the animal life, which composes what is named the character. Character as well as Temperament depends upon the organic life; possesses all its attributes, and is a stranger

398 Moral necessity is founded on psychic necessity (§1214).

to the will in all its emanations; for our exterior actions form a picture of which the ground and design do indeed belong to the animal life, but upon which the organic life extends the shading and colouring of the passions. The character of the individual is constituted by such shades and colours.” (Bichat 1815, 78.)³⁹⁹

The classical basic clause of philosophical subject-ontology *Cogito ergo sum* (Descartes) can be translated anew – insofar as its founding concepts are wide in their indication – to correspond with the Laestadius’ vitalist-existential thought: *I experience feelings, therefore I am*. Existence and life are not given, only and in the first place, within mere reflective *thinking* (cogito), but instead they are within experiential passions and “psychic phenomena” which are the [self-]given initial condition.

4.3.3 The Self and Unconsciousness

Laestadius’ deconstruction and re-definition of the ego made the phenomenon of selfhood multifaceted. One interesting aspect is that Laestadius’ theory of the Self seems to include a specific notion of unconsciousness. It is present for instance when the notion of Self is expanded to cover spheres that the Self cannot be fully aware of, particularly as Laestadius has to talk about the “me” and the “non-me”.

We already have pointed out the relationship between the lived Self and its foundation principle of life, which functions as the ground and cause of the Self. In this respect, Laestadius held that it is impossible to grasp conceptually that dimension of the Self which is unknown and conceptually ineffable, for instance, the organic functions of subjective consciousness. When the Self is conceived as a vital corporeal phenomenon, the notion of the Self coincidentally covers dimensions that are and are not the Self. The problem of the unconscious dimension is also that of the relation between the Self and its foundation and the subjective and objective consciousness.

The relative distinction and unity within personhood is dealt with also as follows: First of all Laestadius, held that the fact that pure ego without [vital] substance can

399 Bichat writes (1815, 6, §4) ”That man enjoys the happiest constitution in whom the two lives are balanced, in whom the cerebral and epigastric centers exercise the one upon the other an equal action, whose intellect is warmed, exalted, and animated by the passions, but whose judgement makes him at all times master of their influence.” (Bichat 1815, 78.) According to Bichat, passions and understanding are more in balance within man than within animals. Laestadius may have received some evidence from these thoughts for his idea that religious moral passions and emotions bring balance to human life. Bichat mentioned Plato, Markus Aurelius, Bacon, Augustine, Paul, Leibniz, von Helmont, and Buffon as examples of those who have two different and changing sides of human personhood, according to which the human being sometimes governs his own moral actions and on other occasions action is contrarily immoral. Bichat was interested in the unity of these two principles. (Bichat 1815, 78.)

be imagined proves that the principles of life and Idea are not identical. Therefore, it seems obvious that pure unconditional ego is also self-made or a postulation. According to Laestadius, this is a happy possibility for idealists even though nobody can actually tear away and be from one's own embodied foundation (principle of life). However, the possibility of an abstract Ego and Idea based on the idea of un-identity opens up the question for whether man created a God, or in other words, whether the Idea of God was actually constituted by the human mind. This question is left unanswered, just like the question concerning the precedence of Life and Idea within God. Laestadius, however, claimed that the idea of absolutely transcendental ego and an absolutely transcendental God as an Idea or abstract intelligence had a similar origin:

“The question whether God is a self-made personhood, originating in the same way as the *philosophers persona abstracta*, independent of his own principle of life, independent of all psychic, metaphysical, and moral necessity, *ens liberrimum sed indeterminatissimum*; this is a question that we must leave unanswered, along with the question of whether the idea and the principle of life within God are identical.” (§1196Note.)

What is possible to conclude here, as Laestadius holds, “is that the idea and the principle of life within man are not identical.” (§1196Note) Laestadius highlights the idea that the principle of life is the same thing as the [vital] soul. Thus, he sums up by saying that “the ego-subject, that is me; but it is not me, because the principle of life and the idea are not identical.” (§1196Note) By this statement Laestadius throws the ball to the idealists, urging them to be “free to prove that there is an idea substantialis,” but then simultaneously claims that “Idea realis non substantialis exists in the abstract consciousness of the sharp thinker.” (§1196Note.) More heuristically, Laestadius states that

“[t]he real reason why substance = being of the soul = the principle of life is not the same as the ego, is based on the fact that ego, *in a more narrow sense* of the word, is a ‘*concrete consciousness*,’ [Cf. object consciousness] which includes the rational soul, or sensory life; while my other ego, organic life, which, by emotional people such as the Hebrews, was understood as the real being of the soul, really is, in the form or in the nature of its activity, separate from my closest ego = sensory life. [...⁴⁰⁰]” (§1196Note.)

400 “But when the sharp thinker can abstract himself also from sensory life in its entirety, and retain only self-consciousness, then this self-consciousness is an abstract consciousness; an ego that is torn loose from being, and the mere possibility that such an ego, without substance, can exist, even

Because life as a grounding and an idea was constituted within and through the life are not identical concepts, Laestadius ended up holding that the Self has also a dimension or sphere that does not belong to the experiential conscious/aware core that “the I” could simply call “me” or “mine”. This ambiguous nature characterizes the Ego-substance or embodied subjectivity.⁴⁰¹

How should we then interpret Laestadius’ notion of the ambiguous-multifaceted and unity of the self? Does his conception entail an actual dualism? We find that the distinction between *the me* and the *non-me* is drawn within the personhood:

“[T]he ego-substance is me, but it is also not-me, *because I myself am not the being of the soul*, but rather a product of the being, ‘genetically’ brought forth by the substance, which, with help of physiology, can be proven. Within man, *the principle of life preceded the idea*, but the principle of life was not the work of the idea. Rather, the other way around. *Such is the relationship between the ego and the subject of the ego* within the created being.” (§1196. emphasis added)

if only in the imagination, proves that the substance is not the ego, or that the principle of life and the idea are not identical. [...] However, it is now clear that the abstract ego is self-made, and were one thereby to draw a conclusion as to the greatest personhood, one can certainly suppose it possible that His ego is self-made: ‘Idea realis non substantialis.’ But, although all spiritualists would be glad to assume idealism as the firm foundation, for the sake of their own comfort, they are nevertheless unable to tear themselves loose from their being (*väsendet*) and, thus, they must assume ‘*ens simplex*’ or the substantiality of the soul, *non tantum idealis*. If the adherents of idealism were able to prove that the idea itself is a substance, not merely an effect of substance, then idealism within the doctrine of God would be a given. God would then become a *persona idealis substantialis*. However, for the sake of ironclad metaphysics, he must now be a *persona substantialis*, not merely *persona idealis*, not merely *persona realis non substantialis*, but a *persona idealis, realis, substantialis*. The question whether God is a self-made personhood, originating in the same way as the *philosophers persona abstracta*, independent of his own principle of life, independent of all psychic, metaphysical, and moral necessity, *ens liberrimum sed indeterminatissimum*; this is a question that we must leave unanswered, along with the question of whether the idea and the principle of life within God are identical. The only thing that we must now consider as proven is that the idea and the principle of life within man are not identical. (Here, the principle of life is the same as the being of the soul.) The sum of these investigations is: the ego-substance, that is me; but it is not me, because the principle of life and the idea are not identical, at least not within man. The adherents of idealism are free to prove that there is an *idea substantialis*. *Idea realis non substantialis* exists in the abstract consciousness of the sharp thinker.” (§1196Note.)

401 Because Laestadius refers to the Hebrew understanding of self as separate “in its activity” and distinct from the aware part of the Self experienced within sensory life, we should ask whether there remains a relative function dualism within Laestadius’ notion of self. This notion, however, in Laestadius’ thought, seems to refer to what he earlier stated about the relatively autonomous nature of the will and self-will within the sensory life, and further, the subjective consciousness as genuine self.

However, within the same personhood, Laestadius established a unity between the Self and life: “[...⁴⁰²]We only know that man possesses life prior to possessing self-consciousness, and if the soul is life, on which the concept of being (*väsendet*) can hardly be applied, then this life is nevertheless necessarily united with the ego, insofar as an ego without life cannot be imagined.” (§1196.)

Furthermore, Laestadius holds that the personhood is constituted not only of mere self-consciousness, but also the “*object-consciousness*” or “concrete consciousness” by which he refers to the intentionality of the sensory life or the intentionality of an objective consciousness. Laestadius saw the lack of object consciousness or concrete consciousness, and thus saw a lack of intentionality of mind, which became the reason why “a child in the womb is not considered to be a person; even after birth, the child is not considered to be person until it has attained full consciousness.” (§1196. See also §1196Note. emphasis added)

In general, the pre-reflective Self, i.e., the “non-me” or the “second ego”, is called the subjective consciousness and subjective personhood “which has predominance within the sphere of personhood.” (§1207.) The unconscious dimension of the Self is something that Laestadius assumed that philosophers did not take into account in anthropological theory and morality:

“Subjective consciousness is the real ego (*jaget*), or man’s second ego, which egoism wishes to reject, since it is not subordinate to the objective ego. It may rather be proven, with the assistance of anatomy and physiology, that man has an objective and a subjective consciousness, [than that the philosopher’s rational soul actually exists].” (§1207.)⁴⁰³

The problem with the notion of unconsciousness is that we can always ask whether we can know and thus be conscious of something which is by definition unconscious and thus something of which we are not aware. However, the way to set the problem remains from an ontological perspective at least within the epistemological frame and emphasizes the limited/confined notion of consciousness and knowledge. From the perspective of Laestadius’ psychology, it is obvious from the beginning that objective consciousness does not cover nor the govern all that exists. Especially, the creative force of principle of life and organic functions within man and nature are aspects that are not empirically perceptible, but however, they are reachable by their manifestations through lived experience.

402 “But we are unable to draw any conclusions about the deity on the basis of man.” (§1196)

403 Herein Laestadius refers also to classical vitalist examples of somnambulism, animal magnetism, visions, and revelations for giving evidence to the claim that subjective consciousness can operate and be active even while objective consciousness is inactive. (§1207.)

Thus, Laestadius' solution for the problem of consciousness would simply be that man can recognize in everyday life the consequences of varying passional states and actions which then clearly indicate that there is a much more than autonomous [self-conscious] Self that does determine the cognitive, habitual, and intellectual life. This cognitive recognition of unconsciousness by its manifestations and emanations is possible through the lived experiences of passional conflicts and dissonant states, and in its full extent, by the religious experience of awakening insofar as it signifies affirmation of a revealed passional awareness/consciousness of the Self. Altogether, it seems to me that Laestadius suggested that a human being is able to recognize unconscious states through the conflicts of passions, drives, and instincts as they also manifest as certain dissonances within the realm of human awareness.

Laestadius' notion of the mind, which was based on subjective and objective consciousness (organic life and sensory life), can be interpreted as having both conscious and unconscious dimensions. In this regard "the Self" is posited within psycho-physiological organization in a way that the subjective or unconscious side is emphasized and the Self paradoxically receives its power and character from what is not "me" or the "objective ego". Thus, it seems that Laestadius does not want to regard the Self only as a mere conscious phenomenon or state, neither a distinct immaterial faculty of mind (reflection, thinking, imagination, memory etc.), nor as a pure and ideal abstraction.⁴⁰⁴

Instead Laestadius conceives of the Self as an emergent phenomenon which has physiological and developmental prerequisites. Following the basic idea of the asymmetrical relationship between organic and sensory lives as well as objective and subjective consciousness, holding precisely that the organic vital functions and passions determine the functioning and intentionality of the mind, Laestadius aims to include the subjective passional aspects – which he sometimes calls "*the unconscious*" functions within the Self or person. Thus, the mind of a self is always conscious of itself to a certain degree, but as the Self is constitutively grounded on organic life, it can never be transparent to itself. Thus, *the lived self* cannot reflect transparently on its own roots that constitute and direct its own intentionality. This ambiguity of the nature of Self also entails that absolute autonomy is not possible. Within experience, the self is manifested as both familiar and unfamiliar to itself; self-knowledge seems to be always in the midst of a dynamic process, depending on the variable passional condition and the situations.

Laestadius' concept of the Self is based on the idea of the principle of life in the way that Self (Jag) is seen as a tension between the organic "unconscious" and the sensory "conscious" life. In a sense, the Self functions as a tension between the partly ineffable and unconscious powers of passions and the conscious awareness of objec-

404 However, he holds that the Self is in a sense the core of the experience no matter what.

tive world; *the condition of tension constitutes the way of being of the Self*. In contrast to “ideal personhood” Laestadius is seeking a notion of the person that would also include the embodied emotional and passional selfhood, and in the vitalist sense, the “substantial” concept of the Self. For Laestadius, the subjective consciousness is “real and natural” – might we say, authentic and genuine – self. Objective consciousness refers to self-aware consciousness (§1207) but it is not, nevertheless, the core of the human person and moral character.

This kind of pre-phenomenological analysis does not take on *being* – whether in a materialistic or an idealistic sense – for its objects and does not posit the human being as a subject (immaterial soul as the essence of a human being). The *ego cogito* does not form a grounding for man; rather the Self is seen as “substantial” in the holistic vital constitution. It is a psychic phenomenon and emerges as tension between organic passions or subjective consciousness and conscious awareness of objective consciousness. In this sense, the Laestadius notion of Self signifies the embodied worldly self of personhood.⁴⁰⁵

This is how Laestadius grounded his philosophy of embodied personality. From the tacit life of flesh and from unconscious passions, drives, and instincts, emerges and develops the primal ambivalent and ambiguous Self. The Self means the tension between an embodied pre-conscious level and conscious reflective level, as well as the body situated in between the perceptual world and an “inner”, passional world-relation. This is also how sin (the natural passions) comes to signify the pre-reflective ground of individuality rather than moralistic normative doctrine (in the original Biblical definition, sin signifies the separation from God). Therefore, personal selfhood in the sense of “Me or I am” is an event or process that is tension between embodied pre-cognitions and the conscious objective states of “I”.

Here, it is satisfactory just to point out what Laestadius meant to indicate by the notion of Self, namely, that in this general sense, the identity or continuity of the self[hood] is based on a certain kind of holistic embodied mineness, the sensible core of vital psychic essence, which covers both the organic unconscious functions and the faculties of objective consciousness that man is capable of knowing. Laestadius’ concept of the Self can, therefore, be interpreted as a kind of destruction of the ideal ego-subject.⁴⁰⁶

405 It is possible to interpret Laestadius’ intentions further. For me, it seems that Laestadius foretells that the self is in fundamental dissonance before a reconciliation that sets subjective and objective intentionality in same “directedness”; also “carelessness” is the immoral consistent condition of intentionality but it is blind to its immorality.

406 We can easily see how Laestadius’ notion opposes the rationalistic idea of the soul and self by seeing the self totally as the phenomenon of embodiment and having a dynamic relatedness with the world and existence (similarly as the mind does).

4.3.4 Personhood, the World, and Responsibility

Because of the passivity of the Self⁴⁰⁷ the passions have crucial importance, as they are mostly in charge of what the Self is and how it manifests itself in a spatial-temporal situation. The Self is not only a predicate, but also tension between the subjective and the objective, and finally, it produces tension between passions that lay the ground for the will, the action, and the intellect. This ambiguous nature of the lived selfhood can also be expressed as a fundamental tension between the Self and the non-Self, between consciousness and unconsciousness, or between the influences of the surrounding world and the effects of a subjective consciousness. Thus, the vital substantial personhood is always in an intimate dynamic relationship with the world through the passions that agitate an embodied human being.

Laestadius does not explicitly elaborate on the social constitution of the person, but instead has a specific psychologizing tendency in the sense that certain constitutive elements are inscribed into the notion of a person. This focus signifies that the social constitution is viewed from an inward psychological-religious perspective. The approach opens a vital-existentialistic view toward the constitution of the shared world and also the possibility of responsibility. Laestadius seems to suggest that not only is social world, but also the world's institutional and governmental structures are understood as being constituted through the mediation of prevailing passions. In this sense, the lived world is conceived as being an intersubjective world.

* * *

The relationship between the organic and the sensory life has been interpreted in earlier studies as a monistic parallelism in the general ontological sense, but without analyzing the relation between the two in more detail.⁴⁰⁸ Roughly, the functions of the sensory life and the faculties of soul are said to be in a similar relationship to each other as are their respective organs in the physiological body (organic life). This thinking is present in Laestadius' theory, and it definitely alludes to a parallelism or a certain kind of dualism for the level of functions of the different domains.

However, instead of a simple parallelism, the described analogical relation could also be interpreted as a psychosomatic relatedness. To support this view, we find several statements where Laestadius emphasizes the simultaneity and correlativity of organic functions and sensory functions. To describe the relationship in this way – the

407 The Self is a predicate (§1229).

408 Similarly the whole material/spiritual or man/God relation is usually conceived as being parallelistic. (See e.g. Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982.) Parallelism is a relatively plausible interpretation as Laestadius had to describe the relatedness in organicist terms by stating that the “faculties of soul” have their respective organs in the organic life, and from another perspective, the susceptible organs have their particular receptive organs in the sensory life.

beginning of the emphasis on reciprocal and simultaneous actions in “both lives” and also highlighting the chant that says, “what happens in body happens in soul” and vice versa – does indicate psychosomatic thinking. Psychosomatic thought is present also in the statement, “the Self that feels is the same Self that thinks.” (Further the self that perceives is also the same self that thinks.) The Self functions as tension or a tendon between feelings and thoughts or perceptions and experiences, and thus functions as the core domain (basis) of both thoughts and experiences.

What I want to argue here then is that Laestadius’ position could be more fruitfully interpreted as being psychosomatic. Laestadius’ intention was to describe an embodied personhood and world-relation that is closely connected to what happens in the mind and body. The psychosomatic relatedness of the body and mind is especially present in the core analysis of the senses and sensory impressions that are conceived as holistic embodied processes as far as they do awaken the passions. Furthermore, as the whole domain of consciousness is thematized as a subjective and objective consciousness which covers both organic life and sensory life (with their functions) it becomes more accurate to interpret the relationship as a constitutive and psychosomatic structure rather than a parallel relationship: Subjective and objective consciousness and organic and sensory lives are thus equal constituents of each other and the whole human person.

Interpreting Laestadius’ theory as psychosomatics also constitutes the *personalist* notion of man. This view provides insight into how the whole socio-cultural world and human beings are interrelated. The relation between the organic life and the sensory life is constitutive in a genetic-developmental and psychophysiological sense; *this constitution emphasizes the physiological⁴⁰⁹ basis more but it does not exclude objective socio-cultural world*, which is the constitutive aspect as well. The social-cultural world is part of the constitution of the organic, habitual, mental, moral, and spiritual manifestations of the person from the beginning. Passions, as intentional correlates, are also constituents of a shared world and social and governmental institutions; they are not distinctly the personal and communal interests of human beings. Laestadius’ “human being” does not exist outside of the factual world; in terms of organic and sensory lives, passions and sensuous feelings, emotions and experiences, the human person is posited into the body in the midst of a passional world.

However, the social constitution of a person is not dealt precisely, but rather fragmentarily when Laestadius points out the corruptive influence of prevailing worldly interests in church and society, thus alienating the character of modernization and intellectualization of the theological doctrines of man, God, and faith. However, the constitution of the world is included in Laestadius’ analysis. Herein the notion of

409 Organicist emphases do not signify the allegorical way of thinking, but instead emphasize that the basis of vital forces resides in specific organs (see e.g. §891). Laestadius stated that the condition of the organ is crucially important for the proper functioning of its respective faculty (e.g. §29).

passion as a constitutive element of the human person, habit and morality, and the social-cultural world as such, is central. In general, Laestadius believes that prevailing passions constitute not only human action and moral character, but the underlying force of a whole intentionality, and passions do signify the personal origin of the cultural-political world. The idea is that passions as an intentional nexus of the man/world relation also constitute a social and institutional ethos through the actions of man. Laestadius emphasized that intentionality of consciousness is determined by the prevailing passions, which indicate that social action also derives from a passional basis.

The social part of constitution culminates actually in a vitalist and family psychological analysis of “psychic reconciliation” wherein the authentic relation to others and God is disclosed as a mutual recognition of each other’s suffering. Giving this circumstance, it can be concluded that the proper analysis of a social constitution actually begins with the notion of reconciliation. The analysis of a social constitution signifies the phenomenological analysis of how natural and moral passions, or in religious terms, God/Good and Evil, actually function and direct the events of a socio-cultural being-in-the-world. In a sense, Laestadius’ idea of reconciliation encompassed a vertical immanent-transcendence and a horizontal social-others-world dimension.

* * *

The notion of Self has naturally a theological and dogmatic significance. Especially, Laestadius had in mind a question concerning the *freedom of will and moral responsibility*. Laestadius sought to extend the notion of Self to cover the whole body and make the Self responsible also for its pre-reflective and pre-cognitive states and inclinations. Laestadius’ way of thematizing the corporeal notion of Self aimed, first of all, to highlight the captivity of will⁴¹⁰ and simultaneously to reveal his own Christian conviction of the corrupted nature of a human being⁴¹¹. While doing so in physiological-vitalist terms, Laestadius went on to demand the total responsibility of the entire corporeal being in the world. Thus, the concept [or the birth] of the authentic self is closely attached to the idea of responsibility (which later was reveal to be impossible for human nature). Once again, Laestadius criticized simultaneously the notion of the ideal ego, for it does not cover all responsibility:

“The proof of psychic responsibility for the entirety of personhood depends on whether the philosopher, within the sphere of his personhood, admits

410 Cf. Luther, Martin 2005. *The Bondage of the Will*. Written in Answer to the Diatribe of Erasmus on Free-Will. (De servo Arbitrio). Transl. Henry Cole. Texas: RDMc Publishing, Forth Worth. In Finnish see Luther 1952.

411 See e.g. Zidbäck 1937; Dahlbäck 1950; Juntunen 1982

all faculties that, according to the law of psychic development, naturally and ‘*genetice*’ belong to the sphere of personhood. With assistance from physiology, it can certainly be proven that *the principle of life*, corresponding to the philosophical substance of the soul (självväsendet), or metaphysical substance, *is related to the ego (jaget) as cause (orsak) is related to effect (verkan), or as foundation (grund) is related to consequence (följd); for which reason the ego cannot exist without a subject, that is to say without its own principle.* But if the ego deludes itself that it is not subject to this higher power, then it cannot be *responsible* for the effects of the principle of life; it cannot be responsible for what the principle of life does and affects, for which reason ideal personhood does not have a ‘*subjective responsibility*,’ before the ego (jag) itself assumes the [vital] substance (ikläder sig substansen) and becomes the ‘*substantial personhood.*’ Because, although the philosopher usually assumes the substantiality of the soul, he is, however, in certain moments able to tear himself loose from his own substance, and thus move around even more freely in the transcendental sphere, as merely an ideal personhood; there the ego is torn loose from its own principle. But it can never in this world be proven, that man is an ‘*ideal personhood,*’ and much less, since no thinker has hitherto been able to do without the substance or the being of the soul (självväsendet). Thus, philosophical personhood must be a ‘*substantial personhood*’ and, as such, he must be responsible for the substance in its entirety.” (§1192.)

Considering the Self as a vitalistic substantiality is to accept responsibility for the whole domain of embodied personality. This shift entails a problem of moral and absolute responsibility, and later the necessity of awakening and reconciliation.⁴¹² Here the Self does not mean that it forms the ground of personality, but rather that personality is considered as belonging under the influence of the organic life. Pure *ego cogito* is a false imaginary starting point in fundamental anthropological or ontological sense, as it pertains only to the epistemological question regarding the basis of knowledge. For Laestadius, ego was already embodied and passionate and in the world – therefore, the beginning of philosophy had to include both the passionate and emotional aspects of the Self.

Laestadius was strict about his [restricted panpsychistic] idea that the Self has to be conceived on the basis of a vital substance, which then shows that there is no incorporeal soul and thus no incorporeal causality. Thus, there is no ego or reason that is distinct from its dirty passionate and worldly roots. Instead, the human being

412 I will come back to the problem of responsibility later in this chapter to examine the necessity of awakening (5.4.) and reconciliation (5.5.)

has to be held responsible and has to take into account the whole embodied vital personhood with all its unconscious passions and drives and emotions, violence, bad thoughts and action so agitated by the passions. Responsibility has to be taken, not only of the intellect and immoral actions, but also of the underlying passional inclinations that direct the cognitive life and human action. Responsibility is not a matter of intellectual calculation or becoming convinced of one's guiltiness or innocence; human responsibility is ultimate and absolute and there is no such a "pure ego subject" that would be free from responsibility.

In a sense, Laestadius radicalized and absolutized responsibility by bringing transcendental ego back to its corporeal situation and elaborating on his holistic notion of personhood. Individual and social morality and responsibility does not seem to be possible using rationalistic moral imperatives. They would be intellectual moral demands, and important as such, but Laestadius also argued that they do not awaken genuine morality. According to Laestadius, morality has to "spring" from the heart, meaning that moral motivation has its source not in the intellect, but in the subjective consciousness, in the passions, and in the heart.

Laestadius thought that rationalism and metaphysical transcendentalism leads to the doctrines of virtues and virtue ethics, which are problematic in many senses. First of all, their force is based on the natural passions of egoism and ambition, and these do not motivate people inwardly for morality. Secondly, and this is more important for Laestadius, virtues may often lead to a "dead faith" and they make awakening and reconciliation seem unnecessary. Here Laestadius' idea was to urge an authentic morality of the heart; morality and righteous life should originate from the heart. Laestadius was also somehow disappointed that virtue had become an unconditional rationalistic idea, or "fixed idea" by which as he indicated a necessary thought, which is hard to destroy. (See, §§1216.) Altogether, Laestadius insisted that the idea of virtues should be destroyed (§652). These thoughts could be understood from examining Laestadius' intention "to show the corrupted nature of man" and make awakening and reconciliation necessary.

However, he seemed to offer a common social critic against the "virtuosity" of people, as he viewed that mere following of the virtues did not achieve the demanded full responsibility and may have lead to egoism, inequality, and common carelessness, and only an outer morality. Laestadius also realized that rationalistic philosophical moral maxims do not give a proper account of human life. Laestadius polemically stated that moral systems based on rationalism and the idols of the virtuous life of people were "fit for angels, not men." (§879.)⁴¹³

413 Polemical questions on where does the transcendental abstract ego receive its power. (See §§647–649.) The vitalistic notion of Self leads to holistic responsibility (§1197) and it receives its power from organic life (§1198).

4.3.5 The Passional Self and Impossible Responsibility

Overall, Laestadius saw the passions as intentional correlates of man's world relation. To conceive of passions, not only as "inner" organic functions, but also as an intentional relatedness of man and world, meant that the embodied man is fundamentally situated in the world and discloses the holistic view regarding the notion of passion. (Heart was the center of passions and the psychic mediating core of subjective consciousness). Laestadius stated that passions are always stimulated by sense perception, and thus they also have this objective "outer" aspect. Given this phenomenological-existential extent of passion in regard to Laestadius' idea of natural passions that dominate human life in its natural state, signified that man is fundamentally and psychologically immersed or fallen into the present world in which he lives.⁴¹⁴ In a sense, the passional nature of man characterizes the ways of human beings in the world: A human is always inextricably attached to the world via senses and varying affective-passional conditions.

Now, if we question the influences of passions on human life and consciousness, the attention extends and turns into a question about what kind of passional world one dwells in. In this wider sense, passions seem to depict the worldliness of man's existence, thus opening the question about what kind of passional relations we live in. Doesn't the fundamental role of passions make identity, autonomy, and responsibility impossible? This question arises, if the organic soul is susceptible to the influences of passions and man dwells in the world, so does there remain any possibility still for change or moral progress? How can man reach and maintain a reflective distance from the passional world, and if so, how can that be possible? What are the prerequisites of moral responsibility if man is absolutely involved in the relative tensions and conflicts of the natural passions of the world and flesh?

For me, it seems that Laestadius faced this kind of aporetic situation when he was considering the possibility of morality and spirituality in the vitalist terms of passions and organic life. I interpret that for this need Laestadius basically went on to elaborate on his insights into the religious experience of awakening and the psychological conception of reconciliation as initial conditions for both moral progress and genuine spirituality. Laestadius saw that without moral passions and a dissonant and conflicting state of awakening, man would remain constantly attached to the contingent present world (without self, freedom, and identity).

Laestadius' theoretical starting assumption was that the correct idea of man precedes the correct understanding of God and faith. Using vitalism, Laestadius perceived that he had reached the proper notion of the self and person, as he returned back to

414 For further comparison with Hobbes' philosophy see, Hobbes 2010: The shift from the state of nature (in foro interno (conscience)) into the governance of state (in foro externo (action)) through political decision/resolution is authorized by the highest personal sovereign; the constitution as reconciliation through reason.

the necessities that show how a human person is inextricably part of the physical, organic, passionate, and spiritual world:

“Thus, man is [a] thinking, feeling, and willing being, endowed with self-consciousness, reason, conscience, memory, imagination. These faculties of the soul are not self-made, but shaped by the Creator through formative organic life, which develops from the principle of life embedded within matter. And insofar as the activities of these faculties of the soul are dependent on their respective organs, then, in his activities, he will encounter: first, ‘*physical necessity*,’ which forces him to remain on earth; second, ‘*metaphysical necessity*,’ within the sphere of sensory life, which forces him to think in accordance with fixed laws of thought, which he has in no way instituted himself; third, ‘*psychic necessity*’ within the sphere of organic life, which forces him to feel both the sweet and sour, both evil and good, both joy and sorrow, happiness and unhappiness, bliss and wretchedness; thus he is, in a physical, metaphysical, and psychic respect, not as free as he would wish. Along with these necessities comes also the ‘*moral and immoral necessity*,’ which forces him to feel evil and good in a moral respect, forces him to desire evil more than good; forces him to think more evil than good: how much freedom, then, does he have left?” (§1219.)

Here Laestadius can be viewed as opposing Kant, who made the moral imperative necessary. Laestadius, on the other hand, tried to show how living faith is necessary.

With respect to the rationalistic and idealistic tradition, it is worth noting here that Laestadius did not talk about necessities as intellectual-metaphysical necessary postulates of reason, but rather as vital-existential necessities within which a human being must exist. Laestadius’ necessities are not necessary “theoretical” pre-requisites; they are rather fundamental psycho-physiological initial conditions within which man always exists. Thus, Laestadius tries to thematize psycho-physiological and vitalist-existential necessities as a foundation for human life that also has its moral, normative and spiritual implications; such as the necessity of awakening and necessity of reconciliation.

These necessities actually reveal Laestadius’ main motif, which was to shift from transcendentalism or rationalism to vitalism. By establishing the vital-existential necessities, Laestadius believed he reached his goal of showing the corrupted nature of man and the necessity of reconciliation as the way out of a moral and spiritual relativism. His intention was to show that the notion of Self as the experiential core of personhood must include an organic subjective consciousness and a subjective will, and henceforth responsibility for all of embodied existence down to its very roots. Because the Self cannot control passions, the absolute human responsibility and moral subject both become impossible [possibilities]. As such absolute responsibil-

ity to fulfill the moral and spiritual law is impossible, the human being is driven to search for reconciliation.

In the broader picture, awakening (kr. metanoia) as the initial condition for reconciliation does not signify only a “change of mind”, but also a change in the whole embodied intentionality or being in the world. Metanoia as a religious experience primarily concerns the level of subjective consciousness, not simply a mere change of mind, but also a change of heart and the whole organic body.

4.4 Summary: The Personal Psychophysiological Intentionality

Laestadius’ theoretical thought belongs to the post-enlightenment era, and is especially attached to the vitalist tradition via Xavier Bichat’s medical vitalism⁴¹⁵. Laestadius’ vitalist approach and its elaborations are related to later philosophical prevailing currents, such as rationalism and transcendentalism, which dominated the intellectual and spiritual life in Sweden in the mid- nineteenth century. Laestadius was especially reading French medical physiology and psychology and the romantic psychology of Carl Gustav Carus, and he was well aware of romantic natural philosophy as well as Kant’s transcendental idealism.

Laestadius’ anthropology or philosophical psychology was constructed based on the tenets of physiological medicine, a limited panpsychistic interpretation of vitalistic monism, and the theory of passions.⁴¹⁶ He especially followed Bichat’s ideas

415 A valuable overview of vitalism is given in Normandin, S. and Wolfe, C. T. (eds.) 2013 (*Vitalism and the Scientific image in post-Enlightenment Life Sciences*). See also Haigh 1984; Williams 2002.

416 Laestadius’ stance was panpsychistic, which in Laestadius’ case simply means that he interpreted a vital force or the principle of life and the passions of the organism as “mental”/vital in their basic character (a restricted panpsychistic view because Laestadius made a distinction between organic living matter and physical “death” matter (See, §1218). He did not want to take a stance on the rationalistic concepts of soul that he saw as abstract because it did not have physiological (and experiential) grounding. In contrast to the rationalistic-mechanical tradition, passions were not interpreted as mechanical carriers of moving particles, but rather as vital forces, such as the living *primus motor* of human beings and organic life. Therefore, he interpreted vitalistic concepts like vital force and passion in phenomenological-existential and theological directions: Anthropologically vital force signifies the living essence of the human being (this view becomes clear with Laestadius’ saying the “soul is the life of the body”). Vital force manifests itself in fertilization, growth, and development of the human organism and in the emergence of consciousness. Organic passions based on the principle of life signify the ontological basis for human consciousness, action, and the cognitive life as a whole. The rational soul or “intellect” is seen as being developed through practice and education, and it is re-defined as the original soul (for organic and sensory lives) or life in its entirety (§309). Theologically, the vital principle means the spirit (kr. *pneuma*), interpreted as the blow of God’s breath into Adam that gave human beings life; mankind is also interpreted as a continuation of the main principle of life. See further of the restricted notion of panpsychism in Aristotle, Whitehead etc. and panpsychistic philosophy of religion in Clarke 2003. (Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. New York: SUNY Press.)

on the principle of life and the theory of passions. However his interpretation and use of the “principle of life” was indeed unique and needs to be discussed further, as he combined his own vision with Biblical vitalism and continuously returns to the notion in different contexts.

From the vitalist position and by elaborating on a panpsychistic interpretation of the principle of life, Laestadius formed a physiologically emphasized theory for the constitution of human beings and life; it pertains especially to the physiological and vital part of the constitution, as he approached the human organism as the developing entity constituting the embodied seat for a higher manifestation of vital functions, capabilities, faculties of soul, and finally the possibility of morality and living spirituality. Thus, consciousness and the faculties of mind as well required certain physiological and vital prerequisites; the developmental stages of organs, their physiological relations, physiological functions like neural and humoral connections and interaction, sensory and sensitive stimulations, and the activity of passions were the vital *primus motor* of the human organism and life.

According to Laestadius, the rationalistic and metaphysical interpretation of soul conceives of the soul as a distinct abstract substance or essence from a physiological and worldly constitution. Laestadius saw that the “philosophical notion of soul” led to problematic dualisms between the body and soul and the body and mind into the problem of dual consciousness, and thus considered non-sensory perceptions or religious feelings as purely metaphysical. Also, the objective faculties are separated from embodied functions, and reason and will are conceived as dominant forces within personhood, and thus, the whole notion of the ego becomes totally abstract and an immaterial transcendental entity.

What is the most problematic aspect of the metaphysicalization of the human soul and personhood is that it seems to lead to conceiving the human person as having the power for a virtuous and moral life within itself. According to Laestadius, this was a false idea of human beings and life. Laestadius’ own intention was to expand, first of all, the notion of soul as pertaining to physiological vital functions, which then led to the idea of vital-existential necessities for corporeal human life. Thus, man becomes attached and responsible for the whole totality of life that encompasses passions, etc. Laestadius elaborated on a dynamic circular view of the process of perception and intentionality. Naturally, because of his vitalist-physiological beginnings, the whole idea of embodied personhood and its passionate, corporeal, and worldly situated directness constituted *an insight into personal embodied intentionality*. The human person and life was fundamentally conceived as embodied intentionality, however much it was deficient and corrupted in its nature and inextricably attached to the world and worldly interests that excluded the possibility of [proper] moral responsibility.

According to Laestadius, the shift from metaphysics of substance into vitalism had theoretical advantages: Now the notion of personhood would be brought back from

idealistic and immaterial abstractions to embodied life in the world. The Self was now seen as a tension between subjective consciousness and objective consciousness – namely, a tension between unconscious passions and conscious states of mind and worldly intentions⁴¹⁷. Also, reason was re-defined as a faculty between understanding and feeling [in the root or basis of subjective consciousness].

The soul is not a being (essence) as a distinct entity, but rather it is conceived as a dynamic vital force (karft) inextricable from organic matter. The principle of life is a real subject of the Self, and it relates to the consciousness as a cause and grounding, and thus it functions as a constitutive basis for the emanation of consciousness and intentionality. Rather than being a simple cause, the principle of life is a necessary hypothesis for the unifying energetic original fundamental soul of the psychophysiological and cognitive life of living man. Laestadius' idea of man was "pluracentric," having the whole organism as its domain, having the heart as the center of organic life, and brains as the center of an animal or sensory life. Thus, the soul has both conscious and unconscious spheres and is relational in terms of its elemental-phenomenal character.

The body is not simply a substance – a being or a thing – in the sense that it consists of mere matter or mere spirit, but yet a non-dualistic elemental (quantity/quality) contingency or event that is conceived as both dynamic functional and relational with regard to organic, physical, and transcendental/spiritual spheres of existence. The physiological body, organic life, is a constitutive basis for the sensory life and thus a domain of the cognitive life. Laestadius had two perspectives about the body – as a corporeal entity subject to physical laws, and a lived body as the human being experiences the self through an organic life and a sensory life in the world.

As the principle of life signifies "existence" devoid of substance and essence and forms the constitutive core of the embodied human person, the passions instead signify the particular psychophysical founding of those vital-existential structures that attach a human person to the world and actual existence. The passions destruct the idea of the Self as an independent and autonomous subject; the human self is not unconditional, for it actualizes in the world always already found in the tension of passions, meaning that man is inextricably a worldly being. Passions are not temporal as affects and emotions are, but rather more fundamental vital-ontological constituents.

When Laestadius held that passions lay the groundwork for the content of the faculties of mind (ideas of understanding etc.) he seemed to think of the functioning mind in a general and longer temporal scale. He did not focus on the processes of the mind as such (distinct from the temporal-spatial world), by speculating how a

417 In a sense, Laestadius' analysis returned closer to the experiential origin of religion, embodiment and the factual life-world.

temporary state of mind or cognition in question is constituted in a given temporal situation, and what passions are based on a certain contingent cognition. Rather, he states that in general, passions that affect the human organism always influence the functions of the mind; in the long run, the passions in question may be seen as the grounds for one's way of thinking, so that even ideas of understanding, concepts of reason, and desires of the will are formed/shaped by the passions (already prevailing in one's life). If so, Laestadius was thinking about a *habitual way of being or passions as intentional relatedness rather than a problem of mind as such*, and tried to emphasize the meaning of passions for the functions of the mind in the *longer temporal period* (in its vital-ontological constitution). He does not state that certain ideas, concepts, or desires, etc., are a direct corollary/consequence of the passions that arbitrarily present when cognition is present. Instead, passions indicate fundamental vital-existential existences or moods within which human life will actualize.

What I want to stress here is that Laestadius surely was familiar with conceptual thinking and the way that scientific concepts and theories were defined in their extension and in relation to each other (as he himself was doing that continuously). However, his idea of the grounding passions of all cognitive life pertained to a wider constitution of existential ways of thinking or formations of ideologies. As his treatise was written for apologetic purposes for pietism, it seems evident that Laestadius was also trying to show how the theological views of his time missed the existential basis of faith and thus become abstract and idealized formulations. Laestadius thought that if priests had experiences with the order of Grace, their formulations would become more correct (§1278. Cf. §1061, 1065, 1068). In this respect, Laestadius' general aim was to highlight the primal importance and necessity of lived experience for any metaphysical or theological theoretization. The origin of faith as well as the origin of theology resided in the lived religious experience.

The body-mind is not conceived as indicating the distinction between consciousness and body; the mind is conceived in psychic-physiological and vitalist terms as a manifestation of organic functions. Thus, mind and body cannot be conceived as opposite because organic vital functions and embodied passions ground and direct the mind. The mind is part of the organic constitution. The conflict remains, however, between organic body and the spirit (physiological and moral-spiritual). The spirit is conceived as the highest manifestation of the vital functions of the sensory life, and so is a branch of the principle of life. Spirit is the element of the vital functions that transcends the flesh itself. It becomes comprehensible from the perspective of constitution theory; the principle of life as a common basis and a vital force is embedded into matter itself to form organs and functions through vital passions. It finally manifests itself as a consciousness, a human embodied mind reaching toward spirit. The spirit is the perennial correlate of the principle of life, but in a circular way; the principle of life is simultaneously the origin of the physiological body and the mind

through which it then reaches toward the spirit, which is coincidentally the highest manifestation of the principle of life itself. This partially ineffable relationship between the nature of human beings and God (kinship) is thematized within the analysis of reconciliation; abstractly, God becomes Itself (heart satisfied) in the same reconciling occasion and manner as a human being becomes itself.

Laestadius' pre-psychoanalytic notion of unconsciousness structurally paralleled the present day understanding of the influence of the embodied habitual and un-conscious activity of the mind.

At the beginning of the chapter titled Person and Intentionality, I tried to explain why I want to bring the concept of mind into an analysis of Laestadius' psychology. Generally speaking, this focus is a way to thematize for the modern reader how Laestadius' psychology expanded the notion of mind to cover both embodiment and holistic intentionality. Laestadius further highlighted the fact that Scripture knows only two life forms, the psyche and the pneuma, and stated that psyche correlates with organic life and pneuma correlates with sensory life. In the English translation "understanding" (förstånd) is sometimes translated with the term "mind"; correctly, insofar as "understanding" (Förstånd) is referred to as the capability of thinking and it thus encompasses most of the cognitive content of which is man is aware. However as "understanding" (förstånd) is only one faculty of soul that belongs to objective consciousness, it would be restrictive to refer to the entire domain of the mind with just the term "understanding". Laestadius made a distinction between the objective and subjective domains of consciousness, indicating that the objective dimension of the mind, which signifies awareness –part of the consciousness, also has its shadowy or gloomy basis/roots that also belong to the holistic sphere of mind. Laestadius referred to this "gloomy" part in various ways, namely, as heart, passions, un-consciousness and precisely, the subjective consciousness. In general, the mind is seen as a natural embodied phenomenon. Altogether, the idea is that understanding or mind and all the faculties of soul receive their driving powers and forces from the organic life and subjective consciousness which are never transparent in terms of the states of objective consciousness (reason, understanding, memory, imagination and will).

Thus, Laestadius' notion of mind extended beyond mere "understanding" and "objective faculties": The mind, that man is actually living, exists and functions on the basis of infinitely variable vital forces and functions such as passions, instincts, drives, affects (that are always awakened by continuously varying sense perceptions). On the basis of such subjective consciousness, man cannot be fully aware of his own existence. The unknown dimension derives from the fact that objective faculties cannot transparently reflect and objectify subjective driving powers, because they and their functioning are constituted by "gloomy" pre-cognitive conditions. As mind itself is constituted by organic functions and forces, it cannot have a transparent reflective relation to its own grounding vital forces. Therefore, Laestadius' concept

of mind included the sphere of subjective consciousness that he also referred to as unconsciousness, and which was a crucially important part of the constitution of the human embodied consciousness, thought, and action.

Therefore, Laestadius' notion of mind did not produce a closed (solipsistic) totality, as the human mind/soul is always in a relationship with the states of subjective consciousness and the infinitely variable influences of the outer world (and passions).

Mind is a vital emergent phenomenon. However, mind is embodied of the dynamic, and the relational phenomena that is open and continuously formative for temporal-spatial existence. Mind has both subjective and objective dimensions: Laestadius was writing during a time when there was no distinct domain for the philosophy of mind other than the transcendental philosophical elaborations that drove to separate the phenomenon of the mind from organic and physiological functions and processes⁴¹⁸. As a natural scientist, Laestadius grasped these preceding medical theories of human consciousness (or soul), but then jumped over the transcendental philosophical current and criticized it because of its speculative method which leaned, according to Laestadius, on mere reflection, and thus, did not have a proper physiological grounding.

The Self and person is not an idealized re-presentation, an independent and distinct essence/being, but a manifestation of an emerging embodied and worldly situated occasion between organic life and sensory life, and thus, it is essentially conceived from the perspective of a body-in-the-world that is continuously under the tensions of vital forces that are functioning through the "outer" and the "inner". Laestadius held that the notion of ego cogito or the soul of metaphysical rationalism does not have a concrete basis and does not resonate with the lived experience and popular opinion, and thus is idealized and abstract in its relation to the vitalist notion of a passionate and worldly organism. The genuine Self exists and functions in between organic life and sensory life as the object or predicate of varying passionate impacts and is thus actualized, not as a stable self-identical pure ego, but rather as a conflicting and dissonant dynamic and embodied self.

The notion of Self having the principle of life as its genuine subject and passions as its intentional correlates, laid the groundwork for Laestadius' philosophical definition of the person. This definition emphasizes that "existence precedes essence." We can note here that Laestadius came to actually define the later common existentialistic conviction and definition of human existence. We can easily recall how Sartre's claim that "existence precedes essence" became the popular slogan of existentialism. However, Sartre's definition constituted an idealistic ethos within which human essence was more often attributed to metaphysical characteristics, such as freedom. Laestadius, holding tight to the psychophysiological basis, did not fall into the short-

418 Cf. Hagner 1992; Kant 1998 (orig. 1781).

comings of existentialism. Sticking with the conviction that the Self is by no means unconditional, but rather attached fundamentally to the necessities of being in the world (physical, psychic, metaphysical, and moral), Laestadius' notion of personhood can be conceived as a realistic and a-metaphysical notion.

Monism or dualism? With regard to the metaphysics, we can conclude that Laestadius' idea of the principle of life did not rely on ontological dualism.⁴¹⁹ For Laestadius, there remained only one creative and unifying principle of which all the organic nature was a part. There was neither a divide between mind and body, nor organic matter and the consciousness or spirit, as the latter was conceived as a vitalist emergence referred to also as panspsychism. Laestadius found a way out between materialism and spiritualism/idealism by conceiving the principle of life to be both independent and free based on its *potentiality* (de potentia) and simultaneously not autonomous and free *actually* (de actu) because it has to function and operate via matter. Therefore, in the level of cause and origin, Laestadius' stance can be seen as a monistic vitalism. (He distinguished between the mere laws of nature and the talk about inert nature, and thus, we cannot conceive of his stance as being panspsychism in a strict sense, but rather as being *panvitalist*, by limiting the notion of "mentality" only to organic nature⁴²⁰.)

Laestadius' vitalist notions and distinctions drawn between original soul (the principle of life) and the genuine individual soul (sensory life) produced classical philosophical questions. When Laestadius began with the notion that there exists a certain kind of *common* principle of life to all organic beings and thus a common soul, did that view indicate that all organic beings – whether animals, plants or human beings – share an existence within the same soul? And if so, how should we comprehend that soul and what would it signify? Would this shared original soul serve also as a basis and a possibility, for example, for shared communal experience, understanding, and sympathy between different organics, such as between animals, plants, and human beings? It seems that this view is what we should conclude if we begin with Laestadius' principles. But how does the common principle of life serve as a connecting bridge between organic beings, or does it just a given as an ontological initial condition in principle only? Even though this questioning could be conceived as highly speculative, we do find support for this kind of thinking as Laestadius himself – referring to (Room. 8:19–23) pointed out that “even animals

419 For heuristic comparison one could refer also to Haeckel's monism which offers an illuminative example of biological monism applied to religious thought. Some points of contacts could be seen with Laestadius' vitalism. See Haeckel 1895 (Monism as Connecting Religion and Science. London: A. and C. Black).

420 However, the research concerning Laestadius' possible panspsychism is a task of other philosophical research that focuses on the concept of God as a probable panspsychistic principle.

yearn for the becoming of Kingdom of God”⁴²¹ when animals would then be released from the egoistic dominance of humankind.

What I find advantageous in Laestadius’ vitalism is first of all his way of attaching the concept of the principle of life to the lived experience and popular opinion. This is already budding or under development in the classical definition of the principle of life that is being conceived as the “psychic essence” of a human being. However, in Laestadius’ use, the principle of life was altogether emphasized simultaneously as a physical and experiential notion. His use of and explication of the principle of life, passions, and vital forces traced the experiential existential-psychological phenomena. They illuminate the experiential dimension and (contextual) life world in the phenomenological sense. Thus, Laestadius occupies and bridges the still problematic gap/divide between the natural scientific and the mere physical and experiential psychological domains⁴²². Thus, we can interpret Laestadius’ notion of the principle of life as covering both immanent and transcendental phenomena. As far as there are no distinct spheres of mind and body, there is also neither a sharp distinction between man and the world or immanence and transcendence – the concept of the principle of life as theoretical “transcendental” term is thus inextricably connected to the phenomena of life and nature as both empirically and experientially reachable. The same conclusion pertains to the concept of passion.

Altogether then, faculties of soul, such as reason, understanding, will, and conscience (§596–887), were not conceived as independent domains of immaterial soul or mind but instead as organically seated functions and capacities based on their susceptibility, sensitivity and reactivity. Therefore, Laestadius seemed to bring home the basic phenomenological idea of human embodiment as a holistic basis for all the functions of mind, action, and intentionality. “Faculties of soul” are only conceptually relatively distinct spheres, but as phenomena, all faculties are more like the phenomenological depictions of the variable ways of embodied intentionality. In other words, they depict how a human organism is related organically and experientially to its own corporeality and surrounding environment, as well as to all of existence [and to God].

It is interesting that Laestadius used all the conceptualizations of the mind, self, and faculties of mind in a *formally-vitalistically indicative* manner: They were organically seated in a human embodiment and world relationship, but as theoretical concepts they were also mere concepts [of reason and thus, ideas], which indicated the phenomena formally, but received their content and manifested themselves uniquely for the person in question in a particular life-situation. Thus, life itself remains something

421 Laestadius 2006, 178, see also 353. (Huutavan ääni/Röpande Röst/The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness)

422 However, the prevailing physiological analysis was rough compared to modern medical knowledge, and thus raised a question about whether it still ended up with the problem of emergence; the problem of emergence emerges always when one looks closer into the details.

conceptually unreachable and ineffable. For Laestadius stated on many occasions, “there are matters that cannot be reached by reason,” and highlights that matters of life and faith can only be understood by heart, indicating a lived experience of one’s own (§100–103).

The reconstructed argument of Laestadius for the vitalistic concept of the Self as the grounding for the concept of personhood:

1. Principle of life is a single and common original soul for all organic beings
2. Principle of life is not distinct from organism, but rather characterizes its way of being and significance; “the soul is the life of the body”
3. Human being is organic being, thus the soul is the life or way of being of the body
4. The mind and thus the phenomena of Self is not distinct from the body
5. Organic passions manifest themselves in the subjective and objective consciousness of the sensory life (*nervlif*) as varying cognitions
6. The experience of Self is both an objective and a subjective cognition
7. The Self is neither distinct from organic passions nor is it pure immaterial cognition
8. THEREFORE, the Self exists as a tension between the subjective consciousness of organic passion-life and the objective cognitions of sensory life
9. THEREFORE, the concept of personhood has to take the vitalistic concept of embodied Self as its basis

5 The Psychophysiology of Moral and Spiritual Intentionality

In this chapter, Laestadius' theory is analyzed and interpreted in more detail with respect to the specific question regarding the possibility, origins, and emergence of morality and spirituality. In a sense, this chapter brings to this analysis the central themes of Laestadius' philosophy of religion that were purposely set aside in the previous chapter. This chapter analysis and interpretation examines the approaches of Laestadius' theory, ranging from its philosophical perspective on keeping the vitalist psychology, and especially the vitalist conception physical/moral, which was pursued to replace Cartesian body/mind dualism, as a horizon.

Insofar as the basic ideas of the vital principle as original soul and intentional personhood have been analyzed above, the psycho-physical basis of the possibility of the moral and spiritual is analyzed here by paying attention to the notions of the passions, heart, conscience, awakening, non-sensory perception and reconciliation so as to disclose a view on Laestadius' vitalist insights concerning the phenomena of faith and God. Here the particular question is how Laestadius explained the spheres of morality and spirituality on a physiological plane, and how the constitution of moral and spiritual was thematized. In this chapter, the vitalist-psychological notion of faith as well as Laestadius' ontotheological reconstruction of the relationship between the Persons of the Trinity of God and the constitutive "parts" of the "threefold" human person (the principles of life, organic life, sensory life) are discussed to examine the intentional character of faith [found] in God.

5.1 From Practical Virtues to the Morality of Conscience

When Laestadius moved to analyze reason and its significance for morality and ethics, he seemed to give full authority to the faculty of reason in morality. At first glance, this focus may sound contradictory in terms of Laestadius' previous analysis where he had a totally critical attitude toward the rationalistic and transcendental philosophical idea of independent and autonomous reason. Once again, however, he comes back to the subject and deals with the problem of whether reason should be admitted as a outer practical competence for morality and legislation. He refers to Petrelli's study book and the thought of Professor Jacob Boström (1797–1866) – known as one of the leading philosophers and the successor to rational idealism at the university of Uppsala in the 1800's.

“Yet in matters of sound public morality, the divine right of reason must surely be acknowledged. Here, reason manifests itself as a principle for everything noble and good. The moral element belongs exclusively to reason, and manifests itself in the forms of ideas; more precisely, the idea of truth, the idea of goodness, the idea of beauty, and the idea of perfection (Petrelli §202). Reason has such a wealth of ideas of about truth, beauty, goodness and perfection that it cannot be exhausted by the intellect, which gathers the most wonderful elements of sound morality from this divine source of wisdom. Note: Professor Boström admits that ‘all our rights are interests.’ May not also the legislation that is meant to secure the rights of every man have its foundation in interests? Legislation belongs to practical reason (the intellect), which ‘gathers the elements of legislation from theoretical reason (ideas about right and wrong).’ But if theoretical reason contains false ideas about right, then practical reason cannot correct these false ideas, but must legislate according to the idea of justice; that is to say, in accordance with that passion or ‘interest’ that governs the personality of the legislator. This may be concluded from Boström’s doctrine on monarchical statehood.” (§572 and Note.)⁴²³

This kind of celebration of human reason sounds almost like the irony coming from Laestadius. For sure, he faced here a challenging problem and a gap between individual morality and public normative moral principles, which he also viewed as important for communal human life. However, after giving his affirmation to the importance of [natural] practical reason and natural law, Laestadius goes on to argue for its insufficiency: Natural law, as based on duties, rights, and “just talionis”, justifies wars between states and “they also justify wars of religion and revolutions through natural right to defend himself (moralist), even when it is done at the expense of the life of another.” (§574)

Laestadius calls this problematic self-justification “self-righteousness” (egenrät-färdigheten) meaning that legislation, if based on the pure principles of reason, and the dismissal of its grounding “interests” or passions, turns into a totalitarian jurisdiction that is unable to reflect and change its own premises and stand points even if they turn out to be immoral, unjust and wrong. “[T]he practical reason [itself] cannot correct ... false idea, but must legislate according to the idea of justice.” (§572.) Thus, law itself is locked into the principle/idea of justice. From this stance, Laestadius goes on to show that reason may be the organ of good *but of evil as well*; this fact depends on the “interests” or passions that lay the basis for morality as well

423 Cf. §§713–14; the concept of right/justice is based on passions. Laestadius may refer here to Boström 1859.

as for legislation. In a sense Laestadius here is facing the problem and indeed the danger of the totalitarian constitutional state, but he does not go further to elaborate on his theory in that direction. (see, §574.) His objectives are instead fundamental-anthropological to find a moral foundation for reason and reasoning. With respect to morality, natural reason based on “practical reason” is only negative freedom, which does not *motivate* or constitute any possibility for moral action:

“If anyone was ever able to live up to the sort of law that the moralist construct in the light of natural reason, then keeping this law would be a matter of a negative virtue, since the freedom of the will in its natural state is only negative, as we have shown above.” (§575.)

Practical reason is thus only able to restrict and limit the life of citizens and cannot create new possibilities and motivate citizens to undertake moral action. Laestadius also highlighted the point that “practical reason” and natural law are not able to develop practical reason in the masses:

“As long as the philosopher cannot show that the world has hitherto been governed by rational principles; as long are we justified in claiming that the philosophers’ talk of divine nature of reason is subterfuge and banality, empty bluster and self-deceit based in self-righteousness.” (§586.)

Here “self-righteousness” (*egenrättfärdigheten*) is used in the context of the legislative process to indicate a form of self-justification within which the legal system *justifies itself* by its own ideas and interests, thus holding that reason as such is a Divine principle. Laestadius seems to indicate here that legislative interests are not innocent because they are not free from the natural passions and indeed seem to be determined by contingent principles of justice and legislation.

Interpreting Petrelli’s definition that reason is ‘a force that is united to the supersensory principles, and which, within itself, carries and moves these principles’⁴²⁴, Laestadius concluded that the philosophical concepts of reason were believed to have contained “within itself [a] supersensory, moral or spiritual force, which is confirmed by the statement: through reason, we are universal (that is to say, divine).” (§588) Laestadius could not find any evidence to support such a philosophical idea of reason, and thus conceived of it as simply a dogmatic belief or wish (§588). According to Laestadius, reason was not a Divine principle. Further still, Laestadius claimed that the “divine power of reason is destroyed” if man cannot exist according to the imperative of the “ought to be” of practical reason, and thus “help man out of abyss.”

424 Petrelli 1845, §247, 2, p. 126.

(citations here?) Laestadius claimed that reason in and of itself, as conceived as an “independent power”, was a “psychological error.” This was simply so because reason was only and solely “a sense that can be affected by wickedness and goodness”, and thus has a capability to receive impressions and the influences of good, evil, beauty and truth:

“Reason is thus able to receive ideas about what is good, what is right, what is beautiful and what is perfect, but it cannot on its own create these ideas; these ideas are transmitted to reason from somewhere else.” (§591.)

Laestadius’ purpose here was to highlight the idea that intellect is not independent and closeted/capsulated pure faculty, but rather, it functions through the body and amidst the varying interests and passions of the world. Here Laestadius also seemed to have a twofold insight about reason and its meaning for morality. He did not want to deny the meaning of “practical reason” (*fronesis*) in “public morality”, science, and aesthetics as such, as reason could also be the source of all the noble ideas about truth, beauty, and goodness. However, his analysis goes deeper to the roots of reason by claiming that reason has not helped human beings out of the abyss of immorality, thus causing a real threat to the legislative process, and further, reason did not seem to be adopted by masses through education.

For this reason, Laestadius returns to his critique of the “rational soul” and “abstract reflection”, now pointing out that reason and the whole intellect, when seen from the organic ground *as a sensitive capability*, could actually execute immoral, unjust, wrong and ugly acts and decisions, even through legislation. This is how natural reason usually proceeds, as it is always colored by one-sided interests and passions. While respecting Boström’s depiction of the significance of practical reason, Laestadius also brought up another *perspective by* obviously indicating that natural practical reason is not enough, or it is insufficient, as it always needs correct, truthful, un-egoistic – in a word, moral – passions for its active basis and motivational ground. In a sense, Laestadius was demanding deeper moral experience and empathy for the tenets of practical reason.

Laestadius had a firm conviction that ethics and justice do not have their foundation in reason or in the law itself. Actually he had a quite contrary vision, claiming that the common virtues and rights are often based on natural passions. Again, when dealing with the influence of passions on the intellect, Laestadius now returned to the problem of natural law: “[I]t is evident that man’s heinous passions have been refashioned into rights in the distillation machine of reason. Natural reason contains ideas about right, but these ideas are not pure ... A natural right does not imply the suppression of egoism, ambition or selfishness,” and thus natural law, demanding a punishment (an eye for an eye) is unable to reach to the Christian ethics (to

turn another cheek) because it is simply more than practical reason demands. (See, Chapter R.R.:§876.)

And further, he believed that passions have blinded natural reason, so that man knows only partly what is right, and there is no Idea of the corrupted nature of man. Man believes that he can lift himself from the corruption by the light of own reason. (§§592,593.)

”Since reason – in its physical, and also a psychological and a metaphysical context – is a sense that is affected by both good and evil, it can, from one *perspective*, be understood as the organ of everything great and noble, and *from another perspective* the organ for everything base and heinous.” (§592. emphasis added)

This shifting between *perspectives* indicated especially the shift from the naturalistic descriptive perspective to the moral philosophical, or spiritual, perspective. As the shift to moral perspective became part of Laestadius’ apologetics and moral philosophy, we can note as well that a quite similar shift was common also for the classical medical vitalists in the 17th and 18th centuries. Vitalists often used the term “moral” in order to indicate something that was irreducible to the mere “physical” but not to mere consciousness⁴²⁵. As mentioned above, the vitalist use of “moral” indicated a certain kind of psychic and internal sphere that was needed to produce a certain kind of distancing or reflective capability of human beings. Thus, this “perspective” indicates an experiential and psychological dimension that also had moral and social aspects. This manner of dealing with the notion of reason seems to have been Laestadius’ way as well. To view reason in a broader fundamental anthropological and in this sense “ontological” context would necessarily bring the question of morals and spirituality forward.

From the position of arguing for the deficiency of the notion of independent reason, Laestadius was moving toward an analysis of religious awakening as a necessity of moral experience that would lay the proper passional basis for a formal “practical reason.” The question is whether Laestadius was trying to argue that practical reason would have to be based on a moral or spiritual conscience to be understood properly, or whether he wanted to re-define the whole notion of practical reason and replace it with the notion of conscience. Altogether, considering all the options, practical reason would then signify the manifestation or form of the moral conscience that would constitute the vitalist substantial ground for its action and functioning.

425 See, Azouvi 2006; Rey 2006; Williams 2002. Williams pointed out that the whole idea of “moral” in the context of medical vitalism is just a question of “perspective”. This idea was discussed at the end of the eighteenth century. See also my introductory Chapter 2.4 in this current study.

What would this mean? Did it indicate that Christian moral thought should lay the groundwork for practical reason? If so, what would the morality of conscience mean and how could it then be explained? How would the public and private dimensions of morality to be dealt with in such a scenario? What also were the moral passions that could lay the precise moral basis for practical reason?

Later, Laestadius drew a distinction between compliance with the law and fulfillment of the law and between external and internal deeds. Now the problem of natural law and practical reason became attached to theological contexts, so that “fallen man can never progress farther in sanctification than ‘compliance with the law’ in the sphere of sensory life, or if one wished, ‘following the law’ (*conformitas legalis*); [but] never ‘fulfillment of the law’ as long as the law is spiritual and demanded the perfect purity and obedience of the heart, while ‘man is flesh, sold under sin.’” (§1545.) The same viewpoint was actually stated about morality; the highest that natural reason could achieve was the negative virtues, that is to say, restrict human life, but not motivate moral action and thought. At the core of Laestadius’ thought was a strict moralskepticism:

”The natural man, whose foundation of salvation is virtue, acts according to his best sense and conscience, honestly and uprightly, does not imply good deeds, since the awakened person –who acts even more conscientiously than the unawakened – feels that the law is not fulfilled by acting in accordance with one’s best sense and conscience. This is because the conscience does not contain the noblest motive for human action. If, for instance, a person helps his suffering neighbor out of pure love; another does so based on good will; a third, based on the demands of conscience; a fourth, from natural compassion; a fifth, out of fear of being seen as stingy if he fails to help; a sixth, because of honor or to reach some worldly goal, for instance Aristides (explain in brackets?) and a seventh helps, for instance, a poor girl in order to be able seduce her with greater ease, then one soon discovers that only the one who helped out of pure love has fulfilled the law.” (§685.) Therefore, “Natural virtue is primarily based on self-righteousness and ambition.” (§689.)

Laestadius’ moralskepticism entail that deprived moral and spiritual condition of man could not be overcome and changed by the *outer* teaching of virtues or outer governance by power, whether that power be ethical, political, or religious. From this perspective, Laestadius criticized the prevailing instruction of anthropology and theology according to which man could then suppress his destructive and immoral passions through intellect and thus lead himself by a rational moral will. Laestadius rejected the intellectualistic ethos common to metaphysical rationalism and transcendental

philosophy, which derived its roots from Cartesian dualism. Against these currents he demanded more fundamental moral and spiritual teaching that pertained to the whole embodied human person. Arguing and justifying his views, Laestadius tried to overcome simple soul/body dualism, while coincidentally he *created a new dualism between the natural and moral or spiritual [aspects/spheres]*. His views were argued in terms of vitalist theory, mainly adopted from Xavier Bichat, but yet interpreted and combined with the Biblical ideas [of sin] and the classical faculty psychological conceptualizations.

The following chapters here go on to explicate and interpret Laestadius' notions of conscience, his spiritual and moral perceptions, the religious experience of awakening and the notion of faith that are closely attached to his physiologically grounded vitalist psychology. I show how Laestadius, by his endeavor to explicate the possibility of morality and spirituality in vitalist terms, tried to find an alternative or initial condition for "practical reason", as a genuine spirituality of heart that would indeed overcome the mere formal use of practical reason.

I further give a brief presentation herein of how Cartesian soul-body dualism is replaced by physical/moral dualism in French Enlightenment discussions [and early modernity] to lay the groundwork for my own interpretation of *how the physical/moral theme is also present in Laestadius' vitalist psychology and philosophy of religion*. From this perspective, I proceed to offer a philosophical interpretation that points out those aspects in Laestadius' theory, which constitutes his own insights with regard to the relationship between the physical and moral or spiritual. Here it is worth remembering as well that Laestadius did not draw a sharp distinction between the moral and spiritual, as he conceived proper morality to be always spiritual based on its core experiential and psychophysiological character. The general distinction between the physical and moral is restated usually as a distinction between the "natural man" and the "spiritual man," and in theological studies this distinction is often interpreted as "old man" versus "new man."⁴²⁶

5.2 The Vitalist Conception of Physical/Moral as a Horizon

Roughly speaking, in the Cartesian rationalistic tradition, mind came to signify the opposite of the body, and the classical holistic notion of soul (*âme*) as embodied phenomena was thereby marginalized. The prevailing problem was to constitute and explicate how "soul" and body could be related, and how a subject's relationship to the world outside was constituted. Later in transcendental idealism, especially in Kant's philosophy which derived its roots from Cartesian dualism, the matters of "soul" or

426 Cf. Dahlbäck 1950.

mind became more radically (at least in the methodological sense) separated from the organic life of the body and also from the actual world.

It has also been pointed out that at the end of the 18th century the Cartesian distinction between body and mind had been replaced in medicine with a new dualism expressed by the terms “physical” and “moral”⁴²⁷. The term “moral” meant for vitalists that something was distinct from the mere physical. The term was often attached to neural activity and conceived to correlate with the “psychic” or “inner man.” This development culminated in the publication of Pierre Cabanis’s *Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme* in 1802. Generally the dualism that was physical/moral served in a way that the concept of mind/body could not. It encompassed both the “mental” phenomena that was irreducible simply to consciousness and the “physical” phenomena irreducible simply to mechanism. Azouvi pointed out that the region of “moral” covered those phenomena that later in the nineteenth century were combine under the category of the “psychological” within the boundaries of the new discipline of that same name.⁴²⁸

Altogether, thematizing the mind/body problem as physical/moral was consistent with the medical vitalist concept; the vitalist starting point was grounded in the physiological investigation of the physical organism that was embedded with vital functions and forces, especially the metaphysical notion of the principle of life.

The theme of the physical/moral set broadly at the core of vitalist writers and their thinking, and it colored their analysis of morality, habit, character and personality, all phenomena dealt on the physiological plane. This line of thought was present also in Xavier Bichat’s work, *Physiological Researches on Life and Death (Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort, 1800)*, which Laestadius leaned on as his main source in *The Lunatic*. For instance, Bichat held that the moral and spiritual character were constituted on the organic life and sensory life and thought that social phenomena and its structures were rooted in this psychophysiological constitution of man.⁴²⁹

Laestadius was familiar with the medical vitalist tradition and later developments in vitalist and romantic psychological theories (e.g. Bichat, Heinroth, Carus, Descuret, Combe), so he was presumably also aware of the general vitalist endeavor to overcome Cartesian body/mind dualism with a physical/moral dualism. Laestadius’ theory was a combination and application of the different vitalist and psychological theories from the enlightenment and romantic eras, and it had many conceptualizations that were similar to vitalist and romantic psychology. There was an emphasis of physiological organization (organicist stance), the concept of passions, vital forces, a distinction

427 Azouvi 2006, 267–279.

428 Azouvi 2006, 267–279; Wright & Potter 2006, 11; Williams 2002.

429 See, Bichat 1815.

between the organic and sensory life. All indicated the general vitalist framework. Further, Laestadius' endeavor was to overcome Cartesian and transcendental philosophical mind/body dualism and create an alternative approach to the problem of dualism. Laestadius' re-definitions of the faculties of soul, his re-interpretations of passions, neuro- and humoral psychology and the terms "psychic", "moral" and "spiritual" were all intended to destruct/reset the dualistic distinction of the mind/body, even though largely for religious-apologetic and theological purposes. In this medical vitalist framework, Laestadius elaborated on his own theory, which was his explicit application of the ideas of medical vitalism, but also partially original elaborations of his own creation.

Here I discuss Laestadius' elaborations on philosophical directions and analyze his themes, including the natural and moral passions and humoral and neural functions within the organic life and the sensory life, heart, conscience, and the possibility of spiritual perception that Laestadius explicated to lay down the explanatory psycho-physiological basis for the phenomena of the religious experiences of awakening (väckelse), repentance (metanoia) and possibility of reconciliation. In doing so, I want to give a philosophical and psychological interpretation of Laestadius' emphasis of the necessity of the religious experience as the initial condition for the emergence of "spiritual man," and to show how this idea constitutes even the basis for a "moral/political man."⁴³⁰ It was typical for Laestadius' thought to demand moral passions for the basis of action and for the initial condition for correct legislation, positive political action, and moral sociality. In other words, Laestadius' theory of the constitution of moral and spiritual culminated in his idea of a living faith which could be a constitutive foundation for both the communal and the political human life.

Offering the general view on the core idea of vitalist moral philosophy above, I interpret Laestadius' vitalist thought from that perspective. I examine Laestadius' insights toward the vitalist background that formed the direct intellectual historical roots for his elaborations. To do so, I lean mainly on *The Lunatic* and support my interpretation with contemporary research concerning classical vitalism and its re-interpretation of mind/body dualism.⁴³¹ I want to show how Laestadius' thought, on the one hand, followed the classical vitalist ideas, and yet on the other hand, interpreted and elaborated on the vitalist ideas for his own anthropological and

430 To this end, Laestadius' idea of morality and spirituality can be attached to J.J. Rousseau's further transformation of general physical/moral dualism as Rousseau expanded it to pertain to "natural man" and "political man" in his treaties on the Origins of Inequality (See, Azouvi 2006, 275). Rousseau saw the social contract as the only possibility, but Laestadius saw the awakening of moral passions as the initial condition for any social contract whatsoever [because ruling passions even determine the public structures and interests of society].

431 See especially Williams 2002; Azouvi 2006; Haigh 1984.

religious purposes, thereby combining the vitalist notions with his own interpretations of the Biblical idea of man, the pietistic notions of a “living faith”, and his pre-phenomenological emphasis on a “lived experience” and “popular collective understanding”. My purpose is to offer an interpretative analysis and highlight the original vitalist character of Laestadius’ explanations and to discuss whether they offer any heuristic phenomenological views on the phenomena of spirituality and the criticism of general Western metaphysical stance inscribed to *The Lunatic*. In this way I aim to show that Laestadius’ philosophy of religion actually formulate an original insight on God/man relationship and elaborate on the idea of faith as an un-objectifying intentionality.

5.3 The Psycho-Physiological Foundation

In the following subchapters, I analyze the psycho-physiological foundation that is the explanatory ground for the moral and spiritual of Laestadius’ thought. It is worth mentioning that the medical vitalist explication of neural and humoral impacts, notions of heart, conscience and non-sensory perceptions, actually belongs to the broader context of religious experience of awakening and the possibility of reconciliation. My analysis could begin by analyzing the phenomena of awakening at the start, but it does not; instead I want to take first a closer look at the themes that are crucial for understanding Laestadius’ notion of awakening and reconciliation. This “problem of order of the analysis” derives from Laestadius’ thought insofar as he held the physical, psychic-moral, and metaphysical together, but simultaneously moved them to relatively distinct “phenomenal” domains. Therefore, it is a challenge to choose whether to begin the analysis with the psychological, and thus more social, phenomena of awakening, or use the founding physiological plane. This order of addressing the more specific natural scientific explications was chosen first out of respect to Laestadius’ own way of trying to explain and analyze the psycho-physiological constitutive basis to reach the phenomenal and experiential domain that was psychic, moral, and spiritual.

5.3.1 Moral Passions as the Source of Morality and Spirituality

As shown in Chapter 4, Person and Intentionality, the notion of passion played a crucial role in Laestadius’ theory. I have not yet analyzed what Laestadius meant by these moral passions and what role the notion of moral passions played in the wider context of his thought. However, here I offer a short analysis of Laestadius’ notion of moral passions.

With regard to the question of “moral” as a possible re-definition of the sphere of “psychic” or “mind”, it is important first to highlight that Laestadius divided the

passions between the natural and the moral⁴³². Purportedly referring to general French vitalism and medicine, Laestadius elaborated on his own insights regarding the “something” that was opposite or “differentiating” from “mere physiological”. While being aware that to bring “moral passion” into the picture would not easily be acceptable in most philosophical discussions, Laestadius referred to those general French discussions within which “moral passion” was generally in use (§705). However, Laestadius was also critical of materialistic and mechanistic vitalism, and “psychological materialism” because of their anti-religious character. (See, §137Note.)

Naturalization also characterized Laestadius’ approach in this respect; his explication remained in the physiological plane, starting from the vitalist notion of a human person. However, the notion of “moral passion” was needed when Laestadius wanted to explicate the possibility of morality or spirituality – especially to explain the religious experience of awakening and the moral emotions (See, §704) – and thus, something distinctly the mere physical (natural functions and passions) or the co-existence of the physical and spiritual to be more precise. Laestadius insisted that moral passions were natural and not merely metaphysical functions or faculties in a human embodied life. In this sense, Laestadius seemed to elaborate on something that was parallel to the physical/moral distinction as his explication of the “psychic” or “something irreducible to mere physical”.

To depict the concept here briefly, moral passions are in their[formal] character similar to natural passions, as they are philosophically defined as an “existence without substance or essence,” a specific phenomenon of human life that can be proven by the “testimony of feeling”. They function as intentional correlates of human life (towards which and to which human intentionality is directed). They are conceived as the driving forces of embodied motion, thought, and action, evoked or awakened/stirred by perceptual stimuli. Each particular passion has its particular respective susceptible organ or center through which it functions and affects a human life. Being simultaneously an organic function and a subjective faculty and a phenomena awakened by (sensory and non-sensory) perceptions, moral passions are also conceived as

432 Moral passions do not actually have an organic seat in the human body in the way natural passions do. More precisely, moral passions are located in the sphere of heart, especially the metaphysical heart. Thus, there is only a capability, based on the sensitive character of human organism, for moral passions to be awakened in the subjective consciousness or human heart. In this sense, moral passions have more of a transcendental character even if they function through an organism. The heart as the susceptible and receptive center of passions can thus change and fight against the natural passions; for example, sorrow and humility which laments the influence of the natural passions (e.g. egoism).

experiential-transcendental and organic-immanent phenomena⁴³³. In general, these passions function by directing an embodied consciousness and attach to a human being in relation to the world, others, surroundings, existence, and God.

What characterizes moral passions with respect to the natural passions is that they are first of all conceived as something *opposite* to the prevailing natural passions. Natural passions direct human life by affirming certain vital functions, such as surviving, re-production and rivalry in social life, and these moral passions disturb and break down the prevailing dominance of natural intentionality (as constituted by natural passions). (Moral passions thus appear to have a psychophysiological transformative function.)

The grounding idea here is that when moral passions are awakened by a perception or religious experience, they set against the natural prevailing passions (egoism), signifying the presence of conflicting (ambiguous) embodied condition⁴³⁴. At this (existential) level of abstraction, Laestadius' insight was very comprehensible. Let me give a simple heuristic example to explain. When facing the situation of hunger of the other and hunger of one's own, the natural passion of egoism and the moral passion of helping that other (empathy and sympathy), may easily conflict and cause a dissonant psychic condition that manifests itself as a disturbance of the mind. However, the conflict of moral and natural passions is stimulated through perception or experience and is thus related to the present world, and any experiential confrontation with the conflicting situation. In this sense, passions signify the intentional relatedness of human beings. One can consider the varying moral dilemmas within which such passions are conflicting and cause "natural" awakening. Conflicts of passions is the natural human condition as a human being lives in an ambiguous world and thus exists within varying rivaling influences on such passions.

433 This two-dimensional nature of passions – as they belong to the shared experiential world and are simultaneously natural characteristics of human organism – gives one reason to interpret that the line between philosophy and theology in Laestadius thought resets inside the concept of passion (Juntunen 1982). This view is a plausible one because Laestadius conceived passions both as the fundamental basis of sin and simultaneously as the natural driving vital forces of human life. However, Laestadius conceived passions also in a theological context as vital-ontological and existential-intentional constituents of human life, and thus, they could be interpreted fully in both the philosophical and psychological sense. As seen above, these passions could also be interpreted as “correlates of human intentionality.”

434 This means generally a dissonant embodied state within which the passions cannot be satisfied. The dissonant state in any organic level of passions also causes dissonance in the levels of the sensory life and mind. This dissonant state-- within which passions cannot be satisfied – Laestadius called awakening (*väckelse*). Laestadius' depicted this stalemate/aporetic/impasse existential condition in various ways, but clearly stated that it is most often an uncomfortable, unharmonious, agonic, and even torturing embodied state that drives the human being to search for satisfaction of the psychic condition, namely, a reconciliation in religious terms. (This line of thought culminates in the re-conception of faith and reconciliation in vitalist and psychological terms in the end.)

Given that moral passions do not constitute the prevailing natural condition of human existence, moral passions are depicted as something “different” that penetrates the intellect and touches directly the subjective consciousness, or the heart. Deep or strong occasions and events of life pass through the reflective capacity of the mind, so that natural organic functions (natural passions) are challenged and may lose their dominative influence on the mind. For example, sorrow is such a moral passion (§§101, 100, 102.). To remind once again, Laestadius shunned the dualistic way of thinking and formulates a psychosomatic insight for the co-existence of soul and body. Sense perceptions directly affect passionate body (organic life) awakening immediately feelings and emotions. Especially, moral passions awaken the embodied awareness of the soul within joy and sorrow, when, for instance, seeing a significant other, the infinite meaning of the other person is revealed. In this sense, the moral passions *disclose the psychic reality*, meanings, self-recognition, and the whole of the psychological existence. In this sense, it could be understood to what sense “moral” as disclosed by passions signifies the psychological sphere of human existence. Still further, imagination can awaken such passions.

Basically, events that awaken moral passions are such that they penetrate the intellect causing a psychosomatic conflict and dissonance. Thus, the awakening of moral passions signifies an awakened condition of the psyche that indicates a destruction of the ego-subject; the prevailing egoism, ambition, greed, and their servant passions lose their dominative disposition, and “something” outside of the ego-totally, or transcendental is disclosed for the ego. In a sense, something that is experienced can move/influence the human’s subjective consciousness without conscious realization. Laestadius refers to this subjective sphere as “heart” [in the moral and spiritual sense] and as unconsciousness. This psycho-physiological order is important in Laestadius’ theory as he realized that morality does not proceed from the intellect and practical reason in the first place, but instead proceeds from the organic life, subjective consciousness, and the heart.

Laestadius stated that the state of awakening also signifies the emergence of self-awareness, a condition where one can first recognize prevailing passions within their own embodied existence. In this sense, awakening also signifies a certain kind of individuation.

In general, Laestadius dealt with the problem of moral dilemmas, looking for a solution for a fundamental level of passions. However, as the rivalry between natural passions does not reach the depth of *religious* experience, he proceeded to a deeper analysis of the religious experience of reconciliation and non-sensory perception which would disclose the ultimate character of the change in moral intentionality in the level of subjective consciousness or conscience. Before going to that aspect, I want to analyze the psychophysiological basis within which the moral and natural influences of passions do take place impact the human intellect.

Laestadius used the term “passion” with dual meaning to have both physical and experiential-psychic aspects. Often Laestadius used passions and heart as synonyms (as well as passions and world), which is understandable, as both physic-psychological in character and thus disclosed simultaneously the co-existence of both physiological-immanent and spiritual/moral-transcendental domains⁴³⁵.

5.3.2 Humoral and Neural Impacts on the Functions of Soul

On the existential level, the emergence of the psychic-existential condition within the conflicting state of awakening is more or less comprehensible, but Laestadius wanted to explain it in terms of physiological vitalism which could confuse the contemporary interpreter. Now the question is how does a “moral” or “spiritual” quality emerge from a “mere physiological” plane? Does the possibility of morals and spirituality belong to the physiological domain of the flesh only? As we have seen, the emergence of consciousness or mind did not cause a problem for Laestadius because he relied on the panpsychistic interpretation of the principle of life, which is itself conceived of as a “psychic essence” or the original soul of each human person. However, to have a consciousness does not necessarily mean that one also has moral or spiritual self-awareness.

Laestadius’ physic-psychological explanation is interesting, and it seems to have been his own modification of the medical vitalist notions⁴³⁶. On the physiological plane, the whole idea is based on the existence of passions that stimulate and awaken vital functions and action in their respective organs via sense perceptions.

”It is a physiological fact that the passions alter the components of the blood and affect the disposition (*sinnelaget*). The passions are awakened by external stimuli and in turn alter the components of the blood; and this change impacts the disposition (*sinnelaget*).” (§305 Note.)

Because passions function via organs, Laestadius’ position indicates his organicist stance; all motion and activity are stimulated by sense perceptions which set the passions functioning in organic life.

435 The transcendental nature of passions becomes clear for Laestadius’ use of the term “passion”: they “reside” in organs, they come to a human being, they are evoked by sense perceptions, and they influence the organs and cognitive life, they refer to heart and subjective consciousness, they contentually signify everyday experiential phenomena, such as joy, sorrow, agony, love, torment, hunger etc., and passions affect organs, indicating that they are transcendental to mere matter... the fundamental character of existence of man is that man is passionate, which was presented in the vitalist theories in a general sense by the statement; “to exist is to feel.”

436 I did not find anything similar coming from either Bichat or Descuret.

“The passions actually belong to organic life and have their basis therein, but are perceived (uppfattas) in sensory life as emotions and desires. They impact the living brain through the circulation of blood and the stimulation of the nerves. Not only the different components of the blood, but also its stronger or weaker circulation, awaken different emotions.” (§ 310.)

When taking a closer look at how these passions (are explained and how they) function and influence the human body, mind, and life, Laestadius leaned on two principles: *First*, passions affect the sensory life and mind in two ways, namely, the distinction between the sensual element of passion and the moral element of passion. This distinction lay a path for the possibility of morals and spirituality together on the physical level; *Second*, the stronger passion always gets its impact through to the brain and mind. Therefore, if the moral passion is stronger, it will dominate a sensuous natural passion and get its impact to the mind and action (on either the psychological or moral level). Laestadius offered an example of the influence of the passion of love:

”The foundation of the chronic passions may be found in certain bodily organs, but their impact on the brain takes place in two ways: *through the reaction of the nerves and through blood*. We call the former instance *the sensual element of the passions* and the latter, which takes place through the blood, we call *the moral element of the passions*. For instance, the sensual element (sinliga element) of love is a strong fluid that *stimulates* the mucous membranes of the genitals; the impression thereof is *transmitted* to the brain through the reaction of the *nerves* and arouses a *sensory desire* (det sinliga begäret). But the *moral element* of love consists of *the same fluid* infused in *the blood*; its impression on the brain occurs *through the blood* and arouses a blissful *feeling in the heart* called the pleasure (njutning) of pure love. If the moral element makes a stronger impression than the sensory element, then the latter (sinliga begäret) *will be suppressed*.⁴³⁷” (§211. emphasis added)

This citation illuminates Laestadius’ physiological argumentation concerning the nature and functions of passions in general and particularly the physical explanatory ground of morals, which interests us especially in this chapter. *First*, we found that the sensual element physiologically functions through a *neural impact* and affects the brain directly by arousing impressions in the sensory life (mind), namely “sensory desire”. This *direct* neural influence on the sensory life seems to *indicate a more primitive instinctual* or drive-based process, as it also indicates an immediate

437 “But he who runs after women cannot have any real love since he channels the substance of his love into the realm of the sensual (kärlekens ämne på den sinliga vägen).” (§211)

response to neural/sensory impact. Also, we found that the *moral element functions through humoral* activity in the blood influencing *heart* first of all⁴³⁸ where it arouses “a blissful feeling.” Both ways are agitated by the “same fluid” (*samma vätska*) in the first instance, but they also function simultaneously through different canals.

Overall, the sensual element is here seen as a neural process, while the moral element is the humoral effect with subjective consciousness through heart. *Secondly*, Laestadius thought that the moral element, which is based on the humoral *secretion*, is able to make stronger influence than neural-sensual impact, and thus *outweighs* (defeat, conquer) the sensual element. If so, that signifies that the effect of moral element is manifested through consciousness. The effect of the moral element can thus dominate and lay a vital basis for the activities of the faculties of mind/consciousness. That would signify that the faculties of soul – both subjective and objective – have a moral passional ground.

What is interesting here as well is that what is manifested in human cognition and action is based on two distinct ways⁴³⁹, namely, consciousness if effected simultaneously by the neural channel and blood vessels through the heart⁴⁴⁰. For this purpose, Laestadius gives another example of hunger to explain the bipolar effect of passions on the consciousness (§212)⁴⁴¹, which also serves as an explanation of how the individual

438 Also, here we recognize that Laestadius followed Bichat’s distinction between animal life and organic life. It is also revealed here that there are different centers; brain as a receptive organ of sensory life (*nervliv*) receives stimulation through the nerves, and the heart as the receptive organ of organic life mediates stimulation through the heart. Thus, the neural media is direct and immediate, but humoral media has heart as a mediating center/principle that “brings forth” influences to the brain. However, this aspect also raises a question for whether Laestadius’ conceived the neural deterministic and humoral centered to heart as an initial condition for voluntary motion?

439 “The mother’s heart is an inexhaustible ocean of love, which brings both bliss and pain. Natural love also does not have its foundation in the heart, but in the genitals.” (§720.) Should we conceive this idea as a distinction between carnal emotions and the opposite spiritual emotions that are transformed through the conscience?

440 Laestadius may have had a contradictory notion because later he made heart the center of passion and a more important role; the “condition of physiological heart” determined the moral character of man. We can also notice that Laestadius was in real trouble when he later gave the role of “morals” to the conscience or subjective conscience, and then onwards to the awakened mind, a problem of moral emergence. However, Laestadius, even while recognizing that the faculties of the objective consciousness (reason, will, understanding) that are the final faculties that execute action and thoughts, backed up and insisted that religious awakening pertained to the physical level, namely, touch the heart and subjective consciousness, which would disclose/“bring forth” the possibility of morality. Thus, his idea was indeed relatively coherent when emphasizing the constitutional perspective and not the explicit use of concepts.

441 “Hunger is a sensation that arises when the gastric juices stimulate the mucous membranes in the stomach, whence the impression is transmitted to the brain through nerves. When man is very hungry, he is also stingy and gluttonous; this is the purely sensual element of hunger. But in some people, these gastric acids mix with the blood more than usual. Man then becomes so stingy that he cannot bring himself to eat, because the moral element of stinginess cancels out the purely sensual elements. That is, the impression transmitted through the blood is stronger than that [impression] which is purely sensory.” (§212.)

characteristics of a person may vary and/or be determined. The human organism functions by its neural life and organic life, so habituality is determined by both a more immediate neural response and mediating humoral activity. Humoral activity brings a certain kind of irregularity or un-deterministic principle into the picture.

It is thus important to highlight that conflict between the passions happens in the physical-organic plane first; if the moral passion is stronger, it suppresses the influence of the natural sensitive passion and puts its influence on the sensory life. The “winning” passion then is “interpreted” in the sensory life or is more effective and manifests itself as moral thought or action (if the issue is a moral situation). Here we need to remind the reader that Laestadius saw the possibility of natural morality, but conceived it as relativistic, as it is most often the mere consequence of varying natural passions, and their rivalry is the basis for the sensory life (individual soul). However, based on the physiological constitution, there is only negative and positive freedom⁴⁴² in the level of sensory life, which means that human being/mind can either resist or consent to the agitations (inclinations) that appear from the influences of the passions⁴⁴³.

5.3.3 Heart as Mediating Organ of the Vital Forces

Laestadius conceived the physiological heart⁴⁴⁴ as the center of the passions and held it as a synonym for passions, “subjective consciousness” and “unconsciousness”. The heart is physiologically posited as a mediating center between the organic life and the sensory life (brains), and it plays a crucial role in transmitting vital passions [and their influences] to the sensory life.

The heart is an

“*organonleptikon*’, or *susceptive organ*; that is to say, the sort of organ that conceives and brings forth; ...; it is a principle of good and evil, of right and wrong, of light and darkness. On the other hand, *subjective consciousness*

442 In the general picture, this subordination of consciousness to passions is called *psychic necessity*: The human person must function in accordance with physiological and vital laws and is not free from the impacts of organic life. See Chapter 4.2.7.

443 For freedom of will see, Chapter 4.2.7 above. Cf. Juntunen 1982; Dahlbäck 1950; Zidbäck 1937. There also remains a disagreement about Laestadius’ stance; Juntunen holds against Zidbäck and Dahlbäck that from knowing Laestadius’ principles there should not be another but negative freedom in the sensory life. My interpretation is that such confusion results from Laestadius’ own inaccuracy in his general statements, as even though he states in on the general level that sensory life is subordinated to organic life, he does not mean that man cannot restrict or direct his actions and thoughts. Elsewhere, Laestadius clearly states that man’s thoughts and actions can make space for reconciliation (limited ascetism). What he wanted to emphasize in more detail was that religious experience has to pertain to the heart and subjective consciousness because these awakened passions lay the ground for a moral and proper spiritual cognitive life and action.

444 See §718 for how Laestadius thematized and coincidentally struggled with the multidimensional notion of the heart. See also §719.

is merely a sense, or 'receptive organ,' which receives impressions from the red blood that streams from the heart. Subjective consciousness is primarily the receptive organ of the moral and immoral elements, but these elements are not brought forth in subjective consciousness itself, but in the heart, whence rise both good and evil, spreading to the other organs.” (§744. emphasis added)

The heart is also the domain where the “conflict of passions” is felt⁴⁴⁵ first. From this physiological basis Laestadius elaborated on a broader notion of the heart that included all the passions and thus go beyond the mere physiological heart:

“[A]ll natural and unnatural passions taken together, which we refer to as the heart in a more extended sense. All passions that are based in organic life must pass through the heart; through the moral element of the passions. Because the heart is the central organ of the passions, it is the nature (beskaffenhet) of the heart that determines moral character.” (§718. emphasis added)

Laestadius also stated quite technically that the “physiological heart is the organ of metaphysical heart,” meaning that the domain of the “psychic”, “moral” or “spiritual” is derived from the experiential core that physiologically is the heart. Laestadius saw the sensory and organic lives as correlative with a relationship between the physical and metaphysical, and thus, the physiological and spiritual:

”The moral purification that takes place during the struggle to repent reaches deep into the human organism on account of the close relationship between body and soul, sensory life and organic life, and the physical and metaphysical organism.” (§783)

Heart is the metaphysical and spiritual name for the “subjective” experiential core in the organic and unconscious plane. For this reason, the heart is conceived as determining the “human personhood,” the “moral character of a human being” and the core of spirituality. Thus, the heart is conceived as a “dual-concept”, covering both the physiological-immanent and the spiritual-transcendental spheres.

Genuine morality needs moral passions as its basis, and that is why we have to highlight that the inspired condition of the heart⁴⁴⁶ plays a crucial role; heart is the center of passions, for it delivers passions to the sensory life and thus is the center of moral character. “[I]t is the heart, not intellect, reason or memory that determines man’s moral character.” (§717.) Here again Laestadius had to conceive the concept

445 Feelings belong both to the organic and the sensory life. (§747)

446 “The good heart refers to moral character.” (§715)

of heart as having a dual-meaning, as it simultaneously indicated the physiological organ and the organ of the “metaphysical heart”⁴⁴⁷, namely, the center of morality and spirituality.⁴⁴⁸ The basic dilemma seemed to be how to combine experientiality or mind with organism.

However, there was no such positive or active freedom in the sphere of the sensory life that could influence the organic life and thus change the conditions of the heart (organic life) by its own power. In other words, a change does not originate from the mere physical, but it can be explained by passions, heart and conscience, by the “transcendental” aspects of the organic life itself. The change in the condition of heart would demand a change in the organic level through the moral passions, which necessitated the religious experience of awakening.

But how does moral passion or the spiritual influence of religious experience affect the physiological constitution of the human being? How are experiential phenomena and sensory and non-sensory experiences attached to the physiological body? In this regard, Laestadius needed to elaborate on the dual-meaning of heart. Laestadius argued that moral and spiritual experiences pertain to the “metaphysical” or “spiritual” heart and can awaken moral passions at the organic level or in the subjective consciousness itself. These “metaphysical” experiences have naturally similar physiological effects on the human organism, as whatever the natural perception or influence of natural passion is. In this sense, the human being is not living only as “mind” or distinct soul, but instead the soul is the principle of life and thus has to cover both the spiritual (pneuma) and the embodied (psyche) domains in order to cover both the organic embodied functions and the “psychic” or spiritual influences. The Soul is “the life of the body”. Here, even though Laestadius’ writing can hard to follow at times, it seems that his idea was both coherent and plausible within the vitalist framework: The heart as well as all the other organs were conceived as “mental” from the beginning; they were animated organs that could receive action and act by themselves, and were thus related to the physical and transcendental spheres from the start. In a sense, the extended notion of sensitivity of the heart and conscience indicated that the “moral” or spiritual” is physical, and vice versa. Thus morality is found in the elemental flesh.

447 Elsewhere Laestadius states that the physical and metaphysical are one and the same thing.

448 States of objective consciousness need states of subjective consciousness, such as emotion, for the basis of their action: Mere concepts, or will without desire (matter), will not lead to the matter of subject whatsoever. This psychosomatic conception (of mind) also highlights the point that aroused/excited organic functions affect the content of the faculties of objective consciousness. Laestadius also referred to heart and passions as the pre-reflective basis.

5.3.4 Conscience As the Sphere of Moral and Spiritual Experience

With respect to the extended notions of heart and passion and their central role in subjective consciousness, Laestadius was able to elaborate on his notion of conscience. For Laestadius, conscience and the voice of conscience were the original phenomena of human life, and they preceded all ideas and concepts whatsoever (Cf. §§1277, 1318, 1320). In this sense they played the primary role in regard to intellect and the intellectual theoretical doctrines of God, faith, and morality.

“By conscience, we mean the *sense of justice itself*, which preceded the idea and the concept. Neither the idea, nor the concept, is able to awaken the conscience. *The idea is unable to awaken sorrow, love, or hate, for which is required either an immediate perception, or an occurrence that touches the heart.* This is so clear, and confirmed by general experience, that whoever claims that he is able to make himself fall in love will give rise to ridicule. It is the same way with the awakening. It always presupposes the some occurrence that goes to the heart.” (§1318. emphasis added)

Actually, conscience refers to a certain aspect of subjective consciousness, particularly the receptive domain of organic influences. The cerebellum is the organic seat of subjective consciousness and thus also the organic seat of the conscience. Conscience is particularly specialized to be able to receive and “interpret” moral and immoral elements, so it has more to do, for instance, with the evaluation of the moral and immoral influences coming from the heart. Thinking so, Laestadius held that the “conscience is a result of the ruling passions,” (§691) which, furthermore, indicated that conscience was susceptible to the varying influences of those passions that determine *the condition of conscience*.

Laestadius undertook an extensive analysis of the varying conditions of conscience⁴⁴⁹, and naturally, he came to focus on the “awakened conscience” within which the founding dilemma of human existence was faced (later with a need for reconciliation). Altogether, conscience receives wicked and moral influences from the heart⁴⁵⁰, which in turn impacts the faculties of objective consciousness. This line of thought reveals Laestadius’ way of explaining the emergence of human motion, action, cognition, morality, and spirituality as having a vertical direction from the bottom to the top:

449 See § 695 and further e.g., §§ 693, 694, 696, 697.

450 We can interpret this receptive capability in that conscience is only a “rationalizing” faculty of the passions, while the heart hold its primary position in what pertains to faith and morality. Conscience is the sphere of the struggle concerning moral and religious thought and action.

“[T]he law manifests itself, first in the heart as a sense of justice, and proceeds to conscience, which has its organ in subjective consciousness, “*syneidesis*,” whence it proceeds to the intellect in the form of thoughts and concepts. It is easy to realize that *this order for the ascent of the moral element from the heart to the intellect* has its foundation in the construction and position of the organs, once one is convinced that each faculty of the soul has its corresponding organ in the body.” (§676. emphasis added)

According to Laestadius, this psychophysiological order coincided with the Biblical views:

“As far as conscience is concerned, the apostle shows us that the law has first been written in the hearts of the heathens, where it manifests itself as a sense of justice. Thence the moral element has proceeded to conscience, or the subjective consciousness (*syneidesis*) and finally to thought (*logismoi*).” (§682.)

The phenomenon of conscience extends the conception of subjective consciousness into a transcendental dimension. Conscience indicates something that is transcendental to the organic functions of the subjective consciousness (heart, passions, conscience) but in such a way that the “indicated itself” is included in the constitution of their physical disposition/composition from the beginning (empty intentionality, God as force). This puzzling intertwinedness of the physical and the non-physical shows up as Laestadius depicted precisely how the physical feelings transcend the Self (Jag) in “the call”:

“[O]ccurrence that goes to the heart, for instance, when [the] drunkard is awakened by the reproach of conscience. Here, it is not merely the exaggeration of evil causing a ‘*reaction*’ within organic life, a weakening (*förslappning*) within sensory life, but *God’s own voice within the conscience* calling for repentance. But this voice of God within the tormented conscience did not proceed from the ego, or the ego-will. Rather, there is a higher power, the moral necessity, which awakens within the will a desire for salvation; in fact, the rational awakening, of which the philosopher speaks, is not the work of the ego-will, since man, the ego, is called upon by moral necessity to actualize its freedom.” (§1318. emphasis added)

While this citation reveals that actual freedom is depicted as negative and “free of something”, it also *deconstructs the dualism*. Conscience neither signifies a mere “inner” or “outer” experience or condition nor a mere “bodily-physical” or simply a “mental-spiritual” experience; rather it unites both spheres in such a way that there

remains no simple dualism neither in human beings nor in the existence of God. Rather man's psychophysiological existence indicates a fundamental relatedness to the "outer" existence or God as such. The phenomenon of conscience seems to refer to a capability of having an experiential holistic "understanding" of one's being in the world as such which then co-ordinates the subjective and the objective. Conscience is explicitly interpreted as the capability for having inner and outer insight:

"In subjective consciousness, the feelings of the heart manifest themselves as insight, 'syneidesis,' or as an awareness of good and evil. Syneidesis comes from the Greek word *eido*, which really means 'to see,' but just as the Swedish word is used to denote both outer and inner vision, so, too, was '*eido*' used to denote both. It means 'to see' when one speaks of the external world, but it means to see when one speaks of internal vision (inre seendet); *the perception of what goes on within ourselves* (förmimmandet af det som föregår innom oss). ..." (§745. emphasis added)

As a phenomenon, conscience characterizes the capability for having a "subjective" experience of one's own-most personal embodied condition in the world. Conscience seems to hold a domain within which the outer world and one's subjective lived experience, both the subjective and the objective, coincide, i.e., what is going on in the world around us, and how do I "take up residence" with myself in the world (dynamic relation). Overall, one's physical embodied state is coexisting with the calling voice, with the outer dimension, and thus seems to constitute a certain kind of *expanded notion of sensibility* (based on the principle of life). Laestadius indeed argued that sensory perception is always extrasensory-perception as well.

Furthermore, this immanence-transcendence problematic spreads all through Laestadius' conceptions; as man is a sentient vital organism, Laestadius had to posit all phenomena conventionally conceived as simply "mental" or "spiritual" distinct from "body", to both immanent organic life and the relatively transcendental capacity of sensory life (nervliv). On the notion of conscience, Laestadius elaborated on his explanation of religious experience of awakening and his quite detailed non-dualistic theory of perception.

5.3.5 Non-sensory Perception Within the Conscience

In Chapter 4, I examined Laestadius' general analysis of the subjective and objective consciousness and theory of intentional perception. Now, in the context of morality and spirituality, we can offer a wider view of what purposes the elaborated insight can serve, especially for Laestadius' religious thought and psychology. The embodied unity of mind played a crucial role when Laestadius went on to argue for the natural embodied character of religious feelings and internal perceptions:

“If one can prove that the soul, or life, is dependent on organic conditions, or that ‘all supersensory perception is also sensory,’ or that ‘the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego that thinks’ (Petrelli, §100); then I hope that both spiritualism and materialism may collapse, and a new foundation may be laid for a correct psychology that more closely agrees with reality.” (§245.)

And further still,

“All spiritualists have considered Descartes’ forceful assertion (cogito ergo sum) to be an axiom. But the claim that man thinks without mediation of organs now require proof (see §192). The spiritualist must pause to ponder dual consciousness, the physical and the metaphysical. The materialist must pause ponder physical and metaphysical activating force. I believe that, eventually, they will meet half-away.” (§245Note.)

In addition to finding a way out from spiritualism and materialism, Laestadius’ more particular interests were to elaborate on an insight to show how emotional experience (moral) could be seen at the same time as natural and spiritual, or in other words, both immanent and transcendental.

Particularly, moral and spiritual feelings or emotions were in Laestadius’ focus as he saw that metaphysical rationalism could interpret religious emotions as being merely metaphysical, thus creating a dualism between natural and metaphysical emotions:

“Because all activities of the soul are also activities of the organs, the feelings belong to both body and soul; they belong to both organic life and sensory life. It is the whole person that feels, not the soul only. The feelings have their origins in organic life but effect sensory life. From this it follows that *the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego that thinks*. Petrelli, §100. Cf, §§48, 191.” (§747.)

However, dilemmatic dualistic ethos was difficult for Laestadius, especially when he then interpreted “philosophers” separate physical feeling and metaphysical feelings, so that the latter is conceived to occur and function without organs. This threatening dualism caused him to radicalize his stance:

”In reality, the physical and metaphysical feeling is one and the same feeling, just as physical and metaphysical consciousness are one and the same consciousness.” (§748.)⁴⁵¹

451 See also §750 eccentric feelings [wrath, love, ambition] and concentric [fear, grief, envy] feelings.

Laestadius fought against the insights that divide the unity of experiential sphere. Here he also drew a distinction between two kinds of feelings – organic and sensory – that pertain to the passions themselves within the organic life and the influence of passion on the sensory life⁴⁵². The feeling is organic when it signifies the passional state itself, but the feeling is sensory when it is the result of the influence of passion on the sensory life⁴⁵³.

Laestadius wanted to argue using analogy that as feelings belong to both domains (organic and sensory), moral feelings must also be simultaneously physical and metaphysical. Here he had a clear religious purpose, namely, to argue against the assumed idealistic rationalism (transcendentalism or Hegel); Laestadius held that moral or spiritual emotions can be understood in natural-physiological terms, and moral feelings have as equal an influence on organic life as natural feelings do. This is why embodied religious experiences and perceptions, as Laestadius seemed to claim, should be taken seriously as natural phenomena.

“In so far as all feelings are simultaneously physical and metaphysical, moral feelings must also be simultaneously physical and metaphysical, but it is an impossibility for the philosopher to admit this. He assumes the existence of only a sensory feeling, perceived sensorily, such as cold, heat, physical pain, and other. But he considers all moral feelings to be metaphysical. Nevertheless it is clear to see that moral feelings affect the organism as powerfully as natural feelings, when they are intensified into passions.” (§751.)

This co-existing, sensory-embodied feeling pertains also to the whole constitution of perception; there cannot be two distinct sensory centers, ego subjects or dual consciousness, that experience. Laestadius most favorite chant was “the ego that thinks, is the same ego that feels”. Using the example of the influence of alcohol on the body and the rational soul, Laestadius concluded that

“We imagine that all bodily feelings are also the feelings of the soul, and vice versa; that all the feelings of the soul are also those of the body. ‘Be-

452 This distinction coincides with the distinct way of how influence is mediated to the organs of sensory life either through the blood via heart or via nerves directly to the organs of sensory life (See above). This view also relates to the above distinction with respect to the moral-humoral and sensuous-neural.

453 “Insofar as man has an organic life and sensory life, we must first draw a distinction between organic feelings and sensory feelings; it is a difference between the passion itself, which belongs to organic life, and the impression of the passion on the sensory organs, which belong the sensory life. The latter is generally seen as the soul and corresponds to the philosopher’s rational soul, although the public most often considers the heart to be the real organ of the soul. [philosopher distinct soul from sensory life].” (§752)

cause the ego that perceives through the senses is the same ego that thinks.’
Petrelli §100.” (§306)

Thus, Laestadius came to hold a psychosomatic view of experiential phenomena: No matter whether it is physical sensory perception or non-sensory “inner” perception, both are experienced by means of organs and received by the “Self” that is the organic-physical and sensory-transcendental core [predicate] of experience (See e.g. §§ 206–308). What was important for Laestadius was that the phenomenon of the body had to be carried all along because the body both mediates and modifies all our experiences.

Laestadius used the expanded notion⁴⁵⁴ of conscience (moral element) as a mode of sensibility to explain the effect of the religious experience of awakening that can occur via the influence of a “heart breaking” life experience, via a touching spiritual sermon or the effect of the Holy Spirit: Through subjective consciousness based on dispositions of organs, and thus having no conscious awareness or activity of the emergence of such an experience, the human organism is able to experience moral emotions. The moral element springs from the [metaphysical-physical] heart and flows to the conscience (cerebral) where it is manifested as moral emotions and is equally effective on the organs (heart) and organic life, as are the natural passions and sensuous feelings. Religious emotions and spiritual “supernatural” perceptions evoked by moral passions affect equally in their power the human organism and life as sensory perceptions evoked by natural passions.⁴⁵⁵ In this way, Laestadius fought against the dualism between natural and metaphysical perception that he seemed to find in Petrelli’s *Psychologie* (1845).

The overcoming of the distinction between subjective and objective is constructed through simultaneity of empirical sensory perception and extrasensory “transcendental” perception. This means that sensory perception (sinlig förnimmelse) relates to extra-sensory transcendental perception (översinlig förnimmelse) in a particular way: Objective or outer perceptions are based on the passional basis of the vital forces of passions and drives; perception is first of all possible because organism is sensible or animated in its vital nature and thus capable of receiving stimulation and reacting on it. However, all the passions are in an intimate relationship with surrounding influences, as all passions are “awakened by sense-perceptions”. Here it is important to notice that by using the term “transcendental” or “transcendentality”, we cannot refer to something absolutely “beyond” or “otherworldly” but just something that is not given indirect empirical sense-perception. In Laestadius’ case transcendental

454 Rey (2006, 260) has pointed out how Fouquet elaborated on a non-conscious experience, which goes beyond what is conventionally conceived as organic function.

455 Cf. Laestadius 2006, 86, 54–66. [Spiritual perceptions, inner perception, “inner eye”, spiritual world.]

signified those inner perceptions based on the dynamic relations of passions within the organic life; thus Laestadius' psychophysiology of religious experience becomes a particular kind of physiological transcendentalism.⁴⁵⁶

Laestadius' view constituted a dynamic theory of human/world relation. It distinguished itself from rational-mechanist explanations and also from the constructivist idea within which the concepts of mind schematize the objective world (Kant). Rather a passional interactive and dynamic relatedness with the world and all things in it – whether material or cultural-ideological – constituted the whole dynamic relation of the human/world or the existence relationship. The relation was simultaneously linguistic and pre-linguistic. We can assume Laestadius' view; preaching of law and poetic evangelical preaching can awaken the moral passions and affect the subjective consciousness wherein they evoke moral and religious feelings and “images” that lay out the subjective motivational ground for both mind and action.

Altogether, transcendental spiritual perception or experience does not derive from an immaterial spiritual or metaphysical world, but to the contrary, from embodied carnal passions that bridge the relationship between embodied subjectivity and the world⁴⁵⁷. Here “the spiritual perception” may contain real everyday feelings of dislike and also more normative principles or personal values revealed by one's own conscience. Developing the connection between sensory perception and extra-sensory perception (moral emotions) belongs to Laestadius' apologetic intentions to explain the pietistic religious experience of awakening (väckelse) and conversion (metanoia) that he wanted to interpret as a twofold embodied physiological and transcendental experience.⁴⁵⁸

456 The fact that Laestadius stated that Christianity is based on images and ideas duly awakened in the religious person, does not mean an emphasis on intellectual mind but rather that the “religious message” (a call emerging in dissonant passionate-cognitive state) or existential experience that passes reason and touched immediately the heart will stimulate high images, ideas, and hopes in the consciousness of a religious person.

457 Laestadius was trying to explain how all physical or natural sense-perceptions (immanence) are at the same time transcendental non-sensory perceptions (transcending the physical); and vice versa, that all movements of the soul or movements of passions in the subjective consciousness also influence the objective consciousness. Thus, Laestadius formed a psychosomatic connection and simultaneity of sense perception and transcendental subjective perception (passions). This pre-phenomenological idea is explained in terms of the early psychosomatic elaborations of Heinroth. Laestadius seemed to recognize how the constitution of meaning (in thus perception) is always constituted by the objectively given data of sensory perception – that is (in his interpretation at least) the direct, immediate, immanent and empiric part – and subjectively given pre-cognitive or extra-sensory data – that mediates the organic, passionated, non-empirical and transcendental part of perception/experience.

458 However, Laestadius' endeavor to discuss the transcendental dimension of perception can also be attached to the phenomenological problem of constitution of meaning. Laestadius (2011) stated in *Mythology* that it is hard to draw a difference between inner and outer experience. Also in *Voice of One Crying* (1988) Laestadius discussed a problem of inner and outer experience in the

Theoretically he tried to explain God's spiritual effect ("imputation") as part of the "natural" experience – for example, the experiences of grace or moral disgust that are based on the organic passions and their influences. For instance, the dissonant state of awakening is experienced as disgust for bad and evil (avsky för det onda). In regard to this "naturalization" of moral passion and its influence on organs and thus on human action and thought (intentionality), it is worth noticing that Laestadius followed and elaborated on common vitalist philosophy in order to discuss the physical, moral and spiritual in the same plane⁴⁵⁹.

Laestadius saw that the sharp distinction between natural (empirical) and metaphysical (spiritual or transcendental) emotions is artificial, that is not affirmed within a psychosomatic lived experience, and that moral passions have an equally powerful effect on organic life as natural feelings and emotions do. Instead, Laestadius seemed to suggest that the distinction between the natural and the metaphysical experience has to occur inside an embodied experience (§752§Note).

For Laestadius, it was necessary to hold that there remains a possibility for inner religious-existentialistic experience and perception grounded on physiological body. (See, §§751, 752.) Otherwise, all of faith would be conceived as an intellectual matter. Again, Laestadius explained how the "imputation" of God was holistic non-sensory perception (or a sensitive experience) that passes the objectifying [gaze of] reason, will, and understanding. For him, the phenomenon of Love worked as a heuristic example: Love is awakened on the pre-cognitive level of subjective consciousness in the first place – not on the level of objective consciousness of the sensory life (there is difference between natural and spiritual love, and the former loses). Similarly, all genuine moral and spiritual passions are felt directly in the heart or the subjective consciousness. Thus, a moral and spiritual (transcendental) experience and perception are found originally in the vital forces of passions and their relationship to each other in the Heart/conscience. Religious experience is explained in vitalist terms as the conflict between natural and moral passions in the living organism itself. To put this view phenomenologically on a more general level, we can say that religious experience is based on the transcendental character of the flesh (which proved for Laestadius that moral emotions and experiences are not merely metaphysical or

context of religious experience: he saw that revelations and religious experiences are possible to explain through medical physiology as aroused passion life. In religious extasis, for example, the inner life is lifted up, so that the human is turned into an inner life while the outer world loses its significance. Laestadius tried to explain and understand how the inner subjective life is primal in relation to the world and God. In *The Lunatic* he tried to sharpen his theory for explaining how supernatural or transcendental experience is as plausible and real as objective perception; that was done justifying spirituality and pietistic religiosity. See, Laestadius 2011 and 2015 and 1988.

459 Cf. Williams 2002.

transcendental, and morality and spirituality can be understood and explained in terms of vitalism.⁴⁶⁰ (as an embodied intentionality)

Religious transcendental perceptions exist as events that are based on conflicts of the passions (and varying continuous sensory data). Also, religious and moral phenomena, such as good and bad, can be perceived within experience based on the conflicting relations of the passions (natural and moral). In other words, dissonance on the pre-reflective organic level causes cognitive dissonance on the objective level of consciousness.

Through this naturalizing explanation of moral and spiritual emotion, Laestadius tried to argue that moral and spiritual experiences are not merely mystical-metaphysical imputations. He blamed philosophical theologians for holding that only sensory perceptions are natural and religious emotions are metaphysical (§751). For Laestadius, moral emotions could be understood in terms of passions and emotions that were awakened on the pre-reflective and pre-conscious organic level.

Laestadius wrote about moral emotion from a new significance: The transcendental dimension of experience were to be found in the carnal passions of organic life (and life-principle), and he even equated the relationship between organic and sensory lives with the pair, physical and metaphysical (§783). This was how Laestadius in a sense naturalistically and hermeneutically explained the transcendental of “inner” human experience and vital essence as such.

On a more general level, Laestadius seemed to recognize how the constitution of meaning in perception is simultaneously constituted by the objectively given data of sensory perception – that is, the (for his interpretation) direct, immediate, immanent and empiric part – and subjectively given pre-cognitive or extra-sensory data – that is, the mediating, organic, passionate, non-empirical and transcendental part. These subjective and objective domains were ontologically intertwined into meaning-perception. Laestadius did not want to separate the intellectual and organic spheres

460 Animal instinct or sensuous passions are not necessarily immoral. Laestadius hold that genuine love is able to sanctify purely animal instinct. Thus, the condition of heart has transformative significance for morality: “In the uncorrupted state of man, his passions may have been so ordered, that the sensual element was always blocked by the moral element. Thus it is, at least, with the moral and sensual elements of love: the purely animal drive is sanctified by pure love. Pure love in a lawful marriage is not a sin, does not wound the sense of justice, does not conflict with conscience, neither with the reason; but dog’s love, the purely sensual, the animal drive, is indecent and irrational. But because man senses a *‘ferocious rut’* (Luther), a burning desire for the pleasures of the lust of the flesh, marriage has, after the Fall, become a remedy against our frail nature (Luther). *‘It is better to marry than to burn’* (Paul: 1. Chorinthians 7:9). Just as a greater evil must be cured by means of a lesser evil, since there is nothing better, then also marriage ought to prevent general whoring, which is so widespread in the world at large. However, the more the world congratulates itself on account of enlightenment and civilization, the less conscientious it becomes. Marriage is despised, while the life of a bachelor – more properly, *‘the life of a whoremonger’* – is praised.” (§980.)

from each other but rather examine them together. It was not a parallelistic, but rather a pre-phenomenologically formed, theory of a psychosomatic whole that was also an extension in the direction of “transcendental philosophy”, as it was meant to explain the spiritual and transcendental perceptions and experiences. Laestadius tried to evade the spiritualistic and pantheistic notions of pure metaphysical perception as well as any materialistic and idealistic explanations.

* * *

Classical vitalist tradition offered me a philosophical perspective of the vitalist account of morals. However, we can now conclude that Laestadius elaborated on the partly similar idea of “moral” and the “spiritual” by his analysis of the dual-sense conception of heart— including the expanded notion of conscience – as it was the core of a human being, given that it signified “something distinct from the mere physical” which enabled spiritual experience and perception (the domain of conscience/ subjective consciousness).

Such non-conscious psychic activity that does not originate in the intellectual functions in the first place, but models itself in humoral activity as a “moral element [in conscience]” goes beyond what is conventionally recognized as organic function. Insofar as Laestadius elaborated on the notion of conscience to explain the psychophysiological effect of religious experience and a religious awakening sermon, the notion could be seen as a unique conception within both philosophical psychology and theology.

Before the analysis of the concepts of religious awakening and reconciliation, it is enough for now to discover that Laestadius had to think of moral action as psychic conscious intention springing from the physical plane in the first place, but this emanation or “emergence” also included transcendental influences, such as moral passions and the influence of the Holy Spirit. This physiological transcendentalism is possible only by interpreting the heart and conscience as having extended immanent-transcendental meaning – having a physical organic basis and a phenomenal transcendental domain of conscience – as the true core of the human person and human moral character⁴⁶¹.

461 Laestadius’ emphasis on blood is sometimes associated with religious blood-mysticism in theological studies (e.g. Zidbäck 1937). However, I can only point out that Laestadius is rationalizing the religious views and forming his own scientific theory rather than postulating mystical or occult notions, while keeping in mind that his theory seeks for a scientific-philosophical explication and justification of pietistic spirituality.

5.4 Awakening and the Emergence of Morals and Spirituality

5.4.1 The Phenomenon of Awakening

Awakening (*väckelse*) is the main concept of Laestadius' thought and refers to religious experience. It pertains and interlinks to both the physiological and psychological aspects. In Laestadius' use of the term, awakening also has Christian-pietistic horizon and an emphasis on one's own-most or the subjective experiences of penitence and contrition as a prerequisite for conversion and rebirth via a physic-psychological event.

The phenomenon and experience of awakening is conceived holistically as a vital-existential condition for repentance and, furthermore, it lays the ground for the possibility of reconciliation. Awakening can be broadly interpreted as a psychological event (having a physiological explanatory ground), but first of all seen as an event that discloses the human condition in its relatedness to one's own way of being, to others, and the world, existence, and God. In this broad phenomenal extent, the awakening is closely related to the notions of the principle of life as original soul, passions as an intentional correlates/nexus, the notion of Self as an experiential core (in-between the organic life and sensory life), and as a "tension between passions;" therefore, this awakening concerns the very problem of human existence, morality, and the possibility for authentic spirituality.

In a theoretical context, the notion of awakening is first of all needed to break the way out of the impossible moral and spiritual condition of human life (that Laestadius often calls the "dead faith"). When recalling the condition of human life thematized as the dominance of organic life and the natural passions, which signify the deprived moral and spiritual condition, it becomes a crucial question to know how proper morality and spirituality is even possible. Especially when viewed from Laestadius' vitalist perspective, which held that intellect or mind has no power over passions in the sense that it could change, modify, or govern them, then reason and will do not have the power within themselves to lead human beings to proper morality and spirituality. How then is genuine freedom, being the Self and moral intentionality, even possible?

If natural passions determine the human condition, then life seems to be doomed to the captivity of fatalistic immoral forces and contingent interests of the prevailing world. In this respect, awakening is thematized in Laestadius' thought as a psychological event that marks the possibility for a change of the human way of existing in the world and in the human relation to God.

Generally, Laestadius' approach and proposed settlement for "moral impossibility" was theoretically constructed on the notions of the human person being a sentient vital being and on the notion of passions that can awaken, inspire, evoke, and redirect the human embodied existence. On this constitutional ground, Laestadius insisted that religious awakening must also happen at the level of organic life, in

the heart, and in vital functions in the first place, not in the mind or intellect that belongs to the sphere of sensory life. By the power of the principle of life and pas-sional/vital nature, a human person is capable of feelings and experiences. From a vitalist perspective Laestadius elaborated on the view that awakening is based on vital-existential functions and experiences; also spiritual experiences were viewed from the perspective of vitalist psychology.

At the core of the event of awakening is the emergence of moral passions which arise against the prevailing dominant natural passions, causing a conflict within the embodied consciousness. Awakening is not pure inner experience, but also related to the present world and social context as far as the moral passions are awakened by sense perceptions and inner experiences that originate in the lived world. In a more general sense, the emergence of moral passions means that awakening signi-fies the conflict or rivalry of good and evil and moral and natural passions within the human's psychophysiological essence. Moral passions may be stirred/risen/sprung up (awakened) both through the experiences of life – by recognizing the influences of natural passions or fear of death⁴⁶² – and through mediation of the spiritual experience of grace. The stirring of moral passions is particularly what is referred to as awakening.

5.4.2 The Positive Psychopathology of Awakening

Given the physiological-physical basis of the moral and spiritual, we can now ask how are the moral passions and thus the moral elements in humoral activities awakened and stimulated? How is the religious experience of awakening explained in terms of existential vitalism? What kinds of experiences are needed for the moral passion or a spiritual impact to be awakened? What are the “objective” conditions for a/this religious experience? Does Laestadius manage to explain the moral and spiritual of man's relating to the surrounding world and existence? We are here thus interested in what kinds of religious awakenings Laestadius was talking about and especially how he explained them and tried to justify them. What does awakening signify both existentially and psychologically?

Analyzing the embodied basis of morality and spirituality, Laestadius leaned on the philosophy of Bichat. According to Laestadius, Bichat was “much closer to the psychological truth, on physiological and anatomical grounds, when he offered his thesis stating ‘*that passions determine man's moral character*’ (Bichat, p. 59f).” (§701.) Bichat offered a key insight, namely that intellectual activity cannot properly change man's moral character because mind has no governing power over the organic life and the passions that determine moral character. Laestadius interpreted Bichat's thought

462 Cf. Laestadius 2006, 39 (Huutavan ääni/The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness [Laestadius 1988])

as coinciding with Luther's theological idea that "man cannot refashion his heart, or make himself good, when he is by nature wicked." (§702.)⁴⁶³

Because Laestadius recognized that organic life dominates the mind, moral and personal character of human beings, he moved toward a more experiential means of moral and spiritual education, such as spiritual preaching⁴⁶⁴. The question then rises where does the changing power originate, if not in the body itself?

Laestadius held that "there must be a force that is not within man himself⁴⁶⁵, which accomplishes a change in man's moral character, regardless of how learned he is. This cannot happen in any other way than through an awakening of moral passions through which the immoral passions are dulled and suppressed, albeit not entirely destroyed." (§704.)

When Laestadius moved to discuss the influence of the "moral element" in conscience, his analysis is not as specific as when he is explaining the physic-psychological processes in the organic plane, and indeed, it seems to turn to more experiential phenomena, to the psycho-social situation where the awakening takes place. Then Laestadius writes that

463 "Similarly, Bichat has come closest to revelation in the doctrine of the passions, when he says: '*upbringing, which noticeably modifies the actions of animal life [Laestadius' sensory life/nerve], is not capable of changing man's physical temperament or moral character*' (Bichat). This truth was articulated by Luther long ago, but in other words, man cannot refashion his heart, or make himself good, when he is by nature wicked. ... How can the rationalist overthrow physiological and anatomical truths without being embarrassed about his own stupidity? That which can be proven physiologically or anatomically cannot be overthrown by empty speculations." (§702.) See also §703: "Bichat further states [that] 'to seek through upbringing to change the nature of someone's character; to dull or excite the passions, the interpreter of which is the character; or to enlarge or lessen their sphere, is as impossible as stopping the movements of heart on whim of the will.' From this [view], it follows unconditionally that man cannot change his moral character, regardless of how learned he is. He cannot annihilate his immoral passions, or awaken moral passions, by his good will."

464 Rey (2006, 263) pointed out how vitalists conceived mental and physical states as part of the same continuum. Also, mental illness was approached by using cases wherein the mind and the body each play a particular role, where the physician acts upon the one in order better to reach the other. Rey states that already vitalists were on the way toward developing a 'moral treatment' of the disorders, systematized and amplified by the alienists at the end of the eighteenth century (Ménuret). For 'moral treatment' it was typical to think that causing a sudden disturbance will cure one of mania (Cf. 'universal delirium', *Crapula mundi*). Laestadius' emphasis on torment and agony of religious awakening is thus explained and justified by vitalist theory: Law and grace, destruction of heart by subjective passions and images are needed for a genuine psychic change of mind, conversion, and repentance. It seems that Laestadius really believed in strong preaching, also for scientific reasons. (Cf. §796.) An awakening sermon aims to evoke a person to his personal passionate state, but simultaneously to the condition of the world, and thus, to deconstruction and re-vitalizing the dynamic world-relationship. During that time, it was common to think also within psychiatry that religious passions and care would balance the patient's psycho-physiological condition.

465 [The principle of life, the calling voice of God in conscience, the uncorrupted part of the principle of life]

“wickedness is born in the heart and spreads from there, first to subjective consciousness – the conscience, which is dulled by the immoral passion – onward to the will, which becomes wicked, and finally to reason and the intellect, which are thereby darkened. Rational ideas about goodness, and the concept of justice, are altered by the passions, [...] The concept of right cannot be stable as long as the sense of justice can be dulled and excited by the different passions.” (§713)

From this physic-psychic order, Laestadius proceeded to emphasize the nature of awakening in psychopathological⁴⁶⁶ terms. Laestadius conceptions of religious experience are viewed as psychological disturbance and genuine reconciliation, depicted in terms of “psychic” reconciliation. My general thesis here is that the vitalistic theory and specific literature that Laestadius was reading influenced his theory and insights more than before have been noted. The central role of the vitalist-psychological description of subjective consciousness or unconsciousness is seemingly the one main reason why Laestadius emphasized “strong sermons”, high emotions awakened by lyrical “images” which could touch the human psyche deeply and thus awaken genuine experiential faith. Laestadius’ description of the experience of awakening emphasizes its embodied character almost without exception. That emblematic description is the following:

“In the beginning of the awakening, the heart feels hard, cold, swollen, painful and heavy to bear. This is most often accompanied by a fear of death; secret shivers chill the entire organism. Occasionally there are sharp tremors, during a sermon when a word from the law has hit Old Adam where he is tender. Some complain that the heart rises up towards the throat. After some time one begins to feel that the heart burns with a real feverish glow. This period signifies the approach of the signs of grace. One is also able to feel hunger that cannot be satisfied with food, and a thirst that cannot be quenched with anything other than the water of life. But at this, the mighty reason gets heart burn yet again; the snake venom brings to sputter in the pit of the heart in all of them who have virtue or dead faith as the foundation for their salvation. Is it possible that anyone

466 Laestadius tells us that in the Bible, the human heart is described as a “heart of stone”, which has to be “pounded until it is tender, with the hammer of law. ... have to be broken and thus be prepared to receive grace and reconciliation.” (§725)

with a normal share of sound reason can believe such madness? And now, everyone shouts in union: to hell with the enthusiast!” (§796.)⁴⁶⁷

Here Laestadius depicts the raising of spiritual and moral passions and the needs that cannot be satisfied. The religious experience is the precise actualization of the inner conflict that causes the unsatisfactory condition of both the natural and moral passions:

“[P]assions that can be satisfied cause no torment, but rather satisfaction ... But when the passion cannot be satisfied – such as love – then grief, sorrow and discontentment spring up. Life becomes difficult, unbearable... if admonishment of the conscience or the wrath of God is added, then emerges agony of conscience, and anguish of the heart.” (§729.)

This kind of conflict is constituted when conscience – the sense of justice – is awakened. In this condition, the natural passions cannot be satisfied freely because the sense of justice (law) and the moral passion of justice (law) cannot be satisfied. It remains impossible for a human being to “fulfill” the law that would signify the demand for absolute purity down to the ground of organic functions, passions, drives, instincts, etc. In this respect, such an awakening indicated a particular kind of psychological conflict. This fundamental-existential and spiritual dead end, the aporia that man feels in his “psychic essence” is precisely what Laestadius indicated as the awakened condition of conscience.

”The heinous passions cannot be satisfied because the law, or the moral passion, prevents them. But neither can the moral passion, the law, be satisfied as long as the law cannot be kept or fulfilled, because the law demands the absolute purity of the heart. Thus, awakening is truly a torment;” (§739.)

Laestadius’ vitalist account of awakening had a psychopathological dimension. In no means did it signify any negative aspect, but rather it emphasized the radical embodied manifestations that an awakening might include. This pathological state is depicted in various ways, all of which have in common the conflict of passions that can find no satisfaction. Within this agony and despair of conscience, emerges “a conflict between the passions, and this conflict is always a torment. This anguish of

467 The description of the process does not seem to depict Laestadius’ own experience, and thus, it must be read as a general description which has also a persuasive tone to accept these “awakenings”. Because many religious awakenings happened during sermons, it can be assumed that Laestadius depicted exactly what he saw during his sermons. The citation also shows us how Laestadius justified the meaning of a shaking sermon by leaning on his vitalist insights.

the heart that arises through this conflict produces a real trauma on the fibers of the physical heart. (Only then does one feel the dreadful torments of the Devil.)” (§728)

Setting aside the idea of the Devil as a personification of natural passions, it is worth noting that for Laestadius, “agony”, “torment,” “despair,” “anguish”, etc., were not experiential only in the existential sense, but more fundamentally, they grasped, roused and tightened the human organism and organs, and thus he emphasized that embodied condition. The awakening constituted a “real trauma” not at the cognitive level of mind alone, but also at the physical level and “to the fibers of the physical heart”.

Laestadius saw the breakdown of the heart as a necessary condition for a change in moral and spiritual intentionality. Even if he simultaneously could admit that carelessness (*sorglöshet*) did not indicate any pathological sign and might manifest itself clearly in a vital and healthy life, he still viewed awakening as necessary. Why? In Laestadius’ terms, the “moral” and “spiritual” are evoked by the physiological influence of moral passions that, through the conflicting and dissonant state in the heart, awaken moral thought, action, disgust at evil at the conscious level. (§211.)

Laestadius’ idea of awakening must be understood then in terms of both moral and spiritual significance; people and modern culture seemed to him to be un-healthy in their moral character, as men are primarily egoistic, ambitious, and greedy. Despite the fact that common life might seem rational and wellbeing, which caused moral and spiritual deprivation, it was amoral lunacy⁴⁶⁸ from which people have to be awakened to recognize their real moral character and the real condition of the world. Moral lunacy, the reason for the agony and delirium of the world (*Crapula mundi*) could be cured only by spiritual lunacy, by an awakened living faith of the heart that had no outer or objective “rational” proof or justification, only an experiential evidence of heart (*fides subjectiva*, conscience). For this need, and through evidence of a physical-psychological order that indicates the primacy of embodied awakening, Laestadius demanded more fundamentally moral and spiritual teaching and education:

468 Cf. §§685, 689: “Natural virtue is primarily based on self-righteousness and ambition.”

An awakened conscience is not able to approve any of our actions because it feels that Love is lacking. This is why Luther held that the best motive for action is a living faith. “Christian is due to the fact that he was unable to find better motive, since love, which ought to be better motive, is so meager and feeble after the Fall, that it is no longer a good enough motive; not since self-love gained the upper hand.” (§686.) → reason and moral will are not sufficient even if a philosopher claims so.

“A sleeping conscience is entirely indifferent.” (§690) This view is based on the natural rivalry of natural passions; the awakened heart or subjective consciousness or conscience does not delimit their effects and cannot bring forth the active moral action inspired by moral passion or faith. The other condition of conscience is referred as being hardened. “Hardened is he, who acts contrary to his conscience, contrary to better feelings, or contrary to his inner conviction.” (§694)

”The preeminent concern of teachers of religion should be first [to] awaken the dulled sense of justice, which is the law [already] written in the heart. Through this, man must be awakened to contrition, where he learns to rightly know his profound depravity; when he tastes the bitterness, torments, and agony of conscience that is spiritual death. Only then is a longing for reconciliation awakened, and the gospel of God’s grace and the forgiveness of sins should be preached to such contrite, penitent, despairing souls. [...] No foundational awakening is achieved thus; rather, the law should be carved with a point of steel.” (§724.)

5.4.3 The Meanings of an Awakening

From a psychological perspective, awakening signifies psycho-physiological disturbance and dissonance that has several consequences or meanings: individuation, self-awareness, morality and identity.

The meanings and dimensions of the notion of awakening⁴⁶⁹ (*väckelse*) in Laestadius’ theory could be divided and analyzed as follows: 1) the emergence of moral passions, 2) conflict and the dissonant condition, 3) emergence of self-awareness, 4) freedom of will and morality:

1. Awakening means the stirring of moral passions within the man

The natural and moral rises in itself from the lived embodied religious experience. Actually, Laestadius holds that natural passions govern the human body before moral passions do, but the natural passions are hidden and thus not recognized. So, we can conclude that there is always a certain kind of reflective chiasmatic relationship between man and the world, but awakening radicalized the question of how the Self in question actually exists in the world.⁴⁷⁰ In a sense, man’s awakened condition indicates the emergence of reflectivity and thus a certain form of capability for judgment.

2. In an awakened condition, the moral passions are placed against the natural passions and create a conflict or dissonance, both within the somatic organic level between passions and the sensory life’s cognitive level existing between the faculties of soul and their cognitive states, contents, and intentions.

469 See, §§ 369, 372, 376, 403, 724, 727, 737, 739, 817, 1076, 1077, 1045, 1477, 1478, 1512.

470 Knowing that Laestadius lived close to a powerful manifestation of awakenings, varying in their character, he did not see them as psychologically harmful, but most often as re-vitalizing and important in terms of moral and spiritual “progress” or good consequences. However, he does suggest that some awakened ones should be lead to the supervision of the rational spiritual leader.

As “natural” and “moral” are opposites, conflict and dissonance will signify a disturbance both in the organic and the sensory level of consciousness. This relation is not parallelistic, however, as often interpreted, but rather psychosomatic and based on the constitution of experience analyzed above. Cognitive dissonance is seen as fundamentally based on organic disturbance, which brings forth or affects subjective consciousness with conflicting variable impacts. Laestadius clearly indicated this awakened state of mind was a certain kind of confusion, agony, torment, and breakdown of the natural psycho-physical order and condition (dead faith) which pushes the human being to search for peace and harmony of the soul (psyche). This “search for better condition” or reconciliation fits well with the common pietistic ideas of awakening and the possibility of reconciliation.

3. Awakening prepares the way and signifies the emergence of an essential self-consciousness and self-awareness (or self-knowledge) because the conflict itself discloses the existence of the natural passions and their actual character in human life. It is particularly the conflict caused by an awakening that reveals the different passions, their characteristics, relationships and connections, and thus places the human being in its own situation. Therefore, awakening becomes also a question of individuation⁴⁷¹.

The dissonance of passions is actually what Laestadius meant by religious awakening (väckelse) and the emergence of self-awareness. A dissonant psychosomatic state reveals the passional substantial personhood of a human being for himself, which signifies the emergence of genuine self-awareness within which that human being is able to recognize his own passional fundamental character that then grounds his whole intentionality of being-in-the-world and his relation to God.

Laestadius indicated that it is possible for a human being to recognize the varying passional states and impacts with a disturbance of awakening in the organic body, in the flesh. This is so because without conflict at the somatic plane, there are neither conflicting “poles” or any contents of conscious states; and thus it is not possible to compare and distinguish anything [both experientially and conceptually].

In the fundamental existential-spiritual aporia, none of the conflicting passions can be satisfied. Laestadius stated that “passions show up” or appear, and thus they become objectified, and one can then become aware of one’s own dominating interests, and subjective states that secretly lay the grounds for one’s action and thought. In this sense awakening also signifies the ability to become more aware of one’s own unconscious states.

471 For the dimensions of individuation and spiritual uniqueness of human beings, see especially, Steinbock 2009, 178- 209.

Moral perceptions within a subjective consciousness underlay also the states of objective awareness. In other words, dissonance in a pre-reflective organic level causes cognitive dissonance in the objective level of consciousness. This dissonance of passions is what Laestadius actually meant by religious awakening and the emergence of self-awareness. To free the reason, will, and understanding from the natural passions, a morally motivational experience must happen in the sphere of the subjective consciousness and in its center, also in the heart. In this respect, religious experience is not merely intellectual enlightenment, but rather a fundamental change in the organic passions that direct reason, the will, and understanding. For this reason, Laestadius sensed that awakening, which primarily means a birth of moral passions, produces a conflict between the natural passions.

This conflict in the organic passion-level also reveals a self-awareness; man will see himself as passional and most often dominated by natural passions – namely, sins (the pre-condition of regret/repentance, awakening, and the possibility of reconciliation). The human being will see himself, not as autonomous and independent and, being led by pure reason and moral will but as an organic human being who as a whole is under the authority and powers of the passions (inclinations, instinct, drives) under the control of Good and Evil and the world (indeed, the higher powers of immoral and Heavenly passions).

To a certain extent, Laestadius' depiction of awakening as an existential aporetic⁴⁷² condition indicated the similar individuating phenomena of anxiety emphasized in the existential-phenomenological philosophies (Kierkegaard, Heidegger etc.). In general, individuation is defined as a “dissociation or delimitation – internal or external – that makes this thing this particular thing, individual thing; what makes this organic being this singular being; what makes this person this unique person.”⁴⁷³

It seems obvious that both the existentialistic and Laestadius' vitalist accounts of awakening – indicate the same multifaceted phenomenon, which is based on the specific

472 Again, Laestadius emphasized the organicist stance: “A sense of justice cannot suppress or annihilate sensual desires because they are based on different organs.” (§736)

473 Steinbock 2009, 178 (Phenomenology and Mysticism. The Verticality of Religious Experience. Indiana University Press). See, about “thisness” as a simultaneity of individual and particular constituting concrete actuality. p.183. “Organic beings are not merely ‘objects’ for human beings who make external differentiations; they also have a being in and for themselves; they are self-differentiating, self-limiting in both spatial and temporal respects. This level of being, to follow Husserl’s and Scheler’s analyses, coincides with what is called, in general, the ‘vital’ level of existence or ‘psychic life’. The vital or the psycho-physical sphere spans plants, animals, and human beings, and as such they partake in their own way in the vital impetus (Lebensdrang). Scheler identifies four forms of psycho-physical life that I find particularly helpful as a way of organizing my exposition of singularity: vital feeling or drive, instinct, habit, and practical intelligence.” (Steinbock 2009, 183–4) Here Steinbock refers to the work of Edmund Husserl in *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Zweite Buch*, ed. Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952); and Scheler’s, “Stellung,” p. 12.

individuating and intensifying experience and in Laestadius' case, the conflict between passions. Existentialistic accounts may emphasize the individuation of existence in a more general sense, while Laestadius' view emphasized both spiritual and moral individuation. For existentialists, the question is about personal existence as such on a more neutral ontological level, while Laestadius' analysis of awakening was elaborated within the religious context; however, they both still share a common constitutive significance.

The major difference between existentialistic and Laestadius' vitalistic notion is in the explanation. For instance, to refer to the most influential conceptions of individuating *angst*, Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian's *angst* is understood as existentially "subjectivating" or as Heidegger held that an *angst* individuate the Dasein, meaning that the question of the meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein) is addressed toward oneself personally; man is put into the question as such.⁴⁷⁴ Overall, this existential individuation is seen as a positive occasion, for it brings man before its own-most existence and life, and thus forms the groundwork for subjective faith or the possibility of responsibility and authentic being itself in the general sense. In Laestadius' account, awakening is also seen as individuating, and a positive, even necessary, event that lays the ground for an embodied self-awareness, the possibility of morality, and an initial condition for reconciliation.

4. Awakening also prepares the way for the active freedom of the will, insofar as the human being becomes conscious of the passion-life that is directing his action and mind. In this regard, moral passion forms a resisting force against the natural passions and their manifestations in both action and thought. Laestadius called this effect of moral passions the *disgust* of bad and evil (*avsky för det onda*) and stated that particularly the disgust signified the active freedom of the will; this resisting force of the active freedom of will is contrasted with the natural virtue which lacks the "disgust of bad", which Laestadius saw as an initial condition for proper morality. (Cf. §376.) The disgust signifies the set/forming of a relative distance to the active natural passions in one's own flesh, and on the other hand, an aloofness/distancing from the "world" that Laestadius often used as a synonym for the natural passions⁴⁷⁵. In this sense, the awakening can be interpreted as an emergence

474 See, Heidegger (1992) on individuating *angst* (§40) and guilt (§58), about "mineness" (§9), and on the definitions of everydayness (§27), and on the fallenness into the world (§38).

475 Especially in this respect, the way of using passions and a world synonymous to each other reveals the insight on the holistic idea of man within which the organic-passionate life of man is inextricably attached to the surrounding world through the senses. The extent of the phenomenon of passions actually depicts the intentional interrelatedness of man and the world, as we have seen here in the chapter on passions. As far as the activity of passions cannot be detached from the sensory world, neither can man be detached from the environment and factual reality within which he is living.

of reflectivity. Laestadius generally held that distance or “detachment” from the present world was a sign of the awakening of a moral and spiritual life. This vital-existential *distancing* in its relation to the present world manifests itself also as agony, sorrow of the heart, and anxiety⁴⁷⁶.

Given that awakening signifies the emergence of self-awareness, even if being in a psychologically un-comfortable condition, the disclosed self-awareness has positive significance in two senses: *First*, it constitutes the possibility and basis both for an embodied self-awareness and cognitive self-recognition; *secondly*, as a psychological “break down” of subjective totality constituted of natural passions, awakening enables a change both in embodied cognition and action. This change in embodied intentionality signifies the possibility of change in habits and thus a change in identity.

What is philosophically interesting here is that Laestadius’ analysis of awakening revealed most clearly how he regarded “moral” as indicating the inner psychic, and a distancing reflective attitude toward the world; thus “moral” for him came to signify a certain kind of “psychological” relation with the world.

A breakdown is a break in the natural order, and thus, it constitutes a dissociation with the world. In other words, it discloses the question of “who am I” in more fundamental depth. Am I myself, genuine, or driven by the present world and worldly intentions, the natural passions? In the theological context, this is a classical question about rebirth, about the “old” and the “new” person. Dahlbäck researched the divide between an old and new human being in Laestadius’ thought, arguing that the Herrnhutian (Moravian) doctrines provided the background for Laestadius’ insight on heavenly passion: It is blood from God’s (heavenly parent’s) heart and the passions brought by that “imputation”, that take the place of those lower passions dominated by evil, and change the life of man from old to new⁴⁷⁷.

We can also conceive the shift in another way as seen above, Laestadius did not posit a sharp divide between “inner” and “outer” – instead there were only different passions that could lead the human person as a whole. It seems that Laestadius did not constitute any dualism in identity. The question of “who am I” was rather related to the question of what kind of passions lead the human person. From a theological perspective, it becomes whether good or evil passions actually lead human persons. However, Laestadius also state that human beings can act morally without being Christian. On the general level, this entails the question of authenticity: Is the Self authentically oneself or led by worldly natural passions, currents, and inclinations? How can a human being maintain his/hers individual selfhood within a passional

476 Cf. §739; Laestadius 2006, 138–139. (Huutavan ääni/ The Voice of One Crying [Laestadius 1988])

477 Dahlbäck 1950, 288.

world? Here Laestadius pointed to one's conscience as the ultimate authority. Evidence of heart, *fides subjectiva*, is experientially given in the believer's psychic life. The mockery against the Holy Spirit is that of not following the call of conscience (§1412; that mockery is possible only when the effects of holy spirits are experienced). Dogmatic and theological principles are secondary in this respect, and it seems that Laestadius did have a strong trust in the power of conscience to lead human beings on the right path and a relationship with God.

Recognition of dissonance means also the possibility of self-reflection, and thus, a relative emancipation of leading natural passions, such as egoism, ambition, and greed, and their sinful manifestations. The awakened condition with proper self-awareness means an embodied "disgust of bad" and evil. Therefore, an awakening signifies there is a formation of existential distance toward natural immoral passions and "worldliness" of the world. However, it does not mean that religious existence would be alienated from its relation to the world and other human beings, but rather a finding of a new morally passionate basis for a more morally inspired agency and sociality in the world.

The self-knowledge or self-awareness disclosed within the conflict of passions and awakening is a certain kind of Christian theological-discursive identity theory. However, it also includes genuine phenomenological points of references to "lived experience," particularly through the idea that the self-consciousness, the Self/ego, is conceived as a recognition of the own-most emotional life, and conflicting states that are present within it. A phenomenologist, however, would refer to an ambiguous world-relation on a neutral and ontological level.

5.4.4 The Basis of Self-awareness

We have earlier pointed out that Laestadius' theory of consciousness was constructed as a constitutive theory based on the limited pansychistic interpretation of the principle of life and organic life. Thus, consciousness is seen as a pansychistic or vital emergent phenomenon. On this basis, his view of the possibility of self-awareness is partially examined, as it is based on the conflict of passions. Here, I focus once more on the basis and emergence of self-awareness, as it seems both are the central and interesting phenomena present within Laestadius' explication.

Laestadius' core idea was that varying passions or organic states lay the ground for varying states of mind, which then enable "the comparison" and thus clear up "the concept":

"Through the conflict of the passions, man acquires an improved awareness of his hidden passions; the concept is clarified through the comparison of two objects. Note: Hidden passions are those that a man believes himself to be free of, the presence of which he becomes convinced of only

when another passion is awakened. This is the foundation of the proper awareness of sin, because awakening brings forth a moral passion that is in conflict with man's natural passions. *I had not known that lust is sin, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet* [Romans 7:7].” (§281. See also §§726, 727)⁴⁷⁸

Laestadius did not elaborate on the “comparison theory⁴⁷⁹” further, but he did analyze the awakening as moral passion⁴⁸⁰ very broadly and seemed to recognize how self-awareness is fundamentally connected to the conflicting and varying flows of passions. He must have been aware of the vitalist way of explaining consciousness as continuous influence of organic life to sensory life, as the whole vitalist philosophy was expressing the infinitely variable character of the vital functions in man⁴⁸¹.

We can also ask whether the emergence of self-awareness or self-consciousness necessarily requires a conflict of passions. In regard to this question, Laestadius leaned on the Biblical idea of natural law that awakens the sin (Paul). Laestadius referred to Paul's idea of the awakening influence of law – and because of the given law and its influence on the heart, neither moral passions nor natural passions can be satisfied – a circumstance that awakens all the passions and drives man to search for reconciliation (peace of soul). A certain degree of conflict then seems to be a prerequisite for self-awareness.

Also from a phenomenological point of view, it seems that if the organic passional physical functions support and excite each other in the same intentional directedness and no breakdown or conflict emerges, then the whole intentional state of mind stays

478 Laestadius seemed to hold that a certain kind of reflectivity is awakened in the conflict of passions. This opposition of passions enables a reflective comparison – in a sense a reflective objectification of specific passional states and their undelaying interests. This vital-existential comparison clears up coincidentally the “concept” or the nature of passions and builds one's relation to itself which is referred as self-awareness. This self-awareness pertains to one's passional and sinful nature, but it also offers a certain kind of capability for moral judgment. (See §726.) “This is what the words of the apostle refer to: by the law is the knowledge of sin and the law has wrought all manner of concupiscence (Romans 3:20, 7:8). That is to say, when the sense of justice is revived by the spirit of the law, and is intensified to become a moral passion that conflicts with the immoral passions; only then does man acquire a clearer awareness (*medvetande*) of his moral depravity. It is logical truth that concepts become clearer by the comparison of two objects. ... [in the] dead faith, man did not know the extent of his guilt; ... He was in virtual state of innocence and did not know to rightly differentiate between good and evil.” (§727)

479 Here Laestadius' comparison refers both to passions and ideas. There can be seen a connection or similarity to Locke's thought, as he stated that truth reveals itself in the mind through a comparison of the ideas.

480 Awakening as moral passion, or the law as a moral element causes torment and conflict upon a human encountering the heinous “natural” passions: §§374, 376, 403, 404, 696, 697–887.

481 See §705 where Laestadius stated that the term “moral passion” was present in French discussions. Cf. Williams 2002, 90–96; Haigh 1984.

united, and thus no “comparison” is enabled. Therefore, the harmonious un-conflicting embodied condition cannot be called self-awareness or self-knowledge: The organic and sensory conditions cannot recognize themselves because of the lack of elements that can be compared. This condition signifies a certain kind of vital “flow”. In other words, without conflict or any breakdown of the prevailing passions, there is no conscious objectification or “reflectivity” toward one’s own passions. In any event, it is justifiable to call the harmonious state “consciousness”, as it still receives action and still acts toward the world, perceives, and so on.

What we have here then is a phenomenologically interesting viewpoint. Broadly, self-awareness is constituted into the varying, multilayered and ambiguous moods of the psychic embodied experience itself. In other words, the “conscious experience” is conceived as *a natural state* of the interaction of organic and sensory lives, and self-consciousness and self-awareness are disclosed for the Self in a stream of varying psychosomatic conditions that enable a direct comparison of changing conditions in a lived temporal existence (in different degrees). The continuous and varying streams of sensory, sensuous and conflicting influences affect the brains and cause movement and varying states of mind. *This temporal process can thus be understood as a functioning of consciousness itself, at least at the basic level.* Thus, there is no gap between the body and mind, as the brains are conceived as a receptive organ of consciousness and sensory capability, and its functioning is made up of feelings, sensations, and moods, etc., that unite in the consciousness of subjective and objective states.

We can now see that Laestadius conceived the body/mind dichotomy in an alternative holistic way. Phenomenally the gap between body and soul manifests itself from inside the embodied experience, for example, in the moral dilemma or religious awakening that he describes. Accordingly, body and mind cannot be conceived as opposites because they co-exist, as the body (immanence) is actually the foundation of the mind (transcendence). It is rather the opposition of the organic body (matter) and spirit (the highest actualization of the principle of life) that can be seen at work in man’s earthly corporeal life. In other words, the conflict is never between emotion and reason, body and mind, but instead between the organic body and the pneuma or “vital/spiritual man”; that is to say that from the vitalist perspective, the consciousness, self-awareness, moral conflict (awakening), and the spiritual nature of man are coincidentally all natural phenomena⁴⁸².

“The conflict can arise between the two lives since one and the same principle is active in both, even though it appears as if a battle is taking place

482 Laestadius argued for a holistic notion of man. With regard to the question of responsibility and reconciliation, Laestadius highlighted the fact that the Self (jag) encompasses both the spiritual redeemed man and the natural man, and called the reconciled man a “redeemed devil” (§1378).

between the mind [nervliv, sensory life] and heart [organic life]; this is an illusion. That which is discerned as a moral conflict within a person is in fact a struggle between passions. That which could truly be called a struggle between body and soul is a struggle between life and death; between the physical forces and the metaphysical force that is life. All other conflicts that we may discern within us are conflicts between passions. Such conflict becomes clearly discernible when some new passion is awakened, such as the struggle between love and selfishness or between love and hate (jealousy).” (§223.)

In a sense, the organic-sensory body or “spiritual organism” is naturally capable of being “called” or “turned” toward a harmonious-reconciled condition of body-soul by the force of the principle of life (original soul). To a certain extent, this relative distinction refers to the same phenomena that medical vitalists referred to as the dualism of the physical/moral⁴⁸³. Laestadius appeared to be very clear and convinced of his view, and this opinion also reveals that his way of thinking was not merely empirically attached to a physiological organization but extended to a holistic phenomenological analysis as well. Respecting Laestadius’ own endeavors to distance his theory from metaphysical rationalism, the transcendental philosophy [of Kant], and being well aware that Laestadius’ theory cannot be seen as fully phenomenological for its empiric-physiological emphases, I propose viewing his psychophysiological theory as a form of *physiological transcendentalism*.⁴⁸⁴

5.4.5 The Emergence of Spirituality

As Laestadius’ attached his theorizing to vitalist insights, it follows logically that the spiritual character of man could also be interpreted to have different levels of spirituality, depending on the stage of actualization. Before proceeding here to a more detailed analysis of spirituality in Laestadius’ thought, I want to briefly show how Bichat’s vitalist psychology lay the ground for Laestadius’ elaborations on the actualization of spirituality in human life.

483 See Williams 2002; Azouvi 2006.

484 The label given also to the vitalist thinkers, such as Fouquet. Dualism is not between the mind and body but includes the moral and natural body, thus it is between matter and spirit. Moral signifies the psychic-physiological sphere, but a specific distanced inner psychic mode of existence. Azouvi pointed out that for medical vitalists, the term “moral” was needed to indicate something differing or distancing from the bare physical; it was dealt with on the same plane as the physiological, but it indicated some kind of counterforce or “reflective distance to the mere physiological; the “moral” was also interpreted as “inner man” and “psychic”, and soon after a psychological quality of physiological human being. Thus “the moral” is now sometimes interpreted as an ancestor of the “psychic” and the “psychological”. (See, Rey 2006; Azouvi 2006; Williams 2002).

We can see from Bichat the idea that not only the pre-eminence of a human being in relation to its surrounding is based on highly developed animal life, but also that spiritual life is reached by animal life. We recall that Laestadius adopted the notion of animal life from Bichat into his notion of sensory life (*nervliv*). Bichat suggested that society and social structures are also the consequences of the actualization of the functions of animal life.

“It is by means of the animal life that man is so great so superior to the beings, which surround him; by means of this that he possesses the sciences, the arts, and every thing which places him at a distance from the gross elements under which we represent brute matter; by this that he approaches spirituality; for industry and commerce, and whatever enlarges the narrow circle within which the efforts of other animals are confined, are exclusively under the dominion of the animal life of man.” (Bichat 1815, 61)

Further still, society is seen as continuum of the “exercise of the different functions of this [animal] life.” (Bichat 1815, 61–62)

Bichat thought that the functions of organic life enter and influence animal life and its functions. We thus find an interesting *distinction between the pre-cognitive language of organic life and the ordinary language of animal life*. However, here Bichat also holds that organic life and its functions, especially agitated by the passions⁴⁸⁵, lay the fundamental source for a common language. Here, Bichat seems to explain the relationship between pre-reflective consciousness and the reflective consciousness of animal life, holding that the more fundamental pre-lingual basis of organic life and the passions actually make the common shared language richer and more vivid. The language of organic life is also seen as the language of poetry, while the language of animal life is seen as a shared ordinary language. From this perspective, *Bichat places religious preaching or declamation interestingly in between organic and animal life, holding that religious preaching can stimulate passions among the interlocutors*.

485 “My present object is not to consider the passions metaphysically. It little matters, whether they be all of them the modifications of a single passion, or dependent each of them upon a separate principle. We shall only remark that many physicians in discussing their influence on the organic phenomena, have not sufficiently distinguished them from the sensations; the latter are the occasion of the passions, but differ from them widely. It is true that anger, joy, and sorrow, would not affect us, were we not to find their causes in our connections with external objects. It is true also, that the senses are the agents of these relations, that they communicate the causes of the passions, but in this they act as simple conductors only, and have nothing in common with the affections, which they produce; for sensation of every kind has its center in the brain, sensation of every kind supposing impression and perception. If the action of the brain be suspended, sensation ceases, on the contrary the brain is never affected by the passions; their seat is in the organs of the internal life.” (Bichat 1815, 62–63.)

”We have always said a strong head, a head well organized to denote perfection of mind; a good heart, a sensible heart to indicate proper feeling. The expressions of fury circulating in the veins, and stirring up the bile; of joy making the heart leap, of jealousy distilling its passions into the heart, are by no means poetical expressions, but the enunciation of that which actually takes place in nature. In this way do all the expressions, *the language of the internal functions* enter into the poetry, which in consequence is the *language of the passions* or the organic life, as *ordinary speech*, is that of the *understanding or the animal life*. *Declamation holds a middle place between the two, and animates the cold tongue of the brain by the expressive language of the inward organs.*” (Bichat 1815, 67. emphasis added)

As Laestadius did lean on Bichat’s theory, it is obvious that these insights confirmed his conviction regarding the significance of the embodied awakening and also the significance of strong religious declamation or poetic preaching for moral and spiritual progress among the people. Laestadius was well aware of the influence of his strong preaching. He highlighted that the Christian faith consisted of high noble emotions, passions, and images. Preaching should precisely target the pre-cognitive level because that level is the foundation and source, not only of vivid language but also the proper foundation for living spirituality.

“It is undoubtedly surprising that the passions, essentially as they enter into our relations with the beings which are placed about us, that modifying as they do at every moment these relations, that animating, enlarging, and exalting the phenomena of the animal life, which without them would be nothing but a cold series of intellectual movements; it is astonishing, I say, that the passions should neither have their end, nor beginning in the organs of this life, but on the contrary, that the parts which serve for the internal functions, should be constantly affected by them, and even occasion them according to the state in which they are found. Such notwithstanding is the result of the strictest observation.” (Bichat 1815, 63.)

Altogether, it can be summed up here that Laestadius’ way of spirituality followed the vitalist argumentation and differentiated the different stages of degrees of spirituality in human beings. First of all, Laestadius’ thought followed the vitalist theory of constitution in a way that the vital principle as original soul signified the natural spiritual or living nature of a human being; awakening (väckelse) as conflict between passions signifies the pre-stage of reconciliation and signifying the first step in the proper actualization of human spirituality; psychic reconciliation as an initial condition for a redeemed state was the perennial actualization of spirituality. Thus,

spirituality was a multifaceted and constitutive phenomenon in Laestadius' theoretical thought, and I will analyze that aspect in greater detail in the next chapter here.

5.5 Reconciliation, Faith, and God

5.5.1 "The Order of Grace" in a Nutshell: From Psychophysiology to Ontotheology

Laestadius' anthropology, psychology, and theology culminated in his notions of reconciliation and living faith, conceived as the ultimate moral passion. In the beginning Laestadius highlighted the view that reconciliation is a truth that cannot be proven by intellect. As "a truth", reconciliation is a genuine experiential phenomenon and a metaphysical necessity⁴⁸⁶. Reconciliation and faith do not pertain to intellect or reason in the first place, but instead to the heart and conscience; thus, Laestadius does not conceive of them as metaphysical rationalistic and transcendental conceptions, but rather stresses how they have embodied life, conscience, and heart as their core. As I have shown here, the notions of soul, mind, Self, and the holistic notion of the human person are all re-defined in vitalist terms as embodied phenomena within which the significance of a subjective consciousness is highlighted as the core of one's own most or authentic selfhood, personhood, and faith. In this respect, the vitalist-pietistic elaboration of the notion of faith constitutes an alternative epistemological and vitalist-ontological relatedness or intentionality toward being, the world, others, existence, and even God.

The idea of the necessity of reconciliation is based on the psychic and moral necessity, which when taken together depict the awakened condition as an ultimate impossibility to achieve the proper morality and a redeemed condition by the power of the human Self (Jag/ego) alone. The basic idea is that the dominating passions try to find ways to be satisfied in human life. However, if the sense of justice is "heightened" through awakening in the heart and conscience (subjective consciousness), then the natural passions cannot be satisfied anymore without causing an agony of conscience. The psychological demand for purity, when combined with a natural moral deficiency, means that the moral passion of justice cannot be satisfied, for it is impossible for a human being to remain pure in the depths of organic passionate life.

486 "We now come to a truth that cannot be proven. But how much is possible to prove in spiritual matters? We are able to feel love, grief, joy, hatred, and other passions, but none of these can be proven. Only the expressions of these passions are visible, and therefore, even the misogynist must believe that there is such a thing as love, even though he considers this passion to be madness. Similarly, he who feels the effects of grace must be considered to be an 'enthusiast,' since it is not something reason is able to comprehend. It is the secret of the heart that is entirely incomprehensible, it cannot be grasped by the intellect." (§1350.)

The idea here is that man cannot resist the existence of immoral natural passions and their influences on his existence in the world. Rather, they unconsciously slip into both his thoughts and actions. This impossibility of a human to satisfy and combine the natural and moral passions simultaneously emerges as an absolute conflict or dead end, which Laestadius depicted by using psychopathological terms, such as trauma, agony, anguish, despair, and torment.

In general, awakening, as a conflict between the natural and moral passions, signifies a psychopathological dissonant state – physical and psychological (moral/spiritual) at the same time. This conflict is basically the rivalry between natural egoism, ambition, and greed and opposite moral passions, such as those demanding a sense of justice, humility, and faith⁴⁸⁷. Laestadius stated that within the tormented dissonant state of conscience emerged a call that is given within one's embodied experience but which coincidentally transcends "subjectivity", as "the message" comes from beyond the physical, thus signifying a call from God.

According to Laestadius the natural experience is in and of itself transcendental in various ways, for example, sensory perception is always supersensory perception, etc. Here it can also be noted that the "call" itself comes coincidentally from the animated flesh and from beyond the flesh, calling the Self "somewhere else." Thus the experience of the call has a temporal structure, as it possesses the contrition of past deeds or prevailing natural passions already active in one's embodied existence, and also a "future mode" as the call is a driving force for the human to "be moved into the better condition." If we interpret this call as the call of an uncorrupted original soul (a principle of life) as the foundation (upphov) of the human person, and also the Creator that remains relatively independent and autonomous from the one created, then the call is twofold. It is calling back to itself, but now also to the original vital or spiritual Self, that exists not only "for-itself" but in relation to God

487 "On the other hand, one must seek for the motivation behind the actions of the spiritual person in one of the seven spirits that John beheld in revelation (Revelation 10), or the seven passions, which are the opposites of the seven devils. For instance, the opposite of egoism is selflessness; the opposite of ambition is to forsake worldly honor; the opposite of selfishness is altruism – that is, to further the temporal and eternal well-being of one's neighbor; the opposite of envy is to not begrudge others good things; the opposite of wrath is burning love; the opposite of hatred is brotherly love; the opposite of the sexual drive is chastity. It is in these inclinations that one ought to seek the principle of determination, the motive, for the action of spiritual man. However, since only a few of these qualities can be intensified to the point where they become passions, the God-given means of grace must suffice; that is, the primary elements of Christianity: *awakening* – the intensification of sense of justice – along with *contrition, faith* and *love*, insofar as it is capable of being kindled." (§468.)

Finally, only faith is the basis of the determination of good deeds (Cf. faith as awakened intentionality). According to Laestadius, Luther and those awakened after him saw the faith as the highest motivational ground for deeds and actions; they taught that faith must be the source and foundation of all good deeds. (§469. See also §473)

[and others]. This process entails the modification of identity as one reaches the new basis of one's own existence, and thus a renewed spiritual intentionality. For me it seems that Laestadius proposes that the Heart, as the organ of principle of life, must exist in relation to God.

Here the aporetic psycho-physical impossibility of fulfilling the conflicting demand of flesh drives man to the edge of decision, when human is absolutely constituted by natural passions, and their sinful actualizations, and is coincidentally given a sense of justice and call that offers grace. It is then that man is under the situation of either receiving the grace to be freed of guiltiness of sins or reject the grace and lean on his own powers of egoism, etc. and proceed to fulfill the moral imperative by his own power (self-justification and self-righteousness). In a sense, this is the difference between self-justification by ego and outer justification by the grace of God. Laestadius' idea of rebirth does not indicate there is an *absolute* transformation of the Self or identity, but it does hold that the reborn person encompasses both the "old and new self." To accept and receive this grace signifies that a human being will be simultaneously sinner, and an innocent human. This condition within which the human being has to maintain its fundamental passional and sinful character gives Laestadius reason to call this reconciled human being a "redeemed devil" (§1378).

In terms of the question of reconciliation, Laestadius' main intention was to argue that mere outer juridical reconciliation is not satisfactory for the proper actualization of full reconciliation. The point here is that juridical reconciliation (forensic) does not reach the depths of the psychological initial conditions of reconciliation, and thus does not constitute subjective evidence, inward moral motivation, and a living faith. Laestadius offered the "family psychological" allegory of the mother/child relationship to depict the psychological character of reconciliation between man and God. He saw that genuine reconciliation demands mutual suffering of mother and child for their reconciliation to be authentic (psychic reconciliation). This concept pertains in its analogy to the psychic reconciliation between man and God: From God's side, the conflicting situation is that a sense of justice – righteousness of God by definition – demands punishment for the criminal and simultaneously unconditional love for his child (Loving God by definition). From the man's side, the reconciliation demands contrition and faith (trust, *kr. pistis*). Man cannot receive a feeling of being innocent (redeemed) by reason (for it is contradictory to accept that man can be simultaneously innocent and guilty) and man can only accept the grace of God via a true faith of the heart. Neither can the tormented heart of God be reconciled without the genuine contrition of man. An unreconciled condition thus signifies the common suffering of God and mankind.

5.5.2 Reconciliation: The Kinship of the Triad of Man and the Trinity of God

I analyzed the notion of the human person above and have shown how Laestadius conceives man as being constituted of a triad of the principle of life that signifies the original vital soul, organic life, and sensory life, which together conceptualize the intertwined[ness] of the body and mind. These parts are inextricably related to each other, so that the principle of life lays the constitutive vital foundation that generates organic life. Henceforth, through ongoing growth and development, creates the specific organs of sensory life (brains and nerves) functions as the psychophysiological basis for human consciousness and the mind. Thus, Laestadius viewed human beings as having parts that interrelate with each other to form a triadic unity.

Based on developmental order, and constitutional hierarchy, the principle of life signifies that the initial vital character of organic life, and organic life is the foundation for sensory life and its functions. This constitutive order forms the notion of the vital person, a holistic notion of sensible man, who exists within various and variable relations (Cf. rapports) that surround nature and the world, other human beings, God, and existence as such. Through the sensible capability of the original soul (vital principle), sensitive susceptibility, and the capability of the body, and through the sensory, cognitive, and emotional capacities which are also conceived as having a special higher order and the sensitive capabilities of intentional mind, human beings exist in the world as both a corporeal and a spiritual organism.

Behind this re-definition of human person still remains a harsh critique of the metaphysical notions of substance (substantia) and essence (essentia) which – when applied to the question of the nature of the soul and a human being – claim to lead to conceiving of the human soul, mind, Self, and nature of reason in dualistic terms as abstract, autonomous and distinct entities (substances). According to Laestadius, metaphysics and rationalism lead anthropology and theology to a situation in which they abstract both man from living and dynamic relatedness to a physiological body, factual world, nature, existence and God. Moreover, Laestadius seemed to indicate that within this metaphysical rationalism, God was reduced to an absolute metaphysical sphere clearly detached from the events of life. According to Laestadius, this sphere was mainly so because the intellectualistic emphasis determined the essence of man and God wrongly, and thus missed the proper comprehension of the human relatedness to existence and God.

The holistic notion of a human person is elaborated in regard to the question concerning the notion of God. Laestadius was convinced that the correct understanding of a human being was a prerequisite for reaching the proper notion on the personhood of God. *From the perspective of the triad of man, Laestadius also approached the question concerning the Trinity of God.* Laestadius realized that the problem of this trinity could not be bypassed when dealing with the doctrine of reconciliation, and he emphasized the holistic view so that reconciliation would pertain to all the per-

sons of God as well as the whole of triadic man (§§1404, 1405, 1410). He claimed that the particular persons of God – the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit – are related to each other in a similar way, as are the three *life forms* of human beings (Cf. §1414, 1422).

The relationship between the triadic constituents of man – the principle of life, organic life and sensory life – is usually described as parallelism. As I point out in several contexts, parallelistic interpretation does not coincide with Laestadius' elaborations, especially regarding the mind/body problem. This is also the case for the question concerning the relationship between a triadic human being and God. Parallelistic interpretation is categorical, replicates the dualism and does not meet Laestadius' pre-phenomenological vitalistic elaborations. Laestadius did not mean that triads of man and God related to each other in a parallelistic way, but rather he stated that “the three life forms within man are psychically related to each other in a same way that the three persons within Godhead are related to each other.” (§1422. Also §1422⁴⁸⁸) It could then be actually stated that the “parallelism”-interpretation justified and replicated dualism.

In this manner, Laestadius dealt with the problem of the trinity from an anthropological perspective and argued for the analogy for the unity of a personhood of God. How then should the problem of trinity, the question of the united person of God, be viewed? Laestadius does not state that the body and mind or soul in man would simply be parallel. Neither did he hold that man and God or matter and spirit would simply be parallel, as is often claimed. Instead he seemed to be after a more fundamental re-definition of man and God, so that the constitution of human spirituality and the possibility [of reconciliation] became holistically and experientially understandable. In this respect, Laestadius elaborated on the original idea of the correlative relationship of the parts of man and the persons of God, and coincidentally related these stages to his psychological insight concerning the progress and development of the spiritual life:

”[...⁴⁸⁹]The principle of life within the egg is abstract life, corresponding to the first person; organic life within the egg that has been kept warm is the creating, generating, and productive life, corresponding to the second person; sensory life is the highest form of life, conjoined with feeling and consciousness, corresponding to the third person. Here there are not three different moral characters; there are three degrees of life, which corresponds,

488 The natural historian conception of “vital design”; not an abstract idea of ultimate Being, but relatively manifested in nature as a creative force, and in the human experience as a vital “psychic essence.”

489 “It is roughly the nature of sin against the Holy Spirit.” (§1414)

not only to the Trinity, but also to the different degrees of spiritual life within man; namely, first, the natural state with the spiritual principle of life within conscience; second, the awakened state with the beginning of spiritual life; and third, the redeemed state with a fully developed spiritual life. [...⁴⁹⁰]” (§1414.)

In the same context, Laestadius lets us understand that sin signified originally a certain kind of opposition against the principle of life, through which he then elaborated on his insight of the “sin against God” and the reconciliation that must pertain to the whole trinity⁴⁹¹. What is crucial to point out here is that Laestadius expanded the notion of the person of God in a similar way as he expanded the notion of the human person: From the vitalist perspective, organic life was itself animated, living based on its founding character, and the faculties and capabilities of mind (sensory life) were direct constitutional continuum of a growing, developing and functioning organic life. Analogical to this line of thought, Laestadius claimed that the hypostases (“life forms”) of the personhood of God were similarly related to each other, thus constituting the unity of the person of God and the necessary parts of the whole [vital] essence of God. For Laestadius the idea that anthropology must precede theology signified that he determined the relations between the principle of life, organic life and sensory life in man as an anthropological perspective to elaborate on the theory of the relations of the Father the God, the Son and the Holy Spirit.⁴⁹²

By this means, Laestadius appeared to oppose the metaphysical-theological speculation concerning the trinity by claiming that the metaphysics of substance and essence confused and missed the true idea of the trinity: Rationalistic metaphysics applied in philosophical theology conceives of the persons of God as distinct entities or essences, and thus ends up with an unsolvable problem concerning the unity of these persons of God⁴⁹³. As already mentioned, the creation receives peculiar interpretations within metaphysics. From the perspective of rationalistic anthropology and the dualistic notion of man, the vital personhood of God cannot be reached and the whole notion of God is unavoidably metaphysicalized and even mystified in the sense that it cannot ever become comprehensible (and effective) within the lived experience.

490 “He who acts contrary to his own conscience prior to the awakening commits the first [degree]’s of sin against the Holy Spirit.” (§1414)

491 See e.g. §§1413 and §1414 where Laestadius tells how sin against Holy Spirit can be holistically understood through an example taken from nature. Here Laestadius seems to think that the highest moral or spiritual “intuition” is based on sympathetic emotions.

492 For comparison see a brief analysis of Leibniz’ rationalistic elaborations on the problem of Trinity in Antognazza 2010, 141–154 (Leibniz’s Metaphysics of the Trinity. *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae & Finnish Academy of Science and Letters*).

493 According to Laestadius, the same problems pertained to the interpretation of the Eucharist and the two natures of Christ.

Laestadius' opposition to the metaphysical notion of God as a first Idea and mere intellectual essence (*essentia*) or absolute intelligence was exposed when he elaborated on an alternative view concerning the classical claim that *being and thinking are one within God*. Laestadius did not accept this idea unconditionally. According to Laestadius, being and thinking are one within God, but only insofar as God's creative action in eternity is an act of His *will*. However, thinking and being are not simply one within God when creation pertains to the birth/creation of the Son; the Son is the second "life form" or hypostasis of the Trinity of God, not created by means of God's intellectual act of will, but rather a *necessary corollary* from the vital [and kinesthetic] essence or Being of God itself. Instead the creation and action of the Son is a psychic activity of the holistic vital essence of God itself within the world:

"[...⁴⁹⁴] Son, who corresponds to organic life, is the real Creator, or the true birth giver. The father has created through the Son, just as the human father creates through the mother; but this creation is something other than a work of art created by the artist from temporary material, either from clay or from ideas. Such creation depend on the will of the Creator; *but the birth of the Son depends more on a psychic necessity (psychisk nödvändighet) than on the will of the Creator: it depends on certain foundational conditions (grundvilkor) that must be presupposed as being essential to life (nödvändiga för lifvoet), and these foundational conditions are not dependent on the will of the Creator, but on his being (väsende). When it is said that in God, thinking and being is one, then this is correct when it concerns a creation that depends on his will; but to give birth to a son does not directly depend on the will (viljan), but on the being (väsendet), on the foundational conditions of life (lifvets grundvilkor): it is 'generatio physica' within man, but a 'generatio psychica' within God.*" (§1428. emphasis added)

By not unconditionally accepting the idea that "being and thinking are one within God," Laestadius opposed the notion of God as metaphysical substance and essence and highlighted his own conviction of God as "one united personhood" and effecting force and an actual activity of a "living God" within the world – a view that coincided seemingly with his own vitalist way of thinking. This view clearly indicates that Laestadius believed the person of God was not purely transcendent, but concurrent immanent-transcendence who is bound to "lifets grundvilkor", and must act accord-

494 "But from this internal relationship of the persons, it also follows that man had transgressed against all three persons (generaliter). However, specialiter, this crime had fallen most heavily on the conscience of the second person, who carried this monster below his heart during the period of creation; that is ..." (§1428)

ing to his essence. The person of God is active from its foundational character and is thus a fundamental ontological process (rather than a mere transcendental being, essence, or intelligence.)

Laestadius' anthropological analogism between the trinity of man and the trinity of God implies an interesting view about the essence of God. The "persons of God" are not viewed as relating to each other in intellectualistic conceptual terms, but rather in psychophysiological terms. As a harsh critique of enlightenment rationalism and metaphysical rationalism of romanticism colors, in all of Laestadius' thought we can now see how the critic of substance and essence (*essentia*) culminated with the question of man, God, and especially the question of reconciliation. From Laestadius' perspective, the notions of substance and the essence of metaphysical rationalism, applied in philosophical theology and anthropology, alienated the human being from its embodied relatedness within the existence/world [as ultimate immanent-transcendental reality], and elevated an abstract God to an absolute metaphysical sphere conceived as reachable first of all by the human intellect.

As a consequence of his interpretation of the metaphysical rationalization of anthropology and theology, Laestadius also held that the comprehension of the nature of faith and reconciliation had been intellectualized, and the psychological affective, emotional, and passional basis had been bypassed. Laestadius simply demanded that the notion of man and human soul should be brought back to the psychophysiological basis. The understanding of God had to be elaborated from the experiential vitalist perspective in such a way that God would be brought back from the ethereal metaphysical spheres to the dynamic events of living life. Further, the birth of Christ as the redeemer of human kind was derived from the vital essence of the Person of God, and the becoming of Christ was an objective necessity as part of God's loving and vital essence (activity and intentions).

The perspective of "*generatio psychica*" led Laestadius to emphasize that God is bound to act according to his/her essence. Now the conceptual contradictions of God's action in the world were not evaluated from the metaphysical perspective of conceptual necessities, but rather viewed as "psychic" necessities. Similarly, as Laestadius emphasized that a human being must act according to the necessities (psychophysiological essence) determined by a vital embodied personhood, God also must act according to His/Hers essence and necessities. The principle of life, or factual creation must function through matter and the world. Laestadius wanted to highlight that God is not mere abstract thinking and a willing being, a pure intelligence, but rather a living force. This view entailed that God had to function through organic life and the world, through greater awakening and reconciliation. We can interpret that absolution or reconciliation happening through developing a spirituality within man (*pneuma*). For instance, God cannot destroy the power of evil in the world, and He has to simultaneously act according to justice and grace.

Laestadius, as a Christian-pietistic priest, held that a human being has to become self-conscious in order to be reconciled with the heart (the organ of the principle of life) and God:

”As the Father has created the world through the Son, the principle of life has created the organic being through organic life. The principle of life is, admittedly, obscure and incomprehensible to reason, but it is closer at hand to our eyes, than the abstract idea that the philosopher takes pains to hold up to the world as the first beginnings of all creation. Just the same, an idea without life cannot be thought, but a principle of life without self-consciousness is something that we can see with our eyes, in the nature. From this principle of life emerges creative organic life. And this life is now closest to us. In order to be able to be reconciled with the Father, we must go to the Son, who is also the Creator, or the person who has given us life. But we are unable to come to the Son without going through the Holy Spirit. We must first arrive at self-consciousness, before we are able to reconcile with our heart. But this self-consciousness is not the abstract consciousness that subsumes within itself the entire sphere of its personhood; and if organic life is united to a universal consciousness that comprises, not only personhood, but also individuality, then the sensory life is united to a consciousness that subsumes within itself primarily personhood, which is not a *‘persona idealis,’* but a *‘persona substantialis’* that is bound by all the conditions of its existence and must act ‘according to the nature of its being (väsende)’; but precisely at this point, the highly praised freedom gets into a pinch: if man must act according to the nature of its being, it follows that, if his nature is evil, he must act accordance to this particular nature.” (§1420. See also §1428)

Under the highly theoretical elaborations of the constitutive order of reconciliation, interpreted here as the “*unio vitalis*”, Laestadius supposedly referred to the Christian awakened self-consciousness, which signified the recognition of one’s own “*persona substantialis*,” passional, and sinful nature one’s deficient moral character. Thus, Laestadius proceeded by stating that in order to become reconciled with the heart, one had to go through Holy Spirit and the Son. In order to become reconciled with the Father, each human being has to be reconciled through a self-conscious contrition with/and in the Redeemer and thus with the Whole Trinity. Laestadius also highlighted that not only the Father, but the whole Trinity was *pars laesa* (§§1400–1410). Thus, the psychological order in reconciliation became the Holy Spirit, the Son, and the Father.

Here again, Laestadius did not hold to the simple parallelism of man and God. Laestadius clearly indicated that redemption had a particular constitutive structure

or “order of grace”; first, the spiritual life was potentially within man by the principle of life, while in the second degree of the awakened state, spiritual life is in the beginning condition, and in the third degree, which means fulfillment (absolution) of the spiritual life, the redeemed condition was then achieved. As pointed out above, Laestadius viewed this constitutive order and the constitutional–developmental hierarchy of the principle of life, organic life, and sensory life as analogical to the way they all are developed within man. From this explanation, we can see that Laestadius viewed the sensory life as a pre-requisite of spirituality. However, Laestadius also held that reconciliation centers on the Son, which correlated with the organic life and thus was the actual link of renewal or returning to the principle of life (original soul, the Father). Thus, the reconciliation is lowered from the intellect to the passions and the heart. If my analysis and interpretation are both correct, *Laestadius’ personal and theoretical breakthrough within philosophical theology* elaborated on which the hypostases or life forms of human beings coincide with the hypostases or life forms of a vital God, and conceive man’s spiritual life as constitutional–developmental in character. This insight correlates with the “reaching of God” towards human beings in vital manifestations, beginning with the vital force of the Holy Spirit, and actualization of the force of Grace in the Redeemer, and the Father/Mother [the Lover]. Further still, the notion of creation and God’s work within the historical world is explained as a practical–naturalistic creative and temporal functioning of the Trinity.⁴⁹⁵

From Laestadius’ anthropological perspective then, the personhood of God is a constitutional kinetic process and temporal. Insofar as the first principle was given as life itself, the Christ was the necessary continuum of the essence of the Father, and the Holy Spirit was an awakened force within humankind. The Son is created by psychic generation, “*generatio psychica*”, a direct necessary continuum from the essence of God; henceforth, the Holy Spirit is seen as originally given by the blow of God into Adam, but brought into the world by the Son and re-vitalized by the force of Grace within mankind.⁴⁹⁶ Laestadius thought that the spirit of God does not become real or actualized through intellect or consciousness, but rather through nature and the embodied life of the human being, which is the reason why awakening and psychic reconciliation is indeed emphasized.

495 Here we can note once again that Laestadius’ idea of creation, reconciliation, and redemption differed from Hegel’s intellectualistic vision. Laestadius’ dialectics functioned through nature and lived experiences within which God comes along; in Hegel’s system, God or Absolute Idea functions through intellect and consciousness, and all material and historical things and events are mere manifestations of the dialectical process of the Spirit. Laestadius’ system does not proceed to the ultimate Absolutization of the Spirit; instead worldly life remains under the power of evil, and only through psycho–physiological awakening and reconciliation may God – or if we will it so, The Spirit – function in the human life and the world.

496 Cf. Hegel’s *Dialectic of Spirit* in Hegel 1977.

It thus appear evident that Laestadius did not conceive matter and spirit or man and God as simply being parallel⁴⁹⁷ to each other, but rather he emphasized the constitutive structure and fundamental relatedness. Man and God are essentially co-existent in the ontotheological structure in a similar way as the body and spirit are co-existent in man. Laestadius referred to Paul the Apostle by saying that there remains a certain kinship “between” man and God; “There is a psychological kinship (psychisk frändskap) between him and the children: they are his own work.” (§667)⁴⁹⁸ Man exists towards its own origin, towards God as the creative living force on which the existence of human being is fundamentally dependent. God is a counter-pole or correlate of the whole of human existence, similarly as the principle of life forms the horizon for the phenomena of nature. Human beings as “relatives of God,” are partly divine [origin] from their origin (original soul), have the qualification to be related to God. As already pointed out, this prerequisite is given within the heart, in the sensitive heart (organon lepticon), which is the organ of the principle of life. Thus, man should recognize its living essence through awakening (dissonant state) and reach toward reconciliation in hope and faith that does not objectify God as an absolutely transcendental and metaphysical being (väsendet), but instead encounters God in His vital manifestations, especially as a call given within a sensible and awakened conscience. This call simultaneously transfers the corrupted man back to its origin (upphov) of life, into the original soul, and thus to a living and ongoing relatedness with God as a most vital force (the Actualization of Spirituality).

Grace does not demand an act, but rather contrition that signifies the destruction of egoism, the ousting of the human own natural will-power as a self-justifying and self-righteousness that are deficient moral and spiritual grounds in the “eyes” of God. In this condition, man has to affirm the condition of being simultaneously guilty and innocent, an absolute paradox for a natural reason. Contrary to self-justification, psychic reconciliation signifies the opposite and necessary “outer” justification. Here we can open the question of what this redeemed state may signify in regard to man’s world relation or the Christian life. All we can say then, based on Laestadius’ writings in *The Lunatic*, is that it signifies an intentional condition of faith that lays forth the renewed [or reborn] moral and spiritual passional basis for human action, thought, life and existence as a whole. Within such redemption/reconciliation man, lets the natural passions of egoism, ambition, and selfishness under the dominance of an

497 Rather the “relation” is co-existence, God is seen as the necessary counter-pole, a correlative, of human life, a holistic horizon of human existence as such.

498 See also the consanguinity between man and God: §§993, 1283, 1324, 1326, 1425. In §668 Laestadius indicated that the sins of the children of God execute the murder of God (interesting theory with a historical similarity to Nietzsche’s philosophy? Cf. §1427 wherein Laestadius states that awakened persons often feel they have murdered the Christ, which is not a result of aroused imagination, but rather a “psychological truth.”

awakened heart, under the original power of principle of life as a divine and eternal vital force found within man. As mentioned above, Laestadius did not think that this rebirth would signify an absolutely new Selfhood or identity; the worldly and carnal condition remained. The reconciled Self still encompasses both the old natural and the newborn morally or spiritually inspired passional Self; this paradoxical condition is called a “redeemed devil” (§1378).

If we now ask how man is related to existence or Being, we will notice that the faith, as the renewed vital basis of a human being, is not related to God as a substantial being (*väsendet, essentia*), or the first Idea as a correlate of human intellect. Living faith does not have an intellectual intentional object, but manifests itself as “living in the faith of the heart [in the Christ]”, or living within the power of God. Laestadius held that there could not ever be formulated any concept of the first Idea without violating the notion of the person of God and faith. Thus, a human being’s intentional relatedness to existence through faith can be defined from its founding character *an un-objectifying intentionality*. This aspect is so, first of all, because faith as a revitalized power of the original soul dwells in its “object”, or to be more specific, in the “force”, residing on the foundation of the vital force of God as the “origin (*Uphov*) of life” itself. Thus, it is not the human being’s own [natural] intentionality that directs that human being, but instead the original force of God, the vital force of life. In a sense, this insight signifies a certain kind of destruction of subjectivity and a yielding to the power of the principle of life, a trust in the power of a God of creation and grace.

Thus, self-justification, a mere affirmation of the grace/forgiveness by intellect, does not create the moral passional basis for human life. Instead, grace received in a passivity of heart and waiting for the mystical event of being freed from the guilty of sins lays the joyous and morally motivational basis for human life. Hence, Laestadius combines the pietistic idea of reconciliation with the vitalist idea of the psychophysical event happening in the corporeal plane. Laestadius called this subjectively emphasized notion of reconciliation *psychic reconciliation*⁴⁹⁹ which is the counter-pole of outer objective reconciliation that he called juridical reconciliation. This possibility of evidence of one’s own reconciliation also constitutes the grounding of Christian faith and Identity in human life.

5.5.3 Actualization of a Psychic Reconciliation and the Christian Faith

Despite the secret and ineffable nature of reconciliation, Laestadius sought to give a heuristic depiction of it⁵⁰⁰. His analysis was constructed in family psychological

499 To be precise, the heart has to receive grace via blood in the first place. Also, the Eucharist is a psychic phenomenon that actualizes as a feeling in the heart. See the following citations below.

500 Laestadius let us understand that anthropological parts of *The Lunatic* were written before 1855, and indeed, he began to thematize reconciliation in 1855, four years before his death. (See §1246)

terms, and based on his conceptions of man and God. In this respect, it is worth recalling the distinction between the subjective and objective faculties of the soul; juridical conscience was posited into the sphere of sensory life as a faculty of objective consciousness, and spiritual or moral conscience as a subjective faculty was situated into the subjective consciousness. These distinctions and the emphasis on the subjective consciousness and subjective faculties of soul became the theoretical background for the discussion concerning reconciliation.

We also analyzed the above in at a quite theoretical formal level how the triadic parts of God and man correlate, and how the constitutive order exposed the degrees of spiritual life in man. However, Laestadius also offered a fully psychologically heuristic depiction of the subjective and objective aspects of the event of reconciliation. Especially, Laestadius wanted to distinguish and accentuate the more inward aspect of reconciliation and show how it was crucial for the actualization of reconciliation. Thus, the notion of psychic reconciliation pertaining to a “psychic essence,” was posited against the mere juridical notion of reconciliation (forensic). This is quite a general pietistic way to emphasize the subjective inner sphere in the first place. Also, the re-depiction of the personality of God as a “heavenly parent⁵⁰¹” (as a vital force) was posited against the philosophical idea of God.

When dealing with the actual event of reconciliation, Laestadius analyzed the reconciliation by similar psychological means as he used to analyze the phenomenon of awakening. Then the depictions of the tormented and agonic condition of suffering were extended to pertain to the heart of God as well and the whole relationship between man and God. Laestadius used as a heuristic example the heart of the loving mother as a correlation to God’s loving heart: According to Laestadius, the loving heart of the mother is the highest manifestation of divinity in the world and thus, it is applicable to characterize the essence of God. Laestadius drew a conscious anthropocentric conclusion from the moral character of the heart of the mother to the gracious character of the person of God:

“However, to become reconciled with the source (uphof) of one’s life is something entirely different, which we have sought to illustrate by means of example that show how reconciliation takes place between parents and children; considering especially the mother’s heart, since this is the most sacred (heligaste) character trait known in all of creation: it is a character trait within the personhood of the Creator, reflected in living nature; not merely in man, who is corrupted by infernal passions.” (§1351.)

501 On the notion of “heavenly parent” in Laestadius’ sermons, see e.g. Østtveit Elgvin 2010; Nilsson 1988.

There is a similar conflict between the sense of justice and unconditional grace within hearts of the mother and God. (§1308) Conflict is between the passions of unconditional love that the “creator” feels for her child, and the demands of justice or law; a mother is always open to forgiving her child, but she also has to act according to the equal moral principle of justice. The same pertains to God as just judicator and loving caretaker. The suffering derived from the conflict of passions within a mother’s heart is similar to the suffering of God’s heart.

God’s ultimately gracious act of giving his own Son to sacrifice himself for all of mankind, for his own children, is similar to the unconditional self-sacrificing love of a mother. God as a whole has given His existence [force, body and grace/Holy Spirit] on behalf of human beings in a similar way as a mother gives hers for her children. By emphasizing the character of God as a “heavenly parent” Laestadius wanted to highlight that God is a living personhood who is open to being related with the desiring human being through the heart, accepted as a vitalizing force (not as an object) by faith.

The characteristics of these persons of God are potentially conjoined with the vital centers of the triadic parts of human beings. Now the character of the Father as the first person and creative vital principle is offered by the allegory of the birth-giving and loving “mother”, and the heart is its organ. “The Son” is depicted as an innocent sacrifice given to satisfy the evil demands and passions of the world [an objective side to free mankind from sin], and it is an actual re-vitalizing power that has to be received “in passivity” through faith. “The Holy Spirit” is the living force given to men through reconciliation [social dimension]. Thus, the whole triadic person of God as unity is in and of itself understood as creative vital whole (a Father has to function according to its essence and according to the laws of matter. A Father has to function via the organic life), and an organic suffering of Son and a human being [of passions], and the Holy spirit as the manifestation of the faith of that heart as the re-vitalized power of human life. Thus, the Son is a factual psycho-physiological meeting-point for man and God, and it can be encountered only through faith [Cf. Luther].

The above discussion means that Christ conjoined through faith simultaneously re-vitalizes the original soul of the human being, and manifests itself as a Holy Spirit in the sensory life. Henceforth, man becomes directed by the Holy Spirit after reconciliation. Because of this loving act of God (sacrifice of the Son) conceived as a vital, absolutely loving and emphatic, and effective force[through faith], the character of the person of God is re-depicted as a “heavenly parent,” the term that Laestadius used to make a distinction between the philosophical impersonal God as a mere just adjudicator and the ultimate categorical being or Idea outside of human existence [having only intellect and will].

Such reconciliation pertains to the whole triadic person of God and thus also to the origin of the human being (principle of life). Here also, the loving heart of the

mother is used as a family psychological allegory to describe the event of reconciliation. The loving heart of God is always open for reconciliation (objective), but contrition is necessary and demanded from man in order to be reconciled (See §§1402, 1351).

“Before there can be any reconciliation between parents and children, a moral suffering must take place on both sides. It is not enough for the parents to suffer for the sins of the children must have a sincere sorrow over their sins before reconciliation can take place. Reconciliation is a consequence of the physical and moral suffering of the Redeemer; on the part of the Redeemer, and of the moral suffering on the part of the one who is to receive grace. The religious mother has also suffered physical pain for her children when it was born, whereby the mother’s heart has become more tender than the father’s heart. . . . But pains and aches heighten the maternal feeling. . . . We are unable to give reason for this, but this is the case: when the mother has acquired her child with pains and aches, it is much dearer to her, since the maternal feeling has its organ in womb.” (§1323.)

Despite the rough organicist views, we can proceed and notice, however, that the “psychic” and “the heart” refer to the organic functions that constitute the whole of subjective consciousness and vital functions and conflicting passions that strive for satisfaction. Thus, reconciliation, to be understood clearly, *has to be understood in terms of the satisfaction of passions*; here Laestadius held that legal or juridical reconciliation is insufficient, for that process belongs only to the level of sensory life or intellect, as the whole juridical conscience belongs there too:

”It seems clear, on the basis of all human relationships, that *actus forensis* is not capable of rendering reconciliation clear and comprehensible. Reconciliation is not a legal act, but a *psychic act*. We call it ‘*psychic*,’ since it concerns the psyche; it concerns the heart, as a consequence of the testimony of feeling: ‘*I feel my heart reconciled.*’” (§1349.)

Laestadius sought the psychological aspects of reconciliation (as spiritual and moral motivation). A mere conscious legal act does not constitute the satisfaction or give any evidence to the heart of one’s own reconciliation (“testimony of feeling”), and thus, reconciliation cannot be an act of objective consciousness in the first place. The preference for the precedence of psychic reconciliation over mere objective reconciliation included a harsh critique of the notion of objective reconciliation of Lutheran orthodoxy (§1265). Laestadius pointed out the misinterpretation of the nature of reconciliation and assumes that it follows from a wrong interpretation and translation of a confession [of Lutheran faith] (§1266. See also §§1267, 1268).

Laestadius is trying to say that in order for the ego to be reconciled, there have to be given moral passions that make one really feel reconciled. Juridical conscience “does not imply abhorrence/disgust of the desire (afsky för begäret) (§674). It does not imply a struggle against the desire, but against the satisfaction of the desire,” and thus does not create a living morality and spirituality.

Laestadius offers an example of the legal pardon by a graceful king to highlight the fact that a pardon alone does not release one psychologically from the feeling of guilt. In order to emancipate one from the accusations of conscience, a human being has to *believe* that he has been granted amnesty. This line of thought goes as follows: insofar as a human being exists in the world, he is fundamentally guilty because of the prevailing natural passions and their manifestations in thought and action. Insofar as the ego cannot reconcile itself [self-justification], it has to remain passive. It has to wait, and be open through faith for the grace, be open to a pure gift, which is not receivable by the [intellectual] mind but by the faith of the heart (clearly indicating the influence of moral passions on the faculties of the soul).

While God’s reconciling act is given through the Son objectively, man is offered the possibility of emancipation from the guilt of sin subjectively. Nonetheless, this (emancipation) cannot be accepted by intellect alone because it does not meet the demands of the principles of reason, as it signifies the contradictory condition of being both simultaneously guilty and innocent.

However, the reconciling act of pure grace can be received by living faith of the heart (psychic); and it is coincidentally an affirmation of a contradictory vital-existential state – being guilty as a passional sinner (worldly existence), yet freed from the guiltiness of shortcomings and sins. The idea is that a human being has to take the responsibility of his vital personhood, and as absolute responsibility proves to be impossible, man has to accept his depravity and believe in the absolute responsibility placed on the charge/responsibility of Christ. This *shift*, namely, falling in front of the possibility to fulfill the moral imperative by one’s own power, becomes a necessary condition for man to be able to be freed from the accusations of conscience and law. Man does not lose his responsibility and natural passional nature, but he does become simultaneously innocent through Christ. Thus, man is criminal and innocent simultaneously, a psychic fact proved by the “evidence of heart.” (See, §§ 1539, 1540, 1579, 1582.)

Laestadius’ interpretation of the presence of God in faith and his analysis of transubstantiation are interesting. Here Laestadius follows the vitalist-existentialistic interpretation highlighting that Christ is *present in power* when approached (“reached towards”) through a subjective inner faith. The vitalist approach seems to give him a satisfactory explanatory basis when he conceives of the transubstantiation of bread and wine as the vitalizing presence of Christ once received through subjective faith. Laestadius wanted to highlight that Jesus’ body and blood are not mere Idea, imaginary representation, or empty concept but rather an idea actualized through faith:

“Whatever man perceives by faith is real, since it is actualized (realized) through faith. Thus, when the idea of the body and blood of Christ is actualized in the heart, the idea is actualized; that is to say, the object is not merely an idea, an imagination or an empty concept, but a reality within the heart.” (§1582.) “[T]he bread and wine are to bodily life, what the body of Christ given and the blood of Christ shed are to spiritual life. Or the bread and the wine are (to objective consciousness the same as) the body and blood of Christ to subjective consciousness.” (§1583.) “Thus, the most important thing in the Lord’s Supper is this psychic phenomenon: that the body and blood are truly present as soon as the idea thereof is actualized in the heart, through faith.” (§1584.)⁵⁰²

5.5.4 The Mystery of Faith and the Evidence of the Heart

Despite his detailed elaborations, Laestadius was still convinced that reconciliation remains – until the end – a *secret*. Faith “contains ‘mysticism,’” as it pertains to the condition of the individual human heart, and it is thus a question of one’s own-most faith without objective evidence. According to Laestadius, faith has to be understood in terms of passions and emotions, as living faith is constituted of “high heavenly emotions” and religion can be understood only in terms of passions, then religion cannot be objectified and defined precisely:

“The Christian religion excites all nobler feelings of which man is capable, and suppresses all heinous passion by which the heart is torn asunder. Through living faith, the heart is seized by blissful feelings, or moral pleasures, and this is what saving faith consists in. The rationalist claims just the same that feeling do not belong to religion, or *that religion should be excluded from the mystical realm of the feelings.*” (§721.)

There cannot be an objective explanation of how reconciliation happens in the individual heart. Faith is not a belief of the mind because the passions and emotions precede all the beliefs of the [intellectual] mind⁵⁰³.

502 See further, §§1586–1588.

503 In this sense, we cannot really use the notion of fideism to pertain/depict Laestadius’ conception because the phenomenon of faith is analyzed at a more fundamental physical-psychological level. There also seems to be several evidentialist tendencies in Laestadius’ theory, for he conceives vitalism as explanatory basis for his religious views. The conceptual question concerning fideism and evidentialism in Laestadius’ thought is of course a task of another study. That kind of study should distinguish two kinds of evidentialism: First, Laestadius’ scientific-philosophical explanatory level for apologist purposes, and secondly, the experiential demand for proof and a double-foundation within religious experience.

“Living faith consists in exalted heavenly feelings that are perceptible within the heart, and these feelings cannot be described with words; they cannot be defined since the intellect is unable to reflect upon these feelings or bring them to clarity through concepts (see section B.B.). Therefore, religion cannot be defined [...⁵⁰⁴] How could it be possible to define faith, which is a living feeling, a passion, when not even natural love can be defined, nor grief or fear; passions of which one is unable to say anything more than that they are feelings! For this reason, then, affairs of love contain a ‘mysticism’ that only lovers are able to grasp, not with intellect (förståndet), but with the heart.” (§1557.)

Opposing the possibility of objective rational-conceptual proof, Laestadius simultaneously shifted the evidence pertaining to reconciliation to the inner order of the heart and conscience, or to put it in Kierkegaardian terms, into the inwardness, into the subjectivity.⁵⁰⁵ “Perceptibility” as an “evidence” of *fides subjectiva* refers to that inner conviction. Further, the lack of objective evidence turns into an even more demanding need of subjective evidence to the testimony of feeling of the heart:

”But if there is the case, that salvific faith depended on man’s will, then there would be no problem as all to become saved. However, if there is anything in the world that needs a sufficient foundation, it is the living faith, which in the letter to the Hebrews 11:1 is referred to as: “*the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen*”. Verbatim, according to Gerlach-Vensjö, the Greek text could be translated thus: ‘but faith is a foundation for that which one hopes for, the proof of things, which one does not see⁵⁰⁶.’ ... if one enters more deeply into the subjective foundations of faith, one will find that a conviction that is dependent on the will in no way requires a foundation that is outside of will... there are many things in the world that man must believe contrary to his will; man prefers to believe that which he wishes. [...] the foundation for man’s conviction about mortality is not located within the will, but in the sorrowful experience that all men are mortal.” (§1456.)

504 “[E]ven though the Apostle Paul tried to define faith, just as most theologians have tried to define religion. But they have not succeeded since the definitions are very different.” (§1557)

505 Cf. Kierkegaard, Sören 1974. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. [Orig. 1846.] Translated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

506 In the original manuscript: “Men tro är en grundval för det man hoppas, en öfverbevisning om ting, dem man icke ser.”

Altogether, Laestadius gives even a more radical evidential criterion for “living faith.” This conviction or evidence is an inner “testimony of feeling” which has a different character than objective convictions demand, say, for instance, the mathematical scientific or rational theological proofs of a God of orthodox faith. The evidence of heart signifies the subjective proof based on “subjective” feeling and experience.

For heuristic purposes, Laestadius also compared mathematical truths and subjective truths with different evidential character. For instance, matters of love (§1145), faith, and religion cannot be proven by mathematical and mere rational evidence, but only through subjective evidence which also constitutes the initial conditions for any conceptual thematizations:

“The infallible grounds for the convictions of the intellect can be in part objective, for instance mathematical truths, which rest entirely on objective grounds; and in part subjective, which depend on the feelings of the heart, such as love, grief, jealousy, and so forth. Both these foundations for conviction are infallible, each on its own way, in that man can no more doubt a proven mathematical truth, then he can also not doubt his feeling; he cannot doubt love, grief, jealousy, hatred or other passions. The intellect cannot deny feelings.” (§503.) “If lovers wanted to prove the real impact of love by means of mathematical or logical deduction, they would be viewed as lunatics.” (§505.)

Laestadius also differentiated between the subjective and objective ground of evidence and emphasizes the subjective basis of emotion and feeling and criticizes the faith that leans on the authorities. For Laestadius, the mere following of the faith of the authorities without one’s own emotional-subjective faith signified “dead faith.” (§§1052, 1054) Rationalistic faith or faith that was based on the faith of authorities was not saving faith because it did not pertain to the “psyche” and heart. Here Laestadius leaned on common experiences and everyday-psychological examples about the character of love in order to make the phenomenon of reconciliation comprehensible. According to Laestadius, the same holds true with the religious truths even if modern theologians try to prove them with logic (§506)⁵⁰⁷. A discussion on

507 See also §§ 504, 505, 506: The same holds with those religious truths which cannot be proven by logic. In these contexts Laestadius referred to *syneidesis*: “In subjective consciousness, the feelings of the heart manifest themselves as insight, “*syneidesis*”, or as an awareness of good and evil.” In a note, Laestadius draw a *distinction between the knowledge of love and the actual feeling of love* indicating that knowledge and insight belongs to sensory life while the actual feeling is a matter of organic life. Laestadius stated that “nevertheless, this knowledge of love is something entirely different than love itself because love knowledge belongs to the sphere of sensory life while love itself is a passion, which belongs to the sphere of organic life. The same relationship obtains between knowledge of religion and religion itself.” (§745. See also §§1142, 1143, 1144)

the subjective and objective foundation as a necessary “double foundation” reveals reciprocal recognition as an initial condition of genuine love and faith:

“In love, like religion, conviction requires a double foundation; both an objective and a subjective foundation are required. It is not enough for the lover to have an objective foundation for her conviction – that she is loved. The woman is not satisfied with a declaration of love; she demands clear evidence of man’s love. The unfaithful man tries in vain to deceive his genuinely loving wife with false caresses. Love’s perception is focused and clear.” (§508.) “[T]he subjective foundation alone is also not enough. Certainly, the lover will discover, long before the declaration of love, that she is loved, but she cannot rely on her own feeling unless a declaration is made. It is easy to prove the truth that *all moral conviction rests on double foundations*. One seeks in vain to compel the respect of others through dissimulation or hypocrisy. Our conviction regarding the moral character of others always requires a subjective foundation.” (§509. emphasis added)

The ultimate evidence of the redeemed state remains in the passions and emotions of the heart, in the *fides subjectiva*; a personal inward conviction within which one feels his/hers heart reconciled (§1338). Hence, emancipation from the guiltiness of sin could only be attested or confirmed by inward faith and implied insight into the *reasons of the heart*. This is what Laestadius finally meant, namely, that the ultimate condition of human life, faith, and reconciliation could only be understood by the heart, passions and emotions. The conflict of the passions of the heart were calling for reconciliation. Reconciliation as a “psychic act” is the only and necessary possibility for the satisfaction of the moral passion of conscience through outer justification. By this means, Laestadius was convinced that subjective (psychic) faith was the initial condition for the actualization of full reconciliation (metaphysical necessity).

Altogether, the person of God [the first Idea] is now re-depicted as an immanence-transcendence with a personal character. God is given to human beings in three moments: In the living nature and thus in one’s own “psychic essence” as original soul (principle of life); in the body of Christ as the possibility (awakening) of reconciliation; and in the Holy Spirit actualized in a redeemed state, and thus the possibility to live with a spiritual/moral conscience and the living God. This structuring of the man/God relationship is not categorically parallelistic (but rather co-existent with the Other), and for this relation to be actualized demands a reconciling act from the side of God “as heavenly parent” [objective and real], and the contrition, desire, faith and trust [subjective and possible “psychic act”] to live with God from the side of the human being. According to Laestadius, it is not only the heart of man which demands reconciliation; first of all there is the heart of the God. (Cf. §§1311, 1312, 1323, 1334.)

Laestadius' idea of awakening and reconciliation can be viewed from the phenomenological perspective as a unique individuation or absolution. However, because of Laestadius' emphasis on the embodied and carnal character of human life, rebirth as a result of the psychic reconciliation would be not a mere change of mind, but also an embodied experience:

”Luther’s experience proves that the new birth must be something perceivable and perceptible; it is not merely an idea, but an ‘actualized idea,’ an alteration of the heart that cuts deeply into man’s spiritual organism. To be sure, already the awakening is the gracious work of God’s spirit that is perceptible within the heart, just as a contrition, remorse, and sorrow over sin must be perceptible within the heart, if they are to be called true contrition. But these preparatory effects of grace must not be confused with the new birth, which is followed by a perceptible joy, peace, and rejoicing in the Holy Spirit.” (§1531.)

Awakening signifies subjectivization and self-awareness and reconciliation, which encompasses the suffering encounter between a child and a parent, is a personal individuating act. This act does not originate from the subject, but rather is the actualization of the spirit, (a metaphysical necessity as an aspect of principle of life.) Psychic reconciliation can thus be conceived as personal individuation. The actual uniqueness of the human being is actualized upon hearing of the “call” that pertains to me and only me.⁵⁰⁸

From an anthropological perspective, reconciliation is not only an intellectualistic spiritual act, but a psychophysiological and existential need to be free from the domination of natural passions and conflicting passions in the heart.

We can summarize Laestadius' psycho-theology of the Trinity in the following way: Anthropological “life forms” are hypostases through which the triadic unity of God is explained. Putting the notions of the principle of life as a foundational force to the place of substance, *essentia*, and *Idea*, Laestadius believed he was able to get rid of the metaphysical logical problems of Trinity and creation (and the doctrine of Jesus' two natures and transubstantiation): Now the persons of God are conceived as essential vital activity related to each other in a similar way as the hypostases in man. Thus we can see, that God has a temporal and constitutive structure, which functions through an ineffable metaphysical force of the principle of life, through the Son and Holy spirit (passions) within the historical human world, and having a

508 Cf. Steinbock 2009, 193–195.

psychic reconciliation as its initial condition, to unite man and God, then man can become joined to the power of God, and thus human life could take up residence in the guidance of God. To admit and affirm one's own passionate character and condition of world is simultaneously an affirmation of the world as such. However, only through such awakening and reconciliation, can God function in the world and man remain under the guidance of God. To this end, Laestadius discussed whether love or faith precedes and concludes by following Luther in that faith is the perennial source of love and good deeds, morality, and justice⁵⁰⁹.

As Laestadius' philosophical psychology and theology culminated in the phenomena of awakening, psychic reconciliation (that individuates and reconstructs the personal intentionality), and faith (spiritual identity), we ask what significance there remains for subjective faith, once familiar with his theory? It seems contradictory to emphasize the non-intellectual core of awakening and faith and simultaneously highlight that lingual and conceptual elaboration seems to be an important role for the self to recognize one's own moral and spiritual condition (Cf. §§1121–1130). The same pertains to the Biblical conceptualizations. What kind of role then do the conceptualizations play, in this respect, for moral and spiritual progress? The same problem can be addressed regarding Kierkegaard's religious existentialism within which subjectivity is emphasized. Simultaneously, his *Postscript* constitutes a broad intellectual theorization of "subjective faith" and "leap"⁵¹⁰. Can *Postscript* lead one to a subjective Christianity, and if yes, is the faith still subjective but rather reached through a certain specific symbolic and lingual "objectivity"? Does the most shunted intellect then lift up its head?

Basically this questioning concerns the relationship between theology and faith; does faith need theology? In Laestadius and Kierkegaard's cases, we should logically respect their principles and consider that concepts and ideas are not the origin of subjective faith or "psychic" reconciliation and thus a living faith. Yet can these theoretical notions lead us to a living faith? Isn't it always an impossible task to try to talk about faith which is a deeply subjective matter in the first place? Isn't it an inconvenience and even a count against the possibility of religious awakening and reconciliation if one reads Kierkegaard and Laestadius only seeking to find one's own most faith or a foundation for a personal "Leap"? Do Kierkegaard and Laestadius offer rational support and even evidence for the objective rationality of faith and thus make the whole process intellectual?

It is interesting that similarly to Kierkegaard Laestadius also indicated that thinking does have a certain kind of role for finding a subjective living faith (§§1146,

509 See, §684. Cf. §709, in §711 Laestadius polemized on whether the pietistic vitalist or the speculative rationalist was the lunatic.

510 See, Kierkegaard 1974 (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*).

1535). How should we then conceive this paradox, which in the other dimension signifies the relation between inward experience and objective cognition, such as understanding and knowledge? In the end, this enigma can be solved as follows: The aporetic condition of awakening, the ultimate dilemma of human existence, does not depend on whether one accepts certain conceptual “rationalizations”, but rather on whether a human being is open and thus accepts the Word (by first facing the existential dead end). Laestadius might have thought that an inward faith of the heart, beside it being the foundation of proper religious views and doctrines, also demands a conceptual and broader understanding and communal discussion of the matters of faith and life. It is the objective part of the actualization of a living faith that necessitates a communal life, a conceptual and theoretical perspective, varying discursive perspectives, and apologetic and other religious literature to be actualized in a very ambiguous world. If I am not mistaken, Lutheran-Laestadian pietism has as its source the inward experience of religious truths, but it does not turn to radical subjectivity. While it fights for the freedom of religion, from the very beginning, it points the finger at each and every one of us, asking us to question the condition of our own heart.

However, there is still no ideal, conceptual, and theoretical evidence or proof of the rationality or truthfulness of religious faiths, and thus it remains until the end a matter of individuation for any awakening and possibility of reconciliation. There is no freedom of choice or rational “leap”, as it all pertains to trusting the word (logos) itself and the “evidence of heart”; whether given to the heart, existential experience, or the intellect, which receives its evidential affirmation from experience anyway (§1456). In a wider philosophical horizon, the problem is basically more general and pertaining only to the existential-ontological relation between pre-reflective and pre-ontological lived experience and a shared public lingual ethos within which a human being always actualizes.

This is the challenge of human existence as such, not a problem that can be solved. We can note, however, that Laestadius was an emancipatory thinker, as he fought for freedom of religion, resisted the precedence of orthodox dogmatics in favor of the individual religious experience, and criticized the faith that follows the authorities, but simultaneously Laestadius appears as a demanding religious leader who insists on an inward living faith of the heart. On the general level, this is an analogical situation with whatever human situation in the world: A human being must personally experience matters of life in order to reach proper understanding of the subject matter. Linguistic comprehension and reflectivity is a necessary aspect of a “living faith”, although not its primal foundation.

5.5.5 Protestant Vitalist Metaphysics As the Overcoming of Substance Metaphysics

In this study, I have broadly gone through the philosophical, psychological and theological aspects of Laestadius' thought by analyzing Laestadius' "insights" and most of their philosophically and psychologically significant themes. The vitalist way of thought and Laestadius' intentions to deconstruct the prevailing ideas of man and his notions of faith and God have been dealt with here. Laestadius' elaborations concerning the holistic notion of man and a non-dualistic insight into the constitution of human consciousness as well as the constitution of both the moral and the spiritual life have been analyzed.

It is now evident that Laestadius' critique of Western metaphysical rationalism, outstandingly present in *The Lunatic*, was a particular application of the 18th and early 19th century vitalist critique of rationalism and metaphysics within a new 19th century context of Swedish intellectual and spiritual life that was dominated by German idealism and romantic speculative metaphysics. Laestadius' criticism was particularly aimed against the rationalistic, metaphysical and idealistic doctrines of theologians, religious leaders, and philosophical anthropologists. Despite its original vitalist roots, Laestadius' contextual critical evaluation of metaphysical rationalism and its notions of being, essence, soul/body –conception as well as the whole approach toward the phenomena of life, *can also be seen as an obvious opposition to general Western metaphysical rationalism*, particularly its Cartesian-rationalistic, Kantian-idealistic, and Hegelian-speculative currents. This notification raises a question of whether Laestadius' insights offer any perspective regarding the critique of Western metaphysics and rationalism in the more general sense [and especially in reference to the contemporary discussion of this theme⁵¹¹.]

In the following section, I offer a few important insights from this investigation that can contribute to the contemporary discussion on this critic of the Western metaphysical-intellectualistic stance. Here I *shift the research perspective from an anthropological and psychological emphasis* to a more general ontological questioning on the notion of life, being, and the notion of Being (varandet, substance) in terms of its broad metaphysical indication as the ultimate ground and horizon of human existence. In this respect, Laestadius' *vitalist Protestant metaphysic* is discussed in relation to the concept of substance present in the Western tradition from ancient history to the modern era, beginning with Aristotle's definition of "the constant

511 e.g Stanley 2010; Adluri 2013; MacGrath 1985. Beginning with Heidegger's philosophy, much interest has been paid to the problem of Western metaphysics and also to the so-called "originary ethics" which has focused on the phenomenological and ontological foundations of ethics. Especially, Emmanuel Levinas, Jan-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Charles Taylor, Jan-Luc Marion, and many other continental philosophers can be named in this regard.

presence” (ousia)⁵¹². I ask, how does Laestadius’ understanding of human being and life, and God and faith relate to this horizon of Being and to existence as a “constant presence” (substance) as such?

Insofar as Laestadius’ holistic way of thought had the empirical/experiential and the spiritual dimensions as inseparable, we cannot draw a sharp distinction between philosophical and theological metaphysics. In Laestadius’ thought, the philosophical-anthropological and metaphysical-theological are inextricable; the idea of man and the notion of God or ultimate reality (spirituality) constituted the whole. General metaphysics also have in common the quest for ultimate experiential reality and constitutional ground and the horizon of life or being as such, which is traditionally called first philosophy (philosophia prima or philosophia perennis). On this fundamental level, philosophy and theology face the common problem and task⁵¹³ of contemplating in a different means what is perennial being (substance), Being (essence, Idea or force), or in other words, the perennial ground and horizon of human existence? Further, it can be asked what the different theoretical “solutions” disclosed through different theoretical-experiential insights indicate, for instance, in regard to the questions of how the perennial principles of existence are actually reached, and what are the prerequisites or necessities for a proper human life. Because this “relativity” or liquid nature of the ground and the horizon – whether God, the principle of life or whatever substance-principle – we can only analyze the philosophical and theological implications of these different theoretical insights.

Thus, I will discuss how Laestadius’ theory relates to theological metaphysics and philosophical metaphysics, as he clearly seemed to have something to say against both branches. In this respect, we have to clearly note once again that the philosophical-psychological quest for the idea of man is not distinct from the quest for the spiritual nature of human beings, and thus also the perennial metaphysical-theological quest for God and the possibility of reconciliation. The main notions of substance, *essentia*, and the Self (*ego*), as well as the reappraisal of the notions of the faculties of soul, God, faith, and psychic reconciliation have already been analyzed, and it has been noted herein that they are inseparable aspects of the Laestadius’ critique of metaphysical rationalism as a whole.

Laestadius’ way of overcoming the prevailing metaphysical rationalistic stance in theology and anthropology of his time had two sides. On the one hand, he advanced a theological critique with Luther’s emphasis of faith and *theology of the cross*, and on

512 About Heidegger’s deconstruction of Western metaphysics and his interpretation of Aristotle see, e.g. Heidegger 2001, 3–102; Heidegger 1993a, pp.92–110; Marx 1982, 7–37; van Buren 1994b, 220–>; Kisiel 1995, 221–276; Backman 2015, 44–55.

513 Cf. Aristotle 1995 (Metaphysics). In his Metaphysics Aristotle states that the perennial philosophy of the first principle is either meta-ta-physica (metaphysics) or theology (the thematic of God as a “first principle”).

the other hand, he formulated a critique of anthropology applying his vitalist insights on man, faith and God. As noted above, Laestadius' vitalist psychology became the basis for his theological and anthropological elaborations, and henceforth also his critical evaluation of theological and philosophical metaphysics. This knowledge allows us to view Laestadius' thought in the wider context of the full critique of Western metaphysics.

If we take a look at contemporary philosophical anthropology and theology we will notice that the most influential and holistic critic and deconstruction of Western metaphysics is found in Martin Heidegger's philosophy, presented especially in his *Being and Time*⁵¹⁴. It is also interesting that Heidegger takes his core ideas for his destruction of metaphysics from Luther's interpretation of Paul and Luther's formulation of the theology of the cross⁵¹⁵.

With regard to the general critique of philosophical and theological metaphysics, Luther's *Heidelberg Disputation* is the most important and most referred source (also the lectures on the letters of Paul)⁵¹⁶. It is clear that Luther was critical of the predilection of scholastic theology to practice abstract philosophical reflection. Luther's lectures on Paul in the summer of 1516 manifested his obvious dislike for metaphysics: "But alas, how deeply and painfully we are ensnared in categories and questions of what a thing is; in how many foolish metaphysical questions we involve ourselves!"⁵¹⁷

Also in Heidelberg Disputation in 1518 Luther shunted over metaphysics: "He who wishes to philosophize by using Aristotle without danger to his soul must first become thoroughly foolish in Christ."⁵¹⁸ After this, Luther continued to criticize Aristotle's understanding of the eternal nature of the world, contrasting him with Plato, whom he found to be superior. Then he proceeded to the proof his thesis, his *theologia crucis*, wherein he formulated the famous statement "a theologian of the cross calls the thing what it actually is".⁵¹⁹ Stanley interpreted it, suggesting that here Luther "refocuses his interlocutors' attention upon the physicality of Jesus Christ on the cross, while simultaneously calling metaphysical presuppositions into question".⁵²⁰

514 Heidegger 1992. See also Heidegger 2000; Marx 1982; Kisiel 1995, Part 2.

515 Heidegger 2010; Stanley 2010, 14–26; Van Buren 1994a, 159–174 and 1994b, 157–202, 220; Kisiel 1995, Part 1, Chap. 2,3&4; Stanley 2007; Adluri 2013.

516 Luther, Martin, *Luther's Works*, edited by Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehman. American ed. 55 vols. 14, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 38, 41, 51. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1999.

517 Luther, *Works*, 55 vols, 25, p. 361; See also, Stanley 2010, 14–25.

518 Luther, *Works*, vol. 31, p.41.

519 Luther, *Works*, vol. 31, p.53.

520 See, Stanley 2010, 14–25. Stanley highlighted "sight" as an outward vision. Contrary to the "sight" we can note that Laestadius encouraged his readers to turn on the merit of God in the cross of Christ and thus, he seems to emphasize a more emphatic inward relation of faith in order to receive the power of grace, which he believed was the genuine "essence" of Christ.

The foundational idea for Luther was to destruct the objectifying theoretical notions of God and Christian faith as manifested in a so-called theology of glory⁵²¹. Luther formulated a harsh critique of scholastic intellectualism, holding that the proper nature of God cannot be grasped by theoretical-intellectual contemplation or scholastic philosophy.⁵²² For the question concerning the revelation of God, the theology of the cross approached God through the cross and suffering of Christ, and shifts the core emphasis onto an inwardness of faith; for Luther the essence of God cannot be approached and transparently reached by intellect, but instead the grace of God has to be received by “faith alone”⁵²³.

Stanley saw that “[o]ne of the direct ways in which Luther’s ideas demonstrate the critical yet ambiguous relationship to his scholastic contemporaries was in regard to freedom.”⁵²⁴ Luther stated in his Heidelberg Disputation that “free will, after the fall, exists in name only, and as long as it does what it is able to do, it commits a mortal sin.”⁵²⁵

The principal theme in the Heidelberg Disputation, in which Luther proceeds to define the limits of the theory of knowledge, is paying attention to the natural and theological possibilities of human being/life. This is crucially important when reading the debated statement of Luther – “free will, after the fall, has power to do good only in a passive capacity, but it can always do evil in an active capacity.”⁵²⁶ Here is found also that the often referred notion concerning the human being’s possibility to have an influence on his own salvation: “It is certain that man must utterly despair of his own ability before he is prepared to receive the grace of Christ.”⁵²⁷

In theses 19–21 of the *Heidelberg Disputation*, which covers the discussion on the cross of the Christ, Luther’s position is the clearest and indeed lays out his metaphysical stance⁵²⁸:

Thesis 19: “The person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as thought they were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened [Room. 1:20]...⁵²⁹”

521 See, MacGrath 1985; Stanley 2010, 1–21.

522 Cf. Kisiel & Sheehan 2007, 187–195; On the influence of Aristotle’s notion of happiness (Eudaimonia) on later ontotheology of Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and its connection to theology of glory as mere intellectual contemplation of highest being.

523 MacGrath 1985. See further of Luther’s relation to scholastic tradition in Stanley 2010, 16–17.

524 Stanley 2010, 23.

525 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p.48

526 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p. 49.

527 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p. 49. See further of Luther’s breakthrough in Stanley 2010, 23–24.

528 Stanley 2010, 25–27.

529 Luther’s works, vol. 31, p.52. Luther, Martin, *Luther’s Works*, edited by Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehman. American ed. 55 vols. 14, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 38, 41, 51. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1999.

Thesis 20: “He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross ...⁵³⁰”

Thesis 21: “A theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theologian of the cross calls the thing what it actually is.⁵³¹”

These often referenced statements of Luther have broadly inspired different theological and philosophical metaphysicians, and they also have radiated into many dogmatic questions, for instance, the problem of transubstantiation⁵³².

Later Luther added an addendum to Thesis 21: “he who does not know Christ does not know God hidden in suffering.⁵³³” This addendum is seen as including Luther’s goal to fit natural reason and theological reason together. Insofar as God is revealed in the cross of the Christ and when the Christian believer contemplates that horrible death on the cross, the believer has to admit that God does not seem to appear to be revealed at all.⁵³⁴ Stanley concluded that for Luther, then, “there is no way to get from metaphysical reflection to a revelation of Christ’s divinity.⁵³⁵”

However, the cross as the limit of natural reason in the matters of faith includes the idea that natural reason and the “reason of faith” can peacefully co-exist. Faith is not irrational and opposite to the natural reason, but is rather ungraspable by any natural reason, and is able to reach even further than natural reason can⁵³⁶.

530 Luther, Works, vol. 31, vol. 31, p. 52.

531 Luther, Works, vol. 31, vol. 31, p. 53.

532 Stanley writes: “For Luther, the Cross of Christ revealed the being of God, and this is the chief reason why the ‘is’ in Christ’s statement ‘this is my body’ could not be understood in a strictly metaphorical sense.” (Stanley 2010, 27.) If “is” does not refer to its object as a metaphor, but instead to the “nature or essence of Christ” then the reference indicates or coincides the meaning with which Laestadius thought of eucharist as being genuinely received a “in faith mode” and within its inward vital-existential meaning within which the Christ “is present” in the Eucharist as a “object of faith.” If my interpretation of Laestadius’ notion of faith as un-objectifying intentionality is correct, we may see that Laestadius’ notions of God on the Cross encountered through faith and the Jesus’ body and the blood received in Eucharist “in its vitalizing power through faith”, deconstructed the idea of “being” or “is” as God really is present and actualized in the heart of a believer through faith. This notion of actualization could very well be interpreted as Laestadius’ vitalist-existentialistic interpretation; in a transcendental horizon of faith of the heart, the Christ “is present” and “lives” as a vitalizing force in the inward religious existence of the believer.

533 Luther, Works, vol. 31, p. 53.

534 See McGrath 1985, 163 (Luther’s Theology of the Cross); Stanley 2010, 27.

535 Stanley 2010, 27.

536 Stanley states that this does not signify that the cross would be the anti-thesis to human reason. However, Luther encourages his interlocutors to turn their eyes upon the cross, as if it would force man to encounter the impossibility of God in the depravity of human beings, and then the theological truth would become a *real possibility*. (Stanley 2010, 27–28) As McGrath writes: “Though the relation of natural reason and revelation which we have discussed indicates a *diastasis*

Heidegger interprets and inscribes to Luther's theology of the cross, both ontological and epistemological meanings. Based on Luther's Heidelberg disputations (19, 20 and 21) Heidegger, Luther overcomes the prevailing Aristotelian paradigm of the metaphysical notions of being (ousia) or substance, within which the Being is, in the most general sense, conceived of as a "constant presence." The metaphysics of substance and essence also prevailed in scholastic theology. God was mainly conceived of as a "constant presence", the ultimate Being, unmovable mover, and a perennial object of theoretical thinking or human intellect⁵³⁷. This would mean a philosophical notion of God. It would signify the intellectualization of faith and the dismissal of experiential faith that was emphasized by Luther.

Heidegger's interpretation is interesting with respect to this current study. Luther's critique and Heidegger's interpretation constitute the core of Protestant metaphysics, which includes a strong critique of philosophical intellectualism and the use of metaphysical rationalism in matters of faith. Having summarized the basic idea of the theological origin of the critique of Western metaphysics, we can now turn back to *The Lunatic*.

We can begin here with the following citation that highlights Laestadius' particular intention to move from a metaphysics of substance to the ontology of a vital event:

"Once we have been liberated, through the principle of life, from ontology and metaphysics, we only need the given axiom, the dynamics of life, in order to uncover the elements that belong to the sphere of personhood. Through this logical trick (life), we have moved away from the being of the idea (ideväsände) to the life of the idea[s] (idelif); from substantiality to vitality, from the unthinkable idea substantialis to the more thinkable 'idea vitalis'; and even if the idea is not in the principle of life, as Heinroth claims, it is nevertheless present in formed life." (§1206.)

Even though this formulation is not yet aimed at thematizing atonement or reconciliation (as an absolution of the existence or God-relation), it is an anthropological preparatory move toward the notion of vital personhood. Thus, the turn from the

between reason and faith which the creature can not eliminate, it certainly does not imply a divorce between the realms of reason and faith. Far from postulating a double truth, it rather excludes it. Faith is not irrational or contrary to natural reason but rather ungraspable by natural reason. This very conception allows for the reconciliation and harmonization of seemingly contrasting conclusions in science and theology by way of a 'peaceful coexistence.'" (McGrath 1985, 162–3) See also Stanley 2010, 27 footnote 126; Luther, Works, vol. 26, p. 174. Also Gerrish 1962, 69.

537 It has been argued that Heidegger's interpretation of Luther's intentions is inflated. However, Heidegger's interpretation has been influential, thereby gaining many successors in Protestant theology, metaphysics, and phenomenological ontology. For example, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, and all of contemporary France philosophy, including Jean-Luc Marion, Derrida etc.

ideas of essences or beings (*ideväsénde*) to the life of ideas or “thought life” (*idelif*) is definitely Laestadius’ “path into thoughts.” We have seen above that this shift signifies simultaneously the turn from the mere logical analysis of metaphysical rationalism to the analysis of psychophysiological organization, functions, and processes – which lays the ground in general for a constitution of living ideas and cognition in man – and Laestadius’ own [methodological] turn toward lived experience and pre-phenomenological thinking, and thus, to the life of ideas (*idelif*). (Life precedes concepts and ideas)

In this respect, Laestadius offers an alternative way of conceiving the human soul as vital *intensity* and a holistic intentional relatedness with both existence and God. Also, the emphasis on psychic reconciliation plays a crucial role for the event of *unification or the participation* of man and God as a metaphysical necessity in order to return to the originally empowered soul.

Based on his idea of man, Laestadius also explains and re-interprets the character of human psyche, moral and spiritual experience, and the notion of reconciliation, which became his main goal in *The Lunatic*. With respect to the notion of reconciliation, Laestadius elaborated on the original theory of the correlative relation between the triadic man and the Trinity of God, and highlight the concept that reconciliation pertains to the whole Trinity of God and also holistically to the embodied human being. This holistic reconciliation between man and God necessitates both objective and subjective aspects, but Laestadius emphasized the subjective aspect as a “psychic” reconciliation. This “psychic” sphere is also conceived of as the genuine domain of “living” or an inward faith through which the reconciling act of God in his “self-sacrifice” (the Son) can only be received (as it does not fit with the principles of natural reason). Thus, albeit that the reconciliation is the holistic “*unio vitalis*” and pertains to all the persons of God, Laestadius still holds that the possibility of reconciliation progresses through a specific order, so man has to *first* enter the self-conscious state (signifying the recognition of his own vital passionate essence or fundamental deficient character), then *secondly* the affirmation of the reconciling act in the Son, which discloses the actual character of God as (suffering and) having unconditional love and grace (for the sinner) and henceforth leading to the discovery that God exists as an essentially whole and *ultimate Being* (*varandet*). This “*ontotheology*” understood as a three-dimensional force in human life: 1) as the original creative power in nature in the “form”/function of the principle of life and thus an original soul of a human being; 2) as an “imputation” into a factual organic life through the embodied Christ; and 3) as a Holy Spirit re-vitalized through reconciliation with the humane spiritual life and vital consciousness⁵³⁸.

538 Here it can be also analyzed to see how the existence of God has a temporal structure: A genealogical foundation for the principle of life, the historical occasion, and the present possibility in the Son, and disclosed a future possibility in the Holy Spirit. Naturally, this analysis had to be excluded from this study.

Insofar as the emphasis is on encountering the God in Christ through faith, Laestadius' psychophysical insight followed the line of Luther's idea in that God will be properly encountered in the "cross and suffering" through faith, instead of an intellectual reaching toward an ultimate being and cause (substance, essence). More generally, Laestadius' thought relates naturally to the tradition of Protestant metaphysics through its emphasis on the Lutheran critical attitude toward philosophy and the emphasis on "faith alone" (*sola fide*) and the suffering and the cross, but also through a pietistic radicalization of Luther's ideas combined with the vitalist interpretation of the nature of living faith. It seems clear, therefore, that Laestadius was indeed influenced by Luther's anti-philosophy.⁵³⁹

In Laestadius' case, a God encountered through faith does not actually illuminate itself as being, but rather as the "living force" that manifests itself in different ways within nature (the principle of life) in history and also present life (the Son, born and becoming organic life) and in the Holy Spirit as a consciousness brightened and empowered by moral passions and faith.⁵⁴⁰ Laestadius stated that the father creates/is the Son is a necessary essential continuation of his vital essence, and the Son "creates" the world through the Holy Spirit which is the highest constitutive manifestation of the functional essence of the Father, the God. Thus, Father/Mother the God, the ultimate Being (*varandet*) or principle of life creates the world through the Son. As far as Laestadius' opposition to applying rationalistic and metaphysical philosophy to the matters of life and faith formed his general critical stance toward the intellectualization of the notion of God, man, faith and life, *psychic reconciliation can be seen as the core notion* within which the man/God relationship is interpreted in the opposite way, from a holistic experiential perspective that emphasizes the inward encountering of the God instead of using an intellectual approach. This turn into inwardness, the psychological affirmation of the "work of Christ" on the cross and suffering (as a pure gift and offering the possibility of emancipation for the guilty of sin) *can be seen in Luther's terms as a "theology of the cross," contrary to a "theology of Glory."*

Laestadius does not stress the "gaze" on the cross and suffering of the Christ, but he does highlight the necessity of sacrifice and the actualization or experience of the power of grace as revealed in the inwardness of faith in Christ; this sense is thematized in psychic reconciliation as the initial condition for actual reconciliation,

539 Laestadius, of course, could not be familiar with Heidegger's interpretation, but its other roots, such as the pietistic critic against Lutheran orthodoxy as well as the general pietistic critic against Hegelian metaphysics – for example, found in Kierkegaard's philosophy – re-vitalized Heidegger and Laestadius' critics. It is not sure either whether Laestadius knew Kierkegaard's work even though they were contemporaries.

540 Laestadius could have not developed his doctrine of the trinity of God without Bichat's distinctions of principle of life, organic life, and animal life (Sensory life).

contrary to the outer “gaze” or knowledge objective aspect of reconciliation. In this respect, psychic reconciliation includes such an inner evidential experience.

Laestadius anti-philosophy begins with a different theoretical frame than Heidegger’s existentialistic approach. However, the theology of the cross and the pietistic emphasis on subjective experience or inwardness are inscribed into Laestadius’ psychological-philosophical theory. It can be seen not only in the titular critique of metaphysical rationalism, but also fully in the fact that the intellect plays a secondary role with respect to embodied experience (which culminates in the intentionality of faith). Further, this anti-philosophical-epistemological stance overcomes the “mere objective”, “material”, and “spiritual” and pursues to elaborate on the notion of life, which is simultaneously immanent and transcendent (the principle of life as the vital essence of God as well as the essence of a human being).

Laestadius’ whole philosophy aims to make psychic reconciliation necessary and thus entails a psychologization of the theology of the cross. From this perspective, Laestadius fits well within the tradition of Protestant metaphysics, and as we have seen, this inward relation to God and the consequences it is assumed to have in human organic passions and henceforth for human consciousness; the inward relation to God and its cognitive indications seem to have both ontological and epistemological significance. Even if Laestadius began with the notion of the principle of life or vital force in nature given by God (theology of nature), he came to think that the divinity of nature is not given directly to an “empirical gaze” of experience; rather for nature to be disclosed as divine necessitates the religious experience – as only through the religious experience of awakening, is nature conceived as created by God and thus a manifestation of divine force. The being, especially all organic life as animated constitutive and creative life⁵⁴¹, is first of all appreciated as such as a creation of God, and the knowledge about God is from the very beginning experiential and disclosed though both moral passions and living faith. *Thus, we may conclude that in Laestadius’ theory the philosophical and theological metaphysics of substance is coincidentally overcome by a vitalist-existential emphasis and by the emphasis on the theology of cross as affirmed through the notion of psychic reconciliation.*⁵⁴² Life is a dynamic event and enable to

541 To say this about the whole organized physical universe would demand an argument on Laestadius’ radical panpsychism, which cannot be formulated in this study.

542 The similarities between Luther’s theology of the cross and Laestadius’ vitalist-existentialist interpretation of the notion of psychic reconciliation and the “living faith of the heart” disclose an interesting connection with the pioneering Finnish Luther –research: Cf. Mannermaa 1998a and 1998b. Especially Tuomo Mannermaa’s Luther –interpretation regarding the idea of God’s actual presence in faith (Union with Christ) seems to have a similar understanding of Luther’s conception of faith as Laestadius presents. The question of whether Laestadius’ interpretation of “living faith” and “unio vitalis” is an explicit interpretation of Luther’s notion of faith and the cross and whether Laestadius’ idea of psychic reconciliation and living faith included the ideas of participation and divinization are fruitful theological questions for further research. As

approach itself only through experience, feeling, and passions. In this respect, Laestadius' psychophysiological anthropology turns to an ontotheological Christology which, however, also seems to include the "natural philosophical" dimension of the divinity of nature.

5.5.6 Overcoming Philosophical Metaphysics

Presumably inspired also by Luther's critique of metaphysics, Laestadius saw in his context that metaphysical rationalism combined with theological questions created problems.⁵⁴³ What is interesting is that Luther and Laestadius both referred to the need for overcoming metaphysical speculation and they both moved from an objectifying and re-presentational way of looking at metaphysics into the realm of descriptive thematics on inner existential relatedness. For Luther, it was Aristotelian metaphysics (scholastic Aristotelianism) that objectified God and the theology of glory that embraced God only in its *eidos* or outward essence (achieved by intellect). According to Laestadius' critique, it was the later currents of rationalism (Cartesian tradition) and German idealism (especially Hegelianism) in the 1800's context that misled theology scholars/philosophers into objectified notions of God, faith and man. Luther and Laestadius do share the basic trend of critiques when criticizing philosophical theology on idealistic speculation, which then misled them from correct understanding of a living Graceful God and idea of man as an embodied fleshly being. For Luther, the shift meant a move to the intentional sphere of faith as the inner basis for meanings; this view emerges in the Heidelberg disputation in the questions of "what really Is" and seeing the Cross as revealing the true God within the (suffering and) faith. For Laestadius, the emphasis of an own-most faith and reconciliation is also explained by the anthropological argument of primality of subjective consciousness and metaphysical necessity (psychic reconciliation) so as to move from the metaphysics of substance into the metaphysics of a vital event.

demonstrated above, Laestadius elaborated on the insight of the idea of a "union with Christ" and an empowered embodied soul through a living faith, but to make plausible claims in this respect would demand more detailed analysis and further interpretation. Altogether, if it could be shown that Laestadius' notions of faith and reconciliation did encompass particular ideas of participation and divinization, then the discussion on the "New Finnish interpretation" would naturally have a new advocate from the school of "Old Swedish interpretation."

543 Critique of "hylomorphism" and the emphasis of humoral secretion (§996.); See also §997, §998, §1202 to note how Laestadius claimed that the philosopher postulates essence and substance into the God. Further Laestadius applies vitalist criticism of rationalism, dualism and mechanism into contemporary philosophical theological context arguing its God to become highest Being, keeping immaterial dualist soul, abstract personhood and falsely see human being free and moral in-itself without outer justification. In §681 Laestadius insist that emotions and passions precede concepts and thus metaphysics.

For both Luther and Laestadius, the character of God is revealed in the “suffering and the Cross” (for Laestadius, God is suffering and self-sacrificing, but above all also gracious). God can be encountered through own embodied suffering, through awakening through the breakdown of human egoism and the affirmation of Grace as a pure [emancipatory] gift. This encountering of the “proper” Christian God, not an outer essence represented by intellect and reason, occurs through experiential faith, or in Laestadius’ case, through subjective consciousness or “inner” intentionality of faith (psychic reconciliation).

Proper understanding of the phenomena of life, human beings, and God has to be based on an inner experience of the heart rather than any rationalistic metaphysical and re-presentational conceptualization. The result of these shifts is to open up an anti-intellectualistic and existential stance for the ontology of the events of life and faith, and the possibility of reconciliation.

We can assume that Laestadius had in mind Luther’s harsh critique against scholastic Aristotelianism and the applications of the ideas of substance and essence that led to an abstract idea of essence of God as ultimate being and unmovable mover. To put it briefly, Laestadius’ endeavor here was to shift from thinking about “outward essences (eidos)”, which indicated intellectualism, to inner experiential thought, which now signified a more “existentialistic” approach. In this way, the embodied character of the human being, as well as the “hiddenness of God,” are grasped experientially, not only through reason, but also holistically in the experiential domain of faith. Thus, “faith” in Laestadius’ case meant embodied *passional intentionality that was contrary to mere intellectual relation*. In a sense, Laestadius’ “metaphysical turn” to vitalist existentialism can be perceived as inscribing Luther’s distinction between the theology of the glory and the theology of the cross into his own theory.

This “turn” also has interesting philosophical implications: It is not possible to conceive of the whole of human life by only a rationalistic “gaze” or conceptualizations of being (seiende), but instead to conceive that whole as an event of life, tensions of natural and moral passions, and influences of surrounding world. These events and tensions lay the fundamental ground (passional, mood) for every meaning (being) of human life. In this sense, it can be interpreted that God is similar to Being as the horizon for all meanings of the manifestations of Being. Human life or being whatsoever is disclosed/revealed within/through passions, and finally on the basis of an intentionality of faith that overcomes the “constant presence” (ousia) and the substantiality, and releases human existence into its inner experiential sphere of the event of life.

Because God is not properly encountered by intellect, but rather necessitates an inner experiential grasp of faith, faith remains secret to reason.⁵⁴⁴ Because religious experience as a lived experience is based on pre-cognitive passions, faith is not possible to be fully conceptualized and thematized by reason and understanding⁵⁴⁵. From this clearly thematized position, Laestadius moved toward an alternative approach, toward the evidence of heart that was for him a more reliable source of evidence than reason in matters of life and faith.

According to Laestadius, faith has to be understood in terms of passions and emotion, as a living faith is constituted of “high heavenly emotions”; religion can be understood only in terms of passions, so religion cannot be objectified and defined precisely:

544 The core of Laestadius’ philosophy exists and tightens around the question of the nature and possibility of the religious experiences of awakening, conversion and reconciliation. Therefore, Laestadius’ philosophy can be interpreted as holistic and a pre-phenomenological explanation of the necessity of change of mind to which the word *Metanoia* refers in the Bible. Within a theological context, Laestadius’ view of conversion and reconciliation is quite classical Lutheran-pietistic with an emphasis on one’s own most and inner need for religious experience on which the passivity of will in favor of outer “imputation” of grace plays a crucial role (in the change of the heart). In the anthropological direction, it is also important to notice how Laestadius’ scientific and pre-phenomenological descriptions tried to explicate *metanoia* not only as a change of mind, but also the change in the whole embodied intentional directedness of the human being.

In the frames of philosophical anthropology or philosophical theology, Laestadius’ theory also reveals a connection to a more general shift in the metaphysical approach towards *metanoia*: Laestadius saw Western rationalism and metaphysics as inadequate approaches for discovering the true nature and meaning of the embodied religious experiences of awakening and reconciliation. His main idea was that reason is not the faculty of the soul within which faith and matters of life can be understood. Also, idealistic ideas of immaterial soul as the essence of a human being as well as the whole stance of metaphysics of substance are insufficient approaches.

Laestadius’ thesis was that – in understanding faith and existential matters of life, sorrow and joy – research had to move from the perspective of the idea of substances to the idea of vital processes. Laestadius saw that the idea of substance and the reflections of reason led to misunderstanding of the essence of the human being as well as in understanding the living God correctly because both objectified and created unneeded dichotomies (such as body and mind). He saw that vitalistic monism was more dynamic, heuristic, and experientially more plausible ground for understanding and explication. (*Metanoia* as a fundamental change in embodied intentionality cannot be explained by the metaphysics of substance and rationalism, but only in terms of monistic vitalism and medical psychology. BY forming the anthropological theory of *metanoia* and grounding it in vitalism, Laestadius thematizes an alternative metaphysical position that contrasted with the rationalistic-metaphysical doctrine of man. Laestadius thus created the metaphysics of event or process by positing man in an organic body and a factual world.)

545 Laestadius emphasized that matters of faith and life have to be understood by the heart, thus referring to the grounding level of subjective consciousness as a pre-cognitive and unconscious sphere: Matters of faith and life are not given as any direct empirical or rationalistic perception, but rather through an inner embodied experience and these matters are always mediated through the passions, emotions, drives, instincts, intuition, and the spiritual conscience!

“Living faith consists in exalted heavenly feelings that are perceptible within the heart, and these feelings cannot be described with words; they cannot be defined since the intellect is unable to reflect upon these feelings or bring them to clarity through concepts (see section B.B.). Therefore, religion cannot be defined even though the apostle Paul tried to define faith, just as most theologians have tried to define religion. But they have not succeeded since the definitions are very different. How could it be possible to define faith, which is a living feeling, a passion, when not even natural love can be defined, nor grief or fear; passions of which one is unable to say anything more than that they are feelings! For this reason, then, affairs of love contain a ‘mysticism’ that only lovers are able to grasp, not with intellect, but with the heart.” (§1557, see Chapter DD.)

From this discussion, we can conclude that Laestadius’ monistic vitalism signified a certain kind of ontology of event and also a partially hermeneutic endeavor to understand the fundamental pre-cognitive initial conditions of faith and the possibility of a change in an embodied intentionality (awakening). From this perspective, Laestadius’ theory of awakening or conversion – in terms of the meaning of metanoia - suggested not only a “change of mind”, but also a change in the whole embodied pre-cognitive intentionality [of being-in-the-world].

It is similar to Pascal saying that the “heart has its reasons that reason does not know” or Kierkegaard emphasizing “the Leap” as an existential necessity of decision-making without any rational objective evidence, when Laestadius emphasizes the “living faith of the heart”. It was actually the whole deconstructed Biblical idea of soul that came into question in Laestadius’ case:

“But the simple man judges the soul according to what he feels. May not feeling be as reliable a source of knowledge as intellect and reason, especially in matters that lie beyond the grasp of both intellect and reason? Neither intellect nor reason is capable of obfuscating (jäfva bort) or rejecting as lies (göra till lögn), that which man feels within himself.” (§58.)

In terms of the emphasis on the evidence of heart (passions, moods) instead of rationalistic intellectual evidence, we can use a fragment from Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as even more fundamental ontological grounding for Laestadius’ endeavor:

”Phenomenally, we would wholly fail to recognize both *what* mood discloses and *how* it discloses, if that which is disclosed were to be compared with what Dasein is acquainted with, knows, and believes ‘at the same time’ when it has such a mood. Even if Dasein is ‘assured’ in its belief about its

‘whiter’, or if, in rational enlightenment, it supposes itself to know about its ‘whence’, all this counts for nothing as against the phenomenal facts of the case: for the mood brings Dasein before the ‘that-it-is’ of its ‘there’, which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma. From the existential-ontological point of view, there is not the slightest justification for minimizing what ‘evident’ in state-of mind, by measuring it against the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something which is purely present-at-hand [object-like]. However the phenomena are no less falsified when they are banished to the sanctuary of the irrational. When irrationalism, as the counter play of rationalism, talks about the things to which rationalism is blind, it does so with a squint.” (Heidegger 1992, *Being and Time* §29, p. 175)

Based on this critical assessment of the distinction between rationalism and irrationalism, Heidegger’s intention was to thematize attunement or mood (*Befindlichkeit der Stimmung*) as an original existential-ontological “structure” of the revelation of a thing, being, or event. Rationalism, by focusing its theoretical gaze to mere present-at-hand or objectified being, overrides the experiential phenomena (thus, signifying empiricism in its trues essence) as well as emotivism by emphasizing that the psychological dimension misses the ontological-existential character of attunement as an opening structure of being or thing as such.

What is interesting here then is that Laestadius saw rationalism as a form of objectifying approach and likened to empiricism, as it missed the phenomenal-experiential sphere of spirit-life [the domain of faith as subjective consciousness]⁵⁴⁶. For Laestadius, rationalism was calculating along with objectivity and an objectified being in a theoretical gaze without exploring the things through the experiential stand point of the subjective consciousness or “heart”. Laestadius emphasized passions as grounding the intentional correlates of the things and matters perceived as to whether the object of *idélif* [life of the idea or thought life] is the world, God, or a thing whatsoever. Laestadius did not simply reduce passions to human biology, but rather saw them as synonymous to the world; thus, passions are always awakened by sense perceptions, but they simultaneously also direct the gaze of objective cognition and consciousness. Laestadius also interpreted passions as a phenomenal-experiential grounding of the human intentionality of being-in-the-world⁵⁴⁷. For Laestadius, the heart forms the core and center of passions, and thus any change of intentionality has to begin in the sphere of organic passions, not the objective consciousness of the mind.

546 Laestadius saw rationalists sometimes as materialists and sometimes as spiritualists. He directly opposed both materialist psychology and transcendentalism.

547 See, Chapter 4.2.4 Passions as Vital-Intentional Correlates (nexus).

However, Laestadius was critical of an emotivism that leads to moral relativism. Following the emotions awakened by more noble passions is to rely on the relative ground within which both human action and thought depends on the mere rivalry of the impacts of natural passions. Instead, he claimed that spiritual awakening that directly touches subjective consciousness is necessary for any genuine moral change of mind; in other words Laestadius realized that grounding the forces of passions in flesh and in the world constituted the underlying basis for intentionality and repentance (kr. metanoia) or moral development as such. Awakening as a conflict of natural and moral passions constituted the self-aware state that makes either moral or spiritual change possible.

5.5.7 Capturing Metaphysics

Life as phenomena and a worldly immanent-transcendental occasion is not dealt in terms of being (ontology and metaphysics), but rather in terms of vitalism (vital force) and an experiential-moral description as a dynamic event, development, (evolution), a continuous change, a tension between forces, and life and death. Life cannot be re-presented as conceptually transparent, for it cannot be objectified by an intellect that belongs to the physical constitution of life itself. Thus, life cannot be grasped by any representation in its deepest significance by the intellect. Life is a mystery, and this characteristic has to be secured within the theological dogmatic and genuine religious faith. However, life can be approached by experience, in the form of passion, emotion and feeling; this inner entrance into the life can reveal life in terms of its inner and un-categorized meaning.

However, despite the holistic critique and the fight against metaphysical rationalism in anthropology and theology, Laestadius had to lean on metaphysics, as we have seen here, and use the language of metaphysics of substance and essence, even if in its re-defined significance. As a consequence of moving between scientific-psychological and religious discourses, Laestadius' theory was captivated by the Western metaphysical theorization. This view is present, for instance, when he called the horizon of all beings and phenomena of life by the concept of God as "absolute being".

Here Laestadius' physiological transcendentalism shows its perennial metaphysical character. The ontological difference between absolute Being (*varandet*) and being is made explicit. Coincidentally, the principle of life is conceived as something autonomous and transcendental from matter itself even though it does have to function through matter. God and His manifestation in nature – the principle of life – signifies the absolute transcendental horizon, *varandet*, of being whatsoever:

“But the physicians who posit the soul as substance and the body as contingent cannot reasonably be accused of materialism. They proceed from the principle that matter is ‘ens contingens’: something that can exist or

not exist, but need not necessarily exist, because it does not contain within itself the foundation of its existence. In relation to God, which is *absolute Being* (varandet) matter can never be substantive, only contingent, since its foundation lies in something beyond matter itself.” (§54.)

This citation shows that Laestadius had to lean on the metaphysical conceptions of essence (väsen) and Being (varandet), even if he tried to rid himself of such philosophical terms. Thus, his critique of Western metaphysics had to be conceived only as a re-evaluation and deconstruction of theological and ontological notions from the given vitalist and experiential point of view, and for a given historical epoch. Thus, the most valuable insights of his critique of Western metaphysics and ontology (being and Being, essence and substance) is included in his critique of the idealistic and rationalistic notions of soul, faith, and God. Laestadius’ critique of metaphysical rationalism and ontology strove to offer a more dynamic alternative account so as to destruct and deconstruct the objectifying conceptions prevailing in his times. However, as a consequence of its attachment with tradition, Laestadius’ theory remained ontotheological, as it held that God as an “ultimate Being” was the horizon, foundation, source, and ground for all of existence.

5.5.8 Eternal Soul and Resurrection

Laestadius insisted on a vital-existential understanding of the phenomena of life and faith. Coincidentally, Laestadius compared the kingdom of heaven as an internal condition to the classical phenomena that vitalists used to explain the functioning of vital force: As well as God, a human being is also a immanent-transcendence within which the transcendental remains:

“When we say that the feelings are objectivized into living visions (the explanation of which falls to the physiologist), we have thus hinted at our conviction, that ‘visionary only sees his own feelings,’ ‘he sees the Savior and the kingdom of heaven in his own heart.’ However, since the Savior has said that ‘the kingdom of God is within you,’ (Luke 17:21) the philosopher needs to prove that the kingdom of God is not internal, within man, but somewhere outside of him; in the sun, in the moon, or in the stars. The philosopher has too little faith, or no faith at all, in the empirical discoveries that the physiologist is able to show concerning somnambulism, animal magnetism (sv. animala magnetismen, hypnosis), nightmares (maran), visions, and dreams, along with other physio-psychic phenomena, the real existence which he is unable to deny, yet he does not believe in them any more than he wants to, because he cannot comprehend them. And yet, he claims to know more than the other people about spiritual matters, even

though he does not have the least understanding of life and its dynamics, which is taking place right before his eyes. How much does the philosopher understand of his own dreams? How much does he understand of grief, joy, jealousy, hatred, and other passions, the effects of which he sees with his own eyes every day?” (§1340.)

This citation is clearly connected with our earlier analysis of non-sensory perceptions within conscience.⁵⁴⁸ In life, vital force or the principle of life is a psychic quality achieved through lived experience. However, Laestadius seems to have been influenced by natural scientific ideas and conceived of the principle of life as being analogical to physical laws when he conceived it as a quantity after death. Laestadius held that the force of life is a particular form of natural law: “Life is a quality, but when the body dies, life becomes a quantity.” (§64.)

This is not quite an original thought, as many seventeenth/eighteenth century physicians admired mechanist theorizing, and especially, Newton commonly acclaimed it in his accurate explications of the laws of nature. This Newtonian influence led some vitalists, for example, Bathez, to conceive of the vital principle parallel to Newton’s law of gravitation, except for having it pertain to organic life (not physical inert matter)⁵⁴⁹. Altogether, the vital principle as a law-like organization was seen as analogical to the laws of physics, which could only be perceived through their effects, manifestations, and “conclusions.”

In Laestadius’ thought, the idea of vital force as a quantity is present, especially when he anticipates the accusations of materialism; materialist or naturalistic rationalization would naturally have to include an account of the possibility of immortality and resurrection of the soul. In this regard Laestadius referred to the law of constancy [of force], stating that no philosopher had yet been able to prove that the mass of matter and force would dissipate/disappear simultaneously:

“The above-mentioned psychological thesis—that the soul is a life and not being (våsen) – is likely to be countered by the philosopher by claiming that what is merely a property of the body – such as, for instance, organic life –

548 Also in *The Voice of the One Crying* Laestadius states that the visions and revelations can be explained only by the help of physiology which is the part of the science of medicine (Laestadius 1988, 38.) Furthermore Laestadius held that visions can be explained as thoughts actualized within embodied passional life within which they become “subjective truth.” In turn this psychosomatic process also explained how “subjective matter can be understood subjectively. Or how the feelings of the heart can change to visible pictures in one’s subjective consciousness.” (Laestadius 1988, 54–55.) If my interpretation is correct, Laestadius here describes his naturalistic view of the visions and revelations as increased force of passions and its impact on consciousness that he later explained in more detail in *The Lunatic*. See about passions also in Laestadius 1988, 22–23.

549 Haigh 1977, 1–14.

must cease when the body ceases to exist. If the soul is merely a property of the body, rather than being (väsen) or substance, then it must vanish when the body dies. But if we were to accept the philosopher's own notions of time and space, which he often employs in regard to transcendental matters, then no quantities can exist beyond time and space. If the soul is of an *intensive* rather than *extensive* order – that is to say, force – then no philosopher has yet been able to prove that matter and force are destroyed at the same time; or that force must dissipate when matter ceases to be.” (§138.)

Even if the idea of the constancy “of force” might have been adopted from Petrelli's *Psychologie* (§88), it seems that Laestadius preferred, or at least flirted with, the idea of a constancy of force, and he seemed to imply that the immortality of soul could be understood, if not explained, in analogical way to the law of constancy. If doable, Laestadius seemed to think that the principle of life as the force (kraft) of the soul could transform or change from quality to quantity in death⁵⁵⁰.

Laestadius claimed that the natural philosophical idea that says that nature emerges through the “blind force of nature,” and acquires consciousness through man, lacks a sufficient rational principle (principium rationis sufficientis). Natural philosophers have not been able to prove that the “blind force of nature,” can function without preconditions. Laestadius questioned the emergence of the “force of nature” and referred to Plato by stating that the

“sharpest thinkers have been forced to realize and admit that the institution of nature pre-supposes both will and intellect; it presupposes an idea that has been actualized. Plato's anima mundi [the soul of the world] was not unconscious force (medvetlös naturakraft).” (§1600.)

Laestadius was especially worried that the doctrine of only the abstract or ideal forces of nature would lead to pantheism, panpneumatism, naturalism, dualism, and fatalism, and thus wanted to highlight that his stance was a rather limited panpsychism, which would presumably avoid the [unchristian] problematic stances of natural philosophies:

”Moreover, the doctrine of the forces of nature leads, by its logical extension, to pantheism, naturalism, dualism, and fatalism. To be sure, we have

550 Does this idea signify that original soul as the principle of life, is not personal or qualitative after death? Does this signify the end of experientiality, a qualitative character? Is the human soul the same? What part of the soul and how does the soul change in death? (i.e., Heart as the organ of the principle of life). It is notable that we cannot find much depictions and characterizations of the life after death from The Lunatic.

previously in these treatise accepted 'panpsycicism' within the material part of man, but we have not accepted 'panpneumatism,' which would lead to pantheism within nature. At the same time we have accepted the substantiality of matter, but no one has been able to accept the substantiality of life, since the very concept of substance and being (väsens) are materialistic. However, since many sharp thinkers have assumed that matter is an 'ens contingens,' something that can be and not be, from which it follows that matter does not possess substantiality, but must be considered as 'contingent,' which certainly destroys materialism in its darkest hollows; while many great thinkers also assume the substantiality of both body and soul, that is to say, of both matter and life, or force; even as idealism assumes that the idea is the real substance; we are unable to assume that any of these several unproven hypotheses is true. Rather, in the question of substance and non-substance, we must follow the guidance of revelation, which teaches us that the world will be annihilated and disappear, and that man's body shall become immortal through the power of resurrection, the life force will be heightened (stegra) to the extent that it negates gravity and other characteristics of matter, which can be concluded from transfigured body of Christ. From this, one may also conclude that the force (characteristics) of matter can be altered." (§1601.)

Following classical vitalist ideas and expanding the notion of having a vital force for life philosophical and theological directions Laestadius elaborated on the fundamentals of his philosophy of religion. He held that passions can cause even death, but the re-vitalizing force of God (the principle of life as original soul vitalized through grace) can heighten any corrupting powers and resist the forces of death (§738, 739). In this way, the vitalistic interpretation of soul and grace offer a key insight into the possibility of eternal life. The principle of life, the actualization of God's eternal thought in nature, signifies a creative energetic principle and an eternal principle of human life. Thus, Laestadius seemed to offer a quite classical Christian idea on an evidentialistic way. The carnal worldly *life* of human beings is a passage through the world; the eternal vital force (Life) in man finally returns to its own foundation or source (Uphov).

5.6 Summary: Faith As Un-objectifying Intentionality

In the previous Chapters (2, 3, and 4), I have shown how Laestadius attached his apology of Christian pietism on medical vitalist philosophy and followed its basic ideas. He deconstructed the mind-body dualism and dealt with it in vitalist physiological

terms, especially leaning on Bichat's distinction between organic life and animal life, and elaborating further on his own ideas of objective and subjective consciousness.

Laestadius also elaborated on his theory of the "moral" and the "spiritual" on the physiological plane and replaced mind-body dualism with a relative distinction between physiological (the flesh) and moral/spiritual (the spiritual) which were however, conceived as constitutively interrelated domains. Laestadius used the term "moral" to indicate the "psychic" and "spiritual" domain of human existence. Thus, "physiological" and "moral/spiritual" encompass both the "mental" or psychic phenomena, irreducible simply to a distinct "rational soul" or consciousness, and the physiological phenomena, irreducible to mere inert matter and its functioning mechanisms. This undertaking was done by referring to the notion of the principle of life as original soul and a constitutive force within matter.

In regard to the above analysis, Laestadius seemed to have scientific explanations and justifications for experiential pietistic faith, religious experience, as well as for his own use of powerful poetic sermons. It becomes understandable that Laestadius demanded real embodied experiences as the basis of learning, moral progress, and genuine own-most faith because he perceived (following Bichat) that mere outer "knowledge" which is only "in the head" is unable to awaken deep embodied experiences (as it does not affect the subjective consciousness) that can influence experiential change. In other words, "strong embodied experiences" are needed for learning and spiritual awakening. Outer knowledge, Laestadius argued, does not reach the level of blessedness/salvation. Laestadius saw experientiality as being very important, as formulated and emphasized by the terms of passions, heart, conscience, and the subjective consciousness, and unconsciousness.

Whatever the combinations of different organic functions – whether impulses, humoral activity of the liver, kidneys or genital organs – Laestadius saw as evident that organic organization and its vital functions lay the groundwork for motion, voluntary and in-voluntary action, and a higher sensory or cognitive life, and thus also a grounding for morality and spirituality⁵⁵¹.

Laestadius' insight naturally raised questions. Are moral habits and personal characters determined by physiological laws? Is there any room for freedom of will

551 Thus, even the physiological seat of the organic body is depicted in a quite rough way from the perspective of modern medicine, as it still remains analogical, at least formally, to the present day physiological-materialistic explanation of consciousness. Organic functions influence the organs of consciousness and mind, manifesting as different cognitions, such as emotions and thought, depending on their varying contents. In psychological research, the power of the use of pictures, music, and lyrical speech is generally recognized. (Vitalists as well as Laestadius have been well aware of the power of sermons and pictures; physicians as well as priests who are familiar with vitalist doctrines of pathology have certainly applied their knowledge to curing people (in matters of the soul and body)...

and autonomy (however framed and conceived)? Why is humoral activity conceived as a “moral element,” and does that view entail forcing human freedom, autonomy, morality and habituality to have more to do with humoral activity (secretion) than neural sensual functioning? Are neural functions the grounding of deterministic activity and is the humoral a source of change, variability, and more voluntary activity (both sympathetic and autonomous nervous systems)? Altogether, despite the fact that Laestadius overcame dualism with respect to both origin and cause (as mind and body have the same common principle of life as their basis), his theory offers another kind of function dualism on the physiological plane which manifests as the distinction between the physical and the moral/spiritual⁵⁵².

Conflict between the passions is dealt with on the physical plane, perceptibly in a naturalistic fashion and partly even mechanistically in vitalist terms. These examples reveal that Laestadius’ way of conceiving the character and action of the human person can be fundamentally explained in terms of two distinct systems that influence the organs of sensory life (brain). Laestadius seemed to conceive the distinction between humoral and neural effects as concomitant, but also as somehow interactive with regard to their effects on each other and their object, the brain. Also, moral impact (experience) is explained on a physical level as humoral activity that manifests itself as a “distancing” or debilitating influence on a natural sensual impact (functioning mostly through nerves).

We can thus conclude that the physical itself includes a tension, which may manifest in either subjective consciousness or spiritual conscience as “moral”, “something else than mere physical”; the emergence of conflict, tension, or temporally variable effects of such passions signifies itself as “psychic” phenomena, and thus also “moral” phenomena. Personal characteristics and habits are seen as based on individually varying unique functions of the organic life, while also the possibility of the moral is conceived to be based on the conflict of passions on the physical level. With respect to the transcendental and supersensory experiences as psychic phenomena, they were interpreted in a way that transcendental was originally found within the organism or flesh itself. A sensible human organism transcends itself via different levels, such as sensory capabilities, affects, emotions, and cognitions agitated by the psychophysical impacts of passions, and finally by means of religious experiences, such as the calling voice of God within an awakened conscience (lower parts of the subjective consciousness).

The philosophical-psychological endeavor to hold the physical, moral and spiritual together and analyze them on the same physiological plane created an interesting dilemma within which Laestadius found he had to conceive main concepts, such as heart, passions, subjective consciousness and conscience, in a more holistic sense

552 Cf. Azouvi 2006, 275.

(“dual-meaning”) having simultaneously all modes of existence – the physical, psychic/moral, and metaphysical/spiritual. In defining especially passions a-metaphysically as “existences” without substance and essence and exposing their organic influences Laestadius elaborated on a conception of man that includes both immanent-physical and transcendental-psychological domains. Thus, Laestadius’ philosophical stance can be named physiological transcendentalism to highlight the critical distance to metaphysical rationalism or transcendentalism that was prevailing in the anthropology and theology of his time.

In regard to the notion of spiritual perception, it is possible to offer a philosophical interpretation of moral “disgust” and awakened self-awareness. They constitute the reflective distance to the person itself and to the present world. It was obvious that disgust (*avsky*) did not signify a theoretical reflective distance of gaze, but instead, a holistic embodied and physiological distancing condition toward the natural passions of the flesh and present worldly nature of the world. Thus, moral disgust and spiritual self-awareness replaced, as a spiritual-moral existence, the transcendental sphere of a “rational soul”. Still, they both are irreducible to mere consciousness (imagination or phantasy) or mere physiology. The moral and spiritual reflection is natural vital phenomenon and grounded in an embodied and empirical spatio-temporal relatedness (situatedness).

The experiential “living faith of the heart” (*fides subjektiva*), is not defined in terms of intellectual cognitive intentionality (of beliefs), but rather in terms of passions and emotions as embodied in the pre-reflective intentionality of subjective consciousness, which thus overcomes the intellectualistic re-presentational notion of faith (and the Deistic notion of God). Viewed from a philosophical perspective, faith, Laestadius seemed to signify there was a *fundamental embodied un-objectifying intentionality* – not just an intentionality of intellect – which opened simultaneously an alternative view of Western objectifying metaphysics and an original vitalist perspective of a Christian-pietistic existence. A living faith as experiential-emotional, and thus “secret” in its character, thus precedes all theological and intellectual conceptualizations.

In Laestadius’ use of the concepts, the moral and spiritual are often synonymous, and his idea of faith was inextricably attached to morality. Living such spirituality interpreted as the “living with conscience and God” naturally entailed Christian morality of his time. However, Laestadius’ apology of pietism emphasized strongly the ultimate authority and freedom of conscience which altogether highlighted religious tolerance and freedom of religion. Un-objectifying intentionality entails epistemological indications as well as moral and spiritual summons. The precedence of experience is emphasized both in the moral and the spiritual sense. (§1277, 1278.) Generally speaking, therefore, experience precedes knowledge.

Laestadius’ anthropological-theological grounding was supposed not only to constitute a scientific apology of pietism, but also to form a more general explanatory

basis for reformers' – such as Luther and Augustine's – views on human life, faith, and God. Laestadius claimed that medical vitalism could serve as an explanatory basis for the Biblical understanding of human life, faith, and God. He sensed that vital force as original soul was embedded to organism itself, thereby coinciding with the ancient idea of soul as the “breath of life”; thus, the human soul was not separated from the organic body, but rather conceived as the breathing or “life of the body” itself. Theologically, the principle of life means the blow of God into Adam; the living soul of man was blown by God into Adam's nostrils. Therefore, mankind was considered as a continuation of the principle of life. Laestadius seemed to be convinced that medical vitalism did scientifically explain the Biblical idea of human life/soul and especially the Hebrew idea of heart as the center of all human thought, action, and intentionality (psyche, pneuma, soma). (§§1274, 1281, 218, 87–88.)⁵⁵³

553 Especially, the main vitalist concept of the principle of life is interpreted as the living soul of man given to Adam via the blow of God, which is assumed to coincide with the Hebrew understanding of “logos” as a living power, and heart as the center of a vital force, and thus, the core of intentionality.

Concluding Remarks: The Philosophy of the Sensory-Intensive Human

Laestadius' philosophy became a unique manifestation of classical ideas of medical vitalism in a Nordic spiritual context. *The Lunatic* was conceived as an application of the classical vitalist philosophy for defending and justifying North Scandinavian Lutheran-pietistic religiosity and humanity. In this respect, Laestadius' "system" extends beyond classical medical vitalism and is applicable to those questions and phenomena beyond the usual medical ken of vitalism.⁵⁵⁴ Simultaneously, it offered detailed critique of enlightenment rationalism, Western metaphysical positions that dominated the theology and anthropology of Lutheran orthodoxy during the 1800's.

Laestadius can be seen as a successor of enlightenment and romantic science and philosophy in the same sense as the medical vitalists viewed themselves. The Enlightenment era was not united but did include debates on basic elements and theoretical approaches, such as vitalism-mechanism, within which the intellect and emotions were emphasized in varying ways. Laestadius' philosophy offered in *The Lunatic* is the systematic rationalization of religious faith and explains pietistic spirituality in scientific-philosophical terms. Thus, Laestadius also had clear transmission-theological interests. He grounded his religious views on the science of man, contemporary psychology, and the vitalist philosophy, and even elaborated on them for his own purposes, especially with regard to the philosophical theology of reconciliation, anthropology, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of mind. As an apology, justification, and scientific explication of Northern pietism, vitalism became the main theoretical perspective for Laestadius. Indeed, he highlighted that "his teaching" and Northern pietism were well grounded on a clear "system".

"The primary purpose of this treatise is to show the psychological perspectives that have provided the foundation for the author's sermons, which, on the other hand, have been considered Jesuitism, fanaticism (svärmeri), and indecency, but on the other hand, have had a remarkable impact on the hearts of those who have heard it. If the author is able, through these treatise, to convince some of the intellectuals that there is a consistent system of thought underlying this so-called fanaticism, then the semi-educated who are not bothered with thought may continue to call him a

554 Cf. Williams 2003, 277

Jesuit and say: 'thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil.'" (Laestadius 2015, *The Lunatic*, Foreword, p. 16.)

His clear message was that pietistic experiential religiosity is not only a fanatic and emotional form of religiosity, but also presents a clear idea of man and an understanding of Christian God and faith – a system – based on it. This system is thematized in *The Lunatic* to reveal and justify the pietistic idea of man and the character of religiosity – or “the order of Grace” within the state of Sweden and the Lutheran Church.

In terms of the title, *The Lunatic – An Insight Into the Order of Grace*, it seems obvious that beside the “Biblical authors” its “Insight” refers to vitalism, whereas “the order of Grace” refers to the pietistic-Lutheran and Biblical understanding of faith and God that Laestadius defended and justified at a time when pietism was marginalized by the Conventicle Edict.

The term “Dårhushjonet” (The Lunatic) is more complicated, and Laestadius stated that it could refer to many different things.⁵⁵⁵ Laestadius did not refer directly to the Scriptures when he spoke of choosing the title, but in the letter where he touches on the title, Laestadius cited 1. Kor. 4:10: “Vi äre dårar för Christi skull; men I ären kloke I Christo ...”⁵⁵⁶ Åberg proposes that one could also think about Rom. 1:21:22: “... då de höllo sig för visa, äro de vorne dårar ...”⁵⁵⁷ In a broad sense, we could also think of the biblical story about the confrontation of the Apostle Paul and philosophers in Athena where the Apostle views Christianity as madness (dåre) for the Greeks, referring to philosophers by the “Greeks”. It looms in the background of the word, “Lunatic.” It is sometimes assumed that Laestadius indicated with the “Dårhushjonet” those pietistic believers who were sometimes considered as insane and sent to mental hospitals because of their emphasis on their experiential-emotional faith and striking religious experiences (affective religious enthusiasm, “liikutukset” in Finnish).⁵⁵⁸

However, during the 1800's when philosophic-theological speculation also flourished in Sweden, those theologians and philosophers who applied speculative philosophy and science to matters of faith were in public discussion called “Dårhushjon.” Åberg suggested that the title has a double reference: On the one hand it referred to speculative philosophers as lunatics (dårhushjon) in light of the new empirical sciences and even from the perspective of scripture and its psychological insights. On the other hand, those who were considered to be lunatics (dårhushjon) in the eyes of the world and the officials of the church actually proved to be advised and

555 See, Bäcksbakca 1938

556 See, Bäcksbakca 1997, Inledning till Dhj, Part 2, p. XIX; Åberg 1997, 43.

557 Åberg 1997, 43.

558 Cf. Åberg 1997, 42.

driven by the spirit of God.⁵⁵⁹ Altogether, by choosing the title, the *Dårhushjonet* suggest that Laestadius identified himself as a philosophical theologian who wanted to join in the contemporary discussion on the nature and role of religion in society, and the discussion concerning anthropology and the role of the intellect and virtues in matters of faith and life.

Leaving the question open about the significance of “*Dårhushjonet*” in the title, I would dare to propose here an alternative philosophical interpretation. Could “*Dårhushjonet*” refer to the more general philosophical quest for a holistic understanding of humane well-being and moral pathology? Classical vitalists were more interested about the variable phenomena of life; normal and pathological, illness, health, and physiological ground of mental functions without excluding cultural-social, linguistic, spiritual, and environmental factors. In this respect, the vitalists emphasized susceptibility – the passional, emotional, and experiential character – of being human, whereas the rationalists seemed to emphasize the soul as a distinct “rational principle” of life in a functioning “human machine”. The classical Cartesian soul/body dichotomy was deconstructed in the vitalist approach, as they held that the mind or soul existed as a vital principle or life force in the actual organic matter. Also, mentality was thereafter considered as being grounded in physiological organic matter. Thus, the “problems of soul” were viewed differently in these camps; rationalists saw the problems and dysfunctions that derived from the mental sphere of the intellectual mind or soul, while the vitalists emphasized the dissonance or in-balance of physiological functions which became the foundation for the higher cognitive functions, dysfunctions, problems, or dissonance. From this perspective, it is possible to assume that Laestadius, as a vitalist-pietistic thinker, might have been referred by “*Dårhushjonet*” to the pietistic experiential-emotional religiosity as a follower of “madness” in that era of enlightenment and metaphysical rationalism. However, Laestadius’ apologetic and justifying analysis certainly turned into an unstated question, namely, whether the metaphysical function-rationalism of enlightenment itself would signify irrationalism or lunacy.

Actually Laestadius saw that world has gone crazy. Did Laestadius believe that an experiential “lunatic” faith could become more rational than rationalism during the rise of metaphysical rationalistic speculation? It disregarded the concrete experiential basis of human life and faith. Or did Laestadius refer to the more general condition of Western civilization, meaning that human existence signified a dissonant “lunatic” state from the very beginning, an idea that would coincide with the idea of original corruption or sin. Laestadius saw pietistic psychic inward reconciliation as a necessary entry path into the un-dissonant condition and thus into proper morality and humanity, and considering that total “absolution” was not possible in the everyday

559 Åberg 1997, 42.

carnal world, the existential-ontological condition of human beings would actually indicate the necessity to exist as a “madman”, a “lunatic” or a “madhouse inmate.” There is no outer or objective rationalizing criteria for how one should be or should believe in the world because belief is a matter of conscience and faith. And for faith to be authentic, it has to be own-most or “subjective” which is always a form of lunacy to the intellectual and dogmatic gaze of the world. Could *The Lunatic – An Insight Into the Order of Grace*, have been intended not to be just a philosophical-theological and scientific apology of pietism, but also an ambitious thematization of the full human condition as such?

* * *

The title of this study, *The Physical, Moral and Spiritual: A Study on Vitalist Psychology and the Philosophy of Religion of Lars Levi Laestadius*, was chosen to cover Laestadius’ holistic intention to hold all the physiological, psychological and metaphysical realms together and thus explain the possibility of morality and spirituality. Laestadius elaborates on the holistics psychophysiological and psychosomatic theory of the constitution of consciousness, morality (psychical) and spirituality (transcendental, metaphysical) that is based on the vitalist notion of the principle of life. This study shows that Laestadius’ theoretical thought cannot be reduced to simple empiricism, materialism, or spiritualism. He sought a way that was between rationalism and empiricism, simultaneously rejecting idealism and an idealistic natural philosophy that he conceived as merely speculative metaphysics. Laestadius’ vitalist stance clearly signifies that his “naturalism” and “reductionism” differed from the materialistic and biological naturalism and reductionism – and in this respect, if I am correct, Laestadius’ psychological vitalism cannot be viewed as a strict natural scientific physicalism.

This study also affirms the already exposed interpretation that anthropology preceded Laestadius’ theology and lay down an explanatory psychological-philosophical basis for his religious and theological insights. Through this more specific analysis of Laestadius’ anthropological-psychological elaborations, it is clear that his analysis can be seen as moving in a transcendental direction within the vitalist psychophysiological framework. As a consequence, Laestadius’ theory can be conceived as a form of *physiological transcendentalism* and *vitalist existentialism*. By pointing out Laestadius’ emphasis on the psychosomatic constitution, this study offers an alternative interpretation to the earlier theological interpretations of Laestadius’ theory as parallelistic monism. It is obvious throughout the *Lunatic* that Laestadius’ apologetics had a transmission-theological character, even when the more explicit analyses of the relationship between the theological and scientific explanations are left and set aside for future research.

Generally, this study confirms that particularly the vitalist perspective and its psychological implications, which form the founding character and “insights” of Laestadius’ anthropology, psychology and philosophical theology, are central for clearly understanding and evaluating Laestadius’ theoretical thought. Laestadius’ theoretical thought relates most closely with medical vitalism and indeed characterizes his applicative theorizing as being related to theological, psychological and apologetic purposes. This is important aspect to notice here, as Laestadius’ philosophical starting points and psychological views have been often disregarded when others have been analyzing the precise formation of his theological, moral philosophical, social-political, and religious views.

Laestadius especially adopted the philosophical vitalist notion of the principle of life for his theory. The anthropological conceptions pertaining to the holistic notion of the human person, such as the principle of life, organic life and sensory life, were adopted by him from Xavier Bichat’s psychophysiology and vitalist philosophy, and constituted a basis of Laestadius’ theory on the constitution of the human person and human consciousness, morality, and spirituality. Thus, Bichat’s vitalist thought played a crucial role in Laestadius’ anthropology, psychology, and the ontotheological system as a whole. Of course, one must not forget that some of his more specific distinctions, e.g., sensory and supersensory perception, conscious and unconscious realms, and faculty psychological distinctions were also inherited from other sources but still further explicated by Laestadius within the medical vitalist frame.⁵⁶⁰

By such a vitalist and pre-phenomenological means, Laestadius was able to deconstruct Cartesian body/mind dualism using the vitalist conceptions and then format an explicit vitalist and metaphysical critique of the classical metaphysical notions of substance and essence and their implications for the nature of consciousness, the faculties of soul and the human person as such. Claiming that metaphysical rationalism and intellectualism dismissed the psychophysiological foundation of experience and human personhood, Laestadius then formed an alternative notion of the embodied human person. In doing so, he redefined the notion of Self (Jag) and the faculties of soul more or less as embodied and organicist phenomena and functions. The faculties of soul were determined as “senses”, intimately attached via corporeality and sensory impacts in a worldly situated life. The objective faculties of soul were conceived as being receptive and susceptible faculties of the sensory life that were submissive to an underlying organic life and functions and prevailing passions within which human being fundamentally exist. Vital embodied personhood and the theory of consciousness elaborated within that personhood thus became the philosophical-psychological basis for Laestadius’ philosophy of religion. Laestadius’ insights concerning creation, the human person, the faculties of soul, the personal

560 Cf. Åberg 1997.

Trinity of God, redemption and the intentional human mind, religious experience, and possibility of morality and spirituality were mainly viewed and explained by him from the perspective of vitalist psychophysiology.

* * *

This study shows that Laestadius' theoretical thought offers interesting notions for several philosophical and psychological themes: 1) A philosophical interpretation reveals that Laestadius was able to elaborate on the coherent psychophysiological and psychosomatic theory concerning the constitution of consciousness and its functions on which his insights concerning morality and spirituality became based; 2) Laestadius overcame the classical Cartesian dualism in the stage/level of origin and cause by attaching his theory on the vitalist notion of the principle of life. A limited panpsychistic interpretation of the vital principle served as a constitutive basis for his further elaborations of the emanations or emergence, the development and functioning of mind and avoiding the classical problem of the emergence of consciousness. Even if there cannot be found any sharp dualism between the body and mind in Laestadius' theory, he still leaned on the dual functions in a physiological plane, especially in his psychophysiological explanations of the constitution of moral feelings and emotions (tensions within a psychophysiological mind). This relative dualism or tension is explicitly present in Laestadius' distinction made between "sensuous feeling" and "moral feeling," which are based on the distinct physiological functions of both neural and humoral impacts on conscious experience;⁵⁶¹ 3) The relationships of the faculties of soul are conceived as intertwined, and together, they characterize the holistic embodied intentionality of human beings and life. From the perspective of the embodied faculties of soul, Laestadius was able to offer a view that emphasized the constitution of personhood in a worldly situated life, an unconscious dimension of the influences of present world, and the impossibility of absolute responsibility and moral purity; 4) In the broad sense Laestadius proposed an holistic insight into how the sensitive human organism is attached to the world,

561 In this part, Laestadius' theory could be conceived as reductionistic or even mechanistic. However, Laestadius simultaneously held tight to the idea that all physiological functions are inextricably related to an objective sensory world and psychological phenomena, especially to the passions. Also, these passions are divided into natural and moral passions in regard to their phenomenal-vital nature and their impacts on the psychophysiological human organism. Altogether, with respect to this correlative and simultaneous psychological dimension, which is always present in any physiological explication, Laestadius' theory cannot be viewed as fully reductionistic; lived experience is not explained fully by physiological-biological functions, but must also be explained by psychological-social tensions within which a human being always does exist in the world. Thus, experience is always explained and always encompasses social-psychological and physiological-biological aspects.

and how it reaches toward own most spiritual existence in a natural way through inward experiences.

In this way, Laestadius was able to conceive a personal embodied intentionality and religious faith (an actualization of psychic reconciliation) for constituting a modified everyday way of existing which, however, was not absolutely different and not distinct from the natural vital-existential modes of being. A human person actualizes in the world and relates God as a tension of the passions (the condition of self) and as a tension of a natural embodied intentionality and un-objectifying spiritual intentionality.

In Chapter 1, Introduction, Laestadius' theoretical work and the state in the academic Laestadius –studies was briefly depicted and the phenomenological perspective of this study was introduced. It was pointed out that Laestadius found the spiritual phenomena as an objective of his theoretical thought already in his research concerning to Sámi mythology and further developed within his philosophy of religion in the *Lunatic*. Also the historical schism between Lutheran orthodoxy and pietism was discussed as a context of the birth of *The Lunatic*. The multidisciplinary nature and ambiguous purposes of *The Lunatic* was highlighted and noted that phenomenological hermeneutical way of researching Laestadius' theory fits plausibly with Laestadius' own pre-phenomenological way of thought.

In Chapter 2, Historical Contextualization, the spiritual and intellectual background of Laestadius' theory was discussed. Laestadius' theoretical thought was closely attached to medical vitalist psychophysiology and philosophy. The grounding ideas of Laestadius' thought were to conceive the human being as a thinking, feeling, and acting being whose existence depends on physiological and vital-psychological pre-requisites in such a way that all actions and functions of the human mind are seen as a constitutive continuum of a natural growing, developing, and evolving differentiation of animated organic life itself. Laestadius combined these psychophysiological insights with the Biblical and reformist ideas of man and the Christian faith. Laestadius was critical of the prevailing metaphysical and rationalistic currents of anthropology and theology. His theoretical elaborations can also be seen as an application of the vitalist critique of rationalistic mechanism and metaphysics in the later spiritual and intellectual context of metaphysical rationalism, transcendental idealism, and absolute idealism.

Chapter 3 The Creation and Initial Condition, demonstrates that to a certain degree Laestadius held to the approach of natural theology emphasizing vital nature and lived body (flesh) as the initial starting point for proceeding in anthropology and theology. Laestadius insisted that the classical starting point in theology (the first Idea) was problematic and contorted the Christian understanding of human being and God. Alternatively, he held it necessary to begin with a natural animated nature and embodied life as the actualization of the creative act of God. However,

his approach was also “transcendentalist”, as he began with the notion of principle of life which he also interpreted as a limited pansychistic principle. Laestadius’ idea of the relationship between the creation and the created can be interpreted as addressing the problem of origin as such, and a pre-condition for the possibilities for philosophical-anthropological and theological thinking. Similarly, as the principle of life was conceived as a necessary metatheoretical hypothesis when proceeding in anthropology, God as vital force also had to be presupposed/believed when proceeding in theology. It can thus be stated that Laestadius’ starting point held a certain kind of physicotheology on the basis of his ontotheological system.

In Chapter 4, Person and Intentionality, *The Lunatic* is interpreted as elaborating on a vitalist account of person and intentionality as a critical alternative to the then prevailing metaphysical rationalistic notions of man and human personhood. Laestadius elaborated on the interesting organicist psychophysiological theory of embodiment and faculties of soul that constituted the core of his psychology and philosophy of mind. Laestadius placed a strong emphasis on pre-cognitive states, especially the passions, emotions, and drives, and indeed, the whole subjective consciousness as pre-reflective ground. Within the realm of subjective consciousness, Laestadius also referred to the notion of unconsciousness. The realm of pre-reflective subjective consciousness laid a constitutive basis for the functions of mind and higher cognitions, and thus constituted the human/world relationship and its situatedness, and further still gives Laestadius a plausible and fundamental anthropological foundation to use to proceed to argue for his Christian-pietistic idea of the precedence of the inward religious experience. Thus, it was shown that subjective consciousness did play a crucial epistemic and ontological roles in human existence. Passions and their manifestations in the human consciousness and personal embodied intentionality do not only mean the pre-condition of the actualization of sin, but also have significance for how man is seen to be situated in the living world. It is precisely passions that have much to do with individuation, self-awareness, morality, and identity, and finally, reconciliation (mutual suffering demanded). Passions characterize man’s intentional relatedness to the world, existence, and God. Thus, it was shown that Laestadius’ elaborated on the theory of personal embodied intentionality.

Overall Laestadius’ was able to elaborate on the holistic notion of the human person and argue using his anthropology for the impossibility of the moral subject and absolute responsibility. Laestadius’ sees the human person fully under the dominance of the influences of organic life, but then also betokens the possibility of a relative freedom of will, action, and genuine morality through the human religious experience of awakening and reconciliation, thereby constructing a relative compatibilist view of human life.

In the second major Chapter 5, Psychophysiology of Moral and Spiritual Intentionality, Laestadius’ theory is viewed and analyzed from the perspective of the

common vitalist conception of the physical/moral. In this respect, it is clear that Laestadius' elaborated on his conception of constitution of morality and spirituality using a psychophysiological foundation. Laestadius was able to form a coherent "naturalistic" explanation of human spirituality for the most part in similar way as medical vitalists had done. Laestadius explains the spheres of morality and spirituality on the psychophysiological plane. The connections between the physical, moral and spiritual realms are seen as overlapping realms and constituents of each other in a vital, developing evolving life.

The religious experience of awakening (väckelse) became a most central notion through which Laestadius then vitalistically explained religious experience as a positive psychopathological event and the pre-stage of moral progress and birth of genuine embodied self-awareness and reflectivity. Laestadius also formulated interesting psychosomatic view on the possibility of non-sensory or "supersensory" perception, which played an important role in explaining the phenomenon of conscience and spiritual experience. The notion of faith as well as Laestadius' onto-theological reconstruction of the relationship between the Trinity of God and the constitutive triadic of the human person enclosed his systematic thought. It was shown that awakening was conceived in psychopathological terms and reconciliation with family psychological allegories and they enabled Laestadius to elaborate the insight on how the Trinity of man and the Trinity of God were co-existent. The notion of psychic reconciliation was viewed as primal in regard to the possibility of receiving grace and a vitalized living faith. Laestadius' emphasis on inwardness in vitalist-existentialist terms indicate there was a certain kind of unification/participation in a living God. Faith was interpreted as un-objectifying intentionality, as it pertains to the inward experience. Laestadius' notion of psychic reconciliation was attached through Luther's theology of the cross to the more general critique of the Western metaphysical position. By developing an un-dualistic notion of mind and attaching it to organic vital functions, Laestadius disclosed the possibility of conceiving faith in anti-intellectualistic and a-metaphysical terms.

In contrast to the notions of God as an immaterial absolute Idea, spirit, consciousness, unmovable mover and first cause (in Aristotelian and metaphysical rationalism [from Descartes to Hegel] traditions), Laestadius elaborated on the experiential approach that constituted a new view of the embodied existential-vital mode of actually being-in-God. This outcome is thematized in this study as the "un-objectifying intentionality of faith" and the coincidence of triadic man and the Trinity of God, and is viewed as being closely similar to the Lutheran notion of faith as elaborated through the theology of the cross.

The philosophy of the intentionality of mind (the question of "what Is"), tends to reveal the "proper concept of reason and reasoning" and suggest an advantage for an alternative epistemic relation between man and world. Faith as the intentionality of

conscience signifies a re-definition of reason, so that man is not related to the world by intellect in the first place, but instead by embodied experience (which includes the foundation for moral and spiritual judgment). This account, therefore emphasizes the primacy of morality and spirituality in terms of mere epistemic “knowing” or the intellectualistic relationship.

Faith illuminates what and how things and beings are revealed to a lived experience in a faith-mode. Thus, when faith drives back to its roots of lived experience and a life world, it also tends to overcome the Western metaphysical notion of “ultimate Being” (ousia) in terms of the significance of a “constant presence” as Being is often conceived. For Laestadius, life is a mystery that cannot be grasped by intellect or by objectifying reason, and neither can it be understood in the conceptual sense even though its functions, events, and occasions can be “known” by feelings, emotions, and the passions. However this pre-ontological and pre-reflective basis and source is never intended to be totally transparent, and thus, life, God and reconciliation always remain secret, only disclosing an attractive direction, route, or destination “towards which” the existence of man is then called from its vital essence (the principle of life and spiritual conscience).

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This study analyzed Laestadius’ theoretical thought, using the written text of *The Lunatic*, seeking to offer a clarifying holistic view on its philosophical, psychological and theological elaborations, and insights. As such, the paper does not take into any *systematical analysis* the certain philosophical questions, such as *ontological and theological realism* or the question of the role of natural scientific explanation which did play a crucial role in Laestadius’ theory. In this study, it became necessary to analyze and interpret first of all Laestadius’ theory at the level of its own language and views in order to lay out the heuristic possibilities for understanding Laestadius’ theoretical thought as a clearly whole. As far as I could see, this task is also necessary for any further future systematic studies concerning the more specific disciplinary questions. Thus, the study hopefully has opened up new possibilities for further studies, especially with regard to the questions related to ontological and theological realism and the question regarding natural scientific explanation and its relationship to theology and the philosophy of religion.

However, a reflective reader may have recognized that my analysis touches often the more general questions, for instance, concern ontological realism and theological realism. The headline of my study also indicates the precise philosophical question that concerns the character of human reality as such. How does one conceive the nature of reality from reading Laestadius’ philosophical-theological thought? What is the perennial reality found in Laestadius’ theory? Is it animated matter, the principle

of life as such, God, or something else? These are problematic questions regarding ontological and theological realism. According to the realistic stance, there exists a kind of reality that is independent and autonomous of the human being and mind. It raises a question of how one can reach any knowledge of such an independent reality if there is no any presupposed relation to it in the first place.

In the following, I briefly question and offer a preliminary clarification for the questions on ontological and theological realism from the perspective of Laestadius' theory. This is not to offer a full and complete analysis here, but rather a preliminary perspective for likely future research on Laestadius' philosophy of religion, theology, and psychology. Indeed, it has always been from the start worth highlighting that Laestadius did not systematically elaborate on theories and views about the later thematized questions on ontological realism and theological realism. However, he does appear develop certain philosophical questions, so thus it is possible to construct a preliminary interpretation by questioning how Laestadius' theory relates to the questions that seek to problematize and clarify the perennial nature and characteristics of reality and the relationship between human life and either a transcendental or supernatural reality?

Based on my interpretations herein, we have noticed that Laestadius' limited panpsychistic interpretation of the vital principle suggests that the perennial reality, the living organic life and soul – is conceived to be somehow “mental” in its fundamental character. This idea was given a twofold character focus on the principle of life. Even though the principle of life can exist independently of everything else, similar to God, it does signify there is a specific confluence of spirit and matter, and one that can be reached only through its actualizations and manifestations within nature or in organic life. By applying vitalist psychology Laestadius suggested that spiritual things and entities can be reached through their manifestations in living the “psychic essence” of the human person; the principle of life and its passions as experiential-emotional realities (correlates) of the psychological existence of human being that are reached through their manifestations in their embodied life in the world. Thus, Laestadius, while holding that there does exist something distinct to human beings, could be seen as a realist, for he clearly insists that we have to assume [principle of] life in and of itself as an independent “transcendental sphere” and the original sensitive human soul, which all together lays the foundation for and initial resounding and clear horizon for all that exists.

However, when we move from the question of “that it is” to the questions of “how and what” is the perennial reality, we must notice that Laestadius strongly emphasized the mediation of the manifestations and actualizations of these perennial realities. For instance, life itself within nature or the vital principles of passions that embody the lives of human being cannot be reached directly, but only through their actualizations and manifestations within nature and an embodied social and individual life.

In this way, he indicates that the vital principle and its passions are clear part of the real actualization of nature and human life even if they are distinct and independent ontological-existential factors of that life.

To assume life is not yet very informative statement about reality. However that formally indicative assumption is all that is possible and necessary for reaching actual human understanding; to know the more specific characteristics of life demands a turn toward the phenomena of nature and the psychic vital-experiential essence of the human that is based on a single fundamental vitality and sensibility, the principle of life. Analogical to this turn toward phenomena of living nature, the actual characteristics of God and Evil can be reached and studied only through their precise manifestations in the actualized human life in the world. Thus, Laestadius seems to hold a similar stance in regard to the question concerning theological realism: God, Evil, and spirit-world exist as the ultimate reality-horizon, but human cannot reach and study them directly. In a sense the realm of morality and spirituality are reachable only as a *psychological phenomenon*: The original soul has the capacity to reach out toward the ultimate [Being, as that Being is its own foundation], and indeed, the ineffable foundation of its own [Original vital soul]. What and how this onto-theological reality is presented/accessed for human beings can only be approached through the actualizations of the ultimate itself/as such within the human life. As far as passions in the world are philosophically defined as real existences or vital-existential “spirits” without substance and essence, similarly to how principle of life is seen as a constitutive vital foundation (*sine substantia et sine essentia*) it is possible and even plausible for Laestadius to have held that God and Evil are (for the most humane understanding) *personifications* of natural and moral passions. Evil and God exist in a human world as aggregates of varying natural and moral passions; in other words, these aggregates are destructive and vitalizing forces apparent and existing in a human’s psychophysiological life.

Insofar as Laestadius conceives of Evil and God as personifications of passions it can also be asked whether Laestadius executes a *naturalistic anthropological reduction of religion within the limits of vitalist theory*? To me, it seems that Laestadius actually executed a certain kind of *naturalistic reduction to anthropology within the frames of vitalist psychophysiology*. Similarly, the ultimate Being, principle of life, or God is then relatively reduced to anthropology in the vitalist frame; all we can know about Being is only reached through its manifestation in nature and our own lived experience.

Further, the effects of God and Evil are approached, explained, and interpreted naturalistically. This focus makes us ask how we should understand the effects of the Holy Spirit within Laestadius’ religious discourse? Are the effects of the Holy Spirit interpreted – in line with theological realism – as effects of ultimate or supernatural reality that are absolutely transcendental to human reality? Does the anthropological-vitalist reduction pertain also to ultimate reality within the religious talk on the

effect of the Holy Spirit as such? Are they – in line with theological realism – the supernatural effects to psychosomatic events and processes?

In the psychological-anthropological context, the holistic notion of natural-spiritual reality is based on the psychosomatic notion that sensory perception is always supersensory perception; the same Self that feels is the same Self that thinks, and thus there is no sharp distinction between a thinking and feeling being in the embodied selfhood. Similarly, there is no sharp distinction between sensory and supersensory perception, which is why the naturalistic anthropological reduction of divinities (personifications of passions, real existences) coincides with the partly supersensory, supernatural, or ultimate reality that is real existence in the sense that it is independent and distinct from the human mind. Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between natural and supernatural reality, but the two are rather intertwined, as for me, it seems that supernatural reality, sometimes called the spirit-world, is seen as a natural part of the psychological-existential experience of humane reality and generally refers to the psychological reality of human being. If so, the questions concerning ontological realism or theological realism are problematic in the context of Laestadius' theory, as they presuppose or seem to approach "realities" from only a categorical, objectifying substantial, dualistic perspective.

Laestadius defines the existence of "spirits" clearly as non-substantial and non-essential, with the addendum that spirits and passions are experiential, vital-psychological realities or "real existences", as he calls them. Laestadius' vitalist and pre-phenomenological approach deconstructs the dualities and sharp distinctions between the immanent and transcendence from the start. It is simply expressed as the idea of the principle of life as being a relative transcendence within organic life in and of itself and in the idea that the notion of the principle of life can be applied to the question of God or a spiritual supersensory world/reality. Thus, Laestadius can actually say that natural human life and experience is not (absolutely) outside the spiritual existence at all, and vice versa, namely, that the ultimate spiritual realm is not absolutely transcended to the natural human life. Thus, the premises of the vitalist "anthropological reduction" of a supersensory "world" are constituted coincidentally with the first premises of the principle of life and passions (vital organic matter, and a living God) which then does disclose the psychological-existential reality of human beings.

Beside Laestadius' naturalistic *vitalist reduction* of God and Evil into anthropology, God is still called the ultimate Being. How should we, then, interpret this reductive and ultimately transcendental character of *God as the foundation of life within an immanent organic life* and at the same time, a coincidental notion of God as the ultimate Being that grants both natural existence and human life and its soul as such? This is the problem that Laestadius recognizes as an aporetic or unsolvable problem for the precedence between Life (principle of life) and Idea (God as first Idea).

Here it is possible, first of all, to conclude that the effects of the Holy Spirit and the spiritual perceptions are and should be natural phenomena within a vitalist frame when Laestadius follows his own principles, namely that vital spirits (passions and devils) cannot be reached directly by the intellect but only through their experiential manifestations and actualizations. In a way to accept Laestadius' notion of passion as a vital existential correlate indicates it is not difficult to see how he conceived his ultimate Good and absolute Evilness natural phenomena of the manifestations and personifications of the passions. Awakening as a pre-stage moving toward reconciliation can be naturalistically explained based on the conflict between the natural and moral passions and the calling "voice of God" within conscience that is awakened in this condition. However the "voice itself" is not natural, but "a call of God itself" as it includes the "call" or effect clearly transcendent to the embodied subject itself. It thus discloses something to the human self-experience which is not merely from the [capsulated] subjectivity itself and also calls the human being simultaneously back to the foundation of its own life (principle of life as this original soul) and thus toward the nearness and participation of God (as the ultimate foundation of all nature and all Good). In this sense, the question concerning theological realism seems irrelevant here as far as Laestadius holds that the immanent and transcendental or profane and divine intertwine, although Laestadius also holds that God as the principle of life, ineffable in and of itself, but always present in organic life, is the *ultimate Being*.

It seems to me as well that the question concerning ontological and theological realism is problematic in the context of Laestadius' theory for two reasons: 1) The vitalist notion of the principle of life is present within the immanent, but coincidentally independent and has an autonomous existence (*sine substantia et sine essentia*) as such, and 2) this notion is applied to the question of God, so that God itself possesses "ontologically" the same character of being immanently present and relatively transcendent in its own autonomous and independent existence.

Overall, the question concerning ontological realism and the perennial characteristics of reality seems to be irrelevant in Laestadius' case. In both the ontological and theological directions, reality exists independently, but the "*what*" and the "*how*" it actualizes and manifest as itself is a different and more important question which pertains to the way a human being is constituted and in relation to that reality, whether it is Life or God itself. Here we notice also that the question concerning mere physicality or spirituality as possible perennial characteristics of reality, misses the point.

For Laestadius' theoretical insight, all that exists is viewed from the perspective of a vitalist psychophysiological constitution: The principle of life or God as the ultimate Being and foundation (not a first Idea, but a founding vital force); morality as a struggle of personal life within the tension of varying influences of passions; and spirituality as a possibility and initial condition of redemption, the actualization of proper human nature as far as spirituality through reconciliation is concerned signifies

the reaching of one's own vitalizing constitutive foundation (upphov) in the original soul or principle of Life and in God. Thus, physical and spiritual are interlinked [natural] constitutive dimensions of human life; they are the vital-natural realms of the one and the same experiential reality⁵⁶².

To conclude then, on the question of realism we can say that the perennial reality is always only presupposed, and its nature and character always depends on its material manifestations and the embodied consciousness and intentional relationship of human being towards it. All that human beings can experientially know of ultimate reality or God is enclosed in the psychic passional-emotional capability/realm, even though not only for intellectual-conceptual realities.

Vital-existential reality is always individually unique, and its "that it is" is *irrelevant* for the human being who always lives in the "what" and "how" that is. Accordingly, the question of *whether there is* God and an ultimate spiritual reality is a vain and empty question for the human being who lives within it and seeks through the deepest of experiences to feel and know *what* and *how* divinity and sacredness are/exist for him/her. Laestadius himself might use the heuristic example of love in this context, as the one who has fallen in love does not doubt the existence of the object of that love but instead reaches towards it with all the power of his/hers intellect and emotions.

The question of realism is then a question of perspective. From a vitalist perspective, similar to the vital nature, that nature "could only be appreciated in its manifestations"; also spiritual vitalizing and destructive psychological reality can be respected and appreciated as a natural dimension and possibility of the holistic psychological reality of human existence. Laestadius' convictions about the precedence of the authority of conscience in relation to all intellectual conceptualizations and dogmatics, the fight for the freedom of religion, and religious tolerance are all connected to these fundamental ideas of the coincidental psychophysiological and spiritual existence of the human being to gain a more holistic grasp of psychological personhood.

562 With regard to the perspective of a modern scientific worldview, we can note that Laestadius' vitalist-religious approach deconstructs the mere objectifying attitude toward beings and physicalistically oriented theoretical gaze. Life or its manifestations cannot be understood by only focusing on bare matter using intellectual means; the functioning, actualization and manifestations of that Life are only the foundation and horizon for theorization. It is rather the experiential and manifesting of life itself that leads to understanding things and phenomena holistically.

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