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**MORAL INQUIRY INTO NORDIC ANIMAL WORK IN TOURISM  
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS AND REASONING**

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### **Abstract**

Human-nonhuman animal relationship in tourism reveals a dichotomy between tourism prosperity and ethical concerns. For long nonhuman animals have been involved in different forms of tourism activities with functions ranging from entertainment and profit generation to marketing and education. At the same time, recent talks of animal rights and welfare call to ponder on the moral aspects of nonhuman animal involvement. The currently accelerating wave of social awareness of anthropogenic impacts on our globe's ecosystems only further pushes both researchers and society to reassess human-nonhuman animal relationship within tourism.

Within the field of tourism studies, human-nonhuman animal relationship has been predominantly researched from normative ethics perspectives and viewed either through the context of animal captivity or tourist-animal relationship, with little research taking the worker-animal relationship perspective. Theoretically, this study draws upon the normative discourse of academic literature and major animal ethics theories, joining a critical paradigm which highlights the need to shift the research focus away from justification or application of absolute normative principles towards the inquiry of morally problematic situations. It suggests a turn from a monistic viewpoint towards more intersubjective-interpretive approach.

This study aims to explore how cognitive and emotional attributes of animal workers in Northern Europe facilitate moral deliberations of the use of nonhuman animals in tourism. After conducting participatory and non-participatory observations during winter period of 2019-2020, the empirical data was collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews with 6 tourism animal workers in Finnish Lapland in the winter period of 2020-2021. The data was then analysed through the qualitative interpretive content analysis to facilitate the exploratory disposition of the study.

The empirical data of the study indicates that emotional motivations and emotional relationship with nonhuman animals facilitate moral positioning of nonhuman animal labour. At the same time, tourism animal workers utilize certain emotional management mechanisms to cope with the difficulties and specifics of the job. Overall, the results of the study on the theoretical level suggest reflective equilibrium as an approach to achieve an endpoint of moral inquiry.

**Keywords:** animals in tourism, animal ethics, emotions, human-animal relationship

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history we have developed a strong and, as described by Shani and Pizam (2008, p. 679), “strange, complicated and unstable” relationship with nonhuman animals. Our relationship with other animals appears in different shapes and through different ways in which we represent nonhuman animals, use them and relate to them: we tame animals and eat them, watch them and captivate, cuddle and hunt, protect and use for entertainment, cure and make experiments on them, assign them with symbolic meanings and write stories about them – we use nonhuman animals for any possible purpose (Gannon, 2003, p.589). We build tourism products and services around animals also.

With the accelerating awareness of the anthropogenic impacts on our globe’s ecosystems, social groups and academicians also started to raise more ethical concerns over human-nonhuman animal relationship. In many fields, such as medical or the food industry, the ethics of using nonhuman animals has long ago been put to question, aggravating moral concerns over medical experimentations on nonhuman animals or meat consumption (Shani & Pizam, 2009). Social activists demonstrate their apprehensions through diverse cultural movements of vegetarianism, manifestations opposing animal cruelty or inclination towards responsible decision making (Murno, 2005). This wave of global rise of sustainability and ethics concern did not leave the far-reaching involvement of nonhuman animals in tourism services out of notice. While the common practice of animal involvement in tourism activities perceptibly promotes economic prosperity of the entire industry through product diversification, marketing, and tourist entertainment, it furthermore brings questions of nonhuman animal advantages in this relationship. This initiated many tourist activities involving animals to gain critique by advocates and activists of animal rights and welfare, researchers, and publicity in recent decades. It also pushed both researchers and industry to reconsider the entire human-nonhuman animal relationship within tourism industry.

Despite the number of positions aggravating doubts in the need for ethical concerns about the use of animals in tourism “in a world full of human problems” (Butcher, 2014) or justifying the use of animals for human benefits (see Frey, 2002; Knight & Barnett, 2008; Machan, 2002), talks of animal rights and responsibilities for involving them into tourist

activities attract more and more attention in both society and academy. Advocates of animal rights and welfare regularly emphasise the attention on the brutal side of animal-based tourism and protest against the violation of animals and their freedoms, scanty captivating facilities, encouragement of unnatural behaviour through training, and destruction of their social and family ties (Fennell, 2012a; Hall & Brown, 2006; Regan, 1995; Shani & Pizam, 2008). Despite the increasing concern, animal involvement in tourism finds only limited practical implications: while some animal attractions barge against criticism, new forms and opportunities of tourist-nonhuman animal interactions appear.

Tourists and society show empathy and concern over animals. What is also often overlooked in the discussed discourse is the role of emotions in human-nonhuman animal relationship. We can view this through the prism of people who work with animals in tourism: who, on the one hand, take care of nonhuman animals, are passionate about them, and, on the other, conduct work that triggers all the potential negative consequences for animals. Workers appear as a commodious case for examining the role of emotions in the relationship as, unlike with some other labour, people who decide to work with or for animals, predominantly do so for attributes other than financial, as this work is commonly not highly paid. Thus, sociocultural and emotional principles may play a more significant role in their labour choice. The emotional setting of workers towards animals: whether these emotions encourage workers or are suppressed by them – play an imperative role in both animal labour and human-nonhuman animal relationship, bringing new perspectives and findings to the ongoing discourse, with emotions guiding our decisions and values alongside with the cognitive thinking and sociocultural/political principles. Yet this relation has been generally overlooked in the academia and/or not well theorised, especially in the field of tourism. In the time of socially rising concerns over nonhuman animals on the one hand, and a massive popularisation of animal-based tourist attractions on the other, along with its economic and cultural significance – the vexed and provocative subject matter of animal ethics in tourism requires continuous contemporary discussions, research, and solutions.

Prior to going further with the study, it should be noted that this paper follows the tradition of more contemporary scholars in human-nonhuman animal research and strives to use

the term “nonhuman animal” as preferred to “animal”. This term choice, by means of the power of language, enables to accentuate the relation of humans with animals other than human, and highlight that humans are nothing but a form of animal (Markwell, 2015). It helps to verbally minimise the opposition of human versus animal. Also, many scholars distinguish between “morals” and “ethics” terms. Whereas ethics predominantly refer to a set of rules defining acceptable actions and behaviour, morals define more personal ideas and guiding principles. However, in the scope of this study, these terms can sometimes be considered interchangeable.

### **1.1 Previous studies**

The human-nonhuman animal relationship discourse is not novel and it has attracted a substantial academic interest (for generic discussions on human-animal relationship see, for example, Andersson Cederholm, Björck, Jennbert, & Lönngren, 2014; Peggs, 2012). In view of the fact that nonhuman animals are ubiquitous to human life, studies of our kinship have historically attracted the interests of biological, anthropological, philosophical, environmental, ethical and other academic fields, which overall acknowledge nonhuman animals as not only physical objects and biological beings, but also as symbols and cultural artefacts (Coulter, 2016; Freeman, Watt, & Leane, 2016; Lawrence, 1985). Although it is only in recent decades that human-nonhuman animal studies gained considerable popularisation through interdisciplinary inquiries (Birke & Hockenhull, 2012).

The ethics dialogue of human-nonhuman animal relationship in academic literature generally begins with the nonhuman animals’ status determination. Many scholars have studied biological, cognitive and emotional characteristics of nonhuman animals, comparing them to those of humans, in order to determine the moral status of nonhuman animals (see DeGrazia, 1993; Garner, 2005; Leahy, 1994; Murno, 2005; Murray, 2008; Regan, 1983). In this block of literature, the capacity of nonhuman animals to experience pain (Bermond et al., 1997; Rollin, 2011; Sneddon, Elwood, Adamo & Leach, 2014) and nonhuman animal consciousness (Bekoff, Allen & Burghard, 2002; Griffin, 2001; Rollin, 2017) have been largely viewed as the key attributes for nonhuman animal ethical considerations. However, since the interest towards the subject matter emerges from

radically different academic disciplines, such studies differ in their approaches, research paradigms, methodologies, and research questions (DeMello, 2012; Echeverri, Karp, Naidoo, Zhao, & Chan, 2018).

Human-nonhuman animal relationship has been researched through different theoretical domains and went from reflecting on the moral status of nonhuman animals to forming animal ethics theories (for general literature presenting animal ethics theories see Armstrong & Botzler, 2003; Fennell, 2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b; Tännsjö, 2013). Diverse animal ethic theories (discussed in Chapter 3) have gained significant attention in the literature, where advocates of different theories: animal welfare (see Broom, 1988; Garner, 1993; Haynes, 2008), animal rights (see Regan, 1983, 2003), utilitarianism (see Frey, 1983; Singer, 1993), ecocentrism (see Callicott, 1984; Leopold, 1974; Lovelock, 2000), ecofeminism (see Gilligan, 2003; Midgley, 1985) – argued in support of their position as well as received criticism from proponents of other doctrines. This wide range of existing studies and academic publications, accompanied with empirical findings on animal ethics, has established a solid theoretical knowledge, that serves as a solid ground for further research (see Goodale & Black, 2010; Human Animal Research Network, 2015).

In more empirical sense, researchers on ethical attributes of human-nonhuman animal relationship have touched upon numerous practical issues, such as: animal experimentation for medical or cosmetic purposes (see Emlen, 1993; Yarri, 2005), animals in food industry (see Cuneo, Chignell & Halteman, 2016; Stephens, 1994) or animal captivity, especially zoos (see Kellert & Dunlap, 2004; Lyles & Wharton, 2013; Norton et al., 1996; Shani, 2009). The use of nonhuman animals in tourism industry has also been extensively enlightened (see Fennell, 2011; Grimwood, Caton & Cooke, 2018; Markwell, 2015), although being a relatively novel sphere in academic discussions in comparison to some other fields. While a big amount of academic literature designated the disruptive consequences of animal-based tourism: like the violation of animal rights and freedoms, scanty captivating facilities, encouragement of unnatural behaviour of animals through training, and the destruction of their social and family ties (see Hughes, 2001; Orams, 2002; Regan, 2001) – other authors emphasised the educational and



wildlife-preservative aspects of such tourism (see, for example, Blamey, 2001; Mason, 2000; Weaver, 2005).

The ethical dispute over human-nonhuman animal relationship accelerates in gaining attention through popular documentaries (see Attenborough, 2020; Foster, 2020; Tabrizi, 2021), cultural movements like vegetarianism (see Andersson Cederholm, Björck, Jennbert, & Lönngren, 2014; Shani & Pizam, 2008), public critique and social-political debates. This attention to the topic also finds reflection in various forms of animal ethics guidelines, codes of conduct and regulations for different industries (see, for example, Eurogroup for Animal Welfare, 2001; Mason, 1997; Mellor & Bayvel, 2008). Although not always and not ubiquitously these, predominantly associated with animal welfare, principles attain reflection in legislation and tourism practices (Fennell, 2014).

Whereas most of the studies and theses acknowledge the moral dilemma in human-nonhuman animal relationship and propose a critical inquiry, the overall discourse remains ambiguous and controversial. The theoretical and philosophical discussion often carries an absolutist or normative character and tends to oversimplify the ethical phenomenon, every so often disregarding new discoveries, contextual aspects, or interdisciplinary approach (Kupper & De Cock Buning, 2011), as well as they often ignore or discard the role of emotions in human-nonhuman animal relationship, assuming the rational nature of human decision-making. Whereas, the contemporary literature starts to acknowledge and regard emotions as functional attributes, what can predominantly be viewed in fields of emotional labour and emotion management (see Fineman, Bishop & Haman, 2007; Hochschild, 2012), surprisingly few studies discuss emotions in relation to human-nonhuman animal relationship, for instance, in work context (see Hamilton & McCabe, 2016; Wicks, 2011; Vanutelli & Balconi, 2015), and even less in tourism context.

Despite the obvious growth of animal ethics concerns in tourism and an increasing amount of research on the topic: although dominantly normative studies may find application in abstract thought-examples – current studies struggle to be successfully applied to morally problematic situations in real world, because of contextual complicacies, intertwining with other disciplines and the complex nature of human moral

judgement. The complexity of human experiences and emotions and dynamics of the changing world, continuously revealing its new parts and possibilities, requires a more flexible and open approach to moral inquiry. That way, acknowledging emotions as guiding structures to reason and moral judgement is a significant step in the animal ethics discourse. One of the goals of this study is therefore to explore the role of emotions and the potential of its inquiry in the human-nonhuman animal relationship in tourism. Academia requires the move away from absolutist vision towards alternative, pluralistic approaches to human-nonhuman animal relationship studies within tourism.

## **1.2 Purpose and goals of the study**

The diverse and multidisciplinary nature of the human-nonhuman relationship in tourism, as well as the multiplicity of stakeholders involved in animal tourism activities and external factors, make it challenging to attain a comprehensive overview of the human-nonhuman animal relationship. The globally growing sustainability and environmental concerns and positions aggravating doubts on the ethics of the use of animals in tourism (Shani and Pizam, 2008), initiated a wave of criticism towards the use of nonhuman animals in tourism. As a result of this growing interest and criticism, in the endeavour to eliminate the negative effects of animal tourism practices, social science researchers have been attracted to exploring human-animal relationship in tourism. Whereas some researchers focused on investigating experiences of tourists encountering animals in different settings (see Higginbottom, 2004; Newsome, Dowling & Moore, 2005), others dedicated their attention on reviewing the ethics of using animals in tourism (see Fennell, 2012a). This study adds to the critical view of the human-nonhuman animal relationship in tourism and contributes to the examination of moral attributes in the ethics research paradigm.

The study largely calls for an intersubjective approach to human-nonhuman animal discourse in tourism, which would be beneficial for both theoretical inquiry and practical implications. As previously discussed, common in human-nonhuman animal discourse purely ideological and absolutist arguments often stimulate ethical dilemmas and conflicts of perspectives, providing little help contributing to practical solutions and objectives (Robinson, 2011). Therefore, what this study intends to convey is the shift of

the research focus away from justification or application of absolute moral principles towards the inquiry of morally problematic situations. In the theoretical standpoint, it suggests a turn from a monistic viewpoint towards more intersubjective-interpretive approach, viewing already established animal ethics theories not as absolutist principles, but as part of socio-cultural attributes, which in amalgamation with emotional attributes, contribute to the formation of moral standing.

With the discussed interpretive-intersubjective approach, the study attempts to explore, and subsequently to confront or combine, both cognitive attributes of human-nonhuman animal relationship discourse and emotional attributes. Through the acknowledgement of human relation to the world primarily as practical rather than theoretical, and as emotional rather than rational, this study aims to explore:

- How do cognitive understandings and emotional attributes of animal workers in Finnish Lapland facilitate their moral deliberations of the use of nonhuman animals in tourism?

To help answer that main research question, and to better examine the significance of the emotional attributes, the following secondary research question was formed:

- How does workers' emotional connection with nonhuman animals in Lapland influence their moral considerations?

This research inquires the topic through the case study of animal workers in tourism in Lapland. It has been noted that most of existing studies tend to inquire the topic of human-nonhuman relationship in tourism through the perspective of tourists-animals, and there is a lack of attention in the literature towards workers-animals relationship. Workers' decision to work with animals as well as their longer relationship with animals, suggest a interesting case for the purpose of this study. Also, while commonly animal ethics studies take place in the southern context, especially African and Australian, very limited papers have viewed the topic in the Nordic context, where animal tourism plays a significant role for the tourism industry. What is more, the study focuses not (only) on the use of animals for observations, but rather the use of animals for safari purposes, as carriers. The most popular and demanding safaris with animals in Northern Europe (Lapland) involve huskies and reindeer.

The research follows a qualitative interpretive method with the empirical material consisting of semi-structured in-depth interviews with six animal tourism workers in Finnish Lapland, collected during the winter season of 2020-2021. All interviews were organised face-to-face, some taking place on a farm and some in public cafes. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and the material was later coded for the analysis.

### **1.3 Structure of the study**

The discussion in this study is presented in four major parts, starting after the introductory chapter and introduces theoretical framework (Chapters 2, 3 & 4), methodology (Chapter 5), analysis and discussion (Chapter 6), and conclusion (Chapter 7). Starting in the *second* chapter, the theoretical framework of the study starts with positioning nonhuman animals in literature and their moral status determination in the discourse. The *third* chapter continues the theoretical discussion by presenting and elaborating on the major animal ethics theories, namely: animal welfare, animal rights, utilitarianism, ecocentrism and ecofeminism – and their challenges. The latter section of this chapter offers a critical view of normative ethics theories and presents challenges for their plausible practical implications in real-world morally problematic situations. The following chapter *four* brings the topic of emotions. It highlights the significance and relation of emotions to the discourse, determines its meaning and potential in studies of human-nonhuman animal relationship, completing the theoretical framework of the study.

Chapter *five* continues by introducing the methodology and design of the research. It describes the methods of data collection and analysis, implemented in the study. It explains how the qualitative research method is utilised to acquire data through a series of semi-structured interviews and further describes how the collected material is examined through content analysis and coding tools. The following *sixth* chapter reveals the analysis of the study and its key empirical findings and invites the reader for the discussion. It intends to convey the major findings of the empirical study and identify the emotional attributes of workers towards nonhuman animals. It also discusses how their emotions contribute to moral justification and formation of moral principles towards

nonhuman animals they work with; and how it correlates with the well-established normative animal ethics theories. Finally, the *seventh* chapter sums up the key findings of the study, depicts its limitations and potential implications, and proposes directions for future research.

## 2. HUMAN-NONHUMAN ANIMAL RELATIONSHIP

The recent rise of the global concern over the climate change, environmental pollution and biodiversity loss has increased the interest in human-nonhuman animal relations. Nonhuman animals have always been omnipresent in humane society and existence from both physical and cultural perspectives (Andersson Cederholm, Björck, Jennbert, & Lönngren, 2014, p. 5). Some cultures, e.g., certain indigenous peoples, have always acknowledged that humans are nothing but part of the nature and one of its animal species, thereby they have learned to live together with animals, and continue living within nature's sustainable balance. Yet most human cultures nowadays often fail to indicate and recognise nonhuman animal presence in the environment we all share, regardless of whether we live in an urban setting or not. In these cultures, people have long stepped away from the principle of living together with nature and other animals towards utilising them. Different cultures stimulate people to praise certain animals and neglect other, inspire to relate to some animals and to distance from other, to love some and fear other. Furthermore, not only these cultural attributes shape the way we view nonhuman animals, but also how we perceive our relationship with them and how we position ourselves in the world.

The sociocultural attributes of the multidimensional topic of human kinship with other animals are vexed, and just like human-nonhuman animal relationship itself, they comprise a fair amount of controversies. Despite human beings biologically belonging to the animal group and sharing the planet with other animals and having an emotional setting similar to that of many animals, people often refuse to identify themselves as animals, and sometimes even confer the term animal with a meaning opposite to humane (Freeman, 2010, pp. 11–21; Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 138–140). In this endeavour, the term 'animal' obtained certain dualism in meaning, and according to Mary Midgley (in Freeman, 2010) has two definitions. The first definition refers to the scientific taxonomy and considers animality as a "domain or kingdom" which includes humans. Whereas the second is a conditional term which excludes humans and is opposed to humanity. This dichotomy of nature versus culture, or humans versus unhuman animals seems to have evolved substantially with the industrialisation era and the popularisation of capitalist system and has successfully integrated into our culture (Adams, 2007; Coulter, 2016, pp.

8–19). Not only this indicates the tension and controversy of human relationship with other animals, but also highlights the significance of the cultural attributes of the discourse.

From how we perceive nonhuman animals, and how we relate to them, depend, above all, our policies and views to sustainable governance and protection of the integrity of natural environment, and lives of many animal species. While the common anthropocentric position has been tacitly accepted by many cultures and rather occasionally it has been put to question, with the recent globally enhancing acknowledgement of environmental issues, human-nonhuman relationship started to gain particular interest by many studies and through various contexts. In the literature, researchers have engaged with these contemporary issues and questions inherent to human-nonhuman animal relationship: the representation of nonhuman animals, empirical and ethical issues of human interactions with other animals and debating on the moral status of nonhuman animals as conscious beings themselves (Freeman, Watt & Leane, 2016). Our cultural perceptions regarding nonhuman animals and the acknowledgement of nonhuman animal moral status affect our social behaviour directly, as well as it affects the environment we live in and ethical principles. The academic debate over the moral status of nonhuman animals, however, seems very contentious: in the search for one timeless attribute to determine the moral status of nonhuman animals, new studies and findings continuously refute old perceptions and arguments they were based on, proving their inadequacy.

Scholars, this way, disagree in their opinions on the rightfulness and the extent to which we should or should not assign nonhuman animals with moral worth. Hence, proponents of the neo-Cartesian doctrine ascribe nonhuman animals with no, or very inconsequential, moral status due to the absence of sentience (Harrison, 1992; Leahy, 1994; Murray, 2008), or the lack of moral interests of nonhuman animals (Frey, 1980; Guyer, 1998). Moral orthodoxy, in contrast, does assign nonhuman animals with moral status, yet emphasizes its inferiority to moral interests of humans (see DeGrazia, 1993; Garner, 2005; Munro, 2005). On the other side of the debate are proponents of moral heterodoxy who claim for inherent value of nonhuman animals and their moral status equally valuable (see Bull, 2005; Cavalieri, 2001; Regan, 1983; or the utilitarian approach of Singer, 1975). The following chapter discusses these positions in more details.

## **2.1 Moral status of nonhuman animals**

The key animal ethics positions in academic literature fall into different categories in terms of assigning moral value and status to nonhuman animals, its bases, level of determination and the corresponding human-nonhuman animal relationship. The central question here is why nonhuman animals should (not) count morally. As previously mentioned, according to Garner (2005), ethical conceptions of animal ethics split within three major categories: approaches emphasising the lack of moral status in nonhuman animals, moral orthodoxy and moral heterodoxy. Thereby, based on three categories by Garner, this subchapter discusses the major scholar approaches presented in animal ethics literature, and deliberates their core principles and differences.

In the first category scholars generally discuss the lack of moral status in nonhuman animals, and they either refer to the absence of animal sentiency (see Harrison, 1992; Leahy, 1994; Murray, 2008), or the lack of morally significant interests in nonhuman animals (see Frey, 1980; Guyer, 1998). This position contributes to the neo-Cartesian viewpoint (see Murray, 2008) and to the French philosopher of the sixteenth century Rene Descartes himself, who described animals as “machines without souls” (Harrison, 1992, pp. 219–227). The key arguments in this approach form around the assumption of animal lack of sentiency and animal unconsciousness and, what follows as according to Leahy (1994), animal unawareness of their sufferings. Alternatively, scholars of this category accept nonhuman animal sentiency but claim about the absence of their moral interests. Here, Kant’s judgement of rationality as the key element in determining moral consideration makes him be one of the central advocates of this approach. Proponents of this doctrine also highlight the inability of nonhuman animals to believe and desire or have intrinsic interests (Frey, 1980). What followers of this group agree on, is that nonhuman animals lack moral worth; thus, the treatment of them implies no moral considerations.

Thereby, this doctrine ferociously repudiates the moral status of animals and declines to endue animals with thorough ethical considerations. Applying this position on morally problematic situations, actions that induce animal suffering or death would not be classified as morally challenging or criminal. However, a number of scholars have criticised this doctrine and exhibited its major flaws. For instance, the argumentations on



animal unconsciousness appear rather doubtful, being limited by the aspiration to view purely human attributes in nonhuman animals (see Griffin, 2001). These theses also fail to consider animal suffering because of an unacceptance of nonhuman animal common interest in not feeling pain as their inherent value. In contrast, numerous recent studies contribute to the recognition of animal sentience and a certain level of consciousness (see for example Le Neindre et al., 2017), as well as the ability to feel pain among many species (Bateson, 1991; Rollin, 2000), also aquatic animals (Sneddon, 2015). Thereby, the new wave of academic research and findings dispute the validity of the core principles of the discussed doctrine.

Proponents of the moral orthodoxy doctrine, on the other hand, accept the moral status of nonhuman animals but highlight its inferiority to humane. Scholars following this approach do acknowledge the interest of animals in not suffering, nevertheless accepting their sufferings to be prevailed by the greater good, human interest or other factors (see Garner, 2005; Munro, 2005). DeGrazia (1993, pp. 17–31) argues that interests which can be put in the same category, such as an interest in well-being, life and freedom, of different species are not similar, and thus, do not entail to equal moral weight. Similarly, for some scholars as Garner (2005), who distinguished between moral standing and moral status: nonhuman animals have moral standing, though given equal consideration, nonhuman animals acquire less significant moral status. This doctrine, for instance, being generally against nonhuman animal suffering may justify it in sake of medical purposes, such as animal experimentation. Perspectives of moral orthodoxy also include animal welfare discussions and dedicates core attention on the conditions in which animals live (see Gordon, 2009; Håstein, Scarfe & Lund, 2005; Korte, Olivier & Koolhaas, 2007), or ecocentric position that places holism, or value of the environment as the whole, over individual interests (Callicot, 1985; Leopold, 1990).

It leads us to the position of moral heterodoxy, which correspondingly brings up a deontological approach of animal rights. Largely based on Regan's absolutist position on animal inherent value, what this doctrine intends to convey is an unacceptance of any use of nonhuman animals as commodities for human ends (see Bull, 2005; Regan, 1983). Regan's concept of animal rights signifies that animals, as "subjects-of-a-life", are moral agents with equal inherent value, and thus are all equally valuable. It would then imply

that all actions that treat other animals as if they do not hold rights are unjust (Kalof & Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 23). This perspective has later acquired certain criticism, for instance, by Cohen (1997, pp. 91–102) for applying a purely humane concept of rights on nonhuman animals; while other scholars were consistent with Regan (see Cavalieri, 2001). Of big significance in moral heterodoxy stands a utilitarian position: it seeks for rationality of consideration and accordance of equal moral status to all animals (Singer, 1975). Singer (2002), as the central figure associated with utilitarian approach, argues that humans should treat nonhuman animals as they would treat other humans. Thus, he suggests boycotting the meat industry, and considers animal experimentation only acceptable if human beings are used in experiments at the equal level.

This brief review of academic positions illustrates very contrasting and even opposing approaches within, as Garner calls it (2005), the “continuum of recognition” of animal moral standing. On one side of which scholars heatedly repudiate the moral worth of nonhuman animals, whereas on the other contrast of this continuum ethicists claim for animal moral equality and rights. The basis of moral value of animals in contrasting approaches largely depends on recognition of certain animal attributes. Having a look at the animal ethics discourse, one can see that in a considerable amount of literature scholars elaborate the significance of nonhuman animal consciousness (see Bekoff, Allen & Burghard, 2002; Edelman & Seth, 2009; Griffin, 2001; Gutfreund, 2017; Rollin, 2017) and the capacity to experience pain (see Allen, 2004; Bermond et al., 1997, pp. 125–144; Rollin, 2011; Sneddon, Elwood, Adamo & Leach, 2014) as important attributes for (not) assigning animals with moral worth and consideration. One can rightly call in question this approach to moral epistemology as it oversimplifies the phenomenon of ethics and builds its judgements upon narrow facts or assumptions, regardless the context. As in the example of the first category, many scholars built their theses on the assumption that animals lack the capacity to experience pain, which has at least to some extent been refuted. Some approaches, for instance ecofeminism (see Adams, 2014; Donovan, 1990), acknowledge and criticise the limitation of classic scientific epistemology, and emphasise the recognition of the variety of species in a non-hierarchical manner and respect towards the aliveness and spirit of other beings.

## **2.2 Nonhuman animal work in tourism**

Cultures and fluctuations in them, as well as the knowledge we possess, significantly affect our relationship with nonhuman animals in a more practical sense and in our daily lives: whether we plan a holiday or go for a dinner in a restaurant. Thereby, the academic interest towards human-nonhuman relationship takes place in various empirical contexts: medical, especially the subject matter of animal experimentation for cosmetic purposes (Emlen, 1993; Yarri, 2005), food industry and vegetarianism (Andersson Cederholm, Björck, Jennbert, & Lönngren, 2014; Cuneo, Chignell & Halteman, 2016; Stephens, 1994), and also tourism, through the prism of animal captivity (see Kellert & Dunlap, 2004; Lyles & Wharton, 2013; Norton, Hutchins, Maple, & Stevens, 1996; Shani, 2009; 2012), or animal work (Coulter, 2016, García-Rosell & Tallberg, 2021) – to name but a few. The interest towards the use of nonhuman animals in tourism and human-nonhuman animal relationship in tourism has been rapidly growing in academic literature recently (see Fennell, 2011; Grimwood, Caton & Cooke, 2018; Markwell, 2015).

Human-nonhuman animal encounter in its various tourism forms and animal involvement in numerous activities have a long history in tourism industry. Wildlife observations acquired popularisation already in seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, in the “visualisation” era of tourism, which enhanced the sightseeing aspect of travelling (see Adler 1989; Urry & Larsen, 2011). It promptly led to widespread practices of captivation and concentration of nonhuman animals in specific controlled areas (such as national parks and zoos), which began to serve as dedicated tourist attractions (Yale, 1991). Nowadays, observing nonhuman animals in captive settings is still considered to be the most common form of animal encounter in tourism (Tribe & Booth, 2003). Apart from zoos, as being the most apparent, animal observation in captive settings comprises of manifold tourist attractions: aquariums, theme parks, safari parks, farms, sea parks or even pet cafes.

In tourism, human-nonhuman animal interactions happen not only through observations, but also physical encounters, and image creation (Orams, 2002, pp. 281–282). Thereby, nonhuman animal presence in tourism is not limited to wildlife observations: nonhuman animals are also obligated to perform as carriers, take part in races and fights, they are trained to perform at amusement shows, they become prey for ‘entertainment’ hunting or are used as objects for petting and photography (Fennell, 2013a; Shani, 2009). This is a

mere illustration of nonhuman animal presence in tourism and its significance which is often left overlooked, and so is the role of animal representation by the industry in forms of storytelling, marketing, and image creation.

Animal involvement in tourism activities and animal representation in tourism destination or product marketing images have a huge financial impact on the industry. Even though it appears impossible to view and analyse the complete economic value of animal use and integration in the industry, due to its diverse collateral influence; its huge impact is incontestable. In Northern Europe, which is the case of this research, according to the study conducted by the Multidimensional Tourism Institute in Finnish Lapland, animal-based tourism service providers alone generate about 2,5% from the annual turnover of the tourism industry in Lapland (Bohn, García-Rosell & Äijälä, 2018). Not so impressive numbers: however, these numbers do not consider the benefits of destination management organisations or travel agencies, who sell animal-based tourist activities, or hotels, restaurants and whole destinations that benefit from nonhuman animal-oriented services; neither it indicates the role of animals in gastronomy, interior and clothing design or souvenir production. Not to mention the significance of animals for destination image and its tourist attractiveness; a case in point, reindeer, husky and other animal-based activities serve as a powerful tourist motivation to visit the region (Bohn et al., 2018), influencing tourists already on a pre-travel stage. Images of animals and availability of nonhuman animal-centred activities influence tourists' motivation to travel to a specific destination as well as draws certain perceptions about the place. Thus, the major economic value of nonhuman animal-oriented tourist activities in tourism arguably comes not in the form of a direct financial profit, but rather an implicit effect on the tourism development, diversification, and marketing.

Given the huge significance and effect of nonhuman animal involvement in tourism practices on industry's economic, social, environmental, and symbolic characteristics, researchers and industry practitioners acknowledge the urge to develop new ways to research and understand human-nonhuman animal relationship in the scope of tourism (Äijälä, García-Rosell, Haanpää & Salmela, 2021; García-Rosell & Tallberg, 2021; Kupper & De Cock Buning, 2011). Consequently, the academic interest in topics of human-nonhuman animal relationship and the use of nonhuman animals in tourism has

formed a substantial modern block of literature (see Fennell, 2011; Grimwood, Caton & Cooke, 2018; Markwell, 2015), extensively forming various concepts and perspectives under the umbrella of nonhuman animals in tourism. In tourism literature, for instance, nonhuman animals are often viewed as workers from entrepreneurial viewpoint, as objects or subjects with certain intrinsic value from the tourist perspective, or they are considered generally as tourism stakeholders (see Coulter, 2016; García-Rosell & Tallberg, 2021).

One of the positions common in academic literature acknowledges nonhuman animals as workers, when nonhuman animals get involved or used in various services and fields. Coulter (2016), in her book *Animals, Work, and the Promise of Interspecies Solidarity*, comprehensively elucidated the concept of nonhuman animal work and called for recognition of nonhuman animal labour through examining work done with, by or for nonhuman animals. In particular, she categorised nonhuman animal work as done for themselves, done voluntarily for humans and done as mandated by humans. Coulter (2016, pp. 149–163) views the subject matter through “interspecies solidarity” framework, which proposes solidarity and empathy for nonhuman animal work, bringing the notion of humane jobs, or as she puts it: “jobs that are good for both people and animals”. The “use” of nonhuman animals within this framework is not seen as necessarily negative in itself, but instead it accepts the use of nonhuman animal labour if it integrates protective measures and positive entitlements (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011).

In her call for solidarity and empathy towards nonhuman animal labour, Coulter (2016) also leads to the discussion of emotions and its significance in work with nonhuman animals. The feminist body of contemporary literature has generally studied well the role of emotions: especially through service labour and emotion management (see Fineman, Bishop & Haman, 2007; Hochschild, 2012), and later also started to conceptualise emotions in the context of nonhuman animal work (see Hamilton & McCabe, 2016; Sanders, 2010; Vanutelli & Balconi, 2015; Wicks, 2011). Thereby, human emotions towards nonhuman animals influence people decisions regarding their careers or hobbies, commonly demonstrating the notion of emotional motivation by naming their “love” towards nonhuman animals as an inspiration of their work choice (Sanders, 2010).

Emotions in relation to nonhuman animals determine not only our motivations, but also our behaviour and moral principles.

The feminist ethics of care framework allows to assign nonhuman animals with the status of a stakeholder, through acknowledging nonhuman animals as workers and by exploring their social and emotional interspecies connections (García-Rosell & Tallberg, 2021). Nonetheless, it finds little application in legislation and tourism industry practices. And while there is still a long way for the tourism industry, socio-political and cultural systems to move away from principles of *utilising* nonhuman animals towards a “care for” framework – the conversation continues.

### 3. MAJOR ANIMAL ETHICS THEORIES

This chapter examines the contribution of animal ethics in addressing morally problematic situations. When facing a practical morally complicated situation, apart from analysing case-relevant facts, we must have a comprehension of some ethical principle to be followed, to arrive to the morally appropriate conclusion. Can contemporary animal ethics provide us with reasonable principles and guidelines to solve morally problematic situations of human-nonhuman animal encounters in tourism? And more importantly, can there even be one, unique, absolute moral principle? The nature of moral truth may seem relative, not absolute; and if it is true, it might be thought that the search for the single moral principle is worthless. However, whether morality is absolute or relative, or there is no moral reality per se (moral nihilism), there is still advantage of learning from moral theories, or as Tännsjö puts it (2013, p. 9): ‘Even if there is no absolute truth to pursue in ethics, there is still a point in thinking through one’s most basic moral ideas and to eliminate inconsistent arguments from moral thinking’.

This chapter presents a succinct review of most prevalent animal ethics theories: it explores main theses of influential proponents of each position and provides a critical view on them. Whereas the previous chapter discussed how scholars have formed contrasting basis for the moral worth and value of nonhuman animal, this section elaborates more specific animal theories. Several academicians conducted comprehensive overviews and analyses of the major concepts and theories on animal ethics that play an important role in the discourse of human-animal relationship (see, for example, Armstrong & Botzler, 2016; Atkins-Sayre, Besel, Besel, & Freeman, 2010; Parker, 2010; Taylor, 2003). This chapter is based largely on books “Tourism and animal ethics” by David Fennell (2012a), “The animal ethics reader” by Susan Armstrong & Richard Botzler (2003), “Animals and tourism” by Kevin Markwell (2015) and “Animal ethics” by Robert Garner (2005), to name but a few. The discussion is chosen to follow the structure presented by David Fennell (2012a), who centralised five ethical theories most relevant in the application to the tourism context: animal welfare, animal rights, utilitarianism, ecocentrism and ecofeminism. Although some of the discussed theories may at some points overlap with each other or have similar practical implication suggestions, they all do carry distinct characteristics and guiding principles. And the latter section offers a critical analysis and challenges of animal ethics theories application.

### **3.1 Animal welfare**

As one of the central current animal ethics positions, animal welfare deals with questions of how we should relate to animals and how we should deal with them in our daily lives. Probably the most acknowledged definition of animal welfare belongs to Donald Broom (1988; 2017) who described it as “the state of the animal as regards its attempts to cope with the environment in which it finds itself”. In this sense welfare includes an emotional state and physical functioning of a living animal, which can be measured scientifically and vary from very good to very poor.

Animal welfarists broadly accept sacrificing interests of animals for most of the current benefits of humans but seek to minimise animal suffering (Garner 1993; Jasper & Nelkin, 1992). Animal welfare position assumes that there are conditions under which nonhuman animals may be used (raised and in some cases slaughtered) that are ethically acceptable (Haynes, 2008). Thus, there can be distinguished two major constituents of this approach, as also noted by Bekoff & Nystrom (2004): quality of animal life and the use of animals in human interests. The quality of animal life is good, for example, if they have food, a place to live, they are free of pain, suffering and hunger. The other factor is whether we can use animals in own interests, and it brings certain dubiety to the discourse. In which cases shall scarification of an animal be justified? Generally, the welfare position accepts the use of animals if they are not used badly (Fennell, 2015; Kistler, 2004); in this manner it associates with utilitarian position (discussed further), notwithstanding that welfare keeps the dominant focus on the state and life quality of the animal.

Welfarists use different approaches of defining and quantifying animal welfare. Thereby, there can be distinguished three key categories of what matters the most: emotional state, biological functioning, and natural/normal behaviour (Broom, 2017; Hewson, 2003). The assessment of emotional state considers animals’ experiences, such as fear, stress, or serenity. If animal behaviour and its bodily responses do not indicate any deviation, it is considered to fare well. The second approach concerns the biological functioning of the animal through the assessment of its health, reproductive abilities, and disturbance of life. The third approach prioritises the capacity of the animal to perform the full range of its natural behaviour. It concerns that the nature of the animal is not conflicted, nevertheless it accepts some forms of physical and emotional suffering, for instance food deprivation.



The method of “Five Freedoms” (see figure 1) attempts to merge together these three categories in a framework to measure animal welfare: freedom from hunger and thirst, freedom from discomfort, freedom from pain, injury and disease, freedom to express normal behaviour, freedom from fear and distress (Korte, Olivier & Koolhaas, 2007).



Figure 1. The "Five freedoms" of animal welfare (Korte, Olivier & Koolhaas, 2007).

This framework is, for example, utilised by the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) to assess the impact on welfare of farm animals (Eurogroup for Animal Welfare, 2001, p. 24), as well as it is largely implemented by the tourism industry in the Global Welfare Guidance for Animals in Tourism (ABTA, 2013). In its guidelines, for instance, ABTA (2013) sets a benchmark for best practice, establishes the minimum requirements in animal welfare standards, and defines unacceptable and discouraged practices for the tourism and animal attractions globally. ABTA additionally provides five specific manuals which cover the most widespread types of animal involving tourism activities. Such guidelines normally aim to enhance the awareness of – and to encourage businesses to achieve better standards of animal welfare. In case of ABTA, their members include some big travel providers, such as: G Adventures, Saga Holidays, Thomas Cook, TUI Group, Virgin Holidays – many of which have limited cooperation with some service providers and selling of animal involving activities that were defined as unacceptable (ABTA, 2013).

There are, however, several challenges of the animal welfare position and criticism towards it. One way, in which animal welfare may be criticised is its assessment and application practices. There can be questioned the trustworthiness of animal feelings measurement practices due to the conceivable misinterpretation of emotional state or behaviour patterns. It brings challenges to animal welfare model based on animal satisfaction and happiness (see Dawkins, 2004). The assessment of physical conditions,

on the other hand, relies on rather measurable factors, but they may induce conflicting results, disabling a thorough estimation of animal welfare (Eurogroup for Animal Welfare, 2001). Kistler (2004), in his turn, criticises the widely adopted in animal welfare practises of universal assessments and applications which restrict to fully consider the variety of animal species as well as contextual differences. In this way, animal welfare assumes what is good for one animal is good for all (Fennell, 2015), regardless of species, setting, mode of engagement and state of the animal.

Such assessment deficiencies provide a significant ground for interpretation among conflicting economic, political, environmental, social and tourism interests, and the translation of measurements into practice becomes problematic (see Garner, 1993). Shifting interests and the failure to equally consider the whole spectrum of the ways animals are used resulted in EU animal welfare legislation to leave many widely kept species out of consideration and without an adequate or any protection: i.e. trout and salmon, turkeys and ducks, cats and dogs or rabbits (Broom, 2017, pp. 47–53). Singer (2015) notes that many animal welfare organisations originally established to prevent animal abuse have gradually changed their positions under the influence of political, economic or other authorities (Fennell, 2015, p. 31).

### **3.2 Animal Rights**

Where, simply say, animal welfare stands for “bigger cages”, animal rights imply “empty cages” (Regan, 2004a). Regan (1983) with *The Case for Animal Rights* is the most known proponent of the animal rights position in contemporary academic discourse. His deontological perspective suggests that animals possess inherent value, which means they exist as ends-in-themselves, and they should never be treated as means to an end. The justice principle of animal rights proposes that not only we must treat individuals with respect and never harm them, but we also have a duty to protect those who are victims of injustice (Fennell, 2015, p. 32). In practice, this position would view most of the current uses of animals unjustifiable.

To better determine the concept of animal rights, in his work, Regan (1983) elucidates the distinction between moral agents and moral patients, the concept of inherent value

and criteria of being the “subject-of-a-life”. To start with, he designates who accounts for moral actions by distinguishing between moral agents and patients. Moral agents are individuals with a capacity to bring candid moral principles to determine what is morally ought to be done and consequentially choose to act or fail to choose to act according to what they consider morally right. In contrast, moral patients lack this ability to deliberate what is morally right and thus, unlike moral agents, they are morally unaccountable for what do. It follows that moral patients can do nothing right or wrong, however moral agents can involve or affect moral patients in their right or wrong acts (Regan, 2003, pp. 17–18).

Regan goes on to suggest a justification principle of *equality of individuals*, in which he views certain individuals as having inherent value and emphasises that these individuals are equal in inherent value. In this manner, Regan contraposes Singer’s utilitarian principle of equal consideration of interests and argues in favour of the equality of individuals as ends-in-themselves. The concept of inherent value, distinct from the intrinsic value, implies that certain individuals possess value in their own right, that is not reducible to and incommensurate with the values of experiences they have or undergo (Regan, 2003, p. 19). The question would then be, which individuals possess this inherent value? Assigning individuals with inherent value under the condition of being alive appears problematic, as it would imply having moral duties, respect and just to all live beings including trees, vegetation, insects etc. Thereby, Regan proposes alternative criteria to ascribe inherent value based on more comprehensive characteristics than being alive or being conscious, calling those in possession of the criteria *subjects-of-a-life*.

Individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interest. Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of

value – inherent value – and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles.  
(Regan, 2003, p. 20)

The fundamental principle of Regan's position of animal rights is the doctrine of respect for individuals: "We are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value" (Regan, 2003, p. 21). It thereby invokes to treat all who are categorised as subjects-of-a-life with respect which is egalitarian and non-perfectionist: implying equal respect without prioritising anyone's moral regard. If the situation compels to override the rights of many or the rights of few, in which the harm is *prima facie* comparable, then we must choose to override the rights of the few: what would be the *miniride principle*. If, however, in the situation harms are not comparable, then we must follow the *worse-off principle*. Overall, this position suggests that animals, who possess inherent value, have rights which cannot be overridden by some human interests, and thus it cannot justify the use of animals that violates their inherent values and rights.

Despite Regan's animal rights approach being theoretically and philosophically substantial, it has instigated considerable criticism. The first concern refers to the politicization of the animal: as the process of application of the concept of rights on nonhuman animals as well as natural world that may be considered contentious (Fellenz, 2003, pp. 83–84). Also, the case where animals possess moral rights would entail to its huge political conflict with human rights. This controversy is consistent with McCloskey (1979), who assumes that animals without the capacity to comprehend responsibility, equality and reciprocity cannot be conferred with rights. Cohen (2003) in reply to Regan denies the possibility of animals to hold rights. He states that animals have no moral rights because there is no morality for them and argues that rights should be granted on the bases of species, not individuals. He also questions how the adoption of Regan's principles would affect human lives. Indeed, the adoption of animal rights principle would necessarily need to deal with political, physical, economic, religious, cultural, historical, legal, psychological obstacles (see Wise, 2004), and make the human presence in the world with current human actions rather objectionable.

### 3.3 Utilitarianism

The utilitarian position argues in favour of extending the principle of equality beyond our own species, however, contrast to the animal rights principle of individuals being equal in value, utilitarianists propose a principle of equal consideration of interests. The practical ethics of utilitarianism, being teleological in nature, induces to maximise the sum-total of welfare or happiness among everyone affected by the action (Tännsjö, 2013, p. 17). A good act produces or intends to produce the greatest possible balance of good over bad, and an act is wrong if does otherwise (Fennell, 2015; Frankena, 1963). This argument implies that animal interests, e.g. interest in not suffering, are to be considered, and the failure to do so cannot be morally justified. That way, the utilitarian position associates with animal welfare stance to an extent; however, while animal welfare centres primarily around the emotional and physical state of an animal, utilitarianism focuses on the maximisation of the overall prosperity of all actors through equal consideration.

Peter Singer is known as the principal proponent of the utilitarian position in animal ethics discourse, emerging the necessity of moral consideration of animal interests in his books, *Practical Ethics* (1993) and *Animal Liberation* (2015). Singer is not original in proposing the principle of equal consideration of interests, but he is the most persuasive in contemporary discourse to emphasise the application of this principle outside human species. In this regard, he significantly developed the idea of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who noted the potential for consideration of animal interests by virtue of recognition of their ability to suffer.

The day may come when the rest of animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum* are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate.... The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*? (Bentham, 1948, p. 311)

Singer agrees with Bentham that the capacity for suffering is a substantial condition of a being to be entitled to equal consideration and considers it as a prerequisite for having interests as such (Singer, 2003, pp. 33–34). He goes on to argue that we must extend the principle of equality to members of other species, nonhuman animals. Singer's perception of equality, being different to Regan's concept of value equality, suggests that despite the equal consideration of interests, the sufferings of different species, or their sentience, are not equal in similar situations. His rather hierarchical in practice position on equality assumes that in case of a severe injury, the human suffering is greater than the suffering of the comparably injured pig, due to human superior awareness of what is happening and other characteristics. Thereby, both must require equal consideration and care, but the right action is the one that aims to relieve the greatest suffering. Fennell (2015, p. 34) notes that Singer's view of equality is not anti-exploitation, instead, in his approach the consequences justify the means.

It is, however, not only a matter of calculating the cause of suffering and pain to the members involved in or affected by the given situation. Singer's approach is hedonistic in the persuasion of the greater group happiness in the long run, even if it implies minor sufferings, inconveniences or troubles (Fennell, 2012b). And the right act in Singer's (2003, p. 527) comprehension is "the one that will, in the long run, satisfy more preferences than it will thwart, when we weight the preferences according to their importance for the person holding them". At the level of practical moral principles, the utilitarian position on animal ethics tolerates the justification of certain cases of animal suffering and even killing, although for many of its proponents, like Singer, the killing or suffering of nonhuman animals for many of the purposes, e.g. food or entertainment, should be rejected.

Many scholars criticise utilitarian approach, as well as other theories that rely on the concept of sentience, for insufficiency of moral consideration on the principle of sentience. Authors like Matheny (2006) and Ryder (2001) consider sentience as inadequate criterion for extending moral concerns to nonhuman animals and suggest to focus on other conditions, e.g. language, intelligence, rationality or merely on the capacity to experience pain (Fennell, 2015, p. 34). Ryder (in Leuven & Višak, 2013) also refuses to accept the utilitarian comparison of welfare and suffering of different individuals,

highlighting its aggregation. In his perspective, the character of suffering is fundamentally individual and thus cannot be sufficiently adopted in summing total welfare. The utilitarian position indeed runs into a significant controversy of methods and criteria for defining the greater sum-total of welfare. Frey (see Frey 1983; Frey & Wellman, 2005), being a utilitarianist himself, specified that weighting the life of the animal that pits against the overall welfare of all humans, a priori grants the animal with petit chance to prevail. He indicates that the criteria of sentience in the comparison of animal and human welfare is not equally applied and sets the animal up for loss. Why then can we justify the medical experimentation on animals for scientific advances but can hardly accept human experimentation?

The utilitarian position can be criticised for its categorical distinction between actions that are right and wrong. Given that, as Tännsjö puts it (2013, p. 18), “an action is right if and only if in the situation there was no alternative to it which would have resulted in a greater sum total of welfare in the world”, all other actions are wrong. Then, having considered the complicacy of the examination of the greatest sum total of welfare, with a corresponding focus on the problematic, as previously discussed, maximisation of expected rather than actual welfare, utilitarianism appears very precarious in application.

### **3.4 Ecocentrism**

The majority of theories presented by far are to a certain degree anthropocentric, putting a human being in one way or another in the centre of the universe. Many theorists suggest the moral reasoning on claims about human intrinsic values, and few expand the reasoning to a certain extent on animals. Callicott (1984) notes that in the prevailing position of the contemporary Western philosophy human beings and/or their states of consciousness are predominantly regarded as intrinsically valuable and everything else as instrumentally valuable things. That is to say that the intrinsic value of humans, in the prevailing tradition of moral discourse, is given an inherent worth as an end-in-itself, whereas wildlife and natural resources remain only instrumentally valuable as means to an end, i.e. human needs and interests (Callicott, 1986). Ecocentrism, on the other hand, proposes to recognise the intrinsic value of wildlife and to move the perspective we view human and wildlife relationship from *ends and means* towards *ends and ends*.

Environmental ethics have developed through a diverse range of theories ranging in the degree to which they put emphasis on human- and ecologically centred values (Fennell, 2013b). Curry (2011) categorises environmental ethics in three groups: light green, mid-green and deep green. Light green environmental ethics concentrates value on humans; in which environmental concerns serve for maximising human benefits and needs, e.g. health and comfort. Mid-green environmental ethics extends its values primarily to animals, but not to entire ecosystems; it endues animals with moral status and acknowledges them as deserving protection in their own sake (Curry, 2011, p. 72). Finally, deep green environmental ethics (or ecocentrism) places value on natural environments in themselves. Some prominent positions of ecocentrism include the *Gaia hypothesis*, proposed by the ecologist Lovelock (2000), which views the entire biosphere as a living, self-regulating organism, or *deep ecology* by Naess (1976), who particularly regards a decrease of the human population as the requirement for the flourishing of nonhuman life, or the land ethics of Leopold (1974), who grounds the value of wild things in evolutionary and ecological biology.

Moore (1873-1958) argued that organic wholes possess intrinsic value (Tännsjö, 2013, p. 136). He compared nature to culture and considered that some pieces of art hold intrinsic value, and so do certain natural environmental wholes. In his example of an organic whole, he opposes the hypothetical exceedingly beautiful world with flourishing nature and the ugliest possible world:

Supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation by human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly? Would it not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that it would; and I hope that some may agree with me in this extreme instance. (Moore, 2012, p. 84)

Despite Moore's argument being problematic and not providing sufficient justification for value possession of the beautiful world, his view is reflected in many contemporary positions of deep ecology. In his land theory, Leopold accepts the subjective nature of



value, being originated in consciousness and projected onto objects (Callicott, 2003, p. 386). He acknowledges that both human beings and wild things belong to the biotic community and suggests extending the philosophical or intrinsic value to include animals, plants, water, soil and everything that comprises the land (Leopold, 1966, p. 193; Nelson, 2004). According to Leopold (1970, p. 262), “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise”. The central value is put on the prosperity of ecological systems, and our actions should not bring harm to the biotic community on the whole. Thus, some activities leading to death of some individuals, e.g. fishing and hunting, would be considered morally acceptable if they do not disrupt or threaten the integrity of ecosystems.

Ecocentrism is widely criticised for several reasons as it counters the more widespread anthropocentric positions. Ecocentrism is often seen as fundamentally lacking significant and convincing arguments in defence of its positions (Tännsjö, 2013, pp. 135–139). Whereas as arguments against it, scholars note the failure to substantiate the placement of intrinsic value on organic wholes or ecosystems (see Jamieson, 2010). Steverson (1994) as well as Jamieson (2010) question the actual existence of ecosystems: they view ecosystems rather as collections of individuals, and as such, they are not deserving of moral status. According to O’Neil (2000), non-sentient environmental entities like rocks or vegetation may possess certain intrinsic value, but not the moral standing: because they have no interests – they cannot be neither harmed nor benefited. In the similar manner Regan (2004b), does not accept inherently valuable collections of ecosystems to be attributed with moral rights. Regan goes on to criticise ecocentrism for disregarding the rights of individuals in favour of the biotic community prosperity. Can a killing of a human, or any other individual, be justified for saving a specie, for instance, a rare wildflower?

### **3.5 Ecofeminism**

What is often called as ecofeminism, or a feminine ethics of care, takes a form of an opposition to the traditional moral theories. The feminine position criticises the hyper-rationality of major “masculine” moral theories, which, paradoxically, provide a theoretical foundation for justification of animal abuse (Donovan, 2003, pp.45–46). So,

what does the feminine voice stand for? Carol Gilligan, in her book *In a Different Voice* (1982), presents two alternative moral “languages”: the more traditional language of justice and impartiality, and an alternative one, the language of care and responsibility. Whereas gender appears as a tool to characterise a contrasting voice, Gilligan highlights a distinction between two perspectives, and offers a way to consider a moral perplexity as ‘a narrative of relationships’ and to employ to caring disposition in solving it.

From a justice perspective, the self as moral agent stands as the figure against a ground of social relationships, judging the conflicting claims of self and others against a standard of equality or equal respect (the Categorical Imperative, the Golden Rule). From a care perspective, the relationship becomes the figure, defining self and others. Within the context of relationship, the self as a moral agent perceives and responds to the perception of need. The shift in moral perspective is manifest by a change in the moral question from ‘What is just?’ to ‘How to respond?’ (Gilligan, 1987, p. 23)

The relationality of (eco)feminist ethics is opposed to separation and individuation of ‘masculine’ ethics. Contrast to distancing from the subject (e.g. an animal) in attempt for rationality of masculine ethics, feminist ethics proponents, like Mary Midgley (1985), evoke the need for developing a sense of emotional bonding with animals, stating that our consideration of animals should be guided by the principle of emotional fellowship, and not intellectual capacities. Feminists accuse masculine theories in not leaving room for ‘kindness, affection, delight, wonder, respect, generosity, or love’ (Vance, 1995, p. 172). Nevertheless, the rejection of sentimentalism and emotions by proponents of the rational inquiry, such as Regan and Singer, is deliberate and is based on the belief that reason, and not sentiment, is the foundation for animal consideration and respect (Regan, 1983). An illustration of this position is an anecdotal story from Singer’s *Animal Liberation* (1975), where he draws an image of a woman who claims to love, thus has sentiments toward, animals, while not denying herself the pleasure of eating meat.

Although most ecofeminists would suggest refusing meat consumption through veganism or vegetarianism, they emphasise the importance of the context. From the perspective of ecofeminism, vegetarianism is an expression of feelings for animals through concrete

actions rather than merely a diet (Kheel, 2009, p. 48). Gaard (2002, p. 134) argues that a dietary decision is context-oriented and thus is not 'static, universal, or absolute moral state, but rather a dynamic moral direction'. Thereby, ecofeminists acknowledge that vegetarianism cannot be a universally accepted rule, it would be rather absurd to assume that, for instance, Saami (indigenous people of Northern Europe) would stop eating reindeer meat, because some ecofeminist considers it morally wrong. Such decisions, not only dietary, but also related to other fields including tourism, should be conscious, coherent as well as contextual (Gaard, 2002, p. 135).

The modern view of ecofeminism goes away from the subject-object perspective of the scientific epistemology and the rationalist distancing, towards developing a relationship with and respect to 'the aliveness and spirit' of other beings (Donovan, 2003, p. 48). Accepting the presumable lack of practical guidelines of this ethic, Donovan's goal is to demonstrate an alternative approach to view human-animal relationship. In solving morally problematic situations, ecofeminist epistemology rejects 'either/or' thinking, proposing a 'both/ands' paradigm, discovering alternative solutions and preventing dead-end situations in the first place (Donovan, 2003). Through the relational ethics of caring, ecofeminism emphasises respect towards animals; in which animal abuse, killing or exploitation is not morally accepted, but not in the form of justice.

Ecofeminism has caused a wave of criticism for turning away from the traditional ethics approach based on reason. As previously mentioned, several proponents of 'masculine' ethical theories, such as Regan and Singer, questioned the reason-emotion dichotomy of ecofeminism (Fennell, 2015, pp. 38–39). For Regan (2001, p. 60), prevailing reason over emotion, in which emotion is not denigrated, is not wrong, whereas 'emotion without reason can be blind'. Scholars also question the situations where we show less care. As according to Tännsjö (2013, p. 124), if we develop a caring relationship with those who are 'near and dear' to us, our relationship with others may turn out treating them without respect, or even with cruelty. To many, ecofeminist approach struggles to turn its perspectives into a coherent ethical position (see King, 1991). However, if we accept that ecofeminist epistemology is not a plausible competitor of the above-discussed 'masculine' theories, its disposition of care and respect may appear as a rewarding complement to moral ethics discourse and theories.

### 3.6 Searching “truth” in animal ethics theories

All the discussed moral theories hold strong arguments in their favour, each has their drawbacks reflected in criticism, and each has their proponents in the contemporary moral discourse. This section puts the moral discussion further and explores how moral theories may, or may not, be applied and how we can decide which theory, if any, is right to follow. Notwithstanding normative ethics being the subject in its own right, moral theories must have plausible practical implications in order to bring knowledge about what to do in a morally problematic situation, in other words, they need to be applicable (Tännsjö, 2013). Fennell (2012a, p. 69) highlights that regardless of how difficult it may be to combine applied with the theoretical, it becomes the imperative for the animal ethics discourse in order to move forward. Other authors also support this claim, pointing out the necessity to merge theoretical and empirical qualities of ethical studies and stop dividing normative/prescriptive and descriptive approaches (see Kronen, 2009). It is through intertwining theories with practice, context-orientating and applying to practical moral problems that we may conclude which theories provide ‘true’ and justified moral principles.

Then we should apply our theories to morally problematic situations and see what practical implications they offer. We can note, however, that the pursuit of a single, timeless attribute to ground the moral position on nonhuman animals, inherent to many normative theories, induces doubts to the adequacy of their applicability to real world situations. On the theoretical level, ethicists continuously oppose each other in the philosophical debate of so-called ethical monism (see Kupper & De Cock Buning, 2011, pp. 431–450; Smith, 2003), each holding own arguments and truths, and maintaining own moral principles in opposition to each other. In this absolutist search of the truth, many normative theories tend to oversimplify the phenomenon of ethics, often leaving the contextual aspects out of the scope (Persson & Shaw, 2015; Preece, 2005). Morally problematic situations in the real world, however, are often too complex and context related for moral theories to be applied to, involving multiple variables and stakeholders, where anything can happen (Tännsjö, 2013, p. 6). Thereby, many theorists fall back upon abstract thought-examples which, on the other hand, allow to construct hypothetical situations where we assume a certain set of events and conditions to be the case. Hence,

we encounter the case of normative ethics being more convenient to be applied to abstract thought-examples, rather than real world situations.

It turns out that we have no better option than to follow the tradition of many theorists and refer to an abstract thought example. The most famous example of this kind, presented in many studies on ethics and morality, is 'The switch' or 'The trolley dilemma', originally elaborated by Philippa Foot (1976) and further adapted by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1985). The example has many variations, but originally it draws a situation of a trolley running down a track towards five people, who have been tied to that track. There is an option to flick a switch to send the trolley to the other track, avoiding the death of these five people. However, on the other track there is another person tied to it and (s)he will die if the train is turned there. Then people are asked if it is morally right to flick the switch. Let us adapt this example to better suit the case of animal ethics by simply imagining one person being tied on the original track and a horse on the other track. How much does it change the situation and our response to it? What are our intuitive responses and what can normative theories suggest? We may assume that many would intuitively flick the switch to save a human, and then justify it by supposedly greater moral value or rights of a human. Although some may disagree, saying that active killing is never acceptable or that the horse is more innocent in the human-caused situation.

Here comes a variation of this example, again adapted from the original case to involve an animal, 'The footbridge'. Now again there is a trolley running down a track towards a person tied to the railway. However, this time you and a horse are on a bridge under which the trolley will run. The only way to stop the trolley is to push the horse on the railway, killing the horse and saving the human. Would people who are ready to flick the switch in the first example also push the horse here? How do they justify their decision? And is there a difference between the two examples?

What can our theories suggest in application to this abstract example? Whereas ecofeminism would hardly provide a very definite practical implications, the discussed normative animal ethics theories allow to draw certain moral principles in application to these two examples, which then in confrontation with our moral intuitions may lead to the morally justified decision. Hence, anthropocentric positions on animal ethics are

likely to justify the killing of the horse in both scenarios. The utilitarian perspective is more likely to consider rational to save a human life by means of killing an animal, as for utilitarianists that would lead to the greatest sum-total of 'happiness'. The ecocentric position, however, or some example of animal rights may consider unjust the killing of the horse. Different theories suggest different implications, and their principles to a certain extent allow to achieve the justification in the abstract dilemma, where the decision to save the human or to not kill the horse would be purely the manifestation of rationalism. Nevertheless, it gives no answer to what practical conclusion to consider right. Absolutism and rationality of normative ethics alone, with their view of individuals as rational payoff maximisers, seem insufficient to provide a cogent solution to the situation. It seems that animal ethics currently leaves no clear conclusion to the ongoing discourse.

The insufficiency of normative animal ethics to deliver a set of universally valid moral principles may encourage us to find compelling positions of moral nihilism or ethical relativism. If there exist no commonly accepted moral rules and principles: can we hope to achieve any truth in ethics? Since the moral discourse leaves no knock-down arguments, we may be left accepting the nihilist view that there are no absolute principles in ethics and that the most commonly shared non-absolute moral values are simply 'good enough' (Krellenstein, 2017, pp. 75–77). Or we may agree with the moral relativist position that the concept of rightness and wrongness cannot be absolute but is only relevant through a set of conventions or frameworks; and to accept the variability of moral values, which cannot be eliminated practically or epistemologically (Mizzoni, 2014; Quintelier & Fessler, 2012). Ethical relativism accepts variations of moral judgements through sociological, cultural, environmental or other contexts, and does not consider them contradicting, each being coherent in its framework or system. Both positions, however, may be viewed not as arguments, but as a consequence of two observations: first being an incompatibility of moral norms we have lived and live by, and second being a failure of normative ethics to deliver a universally valid set of moral norms (Velleman, 2013, p. 45).

What if, instead of adopting a rather pessimistic nihilist or relativist view and instead of choosing between mutually inconsistent theories, we look at some combination of these

theories? Can we hope to reconcile theories in a plausible way that will view them as uniting rather than contradicting? Ross (1930), for example, suggests such a compromise theory of *prima facie* duties that derives from his beliefs of ethical non-naturalism, ethical intuitionism and ethical pluralism. According to his doctrine, moral statements are mere propositions (which can be right or wrong, independent of human beliefs), and the rightness of a proposition relies on how well it reflects the objective features of the world (Ross & Stratton-Lake, 2003). Ross's pluralist theory acknowledges many *prima facie* duties we encounter; moreover, although all of them being true and consistent with each other, they can, and they continuously do, get in conflict with one another. Thereby, in morally difficult situations where the duties are in conflict, what the right action is, one has to decide through judgement in that particular situation (Tännsjö, 2013, pp. 149–151). Some moral truths, according to Ross (1930), we can know intuitively through moral sense or a priori knowledge; however, most of the real-life moral propositions are not self-evident, and thus, we can only have a probable opinion on them (Ross & Stratton-Lake, 2003, p. xiii).

This position corresponds, but is not similar, to *particularism* of virtue ethics, which grounds on some sort of moral knowledge or expertise in examination and justification of actions. The key principle of virtue ethics is in changing the focus from deliberating on what makes a right action right and wrong action wrong towards questioning what kind of person I ought to be, based on virtues (Anthony, 2003). According to Slote's (1996, pp. 84–90) vision of this theory, it would mean that an action is right if it truly exhibits, expresses or furthers admirable (good) motivation, and it is wrong if it reflects bad motivation. This position allows to distinguish similar actions with different motivation. For example, a person who is concerned about animal exploitation and refuses to consume animals in food, has a different motivation than a person who decides to become vegetarian in order to acquire popularity in social media, using vegetarianism as a popular trend. Despite analogous actions, “vicious” and “virtue” actors had distinct motivation, what makes their actions be not equally right. As criticism, it can be argued that virtue ethics leaves certain actions without a normative status, actions that do not belong to neither right nor wrong category. Ethics of care, such as ecofeminist perspective or virtue ethics with attributes of relativism, form an opposition to absolute normative theories, however, they cannot provide definite plausible implications. Moreover, either virtue or

prima facie principles give no opportunity to put them to test, as it is possible with previously discussed normative theories. And in regard to our trolley dilemma, intuitionists provide no solution.



## 4. EMOTIONS IN ANIMAL ETHICS DISCOURSE

*[Emotions] are at the heart of what it means to be 'person'.*

*Steinbock, 2014, p. 274*

As what follows from the previous discussion, animal ethics theories provide a good amount of knowledge about our rational principles in the moral discourse. These theories may help solving some abstract thought examples, but they fall short in solving real life morally problematic situations. In human-related moral situations we also need to address to sociology and psychology which acknowledge individuals to be other-regarding, emotional and socialised moral agents who strive to fill social roles and who are dependent on others (see Gintis 2009). Can the inclusion of emotions into our discourse help us resolve some dilemmas of the normative ethics theories, as well as help with explaining why purely rational approaches alone are of little help in real world situations?

In the following sections we will attempt to define emotions, discuss their general aspects, as well as briefly touch upon the neurophysiological origins of emotions to get the basic comprehension of the phenomena, and discuss the role of emotions in practical rationality. In the later section of this chapter we should position the importance of emotions in the animal ethics discourse.

### 4.1 What are emotions?

*Everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition.*

*Fehr & Russell, 1984, p. 464*

A long tradition of ethics domain shows the tendency of many academicians and philosophers, starting from Plato, to discard emotions from moral considerations and judgements, acknowledging emotions as a distracting factor and criticising them for being irrational (Ben-Ze'ev & Ben-Ze'ev, 2000, p. 223). Many ethical theories, especially those of normative arguments, to a certain extent are formed around the assumption that human beings are rational. However, humans are not truly, or at least not in a normative sense,

rational. In fact, as many neurophysiological studies suggest, a complete 'rational', emotionless reasoning would not allow us to properly function in the real world and be part of the society. In moral judgement and decision-making, human knowledge is important, nevertheless incomplete: dealing with many factors, contexts and agents, emotions guide thought and reason.

Emotion is a familiar phenomenon to every human being: we normally understand what emotions are and can recognise them in people, and even animals, around us, especially when we are closely related to them. When asked, we can easily give examples of emotions, for instance: happiness, love, anger or fear (see James, 1884). At the same time, defining emotions appears problematic, and there does not exist one generally accepted definition of emotions in academic literature. The difficulty with studying emotions begins when we start organising our general, common-known, knowledge into a comprehensive conceptual framework, due to its complexity and heterogeneity (Ben-Ze'ev & Ben-Ze'ev, 2000, p. xiv). Thereby, many academicians propose the so-called working definition of emotions, which emphasises its key attributes.

The discussion of emotions in this paper thus starts with a working definition of emotions as it provides the reader with an insight about the subject of the discussion. The working definition offered here initially derives from Frijda's (1986) work and which was later presented in the book of Oatley and Jenkins (1996, p. 96), and it consists of three aspects. First is that emotions are caused by a conscious or unconscious evaluation of events in relation to personal concerns. Emotions are felt positive when concerns advance from the event and negative if they obstruct. Secondly, emotions stimulate the readiness for action and planning as well as they suggest priorities to multiple actions and their urgency. And thirdly, emotions are experienced in a form of a mental state, which are often accompanied by bodily changes and behaviour changes. This definition is to be considered as a starting point for our discussion: it gives us a general understanding of the phenomenon as well as the direction for further exploration yet being flexible for potential changes.

To see the suggested features of emotion, consider an example: we intend to pet a dog and it suddenly starts barking. What our reaction could be is probably to jump aside and

take the hand away from the barking dog. We get scared, assuming the dog could have bitten us, we notice that our heartbeat increased, we start to closely examine the dog's behaviour and whether it is attached to a leash. Our planned actions got interrupted and priorities changed, we decide that we need to be more careful with approaching dogs we do not know well. We may notice ourselves trembling and we plan our further actions. In this example we may acknowledge all three aspects described in the working definition: evaluation of the event, getting ready to act, action and bodily change.

Emotions do not occur straight away, but rather follow a certain process. This process can be generally considered in three stages, as proposed by Stein, Trabasso and Liwag (1994): perception of the concern-relevant event, processing stage of the event when our beliefs may get challenged, and action planning along with possible modification of our goals. Alternatively, the emotion process was similarly presented in four stages (see Figure 2) proposed by Frijda (1986).




Figure 2. Frijda's stages of emotion (in Oatley and Jenkins, 1996, p. 96)

This process starts with the recognition of an event as relevant regarding our concerns, the stage called *appraisal*. This stage can be characterised by determination of goal or concern relevance, its congruence and ego involvement (Lazarus, 1991). Thereby, emotions only occur if the event in any way concerns our goal. Emotions appear positive or negative depending on whether the event helps us to approach our goal or moves us away from it. It is also of importance the value of the event for the person, which leads to the occurrence of distinctive emotions. What is of significance at this stage, however, emotions are normally caused by certain events and they have an object: that is to say that one does not simply get afraid, but e.g. gets afraid of a dog, one is not just happy, but happy about something, not just in love, but in love with someone.

In the *context evaluation* stage, we think about the context: how to deal with the event which caused the emotion, what plans to make in its regard. Then we get ready to take

actions regarding to the event, what is indicated by the stage of *action readiness*. This is the central stage and the core of the emotion process in this framework (Frijda, 1986). When some relevant event happens to us, emotion processes guide our actions, setting the priorities and changing the course of actions when needed. It leads us to the final stage of *expression, bodily change and action*, which goes in line with the third aspect of the proposed working definition. It is at this stage, that the emotion often becomes visible for others (Oatley and Jenkins, 1996, p. 106). In relation to this stage, Lang (1988) proposed an emotion response framework that consists of three systems, which were further revised by Frijda et al. (Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans & Goozen, 1991) and Oatley and Jenkins (1996): the cognitive-verbal, the bodily-physiological and the behavioural-expressive – each carrying specific functions.

The cognitive-verbal system is the one with which most theories of emotion are concerned: in it our action readiness prioritises plans and goals. We can usually notice these emotions, and these are emotions we think of short after the event and can share with others verbally. Regarding our example of the dog we would tell “I got afraid of the barking dog” and it would lead us to go away from the dog and be careful. The bodily-physiological changes, on the other hand, last much shorter and may flow unnoticed. Its major purpose is to adjust and prepare the bodily resources for action (Oatley and Jenkins, 1996, pp. 120–121). When we encounter the barking dog, our heart starts beating faster, setting the body ready for the quick energetic action. And lastly, over a longer period of time we may become subjectively aware of our emotions. In different ways we express the emotion, which carries a communicative-social function. These three systems are only loosely tied, and some emotions may be caused in one way and not the other (Cacioppo, Bush & Tassinari, 1992; Lang, 1988, p. 177). Thereby, in research on emotions it is important to investigate all three components, including affective language, overt behaviour and physiological responsiveness, to acquire comprehensive knowledge about emotions of a subject (Lang, 2014, pp. 96–97).

Now that we discussed the general features of emotions and ways to understand its processes, how do we define emotions? For that, we would need to determine certain conditions, under which emotions occur and without which they cannot. To understand the conditions of emotions or emotional behaviour is to ask when emotions occur and

what causes them. Whether we consider emotions in relation to non-instrumental behaviour or its aspects, physiological manifestations that have a psychological cause or subjective experiences, its key characteristic is the response to external or mental event, determined by the relevance of its significance (Frijda, 1986). Hence, Frijda (1986, pp. 453–466) views emotions as a change in action readiness: which can be a change in readiness for action as such, or cognitive readiness, or readiness in adjusting the relationship with the environment, or readiness for specific goal-related activity. Then the function of emotions, as Salmela writes (2014, p. 3), is “to evaluate perceived changes in the environment for their significance to the subject’s concerns and to motivate adaptive responding to the situation”. Emotions thus help us define our priorities and actions, connecting our goals and concerns with the changing environment and the world.

#### **4.2 Emotions in practical rationality**

For long emotions have been criticised for being irrational and non-functional in the moral discourse, distracting us from taking precise judgements and decisions. This perspective has changed dramatically with the growth of research on emotions, including neurological and social science studies. Nowadays emotions are often argued to serve important functions in everyday life: such as indicating the responses, mobilising resources and communicating – and guiding optimal rational functioning rather than hindering it (Ben-Ze'ev & Ben-Ze'ev, 2000, p. 161). Emotions provide immediate evaluations of a situation and suggest a direction for acting, what makes them be, as argued in Damasio’s (2005) *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*, essential for practical rationality. Although it is not the purpose of this study to dive into neurological or anatomical origins of emotions, this section provides a brief overview of key neurophysiological findings which help understand the functional significance of emotions and highlight the potential of neurological studies in animal ethics discourse through multidisciplinary approach.

To better understand the functional significance of emotions in practical rationality, we may start with taking a closer look at the neurophysiological organisation of emotions. Neurology and social sciences significantly advanced the comprehension of emotions by virtue of experimental and stimulation research on brain mechanisms of emotions (see

Cannon, 1931; MacLean, 1990, 1993; Papez, 1937). What these studies have revealed is the presence of emotions across many animals, which serve specie-characteristic functions based on a specific brain structure (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, pp. 137 –158). More precisely, neurophysiological control of emotional behaviour can be considered through three distinct systems: striatal system, limbic system and neocortex (Frijda, 1986, p. 379). The concept of three brain divisions has been largely developed by MacLean (1990), where the striatal system corresponds to *reptilian* brain, the limbic system is inherent to *paleomammalian* brain and neocortex – to *neomammalian*.

The so-called *reptilian* brain is the most basic part of the forebrain, which contributes to scheduling of elementary specie-specific behaviour patterns. Although reptiles do not display very clear emotions, striatal system allows them to generate a ‘schedule’ of daily activities in accordance with elementary needs and to modify them in response to the changing environment (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, pp. 138–140). MacLean (1990) described such behavioural routine patterns on the example of lizards and their ‘scripted’ activities which include controlling the territory and possible fighting for it, building of a home, hunting, forming social groups, mating, flocking and migrating. In humans, for instance, the damage in the striatal area often effects the scheduling functions: sometimes causing patients to become disabled of organising daily activities (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, p. 139).

The limbic system, also referred to as *paleomammalian* brain, may be seen as a network that integrates cognitive aspects with commands for species-typical actions and social interactions. With the evolution of the limbic system, mammals have acquired the ability for maternal caregiving, vocal signalling, and play (MacLean, 1993). The mechanisms of the system, on which the paleomammalian brain works, and which includes such brain parts as amygdala and septum, are not fixed, but environment-related (Valenstein, Cox and Kakolewski, 1970); moreover, they may possess positive or negative emotional characteristic (see Glickman & Schiff, 1967). Amygdala, according to the hypothesis of LeDoux (1993), then plays the role of the emotional computer of the brain, responsible for assigning emotional significance to events and modulating species-specific action systems by activating other brain parts. The presence of emotions within the limbic

system in connecting the outside world with the body indicates that emotions have principle functions even before cultural and linguistic factors.

Neocortex, which is called *neomammalian* brain in MacLean's (1990) theory, distinctive to higher mammals, completes limbic mechanisms with cognitive analysis to emotions. Neocortex can be said to be responsible for linguistic information exchange, foresight and learning, it contributes planning of actions, cooperation, spontaneous interests and future goals (Frijda, 1986, p. 381). Panksepp (1993) viewed brain as a complex specie-distinctive organisation, in which emotions, such as fear, anger, attachment, play and sexuality, are controlled by separately localised anatomically systems which contribute to the emotion-relevant action. Here, we may find profound the example of Harlow's (1868) observations on the case of Phineas Gage. Gage suffered from an accidental physical brain damage and after the following recovery and the seeming proper functioning, the "balance between his intellectual faculties and his animal propensities seems to have been destroyed" (Harlow 1868, p. 227). Gage became impatient and emotionally instable, as well as he lost his capacity for thorough planning: due to the damage of the higher brain centre (cerebral cortex), the control of the lower centre, that is widely associated with emotions, may have been lost.

Many following neurophysiological studies and experiments have confirmed the correlation of various brain section stimulation to spice-specific emotional responses on them. It brings us to the corresponding example of Damasio's (2005) case study about the dependence of emotions and feelings on reasoning. In his research, Damasio (2005) examined people with the damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex, who, although performing extremely well on all kinds of intelligence and psychological tests, systematically failed to act rationally once they were put in the gambling exercise, fabricated to imitate the real life situation. Why are people, otherwise capable of producing rational decisions in theoretical settings, unable to act rationally in real-life situations? Damasio's general findings were that patients with the damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex lacked emotional capacities, which are inherent to practical rationality. It turns out that without certain feelings and emotions, such as fear, happiness, anger, disgust and attachment, we lack a guiding component of rational

thinking (Overgaard, 2010, p. 147); or as Damasio (2005, pp. 52–53) writes, “Reduction in emotion may constitute an equally important source of irrational behaviour”.

Overall, relatively young neurophysiological findings on emotions considerably advanced the comprehension of the phenomenon. Firstly, they indicate that emotions are neurologically integrated into the brain functioning of many animals. The more complex and evolutionally developed the brain system is, the more functional and complex the emotional component becomes. The recognition that animals possess emotions may not only advance neurological and medical studies but bring new perspectives to the animal ethics discourse and complement human-nonhuman animal relationship. Secondly, neurophysiological studies highlight the functional significance of emotions and their role in practical reasoning and view emotions as an integral constituent of brain functioning. From the neurophysiological perspective, emotions can be considered as patterns of manifold brain sections’ neural functions and their interconnections that perform both cognitive appraisal and bodily perception (Thagard, 2016, p. 178). It seems that reason, at least in practical circumstances, must incorporate an emotional constituent and as Overgaard (2010, pp. 159–160) writes: just like “emotion without reason is blind; [...] reason without emotion may be empty”.

### **4.3 Emotions in animal ethics discourse**

Viewing and recognising emotions as guiding structures to reason rather than barriers is a significant step in animal ethics discourse, as emotions prove to be irreducible to our perceptual and behavioural acts (Steinbock, 2014, p. 261). And recently, contemporary literature of moral discourse more and more started to view emotions as functional, which serve as heuristics, shaping our moral views when we do not have enough knowledge about a particular morally problematic situation or enough time or other resources to form a fully cognitive moral opinion (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, pp. 282–283). A considerable attention in the literature has been given to empirical and theoretical studies of emotion management and emotional labour (see Fineman, Bishop & Haman, 2007; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011; Hochschild, 2012), yet relatively few studies focused on emotions in the human-animal relationship perspective, especially in work context (see Hamilton & McCabe, 2016; Wicks, 2011; Vanutelli & Balconi, 2015).



Despite the neurological origins of emotions, we should view them not solely as an individual biological phenomenon, but as social. Many researchers argue that emotions do not exist in isolation within individuals, but are socially and culturally developed through interactions, communication and environments (see Bolton, 2008; Fineman, 2008; Hamilton & McCabe, 2016). Brining up a concept of *emotionology* as a social characteristic of emotion manifestations, Fineman (2008, p. 2) writes: “While emotions may have biological roots, they are given meaning through disparate discourses; we are born into a world where *emotionologies* take a grip on our experiences and behaviours”. Now we remember from the previous discussion that emotions may be interpreted as changes in action readiness (Frijda, 1986, p. 466), changes that are elicited by stimuli which are relevant to our concerns and goals. In turn, our concerns in many ways are individual reflections of social interactions, cultures, environments, life goals, values and experiences. Emotion processes are not abstract or detached from the context; on the contrary, emotions depend on the environment and possible changes in it, they are time-relevant and they stimulate our learning by monitoring the processes, and lastly, emotion processes are related to other processes and do not exist in isolation (Frijda, 1986, pp. 458–460). Then it must be correct to state that the guiding structures of emotions are not only biological, but also social and cultural (Salmela, 2014, p. 9; Weiner, 2006, pp. 156–157).

A number of social and psychological studies show how human behaviour as well as emotional state are shaped by environment and confronted situations. Effects that the working environment has on our emotional behaviour are widely discussed under the topic of emotional labour, since it was presented, originally in 1983, by Hochschild (2012) in the book “*The Managed Heart*” (Salmela, 2014, pp. 9–10). Hochschild argues on the example of people working in the service industry, where they are expected to express certain kind of emotions, that workers manage or alienate from their personal emotions to fit with their working roles. Or in situations where people constantly confront emotionally dissatisfactory events, such as animal abuse or killing in work at a slaughterhouse, through the process of denial on both social and individual level people obtain an ability to ‘not see’ or acknowledge certain aspects of their work and otherwise unpleasant experience (Hamilton & McCabe, 2016; Wicks, 2011). Although emotions

are not always true to our 'cognitive behaviour' and, as argued by Peter Goldie (2008), they often mislead us, and they do it in ways that are systematically difficult to detect, emotions are vital in our moral judgement and decision making.

In morally complicated situations, where the truth is not self-evident, not only our judgements rely on what we know, but also how we feel. Gerald Clore (1992, p. 134) already in 1992, in his cognition-emotion discourse, noted the significance of the effect the mood has on evaluative judgements, in reference to the evidence that in making moral judgements and moral decisions we do not merely consider facts. Many psychological and social studies, such as Fogas & Bower's (1988) review of demonstrations, Schwartz & Clore's hypothesis (1988) or Worth & Mackie's (1987) experimental study on the effect of mood on judgements, indicate that emotions and the state of our feelings can change our judgements. When we lack knowledge or certainty about the moral situation, our emotions may be considered as an extra piece of information. Especially in occasions when our knowledge about some morally problematic situation is incomplete, or we have certain doubts, things other than cognition come into judgement, where emotions are heuristics. In animal ethics and moral studies not only we as researchers need to examine normative theoretical grounds of human behaviour, or 'rational reasoning', but equally important emotional aspects of reason.

## 5. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Since the study aims to understand cognitive and emotional attributes facilitating the formation of moral principles of animal workers in Lapland towards nonhuman animal involvement in tourism, it employs a qualitative research method through an interpretivism paradigm. Generally, qualitative research method allows to disclose in depth individuals' views and perceptions, instead of generating superficial evaluations of social constructs in quantitative studies to help acquire credible results. Whereas an interpretive framework, through a set of ontological and epistemological predefined assumptions, opens data for new interpretations and possibilities (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006, pp. 101–124). In other words, the chosen method allows to establish new perspectives and ways of understanding the phenomena, as according to Schwandt (2003, p. 303), to understand something – we need to understand it differently.

Without having a well predefined theory, the research corresponds to inductive method, as it focuses on exploration and interpretation of cognitive and emotional attributes. A qualitative interpretive method inquires that firstly, through literature review and theory analysis, a particular theoretical perspective is formed, and although being continuously revised throughout the course of the study, it generates some theoretical assumption and a framework for the research (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006). Thereby, the literature review of this study focuses on ethical perspectives towards nonhuman animals, as well as emotional attributes, with an abstract perspective that both cognitive and emotional attributes are significant in moral considerations. This predefined through theory perspective later enables the researcher to draw the attention on certain aspects of the data and conceive something new in it, which could otherwise be left unnoticed (Atkinson & Coffey, 1996; Moisander & Valtonen, 2006). The similar approach refers to creating meanings, which are viewed as non-objective.

This brings the attention to the position and the role of the interpreter in the process of research, interpretation and understanding. A qualitative researcher, as according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 3), seeks to interpret subject matters in terms of meanings that are brought to them. A researcher, however, does not attempt to understand a phenomenon in the same way as its author, but instead aims to understand the logic of how it was produced (Denzin, 2001, p. 325; Moisander & Valtonen, 2006). Thus, the

researcher in this study, although taking a neutral position withing the discourse, produces meanings through the prism of his own interpretation, and hence is an active participant of the study. The researcher throughout the whole study acts as a ‘co-producer’ of meanings (Denzin, 2001). Not only during the research design and theoretical framework analysis, but also during empirical data collection, the researcher had an active role and was directing the process.

The line following throughout the research is the researcher’s assumption of the human relation to the world primarily as practical rather than theoretical and as emotional rather than purely cognitive, and social meanings as interpretive rather than fixed. The study acknowledges the subjective character of interpretations: in fact, it aims to trigger different interpretations, by challenging more traditional views and providing new perspectives and opportunities. The researcher’s awareness of disciplinary pre-understandings and his familiarity with the subject matter through previous personal experiences and field observations, the researcher guides the interview process, following the established framework, initiating an interpretive dialogue. However, the researcher’s neutral position in the discourse invites the reader to make own interpretations and decide whether intertwining cognitive and emotional attributes of human-nonhuman animal relationship contributes to the discourse. The study also does not attempt to view the practice of the use of nonhuman animals in tourism neither as negative, nor as positive.

Putting the research in a timeframe, the implementation of the initial stage of the study was a continuous process that started in early autumn 2019 by literature review, secondary data analysis, forming a theoretical perspective and formulating a preliminary research question. In addition, participatory and non-participatory observations were conducted to contribute to better comprehension of the discourse context and stakeholders and to help develop the research approach. After the initial framework of the study was formed, the research method and design were measured, followed by a more comprehensive literature review. The work process on the theoretical framework of the study, which gradually revised the researcher’s theoretical perspective, lasted until spring 2020, when the main theoretical concepts were formulated. Later, the empirical process of the study was planned in autumn 2020: semi-structured interview form was designed, and potential interview candidates were selected. During the winter period of 2020-2021, in the time

when the tourism industry was experiencing impacts of the global pandemic situation due to COVID-19, five semi-structured interviews with six people were conducted, transcribed, and prepared for further deeper analysis which took place in spring 2021.

## **5.1 Research context**

The study takes place in the context of Northern Europe, in Finnish Lapland in particular. Lapland is a cultural region of northern Europe stretching across Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia, with rather indefinite borders – while Finnish Lapland is also the northernmost state province of Finland with a vast territory, but very sparsely populated. Finnish Lapland, like the Arctic region in general, has attracted a lot of tourist attention over the years for its cultural and natural qualities. Unique environment and harsh climate have shaped the tourism image of Lapland: with many tourists coming to see the northern lights, also known as aurora borealis, unspoiled wilderness, to do nature-based activities, visit Santa Claus, or extend their knowledge about Saami indigenous people (Smith 2009, pp. 42–43; Stewart, Draper & Johnston, 2005, pp. 383–384). The tourism industry in Finnish Lapland, apart from contributing to the economy of the region, bringing development projects and investments, has supplied the area with a considerable proportion of workplaces, providing jobs for residents and attracting foreign workers (Fredman & Tyrvaïnen, 2011, p. 5). The growing image of the Arctic, with its environmental and cultural peculiarities, and the area's tourism industry rapid development in pre-COVID era have made Finnish Lapland a world-known popular tourist destination (Karlsson & Smith, 2013; García-Rosell et al., 2013; García-Rosell & Äijälä, 2018). The tourism sector has been rapidly growing until the global pandemic situation, which stopped almost all the international tourism activities in the area from spring 2020.

Attracting tourists from all around the globe up until the world pandemic period, tourism in Finnish Lapland has, however, long been very seasonal. Generally, winter seasons (from late November to early April) attracted most of the international tourists, with the Christmas time reaching the peak of tourist arrivals. Whereas the summer season of midnight sun seemed less alluring or known for tourists, with most of the tourists being domestic. Destination marketing, school or other holidays in different countries,

availability of transport connections and charter flights, availability of tourism services and climate throughout the year were some of the major factors affecting the seasonality of tourism in the area, which made an international image of Lapland to be conceived primarily as a winter destination (Kohllechner-Autto 2011). The seasonality directly affected operations of many tourism companies, who were often ought to adjust their annual budget in accordance with it, as well as it created a seasonality for many workers, and nonhuman animals involved in tourism. Erratic was also the distribution of tourists withing the area: and most of the tourists preferred bigger resorts and destinations compared to rural areas (Kohllechner-Autto 2011).

Nonhuman animal involvement in tourism activities is widespread in Finnish Lapland, with activities like husky dog sledding and reindeer sleigh rides being some of the most popular tourist attractions (García-Rosell & Äijälä, 2018). According to the recent study of Multidimensional Tourism Institute, nonhuman animal-based tourism service providers directly generate around 2,5% of the annual turnover of the tourism industry in Finnish Lapland (Bohn, García-Rosell & Äijälä, 2018). However, nonhuman animals have a much bigger significance on the industry if we consider the benefits of DMCs or travel agencies, who sell nonhuman animal-based tourist activities, souvenir production, or hotels using images or products of nonhuman animals in design, restaurants using nonhuman animals for food and the entire destination that benefits from nonhuman animal-oriented services. Not to mention that reindeer and husky tours, and other animal-based activities serve as a powerful tourist motivation to visit the region and create a destination image (Bohn et al., 2018). It is calculated that approximately 4 000 dogs, 750 reindeer and 150 horses are involved in tourism activities in Finnish Lapland, and the actual amount of involved nonhuman animals can be higher attractions (García-Rosell & Äijälä, 2018).

Husky and reindeer tourism farms were chosen to be the focus of this study since safaris with these nonhuman animals are the most popular in Finnish Lapland. Husky kennels vary in sizes and accommodate between 10 and 500 dogs, who usually live in outdoor kennels (García-Rosell & Tallberg, 2021). Most of the dogs working on farms are Alaskan huskies, a blend of Nordic breeds without a regulation about their looks but bred specifically as sled dogs. Siberian husky is another common breed, having a distinct

regulated look, their images are often used in marketing and movies. Alaskan Malamutes, a bigger breed, are sometimes also present, although less commonly. Pulling sledges in groups of 4-6 dogs, huskies perform different safaris from short (5-10 minutes), medium (1-2 hours) to long overnight safaris (2-5 days); and often a dog can run up to 50 km or more in one day during the season. Depending on the safari company and the length of the tour tourists ride a dog sledge themselves after a briefing or are driven by a musher.

Unlike huskies, reindeer are considered semi-wild animals, and although most of the reindeer population does not live on farms all year round, each reindeer in Finnish Lapland has an owner. Many reindeer live freely in the wild within their herding area, only sometimes going to a reindeer farm during winter to get food, some reindeer spend the entire winter season at a farm, while very few live at a farm all year round. Reindeer herding in Lapland has a long history closely intertwined with Saami culture, and one of its major purposes is meat production. Reindeer, however, perform various tasks in tourism also: from pulling sledges to being objects for petting, feeding, and photographing (Hoarau-Heemstra, 2018). Reindeer used for pulling sledges are male castrated reindeer, as female reindeer are normally pregnant during winter seasons and are generally smaller in size. Reindeer rides can range from 5-10 minutes to couple of hours depending on the programme. Some short safaris are performed in a closed area where reindeer follow a track between fences, and customers ride by themselves. On longer tours reindeer are put in a line, following each other, with a reindeer herder walking a reindeer in the front.

## **5.2 Data collection**

The primary empirical data of the study derives from interviews conducted with workers from different tourism companies of Northern Europe that are related to tourist services involving nonhuman animals. The format of semi-structured interviews was chosen as the most appropriate form of data collection for the scope of the study. It supports the production of the variety of interpretations and provides the researcher with a better understanding of the relation between individual's cultural background and the subject of the study (Patton, 1990). Keeping the interviews semi-structured allowed to guide the process in accordance with the predefined theoretical approach throughout each

interview, and to keep interviews in line with each other, while at the same time it provided certain flexibility to the process and openness towards new arising perspectives, interpretations, and changes. Thereby, semi-structured interviewing makes a very balanced data collection method from this viewpoint (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004).

Before interviews, however, participatory, and non-participatory observations were conducted to acquire a better comprehension of the field, form preliminary theoretical assumptions, and design the study process and interview structure. These observations took place at several different husky kennels and reindeer farms during the winter season of 2019-2020, with a researcher's attention put on observing worker-nonhuman animal communication, farm environment, operations, and interactions with customers. These observations were largely possible due to researcher's work in the tourism industry, which included numerous visits to reindeer farms and husky kennels around Rovaniemi. The researcher was mostly taking part in worker-nonhuman animal interactions as an observer, only occasionally taking active participation helping workers by following their guidelines. This part of the empirical study allowed to construct the study structure, gain a profound pre-understanding, that is an orienting frame of reference, define and analyse the theoretical framework, and design an interview structure and guidelines (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006, pp. 108–111).

The general interview structure consisted of four sections, aimed at exploring: (1) participants' personal background, (2) their personal relationship with animals, especially in work context, (3) their opinion on the general use on non-human animals across different industries, such as farming, and (4) their perspectives on the use of nonhuman animals in tourism activities. Throughout interviews it was important to attain workers emotional concerns as well as their more cognitive perspectives, without segregating the two from each other. On the whole, based on conducted observations and theory reviews, the predefined framework for interviews aimed to explore the morally problematic situation through workers' connection and relation with nonhuman animals and their moral standing – although the predefined framework was a subject to revision throughout the study.



Selected interview participants came from different companies in Finnish Lapland, except for the couple that was interviewed together. All the companies were located around the city of Rovaniemi, which is the capital of Finnish Lapland and one of the major tourism destinations in the area. The goal was to invite people with different demographic background and from both husky and reindeer farms. A number of candidates were contacted through social media platforms and invited for a face-to-face interview meeting: with few people not responding or not being able to meet – a total of six participants agreed for an interview. Four participants were husky kennel workers and two participants worked with reindeer. Half of participants were female and half – male. Two participants were employed workers and four – entrepreneurs owning their business. Participants had a diverse background and were both international and local (Finnish). Interviews were arranged as physical face-to face meetings; two meetings took place in a café in the city centre and three interviews were held on farms where participants worked.

Individual semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to obtain more personal interpretations and understandings, through closer contact and interaction with interviewees, which resulted in deeper insightful content. Interviewing process predispose to higher concentration and reflection on the discussed topic from each interviewee. Whereas in focus group interviews a risk of one dominant opinion influencing others, occurs. Moreover, interaction between the participants in focus groups plays a big role, creating additional challenges for the researcher to focus on the flow of the process and the content itself (Smithson, 2000). Hence, in this study, four interviews out of five were individual and one was conducted with two participants at the same time, since they were a married couple working at the same farm. A total of five semi-structured interviews, were conducted with six people working with nonhuman animals in different companies in Finnish Lapland. The interviews were conducted during winter season 2020-2021, when the tourism industry was heavily affected by the global pandemic situation and travel restrictions.

It is also important to note that all interviews were conducted in English language, which is not the native language for any of the participants, including the researcher. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, forming a total of 66 pages of text data for content analysis. All participants prior to interviews signed a letter of consent, and the

major purpose of the interview was explained to them. At the end of each interview participants were offered to add anything on the discussion.

### **5.3 Data analysis**

This study is based on the qualitative interpretive method of content analysis and inductive use of theory. The inductive design of the analysis implies that patterns and meanings emerge from the data without having strictly predefined in advance study dimensions and theories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 56). Whereas an interpretive approach in the study eases analysing the inquiry through a perspective that links normative theories, social meanings and practices, and individuals' viewpoints (Gephart, 2018, p. 51). The latent content was received from semi-structured interviews: and the analysis examines what the text talks about, what it relates to, and most importantly *how*, stimulating an interpretation of the underlying meaning of the text (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992; Kondracki, Wellman & Amundson, 2002). The interviews aimed to facilitate openness and reflexion of the participants, as well as to enable the dialogue of interpreter's pre-understandings and theoretical perspectives, with the emerging data (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006). And they aimed to acquire participants' perspectives and interpretations of the morally problematic situation of the use of nonhuman animals in tourism activities.

The analysis of the study aims to explore the core of the meanings and to understand how different actors have come up with their interpretations and what were the conditions that made it possible (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006). The interpretive nature of this study takes the use of coding to analyse the empirical data, as it can be viewed as an act of interpretation (Saldana, 2008). Generally, coding can be described as a cyclical process of linking, and goes beyond mere labelling (Saldana, 2008). As Richards and Morse (2007) stated: "Coding leads you from the data to the idea, and from the idea to all the data pertaining to that unit". All in all, the process of coding is not an end-in-itself, but a tool that enables the data to be analysed, organised, compared and related so that finally, the underlying meaning, that is, the latent content of the categories, is interpreted to an outcome theme, meaning and conclusion (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004; Moisander & Valtonen, 2006). That is to say that the data is viewed through the process of

interpretation, where meanings are negotiated, rather than objectified, and they derive from interpreter's understandings (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006; Schwandt, 2003).

The analysis process implied that after conducting semi-structured interviews, the data was transcribed into text file, forming a single unit of analysis consisting of 66 pages. For deeper comprehension, the data went through the process of continuous and careful reading, reviewing, re-reading and reducing. On the next stage the text was divided into meaning units: sentences and paragraphs that contain aspects related to each other through their content and context – in a process of coding the text, with the help of the “Atlas TI” computer programme. While coding, the data was viewed through the analytic lens of the research subject, which in this study especially focused on ethical perspectives towards nonhuman animals, as well as emotional attributes. Codes, in their turn, formed coding groups or categories. Categories are groups of content sharing commonalities (Krippendorff, 1980). The statements of categories then helped to compare them with each other to distinguish relationships and to facilitate outcome propositions or a theory (Saldana, 2008).

#### **5.4 Research Ethics**

This study discusses ethics as one of its major topics, but also ethics are crucial to contemplate in the research process. Thereby, ethical principles were carefully considered when preparing for the study and conducting it. Ever so often, in academic studies the traditional understanding of “research ethics” is limited to methodology, data collection and matters of confidentiality. This study, however, is in line with Caton's (2012, pp. 1923–1924) proposition that research ethics should, above all, address matters of purpose and consequences. As researchers, we are accountable of our positions and decisions of which projects we commit to and how (Caton, 2012; Macbeth, 2005). This study's choice to contribute to the discourse of nonhuman animal ethics in tourism aims to direct the researcher's efforts the way it would help academia and tourism practitioners in understanding and resolving the existing problematic situation, with the good hope for it to give voice to the voiceless and prevent possible suffering. That also means that the researcher does so to his best abilities, and as an interpreter, carries all responsibilities for the interpretations he makes (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006, p. 108).

All the previous publications that are referred to in the study or helped the researcher to form his understandings are analysed and considered in the study with attention, care and respect, emphasising the importance of correct citing and referencing for both: authors and readers. The literature used for this study was also carefully selected to ensure the reliability of their statements, theories, and assumptions, and the researcher expresses gratitude to their authors. The empirical study aims to obtain as truthful data as possible through semi-structured interviews, treating its participants with respect in regard to their interpretations, confidentiality and interests. The study treats with care matters of participants' privacy, confidentiality, informed consent, anonymity, and freedom to express own interpretations and opinions (Boeije, 2010).

One of the ethical principles in the empirical study dealt with the distribution of personal information as well as the right for participants' self-expression. The study touched upon a sensitive subject ethics and personal moral values; thus, it was of the great significance to make all the participants feel comfortable sharing their personal views without a fear of being disrespected or prejudged and excluding the possibility for causing any negative psychological consequences. The researcher, thus, took a neutral position during the interviews, guiding it to acquire the required data, but not affecting participants' interpretations to the extent possible. The research aims to balance between considering all the relevant data and protecting personal information (Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity, 2012). The study treats the subject of confidentiality the way that no names of the participants are given, and all the private data is secured. Thereby, instead of the names, when addressing or quoting a participant in the text, the study uses a combination of a letter and a number, where letter "H" indicates a husky kennel worker and "R" refers to a reindeer farm worker and a number to differentiate between the participants: e.g., "H2" stands for husky kennel worker number two.

Another aspect of the research ethics deals with the credibility of its findings. How well does the data and analysis process address the intended focus/aim? The research method and the approach of the study have been thoroughly elaborated in accordance with the research focus and aim. Participants with different background (international and local) have been carefully selected for interviews, to increase the variety of perspectives and

provide more credible data for analysis and interpretations (Patton, 1990). Also it was chosen to explore both husky and reindeer workers to see how and if workers' moral standings differ in work with different animal species. On the analysis stage, it was the researcher's goal to implement a method of so-called "sociological imagination", enabling the interpreter to shift from one perspective to another, combining different ideas to create new interpretations (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006, p. 121). During the analysis and coding the data, themes, categories and codes were carefully and logically organized: attempting to consider all relevant data and exclude irrelevant (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004).

Transferability of the study, or the extent to which the findings can be transferred to other settings or groups, is achieved by thorough design of the research, and explicit explanations of the research process and context. As previously discussed, however, since the study is conducted by interpretive approach, the data is viewed through the process of interpretation, where meanings are negotiated, deriving from interpreter's understandings. The study acknowledges the significance of the context, culture, personal background of participants in construction of one's interpretations and understandings. With that in mind, the findings of this research can be transferred to other settings and contexts. Possible limitations of the study were also carefully considered and are presented at the end. The dissemination of the results with possible adjustments is possible.

## **6. EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS**

The study at hand explores moral considerations of workers towards the use of nonhuman animals in tourism, and in particular the role of cognitive and emotional attributes. The case of the study looks at animal workers who work with sled dogs and reindeer in Finnish Lapland, where nonhuman animal tourist activities have been some of the most popular tourist attractions. This part of the study presents an analysis of empirical data which in dialogue with the theoretical framework aims to answer the central research question of how cognitive understandings and emotional attributes of animal workers in Finnish Lapland facilitate their moral deliberations on the use of nonhuman animals in tourism. In the first sections of the analysis, the study partially adopts the framework offered by Coulter in her work *Animals, Work and the Promise of Interspecies Solidarity* (2016), who viewed the topic of animal labour through work done *with*, *by* and *for* nonhuman animals. In this study, firstly, the analysis seeks to position the work done with nonhuman animals: how animal workers position themselves in relation to the work they do with nonhuman animals. Secondly, the study investigates the empirical data to review the work done by animals: examining perspectives on nonhuman animals as workers and exploring moral considerations and their correspondence with ethical positions. And in the following chapter, the study reflects on workers' considered intuitions, and addresses how workers' emotional connection with nonhuman animals in Lapland affects their moral considerations, bringing the empirical findings to discussion.

### **6.1 Work done with animals**

The first part of the analysis aimed to view workers' interpretations of the work done with nonhuman animals. In other words, essentially it was important to understand how workers employ meaning-construction of the work they do with other animal species (Coulter, 2016; Hamilton & Taylor, 2013). Several scholars have discussed animal workers' perceptions of the work they do, nonhuman animals they work with and their overall motivations, understandings of which set a departure point for the further discussion. However, despite many shared characteristics of workplaces and workers across the field of nonhuman animal labour, the significance of contextual differences

makes generalisations be highly inapplicable, and calls for local, contextual analysis (Arluke & Sanders, 1996; Coulter, 2016, pp. 23–25).

It is important to note that most of the participants of the study, four out of six to be precise, were not employed workers, but business owners or entrepreneurs, however all of them actually working at those companies. Through a series of questions about participants' personal background and their motivation to start working with nonhuman animals there were observed several peculiarities. Some participants were describing their work choice as to be largely based on their interests in nonhuman animals and desires to work or live with them. Here is what some of them said when asked about the motivation to work with animals:

*I have always been interested in animals; and when I was little, I had like 50 books about different kind of animals, and I was always reading them. (R2)*

*It's our family dream. (H1)*

Throughout interviews it became clear that for most of participants the work choice was predominantly, although not exclusively, determined by worker's intrinsic interests. Only one respondent seemed to get into working with nonhuman animals for reasons other than "love" towards them or interest in them. As H4 said: *It was my partner's idea; I didn't have much to say.* Still, an observable tendency, which was similar to the discoveries of Bunderson and Thompson (2009), was that in deciding to work with animals, although influenced by different socio-cultural factors, people predominantly pursued their emotional motivations (Sanders, 2010): whether it was love for nonhuman animals in some cases or continuing family's traditions in other.

What was, however, particularly interesting is that many workers, especially those who work as entrepreneurs or business owners, viewed their work rather as a lifestyle. Such people can be called "lifestyle animal entrepreneurs", they often have a small farm and from their responses it could be interpreted that the work and living with nonhuman animals is a hobby and lifestyle choice, whereas the tourism aspect of the work is then seen as a mean to maintain such lifestyle. From what they said:

*... The main reason why we do this is not the tourism. It's because we want to be with the dogs and drive with the dogs. (H3)*

*So yeah, like hobby and lifestyle. Like this tourism side, is only so that the dogs can earn their food during the winter. A lot of money of course [to keep the dogs] (...). Of course, when you have one or two dogs you can feed them with your own salary. But when you have 30 dogs, your own salary just doesn't cover it. So that's why a lot of people, when they have a lot of dogs, they use (...) they work in tourism during the winter so that the dogs can earn their money, like the food. (H2)*

Moreover, some participants were making a clear distinction between their work and other workplaces, distancing themselves from the “other work”. Anthropological studies, especially those of post-colonial and feminist doctrine, have long emphasized the significance of “otherness” in the construction of interpreted reality, meaning and social identity (Hall, 1997; Moisander & Valtonen, 2006). The creation of difference or “otherness” can act as a constitutive aspect in meaning creation, but it can also indicate certain negative feelings towards the “other”. Thus, it becomes imperative to identify and interpret such elements of opposition and “otherness”. In the course of interviews, among several participants such element of opposition could be traced through participants’ use of language and tone, when they talked about “other” work fields referring to it as a *regular job* (H3) or *work in the city* (R1).

*And of course, if we go there, like regular job, we have to be like eight or nine hours (at) some other place. And the dogs they are just alone that time. So, I think it's better that we are with the dogs almost all the time. (H3)*

In this study’s discussions, observable elements of opposition to the “other” work, however, did not seem to necessarily carry a hostile character. Instead, in animal workers’ interpretations, as can be seen in the above quote by H3, the work other than with nonhuman animals was viewed as an obstacle for animal workers to maintain their desired lifestyle. Often, the choice to live with nonhuman animals, especially in case with huskies, was not a work choice, but a lifestyle choice. An in such case, interviewees considered



having a “regular job” as an obstruction, which would make it hard, or even impossible to maintain their lifestyle.

In this instance, it was interesting to identify some similar perspectives of workers towards the work in the tourism sector. Although not everyone was clearly affirming it, but noticeable among most of the interviews, the tourism work was largely considered as an opportunity for retaining the lifestyle with nonhuman animals. Tourism gave workers a possibility to turn their “hobby” into a paid work or financially profitable business. That way, they could spend their time doing what they desire, while at the same time making it possible to financially support it. As one of the reindeer workers said, when asked whether he has considered any other work opportunities:

*I had some ideas, because you know, reindeer herding itself: it's not for the money – it's for the life. So, it's been always part of my life and (...) and the tourism business finally opened the doors that I can continue the farming 100% and can work at home. (R1)*

Ultimately, people’s perceptions of work depend on motivations, experiences at work and financial opportunities this work gives them (Coulter, 2016, p. 28). Generally, the work with nonhuman animals is not very well-paid. However, people interested in nonhuman animal work find value in it other than financial. And what is for tourism, it seems to have provided an opportunity to make a living doing what they want and love. Because essentially, in order to maintain their way of life or interests, people need secure means of support. And especially lifestyle animal entrepreneurs, given that their emotional motivations are to work with nonhuman animals, seem to have found such a solution with tourism.

It seems then that the emotional motivation and experiences at work become central in interviewees’ positioning of the work done with nonhuman animals. It can then be stated that it is human emotion towards nonhuman animals which, in a form of emotional motivation or “love”, largely influences cognitive decisions regarding work choices (Sanders, 2010). Moreover, workers often judge business owners who, in their perspective, do it “for the money and not for the animals”. As in the following examples,

husky workers point out the importance of emotional motivations towards nonhuman animals:

*I think most of the husky farmers are like me, they love dogs. And that's why they do (...) okay little bit business too, but (..) I think it is so that they love the dogs.* (H1)

*If the person has built the husky kennel just for the business and for the money and doesn't actually understand the dogs and just have bought the dogs and take some people to work (..) [having] no clue about how the things work, so of course, there might be some problems. Because you actually need to know the dogs so that you can take care of them.* (H2)

*If you don't want to work with animals, then don't do it.* (R2)

Although uncommon, but there are cases of people getting into working with nonhuman animals in tourism, particularly in Lapland, for reasons other than having an initial emotional motivation in a form of love to other animal species. A number of socio-cultural reasons or other factors may encourage a person's decision to get into working with nonhuman animals. As previously mentioned in the case with H4, the initial stimulus to start the work could be, for instance, family circumstances "...my partner's idea". What is more important, the absence of the initial intrinsic-emotional motivation can be reflected in perceptions of the work with nonhuman animals. In the discussion about work, H4 (who also is an entrepreneur) positions the work primarily as a business, contrast to other workers and entrepreneurs, talking about marketing, financial or human resource management and less focused on nonhuman animals. Unlike other interviewees, H4 conducts the managerial and financial aspect of the company, leaving the actual work with nonhuman animals to the partner and employees, unless it is necessary. As it follows from the interview:

*I don't work so much with the dogs. But recently I have been helping a lot and (...) actually, last weekend was the first time I went on the dog sled. First time this*

*season. And we are in February [laughing]. But cleaning yes, and helping (...).*  
(H4)

Even though for most of the interviewees working with nonhuman animals was their wish and goal, which in some interpretations transfers even into a lifestyle, all interviewees acknowledged it as a very hard work. Animal work commonly requires emotional and physical presence, involvement, and high level of commitment (Coulter, 2016). Since most of the workplaces in this empirical study as well as generally in this field are not very big, employees, as well as entrepreneurs, are often obligated to perform a wide range of tasks: which vary depending on the season and include feeding and watering nonhuman animals, cleaning spaces, training, doing customer service, conducting actual tours, and doing maintenance on farms – to name but a few. Here is what some of the workers talked about their daily routines.

*...And that is my normal day. That I am there 8 hours or sometimes 12 hours with my dogs. And whole year every day.* (H1)

*When the season is on, we start really early like at 6am or something. We have to do all the snow work and give the (..) breakfast to the dogs and maybe clean the tracks. And usually, the first customers come in when it's maybe around 10 o'clock. And usually, (..) we are ready with customers maybe [at] three or four o'clock. And after that, we again feed the dogs. And fix all the places. So, we spend time here like (..) 10-12 hours a day.* (H3)

*It's middle winter, so we are feeding reindeer every day. That's what you NEED to do. And we are training some young reindeer for pulling the sleigh. Yeah, we have got 375 reindeer at home. So, you need to check that they all feel good. It takes few hours per day. (...) But the rest of the year – it's all about the farming: potatoes, fixing fences, herding the reindeer in the woods, yeah, making hay in summer – there's millions of things to do.* (R1)

Workers' tasks continuously involve elements of so-called "dirty work" also, such as cleaning cages and farm spaces from animal faeces, or elements of danger: risks of getting

injured because of an accident on tour or caused by nonhuman animal or because of working in harsh climate conditions. Nonetheless, this dirty or dangerous work does not let people doing it consider it as strictly unpleasant or make them reconsider the overall satisfaction from the work (Miller, 2013). As H1 went on to say: *It's not so easy [work], but I love it*. This romantic image of nonhuman animal tourism work interviewees constructed in the conversation, however, may significantly contradict field observations during a high tourism season. During the peak season, through conducted observations and informal conversations with workers, it could be noticed that many workers were experiencing a lot of stress, surges of anxiety, tiredness and occasionally when confronted with some unanticipated events which workers were asked to deal with, you could hear expressions like *"I am not paid well enough for it"*.

While some employees manage to find a balance between their emotional motivations and challenging experiences at work, this dissonance may become critical to others. This appears to be especially problematic on bigger farms. The failure of the industry to provide labour conditions that would meet emotional interests of workers, offer a pleasant work experience, or fulfil their economic needs results in many workers leaving their jobs after one season. As H2 noticed: *"I think the biggest issue is that the people that have work in this area are changing all the time"*, this happens largely due to the seasonality, as well as other discussed negative factors. In case of some animal workers, who had not achieved gratification as employees, they have discovered entrepreneurship as a solution to fulfil their emotional interests of working in this field yet minimising its negative sides. For instance, H3 previous work experience developed the motivation to start own farm: *"I liked that work when I worked at the husky farm, but (...) the place was too big. In my opinion"*.

Overall, the empirical findings of this study suggest that perceptions of the work done with nonhuman animals present a certain level of conflict. On the one hand, despite some peculiarities of each individual case, it appeared that for most interviewees, the work decision was guided primarily by their emotional motivations. That was traced in the emotional tone and language used when talking about their work, using expressions such as *I love animals*, or *I have always been interested in animals* (R2), or *It's our family dream* (H1). And only occasionally, as it could be observed in the case of H4, a worker

would get into the field of work with nonhuman animals for reasons not related to emotional attraction to nonhuman animals. And this emotional motivation, or its absence, is reflected in the workers' perceptions and interpretations of the work.

On the other side, this study shows that workers acknowledge this work as very hard, stressful and not always pleasant. In tourism in Finnish Lapland, animal workers frequently work long hours for, what commonly is a low payment, they operate in cold harsh conditions, they do emotionally and physically demanding labour, taking responsibilities not only for customer experiences, but also nonhuman animal care (García-Rosell & Hancock, forthcoming; Guerrier & Adib, 2003). Yet, working with nonhuman animals and dealing with tourists, workers are to cope with those challenges. Nonetheless, despite many workers finding a way to resolve these discrepancies, these "dark" or "dirty" sides of the animal work affect the emotional tone of workers, also influencing their positioning towards and connection with nonhuman animals.

Emotions in relation to nonhuman animals determine not only our motivations for work, but also our behaviour and moral principles. Depending on worker's emotional motivations, work context, conditions, and experiences, workers must utilize some emotional management tactics to cope with the job (Coulter, 2016, p. 39; Sanders, 2010). And as argued by Hochschild (2012), people working in the service industry need to manage or alienate from their personal emotions to perform their job in a required way; the findings of study coincide with it and suggest the view on animal labour as an ongoing cognitive-emotional negotiation. Workers' emotional motivations and practical experiences of the work define, above all, their vision and interpretations of the work done with nonhuman animals, which in turn would set how they relate to nonhuman animals, connect to them, and interact with them.

## **6.2 Work done by animals**

Whereas the previous section examined how workers employ meaning-construction of the work they do with other animal species, this section focuses on the work done by nonhuman animals. It aims to explore and interpret workers' perspectives on nonhuman animals, examine their moral considerations and the correspondence with theoretically

established ethical positions. It contributes to the question formed by Birke (2009) “What’s in it for the animals?”. Through the analytical interpretive approach this section attempts firstly to position the role and status of nonhuman animals in workers’ perspectives, and secondly to analyse them through the prism of animal ethics theories.

### **6.2.1 Animals as workers**

In the big body of academic literature on human-nonhuman animal relationship, when nonhuman animals are involved or used in various services and fields, they are commonly acknowledged as workers (see Coulter 2016; Fennell, 2012a). In fact, Coulter (2016) called for the necessity of recognition of nonhuman animal work. However, people’s perceptions of animal labour are very complex, and a number of studies indicate that in different fields nonhuman animals fail to receive a status of “workers” (Fennell, 2012; Birke & Thompson, 2014). What could be noted from field observations, nonhuman animals involved in tourism activities in Finnish Lapland perform work in many ways similar to the work of humans in the same field. Although not deliberately, nonhuman animals work to create tourist experiences, they actively or passively interact with tourists and perform certain tasks to entertain customers.

Nonhuman animals do their share in the marketing also. Their images trigger tourists’ motivations and attract customers. What is more, in tourism in Finnish Lapland, huskies and reindeer perform as passive “actors” contributing to creation of different narratives or utilising them. That way, reindeer through different popular Christmas narratives are often meant to represent Santa’s helpers. While huskies are sometimes supposed to spark a tourist association with Disney movies. In their interactions with tourists, huskies and reindeer are used not only for pulling sledges, but also as objects for petting and observations. Thereby, they do a wide range tasks as their work. And in the case with reindeer, not only they are used for work, but they are used for meat, and it is the herder who decides which reindeer goes where.

The empirical data of this study shows that interviewees, for the most part, do acknowledge nonhuman animals as workers. They commonly talk about nonhuman animals as of workers, saying that *they work* or *do the job*. Or they are said to be *earning their money as food*. Moreover, nonhuman animals are also treated as employees when

they are getting “employed” or selected for the work. People recognise that not all dogs and reindeer would like to work or could be good workers. One of the husky workers went on to say, *because not even all huskies like to run, like to pull* (H2).

Especially reindeer need to go through the selection process which can be compared to the process of hiring in order to proceed to training, and if completed successfully, they get to work with tourists. And only male reindeer get a chance to work with tourists pulling a sledge, as female reindeer are usually physically smaller and weaker and are commonly pregnant in wintertime. If, however, a reindeer is not selected for the work – it has high chances to be sent for meat to a slaughterhouse. Whereas in the case with huskies the selection process is the opposite: most of the dogs go through the training and only those dogs who are seen as not suitable to conduct the work are dismissed. Such dogs are usually sold or given away to families and people willing to adopt a husky.

*It can be a bit stressful for some really sensitive or shy dogs. So maybe that kind of dogs we have given to family or some person who just does this as a hobby and has few dogs. So it's more relaxed environment for this kind of dogs.* (H2)

*I test them. I can see the character. And that's part of my profession, that's (..) for example, for you is impossible. But I can see immediately when they are calves, that which one will work with the clients and which I will just use for the breeding, or which I just sell for meat. So that, that's the skill that you learn by doing. So you look them in the eyes (...), few times, and then you can say that: “Okay, this is good one, this is not a good one”* (R1)

When workers decide, which nonhuman animal is more suitable for the work, they predominantly evaluate animal’s emotional characteristics. As from the previous discourse, huskies who struggle to emotionally manage the stressful job are usually dismissed from work. Thus, interviewees value certain emotional traits in working animals in relation to the work, among which interviewees distinguished *stress resistance, friendliness* and *will to work*.

*There, there is many that are higher level, (..) in my mind. They behave differently, they become... (...) I wouldn't say... They are not pets, but close. We have (..) relationship. (R1)*

Interviewees note that with some of the nonhuman animals they have established a closer connection or relationship. With many workers having their own “favourites” with whom they had a special emotional connection or attachment. Animal workers recognise their nonhuman animal “colleagues” as personalities, normally giving them names and knowing their each characters. And although while saying that *all of them are equal* (H2), almost every worker had a *special one* (H2). And interviewees showed a lot of emotional attachment to these animals when talking about them for both reindeer and huskies, like in the following examples:

*And there's two leader dogs what I'm crushed to... (H3)*

*Like, of course, like we have those, like, special babies. (H2)*

*I have one reindeer which is called Poro (the name was changed). He is really kind male. He is like a dog. I can, I could let him free on the yard, he doesn't go far. He is part of the family basically. Always when I work with Poro, it is something (..) special. We have... that is the best reindeer that I have. (R1)*

While some of the nonhuman animals become friends or even *part of the family* to workers, other working animals may be distant. From the discussions it became clear that not all animals are equal in their status or value in the eyes of workers, and it largely depends on the established emotional connection with each animal. One of the reindeer herders described how the emotional connection with some reindeer changes his perception with these specific individuals, treating them with respect and compassion. While at the same time he recognises that reindeer for him are above all *producing animals* which are used for meat. Here is what he said:

*Some of the old ones I respect, but they are still producing animals. So we are using the meat, so. Most of the good ones even, in the end somewhere, they go for meat.*



*Because that's, that's the main purpose why they are here. But if they are with me for 15 years, the best of the best I just bury, I don't sell the meat, I don't use the meat at all. I just put them in the ground. That is some way of respecting also: because they have been working for me for many years. (R1)*

One husky worker noted that she does not have any favourite dog, nor does she want to get any emotional attachment with any working animal. In her perspective, getting attached to a dog would weaken her abilities to take emotionally difficult or distressful decisions. This case can be interpreted a pragmatic instrument of emotional management or distancing that, as described by Zimbardo (2007, p. 223): “serves an adaptive function for an agent who must suspend his or her emotional response in an emergency, a crisis, or a work”. Whereas some workers in their work process attempt to manage their emotional relationship with nonhuman animals, others prefer to minimise this emotional connection as such.

*The reason I didn't want to work anymore close to the dogs: I get too attached to them, it's very difficult to let them go. It's psychologically a big decision. When the dog needs to go. For any reason: if they are sick or (..) they are going to a new house or when it's (..). (H4)*

This position, however, is not popular and it may barge against criticism in the eyes of other workers, who, on the contrary, emphasise the significance of building a connection with nonhuman animals. *Because you actually need to know the dogs so that you can take care of them* – H2 says. Thereby, animal tourism workers in Finnish Lapland commonly acknowledge nonhuman animals as workers. And in fact, animal labour carries many similar characteristics to human labour – which makes many anthropocentric approaches be applicable to exploring animal work (Coulter, 2016). It also unites human and nonhuman animals doing the work together to an extent, establishing emotional connections which strengthen the moral and emotional recognition of nonhuman animals. Nevertheless, human connections with and perceptions of nonhuman animals are mixed with paradoxes. Rarely nonhuman animals get equal considerations to humans, as they are commonly positioned lower in the hierarchy of power and human-nonhuman animal

relationship (Labatut, Munro & Desmond, 2016). And that opens the discussion of ethical considerations.

*I just hope that everybody would try to understand the. And because they are animals, you cannot stress, so it's a fun job. Because then you cannot stress, your life is a lot better with animals. (R2)*

### **6.2.2 Ethical perspectives towards nonhuman animal work**

Although often recognised or interpreted as workers, most of the working nonhuman animals are not considered as equal to their human colleagues. That corresponds to anthropocentric hierarchy of power, where humans are taken to be superior to nonhuman animals (García-Rosell & Hancock, forthcoming). It is a common propensity across different industries that what is called a nonhuman animal labour, from outside can often be seen as nonhuman animal slavery. As García-Rosell and Hancock (forthcoming) note, that often “the best a non-human animal employee can hope for is sufficient food and rest”, with less attention being put on their interests and freedoms, needs for distractions and companionship. Sometimes nonhuman animal workers become “disposable” and once they are considered to not be able to do the work, they are often considered as objects. This image of animal tourism however significantly contradicts to workers’ romantic interpretations of farm life and their emotional motivations.

Although animal ethics and moral concerns are widely discussed topics both publicly and academically, the study shows that it is still a very complex phenomenon. It appeared challenging to formulate or interpret any particular position of workers towards using nonhuman animals in tourism work from the perspective of animal ethics theories. Throughout interviews, tourism animal workers of Finnish Lapland raised many moral concerns. Yet at the same time the positions were very diverse and inconsistent.

It is important to note, however, that some respondents indicated certain confusion when asked about the use of nonhuman animals in different fields. For instance, when asked to give their opinion on industrial farming and food industry, some respondents asked to repeat the question or said that they do not understand it: *I don't understand what you mean. (H1)*. And later when the question was elaborated, H1 responded: *hmm (...) I don't*

*mind that.* Or when another participant was asked to share a perspective on the use of nonhuman animals in tourism outside Finland, he got frustrated at first, replying that:

*Oh! I haven't. thought about that. (..) Oh, that was a tricky question. (..) I haven't travelled really, but I don't know the answer for that. (R1)*

These reactions exemplify that such questions were unexpected by some interviewees, or it can also be interpreted that they were not particularly concerned about that subject matter. Although through additional questions of the researcher these interviews proceeded to the following discussion of the subject, these responses and immediate reactions are important, as they disclose information.

On the other hand, other responses indicated certain level of familiarity with the discourse of human-nonhuman animal relationship as an ethical phenomenon. When they talked about a zoo, for instance, they immediately interpreted it as something unethical per se: *if you take some zoos, that are not like, ethical (H2)*. Then they go on to reflect about captive settings of zoos, harsh environment for nonhuman animals and forcing of unnatural behaviour. The interviewee's immediate association of *zoos* with *unethical* may be a result of their firm beliefs, or it could be a result of presumed social expectations and norms. In the way that people presume certain position as being a socially accepted.

When talking about the use of nonhuman animals across different industries, tourism workers commonly accepted the use animals on a general level, if "*it's done right*" (R2). The "rightness" in turn was a matter of interpretations across interviewees. Several workers, for instance, emphasised that nonhuman animals, even if they are grown for food, should have a *good place to grow*, be *well taken care of* and *feel happy* (R2). This position highly corresponds with the principles of animal welfare, discussed in Chapter 3.1: to accept the use of nonhuman animals in humane interests, but minimise possible animal suffering (Broom, 2017; Garner, 1993). H3, for example, also highlighted the importance of good facilities for animals who are grown in food industry. Whereas R2 raised concerns over nonhuman animals' physical and emotional conditions when doing work in tourism. She emphasised the importance of not "overusing" animals and giving them enough rest from work.

*You can see sometimes when a reindeer is really exhausted, they just (..) might go lay down during the safari. And that's not nice to watch for me, or for the customers of course. It's not good thing to do, but sometimes it happens, and it's wrong for me. (R2)*

Specifically with reindeer and huskies, animal workers of Lapland stressed how animals are taken good care of. All the workers were willing to discuss in detail the feeding process and how they check animals' health conditions. Many workers talked about the role of *learning* animals, *knowing* and *understanding* them. In so, they recognised animals as individuals who often require personal care and approach.

*You should know all of them 100% but if you have 1000 you cannot know them. That is not good (R2)*

*If they [dogs] have muscle pain or like stiffness or something, we massage them a little bit. (..) Well, when you work 12 hours with the dogs, you kinda know and see who's a bit [more] tired than usual or like, who is not eating well or, something like this. So usually, it's like very little things. I think it's a bit hard to tell because all the dogs are like super individuals, and it's different with every dog. (H3)*

A big block of discussion formed around the subject matter of facilitating nonhuman animal unnatural behaviour through work. Despite the participants not having an actual conversation with each other, in the data of this study, the topic of natural or unnatural animal behaviour turned into a debate. The general approach was formulated by H2 when she said that *If animals are forced to do something, that it's not natural for them, maybe then it's a bit problematic*. It appeared that for husky workers the major “justification” of using dogs for pulling sledges formed about the argument that huskies were bred to pull and they love running.

*Dogs love running and love pulling. We do not have to teach our dogs to pull. (..) So they do what they are bred to do. That is in their nature. (H3)*

Whereas most of the animal workers agree that huskies do enjoy the work of pulling sledges, opinions about reindeer were very contradictory. One husky worker even expressed a certain negative attitude towards reindeer, as he said: “I have to say that I don't like that reindeer thing because those reindeer farmers (..), how I explain it... those reindeer can be everywhere”. While other husky workers managed to form a more constructive moral opinion on the use of reindeer in tourist activities but opposed in their judgments (see H4 and H2 below). Whereas reindeer workers did not acknowledge a moral problem in reindeer work.

*Because it's animal cruelty (..). Reindeers are not made for pulling. Reindeers are wild animals living in a forest. I read, (...) that it takes three years to teach reindeer to pull the sledge. It means the reindeer really doesn't want to do it. So it's against the animal will. (..). When dog loves running and loves pulling. We do not have to teach our dogs to pull. (..) So they do what they are bred to do. That is in their nature. (...) Are they made to run and pull? (H4)*

*With the reindeer, they're very used to pulling carriages, because in Finland, reindeer and horses have been pulling carriages. So even reindeer are kind of used to that. (H2)*

Overall, interviews presented elements of a wide spectrum of positions on animal ethics. From the utilitarian point of view (see Chapter 3.3), animal workers can be interpreted as balancing between pursuing own interests by doing their own job, taking care of the animals, considering their interests, and creating tourist experiences, in their attempt to produce the greatest “good” (Fennell, 2012b; Singer, 2015). An example of utilitarian approach is presented in the desire of H4 to keep emotionally detached from animals to better manage morally problematic decisions.

Elements of ecocentrism (Chapter 3.4), on the other hand, are reflected in some workers' moral positions towards reindeer. Since the population of reindeer is controlled yearly, arguments of reindeer not being an endangered species along with maintaining reindeer life cycle are widely used to justify reindeer meat production (Curry, 2011). A similar ecocentric approach emerged when one reindeer worker was asked about the animals in

the zoos and whether they should, through different rehabilitation programmes, be prepared and released back to the nature. From his response:

*But if the population is good around the world... Ohh, why should, why you should let those free, who are connected to the humans?! Only reason that I (..) accept that, is that this animal is really rare around the world. (R1)*

While most of the interviewees agree on the fact that animals should be well taken care of, and their possible suffering must be minimised, what partially corresponds to the ethics of animal welfare, overall, their positions are mutually inconsistent. Workers seem to distance themselves from anything immoral brought by animal tourism in their own field and seem to be more critical towards other fields and industries. Workers prefer not to or fail to recognise morally problematic situations at their own workplaces. And thus, fail to provide a mutually consistent moral perspective on the use of nonhuman animals.

## 7. DISCUSSION: TOWARDS REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM

*The value of knowledge lies not in an unachievable capturing of the truth of the world as it really is, but rather in the generation of conceptions that allow us to function better in the world.*

*Caton, K., 2016, p. 39*

The empirical findings suggest that animal workers rely not on as predetermined, purely cognitive set of ethical principles, but act in a context, producing multiple, often inconsistent moral principles. Taking the discussion further, and examining how cognitive and emotional processes facilitate moral deliberations, can we hope to achieve an end point of the moral inquiry? Can we hope to find a moral principle that would bring us the most plausible practical implications and be universally applicable? To find the answer, the existing moral theories would need to be verified to the extent possible. As previously suggested, whereas ecofeminism is to be accepted rather as a complement to normative ethics, not providing clear systematic guidelines to moral action, other theories contemplate practical implications and thus, allow us to test them. To test the theories, it is not enough for them to be applied to moral problems, but to confront them with our intuitions and beliefs. When we find a theory that is not only coherent with our moral intuitions, but suggests plausible moral implications, then we may possess justified moral beliefs (Tännsjö, 2013, p. 142). Even then our beliefs will not necessarily be true, but we will achieve the endpoint of a deliberative process of moral inquiry, what Rawls (1971) called reflective equilibrium.

The state of reflective equilibrium, the term originally presented by John Rawls in his book *A Theory of Justice* (1971), can be achieved by resolving possible discrepancies between our considered intuitions (or judgements) and the original/general position. This justification method sets our moral intuitions as an evidence to the general beliefs about the particular situation (see Goodman, 1955). Rawls' notion of reflective equilibrium and his position on how to reconcile descriptive and normative aspects of moral theories differs in his works (for more on reflective equilibrium see Daniels, 1996; Mikhail, 2011; Rawls 1971, 1974), however, it is not the purpose of this paper to get into detailed description of different accounts of reflective equilibrium. What is of significance in the light of this study is that the concept of reflective equilibrium offers a method of

confronting theories with our considered judgements in order to achieve the state of the coherent justification of our moral decisions. If, in the result, the general principles match or extend our considered intuition in an acceptable manner, then we may say that we have managed the interpretation of the situation to satisfy justice requirements (Mikhail, 2011). This approach follows the idea that no moral theory can be accepted as a logical principle if it is incompatible with our considered intuition, and thus it would require further revision; it also emphasises that deliberation of ethical theories cannot be divorced from practical ethics.

Considered intuitions then play an incontestable role in the principle of reflective equilibrium and the overall justification of our general moral principles. Our considered intuitions can be generally interpreted as the immediate reactions to a particular situation, in other words, our judgements which we make intuitively and in which we have the greatest confidence (Tännsjö 2013). These cognitive-emotional intuitions have a complex origin and, as Gintis (2009) points out, they are transmitted from generation to generation by means of socialisation, in which the initiated incorporate norms and values into the uninitiated (e.g. younger generation) via a complex series of interactions (see also Green et al., 2004). That way using a reindeer for meat can be an emotional intuition for a person who has grown in a family of reindeer herders. Thereby, we must make certain that our considered intuitions are indeed reliable and are not merely a consequence of a cultural predisposition or a cognitive mistake.

We test moral theories against not intuitions as such, but the consequences of our moral beliefs, or what Tännsjö (2013, p. 143) calls ‘the propositional content of the intuition’. When we know what our intuitions propose is right or wrong and what we ought to (not) do, and when we know what implications moral theories suggest, then we can confront them. Moral theories cannot be applied if they go against our firm convictions: consider, for example, our trolley dilemma from Chapter 3, in which for a person, who is ought to make the decision to kill a horse or save a human, a horse is a strictly sacred animal due to a religious belief. Her firm conviction then does not let sacrificing a horse as the mere mean to save a human – thus, some theories would find little application in her case. What then, cultural variations aside, would be our immediate reaction to the dilemma? This can be the purpose of a separate study to investigate, however, referring to the results of the



original study, we can presume that the majority would intuitively choose to flick the switch in the first case, and sacrifice the horse to save a human. The footbridge variation of the dilemma turns more controversial and this time the majority does not seem to be willing to kill the horse. It seems that it still is difficult to find a theory which would gain a full support from our intuitions. Moreover, it is of significance the way the case is represented, its order and what emotional connections we establish with characters involved.

To better understand the principles and nature of forming our considered intuitions, we may discover profound studies of neuroscience. The topic of neural functioning was touched upon in Chapter 4 “*Emotions in animal ethics discourse*”, and here we aim to grasp its significance in achieving the state of reflective equilibrium. In particular, the study of Green, Nystrom, Engell, Darley & Cohen (2004) proposes a dual model in which our brain processes cognition on the one hand and emotion on the other where different brain sections are responsible for these processes. It suggests that our utilitarian, or consequentialist, responses are related to the high activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, responsible for cognitive control; while the ventromedial prefrontal cortex controls the generation of our emotions and triggers non-utilitarian, or deontological, responses (Green et al., 2004). It also indicates that in order to frame the utilitarian judgement, one must overcome the emotional resistance (Green et al., 2004). Furthermore, recent studies also indicate an increase in activation of additional brain regions in making one’s own moral judgements about the moral situation, compared to judging others or abstract moral situations, suggesting different neural processes involved (Garrigan, Adlam & Langdon, 2016).

Neurological studies then correspond to the empirical observations and findings of our study, where emotional distancing was viewed as the pragmatic coping mechanism of some animal workers. Or as Zimbardo (2007, p. 223) noted that such emotion management “serves an adaptive function for an agent who must suspend his or her emotional response in an emergency, a crisis, or a work situation that demands invading the privacy of others”. As well as neurological studies may suggest explanations on why workers’ moral judgements of themselves differs to their moral judgements of others – which was also noted in the empirical findings of this study. This gives hope for

neuroscience to provide new insights and perspectives by including it in the animal ethics discourse.

How can the knowledge about our moral intuitions derived from neuroscience at this stage help us achieve the reflective equilibrium and find the right moral hypothesis? The overall implications of these observations remain ambiguous, nonetheless promising. Some believe we should stick to the emotional response and hold such emotional intuition as the right one (Tännsjö, 2013, p. 148). Others, on the contrary, argue that neither we should trust an intuition which derives purely from our emotions, nor we should trust our cognition if it is the result of an influence by our favoured moral theory (Tännsjö, 2013, pp. 147–148). Singer (2005) considers that the dual model hypothesis provides grounds to discount the deontological intuition, driven by emotions, from moral considerations. Berker (2009), on the other hand, criticises this position, shedding scepticism to deriving normative implications from the neuroscientific study and indicating precariousness in Singer’s argumentations. Obviously, more research needs to be conducted before we can conclude which intuitions to regard as considered ones; but even if, as according to Berker (2009), neuroscience plays no justificatory role in moral theorising, it may certainly provide hints and new perspectives to our discourse.

Contrast to science, as Tännsjö (2013, pp. 148–149) puts it, there are no “neutral grounds” or clearly observable traces in ethics. Nature sciences allow to construct simplified laboratory conditions where modelling is analytically compliant; ethics generally does not provide this option. Animal ethics, or ethics in general, are based on living systems which are, as Gintis (2009, p. 243) notes, ‘complex, dynamic adaptive systems’ with properties that cannot be properly traced and analysed. We may come to the justification of moral beliefs, but it would not mean that we have achieved the moral truth. Indeed, we may justify even ‘conflicting’ moral beliefs, given that we have confronted them with our considered intuitions; but being mutually inconsistent, normatively they cannot all be right. An animal rights advocate may be justified in her believe that an animal must not be killed for the benefit of humans, while a utilitarianist may be justified in her belief that it is right to kill an animal to maximise the greater happiness. However, while they contradict each other, they cannot both be true. Then we

should agree with Mikhail (2011, p. 30) on the point that ‘the best a moral theory can hope to achieve is to be better than its alternatives’.

## 8. CONCLUSION

The purpose of the study was to offer an approach that shifts the research focus away from justification or application of absolute moral principles towards the inquiry of morally problematic situations. The study turned away from a monistic viewpoint on animal ethics towards more intersubjective-interpretive approach. It attempted to interpret both cognitive and emotional attributes of human-nonhuman animal relationship from the perspective of tourism animal workers discourse and emotional attributes. This study aimed to explore how cognitive understandings and emotional attributes of animal workers in Finnish Lapland facilitate their moral deliberations of the use of nonhuman animals in tourism.

The study provided a coherent theoretical review, beneficial for both scholars and tourism practitioners, explicitly elaborating on the major theoretical perspectives relevant to the human-nonhuman animal relationship moral discourse. It examined major scholar approaches established in animal ethics literature, deliberating on their core principles and differences. The study presented a succinct review of the most prevalent animal ethics theories that address morally problematic situations: animal welfare, animal rights, utilitarianism, ecocentrism and ecofeminism – presenting main theses of influential proponents of each position and providing a critical view on them. The study also positioned the role and importance of emotion studies and considerations within the animal ethics discourse, suggesting a potential of a feminist or emotional approach to the discourse.

The empirical data of the study showed that firstly, animal workers in Finnish Lapland rely heavily on their emotional motivations and emotional relationship with nonhuman animals, when positioning the work done with nonhuman animals, which in turn affects their relationship with nonhuman animals. At the same time, workers utilize emotional management mechanisms to cope with the difficulties and specifics of the job (Coulter, 2016; Sanders, 2010). These emotional coping methods, through processes of denial and distancing on both social and individual levels allow workers to obstruct from or disregard certain aspects of their work and otherwise unpleasant experience (Hamilton & McCabe, 2016; Wicks, 2011).

Secondly, this study indicates that tourism animal workers in Finnish Lapland generally acknowledge nonhuman animals as workers. Through a set of shared characteristics and close labour communication workers tend to establish strong emotional relationship with some of nonhuman animal workers. It also unites human and nonhuman animals doing the work together to an extent, establishing emotional connections which strengthen the moral and emotional recognition of nonhuman animals. Nevertheless, despite often being recognised or interpreted as *workers*, most of the working nonhuman animals are not considered as equal to their human colleagues. That corresponds to anthropocentric hierarchy of power, where humans are taken to be superior to nonhuman animals (see García-Rosell & Hancock, forthcoming; Labatut, Munro & Desmond, 2016) and presents certain duality in the human-nonhuman animal relationship in tourism work context.

And finally, while moral considerations of tourism animal workers towards nonhuman animal work corresponded with certain aspects of the ethical position of animal welfare, or feminine ethics of care, overall, they fail to contribute to establishing of a coherent ethical position. Raising a wide spectrum of emotional and moral considerations, their positions were otherwise inconsistent. Additionally, workers were perceived as distancing themselves from anything immoral brought by animal tourism in their own field, while showing more critical reflections towards other morally problematic situations.

The empirical findings of this study provide insights that are fruitful for industry practitioners to better examine the relationship and perspectives of tourism workers towards nonhuman animals. They disclose the significance of emotional motivations and emotional management of workers in performing their work tasks and contributing to the balanced work environment and relationship with nonhuman animal workers. In this perspective, the study contributes to Coulter's (2016, pp. 149–163) suggestion to view the subject matter of nonhuman animal labour through "interspecies solidarity" framework, prioritising solidarity and empathy for nonhuman animal work, and working towards the notion of humane jobs, or: "jobs that are good for both people and animals".

The discussion in this study further elaborated how cognitive and emotional processes facilitate moral deliberations in the discourse. It went on to suggest an approach which

gives hope to achieve the endpoint of a deliberative process of moral inquiry, through Rawls' (1971) notion of reflective equilibrium. In conclusion, maybe we can eventually develop a unified model of ethical philosophy that combines different principles, eliminating their incompatibilities, that can provide plausible implications in different morally problematic situations. Even if we figure out a sound compromise theory, we cannot be certain that it will allow the better judgment or any more plausible implications than the original theories from which the joint parts were taken (Tännsjö, 2013, p. 151). For the moment, the ethics discourse leaves open. Given this, instead of viewing animal ethics theories as ends in themselves, or a set of absolutist principles, we may rather consider them as means to an end and use them for developing better perspectives and enhancing our comprehension of ethics and morality.

Partly discussed in Chapter 5, this study recognises certain limitations within its scope. Firstly, despite many shared characteristics of workplaces and workers across the field of nonhuman animal labour, the significance of contextual differences makes generalisations challenging and they must be conducted with caution. The scope of the study and its timeframe limit the sampling of empirical data, with more data recommended to be collected in the post-pandemic time, when the tourism industry recovers with more participants in different geographical context. Also, the interviews were conducted in English language, which is not a mother tongue for any of the participants. The interpretive method of the research suggests that constructed meanings are produced through the prism of researcher's own interpretations.

Although the amount of research on the discourse tends to increase along with the growing acknowledgement of the moral issue of nonhuman animal labour in tourism, the subject is not entirely elaborated. The study calls scholars to conduct new studies, employing interdisciplinary approach to researching the topic, and to collect empirical data collection that would include sociological/psychological perspectives on humans dealing with nonhuman animals, as well as animal-centered approach exploring nonhuman animal physical and emotional characteristics. The study also suggests future research to include neuroscience in the animal ethics discourse, as it seems to provide a great potential for new insights and perspectives.

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