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BARENTS STUDIES ●● *At the economic, social, and political margins*

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EDITORIAL

At the economic, social, and political margins

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The new issue of *Barents Studies*, an international peer-reviewed journal, continues to popularize research in the Barents Region in collaboration with its partners the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland, The Barents Institute at the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø, and the Luzin Institute for Economic Studies of the Kola Science Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Barents Studies articles (Espiritu 2015) seek to reflect commonalities in people's everyday negotiations of globalization, massive industrialization, economic recession, human security issues, human rights, gender and class inequalities, environmental degradation, population decline and increase, and cross-border relations. Our main goal is to maintain the diversity of topics and to make sure that the journal also covers topics around marginal phenomena. This has prompted us to devote the 2018/1 issue to the theme "At the economic, social, and political margins". Writers have been invited to submit manuscripts about any topic related to marginal – less common, well-known, or studied – phenomena beyond the mainstream of economic, policy, or social research in the Barents Region. This is one way of expanding our understanding of the Barents Region in a global, social, political, and economic context. And perhaps there is a need for a second call for this very theme, so that we might reach academic work in fields such as social work and social policy, which also need addressing. Barents Studies offers a unique opportunity to promote research cooperation in the Barents Region in these fields, too.

This issue features three peer-reviewed scientific articles and two research communications, a book review, and introductions of young scholars of the region. The new issue features five very different articles that foreground five studies located in the Barents Euro-Arctic region.

Our first research article, by Hanna Lempinen, examines the societal dimensions of energy. Exploring media representations of the regional energyscape through the "theory–methods package" of situational analysis, this article highlights the diversity of regional energy beyond oil and gas production; the simplistic manners in which the societal dimensions of energy are understood; the absence of everyday life, ordinary people, and the female gender from the depictions of the regional energyscape; and the lack of attention to climate impacts of northern energy production.

In the second refereed article, Frode Bjørgo investigates how different policy areas are coordinated in two Nordic municipalities affected by mining megaprojects. Drawing on institutional theories in public administration and governance, the article demonstrates how the emergence of new corporate interests sparks the formation of interactive governance networks focusing on business development and economic growth, leaving welfare departments out of strategic policy development. Bjørgo concludes that

> first, there has been a growing tendency for the state to regulate local government service production in order to ensure universality. Yet standard solutions risk being poorly suited to local needs and problems, for example during a dramatic change in the local economy. Second, if local welfare provision ends up being a mere appendage to local democracy, a mandated role carried out in a managerial way but not coordinated and incorporated into a larger governing context, this may in fact undermine the governance capacity of local government.

In our third refereed article in this issue, Heidi Rapp Nilsen and Trond Nilsen tackle the discharge of drilling waste from petroleum operations in the Barents Sea. Their qualitative research presents suggestions for environmental improvements to the Norwegian regime for discharging drilling waste, which is an important and current issue. The authors conclude that the applied systemic methodology yields new knowledge and salient policy recommendations for a part of the Barents Sea petroleum regime that has been less studied to date.

Our first research communication, by Pekka Iivari, attempts to determine how Russian media representations of migration are contextualized and what kind of spatial practices are formed in the case of the arctic border with the European Union. Iivari focuses on the migration discourse at the Finnish-Russian border in the winter of 2015–2016. The author finds that

different media sources reported on asylum and immigration in broadly similar ways. This may reflect a homogenous press system in Russia. Newspapers and agencies tend to use the same language, report on the same themes and feature the same explanations and responses. Furthermore, whilst there was some variation, this can be attributed to different editorial guidelines and target audiences. The migration crisis was consistently represented in terms of its political contexts; the themes that emerged were broadly compatible with the various aspects of east–west relations as they are politically contextualized and understood.

Our second research communication, by Marit Sundet, informs us about the challenges of being a participant observer in a non-established culture, in No Man's Land as she defines it. The traditional method assumes that the anthropologist will learn to understand the other from the social and cultural assumptions the other is born into. This text addresses the challenges the methodology poses in such a research situation.

The journal also features four young scholars of the Barents Region: Anna Nikupeteri (University of Lapland), Anastasia Emelyanova (UArctic Research Liaison and Thematic Networks Office), Anna Näppä (Luleå University of Technology), and Bodil Hansen Blix (UiT The Arctic University of Norway).

The issue contains a book review by Monica Tennberg of the Encyclopedia of the Barents region, which covers 1200 years of history in the region from different perspectives: state formation and borders, social history, economic systems and industrialization, regionalism, and globalization. As the reviewer argues, the encyclopedia is well-suited for anyone looking for key information about the region.

I would like to thank the eight anonymous reviewers who expertly and constructively reviewed the articles in this issue. I also thank the young scholars for their collaboration and wish them all the best in their work in the academic community in the Barents Region. Thanks are also due to Monica Tennberg for much collaboration and support.

Winter is almost here!

Tarja Orjasniemi

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

ARTICLES

At the margins of the Barents energyscape

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ABSTRACT

In political, popular, and scholarly debates, the Arctic – and most importantly within it the Barents region – is portrayed as being on the brink of becoming the "world's new energy province". Growth in global energy demand, dwindling reserves, political instabilities at existing production sites, warming climate, as well as advancements in extraction and transportation technologies are pushing energy activities further towards the previously inaccessible north. In these framings, energy in the Arctic is mostly understood as synonymous with oil and gas production for international exports and as a concern of markets and politics, and of technology, science, and economics. Exploring media representations of the regional energyscape through the "theory-methods package" (Clarke 2015, 87) of situational analysis, this article highlights the diversity of regional energy beyond oil and gas production; the simplistic manners in which the societal dimensions of energy are understood; the absence of everyday life, ordinary people, and the female gender from the depictions of the regional energyscape; and the lack of attention to climate impacts of northern energy production.

Keywords: *Barents; energy; media representations; situational analysis*

INTRODUCTION: PUTTING THE BARENTS REGION ON THE (ENERGY) MAP

The Barents Region is usually framed as a resource storehouse for global markets (Elenius 2015, 138; Tennberg, Riabova, and Espíritu 2012, 15–18), but as a region it is more diverse. It spans the northern territories of four environmentally, culturally, and politically diverse nation states and it is home to more than five million people of non-indigenous and indigenous backgrounds (BEAC 2016). Politically, the region remains loosely integrated in terms of infrastructure, politics, and regional identity alike (Elenius 2015). However, the increased international interest in the northern regions and the associated strategy work on the regional and state levels has contributed to an increasing emphasis on furthering northern (economic) development (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; Prime Minister's Office of Finland 2013; Government Offices of Sweden 2011; Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic 2020). In these envisionings, it is the energy resources in the region that play the crucial role when rethinking its socioeconomic landscape.

In the context of the Barents region and the broader Arctic, the understandings of "energy" in political, popular, and academic debates are "dominated by a focus on oil and gas exploration, development, and extraction" (Sidortsov 2016, 1). This emphasis on the importance of fossil fuel-based energy is by no means surprising, as "the heavy dependence on hydrocarbons" is "a distinguishing feature of advanced industrial societies" (Redclift 2009, 375; see also Salminen and Vadén 2013), and a significant share of the estimated remaining oil and gas resources in the world are located in the seas surrounding the Barents region (cf. USGS 2009). Even though "signs of change in global energy have multiplied" in recent years (IEA 2015a, 12), global energy consumption is still expected to continue to increase substantially, and much of this consumption is still projected to be heavily reliant on fossil fuels (cf. IEA 2015b).

However, framing the Barents region in this manner – as the new oil and gas province for global markets – is a very simplistic view. To begin with, it does not take into account the presence of a variety of renewable energy sources, or coal, peat, and nuclear power in the overall energy landscape of the region (cf. Lempinen and Cambou, forthcoming; Lempinen 2017, 91–92; Banul 2012). In a similar vein, the focus on energy exports ignores the fact that energy is also consumed in the region, which has a cold climate, long distances, and its share of heavy industries: some areas and residents of the Euro-Arctic north are among the highest per capita energy consumers in the world (cf. Rasmussen and Roto 2011, 151). Indeed, some parts of the Barents remain, despite the region's tremendous "energy wealth",

unevenly characterized by "energy poverty" (Hemsath 2010, 5) and, as such, unable to continuously meet their energy needs in a safe, reliable, and affordable manner (on energy poverty cf. e.g. Bazillian, Nadooka, and Van de Graaf 2014, 219–220; Boardman 1991). The region, its environments, and residents are also vulnerable to the risks associated with the increased shipping of resources (cf. PAME 2009, 136–138) and to the environmental and sociocultural changes brought on by energy project planning and implementation (Kristoffersen and Dale 2014; Wilson Rowe 2016; Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011, 786–787; Stammler and Wilson 2016, 1).

In this article, I seek to go beyond these simplistic hydrocarbon export-dominated understandings of what energy in the Barents region entails. Making use of the "theory-methods package" (Clarke 2015, 87) of situational analysis, the article approaches the regional energy debate as an energyscape and as a situation in the case study context of the media materials of the BarentsObserver news portal. The article focuses 1) on the diversity of constituents that are assembled around the regional energy concern and 2) on who and/or what are left at the margins when the issue of energy in the Barents region is addressed. Through an analysis of the textual and visual representations of energy in the selected media materials, the article highlights i) the diversity of regional energy beyond oil and gas production; ii) the simplistic manners in which the societal dimensions of energy are understood; iii) the absence of everyday life, ordinary people, and the female gender from the depictions of the regional energyscape; and iv) the lack of attention to climate impacts of northern energy production. As such, this article does not explicitly tackle the interests and aspirations of and power relations between different actors or the conditions of production of the analysed materials, but instead delves deeper to the contents and connotations of regional energy representations.

CONSTRUCTING AN ENERGYSCAPE

Up until this point energy resources have been discussed as if they were just quantifiable and unquestionable states-of-the-world, that is, as if energy and resources were mere "raw materials that can be calculated as barrels, bushels, crates or some other handy units" (Lähde 2015, 60) and that can be assigned an accurate and calculable monetary value (cf. Ferry 2016). However, "resources" should also be understood as a socially and culturally constructed term for the parts of the natural world that are perceived as having utility or value from one perspective or another (Bridge 2009, 1219; also Desbiens

2013). These "cultural appraisals" (Bridge 2009, 1219) are inherently perspectival and therefore invite discussion on and analysis of "*how* they are constructed, by whom and for whom" (Nilsson and Filimonova 2013, 3).

Indeed, the instrumental role that energy as a "master resource" (Strauss, Rupp, and Love 2013, 11) has in making state and everyday functions possible (Rüdiger 2008; Aalto and Westphal 2007; Scrase and Ockwell 2010) means that energy resources "often fall prey to the rhetoric and competing discourses that decision-makers use to sustain, lobby for, and diffuse favored … policies and services" (Fischhendler, Nathan, and Boymen 2015, 114–115). This, in turn, has worked to relegate the energy issue to the spheres of markets and high politics and to the domains of (natural) science and technology, with little attention to energy as a soci(et)al concern (cf. e.g. Lempinen 2017; Ciutâ 2010; Newberry 2013, 228). However, I argue that energy is as much a question of cultural and societal practices as it is one of trade, politics, technology, and engineering. The energy concern crosscuts different values, interests, discourses, use(r)s, and living worlds, all of which are considerations far beyond the spheres of institutional politics.

In this article, I build on the understanding that texts and images not only reflect but also shape how the (energy) world and its constituents are thought of and acted upon (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Linguistic representations always highlight some aspects of the same concern while slighting others; visual representations similarly both reflect and construct the ways in we which see, experience, and enact the world (cf. Seppänen 2005, 78; Rose 2007, 12). The presence of an image in any given body of text is always the result of a choice, either intentional or unconscious. In a similar manner, the choices made in constructing the texts and images are always shaped by cultural practices and questions of power and politics (Rose 2007, 26), just like the words we use. This applies also to media representations – despite their seeming neutrality and objectivity (cf. Kunelius 2009; McCombs 2005; Goffman 1974)

These uses and abuses of energy language are intrinsically entangled with power (Scrase and Ockwell 2010; Fairclough 1989; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). As a consequence, any discussion or concern related to energy is profoundly intertwined with the questions of politics and the political (cf. Palonen 1983). Viewing the (energy) political as being shaped by and taking place through language, linguistic choices, and framings (cf. e.g. Sengers, Raven, and van Venrooij 2010; Hajer 1995) highlights both the profoundly discursive nature of energy-related policymaking and the diverse range of actors potentially involved in energy-related developments and debates. The ways in which things – including energy

– are discussed and defined are neither innocent nor without potential consequences: "different views of energy shape policy choices, which in turn further legitimise particular views", and "[t]he effects of policy decisions based on particular views can be profound" (Mason 2016, 132). For this reason, it is important to critically investigate the ways in which northern energyscapes are represented (see also Sidortsov 2016).

As the inherently political nature of energy-related language use has been broadly acknowledged, the ways in which linguistic choices play out in shaping our understandings and actions in relation to energy have been investigated on several fronts. Extensive work has been conducted on, among other topics, strategies and patterns of energy argumentation (e.g. Littlefield 2013; Corvellec 2007; Windisch 2008), discourses on and the framing of different energy sources and alternatives (e.g. Scrase and Ockwell 2010; Sengers, Raven and Van Venrooij 2010), as well as verbal and visual energy metaphors and rhetoric (Lempinen 2013; Anshelm 2008; Littlefield 2013; Fitzgerald 2012; Livesey 2002; Mason 2016; Tynkkynen 2016). However, I argue that there remains a gap in the ways in which the discursivity of energy-related concerns is addressed, as to date few studies have attempted to go beyond the framings of dominant actors, hegemonic discourses, or linguistic representations of individual energy sources or single issues or phenomena. The aim of this study is rather the contrary: to draw attention to the diversities and multiplicities of the elements that together, as a whole, constitute and contribute to the regional energyscape, with an eye to what might be lurking in the margins of the depictions of the world's new "energy province" (Hemsath 2010, 12) in the selected empirical materials

In this article, this complexity of the regional energy concern is open-endedly approached and addressed through the notion of *energyscape* (see also Strauss, Rupp, and Love 2013; Kaisti and Käkönen 2012; for "scapes" see Appadurai 1996). As a concept, "energyscape" draws attention to the ways in which a diversity of different elements relate to and come together around energy in a given space and place (cf. Neumann and Neumann 2015, 799). Building on the notion of energyscape also implies understanding the regional concern as a situation: a setting within which everything "both c*onstitutes and affects* most everything else in the situation in some way(s)" (Clarke, 2005, 72, italics in original). The key to such an approach is its focusing on the diversity of issues, entities, and discourses that together constitute the regional energy situation in the body of empirical materials – without assumptions about who or what matters in relation to energy, and without a pre-existing interest in who might matter most.

When approached through the conceptual prism of the energyscape, energy is not automatically relegated to the arenas of state politics and market operations or wholly outside everyday life, and experience: while it is an object of high-level decision-making and corporate activities, it is also a "cultural artifact" that manifests itself differently in different temporal and spatial settings and at different scales (Strauss, Rupp, and Love 2013, 10–11). Energy permeates societies, technologies, and economies as well as ways of communicating, thinking, and living far beyond institutional politics or market transactions. It is exactly this diversity that the notion of energyscape has the conceptual potential to capture; however, no amount of conceptual readiness can translate into being able to grasp those issues and perspectives that might be lacking from the "real-world" discussions and debates.

METHODS AND MATERIALS

In order to accommodate the viewpoints above, the Barents energyscape is approached here through the "theory-method package" (Clarke 2005, 4) of situational analysis (SA). As the name implies, SA takes the notion of situation as both the starting point and the locus of analysis. The aim of SA-oriented research is to gain a comprehensive understanding of "the full situation" (ibid., xxvii) under investigation *in the empirical materials utilized.* Analyses in this vein undertake to map and lay out as comprehensively as possible the diversity of entities and elements – equally human, nonhuman, discursive, and ideational – through and among which the situation exists and is constructed in the context of the empirical case study. Another specific interest is what might be *missing* from the representations of the regional energyscape – who or what is physically "there", but has been left out of its discursive representations (cf. Salazar Pérez and Cannella 2013, 512). Indeed, an SA-oriented research setting acknowledges that "there is always some prior knowledge to direct the gaze of the researcher" (Clarke 2005, 28–29; also Charmaz 2000). In this study, such prior knowledge translates into explicitly paying attention to themes and elements that might be left at the margins of or outside the political and popular energy-related debates.

While situational analysis is only gradually becoming institutionalized as a method of inquiry alongside the more "established" approaches to textual analysis, a growing body of research has demonstrated SA's applicability in analysing the diversity and complexity of energy as a societal concern (cf. e.g. Fitzgerald 2012; Tennberg and Vola

2013; Tennberg and Lempinen 2015). Owing to its focus on "situation" as a whole, SA also provides a tool for overcoming the limitations of more institutionalized approaches to energy-related language use. Instead of providing fragmented perspectives to the energy debate through analyses of dominant actors, hegemonic discourses, and the language of energy persuasion, SA-oriented analysis seeks to grasp the complex intertwinements of energy and the society at large. Energy becomes both an ordering perspective on a given situation and constitutive of the same broader societal context, as it is itself ordered by the other elements, events, and developments in the same situation and/or in the same set of materials.

In its textbook applications, situational analysis proceeds through and visually highlights the "content" or constituents of a situation through the process of mapping (Clarke 2003, 2005, 2010), making note of the diversity of issues and themes that together comprise the regional energy concern. The outcome of the mapping process, the situational map, is a visual representation of "*all* the actors and discourses in the situation regardless of their power" (Clarke, Friese, and Washburn 2015, 16; italics in original). The situational map of the Barents energyscape presented in the following section thus lays out the elements that are connected, in one way or another, with the developments, debates, and policies relating to the issue of energy in the analysed empirical materials during the period under investigation. However, as the relations change and elements and events emerge and disappear over time, the map should not in any respect be taken to represent "locations" of different elements or their relative distance from each other or the energy concern. The dynamic not captured in the seemingly static image, that is, the manifold and changing relations and framings of different concerns and elements, is discussed in more detail in textual form in the sections following the map in the empirical analysis below.

The empirical materials utilized in this study were gathered from the BarentsObserver, an online news service with a focus on reporting on and from the Barents region with an aim to promote "political, business and people-to-people contacts across the borders in the region" (BarentsObserver 2014). The portal that was run by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat and financed by the three northernmost counties of Norway was active in 2002–2015, but as a consequence of disputes over the scope of the portal and principles of editorial freedom, the news service now only exists as a news archive (for a summary cf. e.g. BarentsObserver 14 October 2015). The Observer was selected as the empirical material of this article owing to 1) their dedicated section for regional energy-related reporting and 2) the media practice of citing a broad range of sources in producing

news items: they bring together a wide array of actors, documents, policies, voices, and interests into one coherent and accessible dataset.

In practice, the materials were retrieved from the news portal using two methods. First, all 936 entries classified under the section "Energy" were taken into account. Secondly, also a keyword search using the term "energy" was conducted, after which a total of 511 additional news articles were added to the research materials. The images of the news entries were also included in the analysis to strengthen, complement, and challenge the observations made on the textual contents along the principles of data triangulation (for triangulation see e.g. Rothbauer 2008, Bryman 2004). As a result, a total of 1447 entries dated between 19 February 2008 and 31 July 2014 were analysed, the latter being the date on which all existing entries were retrieved from the database. Overall, the articles were written during an era characterized by rising and/or high oil prices (cf. OPEC 2016, 91), but one yet to feel the full impacts of sanctions and cooling international relations in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis (for an overview cf. European Union Newsroom 2016). This was the period of high expectations for the future of the Barents as the world's new energy province.

The extensive empirical materials were analysed manually by going through the entries repeatedly to identify the elements in whose interplay the energyscape is assembled and constructed: to lay out what elements and entities are entwined with energy in the empirical materials. While the total number of news entries was quite high, the entries focused on and followed the course of a limited number of developments and megaprojects, which meant that the same issues, themes, events, and also images recurred throughout the period investigated. In the first phase of analysis, the observations based on the textual materials of news entries were compiled onto the situational map presented below. In the second phase, the images of the news entries were analysed with a focus on the "visual identity" (Wright 2011, 311) that the images construct for the Barents energyscape. As such, the process of analysis relied on a rather loose interpretation of the principles of SA, but remained faithful to its core principles of data orientation; focus on situations as a whole; attention to diversity and heterogeneity; and the aim of creating a detailed understanding of the situation instead of universal theory generation (cf. Clarke 2005). In the empirical section below, the news entries are cited by their publication date in the form DD.MM.YYYY.

An inquiry making use of media materials inevitably raises issues that need to be addressed. A major concern is that despite its seeming objectivity media content cannot

be perceived as offering objective representations of the (energy) world any more than other linguistic representations can. Media representations are always formed in the interplay of (un)conscious interests, choices, and practices of media production and consumption, and the limitations set by media economics (cf. Cunningham, Flew, and Smith 2015; Bräucher and Postill 2010; Wright 2011, 333; McCombs 2005; Goffman 1974). Media representations themselves are still worthy of analysis in their own right: regardless of whether the choices at work in these processes are intentional or not, the ways in which different entities and elements are portrayed take part in constructing and advocating their own kind of view to the world.

REMAPPING THE BARENTS ENERGYSCAPE

In order to begin to grasp the sidelined, overlooked, and marginalized themes and perspectives of the regional energy concern, we need first a comprehensive understanding of how the Barents energyscape as a whole is depicted. The situational map on the next page condenses "the situation of inquiry broadly conceived" (Clarke 2005, xxii) – all the different elements and entities that together comprise the regional energy concern as it is constructed in the extensive news entries that form the empirical core of this study. It merits pointing out that as a key motivation of both this research endeavour and situational analysis lies in capturing the elements and aspects sidelined and overridden by dominant perspectives, the presence of an element in the situational map does not signal equal weight, equal importance, or an equal share of attention devoted to it in the original research materials. However, its presence on the map serves to highlight that it is indeed "there" and a weighty part of the regional energyscape, even if it were a marginal(ized) one.

Before moving on to the issues and concerns that might be sidelined or left at the margins of the regional energy debate, the energyscape as a whole needs to be briefly opened up and discussed. The situational map above gives an impression of the regional energy concern much broader than the storyline of oil and gas exports. In addition to the allegedly abundant oil and gas resources, other hydrocarbons still contribute to the regional energy puzzle: this is the case not only for coal, which continues to be produced in, transported from, and consumed in the region (e.g. 19.8.2010, 22.2.2012, 27.3.2014), as does peat (5.11.2011). However, it is not coal or peat but the diverse renewable energy resources in all their various forms – wind, hydro, tidal, wave, solar, and biomass – that receive the bulk of the non-hydrocarbon attention in the media materials analysed (cf. e.g. 5.12.2013, 7.5.2013, 13.1.2014, 5.6.2009, 10.2.2009, 6.2.2009). In addition, nuclear



Image 1: Situational map of the Barents energyscape


Lack of knowledge
Boom
Great expectations
Harsh environment and climate
Disappointments
Peak oil
Optimism
Vulnerable environment
New energy province
Resource estimates
Climate change
Seismic studies
Mapping
Exploration
Training
Supplying industries
Research and development
Education
Local population
Indigenous peoples
Funding
Availability of workforce
Value creation
Social development
Social infrastructure
Public organizations
Energy technologies
Other technologies
Tax revenues
Spin-offs
Ripple effects
Employment
Shift workers
Permanent employment
Reindeer herders
Fishermen
Nuclear
Gasification
Regional strategies
State agencies
Authorities
Ministries
Military
Electricity
Heating
Grid capacity
Federal actors
Regional actors
Municipalities
Towns
Parliaments
Governments
Politicians
Parties
Local use
Production
Exports
Consumption
Diplomacy
Licensing
State policies and strategies
Taxation
Russia
State relations
Norway
Arctic strategies
State reputation
Delimitation treaty
National legislation
Putin
Medvedev
Environmental NGOs
Prestige
International law
Other states
Geopolitics
Georgian conflict
Transit crisis
Crimean crisis
Media actors
Researchers
EU
BEAC
IFIs
Resource nationalism
Energy security

power – a prominent impetus for political cooperation in the Barents region (cf. BEAC 1993) – remains firmly on the regional energy agenda (cf. e.g. 16.12.2010, 27.1.2011, 22.11.2013, 12.2.2010, 24.2.2011). The situational map also highlights that energy is consumed in the region in significant quantities (e.g. 4.11.2013, 5.9.2013, 26.5.2009, 22.2.2011, 5.9.2013, 29.8.2008, 22.7.2009). What is more, limiting the consumption of energy is taken up: entries are found calling for, advocating, and formulating energy efficiency and saving measures in the energy industry and others alike (cf. e.g. 4.7.2009, 30.5.2011, 12.5.2009, 20.4.2009; also Hirvaskari and Geraschenko 2015).

As a whole, the Barents energyscape depicted by the regional energy reporting is without doubt one of "great expectations" (16.1.2012). The region's waters "could hide oil and gas resources of elephant proportions" (8.11.2013). Indeed, the regional energy developments are depicted as something unprecedented in magnitude: projects that are unfolding in the cold and icy waters of the northern seas are portrayed as series of "first evers" (cf. e.g. 7.5.2014, 8.4.2014, 6.12.2012, 30.11.2010): as the "northernmost in the world ever" (8.5.2014, also 10.3.2010, 7.7.2008, 29.8.2012) but nevertheless as being realized within a "time frame that is unprecedented" (28.8.2013). Energy technologies and developments are compared to the "moon landing" (20.1.2011) and the "conquering of the cosmos" (26.5.2011). Together, these narratives construct northern energy development as "a heroic endeavor in which ordinary *men* could participate and thus become larger than life" (Desbiens 2013, 134; italics mine). Yet, there also challenges for the bright energy future. A crucial one is a lack of knowledge: the visions of the bountiful resources of the region are based on estimates only, and it might be shown that the estimates of the quantity of resources have been overly optimistic and unrealistic from the outset (e.g. 10.4.2014, 31.8.2010, 5.10.2012, 7.9.2011; see also Lähde 2015). The environmental and climatic conditions also "get increasingly tough as the oil industry moves further north into Arctic waters" (31.10.2011), making operations riskier both in the physical and financial sense (cf. also Emmerson and Lahn 2012). As a consequence, the Barents energyscape is not only one of high hopes but also of disappointments and delays (23.10.2013, 2.1.2014, for summary from 2012 cf. 3.10.2012).

In addition to the tensions between harsh realities and high expectations, the situational map of the Barents energyscape also showcases the "heterogeneous assemblage of different actors" (Kaisti and Käkönen 2012, 148) that come together around the boundary object of the regional energy concern. Indeed, also Clarke, Friese, and Washburn (2015, 18) emphasize the potential that the framework has for identifying and addressing the variety of "stakeholders", actors, and institutions potentially

affected by but not recognized in the processes of policymaking. While differences can be found between the political and administrative systems in the region (cf. Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2008, 17–22), in the overall Barents energyscape equally states within and outside the region, national and global energy corporations, supporting industries, regional actors, international organizations, and institutions all have a role to play in the formation of the regional energy concern (cf. e.g. 21.11.2013, 18.6.2012, 14.7.2009, 29.6.2012, 25.9.2012, 31.7.2008, 10.12.2010, 2.8.2012; also Aalto et al. 2013). Furthermore, through its reporting – the decisions regarding what to report on and how – the news service BarentsObserver itself does much to promote a certain kind of understanding of the regional energyscape over others.

The relationships between these different actors are, however, in constant change and far from unproblematic. The energyscape of the region is fraught with tensions and polarized along the axis from cooperation to conflict (e.g. 24.11.2011, 25.3.2011, 30.9.2008, 10.7.2008, 3.3.2011). The messy nature of the positions taken and the relations formed renders the often-presented "cooperation or conflict" configuration used to describe the nature of the energy concern quite absurd, as both extremes can and do exist in the same energy situation, which, in turn, appears very different depending on the perspectives and actors involved.

The discussion on who acts and matters in relation to the regional energy debate is intimately linked to energy being at the same time a very regional and a thoroughly global concern. The Barents energyscape is not only "inhabited" and moulded by state and corporate actors and institutions originating far away from the region (e.g. 21.8.2012, 7.6.2008, 10.12.2010, 24.2.2009), but also dependent on global market fluctuations (3.6.2010, 13.5.2009, (24.10.2012), international political tensions and events (22.9.2008, 20.8.2008, 20.1.2010, 6.11.2008), as well as incidents such as the Gulf of Mexico spill and the Fukushima disaster (cf. 20.1.2010, 6.11.2008, 16.3.2011). The energy concern in the Barents region is also a profoundly regional one. Energy developments taking place in the region have been reserved an instrumental role in turning around the patterns of depopulation and economic decline plaguing the northern towns, counties, and municipalities. These developments are expected to contribute to improved infrastructure (28.6.2014, 1.12.2008), create incentives for training and education (26.1.2009, 9.7.2008), and bring tax revenues, employment, and increased income (12.6.2013, 27.1.2012, 5.6.2011, 1.7.2014). In sum, they mean "*taxes, roads, employment, expertise*" (28.9.2012; italics mine): "200,000, 300,000 and probably even 400,000 jobs" (15.4.2012) to the otherwise economically challenged region.

EXPLORING THE MARGINS

The news entries portray and construct the thoroughly transnational regional energyscape in terms of great expectations for northern energy development and their beneficial "spin-offs" (12.7.2012, 7.4.2011) and "ripple effects" (27.2.2013) for regional (economic) development. However, in the light of the primary concern of this work, the most interesting observations may very well be what is *not* among the main themes and topics in terms of which the regional energy concern is framed in the Observer materials. The lack of attention to any societal concerns beyond regional socioeconomics is among the most evident "absences" (Clarke 2015, 105) in the regional energyscape. Despite the widely acknowledged "growing criticism of cultural ignorance with which many energy implementation projects are handled" (Bastholm and Henning 2014, 1; also Mitchell et al. 2001), the 1447 news entries of energy talk succeed to a great extent in evading any explicit and extensive attention to the social dimension associated with energy in the region. Beyond references to (symbolic) practices of public participation and protest (4.2.2011, 5.3.2010, 3.3.2010, 17.4.2012, 13.7.2010, 27.4.2010), the presence of other local livelihoods (e.g. 3.2.2013, 29.6.2012, 4.2.2011, 4.10.2010, 21.10.2008, 5.6.3013), and abstract references to "value creation" (30.6.2008), corporate social responsibility (25.5.2012),"social development" (7.11.2008), and "social infrastructure" (22.10.2008), the soci(et)al dimension of energy, communities, and societies is not really "there". The amount of presence assigned to local residents or populations is scanty. They are practically never directly cited and are thus not given a voice of their own – not even in the coverage of a news service deeply rooted in promoting "people-to-people cooperation" in the region (cf. BarentsObserver 2014). As a whole, these findings echo the observations about the simplistic views to the "social" made in the context of broader Arctic energy debates (cf. Lempinen 2017).

Indeed, particularly striking are the ways in which the hopes for a better future are so closely intertwined with the expectations tied to regional energy development. Especially the region's hydrocarbon energy resource endowments continue to be consistently framed in developmental terms: as *the* developmental strategy of Arctic communities and societies whose existence, well-being, and development "hinges on being able to capture the value and benefits of their natural resources" (Bertelsen, Justinussen, and Smits 2015, 22). Curiously enough, this remains the case even in a situation where previous experiences have repeatedly demonstrated "that societies cannot necessarily rely on extractive industries as a secure foundation for future development" (Stammler and Wilson 2016, 3). However, the finite nature of hydrocarbon resources is not accounted for when the building blocks of the regional energy future are assembled. The timeframe of the Barents energyscape and

development within it does not extend to a "post-petroleum" era, when there is no more oil and gas left to produce (cf. Kristoffersen and Dale 2014).

At the same time as energy in the north appears to be entangled in more or less all major challenges and developments that are unfolding in the region, there is one grand concern to which surprisingly little attention is devoted within the explicit framework of energy: climate change. While recent studies have pointed out the incompatibility between internationally agreed limits to global warming and Arctic hydrocarbon production (McGlade and Ekins 2015), in the energy-related reporting the climate obstacle becomes framed mainly as an additional technological challenge posed by the requirements for CO2 capture and storage (24.4.2008, 27.7.2009, 10.3.2010). Very little visibility is accorded to the justifications for or necessity of hydrocarbon development. Scattered references to statements from the Church of Norway, the EU Parliament Environmental Committee, and environmental organizations (19.2.2009, 3.10.2012, 6.8.2012) are the only instances where news items engage in the ethical side of the climate debate. This ominous silence (cf. also Norgaard 2011; Tynkkynen and Tynkkynen, forthcoming), accompanied as it is by references to the role of CO2 capture and storage technologies and capping of climate gas emissions, implicitly ties the idea(l)s of northern energy developments to those of ecological modernization (cf. Hajer 1995), elevating technology to a force reconciling the contradictions between the socio-environment and large-scale, CO2-intensive "development".

IMAGIN(IN)G THE ENERGYSCAPE

In general, visual elements can illustrate and underline the content of a written text as readily as they may challenge and augment it (Seppänen and Väliverronen 2002; Van Leeuwen 2011, 51; Rose 2007, 11). As such, the images of the news entries offer an additional fruitful avenue for investigating how the Barents energyscape is conveyed and constructed. In this section, I mainly focus on how visual materials add to, complement, or challenge the manners in which the energyscape is textually represented, with less attention to where the images only visually underline the textual content and thus serve mainly an illustrative role (cf. Van Leeuwen 2011, 551).

In the context of visually representing energy, the images of the news entries predominantly echo the prominent role assigned to hydrocarbon and energy exports in the textual materials of the news entries. However, the visuals of energy also add to the verbal storylines. A considerable amount of energy-related imagery focuses on

portraying energy as oil rigs defying the vast open Arctic seas' energy (e.g. 14.10.2014, 26.11.2014, 10.9.2014, 16.4.2015), even though the actual number of offshore installations in operation in the region remains at best modest. In a similar manner, illustrations of project implementation plans make into being an energyscape which to a large extent still only exists on the level of political speeches, corporate strategies, and engineering agencies (cf. e.g. 16.9.2009, 8.1.2010, 14.9.2010, 3.7.2013). Together, the iconic oil rigs, project maps, and illustrations render visible an energy province that is only yet to come: amid the disappointments, delays, and declining economies it is possible that the value of "the drama and the character of today's images of the energy future lie[s] in their capacity for governing over the decay of the present" (Mason 2006, 4).

The images of the news entries echo the textual representations also in their focus on political and market actors: amidst all the images of presidents, ministers, and company CEOs, images of flags and corporate logos only further underline the importance of states and markets as actors in the Barents energyscape (e.g. 15.9.2008, 3.5.2011, 8.12.2009, 12.10.2009, 15.3.2011, 25.3.2011). Together, the images construct an understanding of the regional energy concern that has very much to do with state authorities and high-level politicians and very little to do with everyday life and existence in the region. Indeed, it is a striking feature of the news images that "ordinary" people seem to have all but disappeared from the regional energyscape. Among the very few are photographs of indigenous reindeer herders (8.10.2009) or people driving their cars on the snowy northern streets (7.12.2010). However, while "life" in the energyscape is not portrayed or visualized, *working life* in the energy industry is. Countless and countless images represent people at work at the energy installations in the region, wearing their company overalls (e.g. 26.6.2009, 31.10.2011, 1.7.2013, 4.4.2014, 6.8.2014, 26.11.2011). The ways in which the humans in the energyscape are portrayed leave little room for interpretation in terms of the roles assigned to the people living in the region. The mantra-like verbal discourse on employment and income is echoed and accentuated by the visual illustrations of the energy debate.

What is more, the images of male workers at energy installations also hint at whose employment and income it is that is at stake in northern energy development. There is indeed one other rather crucial question to be asked and answered with regard to who is present and represented in the Barents energyscape: What is the one quality or attribute shared by the vast majority of the politicians, corporate leaders, researchers, and the blue-collar workers in the images? The answer is: their gender is male. The Barents energyscape is not only an issue of high politics, international markets, and regional socioeconomics

but also, more often than not, a blatantly, unashamedly masculine one (cf. also Desbiens 2013, 59; Tynkkynen 2016, 387). Through the repeated inclusions and exclusions (cf. Rose 2007, 12), or choices of whom to picture and whom not to, the images swiftly sideline the female gender to the margins of the regional energyscape – and beyond.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

In this article, a set of media representations of the Barents energyscape has been scrutinized with an aim not only to investigate the themes and terms by which the regional energy concern is constructed, but also to highlight issues and perspectives that may be left out or in the margins of the debates revolving around energy in the north. In this endeavour, situational analysis of texts and images together with situational mapping have proven highly useful: a more detailed reading of the regional energy debate showcases a more nuanced understanding of the regional energy concern compared to understanding northern energy solely as exports of oil and gas. However, while renewable and other energy sources as well as energy consumption, efficiency, and saving are increasingly being carved space on the Barents energy agenda, it is the large-scale oil and gas projects and the unforeseen benefits they are expected to bring to regional economic development that continue to dominate the regional energy imagination.

The situational map of the Barents energyscape has laid out a stunningly diverse range of issues that are intertwined with the regional energy concern in the region. In combination with an analysis of the images of the news entries, it has also served to highlight some of the issues and perspectives that remain sidelined from the regional energy-related debates. Among them, the non-existent presence of any societal aspects or everyday life concerns is potentially the most astounding observation: even in the materials of a regional news source, the intertwinements of energy with "personal and professional growth, family relations, work-life balance, and other quality-of-life topics" (Sørnes, Browning, and Henriksen 2015, 3) are not addressed, leaving the soci(et)al aspects of energy reduced to regional socioeconomic concerns. Equally disturbing are the gendered visual representations of energy in the context of the north, when male workers become the (only) visual embodiment of the interrelations of regional energy development and ordinary people and everyday life. These images tell their own tale of whose jobs, income, and lives the regional energy developments are about. These observations are not meaningless, because the ways in which the energyscape is depicted contributes to a certain kind of understanding of energy in the north: why and for whom energy "matters" and who is taken into account when the "world's new energy province" is constructed.

As a whole, the iconic images of drilling installations standing alone in the vast emptiness of Arctic landscapes portray an energy future that is yet to come: it is one of large-scale offshore production and of a new "cultural relationship to the land that unfolds within the paradigm of progress, productivity and triumphant modernity" (Desbiens 2013, 39). What is more, such "triumphant modernity" takes very little account of the climate impacts of northern energy production. This silence or denial around the climate concern in the context of energy appears especially odd when it is seen against the background of accelerating natural and social change in Arctic the region. While climate change is widely accepted as one of the major threats to sustaining societal and cultural well-being and human development in the circumpolar north (cf. e.g. Nymand Larsen and Fondahl 2015), the climate impacts of Barents energy developments are overlooked. Paradoxically, the future development prospects of northern societies are framed as dependent on the very same oil and gas developments which will eventually only further feed the greatest threat faced by the societies of the north: climate change.

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Nordic municipalities and industrial megaprojects: Balancing growth and welfare

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how different policy areas are coordinated in two Nordic municipalities affected by mining megaprojects. Drawing on institutional theories in public administration and governance, the article demonstrates how the emergence of new corporate interests sparks the formation of interactive governance networks which focus on business development and economic growth, and leave welfare departments out of strategic policy development. The article argues that the Nordic welfare model entails certain challenges for municipalities hosting industrial megaprojects. Local governments must therefore acknowledge welfare services as a local political tool instead of perceiving them merely as tasks mandated by the central government.

Keywords: *Local government, extractive resources, local development, Nordic welfare, interactive governance*

1. INTRODUCTION

Despite fluctuating oil and mineral prices, many communities in the Barents region are still pinning their hopes on extractive industry development. In recent years, researchers have shown growing interest in local challenges that follow natural resource extraction (see for example Wilson and Stammler 2016; Koivurova et al. 2015; Nygaard 2015; and Suopajärvi, Poelzer, et al. 2016). However, scholars have mainly focused on issues such as the rights of indigenous groups, local acceptance, and the environmental consequences of large-scale industrial projects. In contrast, there is much less information about how the municipal organizations affected by industrial megaprojects overcome the dilemmas they face when the local economy transforms. To date, even studies that aim to describe the social impacts of mining in this region have failed to acknowledge and incorporate, both theoretically and methodologically, the municipality's responsibilities as provider of welfare services as an important variable in the analysis of how local communities handle big industrial projects (Suopajärvi, Ejdemo, et al. 2016). The empirical goal of this paper is to address this scholarly neglect: it compares the various ways in which different departments in two Nordic municipal organizations are included in planning and policy formulation. The theoretical context for this discussion is a combination of two sets of literature: institutional analysis of public administration and models of local governance.

The research question in the following empirical analysis is: how do the extensive responsibilities of the Nordic welfare municipality affect the municipal development agenda when the municipality hosts an industrial megaproject?

Through a comparative "most similar system design" (Peters 2013), the article compares the coordination of different policy areas in Kvalsund municipality in Norway and Pajala municipality in Sweden as it stood at the time the data was collected (November 2014–January 2015). Although similar in most respects, the municipalities differ in their stage of implementation of the mining project. The mining project in Kvalsund was in a late development phase, whereas the mine in Pajala reached operational status in 2012. The different stages are important, as they can entail different challenges and thus explain the involvement of different municipal departments. Given the role of Nordic municipalities, one might expect that the development phase would be dominated by subsidiary departments responsible for zoning plans and business development, while welfare services such as schools, kindergartens, elderly care, and social services would be part of the strategic decision making when the mining project reached operational status. Further, one might expect that tensions and conflicts would emerge between the departments that were included and not

However, the empirical data does not support this explanation. Rather, the findings reveal that welfare is left out of the process when municipal organizations handle major industrial projects, both during the preparatory phase and during the operational phase. This neglect can make it harder to translate economic growth into broader social goals, and in particular into the goal that most of the interviewed municipal leaders in this study list as priority number one: population growth. Still, the scarce representation of welfare service leaders in decision-making groups dealing with the industrial megaproject does not seem to create significant conflicts between the different departments. This article explains the neglect of welfare services by pointing to two interlinked phenomena. First, industrial megaprojects spur the formation of interactive governance networks focusing on business development and economic growth. This may in itself downplay the importance of welfare services in development. Second, as welfare services are mandated by and subject to the control of national authorities, welfare provision becomes a standard procedure. Instead of exploring possible adaptations of the existing welfare services, or trying to innovate in order to ensure that the services are tailored to the expected newcomers, the welfare departments focus on implementation and cost efficiency. Such a managerial perspective further weakens the participation of welfare departments in strategic policy development. In sum, this gives politicians limited ability to bridge economic and social objectives when carving out their development agenda.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: first, the article describes some differences between the various functions of a Nordic municipality and presents four models of governance that serve as analytical tools guiding the analysis. Second, after a brief note on methods, the article analyses how the two municipalities overcome the challenges they encounter. Third, the article discusses two reasons for the organizational division observed. The conclusion raises the question of whether the Nordic welfare model may exacerbate the difficulties of bridging local economic and social objectives, and points to some future avenues for research.

2. MULTI-ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISES

Nordic municipalities are complex and highly specialized organizations with broad discretionary authorities and extensive responsibilities (Rose and Ståhlberg 2005; Peters 2011). As they are responsible for the provision of most public services, the mu-

nicipalities account for a large share of public spending and employ more people than any other tier of government (Baldersheim and Rose 2011; Lidström 2011). However, municipalities are not only service providers. They are also a democratic body whose role and function includes societal development and, of course, the role as an integral part of the national administrative machinery (Bukve 2012; Lo 2015).

Montin (1990) coined the term *multi-organization* to address the multiple goals and subsequent increasing fragmentation of Nordic local governments. As the central governments assigned new responsibilities to the municipalities, the local public sector expanded rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s (Rose and Ståhlberg 2005). The burgeoning local state had to structure the different tasks and responsibilities in a way that ensured governability and transparency, which led to a growing local bureaucracy divided into specialized subsidiary departments. Nordic municipalities thus became increasingly complex organizations targeting a multiplicity of goals (Peters 2011).

This expansive role had certain unique qualities. The sheer size of the municipal organization made the municipality an important employer, especially in peripheral regions (Bjørnå and Aarsæther 2009). The size of the municipal organization also meant that it held a powerful position in most communities. However, the fragmentation caused by a continuous decentralization was also intrinsically linked to a silo mentality and ungovernability. Institutionalized differences, both in the organizational structure of local government and in the norms, values, practices, and beliefs may further constrain policy coordination. Two municipal roles that often involve contrasting institutional values are development and welfare services.

Development and welfare services are not mutually exclusive categories. Rather, the two policy areas interact and shape each other in myriad ways. A number of scholars have stressed that we should be cautious about perceiving the relationship between these two policy areas as a zero-sum game (Sellers 2002; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Bradford and Bramwell 2014). The quality of kindergartens and schools can be potent means in business development projects, as high-performing educational systems can attract skilled workers, and business development projects in turn can ease the fiscal constraints for new welfare initiatives. However, although the two policy areas impinge on one another, the task of thinking through their linkages and creating synergies can be a real puzzle. Three differences that may make joint performance in these policy areas difficult to achieve are described in the following.

First, locally elected politicians and public servants enjoy greater flexibility in relation to development than in relation to welfare service provision. Although municipalities play a key role in welfare provision, they are mainly implementers of national policy, as the central government mandates the provision of most public services. The municipalities are thus assigned responsibility for decisions made elsewhere (Baldersheim and Rose 2011, 289). By contrast, politicians and municipal administrators have greater leeway in the role as local community developers. Rather than being subject to national policymaking, community development calls for creativity and vision.

Second, welfare provision is mostly organized in-house in the municipal organization. Welfare services also connect closely to a party-dominated political agenda and a parliamentary chain of accountability (Ervik 2009), thus relying on a *political rationality* (Wollmann 2016, 378). On the other hand, local development policies are often formulated and implemented in collaboration with external stakeholders. Such stakeholders are typically single-purpose organizations like local businesses and civil society, which stimulate an *economic rationality*. Here, a more pragmatic and interactive form of governance prevails. The "out-of-house" way of policymaking is congruent with what scholars in the last two decades have called "collaborative governance" (Ansell and Gash, 2008), "interactive governance" (Torfing et al. 2012), "governance networks" (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007), or simply "governance" (in contrast to "government"). What these slightly different approaches have in common is their accentuation of collaboration between governmental and non-governmental actors in the making of public policies. Such collaboration may foster a more inclusive and participatory policymaking, but one that risks that the consolidation of political power among well-organized groups undermines the classical institutional separation between the public and the private sphere (Skelcher et al. 2011). Further, the inclusion of specific interests will also leave an imprint on the political objectives pursued.

Third, as a natural consequence of such differences, the institutional logics differ between the municipal welfare department and the agencies that work on business development. Whereas core rule-of-law values such as impartiality, formalization, and standardization have a strong standing in welfare provision, flexibility and output legitimacy dominate the economic development policy field (Peters, Pierre, and Røiseland 2014). Montin (1990, 258) points to how these differences can lead to rivalry and struggle:

> Tensions and conflicts easily arise in the grey area between traditional and new institutions. However, these are not always visible to the actors them selves. Even if the norms look consistent and uncomplicated from the outside, they can cause conflict. (My translation).

The multi-organizational character of Nordic municipalities means that it is hard to predict how any one municipality will balance its various roles and functions. According to Pierre (2011, 1999), this balancing can lead to four different institutional compromises: managerial, corporatist, pro-growth, and welfare governance. These four models of local governance are analytical tools meant to describe how policy goals will influence the governance structures, which in turn reinforce policy priorities and preferred partners. As these are ideal models, Pierre (2011, 152) underlines that no municipality will display all of the characteristics of any single model of local governance. Different models of local governance can also coexist, as different segments of a local administration tend to adhere to different rationales. Such fragmentation can lead to a lack of inter-organizational coordination and to what Pierce (1993) calls "governance gaps". If different segments of a local administration pursue different governance goals, the overall result may be disintegrated and ineffective. There is thus a strong conceptual link between Montin's (1990) concept of the Nordic municipality as a multi-organization and the intra-organizational tensions described by Pierre (2011).

Managerial governance describes a governing style in which the managerial dimension of local politics has come to dominate at the expense of the democratic/participatory dimension (Pierre 2011, 33). An increasingly strong emphasis on efficiency and performance nurtures this form of governance, which gives non-elected professional managers a key role. Managerialism is therefore on the performance side of the participation/performance, or input/output, spectrum (Gustavsen, Røiseland, and Pierre 2014). Hence, it relates strongly to the principles guiding the wave of reforms known as New Public Management (NPM), in which politicians were to "steer, not row" (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Peters 2011).

Corporatist governance carves out generous space for civil society in both public policy formulation and service delivery. Recent years have witnessed a renaissance of this model under such headings as co-creation, collaborative innovation, and co-production (Torfing, Sorensen, and Roiseland 2016; Voorberg, Bekkers, and Tummers 2015). However, the perils of associative democracy are linked to the inequalities in representation that this form of stakeholderism generates. The outspoken and well-educated will easily gain multiple forms of access, both as engaged citizens and as voters, often securing policy outcomes that benefit their interests.

Pro-growth governance has economic growth as its main objective. Although this may seem a self-evident and highly legitimate goal to pursue, the pro-growth governance model can have severe repercussions for the democratic process, as corporate

interests are prioritized in policy processes, often with direct access to high-level elected politicians (Lindblom 1977; Stone 1989). Such close relationships can reduce transparency and lead to a situation in which policy choices are dictated by economic interests.

Welfare governance describes a system in which the chief local policy objective is to cushion the impact of a declining economy by providing state-funded welfare services. Welfare governance will typically emerge where the private sector is limited and in decay. There is a plethora of examples of this kind of local governance from peripheral regions (Jones and Bachelor 1993). The welfare governance model will thus fit local communities in the High North characterized by declining and aging population, low private investments, and severe challenges in renewing the basis of the local economy. If attempts to renew the basis of the local economy continue to fail, local governments have little to offer but welfare services. The local political leadership therefore focuses more on mobilizing resources from the state than on generating local value creation and economic growth.

In summary, the Nordic welfare municipality's many and diverse tasks and functions contribute to a strong but also complex and potentially fragmented local public sector. The four models described above show different ways of balancing these tasks and functions. One may argue that such institutionalized governance models will yield predictable responses to hosting an industrial megaproject, as each municipality will react in accordance with its overarching policy objectives. However, based on the data collected, the article argues that this is not a foregone conclusion. The analysis of the data will follow after a brief note about methods, data collection, and the case municipalities.

3. METHODS, DATA COLLECTION, AND CASE MUNICIPALITIES

On a general level, this article investigates the intra-organizational coordination of different policy areas in two Nordic municipalities affected by industrial megaprojects. More specifically, the article examines whether and how different municipal departments are included in planning and strategic thinking related to the sudden change caused by massive investments in the local economy.

A comparative case study approach was chosen to gain deeper insights into how municipalities are impacted by industrial megaprojects. The two cases, which are both located in the Arctic region, were selected on the following four criteria: first, the

Nordic system of government, which accords wide responsibilities to municipalities, is a basic premise for this article. Second, because of the variety in legal and institutional frameworks among various extractive industries, a smaller subclass of municipalities affected by mineral extractive industries was selected. Third, the sample was further limited to municipalities hosting planned or newly started mining projects. Fourth, the chosen municipalities had to host mining projects at different stages of development, as this variable could explain the different levels of inclusion of welfare departments. On these criteria, the municipalities of Kvalsund in Norway and Pajala in Sweden were selected.

VARIABLE	KVALSUND	PAJALA
Number of residents 31 December 2016	1027 (Among the smallest 10% in the country	1027 (Among the smallest 10% in the country
Demographic trend in recent decades	Depopulating	Depopulating
Geographical location	Far North Periphery	Far North Periphery
Traditional form of industry	Primary industries	Primary industries
Economic performance	Weak	Weak
Type of extractive industry	Mining	Mining
Institutional context	Nordic welfare	Nordic welfare
Phase of mining project in spring 2014	Planned	Planned

Table 1: Summary of similarities and differences between Kvalsund and Pajala. Population figures retrieved from Statistics Norway (2017) and Statistics Sweden (2017)

Norway and Sweden are by no means identical states, but when it comes to local governance, the differences do not impact the argument in this article (for an overview of Swedish and Norwegian local governance, see Bukve 2012 and Montin 2007). Here it may be useful to remind the reader that all comparisons are in one way or another constructed by the researcher herself (Peters 2013, 155). The similarity between the two cases is thus a result of the chosen theoretical and conceptual framework. Kvalsund and Pajala are both rural and remote, struggling with depopulation and weak economic performance. As Nordic municipalities, they both have vast responsibilities as providers of welfare services, and, not least, both have well-known metal ore resources and have been waiting for investors to turn their eyes northwards.

The overall similarity between the two cases makes them ideally suited for a most similar system design comparison (Peters 2013; Przeworski 1987). In essence, such a comparison presupposes similarity except for one key variable (see table 1). Given the research question about the coordination between different municipal departments, the key variable in this context is the variation in the stage of implementation. Whereas the mining project in Kvalsund is in a late developmental phase, the Kaunisvaara mine in Pajala commenced operation in 2012. Why is this difference important? Hosting an industrial megaproject entails a multitude of challenges, and there is reason to believe that municipal departments differ when it comes to how included they are in planning and problem solving. This will probably also affect the prevailing model of governance, as policy goals will influence the governance structures, which in turn will reinforce policy priorities and preferred partners.

The empirical data in this article is based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews with 25 political and administrative leaders between November 2014 and January 2015 (see table 2). The respondents were chosen from a predetermined list of representatives of various political and administrative roles and functions, including the mayor, chief administrative officer, opposition leader, head of education, head of local health services, head of planning, and financial controller. A mining company representative was also interviewed. The interviewees were asked questions about how a big industrial project affected local democracy, welfare services, and societal development. Although aided by a common interview guide, the interviews had an explorative form, focusing on challenges related to the field of responsibility of the interviewee.

Documents were retrieved from the Environmental Impact Assessment process, public

reports, and case documents prepared for local political bodies such as the local council. When analysing these documents, special attention was paid to the kind of problems the documents addressed and what kinds of strategies the documents suggested.

The interviews from Pajala must be approached with some caution; at the time they were conducted, the mine had recently declared bankruptcy. However, the interviews focused on the coordination of different policy areas in the years prior to and during the operation phase, and it is therefore not likely that the bankruptcy represents any substantial bias.

MUNICIPALITY	WRITTEN DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Kvalsund	11	12
Pajala	13	13

Table 2: Data material analysed

The initial reactions of the public servants to being asked for an interview are included in the data analysed for this paper. The data collection thus includes the responses prior to the interviews. Whereas business developers and staff from the planning departments were very used to talking about the mining project, administrative leaders responsible for welfare service provision hesitated. Some even denied that there were any links between the industrial megaproject and their jobs. Interviewees were also asked to name other useful informants, in a snowball sampling process (Zølner, Rasmussen, and Hansen 2007). The list of people suggested functioned as a map of the actors that were perceived to be important.

4. ANALYSIS – TWO INSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISES

4.1. Kvalsund: first the mine, then the people, and in the end the need for public services

Kvalsund is a municipality in the northernmost part of Norway. The area has witnessed a steady decline in the number of residents, now counting around 1000. Within the municipality, the public sector is the most important employer, and private enterprises generally do not provide significant numbers of jobs (Vareide and Nygaard 2014). The municipality thus fits perfectly into the welfare governance model described earlier. However, a big copper mining project is signalling the possibility of a new era, but it is not yet in operation as it is awaiting final approval.

The social element of the municipal master plan that was passed in 2013 states that the overarching goal for the coming ten years is to increase the population by almost 200 inhabitants (Kvalsund municipality 2013, 4). This rather ambitious goal, which runs counter to the prognosis made by Statistics Norway (Kvalsund municipality 2013, 5), is to be achieved through new industrial activity. The master plan therefore stresses the need to take a possible rapid change in population figures into consideration and prepare for increased demand for public services.

When municipal leaders were interviewed, those included in the work on the zoning plan, the top management, and the economic development section were up-to-date on the current developments. They also unanimously gave credit to the CEO of the mining company, describing him as a man with genuine concerns for the future of the Kvalsund community. Through years of informal meetings and conversations with the mining company executive, they had developed a deep understanding of the mining project. Although there was disagreement about the planned submarine tailings disposal, all of these interviewees stressed the need for jobs and business development.

In order to reap the benefits of the potential megaproject, the municipality had worked out a societal development project that targeted the extended effects of the mining operation. In addition to the mayor and the municipal head of economic development, the project's steering group consisted of representatives from neighbouring municipalities, the county, and the mining company. Their mandate was to set the goals for the project, make decisions, and oversee the project implementation. The project plan explicitly stated that helping the mining company was one of the main goals. Moreover, it listed several different ways of doing so, such as facilitating business start-ups for sub-vendors and establishing and co-financing business networks.

When interviewing the persons involved in the societal development project, concerns for social issues and how the municipal organization should prepare for a mining project generating well beyond 100 jobs were not high on the agenda. According to the top municipal management, it was almost impossible to start preparing for the potential transformation of the local community as long as the necessary licences were not in place.

Municipal leaders responsible for different welfare services shared this view. The general attitude was that it was too early to spend time and resources on problems that had not yet manifested. As one said: "we have no concrete plans for how the mining project will affect the welfare services and we do not need to either (…). We'd better jump-start planning the day the operations begin." Any contact with the mining company was also deemed unnecessary as long as the mine had not yet materialized.

Another interviewee who also opted to await the course of development before staking out a course had experience from the neighbouring municipality of Hammerfest and the petroleum-related boom that had taken place during the building of a natural gas facility a few years previously. She warned against thinking that it would be easy to adjust to a new level of service provision. Instead, she said, the municipality could expect a sharp increase in the need for language skills and broad competencies befitting a more international work force. Thus, it would not only be a question of a quantitative increase in service demand, providing more of the same, but a qualitative shift, as new residents would demand different services than the municipality provides today. The interviewee feared that this would come as a shock to the municipal organization.

Likewise, the representative from the mining company underlined that the need for public services would skyrocket if the mine started operating:
Me: "Are there any municipal tasks and functions that no one talks about?"
Mining company representative:

> (…) the parallel development of schools, health services, and leisure activities. Moreover, getting started with housing development. There will be a big influx, and everyone will need different services. It doesn't seem like they're preparing anything yet, as if they won't touch it before they have to. (…). I can't see a plan for the transition to the operation phase, no matter how you look at it. So I guess it'll be a real shock when it comes.

In contrast to the mining company representative, senior politicians in the municipal council claimed that they had taken the parallel development of welfare services seriously. They referred to the municipal master plan and said they were ready to start preparing if the mining company received the final licences.

In summary, Kvalsund appeared as a municipality where uncertainty regarding the submarine tailings disposal had halted a broader perspective on societal development. Despite a municipal master plan, which clearly focused on both business development and welfare services, the key actors were preoccupied with securing the mining project. As one of the leaders responsible for welfare services explained, the plan was to solve problems relating to increased demand for public services when they emerged. As long as the mining project still awaited final approval, there was no need to rush into thorough preparations. The mining company representative warned against such an attitude. Still, despite a close collaboration with the political leadership, he had not been able to persuade the top municipal management about the need to expand the scope of the preparatory work to include welfare services.

4.2. Pajala and the swamp that was suddenly worth a fortune

Pajala is a municipality in northeastern Sweden, bordering Finland. Like Kvalsund, Pajala has experienced a dramatic depopulation during the last 60 years, from more than 15,000 inhabitants in the 1950s to less than 6300 in 2009 (Pajala utveckling 2011, 4). In 2012, the mining company Northland Resources started mineral extraction from a well-known iron ore deposit in the municipality. Heavy investments poured into the rural community, which led to a sense of optimism and hopes for a prosperous future. Unfortunately, the mining company declared bankruptcy in December 2014, after only two years of operation.

The pattern identified in Kvalsund was also identified in Pajala. When asked for key persons responsible for handling the impact of the mining megaproject, people referred to more or less the same representatives of roles and functions as in Kvalsund. In addition to the chief administrative officer and current and former mayors, the persons mentioned were employed in the technical department, planning department, and the like. When an interview was requested with a leader responsible for welfare services, she responded that she could not see that she had anything to do with the mining project.

In contrast, a business development company named Future Pajala was both visible and self-confident. Jointly owned by the municipality and local businesses, the company

served as a node between key officials in the municipality and external stakeholders such as corporate actors, the regional state institutions, and the EU. The business development company pursued a strategy in which the goal was to make Pajala visible and well-known among potential workers living outside Pajala. Future Pajala participated in expositions and promoted the potential for well-paid jobs in the mine. Boosting Pajala's reputation as an exception to an otherwise depopulating region was important; the message was that Pajala was a place with an optimistic view of the future.

The mine had an all-encompassing impact on local governance in Pajala. Quite understandably, the mine was on everyone's lips. Senior politicians and public officials devoted much of their time and work to mine-related issues, often in joint efforts with the business development company. If they were able to attract new businesses and new residents to the community, the mining project would represent a paradigm shift for the community, making the potential payoff immense. It is therefore not surprising that staff working directly with the mining project enjoyed privileged access to the mayor's office.

Several interviewees, and particularly the politicians among them, expressed enthusiasm about the most hectic years prior to and shortly after the mine opened. However, some of the leaders responsible for welfare services opposed what they called a one-dimensional approach to societal development. As one leader commented: "[W]e have almost neglected the municipality. An unbelievable focus on the mine has made us almost forget about our own organization." Another key actor differentiated between what he called domestic and foreign affairs, the latter being the ambitious strategy of marketing Pajala nationally, even internationally. The hype was a good thing for many reasons, he said, but it left the municipal organization in a void. What he called "domestic affairs", developing the municipal organization and ensuring the necessary flexibility in times of change, was overshadowed by the exogenous shock that the mine represented. Another public servant opposed the way prominent actors had excluded welfare services from the decision-making arenas: "I remember I once voiced my concern, saying that social services should be invited to the meetings in which the strategy is coordinated."

Although some interviewees complained about lacking access to strategic decision-making arenas, they all felt confident that they would be included if the booming economy had a negative impact on social welfare. However, there were few examples of problematic situations. In contrast, the municipality experienced severe problems related to a lack of manpower, especially in the holiday season. According to one

local politician, the social service department witnessed a high personnel turnover when the mine started operating. People quit their low-paid jobs as skilled welfare workers and began working as drivers or the like, making a fortune compared to their previous public sector jobs. Temporary positions became almost impossible to fill, and pensioners had to return to work for the municipality to avoid having welfare services fail to meet needs.

To summarize, the picture in Pajala resembles that in Kvalsund. The business development company appeared to be the spearhead of societal development, pushing for positive PR, improved infrastructure, and continuous growth. Public servants responsible for welfare services felt left out, or, perhaps even more surprisingly, did not even regard themselves as important actors. The presumption that hosting a mining project that had reached operational status would lead to the inclusion of other municipal actors proved wrong. Instead, the same actors dominated the local scene, characterized by a close collaboration between private businesses and the political leadership.

4.3. Comparative analysis

Are the two municipalities in the northernmost part of Scandinavia examples of fragmented multi-organizations incapable of coordinating different segments of the municipal organization? In Kvalsund, the representatives from the welfare departments did not think there was any need for planning or preparations prior to the granting of the final start-up permissions. Instead, they expected an all-out effort once the project materialized. The mining company seemed dissatisfied with this approach, claiming that chaos would follow when the influx of people began. In contrast to the lack of involvement of welfare services in the planning process, those responsible for business development and land-use planning were very aware of the details of the mining project and had a repertoire of policy ideas.

Likewise, in Pajala the business development company leveraged private sector resources for public purposes. Together with corporate actors, the business development company set the agenda and together they were the visible agents for the municipal response to the megaproject. Welfare service leaders felt left out, and claimed that the municipal organization had suffered because of a strong focus on what they called "external relations".

The response from the interviewees clearly suggested a fragmented public administration. Navigating the rapids of economic change, the municipal

organizations had prioritized land-use planning and establishing networks with both the corporate sector and regional and central government agencies. In contrast, employees working in welfare services were not part of the inner circles. Still, a disintegrated municipal organization is not by definition conflict-ridden and destructive. The data suggests that both Kvalsund and Pajala exemplify this: while some segments of the local bureaucracy were surprisingly unconnected to strategy development and policy formulation in the wake of the mining projects, conflicts and tensions were hard to discover. Some of the welfare service providers had voiced their disagreement, but in general it seemed that the leaders responsible for public services accepted their subordination: "This is how it is. We do not like it, but we do not disagree too loudly either", seemed to be a common credo. As the municipal white papers listed population growth as priority number one, such a detached role for the welfare services was unforeseen. Based on the data, several explanations for why the welfare services played such a marginal role are valid. All of them are linked to Pierre's analytical model (2011) and the connection between governance objectives and preferred partners.

First, the disconnect might be a consequence of necessary priorities. Land-use planning and business development are perhaps the most urgent issues to address when a big mining firm shows up on the doorstep of a sleepy town. The institutional capacity in municipalities that have been combating depopulation for decades will necessarily be limited. The municipal leadership must therefore engage in presumably difficult trade-offs when deciding what to prioritize. Further, declining communities seldom have top-notch planning departments or even updated area plans. Suddenly hosting an economic boom will therefore require an all-out effort just to be operational. At the same time, because of decades of depopulation, both municipalities had a buffer of available infrastructure like schools and nursing homes. Thus, the infrastructure needed to deliver welfare services would not be critical in the near future. Still, welfare services are more than physical infrastructure, and a coherent strategy for how to secure population growth must certainly include available welfare services. Nevertheless, what gets prioritized is deeply rooted in policy preferences. The important message here is that when these two municipalities suddenly hosted an industrial megaproject, new societal actors and interests emerged on the local political scene. In order to mobilize their resources and include them in problem solving and policy development, a new structural framework developed of public–private networks. However, the Nordic municipality's role as provider of welfare services does not appear to have been high up on the networks' agenda. This appears to be an example of what Pierre (2011) claims

is a mutually reinforcing dynamic between preferred partners, governance structures, and policy priorities.

Second, the difference between the role as provider of welfare services and the role as societal developer mirrors the difference between the responsibilities of the central government and the flexibility of local government. The creative leaders concentrate on the political issues where their agency and visions count, and leave the state-mandated welfare provision to other segments of the local bureaucracy. In other words, there are structural barriers that prevent a constructive inclusion of welfare service departments in societal development processes.

The autonomy of the local government is a core question in the Nordic welfare model: to what degree can local authorities exercise discretion in the provision of welfare services? As Hansen and Klausen (2002) show, the state has increasingly regulated local government service production in order to ensure standardization and universality. In the two case study municipalities, this tendency seems to have structured the local welfare provision departments as implementers of state policy. Rather than being a tool for creating a more attractive and viable community, local welfare provision is an inflexible and rigid system that operates at arm's length from local politicians. A consistent focus on budgetary control and efficiency in accordance with managerial governance values has further spurred this division between welfare provision and local agency. Accordingly, and in line with the analytical model, welfare services are hardly ever included in the governance structures that focus on strategic development, because the welfare providers themselves pay more attention to the directions from the central government.

Third, the analytical model described a close relationship between political objectives and preferred partners. Prior to the mining projects, the two municipalities fit the welfare governance archetype. The population was moving away or aging, the local tax base was deteriorating, and the local government fought to maintain the local community by the help of state-funded compensatory measures. Suddenly, however, something happened. New corporate actors entered the scene and changed the future prospects dramatically.

The booming economy, or in the case of Kvalsund, the anticipated booming economy, shifted local policy towards business interests. Leading politicians and allied public managers forged close alliances that turned a traditionally sceptical stance towards private capital upside down. In Kvalsund, the mining company representative was included in the steering group of a prestigious societal development project. In Pajala, the business

development company took a leading role in promoting potential value creation.

Both governance networks were headed by the respective mayors, strongly signalling the start of a new era. The new approaches were in line with a pro-growth model of local governance, as they gave non-elected actors substantial influence over policy choices and strategy developments. In general, local business organizations may signal a corporatist approach to local governance, and the corporative element is undoubtedly present in the two cases. However, in both cases the inclusion of non-elected actors was limited, instrumental, and pragmatic. Rather than an organized civil society mobilizing to steer development and secure a wide distribution of economic benefits, as one would expect in a corporatist model, the private cooperation in these cases was confined to a well-organized business sector. This is especially relevant in Pajala; Kvalsund has a more limited range of private stakeholders. However, the pro-growth governance objectives only applied to some municipal departments. On the whole, the welfare services did not participate in the decision-making networks. Both in Kvalsund and Pajala, interviewees spoke about a division between different segments of the municipal organization. However, this division did not breed conflicts. Rather, the welfare departments seemed to be satisfied with the division of labour; they appeared to see themselves primarily as implementers.

5. CONCLUSION

This article has shown that certain segments of the local bureaucracy are neglected in times of economic change. This is primarily not a conflict-ridden and forced exclusion, as the welfare departments more or less agree to step aside and leave the dominant political agenda to more pro-growth departments of the municipality. This pattern does not seem to depend on the operational status of the industrial megaproject. The data collected do not support the presumption that different stages of the projects would be dominated by different policy areas. Instead, the pattern identified in Kvalsund is analogous to the pattern found in Pajala: business development and technical infrastructure seem to dominate at the expense of welfare departments. This lopsided approach is further reinforced by who is included and not in the influential governance networks, as these preferred partners leave an imprint on the political objectives pursued.

The article has pointed to two interlinked phenomena that can explain this organizational division: 1) a change in the prevailing mode of local governance caused by the inclusion of certain non-elected actors, and 2) an effect of the difference in local flexibility

between development and welfare provision in policy implementation. Both are linked to Pierre's (2011) analytical model in which different institutional compromises give voice to specific policy objectives.

When two municipalities concentrate on business development and economic growth, we must allow for the possibility that this is the best way to overcome the challenges associated with hosting an industrial megaproject. However, there is a risk that by leaving welfare out of the societal development equation, the municipalities end up pursuing the interests of a narrowly defined constituency.

The result is what we can call governance gaps (Pierre 2011; Pierce 1993; Warren, Rosentraub, and Weschler 1992). Governance gaps refer to how a lack of intra-organizational coordination can be an important source of local government ungovernability (Pierre 1999, 390). When different segments of the local state pursue conflicting priorities and strategies, the overall governance may be inadequate. In these two cases, a vital part of the municipal organization is left out of the loop with little chance of contributing its expertise and local knowledge to the project development and implementation. Consequently, the linkages between the economic and social dimensions of the community's future are missed. This process also obscures alternative strategies for societal development, as Nordic welfare services function not only as relief for the underprivileged. Welfare services are relevant when targeting the primary priority for all interviewees and the documents analysed: population growth. Furthermore, including welfare service departments not only widens the scope of the development processes and mitigating measures, but will also enhance the competence and knowhow of the municipal response.

One of the questions that emerges from these findings is whether the Nordic welfare model may in fact exacerbate the difficulties of bridging local economic and social objectives during rapid growth. There is nevertheless little evidence to support such a radical claim. The Nordic welfare model has traditionally been regarded as particularly suited to embedding the economy in a larger context of societal goals. This is partly because the central government has traditionally entrusted local governments with responsibility for a wide range of tasks and functions. One can therefore assume that the potential for a broad approach to societal development is particularly well developed in Nordic municipalities. However, the findings in this study point to two unique challenges that Nordic municipalities face in times of rapid change. First, there has been a growing tendency for the state to regulate local government service production

in order to ensure universality. Yet standard solutions risk being poorly suited to local needs and problems, for example during a dramatic change in the local economy. Second, if local welfare provision ends up being a mere appendage to local democracy – a mandated role carried out in a managerial way but not coordinated and incorporated into a larger governing context – this may in fact undermine the governance capacity of local government. Further research should therefore be undertaken to investigate whether these unique challenges prevent coordination across different policy areas when hosting industrial megaprojects. In this context, future studies comparing Nordic and other Arctic countries could prove fruitful. All the same, the findings in this study are a reminder to politicians and councillors in the many Arctic communities still hoping for extractive industry development to be aware of possible governance gaps between different policy departments when handling the consequences of hosting an industrial megaproject.

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Licence to pollute: Stakeholders' suggestions for environmental improvements on drilling waste in the Barents Sea

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ABSTRACT

The Earth system is threatened by the continuous growth and expanding scope of human activity. At the same time, offshore petroleum operations in the Arctic are increasing the burdens on vulnerable marine ecological systems. In research on offshore industries, the environmental focus is on contributions to climate change and "worst-case scenarios" of oil spills. An undesirable implication of such spills is that other common polluting operations escape critical review, also due to a predominant marginalistic approach to considering environmental problems. In the wake of economic activities and industries expanding into increasingly more exposed and vulnerable areas, the article centres on the discharge of drilling waste from petroleum operations in the Barents Sea. The purpose of the qualitative research is to present suggestions for environmental improvements to the Norwegian regime for discharging drilling waste. A theory of definite stakeholders is applied to bring together the most crucial views on the increased pollution. The principal result is a suggestion to enhance ecological integrity by changing the decision-making system regarding permission to pollute. The authors conclude that the applied systemic methodology yields new knowledge and salient policy recommendations for a part of the Barents Sea petroleum regime that has been less studied to date.

Keywords: *Barents Sea, definite stakeholders, ecological integrity, drilling waste, petroleum*

1. INTRODUCTION

The cumulative effect of multiple human-induced stressors on ecological communities has started to influence the global research agenda (Crain et al. 2008; Gunderson et al. 2016; UNEP 2008). Recent transdisciplinary research has provided estimates that humanity has already transgressed several planetary boundaries, intruded by the continuous growth and expanding geographical scope of human activities (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015).[1] An example of an industrial expansion – the case study in this paper – is how offshore petroleum operations in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea (Nilsen 2016) are adding pressure to marine ecosystems already affected by human activity (Benn et al. 2010; Cole et al. 2011; Hoegh-Guldberg 2015; Reker et al. 2015; Thompson et al. 2005). Policies in which the various forms of stressors and pollution have been seen as part of one system are not yet on the global agenda (Crain et al. 2008; UNEP 2008).[2] This means that researchers have a significant responsibility to tackle this challenge in a proactive manner: to bring to the forefront suggestions for how to lessen the ecological burden of economic activities and industries.

Practitioners of systemic research consider a system in a holistic manner (Crain et al. 2008; Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015; UNEP 2008), and systemic research therefore differs from the long predominant reductionist and marginalistic methods for considering environmental problems within economics, the natural sciences, and law (Capra and Mattei 2015; Ingebrigtsen and Jakobsen 2006; Meadows 2008). The ruling reductionist economic postulate is that man-made changes to nature resulting from an activity should not be questioned as long as the economic benefits of the activity outweigh costs (Ison et al. 2002; Neumayer 2003; Perman et al. 2003). There is hence a need to perform systemic and holistic scientific analysis within spheres still dominated by marginalistic methods, and to influence the policy sphere, as has also been pointed out and debated by a wide range of scholars (Ählström et al. 2009; Nilsen and Ellingsen 2015; Spash 2013; Welford 1998).

This paper is based on our case study of offshore oil extraction in the Barents Sea, where controversies relating to economic and environmental concerns have existed for decades. Guided by systemic thinking, we use a stakeholder approach to draw attention to a multitude of perspectives on possible environmental improvements. Our point of departure is the need to lessen the total burden of pollution on the seas and to discover how established activities and processes can contribute here, also when there are positive results from cost-benefit analysis of current practices (Statens strålevern et al. 2008).

The Barents Sea is located north of Russia and Scandinavia, and forms part of the Arctic Ocean, which is home to unique sea bird colonies, large cold-water reefs, and large populations of aquatic animals. The Barents Sea is one of Europe's cleanest and most intact marine environments but is subject to rapid industrial development, specifically within petroleum exploration and fishing (Harsem et al. 2011; Hønneland 2010; WWF undated). As arctic sea ice is receding due to climate change, the southern part of the Barents Sea is becoming increasingly open to shipping, oil and gas exploration, and tourism. The Norwegian petroleum industry keeps expanding geographically, also in the Barents Sea (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2017). More than 5700 wells have been drilled on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, compared with around 150 in the Barents Sea (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate undated).

In 2016, the Norwegian oil and gas industry produced 15 million tons of CO2. In 1990–2016, emissions of greenhouse gases from the Norwegian petroleum industry increased by 80% (Statistics Norway 2018). If the objective of limiting the global temperature rise to below 2°C is achieved, only one-third of the known fossil resources could be extracted (International Energy Agency 2013). The Paris Agreement on limiting global warming to 1.5°C implies the extraction of even fewer resources (European Commission 2014). However, the restructuring of the global energy production has been hampered by huge sunk investments, petroleum-driven economies, and the increasing demand for new energy at a global scale, and consequently fossil fuels are convenient in a short-term perspective (Nilsen 2017). The necessary focus on the emissions of greenhouse gases has probably crowded out public debate on other petroleum operations and practices that pollute and influence ecosystems every day (Blanchard et al. 2014; Frynas 2012). One of these practices is the discharge of drilling waste on the sea floor, and is the topic of our case study.

Drilling waste can be water, drilling mud, or drill cuttings, either separately or in combination. Ecological concerns have been raised about the discharge of drilling waste, which has been practised both with and without a public licence to pollute (Blanchard et al. 2014; Bechmann et al. 2006). Bakke et al. (2012) report that even water-based drilling fluid and cuttings can have biological effects when suspended in water masses. Due to the overall pressures on the ecology of the seas, and guided by the importance of not treating problems as separate phenomena but rather relating them to the totality of a given situation (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2008; Capra and Luisi 2014; Meadows 2008), we use a stakeholder approach to put forward salient suggestions for environmental improvements to the practice of drilling waste in the Barents Sea. More

specifically, we apply a theory of definite stakeholders and bring together their views on the current problem of increased pollution and vulnerability. A definite stakeholder possesses the attributes of legitimacy, power, and urgency (Mitchell et al. 1997). Our research question is: *How can the existing regime of environmental regulations relating to offshore oil drilling be improved?* A stakeholder approach helps us to contribute new knowledge of how policy management in the Barents Sea can secure a better balance between systemic environmental thinking and the traditional reductionist approach.

We start with an outline and discussion of our theoretical platform for systems thinking and stakeholder theory. Next, we describe the study method, followed by identification of definite stakeholders in the discharge regime of oil drilling. Thereafter, we present the data and results of the analysis of both the document review and interviews held with definite stakeholders. We discuss the most salient suggestion for environmental improvement and then present our conclusions.

2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

2.1 The methodology of systems thinking

The point of departure in systems thinking or in a systemic methodology is that the component parts of a system will act differently when isolated from the system's environment or other parts of the system. In contrast to a reductionist and positivist methodology, in systems thinking a system is perceived in a holistic manner (Meadows 2008). A recent and well-known example of systems thinking is the framework of planetary boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015) referred to in the preceding section, but the main characteristics of systems thinking emerged in several disciplines in Europe as early as the 1920s. It was pioneered by biologists, enriched by Gestalt psychology, the new sciences of ecology and ecological economics, and, perhaps most importantly, quantum physics (Capra and Luisi 2014; Ingebrigtsen and Jakobsen 2006; Meadows 2008). More recently, many researchers have concluded that the paradigm of a reductionist and mechanical methodology is the main reason for the unsustainable path that we, as a global community, are now on (Capra and Mattei 2015; Nilsen 2010; Sjåfjell and Taylor 2015; Steffen et al. 2015). Still, many scholars stress that the two different forms of methodology are complementary, and there is a need to shift from the hegemony of reductionism to allow for other approaches, such as holism (Meadows 2008; Nilsen 2010). One striking feature of the difference between reductionism and holism is the change of emphasis from quantities to qualities and relations. This does not mean giving up

scientific rigour but is rather a realization of what science can do. What a theory does not include and therefore cannot be used to explicate is just as important as what it can explain (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2005; Capra and Luisi 2014; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; Nilsen 2010). The terms "holistic thinking" and "systemic thinking" are often used interchangeably. In this paper, "holistic thinking" is in line with how the interviewed stakeholders expressed themselves, and is therefore used when referring to them.

In this paper, our use of systemic methodology provides a framework and argument for our normative research question. The methodology also serves as a guide for our stakeholder approach, specifically with regard to the reflexive method of mapping definite stakeholders, which is presented in the following sections.

2.2 Definite stakeholders

In the social sciences, the stakeholder approach is widely recognized as a method to increase the legitimacy and probability of acceptance (Jenkins 1999; Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001; Nastran 2014). According to Robert Edward Freeman's classic broad definition, a stakeholder is "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (Weber 1947, 854). In this paper, we apply the specific definition of definite stakeholders that leads to significant qualitative suggestions, in this case with regard to improving the regime for discharging drilling waste.

Here, we use the concept delineated by Mitchell et al. (1997): one has to possess the three attributes of *legitimacy, power,* and *urgency* to be a definite stakeholder. Mitchell et al. (1997, 878) state: "Stakeholder salience will be high where all three of the stakeholder attributes – legitimacy, power and urgency – are perceived by managers to be present." Stakeholders lacking one or more of these three attributes have variously been described as dormant, dominant, dangerous, definitive, dependent, discretionary, or demanding (Mitchell et al. 1997).

Suchman (1995) defines the attribute of legitimacy as a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, or definitions. Moreover, legitimacy is a perception or assumption in that it represents a reaction by observers to an organization as they perceive it. Thus, legitimacy is created subjectively but possessed objectively. The classic definition of *power* is a relationship among actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something B would

not have otherwise done (Mitchell et al. 1997; Weber 1947). In the study on which this paper is based, we sought and invited the participation of stakeholders who wanted to exercise power by communicating their knowledge. Hence, we looked for knowledge-based power and specifically knowledge about modifications to a discharge regime for drilling waste.[3] Moreover, by presenting their views in this research paper, we have granted *power* to the stakeholders who communicated such knowledge.

According to Mitchell et al. (1997), *urgency* – the third attribute of a definite stakeholder – exists when a relationship or claim has a time-sensitive nature as well as being important or critical to the stakeholder. Knowledge gains authority through legitimacy, and attention through urgency.

With respect to a recent typology developed by Mielke et al. (2016), the involvement of stakeholders in our research can be characterized as democratic. It is a collaborative approach to research, in which the role of the researcher is to bring together different stakeholders and to facilitate and moderate a dialogue. The typical outcome of such a stakeholder approach is policy recommendations, as opposed to, for example, technical feasibility studies. Our typology thus differs from typologies inspired by rational choice, neutral science, and objectivism. In the following section, we describe our method for identifying the definite stakeholders in the discharge regime for drilling waste.

3. METHOD AND DATA

In order to explore our research question (Section 1), we conducted a qualitative case study guided by our theoretical foundation. Our aim was not to provide statistical representativeness or to develop generalization, but rather to explore the research question based on abductive reasoning (Edwards et al. 2014). The case study approach is a preferred strategy when questions are posed of "how" and "why", the researcher has little or no control over events, and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with a real-time context (Yin 1994). The approach allows in-depth, multifaceted explorations of complex issues in their real-life settings, and is well suited in cases in which the boundaries between the context and the studied phenomenon are not clear (Yin 1994). As argued by Thomas (2011), a distinction between the subject of the study – the case itself – and the object being the theory used to view the subject, is relevant for case studies. We followed this distinction by defining the subject as the waste management regime, while stakeholder theory and systems thinking were defined as the object.

To investigate the topic of stakeholders' perception of waste management regimes in peripheral regions we combined document studies, and qualitative interviews from December 2013 to February 2015. The data material for this paper thus contains two different, but complementary components of qualitative data. The largest share of the data are the results of the analysis of documents from a public consultation held by the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment in 2010 on a revision of the management plan for the Barents Sea, including the discharge regime for drilling waste (Ministry of the Environment 2006). A total of 78 institutions participated in the public consultation process, and we investigated and explored all of their respective 78 documents for comments or opinions on the discharge regime at that time, and for their suggestions for improvement to that regime.

Our process of identifying definite stakeholders was done in a reflexive manner (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2005) with several different sources. We started with brainstorming and discussions about possible definite stakeholders, together with other members of the research project "Barents Sea drill cuttings research initiative" (BARCUT) (EWMA 2015).[4] We involved other BARCUT researchers in the initial process to secure the validity of the identification process and the data analysis. The core of these discussions is described in Section 4, where the focus is on absence or presence of the three attributes required of definite stakeholders.

Next, we checked whether the results of our discussions on definite stakeholders were in accordance with the findings from the document review, and confirmed that our identified definite stakeholders were among the 78 institutions that participated in the public consultation. Further, we investigated whether the identified stakeholders' contributions to the hearing gave input to the three attributes of knowledge, urgency, and legitimacy. The results of this analysis of 78 statements are described in Section 5.1. As part of our reflexive identification process, we used these findings as a quality control of the discussion explicated in Section 4, on absence or presence of the three attributes. These parts of the identification process laid the foundation for proceeding with interviews with representatives of the following groups of stakeholders: oil companies, supply industry, bureaucracy, fishing industry, environmental NGOs, and research organizations.

Moreover, we conducted interviews with one representative from each of the first five above-mentioned groups of definite stakeholders. For the sixth group – research

organizations – we approached three different research institutes for interviews but they all declined to participate. They explained that they did not want to exercise power by communicating their knowledge in a sphere which they perceived as impregnated by politics. Furthermore, two of the research institutes were not comfortable about communicating hypothetical changes to the current discharge regime, and preferred to wait for a potential specific request from their owners or a call from a financier. In total, we conducted five in-depth interviews.

In the interviews, we performed the last step in our reflexive process of identification and confirmation of definite stakeholders: we explained the concept of definite stakeholder and asked our interviewees (1) whether they had any objections to the ones already included, and (2) whether they wanted to include any others, hence opening up for snowball sampling (Miles and Huberman 1994). None of the interviewees had any objections to the already included definite stakeholders, nor did they suggest any additional groups of definite stakeholders, and therefore our reflexive process of identification was completed. The results of the identification process and a summary of the results of the discussion are presented in Section 4. Identifications of stakeholders commonly and often necessarily combine different methods, and often the particular combination of brainstorming, semi-structured interviews, and snowball sampling (Reed et al. 2009).

Three of the interviews were conducted face-to-face and two by telephone, all following the same semi-structured interview guide. Overall, the interviewees were asked to suggest specific modifications to reduce the environmental burden of petroleum activities in regular operations at sea. There were also specific questions relating to drilling waste on the sea floor as opposed to on land, environmental surveillance, cooperation between companies, and the use or development of new technology. To ensure the most accurate analysis of the data material, the interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. The results of the interviews are described in Section 5.2.

3.1 Limitations of method and data

The systemic methodology we used recognizes the inherent subjectivity in all research and the importance of researchers being explicit about the possible implications of their research (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2005; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). *First,* the initial identification of definite stakeholders was made by BARCUT researchers (EWMA 2015), including us. Although this identification was followed by several more steps in a reflexive process, it was crucial in terms of its influence on the

subsequent steps. This is a well-known weakness in several methods for identifying definite stakeholders (Reed et al. 2009).

Second, the 78 institutions that participated in the public consultation on the management plan for the Lofoten Islands and the Barents Sea demonstrated wide-ranging interest in the plan. However, there may have been groups whose voices were not channelled into the hearing, and groups that our reflexive identification process of definite stakeholders did not recognize. The regime of a public hearing may reinforce already established knowledge structures, including perceptions of what kind of knowledge is expected. By relying to such an extent on a public hearing in order to identify stakeholders willing to express knowledge, we have reinforced the current knowledge structure through our paper. Additionally, granting the stakeholders power through this knowledge by including them as definite stakeholders in the study reported in this research paper further strengthens the knowledge structure.

Third, we attempted to increase the number of representatives and interviewees within all the groups of definite stakeholders. For some groups this was not possible due to very few actors in the field, while for other groups, particularly bureaucracy, we did not get any response to our repeated requests for interview. Increased numbers and more diverse representatives could have led to modified versions of the salient suggestions presented in this paper.

4. LEGITIMACY, KNOWLEDGE, AND URGENCY IN THE DRILLING WASTE REGIME

In this section we discuss the attributes of each of the six identified groups of definite stakeholders. In the identification process, the research team discussed each stakeholder group in terms of the presence or absence of the attributes of legitimacy, knowledge-based power, and urgency (Mitchell et al. 1997). The value added of the following discussion is its transparency with regard to the qualitative assessment of the presence of the three attributes.

The most readily apparent group of stakeholders were oil companies, which indisputably have knowledge through first-hand experience and expertise in the drilling waste regime. Moreover, any changes to the discharge regime will have an immediate effect on their business practices and are therefore highly urgent matters. What, then, is the legitimacy of oil companies' suggestions to modify the discharge regime of drilling waste for the benefit of the environment in the Barents Sea? Their most apparent stake

is the production of petroleum at the lowest possible price within the responsible frame in accordance with the Norwegian Petroleum Act (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 1996), and therefore their best financial option is to leave the drilling waste on the sea floor. However, some oil companies have conducted environmental research relating to the sea floor, although with a reductionist methodology (Klima- og miljødepartment 2010). Moreover, they contribute to environmental research on this theme through independent research organizations in which systemic thinking, too, is applied (EWMA 2015). We conclude that petroleum firms' legitimacy is not absent from environmental questions related to the drilling waste regime. They are definite stakeholders.

The supply industry is a very broad category of firms. We concentrated on those directly involved in handling drilling waste from petroleum explorations, operating both offshore and onshore. There has been continuous development of the various techniques to handle drilling waste considered by the authorities and petroleum firms. Such techniques include increased injections of drilling waste offshore and the collection of discharges in large long-life bags stored on the sea floor (Onsite Treatment Technologies undated; Statens strålevern et al. 2008). The supply industry possesses expertise and knowledge in the field of improvements to the regime for discharging drilling waste, and has a high sense of urgency regarding such waste, because handling it is the foundation of its business. Their business idea is either to handle or to process waste into new production, typically recycling it into concrete. Leaving and dumping the drilling waste on the sea floor gives the least ripple effect for the supply industry. This industry therefore operates in compliance with the waste disposal hierarchy, which per se gives them legitimacy in environmental matters. The waste disposal hierarchy proposes, once the waste is produced, to reuse or recycle the waste into new products. Leaving the waste at landfills is the last option in the hierarchy. The current practice of dumping most drilling waste on the sea floor, albeit with permission from the Norwegian authorities, is not even part of the hierarchy (Avfall Norge 2014; Klima- og miljødepartment 2013; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).[5] We thus label the supply industry a definite stakeholder, as all three attributes are present.

With regard to bureaucracy as a group of stakeholders, the owner of the discharge regime for drilling waste in Norway is the Norwegian authorities, represented by the Ministry of Climate and Environment (Ministry of Climate and Environment 2011; Ministry of the Environment 2006). Other relevant actors and representatives of the bureaucracy are the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, which grants the licences to drill, and the Norwegian Environment Agency, which negotiates and grants permission

to discharge drilling waste. The institutional legitimacy is embedded within a system of legislative acts and the existing management regime (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001). The current regime for discharging drilling waste in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea has existed since 2011, and since then, the bureaucracy, as a definite stakeholder group, has not suggested any environmental improvements to the regime. Still, the urgency of the bureaucracy's views is not necessarily visible, because the views are channelled – and sometimes moderated – through the political system. This was confirmed by the representative of the bureaucracy in the interview, which they used as an opportunity to propose a substantial change to the discharge regime. From this, we infer that the bureaucracy is a definite stakeholder, because all three attributes are present.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are important stakeholders in a widening spectrum of themes and many have established themselves as credible institutions and are recognized as such, not least in social and environmental debates (Whawell 1998). In Norway, the environmental NGOs occupy central positions in the political debate (UNEP 2008). Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001, 287) state: "Both industry and government have started to pay attention – and increasingly so – to the pressures for changes in management regimes from environmental NGOs." Norwegian environmental NGOs have been explicitly invited to participate in public hearing processes on petroleum-related matters, and from time to time their claims have led to changes in pollution permits granted by the public authorities (Klima- og miljødepartment 2010). We therefore conclude that environmental NGOs have knowledge and legitimacy concerning the discharge regime of drilling waste. The typical use of a loud public approach, justified from an ecological perspective, is an expression of urgency. Norwegian environmental NGOs are thus definite stakeholders with respect to the discharge regime of drilling waste.

Since the 1970s, petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf have expanded continuously. Although the income from the sector has contributed to increased welfare in Norway, including the funding of costly public functions, the expanding petroleum activities have led to a continued conflict of interests between fishing and petroleum activities. Today, there is no sign of the relative amount of discharges of drilling waste to sea lessening; rather, there have been attempts to deposit less material on land and to increase dumping on the sea floor (Norges Fiskarlag 2014). The Norwegian fishing industry has demonstrated knowledge and urgency concerning the discharges of drilling waste. Moreover, the industry has pronounced legitimacy in marine-related issues (Gezelius 2008; Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001).

Research institutes that focus on the environmental consequences of the discharge regime for drilling waste are stakeholders with highly specific knowledge and have legitimacy through the system of blind-review publications. While their urgency may not always be visible, the urgency is also dependent on how time-sensitive their research findings are. None of the representatives from this group of definite stakeholders were willing to participate in interviews. We infer that research institutes are a definite stakeholder, as all three attributes are present, although not always visible in the public debate.

We used the same method for defining stakeholders as did Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001).[6] They also discuss other possible definite stakeholders, namely indigenous people and sports fishers. However, these are not definite stakeholders in the discharge regime for drilling waste but in the regime of fisheries management. Our case study concerns the environmental situation on the sea floor in deep seas and therefore our mapping of stakeholders does not include as many stakeholders as in cases closer to the shore, or on land (Nastran 2014).

5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS AND INTERVIEWS

5.1 Ending of the zero discharge regime

The Norwegian areas of the Barents Sea were opened up for petroleum exploration in 1980, and for many years the regime for discharging drilling waste was the same for all operators on the Norwegian continental shelf. In 2006, there was a change, as a stricter practice called the zero discharge regime was imposed on the Norwegian areas of the Barents Sea. All types of drilling waste now had to be either re-injected below the sea floor or taken ashore. This regime – or policy – was imposed after political negotiations and was reasoned from a precautionary principle and overall environmental concerns (Knol and Arbo 2014; Ministry of the Environment 2006). Such overall environmental concerns are in line with a more holistic and systemic thinking rather than with the traditional reductionist approach.

In 2010, the Ministry of Climate and Environment invited various institutions to contribute to a public consultation to revise the 2006 plan (Klima- og miljødepartment 2010). In such consultations or public hearings, the Ministry is obliged to consider all incoming responses as part of the knowledge base for the consequent factual policy (Government.no undated).

The 78 institutions that participated in the public consultation represented petroleum firms, research institutes, environmental organizations, municipalities, tourism firms, fishing-related firms, political parties, interest organizations for diverse industries, and labour organizations. We investigated the content of the 78 documented responses to the public consultation for the revision of the integrated management plan (Klima- og miljødepartment 2010) in search for answers to our research question.

The results of the document analysis revealed that only three institutions, all representing the petroleum industry, had comments on the discharge regime. None of the remaining 75 institutions had commented upon or supported the zero discharge regime. The comments from the three institutions were essentially the same: there was no need for the zero discharge regime in the Barents Sea, because pollution from discharges of drilling waste and produced water would not have significant environmental consequences. The institutions were the Federation of Norwegian Industries (Norsk industri), the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association (Norsk olje og gas), and Statoil, the partly state-owned and the dominating oil company in Norway, with over 70% of the licensees. All three institutions have coinciding interests under the definite stakeholder group of oil companies, and are therefore included in our further analysis in this paper.

The subsequent revised integrated management plan abolished the zero discharge regime after only five years of running. In 2011, the rules for the discharge regime in the Barents Sea were softened and aligned with those applicable elsewhere on the Norwegian continental shelf (Knol and Arbo 2014). This was also a shift away from a holistic view of the system, to become aligned with a more traditional and marginalistic regime with cost-effective considerations. According to an interviewed representative of the bureaucracy, the end of the zero discharge regime hinged not only on the feedback from the three representatives of the petroleum industry, but was also subject to political negotiations.

However, a lesson learned is that a consultation can and should be used to support the parts that the stakeholders believe are important to keep, otherwise there is a risk of losing them. By communicating knowledge, one exercises power (Avelino and Rotmans 2011), and in this case power was exercised through arguing that single sources of pollution from drilling waste and produced water would not create significant environmental consequences. This was also expressed as a lesson learned by the other stakeholders we interviewed, who did not use the opportunity to exercise power through communicating their knowledge and concern for the marine environment on the basis of a more holistic view. The results of the public hearing have led us to frame this interface as a "battlefield" where rational actors seek to maximize their

utility by their individual preferences. This neoliberal rational stakeholder approach is in contrast to the democratic stakeholder approach reported in this article with reference to the typology developed by Mielke et al. (2016).

5.2 Perceptions of environmental improvements

The results of the interviews with representatives from the five groups of definite stakeholders are summarized in Table 1.

PROPOSED MODIFICATION	INITIAL STAKEHOLDER SUPPORT	ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT
Petroleum firms cooperate to use the same ship to transport drilling waste ashore	Environmental NGOs, fishing industry	Reduced emissions to atmosphere, fewer ships
Permission to pollute as a pre-defined part of licence to drill	Bureaucracy, oil companies, environmental NGOs, supply industry, fishing industry	Sea floor integrity, predictability
Using gas as fuel on ships used for transporting drilling waste ashore	Bureaucracy, oil companies, environmental NGOs, fishing industry	Reduced emissions to atmosphere, more waste sent ashore for reuse
More drilling waste should be taken ashore	Supply industry, environmental NGOs	More waste sent ashore for reuse, sea floor integrity
Oil companies must take greater responsibility for waste deposits on land	Bureaucracy, environmental NGOs	Safeguards environmental standards for deposits on land

Table 1. Stakeholders' suggestions and support for modifying the drilling waste regime

The heading of the middle column in Table 1 includes the word "initial" to highlight that the support is suggested before further analysis of the suggestions has been made. The stakeholders were not unconditional supporters. Each suggestion must be followed by a range of analyses and subsequent specifications regarding issues such as financial conditions, time span, and transparency, to mention a few.

In Table 1, the third column lists the environmental benefits that the stakeholders pointed to as explanations for why they proposed or supported a modification. It should be noted that the term "sea floor integrity" is our translation of the stakeholders' environmental reasons for supporting a modification, also in line with the role of scientists in this democratic type of stakeholder involvement: "Scientists have to translate the beliefs and languages of the different 'systems' […]" (Mielke et al. 2016, 75).

In the course of drilling almost 5700 wells on the Norwegian continental shelf (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, undated), substantial amounts of cuttings and contaminating substances have been discharged daily (Blanchard et al. 2014). "The integrity of the sea floor" is an emerging and increasingly used concept to focus on human-induced changes to the seabed from a systemic view (Beurier 2014; Boyen et al. 2012):

> Safeguarding the integrity of the sea floor entails protecting the structure of the sea bottom and the function of the benthic ecosystems from human activities, including physical damage to the structure and species in the benthic habitats. Human activities which affect the sea floor include bottom and beam trawling, nutrient discharges both from land-based and marine activities, sand and gravel extraction, chemical discharges, drill cuttings, barium discharges from oil and gas extraction, the establishment of pipelines, dredging and the dispersion of harbor sludge and sediments. (Nielsen and Ravensbeck 2014, 48)

The suggestion for modifying the waste drilling regime that attracted most support was "Permission to pollute as a predefined part of licence to drill" (Table 1), and therefore this suggestion has the highest salience. In the next section, we explore the background and the motivations for this specific modification, as well as objections to it.

6. DISCUSSION OF THE SELECTED MODIFICATION

As shown in Table 1, all interviewed stakeholders expressed initial support for the suggestion "Permission to pollute as a predefined part of the licence to drill", but there were different motivations for their support. In this section, we continue our role as scholars in the democratic type of stakeholder involvement (Mielke et al. 2016) by discussing their explanations, motivations, and doubts about supporting this modification. This also gives an indication of the strengths and weaknesses to be further analysed beyond this initial study. The representative of the bureaucracy reasoned as follows (our translation):

> Under the current regime, the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy announces [a call for application of a] licence to drill wells, and the compa nies granted such a licence must apply to the Norwegian Environment Agency for permission to pollute. As the companies are required by law to utilize the licences, the Norwegian Environment Agency finds itself in a position where it must negotiate with every single firm holding a licence about the size and type of permission. Taking drilling waste ashore is a much more expensive operation for the firm than discharges at sea. This is an essential element in a firm's bargaining position. Other firm-specific challenges, such as technical capabilities and their own financial situation, will also affect the bargaining power of the firm. Ultimately, one of the factors to be negotiated is the sea floor integrity. The suggested modification is to assign the pollution permit conditions for each block before the announcement of licences for explorative drilling. This means that the public authorities must carry out, or at least facilitate, a sea floor investigation before the licence is announced. Today, this is the responsibility of the petroleum firm holding the licence. The sea floor investigations in this modified regime can be in line with the already established project, Mareano.

Mareano is a broad, state-governed and state-financed research programme for mapping depths and topography, sediment composition, contaminants, biotopes, and habitats in Norwegian waters (Mareano undated). We do not know whether the suggested modification to the drilling waste regime would entail the transfer of more drilling waste ashore, which would reduce marine pollution. Four interviewees stressed that discharges of drilling waste, even water-based ones, had a negative effect on swamps, corals, and shells, and created stress for nearby fish. However, all five interviewees agreed that simply by removing the bargaining process between the provider of the pollution

permit and the single petroleum firms, the modification would better safeguard the ecological conditions.[7]

Another distinct motivation among the interviewees was predictability, in several respects. All stakeholders welcomed a better preliminary understanding of how much waste should be discharged on the sea floor and how much should be transported ashore. An important feature of this predictability was that the permission to pollute would have to be non-negotiable. An additional incentive for the oil companies was the ending of the current public hearing process on their plans for handling drilling waste. The hearing process is time-consuming and often leads to oil companies changing their plans due to protests from NGOs or the fishing industry.

Both the representative of the oil companies and the representative of the environmental NGOs had doubts concerning the selected modification, as they believed it to increase costs. The total costs of sea floor investigations would probably be higher if they were carried out by the public authorities, who would investigate larger geographical areas than the more confined areas usually investigated by the oil companies. However, this was challenged by the representative of the bureaucracy, who said that Mareano could be rescheduled to also investigate areas relevant for the petroleum industry; such an analysis has since been done by Fjose et al. (2016). Regardless, if the tax regime continues whereby the Norwegian state refunds 78% of all exploration costs (Aarsnes and Lindgren 2012), the public authorities will pay most of the increased costs of sea floor investigations. Five interviewees raised the point that even if the increased costs were to be added to the licence fee, thus making oil companies pay for investigations of areas where they might not intend to drill or dump waste, the tax refund would leave them with only 22% of their total costs.[8]

CONCLUSIONS

The total magnitude of stressors on the marine environment is alarming (Benn et al. 2010; Cole et al. 2011; Hoegh-Guldberg 2015; Reker et al. 2015; Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015; Thompson et al. 2005). Each polluter must therefore critically scrutinize their practice towards a more sustainable marine environment. In 2015, 231 wells were drilled on the Norwegian continental shelf, a record number for one year (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate undated). However, in the offshore petroleum industry, the environmental focus is on contributions to climate change and the "worst-case scenarios" of major accidents. This focus is undoubtedly crucial and highly

justifiable, but an undesirable implication is that the environmental consequences of these everyday offshore petroleum operations largely escape critical review. The policy sphere is still guided by marginalistic approaches, both when considering environmental harm and when calculating it in terms of short-term costs and benefits for humans. Our research question is guided by a systemic methodology, asking how the existing regime in offshore oil projects can be improved, and addressed by a stakeholder approach.

We have brought to the fore the suggestion that all interviewed representatives of the definite stakeholders supported; it is thus the most salient suggestion for environmental improvements. The proposed modification is to rearrange the process and conditions for granting permission to pollute by discharging drilling waste on the sea floor. Today, the public authority that grants the permissions has to negotiate the content of the pollution permit with each firm holding a licence to drill. In this situation, a firm's bargaining position is naturally affected by firm-specific challenges, such as their financial and technical situation. Ultimately, one of the factors to be negotiated is the sea floor integrity. Instead, the conditions for the pollution permit should already be settled when the licences for drilling are announced. This means that the public authorities would have to carry out or at least facilitate a sea floor investigation before the licence to drill is announced. Currently, this is the responsibility of each petroleum firm already holding a licence. This suggested modification would alter the process whereby pollution permits are granted, and would imply new processes for both the authorities and the stakeholders. There are environmental arguments for initially implementing this modification in petroleum activities in the Norwegian parts of the Barents Sea (Bakke et al. 2012; Harsem et al. 2011), and then eventually applying it to other seas with petroleum activities.

A weakness of our reflexive method is that it gave the members of the BARCUT research group, including us, the power to make the first and important identification of definite stakeholders. However, we checked this initial identification against the findings from the document analysis as well as the opinions expressed by the interviewees. Moreover, we did not go into further details about the suggested modification or its consequences, by for instance conducting a feasibility study. Instead, we used a democratic stakeholder approach, in which the fundamental strength is the high legitimacy of claims in the science–policy interface (Mielke et al. 2016). The definite stakeholders' claim was first and foremost the need to enhance sea floor integrity, which is an argument for pursuing this novel suggestion through further research, also by use of complementary scientific approaches.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] The planetary boundaries that have been transgressed to date are climate change, biosphere integrity, biogeochemical flows of phosphorus and nitrogen, and land-system integrity. A further five boundaries – threatened but not yet transgressed – are ocean acidification, global freshwater use, atmospheric aerosol loading, stratospheric ozone depletion, and chemical pollution (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015). These earth-system boundaries are interdependent, as transgressing one boundary may cause others to be transgressed.

[2] The concept of planetary boundaries was incorporated into a draft agreement from the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012, but was cut partly because the concept was too new and partly due to concerns from poorer countries that its adoption could lead to a sidelining of efforts towards poverty reduction and economic development (Nilsen 2017).

[3] The relation between power and knowledge has been debated to a great extent in social theory, and it is not within the scope of this paper to add substance to this huge and important research area, beyond considerations at the end of the section on limitations relating to the knowledge base we have used and its consequences for power (Section 3.1).

[4] This article was written as part of a project titled "Barents Sea drill cuttings research initiative" (BARCUT), both funded by Eni Norge. The project period is 2013–2018 and the partners are UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Akvaplan Niva, and Norut. Eni Norge has not been involved in the collection of data, analysis, or interpretation of the data. Eni Norge has been informed about the status of the research project, but was not involved in the writing of this article or the decision to submit the article for publication.

[5] The EU introduced the waste hierarchy in 1975, and the concept was further strengthened by 2010 (2008/98/EC). In 2015, the European Commission launched "Closing the loop – An EU action plan for the circular economy". The theory of circulation economics is an example of systemic thinking (Ingebrigtsen and Jakobsen 2006). In Norwegian policy it is also becoming more common to see waste as a resource, as part of a circular economic thinking.

[6] One difference between our paper and that by Mikalsen and Jentoft is that they discuss nuances between absence and presence as high or low degree of urgency and legitimacy, whereas we use the dichotomy of absence or presence.

[7] The representative of the oil companies claimed that the responsibility for setting the right level of drilling waste dumped on the seabed should rest with the bureaucracy. They explained that their initial support for this modification served as a tool for this purpose.

[8] The scope of this paper does not allow for a discussion of this specific feature of the Norwegian regime for oil drilling further, nor does this aspect have any implications for the conclusions in this paper.

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RECEARCH COMMUNICATION

"We can't stop them" (Мы их не можем остановить): Russian media representations of the flow of asylum seekers at the Finnish-Russian border in 2015–2016

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ABSTRACT
In the winter of 2015–2016, refugees arrived at the arctic border crossing points of the Barents region between Finland and Russia. This paper examines how the Russian media portrayed the event and the policy context the coverage occurred in. The first sample of research examines the intensity of the media discussion and the general theme that is derivable from asylum seeker discourse in relation to Finland. The second sample focuses on subtle themes that dominated the discourse around two border crossing points between Finland and Russia. Data were collected from the news and articles published in the Russian Integrum database between June 2015 and June 2016. A content analysis examines the issues of framing, representation, and security to understand how the refugee migration was represented in the media. The analysis shows that there was an overall neutral representation of the refugee flow and that the media did not label the flow as a security issue in Russia. The findings highlight that the Russian media did not securitize the migration wave and the subsequent anomaly at the Finnish-Russian border. The discussion drew a bilateral problem-solving mechanism to the fore and portrayed Finland as an initiative-taker in depicting the phenomenon as a problem. Russian leaders contextualized the refugee flow with a failure of the European Union's immigration policies.

Keywords: *Arctic, migration, trafficking, security, conflict*

INTRODUCTION

The European migrant crisis (Balkan 2016), or the European refugee crisis (Albahari 2015), as it has also been defined, began in 2015 when a rising number of migrants from North Africa and the Middle East made the journey to the European Union (EU) to seek asylum (Eurostat 2016; UNHCR 2016, 40). The migrants travelled across the Mediterranean Sea or through Southeast Europe via the so-called Balkan route. Only a small proportion of them entered the EU and Norway, a Schengen-associated country, via the so-called northern route (Arctic route) through Russia (Frontex 2016a). In Finland, the year 2015 was exceptional in terms of the number of asylum seekers. Over 32,000 persons applied for asylum in Finland, a ten-fold increase from 2014. The largest group of asylum seekers were citizens of Iraq, followed by asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria (Finnish Immigration Service 2015a).

As of August 2015, thousands of asylum seekers entered Finland via its border with Sweden in Lapland, the northernmost region of Finland. From then on, Finland faced its most difficult year in relation to both the EU Schengen border and the EU external border in eastern Lapland, with migrant detention expanding at the Swedish-Finnish land border and the Finnish-Russian border crossing points in Lapland. This traffic slowed down at Lapland's western border in late December of the same year after Sweden and Denmark tightened their border controls. Soon after, the number of asylum seekers at the Lapland stations on the Russian border – Salla and Raja-Jooseppi – picked up.

The Arctic route through Russia over the land borders with Norway and Finland caught the Norwegians, Finns, and the EU by surprise. At first, the migrant flow targeted the land border between Russia and Norway in October and December 2015. Storskog, the only legal land border crossing between Norway and Russia, saw 5500 applications for asylum in 2015, compared with less than 10 the previous year (UDI 2016). The situation eased up in Norway in December 2015 as the migrants were deterred by worsening weather conditions and a shortage of transportation means. At the end of 2015 the Russian authorities began refusing travellers permission to transit their country without a Schengen visa. Despite this refusal, migrants started to appear at the border between Finland and Russia. Asylum seekers had started to arrive at Finland's two northernmost border crossing points, Raja-Jooseppi and Salla, already in October 2015, obviously as a spillover effect from those aiming for Norway. By mid-January 2016 the total number of asylum seekers at the Finnish border crossing points in Raja-Jooseppi and Salla was 1756 persons. Most of them were originally from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but there were also migrants of other nationalities (Finnish Immigration Service 2015b).

The Arctic route is part of the eastern borders' migration dynamic (Frontex 2016b). According to the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), the overall scale of irregular migration at all the eastern borders of the European Union is much smaller than on any other migratory route into the EU. More modest migration pressure at the eastern border together with geographical conditions and border control systems discourage irregular migration. The migration crisis at the southern borders of the European Union is a more commonly known challenge to the European Union's member states, and the flow of asylum seekers was expected to remain merely a southern phenomenon that would not affect the northernmost region of the European Union.

Russia's border with its Nordic neighbours Norway and Finland is commonly regarded as the most peaceful, orderly, and relatively closed leg of Russia's border areas. Therefore, the migration that surged at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 was exceptional, leading to a short-term but intensive anomaly in the Barents Region. The Arctic route of asylum seekers quieted down swiftly during the spring of 2016. The last crossing of asylum seekers at the Salla and Raja-Jooseppi stations was recorded on 10 April 2016, as Finland and Russia negotiated an agreement to stop border crossings from all third countries for 180 days.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This paper attempts to determine how Russian media representations of migration were contextualized and what kind of spatial practices emerged on the arctic border with the European Union. Migration discourse at the Finnish-Russian border in the winter of 2015–2016 is expected to reveal the core themes present in the media. The analysis particularly addresses portrayal of disorder and lack of control at a border traditionally regarded as stable and strictly controlled.

The central focus of the analysis was on the following key questions:

- How was the migration crisis at the Finnish-Russian border represented in the Russian media?
- Did any noticeable themes emerge as typical of the representation of the migration crisis at the two northernmost border crossing stations of the European Union?
- Did the Russian media treat the anomaly at the border as a national security issue for Russia or merely as a humanitarian crisis?

METHODOLOGY

The research design of this study has been developed to best operationalize the research questions, which probe the depiction of the refugee crisis at the Finnish-Russian border in Russian news. Hence, the sources are Russian newspapers and news agencies, and the sampling unit is the newspaper and the agency itself, while the recording units are the relevant articles found within. The representation of the migration crisis in Russian media was analysed through content analysis of the output of news agencies over a 13-month period.

The first sample focuses on a theme that is derivable from the asylum seeker discourse in relation to Finland. Samples from national and regional newspapers (Центральные и Региональные газеты) and news agencies (Информагенство) helped to delve more deeply into the discourse on asylum seekers in the context of Finland. The sources for the sample were two national newspapers *Независимая газета* and *Новая газета,* one state-operated domestic Russian-language news agency РИА Новости (МИА Россия сегодня) and one regional newspaper, the Murmansk branch of *Комсомольская правда.* The latter source represents the very region where the migration crisis peaked. *Независимая газета* is depicted as representing independent media with nationwide cover, while *Новая газета* is known to be a critical and investigative newspaper under the auspices of Россия Сегодня that has controlled РИА Новости since 2014. *Комсомольская правда,* the Murmansk *Pravda* is a daily newspaper and one of the most influential media in the region (Karitskaya 2013).

In this sample, the sources were sought for all articles that contained the word combination "Sanctuary and Finland" (Убежища и Финляндия) in the period from 1 June 2015 to 30 June 2016. The combination reflects the correct definition of the status of the people entering Finland – that they are asylum seekers, not refugees. The first sample unfolds the dominating themes that emerged in the 13-month review period. In all, 112 documents fulfilled the criteria, and these documents were selected for further analysis.

The second sample comprises a case study of 13 months' reporting on the asylum seeker flow at the border crossing points in Raja-Jooseppi and Salla, located in the Barents Region. The sample was created by using Raja-Jooseppi and Salla (Рая-Йоосеппи и Салла) as search words in news released by all newspapers and agencies in the Integrum database from the beginning of June 2015 to the end of June 2016. The border crossing points were chosen because they have been key entry points to the EU

for refugees and migrants from Northwest Russia. The purpose of this sample was to focus more precisely on the border crossing theme reflected by the two northernmost international border crossing points of the European Union. This sample generates themes as representations of the anomaly caused by the surge of asylum seekers at the border. It was expected that the word combination Raja-Jooseppi and Salla (Рая-Йооссеппи и Салла) would confine the sample to the core discussion pertinent to those particular border crossing points. All documents which had the selected combination in the national and regional sources of the Integrum database were analysed.

The material was collected online from the Russian Integrum Profi database, which, as it maintains on the website (Integrum 2016), is the world's largest archive of mass media of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Most of the Integrum documents are in Russian, but some of the material is also available in English. To get maximum benefit from Integrum and to extend the scope of the documentation, it is recommendable to use the database in the Russian language. In this research, the searches were conducted in Russian. In all, there are 6403 sources in the Integrum Artefact search in the category of national (Федеральная) and regional (Региональная) media. Advanced search features in Integrum Artefact are relatively simple and clear. Documents can be found without major effort despite the massive amount of material. However, fluency in Russian is a prerequisite for achieving a reliable outcome from any document search.

The information in the Integrum database was queried with the Artefact search engine by entering key words that condition the search in Cyrillic form into the query window. Key words that should be found in the original documents can be typed in their singular basic form, or truncated. The time scope of documents is indicated in the search window, and, if needed, the search can be confined to a desired list of databases. In this study, a default list of databases determined by Integrum was used to achieve a maximum search result.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Migration and security have tight discursive links that serve political, bureaucratic, and media games in reinforcing organizational and state interests (Bigo 2001, 122; Balabanova and Balch 2010). The media have an influential position as an institution. Information provided by the media influence media consumers in their attempt to make sense of the world and their place within it (Sjöberg and Rydin 2014). The media,

social media included, can also influence public attitudes and policies positively. They have a pervasive presence in modern society and the capacity to interpret and construct reality (Hall et al. 1978). The media do not simply reflect and mirror "reality", they create or re-present a new reality. They are therefore pivotal in the public perception of contemporary phenomena at international borders. For many, the media are the only source of information on topics that fall outside their personal experience (Graber 1994; Hall et al. 1978) and the source of public fear of crime (O'Connell 1999). Agenda setting is a key role of the media (Branston and Stafford 2005; Critcher 2003; McCombs and Reynolds 2002; Hall et al. 1978). According to Pollak and Kubrin (2007), reality is socially constructed, and the media can therefore affect perception and construct social problems.

Media representations of refugees and asylum seekers have been scrutinized by Gale (2004), Kaye (1998), and Bradimore and Bauder (2011). Scholarly analyses of media representations and impacts have been conducted by Mai (2006), Kaye (2001), and Georgiou (2012). Nicola Mai (2006) stresses that the media have been the main source of information for Italians about migrant Albanians living and working in Italy. According to her, the media have a role in the migrants' social exclusion and marginalization. Ron Kaye (2001) scrutinizes the political role of the media in the public perception of refugees, while Georgiou brings gender into the debate on migration issues and media representations. The central finding of studies of media representation in the context of refugees and migrants is that the role of the media in forming the public perception of refugees is considerable (Brosius and Eps 1995; Coleman 1995; Tomasi 1993). Migration, refugees, and asylum narratives are usually problematized; the public perception of migration is typically negative (Beutin et al. 2006, 2; Gerard and Pickering 2014). Coverage of refugees and migrants tends to be negatively categorized as a problem rather than as a benefit to the receiving society. This observation is supported in many studies which highlight widespread feelings of insecurity associated with immigration (Newton 2008; Leonard 2011; Bleiker et al. 2013; Dykstra 2016).

A security-oriented view of migration intensified as a result of the escalating Syrian crisis and the entailing wave of refugees to Europe. The theme of migration and refugees inherently encompasses the question of borders, be they physio-empirical or socio-linguistically and psychologically delineated entities between cultures. Migration is recurrently depicted as a threat to borders, order, and the identity of western societies. This observation is made in papers on the refugee crisis in Lampedusa, southern Italy (Dines et al. 2015; Orsini 2016), Greece (Papadopoulou 2004), the United States

(Ackleson 2005), and Australia (McKay et al. 2011). State leaders and other prominent politicians are thus apt to securitize border issues and migration (Buzan et al. 1998; Faist 2005; Huysmans 2006).

In the 1990s the open Schengen border suddenly became a security deficit, challenging the EU's principles of freedom of movement of persons (Bigo 2001; Boswell, 2003). However, borders are not fixed symbols of statecraft, but are in a constant state of flux (Paasi 1999), at least on the psychological level. Harle (1993, 11) asserts that increased cross-border traffic and cross-cultural interaction may actually strengthen cultural boundaries, rather than lower them. Supportive of Harle's reasoning, Jukarainen (2002) claims that internationalization and global challenges give rise to border activities that may lead to xenophobia, protectionism, and deterioration of a perception of borders as stabilizers and reproducers of security.

Migration as a phenomenon lies at the nexus of reterritorialization and geopolitical rivalry; their manifestation complicates relations between Russia and the West. The border between Finland and Russia serves as a paradoxical tool for reproducing power relations, exerting asymmetry, and entrenching psychological boundaries between the two countries. In practical terms, the border was an embodiment of governance between states in their curtailing of an unexpected group of people coming to the North.

One consequence is a reinforcement and reconstitution of the message of power, dependencies, and delineation between the "we" and the "other", alternatively "us" versus "them". Representations of the other reflect the operations of power. The ethos of the other in relation to migrants can be derived from Said's denotations of Orientalism as representations of the Orient from a European and Russian perspective. According to Said, the Orient is seen as backward, mysterious, and deviant. Orientalism conveys an understanding of European superiority over the people from the East, thus creating the Other for both Finland and Russia (Cloud 2004; Said 1977, 1985).

"The Other" brought two states which usually regard each other as the Other together to solve a common problem as "We". The perceived disorder at the border seems to have surprised both sides. Yet, the initiator of the problem solving was Finland. Here the Other was not the state and the society on the other side of the border, as it is commonly reflected. The Other came to the joint border as asylum seekers, which has not been experienced before at the Russian arctic borders. A completely new setting invoked media attention in the winter of 2015–2016.

According to Hall et al. (1978), stories are contextualized through "maps of meaning", which work because of the assumed consensus of the public. An example would be the assumed consensus that borders represent order and security, and efforts should be made to reduce the occurrence of undesired border events. Another contextualization would be consensus on the understanding that politicians do their best to solve the problem caused by others. A refugee crisis at a border always transgresses the news threshold, and, as Cohen (2002) asserts, atypical events receive more coverage. The media contextualize stories about a refugee crisis. Reinforcing the media's power over perception is its interpretive capacity (Cohen 2002).

Also, Hall et al. (1978) claim that the media contextualize news and apply labels which are presented to us as a simplified product. Research literature shows that the media use the terms migrant/immigrant and refugee/asylum seeker interchangeably (Berry et al. 2015). In Finland, the migration phenomenon has received scholarly attention for example in the context of hybrid war (Martikainen et al. 2016; Moe and Rowe 2016), everyday humanitarianism (Naguib 2017), and as a case for organizational learning (Kosmo 2017).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has noticed that there are major differences in the terminology and language used by journalists in the media in different countries and in their attitude towards refugees and migrants (Berry et al. 2015). The UNHCR reports that the majority of those making the sea crossing to Europe would qualify as refugees because they are "fleeing from war, conflict or persecution at home, as well as deteriorating conditions in many refugee-hosting countries" (UNHCR 2016, 2). The same definition cannot be applied to all people using the land route via Russia: some people arrive from countries and regions not belonging to war zones or conflict areas, while others fall into the definition of refugee.

The media can set agendas and frame debates. According to Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2009), the political and policy context of the "real world" conditions how news accounts are received and read. Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context (Krippendorff 1980, 21). News are written not solely to inform the reader of facts, and sources do not have any natural springboard but are a product of their origins and moulded by the expected audience (Finnegan 1998).

RESULTS

To highlight the topicality of the issue, I carried out a quantitative analysis on article intensity by calculating the monthly number of articles containing a combination of desired search words. The intensity curve gives an idea of the topicality of an issue that is or has been in the media during a defined period. If there are visible curves and peaks in the intensity, the topic is discussed in the media more (or less) often than usually. This observation suggests that the issue is (has been) topical, thus justifying delving more deeply into the reasons why the issue has appeared in the media more intensively. The point(s) of time of the intensity peak(s) and the fluctuation of the intensity curves are particularly interesting because they allow the researcher to focus on causes behind the fluctuations.

A search with the names of the international border crossing points Raja-Jooseppi and Salla (Рая-Йоосеппи и Салла) gives detailed information about border representations. These remote places at the external border of the European Union seldom stir news interest in the Russian media, but as of October 2015, Salla and Raja-Jooseppi started to appear in the media at an accelerating pace. All articles that contained the combination "Raja-Jooseppi and Salla" were analysed. There are altogether 320 documents with this search word combination in the Integrum database in the period from 1 June 2015 to 30 June 2016. A majority of the documents can be found in national news agencies (Table 1). National internet publications are the second biggest data source. The media of the Russian regions published about 22% of all articles with the word combination. The media intensity peak was reached in December 2015 when the Russian media published over 160 articles containing the names of both border crossing points. The intensity went down rapidly and reached long-term normalcy in June 2016 (Figure 1).

Anomalies, represented by peaks and curves, suggest that there is obvious relevance in scrutinizing the research questions more closely. It was expected that the search words and their combinations were sufficient to unfold the anomaly. Other search words, such as "illegal immigration", would not add any benefit to the quantitative results already achieved with the selected combinations.

ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST SAMPLE

The results of the first sample analysis gave rise to "dominant discourses" that the Russian media discussion maintained on refugees relative to Finland: a European Union

NEWSPAPER / NEWS AGENCY	NUMBER OF HITS IN 1.6.2015 - 30.6.2016
Nezavizimaya Gazeta	18
Novaya Gazeta	5
RIA Novosti	83
Komsomolskaya Pravda in Murmansk	6

Figure 1. Number of analysed documents



Figure 1. Intensity curve of the search combination "Raja-Jooseppi" and "Salla".

contextualization, politicization and securitization by Finland, and Russian intervention. The Russian media, when releasing news on asylum seekers at the Finnish-Russian border, generated dominant discourses that followed each other chronologically. These discourses systematize the phenomenon spatially and chronologically, and highlight the focus points of the media. The first and earliest discourse emerged as the migration crisis peaked in early summer 2015. The second discourse started to take shape in autumn 2015 as the migration (asylum seeker) flow turned from South Europe towards the North and Finland. The appearance of asylum seekers at the Russian-Norwegian border and the Finnish-Russian border in Lapland were essential elements for the emergence of the second dominant discourse. The third dominant discourse in turn implies the desire to find a solution to the commonly understood problem. Finally, the media discussion fades after a solution to the asylum seeker flow was found and the acute problem was solved.

A EUROPEAN UNION CONTEXTUALIZATION

The news in Russia in late summer 2015 revolved around the escalating migration crisis in southern Europe. At first, Finland was only a marginal issue without any major importance for Russia. Finland popped up in Russian news in the context of a discussion by the European Union leaders on a refugee quota and agreeing upon a refugee policy, its remuneration, and other assistance by members states in the summer of 2015. However, Finland distinguished itself as not being hostile or against the jointly agreed refugee quotas. The country's hospitality towards asylum seekers culminated in an announcement by the Prime Minister of Finland Juha Sipilä, who said he would offer his home to refugees. In September 2015, four of the 28 EU countries voted against the quota system, with Finland abstaining from the EU decision to impose refugee quotas on member states. The news were written in a neutral way in Russia because the original source of the reports was the Finnish Broadcasting Company Yle. The Russian media carefully followed the escalation of the refugee crisis in Europe and, gradually, also in Finland. One indicator of the crisis was a subsequent filling up of refugee reception centres in Finland in September 2015.

Crisis discourse started to gain ground in Finland in September 2015 as the Finnish immigration authorities launched reviewed guidelines on asylum seekers from Iraq and Somalia. It was later decided that refugees from Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq would not automatically be granted a residence permit.

POLITICIZATION AND SECURITIZATION BY FINLAND

The involvement of top politicians in decision-making and crisis management was a sign of Finland's rapid politicization of the migration issue with Russia. News about the opening of a registration centre for asylum seekers in Tornio, the western border of Lapland, and Finnish plans to harden her immigration policies and enhance control at the Finnish-Swedish border circulated in the Russian media in September 2015. From November on, news about the problematization by Finland of migrants crossing the Finnish-Russian border started to appear in the Russian media. The Russian media's attention was also caught by the Finnish suggestion of not allowing bicycle crossings at its eastern border stations of Salla and Raja-Jooseppi. The media also reported deportations of asylum seekers back to Russia. By this time the flow of asylum seekers through the border crossing points had heated up, which was depicted by quotations of Finnish leaders in the Russian media. An example of the political involvement is the statement of Foreign Minister of Finland Timo Soini that traffic at the border should be limited if Finland does not reach an agreement with Russia:

> If we are not able to move forward in finding an agreed solution, restrictions on the work of the border have to be implemented. (Nezavisimaya gazeta 22 January 2016)

In January 2016, Mr Soini maintained a strong message:

> It seems that severe measures are required. We have to put an end to this illegal immigration and migration. (Ria Novosti 22 January 2016)

Minister Soini urged launching bilateral negotiations with Russia to solve the problem that he already labelled as a threat.

> This is a very delicate question. I cannot make any assumptions before meeting with our Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Russia. However, I hope that problems will be solved… If this problem is not solved, it can become a threat to the whole Schengen idea. There are enough discussions; measures that work have to be taken. (Ria Novosti 25 January 2016)

Moscow swiftly responded, indicating its readiness to discuss with Helsinki the migration crisis. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MID) added that

> … the Russian legislation and the international obligations of the Russian Federation do not provide prohibition to departure from the Russian Federation of persons not having the Schengen visa. (Ria Novosti 27 January 2016)

Very soon after that, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had a meeting with Prime Minister of Finland Juha Sipilä in St. Petersburg in January. Their talks dealt with migration at the northern border crossing stations. The Finnish Prime Minister kept the curbing of "illegal immigration" on the discussion agenda. During the talks, a common problem was identified but opinions on means to solve it differed. Sipilä said,

> We were unanimous in the opinion that it is necessary to find a sustainable solution to this problem, and traditionally good collaboration between competent organs of Finland and the Russian Federation continues… (Ria Novosti 29 January 2016)

The Prime Minister of Finland pressed the urgency of decision-making. There was no time to waste in finding a satisfactory solution to the problem of, as he called it, illegal immigration.

> A solution to the border issue has to be found in a short perspective… (Ria Novosti 29 January 2016)

Medvedev made it known that from a Russian perspective the immigration policy of the European Union had collapsed and was a fiasco: the EU was to blame for the crisis. Medvedev uttered his opinion nearly two weeks after the meeting with the Finnish Prime Minister. What is also interesting is that the Prime Minister of Russia leans on human rights when explaining why Russia cannot stop the migration wave.

> They are very concerned about this because some of these people also cross our border, but we are not able to stop them. There is a European agreement on human rights, which we have joined. We do not want any harm to anybody and do not want to dilute our neighbour Finland with these migrants. But what to do, we simply cannot do anything in another way. (Ria Novosti 11 February 2016).

Russia continued to calm down Finnish anxiety. The ambassador of Russia to Helsinki, Aleksandr Rumyantsev, commented that the Finns had exaggerated the problem. He

said that over 30,000 asylum seekers had crossed the border between Finland and Sweden, while the corresponding number at the Finnish-Russian border was a little over 1000 persons (Ria Novosti 10 February 2016).

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

The situation changed dramatically after Vladimir Putin's meeting with the Federal Security Service (FSB) in February 2016. The Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation started to curb the flow of migration towards the Finnish-Russian border. In the February meeting the President of Russia ordered the FSB to tighten monitoring of the refugee flows coming into Russia or transiting onwards to European countries. This decision substantially decreased the number of asylum seekers at the border. The Norwegian-Russian border had quieted already in December 2015, after which asylum seekers had not come to Norway via that section of the borderline. After the FSB had restored control in the Murmansk region, the Russian media started to write stories about migrants getting jammed in the arctic city of Kandalaksha and waiting for transportation to the Finnish-Russian border. Soon they began to move back south. As of March 2016, asylum seekers disappeared completely from the Finnish-Russian border.

The absolute highlight of the process was the bilateral agreement between Finland and Russia on imposing temporary restrictions at the Salla and Raja-Jooseppi border crossing points. Only Finnish, Russian, and Belarusian citizens and their family members were allowed to cross the border during the 180-day restriction period. President Putin stressed Russia's understanding of Finland's concern over the flow of asylum seekers. It was important for president Putin to emphasize partnership with Finland and that the measures were carried out by the request of Helsinki:

> I can tell you one thing, we understand the concern of our Finnish friends and we are going to work together in a regime of absolute partnership…. In this, I fully agree with Mr President of Finland. (Ria Novosti 22 March 2016)

ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND SAMPLE

In the second sample, I investigated media discussion in the context of the two northernmost border crossing points, Raja-Jooseppi and Salla. The search resulted in 334 documents, which were selected for further analysis (Table 2). The analysis offers

a more profound overview of the actual hotspots through which the asylum seekers entered the Schengen area. As the first sample constructed the context and background for the phenomenon, the second sample served as a subtle analysis of what happened at the very border. As part of the analysis, themes that appeared in the coverage were coded. All the articles contained at least one theme, and most had multiple themes. The media covered such themes as migration statistics, policy prescriptions, discussion of Finnish reactions, and the reception or rejection of refugees.

The central finding is that many of the news articles overlap with those of the first sample: the names of these two border crossing points also appear in many of the news articles in the first sample. Again, Finland is solely responsible for securitizing the phenomenon. Russia did not consider the flow of migrants (asylum seekers) a security threat in her border zone. This can be verified by conducting a search using all declination variants of the word "security" (безопас*). The search result refers completely to utterances in Finland. The names "Salla" and "Raja-Jooseppi" often had a marginal role in the articles due to their role as concluding remarks or news footnotes.

All the news and articles were analysed and their contents were clustered into groupings. As was expected, the result of the content analysis gives a more subtle stratification of topics that were discussed in the Russian media in the context of the two border crossing points (Figure 2).

The jointly agreed ban on using bicycles for crossing was the most extensively spread news item in Russia in the context of these two border crossing points. Many news agencies and media houses in Russian regions referred to the new border regime, established at the end of December 2015. The prohibition to use bicycles for border crossing was labelled by the media as a decision taken by Finland, although it was preceded by negotiations with the Russian border authorities. The media attention on this issue indicates its attractiveness and exceptionality in the Finnish-Russian border regime. Of course, there was a real need to disseminate the information for a large audience to prevent surprises that this regime might cause for travellers, and to contain the flow of migration to Arctic Russia.

The second largest group of media content consisted of social issues related to asylum seekers, their subsidies, living conditions in Finland, or their relations with local inhabitants. Article footnotes and margins recurrently mentioned the border crossing points Raja-Jooseppi and Salla, which therefore played an indirect role in the message conveyed by the media.

MEDIA SOURCE	NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS
Federation Press	3
Federation Information Agencies	153
Federation Internet Publications	76
Federation TV and radio	12
Federation Media Archives	12
Regional Press	9
Regional Information Agencies	23
Regional Internet Publications	45
Regional TV and radio	1
TOTAL	**334**

Table 2. Share of the second sample material.

The new border regime, the third column, includes media content that focuses on the bilateral agreement between Finland and Russia on imposing temporary restrictions at the Salla and Raja-Jooseppi border crossing points. The agreement reached in March 2016 imposed a border crossing ban on all other but Finnish, Russian, and Belarusian citizens and their family members during the 180-day restriction period.

The bicycle ban proposal, preceding the ban itself, ranks fourth in the table. This was also an issue in which Finland was depicted as the initiator. The Russian media typically titled the ban proposal as: "Finland proposes that Russia should ban border crossings by bicycle." Finland was clearly made both responsible for the decision and dependent on Russia.



Figure 2. Ranked order of articles and news grouped by content.

The fifth group is a miscellaneous collection of statistical information on asylum seekers in Finland and Europe or the amount of tourists coming through the border crossing points. Common to all the news and articles in this group is their numerical content.

Speculations of possible alterations of the border regime, such as opening and closing times, circulated in the media, particularly during the beginning of December 2015. Another theme that fell into this category were the European Union's plans to strengthen control at the external borders of the European Union. According to the articles, this would directly affect the Finnish-Russian border regime.

The Finnish-Russian negotiation schemes and contents formed the seventh largest

group of news. These negotiations were conducted between ministers of the interior and prime ministers. The negotiations, held in January 2016, dealt particularly with the regimes of the border crossing points in Raja-Jooseppi and Salla, and the topical flow of asylum seekers in Europe and between Finland and Russia.

Much of the security issues related to refugees and asylum seekers came eighth in the news ranking list, followed by a large spectrum of discussions about the flow of asylum seekers immigration routes, as well as the closing and opening of asylum centres. The presidential intervention into the problem took place at the end of February 2016, resulting in a termination of the flow of asylum seekers.

CONCLUSIONS

The northwest border of Russia with Finland and Norway is historically associated with control, security, and order. The flow of asylum seekers in the winter of 2015–2016 shattered the tranquillity that had prevailed throughout the Cold War era and post-Soviet transformations. The appearance of asylum seekers in the Finnish-Russian border zone came as a surprise to Finland, where the phenomenon prompted a crisis discourse.

For Finns and Russians, the media have been the main source of information about the recent migration dynamics at the Finnish-Russian border. Therefore, media representations play an active part in constructing perceptions on the phenomenon itself, and on the essence of the border. The border between Finland and Russia is the focal point of media coverage in this paper and looms large in the migration crisis discourse between Finland and Russia. However, the paper shows that Russia did not treat the asylum seeker flow as a crisis or a security threat, and security seemed not to be a relevant theme for Russia at all. Notions of illegal immigrants, insecurity, and disorder were not present in the Russian media discourse during the migration crisis. Restoring the status quo to the border by asymmetric negotiations was depicted as merely serving the interests of Finland, which took the initiative in solving the anomaly. The outcome of the research highlights the flexibility in what is securitized by a state. It was interesting to find out that a state, in this case Russia, can perceive and treat an anomaly in a different way than its neighbour, in this case Finland.

What Finland conceives as a security problem, Russia treats as a humanitarian issue. The Russian authorities uttered the word "security" (Безопасность) in their press releases only once when the Prime Minister of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, commented on the seriousness of the migration flow in the context of the meeting with the Prime Minister

of Finland. Instead, the word "humanitarian" (Гуманитарий) appeared frequently. This is a notable finding, because one could have expected a dominant security theme in the border discourse. Apparently, the immigration flow towards the North was not a concern for Russia because it felt the phenomenon was under the control of the authorities from the beginning to the end.

The border intermezzo is an example of an asymmetric relationship between two countries. While Russia abided by its international obligations and agreements, it unilaterally changed the code of border practices with Finland, established already during the Soviet era. Suddenly the border was open to citizens from third countries, who could cross it without a Schengen visa. The Russian border service of the Federal Security Service FSB must have been responsible for the change of practice. However, as has been verified later, organized crime was involved in assisting the asylum seekers to the border crossing points. The flow of asylum seekers took place at only the two northernmost border crossing points of Finland, whereas the southern border crossing points proximate to St. Petersburg avoided the phenomenon.

This underlines the sense of confusion if not trauma in Finland over what happened at the border. The asymmetric relationship is an explanation for the finding that Finland strongly securitized the asylum seeker flow while Russia politicized the phenomenon by projecting the roots and causes to the European Union. For Russia, migration served as an instrument of foreign and security policy, but only Finland was active in highlighting the security implications of the asylum seeker flow. Thus, the politicization and securitization of the anomaly at the border zone were initially carried out by Finland.

At first there were differing views on the urgency and acuteness of solving the problem. The flow of asylum seekers towards the Finnish border was not seen by Russia as a concern in the first place, but as a natural outcome of the long-term immigration policies of the European Union. Contextualization of the migration with the failure of "the West" to curb wars and crises in the Middle East (see also Brekke and Brochmann 2015), and to practise sound migration policy, reflects a long-term spatial attitude in Russia. A reserved attitude towards the West, including the European Union, has been a feature of the political culture of Russia since the end of the 1990s (Iivari 2007). The frequency of threat themes was lower than expected in the samples.

There have been considerable disagreements among western scholars over the reasons behind letting asylum seekers travel freely to the Schengen border zone in Russia, and the aim of this paper has not been to answer the question of why this happened

in the first place. It is left to subsequent studies to find out how it was possible that such disorder emerged at the border and why the Russian FSB and other state security authorities allowed the disorder to go on for months before action was taken to stop it.

The problematization by Russia and the securitization by Finland of the flow of asylum seekers at the Finnish-Russian border seem merely to reflect the pervasive cultural, identity, and linguistic demarcations attached to third-party aliens (such as asylum seekers) at the border rather than the traditional connotation of Otherness vis-à-vis the nation living on the other side of the border. Prejudiced and reserved attitudes towards the Russians were overshadowed by the imminent, strange, and confusing appearance of total strangers in Finland. This offers an interesting vision for developing theories on the border as a symbol of order and security when controlled by the Russians and Finns together instead of letting refugees as an alien group disturb the status quo.

Different media sources reported on asylum and immigration in broadly similar ways. This may reflect a homogenous press system in Russia. Newspapers and agencies tend to use the same language, report on the same themes, and feature the same explanations and responses. Furthermore, what variation there was can be attributed to different editorial guidelines and target audiences. The migration crisis was consistently represented in terms of its political contexts; the themes that emerged were broadly compatible with the various aspects of east–west relations as they are politically contextualized and understood. The representatives of the Russian government, Prime Minister Medvedev and Foreign Minister Lavrov, were particularly apt to contextualize the "migration crisis" with failed migration and foreign policies of the European Union. This way the Russian leaders attributed the anomaly in the Russian arctic to global politics.

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BARENTS STUDIES: *At the economic, social and poliical margins*
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Anthropology in No Man's Land[1]: Methodological challenges in the study of international educational cooperation

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ABSTRACT

This article addresses the challenges of being a participant observer in a non-established culture. The traditional method assumes that the anthropologist will learn to understand the other from the social and cultural assumptions the other is born into. In what I define here as No Man's Land, such conditions exist only to a limited extent. This text discusses the complexities in such a research situation.

INTRODUCTION

As Geertz (1973) defines culture, he includes both the procedural and structural aspects in demonstrating how we spin a web of meanings while simultaneously getting caught up in the web we spin ourselves. But is it possible to imagine a place, a context, or a sphere where such a web does not exist? In this article, I endeavour to describe such a context; where there is no common culture surrounding foundational perceptions and regulatory ideas and norms that are shared by a cooperating fellowship. The article is an attempt to illustrate some of the methodological challenges I face as a participant observer, when the people I'm studying have got caught in their own particular webs while the cooperation mandates that we spin something together that will have regulatory power over the choices and actions that concern the fellowship's goals and intentions. First and foremost, the depiction of this context aims to focus

on structures rather than processes. The context, more specifically, is set in a cooperation led by me of higher education institutions in Russia and Norway.

This context is distinguished by the fact that, as a researcher, I'm continuously faced with peculiar methodological challenges. On their own, they are not unfamiliar to anyone who has read about or taken on the role of participant observer. It is nevertheless difficult to find literature that helps to clarify the choices one should make when the prerequisites for field work, in many contexts, only correspond to a limited degree with method-book theorems. The intention of this article, therefore, is to describe and query some of the methodological dilemmas I have been confronted with as both participant observer and policy advisor in and for a context where the core elements of the culture lack essential content.

This question is much more significant and touches on far more aspects of internationalization than may initially appear as an empirical foundation with strange and unusual characteristics. First and rightly so, it relates to undefined methodological research questions. However, it also elucidates a series of unanswered questions that come to the surface when internationalization of higher education must be translated from an initiative set by nationally and institutionally political agencies and, subsequently, dropped into an untried practice. The initiatives refer to wishes and intentions, but practice has to do with finding out how – trying out ways of taking action that realize the wishes and intentions. The study of practice requires a distanced proximity, while my standpoint is right in the middle, as the individual who substantially formulates practice along with others, who have diverging motives, represent other values and norms, and look at their mission with different eyes than I do.

In the following, I will first clarify why "No Man's Land" is a fitting and valid metaphor. Thereafter, I will more closely address the methodological challenges confronting me. I will then illustrate how the challenges appear and why they are not so easily managed. Lastly, I will come back to the more general implications of these methodological challenges.

MY NO MAN'S LAND

The first objections to the title of this article arose at a seminar where I presented a particularly incomplete version of a paper on conducting studies in an arena that metaphorically lies between the national regulations and cultural domains of two

countries. At the time, it was argued that "No Man's Land" referred to the front lines between opposing armies and that, therefore, it was both an inappropriate and directly incorrect term to portray the relation between the countries studied. I would have agreed if not for the fact that the military definition of "No Man's Land" is neither the only nor the original one. Many people immediately associate the term with a war zone, mostly because it symbolizes the hideous space between trenches and because it has developed a hegemonic definition through extensive literature and film production on the topic.

My empirical standpoint is not located between opposing parties but rather between different cultures. In this case, "No Man's Land" must be understood in the way the term was first used to characterize an area outside of London with no incontrovertible claims of ownership. This both gives No Man's Land an unambiguous and concrete meaning, and points to the ambiguity that occurs when it is unclear what is possible and impossible to undertake within a certain area. In this regard, No Man's Land also refers to the abstract and the undefined that lies between categories such as lawlessness and judicial regulation, what we presume to be moral and immoral, what we see as negotiation and aggression, noise and signals, and what is considered humorous versus vulgar.[2] No Man's Land, in this definition, does not refer to a landscape but to situations and circumstances in which traditions, opinion structures, laws, and regulations do not help to clarify uncertainty and ambiguity.

It is in just such a context that I have taken on a double role as active participant and observing researcher. The participant role is connected to an educational cooperation between one Norwegian and several Russian universities. In the researcher's role, I'm meant to analyse and explain what characterizes the processes that exist within this cooperation. And because a large part of these processes arise in the midst of a No Man's Land, I also come across methodological challenges that have the same ambiguities as the phenomena I'm meant to study. As participant I need to take positions on questions of right and wrong that are not easily clarified by referencing the norms and regulations of the two countries, because each one holds perceptions of right and wrong that often do not coincide. As researcher, I should not only be an observer and keep a distance from my own and others' actions. At the same time, from a Goffman perspective, I need to go backstage as much with myself as I do with the other participants. Contrary to the ideal for participant observation, I'm an active policy advisor in the endeavour to transform our cooperative field from being a No Man's Land to becoming an arena with more unambiguous and clarified prerequisites for mutual action. Hindsight is not only

a ghost that quietly sneaks its way into reasoning as often as it sits on the tongue and the pen. When the context is unsettled, the terms and conditions are diffuse, the goals are fluctuating, the routines are few, the experiences lacking, the speaking skills limited, and "yes" and "no" are dichotomies; it is not possible to be sure of the underlying intentions and reasons for the choices and actions of others.

With experience from many field studies in which the purpose has been to uncover cultural and social patterns and frameworks that I knew existed, I found that the same project offers other methodological challenges in which these patterns and frameworks are largely not established – in which I, as researcher, am also the one meant to formulate such opinion- and behaviour-regulating structures. My concern, therefore, touches not only on the question of what the most important methodological differences and challenges are between a traditional cultural study and a study of life in No Man's Land. It also encompasses the question of whether it is possible and responsible to study oneself in the role of working so concretely with others to construct the reality in which the study takes place.

Since 2008, I have been leader for the Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies (BCS), a degree programme shared between one Norwegian (Nord University 2016) and seven Russian universities. The practical cooperative work required to run the programme occurs within a network consisting of coordinators in Russia, and teachers and study leadership at the Norwegian university. These higher education institutions (HEIs) got connected through the programme at the beginning of the 2000s, and the BCS network has been described and discussed in many places since (Sundet 2015, 2016a, 2016b, and 2016c).

THREE METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

According to Hammersley and Atkinson (2005), field research exploits the ability every social actor possesses to learn from new cultures. They point out that, even when researching a society they are relatively familiar with, there is a prerequisite for participatory observers to treat this environment as "anthropologically foreign" in their efforts to illuminate the implicit conditions of the cultural circle in which they themselves are rooted (Hammersley and Atkinson 2005, 29). These references are based on the idea that researchers find themselves either in a "new" and unknown culture or in a culture that they are a part of. In other words, both cases require that the field research take place in an already existing and established culture.

My current research field, however, is not distinguished by such characteristics. It does not exist in an established culture and lacks the type of structures that are manifested and take place as intuitive truisms and classifications in people, such as those that regulate their behaviour and interpretations of contexts while simultaneously generating collective cultural references. On the contrary, all of those involved in my research field appear, first and foremost, as representations of different cultures and institutions while standing for values, norms, ideas, and rationales that are often incompatible. They are brought together for the purpose of making an international educational cooperation work. They know why they come together but, as a fellowship, they do not know for certain how they should move forward, what may be undoubtedly considered as important or insignificant, desirable and acceptable, or what is always right and wrong. Nobody has ownership of the field, nobody owns the situation, and it is unclear what one can or cannot do, should or should not take on. The field is a meeting place in No Man's Land, in the original definition of the term.

A natural objection to my perspective could be that I do not need to be concerned about what is not there, but rather should direct my gaze towards processes in which the actors eventually fill this pre-cultural field and episodic forum with content. The alternative, in other words, would be to study how this No Man's Land was populated and socialized and how the same core elements that make up every culture grew and reflected, over time, the field's context-specific opinions, norms, and values. Such a study would describe how the field gained owners and was regulated by their own rules that were formulated by their own regime.

Such an objection would be the natural choice if it also helped to resolve the three methodological challenges this article deals with. Two of these challenges are tied to my roles as participant and observer. The third is connected to the peculiar structures in which this educational cooperation is embedded. I share the assessment by Hammersley and Atkinson (2005) that it is not possible to isolate a set of data that is "untainted" by the researcher, and that the reflexive character of societal research has its origins in the awareness that we participate in the social world we are studying. Nonetheless, I would face greater methodological challenges if the role as participant were to overshadow that of researcher. With a research field set in an established culture, one of my problems is therefore that the researcher will not be able to influence the deep structures of the culture. Where such deep structures do not exist, or at least can be said to have little regulatory power, the researcher's participation will be a methodological challenge. More pointedly, it may be asserted that while a participant observer is normally subor-

dinate and must unconditionally integrate him/herself into the culture being studied, in my case there is a participant observer who unavoidably influences and even helps to form the core elements of the culture.

The second challenge also corresponds to the participant role and should perhaps be considered more as a reinforcement of the first. While an observer can try to minimize his or her own influence on situations and contexts in order to emphasize the role of researcher as much as possible, in my case this is an option that is difficult to choose. The reason is that I'm the leader of the very network I study, which means that I cannot just abdicate the role whenever necessary and switch over to the role of observer. It would be possible if there were collective regulatory ideas, an established set of norms, integrated routines, and standard procedures for action that prescribed what should be done. Such elements could provide guidance on how problems should be handled, and what is right and wrong, desirable and necessary.

It may still seem natural to exchange the metaphor No Man's Land for the term "limbo", and rather view my research field as a transitional phase between some type of newborn social context and a more developed and rational system for international cooperation. However, that viewpoint deals with processes that I have thoroughly described elsewhere (Sundet 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). On the contrary, what I'm concerned with here is something that gives rise to a third challenge. It has to do with the structures that create and maintain the situation I characterize with the metaphor of No Man's Land, which cannot be considered as a transitional phase. This is a stable condition without limbo, and the prerequisites for it to change are not present. Because this needs to be illuminated, I will turn to a description of practice, doing so with the use of yet another metaphor.

THE REGULATORY POWER OF A SPEED LIMIT SIGN

It is not possible to offer a precise explanation for how motorists respond to a speed limit sign warning that the speed may not exceed 50 km per hour. One explanation could be connected to the idea that motorists are just as diverse as everyone else and that there will always be some who care less than others about obeying this type of rule. Another could be based on situational conditions, whereby the motorist's assessment is that there is a small probability of meeting the police or other dangers at night or when driving through deserted stretches of road. A third explanation could be that, while in one place there may be a general perception that only inconsiderate

motorists exceed the speed limit, the same sign in another place could be perceived as a suggestion for how much over the speed limit one should beware to drive.

In my double role as participant observer and leader for an international network in higher education, one alternative could be to try not to wield influence by minimizing the regulatory tasks assigned to the leadership role. In other words, I should not put up any speed limit signs but rather observe what has happened and how the situation develops. When putting this into practice, the result was a strong demand for clearer guidelines from the leader (meaning me) and a growing scepticism to a leader (me) who, in the long run, could end up being catastrophic for the future of the cooperation. Metaphorically speaking, my cooperating partners demanded universal and obvious signage.

Alternative two was to put up the sign and just observe how the rest of the network responded to it; again, with the idea of influencing the circumstances as little as possible. However, I was still perceived as a dubious leader. Electronic messages and telephone calls streamed in from individuals in the network who wanted clear explanations and fundamental answers. They wanted to know if 50 km per hour meant 50 km per hour and what the consequences would be if they drove under or over the limit.

The third option was to ask my cooperating partners how they felt we should react to the sign. Aside from the fact that this alternative could, at the very least, reduce my influence somewhat, it also encouraged broader participation and a more democratic process. Additionally it included the opportunity for a learning process in which we, as a fellowship, could develop important and governing understandings and principles. The partners would be able to make meaningful contributions to our otherwise-extinguished mutual cultural chest of drawers. In many ways and in several cases, we have succeeded as a fellowship with this tactic. Nonetheless, for the most part, it seems that what we are able to produce through the joint cultural core elements of this chest of drawers tends to remain there. They contribute to the harmonizing of thoughts and perceptions, norms, values, and visions when we meet and get together. However, when we then part ways, we change back into our civilian clothes and hang up the network uniforms in the closet. Once home again, some of us drive 20 kph while others go 70 kph. Others leave the car in the garage.

Therefore, when I have to use a fourth alternative, out of consideration for the future existence of the educational cooperation, my participant role as leader is further

overshadowed by my task of being an observer. Interestingly enough, I then make my observations as well, and place considerable weight on watching and registering what reactions are caused by me, as acting leader, whether that be in the form of actions or attitudes. This happens when it becomes clear to me that the speed limit is not being followed and that some are driving hazardously while others hold a tempo that causes congested traffic and hinders the progress of the processes. Nobody protests when I subdue some and chase after others while clarifying the message of the speed limit sign. I point to what we have agreed on and the principles we have set for ourselves. My cooperating partners then offer their full support, without exception, to the signs we have put up. At the same time, though, they let me know that some of these signs are unfortunately impossible to employ and live by. Some argue, for example, that a sign cannot be an obstacle to driving fast when they are in a hurry. Others explain that the roads they drive do not make it possible to follow the speed limit and that, therefore, the sign can seem provocative.

THE NETWORK AS A NO MAN'S LAND

The speed limit sign metaphor may be rendered concrete with substantial examples of how those of us in the network are able to agree on guidelines for routines and procedures, what types of information need to be exchanged, and, in particular, why we are meant to cooperate, according to what premises and ideas we must cooperate, and what goals and results we should strive to achieve. Each example will demonstrate that most challenges we face are connected to practical problems and often to insufficient resources such as money, time, attention, and professional competence. In this context, however, it is the causes of the problems that are of interest rather than the problems themselves or the solutions that could be prescribed. For example, an identical question could be asked each member of the network about an agreement or a decision that had just been made. The wording could pertain to what each person felt the agreement was about, how binding the agreement seemed to be, what tasks it involved, and so on. If the questions were asked while we were still physically gathered together, the answers would unanimously concur. However, a while after each member went back to their respective institutions, the questions could be asked again, and the answers would no longer be as uniform and concurrent.

It is not about unreliability and lack of credibility. Nor does it mean that the senior leaders of the HEIs notoriously lay down obstacles for the network members, or otherwise make it difficult for them to live up to the deal that has been entered into. Even though it

can cause problems at times, the explanation is first and foremost systematic. When the agreement is to be implemented back at the home institution, it is translated and adjusted to fit local contextual conditions. In anthropological literature there are infinite empirical examples and theoretical interpretations on such transformational processes (e.g. Bohannan 1966; Rosaldo 1989; Douglas 1991 and 1996; Geertz 1994). Viewed as such, it is elementary that local interpretations of the agreement entered into change the mutual understanding we originally had of what the deal entailed. Thus, initiatives that are taken at the network's annual meetings are considered as abstracts; it is only when they are to be put into practice that the content gains concrete and definitive meaning. It becomes unavoidably characterized by the local context and thereby takes on varied significance and effect, along the same lines as the speed limit sign, depending on where the attempt to implement the initiative occurs.

To varying degrees, the way in which agreements are translated and initiatives coded depends on at least five different types of contextual and substantial characteristics. First, it depends on what the agreements are about and what tasks and resources the initiatives may require. Secondly, it also corresponds with the characteristics of each individual HEI and, among other things, what significance is placed on the educational cooperation, how distinctive institutional features create guidelines, to what degree and in what ways agreements and initiatives are integrated, and how they are interpreted within specific organizationally cultural frameworks. Thirdly, agreements, decisions, and tasks have to be integrated into the respective national educational systems' own logic, different educationally-specific ordinances and general legal conditions. Fourthly, the differences between Russian and Norwegian culture, rooted in norms, values, and fundamental understandings, contribute to the fact that practice often follows what traditions, perceptions, and common sense dictate as reasonable. And fifth, it seems that the fate of agreements is also dependent on the implementation power of local influence, and the amount of energy, competence, and ambition the network participants are capable of putting into their work. All of these circumstances require that practice often takes on a different form and content than was originally agreed to when the network gathered and everyone concurred on all questions that began with what and who, why and how, and which and when.

This makes it clear that the network itself constitutes a No Man's Land. We arrive from each of our corners of the world to discuss our challenges and frustrations, exchange experiences, talk about the future, and make attempts to render ideas and plans concrete. In particular, we try to demonstrate personal interest in one another and in what

each of us is struggling with in our daily lives and work. As such, No Man's Land is a meeting place and an arena for interaction where the participants have different personal as well as institution-dependent prerequisites for their commitment. It is primarily here, where we all physically meet, or just one-on-one electronically, that I'm to take on the role of participant observer. The intention is to study interactive processes up close in order to fill the term, internationalization of higher education, with practice-based inferential content. First and foremost, the identities and loyalties of the Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies network members are tied to their countries, their institutions, and their professional and social networks at home. They come to the BCS network as delegates from independent HEIs and bring along demands, expectations, hopes, and convictions that are not necessarily concurrent with what the other delegates have brought to the table. This means that, aside from their own skills and qualifications, they also participate based on the positions they hold at their respective HEIs and the concessions their leaders allow them to negotiate and enter into agreements.

The task of the individuals in the network is no more concrete than that of being responsible for an international education programme on societal relations in circumpolar regions, having an open discussion about what this should encompass, and coming to agreement on what we will do and how it will happen. We are initially meant to do this with a limited mutual idiomatic repertoire and the help of a foreign language, words and terms that often refer to inconsistently inferred meaning. In other words, the characteristics of this No Man's Land are quite like those associated with the origin of the term; this land is characterized by a lack of clarity and reference to regulatory ideas and norms for how problems and tasks should be understood, what is desirable, possible and right, and how the consequences of choices and actions should be judged.

Secondly, each time we come to an agreement on what should be done and how it should be implemented, the abstract understanding of decisions and agreements is transformed when translated and adjusted to national, institutional, and local contextual prerequisites. Thirdly, a stream of messages, primarily in the form of demands and expectations for what the network should work with characterizes the conversations and, of course, also limits possible decisions taken by the network. More specifically, these are usually directed towards what I must, should, or could consider, facilitate, or do differently as leader. The response, however, is most often positive and certainly appears as an appeal to understand that what we had decided to do as a fellowship did not end up being in line with what we had agreed upon when it was subsequently put into practice. Last but not least, the No Man's Land metaphor is meant as a reminder that

the network's systemic characteristics are relatively static. Because the members of the network are primarily the same individuals who are responsible for implementation of agreements and decisions, that also marks their participation in the network. Even if the social relations between us develop and instil a sense of security and community, this applies first and foremost at the personal level. We still represent different cultures and different institutions and, realistically viewed, our conceptual perception of what we are doing refers constantly to varied contexts. That all exchange of opinions and information occurs in English also means that communication between us is hindered, limited, more superficial than if we could converse in our own languages, and often results in misinterpretations and misunderstandings. Language barriers lead to fewer questions being asked, as little of the ambiguity is clarified and that which is obvious is placed in doubt. The latter is particularly important: the obvious does not have a mutual reference for all of us, and we all go our separate ways thinking that we concur on what to do when we get home.

The only key words that have changed character and content over time are "lack of tradition", primarily only because the network has established a tradition that helps to maintain its characteristics as a No Man's Land.

NO WAY OUT OF THE PREDICAMENT

A dilemma is usually defined as a choice between two possibilities that will both lead to unwanted or desired results that completely or partially mutually exclude one another. The two methodological dilemmas I face refer to unwanted or uncomfortable choices I need to make when I need to attend to my tasks as leader while also living up to the principles of the scientific use of participant observation. As shown, I have played a strong part in establishing the regulatory norms and guiding values within this context, in addition to having contributed my opinion, to an equally substantial degree, to both the work and the cooperation we are running. This influence I wield is a continuous and decisive part of my responsibility as leader. What is unique with my situation is, thus, that I'm simultaneously meant to be a researcher and observing participant; something that demands, in practice, that I observe myself and the structures and processes I'm not only involved in but which can also be traced back to my own ideas and actions as leader.

It is important to emphasize that this touches little on academic discussions of methodological implications such as "anthropology at home" (Peirano 1998; Lien and Melhus

2011) or "go native" (Pratt 1986, 38; Hastrup 1995, 182). Although the latter is directed towards the relationship between participation, observation, and distance – which are also key terms in this article – the prerequisites for performing "anthropology at home" or "going native" are almost not present. My research field and empirical location are not "at home", even when I'm at home. And above all, I cannot "go native", since there are no "natives" (in the original definition of the word) among those I observe. We find ourselves in a No Man's Land, where rules and frameworks for the interaction I should observe are not established but are rather created during our interaction. This is the core point of my methodological challenges.

Inasmuch as there are no clear methodological rules and guidelines to counsel me in dealing with these professional challenges, the use of academic literature and critical assessment of alternative ways of behaving remains. I have attempted to discover pragmatic solutions, even though compromise may appear as a betrayal of research-based principles and I may seem acquiescent as a leader. The research-based treachery naturally refers to the fact that I'm forced to break with central methodological theorems. Acquiescence points to the network's practical tasks and strategic objectives; out of consideration for my own research, the fear of being too norm-setting and regulatory can produce dysfunctional repercussions in relation to the network's core operations. In both areas this may bring to mind the distinction between unexpressed and unapplied rules and theories (Argyris and Schön 1978), whereby that which is unexpressed usually points to what is prescribed and normatively correct, while that which is unapplied characterizes a practice that deviates in important areas from what remains unexpressed. And while the unexpressed issues mirror what we consciously and gladly hold up as important, what is applied is an expression of what is possible or that which contextual conditions dictate as necessary. The dilemma that Argyris and Schön draw on with the term of "expressed and applied" is similar to the confusion of my methodological dilemma. There are no obvious solutions for this, just various ways of handling such dilemmas. What may be the best way of handling it depends on situational circumstances, which are fluctuating and therefore generally unpredictable. For such reasons, I have been least concerned with providing answers and good advice and have been prepared instead to elaborate on my somewhat peculiar methodological research problems.

Having been schooled and trained in a scientific field that places strict requirements on credibility and living in accordance with guidelines for research methodology, I feel that my current research mission encourages, above all, empirical transparency and

open-heartedness about my methodological doubts and dilemmas, while also allowing room for a few self-forgiving arguments. Apropos academic schooling on the narrow path from a methodological viewpoint, there is some comfort in the words of Oscar Wilde (1997): "Having had a good upbringing nowadays is a great disadvantage as it excludes you from so many things."

CONCLUSION: THE SPECIFICS AND THE GENERALITIES

The presentation of my research field and the metaphor of No Man's Land is an attempt to explain circumstances that leave me, as a researcher, facing methodological challenges through which I need to manoeuvre with the help of trial and error more than by turning to textbooks for advice. Participant observation in a non-established culture is perhaps no peculiar situation for a researcher to find herself in; among other things, newly-established multicultural environments and the development of cultural heterogenic arenas of researchers from many academic disciplines throughout large parts of Europe are studied. However, my context consists of a periodic cooperation and decision-making arena in which unbiased and rational issues should take precedence and where the social relations primarily take a back seat but are, nevertheless, necessary prerequisites for the successful operation of the network. My main concern is to lead this network. My secondary concern, a power-incumbent task all the same, is to research what we are doing within the same network.

What may appear as unique with my research mission, and the methodological dilemma it places me in, however, is also relevant far beyond my own case. It will be able to serve as an example of challenges that are more broadly widespread and that occur in the wake of an increasing degree of internationalization in various areas. Quite naturally, since studies of networks expand in line with the growth of international cooperation projects, others may also find themselves in correspondingly problematic double roles when having to work as both active participants and researching observers. Additionally, leaders of international networks have to handle many of the same such problems and dilemmas. Any cooperation across borders must constitute and establish rules, routines, and ways of distributing work, sharing responsibility and authority, and developing some type of check and evaluation system. In particular, objectives must be formulated such that they may be shared by participants who represent conflicting values, norms, and perceptions of reality. If power structures, hegemony, and sanctioning tools are not already established as mandatory conditions in such a network, the participants meet in a No Man's Land where many of the most definitive

regulatory ideas, norms, and values can be lacking or are at least not collective, but rather fractioned and individualized. Even if none of the participants are performing research within this network, they may nonetheless come across some of the same challenges that I face. In No Man's Land, the expressed rules and theories are formulated, while it is the participants' home contexts that direct how they will be applied. Since method is about how we get at the truth and what we set as the foundation for our assumptions, the question of which methods make up the foundation for the network leader's analyses and syntheses must be a highly appropriate topic of research.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] The data used in this article is connected to a larger research project on Higher education in the High North: Regional restructuring through educational exchanges and student mobility. The project was financed by the Research Council of Norway's NORRUSS programme, initiated in 2012 and with a final report submitted in March 2016.

[2] For a more detailed explanation of the term No Man's Land, see Encyclopædia Britannica (2015) and Oxford Dictionaries (2015).

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BOOK REVIEW

Encyclopedia of the Barents region. Volumes I and II

MONICA TENNBERG

Geir Hønneland
Editor in chief: M.-O. Olsson. Co-editors: F. Backman, A. Golubev, B. Norlin and L. Ohlsson. Assistant and graphics editor: L. Elenius. 2016. Oslo: Pax Forlag.

The Barents encyclopedia is an impressive collection of information that covers history, environment, economy, architecture, culture, art and media, education and science, languages, legal issues, people, politics and places of the Barents region. This encyclopedia takes a form of two book volumes containing 415 contributions in alphabetical order. The motivation to do such a book about the Barents region is to compile and disseminate existing information about the situation in the region and in its respective member countries. The objective of the book is to "contribute to the compilation and dissemination of knowledge about the conditions of life in northerly transnational societies"; and "it is expected to facilitate and stimulate interaction between citizens in the region in their capacities as businessmen, administrators, professionals and tourists" (p. 20). Some 300 authors, experts with different disciplinary and national backgrounds, have contributed to the encyclopedia. The contributions vary in length and style reflecting the diversity of topics covered in the volumes. The book is nicely illustrated with photographs, maps, and graphs.

It is rather difficult to give an overview of the wealth of topics covered in the encyclopedia. However, in the following, some points about politics, economy and environment as they are close to my own interests. For anyone looking for some basic information about the region, the encyclopedia serves very well. The encyclopedia provides information about administrative regions and their main development and features, geopolitics and historical development of borders, international cooperation in different regional contexts – North Calotte, Barents, Nordic and Arctic - and diplomatic and interregional relations in the region. Political history, organization and contemporary concerns of the Sami are included. Also, one can find information about some historical events in the region, such as the Alta controversy, Kautokeino rebellion, Svalbard

Treaty, World wars and Perestroika, and descriptions of a number of personalities in the political history of the region. Some topical issues such as colonialism and militarization are presented in the contributions but only for the Russian side of the Barents region. Globalization, a major force of change in the region, has not received its own contribution but the topic is referred as part of other contributions, such as environmental threats and security.

The book contains contributions on trade, economic development and activities. Basic information about energy industry, fisheries, reindeer husbandry, forestry, mining, telecommunications and tourism is included. A topical issue of transport and connections inside and outside in the region is also covered. National resource legislation in the respective countries and as well as nature protection in the region are described. The information concerning the environment includes contributions on terrestrial and marine environments of the region and about environmental threats, legislation and activism. Among the environmental concerns, climate change, its impacts, adaptation to them or mitigation has not received its own contribution but is considered as part of regional environmental issues.

Personally, I enjoy having a book or two like this in my hands, and the volumes have a place on my bookshelf for sure. The long history of the production of the volumes starting from early 2000s explains in my understanding the chosen book format and the selection of topics covered in the two-volume encyclopedia. At those times, internet had not yet become such an important and accepted source of information. Nowadays, there are several electronic sources of Barents related information available. For example, Barentsinfo (www.barentsinfo.org) containing extensive information about region, Barents patchwork (www.patchworkbarents.org/) visualizing regional features



and topics, Barents cooperation (www.barentscooperation.org) with documents about regional cooperation and also websites covering specific themes such as the Barents Sea Environmental status (www.barentsportal.com/) and climate change in the Barents region (www.climatesmart.fi).

One may, however, wonder what if the encyclopedia had been produced electronically what could it have meant for the project and its significance. In my understanding, choosing an electronic format could have meant at least four things: firstly, the information included to the two volumes of the encyclopedia could have been possible extended, and could be more easily maintained and updated in the future compared to the chosen book format. The book format set constraints on the number of pages to be printed, topics to be covered and possible extended for the future. Secondly, the electronic form make possible to have more photographs, maps and graphs to visualize the wealth of information in the encyclopedia. As such, the two volumes have nice illustrations, but some maps, for example, are produced very small which makes reading them difficult (for example in volume, page 483, the map on major mineral deposits). An electronic, internet based format, thirdly, could also include a possibility for readers to interact with other relevant sources of information through links, including possibility to refer to information in other formats, such as documentary films and videos. Finally, an electronic format would make the information more available and accessible to larger groups of users. Of course, these developments are not without their problems: costs of electronic publishing, fragmented nature of knowledge, questions of reliability of sources and access to correct information are challenges of the internet to mention a few. These reflections, however, do not diminish the value of the Barents encyclopedia: as such, it is an impressive expression of regional cooperation and commitment to production of knowledge and understanding of the region itself.

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YOUNG RESEARCHERS OF THE BARENTS REGION

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"I think we, as researchers, have the potential to make children at the margins more visible and help their voices to be heard."

My research interests focuses on violence against women, and particularly, post-separation stalking as a form of violence in the Western context. I defended my thesis in December 2016 at the University of Lapland, Finland. The title of my dissertation is "Being Stalked: Recognising Post-Separation Stalking and Helping its Victims". In the doctoral thesis, I explored women's experiences of stalking after the break-up of a partnership, focusing on cases where women are stalked by male former partners. The study shows that victims of post-separation stalking are still largely unrecognised by the helping system, which prevents them from receiving adequate help and support.

Different forms of violence in close relationships have intrigued me since my bachelor studies. In my bachelor's thesis, I examined child sexual abuse based on the literature. I continued with the same theme in my master's thesis by doing a discourse analysis of the news stories in a local newspaper on the topic of child sexual abuse. I find it important to study sensitive and tabooed phenomena, and to bring forth the experiences of people who live at different kinds of margins

My research interest in marginality arises from two perspectives. First, post-separation stalking is a form of violence which is marginal in relation to umbrella terms such as domestic violence, intimate partner violence, and post-separation violence. Second, the majority of interpersonal violence happens between men: men are often both victims and perpetrators (e.g. alcohol-related use of violence). But when looking at violence in a different context – in intimate relationships – post-separation stalking and violence against women are not marginal anymore. In intimate relationships women are more often the victims of stalking after the break-up of a partnership and men the perpetrators. Moreover, many studies show that post-separation stalking against women can be lethal: it includes an increased risk of a potential or actual lethal act. Despite Finland's

status as a Nordic welfare state known for gender equality, the violence of men against women is a significant social problem. The victims are still unheard or their need for help is not recognised in the helping system, local communities, and society.

Currently, I am continuing the topic of my doctoral thesis, but this time from the perspective of children. I am working as a postdoctoral researcher on the project entitled, "Children's Knowing Agency in Private, Multi-Professional and Societal Settings – the Case of Parental Stalking (CAPS)". For this four year research project, funded by the Academy of Finland, my colleagues and I are interested in children's knowledge and agency in professional and societal contexts, with the focus being on Finnish children's knowing agency in dealing with parental stalking after the parents' separation. The study rests on the conviction that children have a right to knowledge and agency as well as to protection in private, multiprofessional, and societal settings. Approaching children's knowing agency from the perspectives of social work, law, and education, the research aims to produce knowledge to improve practices in social and health services, and law enforcement, and thus help and safeguard victims of stalking. The insights gained will also contribute to the education of social workers, lawyers, early childhood educators, and teachers.

In addition to this, I'm doing research to develop child and family services, particularly the family centre model, in Lapland – the core of which is one of the government's key initiatives to reform child and family services in Finland. The objective of the family centre is to coordinate the public health, social, and educational services intended for children and families into a network that also includes the services offered by NGOs and religious parishes as well as by voluntary stakeholders. I think these two projects support each other in developing better services for children and families, making their need for help visible. In this way, the projects can help to move the families from the margins to the centre by offering better services.

Changing the perspective from women to children continues my research interest of studying people at the margins. Children can be said to be doubly marginalised when taking into account parental stalking and service responses. Firstly, children's needs, voices and rights easily disappear when interventions take place into violence in families. Secondly, violence is often seen as a problem between adults and a problem with their parenting, which moves the focus from the children to the adults. I think we, as researchers, have the potential to make children at the margins more visible and help their voices to be heard.

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"The narrative analysis of the life stories demonstrated that rather than having an established Sami identity, the older adults were actively identifying through the stories they told about their lives."

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My field of research is in the intersections of critical gerontology, narrative gerontology, and healthcare service research. I am interested in the lives and well-being of older adults in general, and indigenous Sami older adults in particular.

My PhD thesis (2014) was entitled "The construction of Sami identity, health, and old age in policy documents and life stories: A discourse analysis and a narrative study". The thesis was based on a discourse analysis of Norwegian policy documents regarding healthcare services for Sami older adults and a narrative analysis of life story interviews with nineteen Sami older adults. Through the discourse analysis, I sought insights on the discursive landscape in which Sami older adults told their life stories. Through the narrative analysis of the older adults' life stories, I explored their perceptions of health and how they were negotiating their identities.

A close association between Sami culture and personal identity was constructed in the policy documents. The documents constructed a rather narrow and stereotyped image of Sami culture. The Sami were presented as either Sami-speaking or bilingual, and never as monolingual Norwegian speakers. Furthermore, Sami individuals were referred to as either Sami or Norwegian, and more fluid and ambiguous identities were excluded. The discourse analysis demonstrated a high degree of discursive continuity throughout the documents published over a period of 15 years. The narrative analysis of the life stories demonstrated that rather than having an established Sami identity, the older adults were actively identifying through the stories they told about their lives. The life stories reflected contrasting public narratives on the Sami. However, the life stories varied with respect to the extent to which they actively challenged such public narratives. The study demonstrated that identifying is an ongoing process that continues throughout life. Moreover, rather than being a passive condition, being healthy is an active process in which resistance plays a central role. The life stories were, so to speak, narratives of resistance. The older adults could not change the historical and social settings of their life stories, and they could not change the fact that they experienced health problems. Nonetheless, they did control the role that these settings and health problems played in their stories. The Sami older adults challenged established "truths" about what is considered healthy and the perceptions of the Sami people as passive victims of Norwegianization.

The insights from the study provide reasons to nuance existing assumptions regarding the strong relationship between Sami older adults and the image of "The Sami Culture" constructed in the policy documents. The current cohort of Sami older adults represents one of the generations most strongly affected by assimilation policies. However, they also experienced "the Sami revitalization". The Sami older adults were negotiating the impact of history on their life stories. The study demonstrated that older adults' life stories are sources of insights regarding their experiences of identity and health in old age, both as subjective conditions and influenced by broader historical and social contexts.

My current research regards formal and informal care for older adults with dementia and their families. The research project "Public dementia care in terms of equal services – family, local and multiethnic perspectives" was initiated in 2016 and will be concluded in 2019. The project is led by professor Torunn Hamran and is funded by The Norwegian Research Council. Current healthcare policies advocate for aging at home for older people in general, including persons with dementia. Consequently, the lives of close family members of persons with dementia are deeply affected. Access to healthcare services tends to vary inversely with the needs in the population served, and it is a policy goal to reduce inequities in access to and use of healthcare services. Our study aims to provide knowledge about local and individual differences in use and non-use of services. The study consists of a survey conducted among family caregivers in 32 municipalities in Northern Norway, individual qualitative interviews with family caregivers of persons with dementia and focus group interviews with healthcare professionals.

Inequity and marginalization in health and healthcare is the very core of my research interests. I am particularly interested in inquiring into how gendered, ethnic, and socio-economic inequities are sustained, and moreover, how such inequities could be addressed and counteracted. In that regard, I stand on the shoulders of giants in critical cultural theory, intersectionality theory, and critical indigenous methodologies. Moreover, I am an enthusiastic advocate for the inherent potential of narrative approaches in qualitative healthcare research. Stories are always told in social, historical, political, cultural and interpersonal contexts. At the same time as we narrate our lives, our stories are always already part of broader stories. Hence, inquiries into individuals' stories can uncover circulating discourses and power relations.

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My research interest is marketing and employer branding in particular. During the past 20 years or so, the area of employer branding has grown both among researchers and practitioners, but there is still much left to investigate. Employer branding was first coined by Ambler and Barrow in 1996, and they defined it as "the package of functional, economic and psychological benefits provided by employment and identified with the employing company" (p.187). Being able to not only attract, but also to retain, good employees has of course many positive implications for companies. With a competitive labour market and population decline (especially in the Nordics), it is no wonder employer branding is becoming so popular (and why I find it so fantastic and interesting!).

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"What I am hoping to achieve in this project is a greater understanding of how companies in retail and hospitality sectors can build their employer brand, so that they appeal to and manage to keep the right type of employees."

My doctoral research is part of the project "Attractive Employers", which explores how employers in retail and tourism & hospitality can work with employer branding. The Swedish Retail and Wholesale Council and the R&D Fund of the Swedish Tourism & Hospitality Industry are jointly funding the project. We study current and potential employees' perceptions, experiences and attitudes toward companies as employers. In order to achieve this, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods will be used: in-depth interviews, observations, experiments and surveys. Data is gathered mainly in Northern Sweden and Finland. To ensure relevance and usability of research results, we are conducting this project in collaboration with Visit Luleå and a reference group from the retail and tourism & hospitality sectors in Northern Sweden.

Before I started my doctoral research, I was a project manager at the Luleå University of Technology's career centre. I worked with different types of activities helping to facilitate students' way into work life, and I worked closely with companies looking to hire LTU students. It became evident that companies work hard to create a relationship with students already in their first year of university, so that they would choose their companies or businesses as a place to work after graduation. These types of employer branding activities are quite common when it comes to jobs that require higher education. The entry-level, customer service positions in the retail and service sectors on the other hand have relatively low barriers to enter (and exit!), require little or no experience or education, and often have low salary levels. Yet, they are major employers and attracting a talented workforce is also important: the frontline employees play a great role in delivering the brand message in the service encounters. The employees represent the brand and the service they give can highly influence how we as customers perceive the company.

What I am hoping to achieve in this project is a greater understanding of how companies in retail and hospitality sectors can build their employer brand, so that they appeal to and manage to keep the right type of employees. One aspect in this study is to look at how the place brand and the employer brand work together. We know that many northern cities are losing inhabitants to the larger cities, which of course has a major impact on the Barents region's economy. Owing to the challenges facing these sectors and our region, together with the important role of the frontline staff in representing a company brand, I am very excited to be working in this research project!

Ambler, T, and Barrow, S (1996), "The employer brand", Journal of Brand Management, 4(3), 185-206.

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"Population aging is one of the largest demographic megatrends affecting regional societies and economies, which can exert profound social consequences in this most desolate and least populated region in the world, such as the Arctic."

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As a young researcher of the Arctic, demography and studies on human capital and wellbeing of the northern population is, to me, of high importance for the future of the Arctic development, similar to the studies on environmental and socioeconomic drivers of change. Local people can actively contribute to the further development, and should enjoy the empowering Arctic, staying healthy and productive as long as possible. My main research interests include spatial demography of the Arctic popu-

lation, in particular the Barents Region. I also explore issues of migration, health, well-being and ageing of northern people, and family and population aspects in regional policy implementation.

I hold academic degrees from the University of Oulu (Finland, MA and PhD in Health Sciences) and Northern Arctic Federal University (Russia, BA in Social Work). My theses focused on population ageing and older people in the Arctic. Population aging is one of the largest demographic megatrends affecting regional societies and economies, which can exert profound social consequences in this most desolate and least populated region in the world. My theses and refereed articles have deepened the understanding of the causes and features of population ageing from national to the sub-national level of the eight Arctic countries in the preiod 1980/1990 to 2015. Alongside standard approaches to measuring ageing, based on "chronological" age, I have applied the alternative methodology based on "prospective age" that is the remaining lifespan of an individual at certain point of the lifetime. The "prospective" methodology takes into account the gains in life expectancy and improvements in population health that have been actively happening in the Arctic.

Recently, I have modelled the future of the Arctic population forward to 2050. For the first time, I have generated population projections for the majority of the sub-national territories in the Arctic (25) in addition to all Arctic countries (8). To add novelty and more socioeconomic relevance to our analysis, education was introduced into the cohort-component model of population projections. Calibrating the input data, I included differentials in local fertility and mortality, along with three specific education scenarios for the future. I believe factoring in the parameter of educational attainment is crucial since it represents a key human capital reserve. Human capital refers to the stock of educated adults (15+ years old) who have attained different levels of education. Depending on the share of the most educated (post-secondary/university level), the Arctic region might get a boost or dip in its future demographic and socioeconomic development.

Population growth in the Arctic is likely to remain fairly steady in the near future, varying between 9.6 (Arctic Dip) and 11.6 (Arctic Boost) million people in 2050, yet representing only a tiny share in their countries' total population. The population of the North Atlantic and North American Arctic will grow faster than in the territories of the Russian and Fennoscandian Arctic. In education, the gender gap will increase further towards feminization of human capital, meaning less females than males in

the primary educational segment and more females than males in the post-secondary segment. One policy message here is to revise current programs and plan the future ones to meet the need for diverse educational opportunities at all levels within and between Arctic territories, in particular for rural, remote, and Indigenous areas.

Policy and population matters in the Russian Federation is another of my focus areas, one of the Arctic Eight countries with a substantial elderly population and low fertility rates. In close cooperation with the Northern Arctic Federal University, I have undertaken comprehensive analysis on the role of population policies in dealing with ageing in BRICS countries (Russian Federation Report). We analysed 59 indicators for the period of 1990 to 2017, in fields such as population size and growth, population age structure, fertility, reproductive health and family planning, health and mortality, spatial distribution and internal migration, and international migration.

Currently, I work at the University of the Arctic's (UArctic) Thematic Networks and Research Liaison Office (Thule Institute, University of Oulu). I am also involved as an author and researcher in more international projects related to the Arctic and Barents population health such as the EU Arctic Cluster Project "Nunataryuk", the Arctic Council "One Arctic – One Health", the Nordic Council of Ministers' funded project "Advancing Elderly People's Agency and Inclusion in the Changing Arctic and Nordic Welfare System", "Arctic Youth and Sustainable Futures". There we look at the different Arctic issues concerning elderly and young people, temporal trends in persistent organic pollutants and other contaminants in the Arctic locations, climate change driven infectious diseases, population diversification in demographics, health, and living environments.

I have been honoured to present some results of my studies as a keynote or plenary presenter at four conferences in 2017–2018 (Peace Symposium, Uusikaupunki Finland August 2017; Development of the UK-Russia Arctic Research and Collaboration Arkhangelsk Russia March 2018; Arctic Scientific Youth Conference Arkhangelsk Russia April 2018; International Congress of Circumpolar Health, August 2018). Working in the network of experts on population health, I have recently started to co-lead the UArctic Thematic Network on Arctic Health and Wellbeing. This is a creative place to contribute to more research and education activities in the area of health of the northern residents
consequently contribute to finding ways and strategies for developing an ecologically democratic and sustainable future for the Arctic region.

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