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HOMUNCULUS
Bearing Incorporeal Arcticulations

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies 'the Arctic in Change'. In contrast to a traditional research setting, its aim is to engage with questions that respond to both 'the Arctic' and 'in Change' as preformed answer and outcome. Since 'the Arctic' is not constituted by a single definition, mode, science, art, discipline, method, state, continent, image, symbol, instance, agent or unit, it is considered and treated with the means and matters of bricolage in the spirit of post-qualitative inquiry. Accordingly, this approach requires involvement from a multiplicity of theoretical, methodological and research material: the intra-actions of performativity theory, the genealogy of discursive material practices, studies on perception, visual culture, aesthetics and ethics, art & design, ecology and ethology, as well as the politics residing in them. Furthermore, the recognition of the partiality, influence and agency of the elements constituting this study beyond the rationalised and controlled research design requires a more fluid manner of writing, deriving from the ideals of writerly and open text, infused with inter- and intratextuality and co-conducted in phenomenological writing to produce a novel conduct in avoiding firm structuring and hierarchy while pursuing open-ended objectives.

The analysis begins by compromising the cohesion of Arctic representations as objects with unaltered identities, exhibiting a diorama of a polar bear. The seemingly neutral and passive object occupies several inherited subject positions that emerge from it as material outcomes. The representation holds the capacity to record the audience's corporeality through sensory and motoric traces and to perform through their bodies as fixed prepositions. The encounter endangers and re-establishes the participatory subject and object positions as co- and counter to each other. How representations are conducted is foremost a question of the manipulation of distance, which proceeds from aesthetics to epistemological and ontological conditions. Different characteristics emerge, disappear, become manageable or are in reach depending on their distance, which is defined as the relationship between the point of perception and the perceived. Attempts to overcome this distance with various scientific technologies and artistic techniques are inevitably influenced by what comes in-between. To penetrate the distance with direct bodily engagements for the purpose of Arctic investigation, is an act limited to the ontology of the knowing body. In order to perform under the natural and cultural environmental conditions related to the Arctic, the body is contained and reproduced as non-Arctic with specific material arrangements within the research vessel, from labour to recovery, to maintain it as a societal human subject. These discursive–material arrangements constitute the human

body through an incorporeal–animal binary, constructed within the equipment of ergonomics and exercise inherited from agriculture and industrialisation. When the same adjustment, human–animal, is conducted in micro-space, it is transferred into the colonial project of discipline and cultivation as a rectilinear school: it emerges as an invasive species in the regional circular 'ecology' and as cultural violence towards the landscape that is formed by seasonal and regional movement that happens in circles, conducting the livelihood and the identity of the People. The reading and rewriting of the landscape, as well as the history and memory of the bodies within it, do not place these human–animal binaries beneath one another, but rather within an act of performative restructuring. While certain iconic animals, are considered representatives of the Arctic region, in the animal activist's attempt to speak for the other, to witness animal subjectivity with documentary techniques and technologies, they do not succeed in ethically mediating or negotiating the subjectivity of the animal-other as such. Such technique produces a hybrid subjectivity of the human, animal and recording technology combined that also fails to free itself from the weight of the genealogy of the human–animal relations of trapping, hunting, slaughter and putting on display. While problematising the capability to engage with the animal subject as an animal, the study further indicates the 'small other' taking place in subject–object encounters, restating 'in-between' as 'in-the-midst'. The human–animal relation contained in an artefact, and its capacity to contain and surface such genealogies, is finally studied in the context of contemporary political debate on the use, meaning and matter of the *inuksuit*, communities building and enacting stone figures erected traditionally by the Inuit for various purposes. While the *inuksuit* have been adopted by the national state with its colonial practices towards the indigenous peoples, the *inukshuk* re-emerges as a re-establishment of identity and power over life and region, natural, social and political bodies.

The questions throughout the thesis suggest that 'the Arctic' is not accessible or returnable as the 'truth'; it is not capable to exist in the Lacanian Real, resisting all definitions and relations. It is composed in linguistic, imaginary and symbolic manner and matter as a figuration 'arcticulated' into an entity existing only 'in Change'. This entity is to be expressed with a figure that bends and reads in multiple modes. The Arctic is therefore a bearing in which one can dwell as a human being, where this being owes and invests itself in an intra-face, named a 'homunculus', a transferring and conducting of human characteristics. The outcomes ought to enable radical and critical thinking towards the 'taken for granted' truths of the Arctic as an object of inquiry through established metatheoretical conceptualisations. The 'homunculus' is offered as a guide for understanding the forms and matters of politics on the issue in a new way in order to have an impact on political science and beyond.

KEYWORDS: Arctic, representation, performativity, perception, modality, genealogy, culture, human–animal relations, gaze, violence.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Väitöskirjan tutkimuskohteena on "Arktinen muutoksessa". Perinteisesti tutkimuskysymyksestä johdettavan tutkimusasetelman sijaan tutkimuskohteen osat "Arktinen" ja "muutoksessa" tulkitaan ennakko-olettamina, tutkimus-vastauksina, jolloin tutkimustavoitteeksi syntyy näihin lopputulemiin johtavien tutkimuskysymysten löytäminen. Koska Arktinen ei koostu yhdestä määritelmästä, modaliteetista, tieteen- tai taiteenalasta, oppiaineesta, metodista, valtiosta, mantereesta, kuvasta, symbolista, tilanteesta, toimijasta tai yksiköstä, käsitellään sitä brikolaasina jälkilaadullisen tutkimuksen hengessä. Lähestymistapa edellyttää useiden erilaisten teoreettisten, metodologisten ja tutkimusaineistollisten lähtökohtien hyödyntämistä performatiivisuusteoriasta genealogiaan, havainnon, visuaalisen kulttuurin, estetiikan, etiikan ja taiteen tutkimukseen, ekologiasta eläinten käyttäytymistieteeseen, sekä niiden poliittisen luonteen tunnistamiseen. Tavoitteen saavuttaminen edellyttää tiukasti kontrolloitua tutkimusasetelmaa ja raportointia joustavampaa kirjoittamistapaa, liikkuen fenomenologisesta kirjoittamisesta ja avoimesta tekstistä, intertekstuaalisuuteen ja intratekstiin, välttäen tutkimusta rajoittavia rakenteita ja hierarkioita, uudenlaisten sisältöjen ja avointen lopputulosten tuottamiseksi.

Tutkimusanalyyttinen matka alkaa Arktisen representaatioiden koheesion ja identiteetin muuttumattomuuden kyseenalaistamisella. Tiedekeskuksen jääkarhu-diorama ymmärretään performatiivisena artefaktina, joka ilmeisen neutraalina ja passiivisena esillepanona sisällyttää joukon polveutuvia subjektipositioita ja materiaalisia voimasuhteita. Jääkarhun representaatiolla on kapasiteetti tallentaa yleisön ruumiillisuus sensorisina ja motorisina jälkinä, ja liikuttaa yleisöään prepositioihin, asemoiden subjektin ja objektin tietynlaiseen keskinäissuhteeseen. Representaatioiden tuottamisessa on keskeisesti kysymys etäisyyden manipuloinnista, edeten estetiikasta, epistemologisiin ja ontologisiin kysymyksiin. Eri piirteet ilmaantuvat, katoavat, tulevat hallittaviksi tai tavoitettaviksi riippuen etäisyydestä eli suhteesta havaitsijan ja havainnoitavan välillä. Yritykset ylittää etäisyys tieteen käyttämien teknologioiden sekä taiteellisten tekniikoiden avulla tuottavat välittävän ja väliin tulevan tason, josta tulee erottamaton osa havainnoitavaa kohdetta. Yritys ylittää etäisyys Arktiseen suoran kehollisen kontaktin keinoin rajoittuu väistämättä tietävän kehon ontologiaan. Kuten tutkimusaluksella, Arktisen luonto- ja kulttuuriympäristössä suoriutuva keho on säilötty ja uudelleentuotettu ei-arktisena erityisillä materiaalisilla järjestelyillä ja tekniikoilla, säilyttääkseen

inhimillisen kehon länsimaiseen yhteiskuntaan sovitettavana. Ihmiskehoa tukeva ergonomia ja kuntoilu materialisoituvat esineissä ja välineissä, jotka polveutuvat eläinten hyötykäytöstä liikkumisessa sekä maatalouden ja teollisuuden voimansiirrossa. Näin ollen ihmiskehoa muokkaavat diskursiivismateriaaliset käytännöt rakentuvat ihmisen ja eläimen yhdistävästä teknologisesta suhteesta, jossa eläimen ruumiillisuus on muutoin poissaolevana. Kun ihmisen ja eläimen agraarisesta suhteesta syntyvä mikro-tilallinen rakennekaava siirretään osaksi koloniaalista koulutusta ja kurinpitoa, ilmenee kultivointi suorakaiteenmuotoisena kouluympäristönä. Lineaarisuus ja suorakulmaiset muodot toimivat vieraslajin tavoin vaarantaen alueellisen kehällisen ekologian, toimien kulttuurisena väkivaltana kehällisen ja kausittaisen liikkeen muodostamaa maisemaa kohtaan, joka liittyy erottamattomana osana luontaiselinkeinoihin ja alueelliseen ryhmäidentiteettiin. Maiseman lukeminen ja uudelleenkirjoittaminen, ja sen sisältämien kehojen historia ja muisti, eivät aseta eläin-ihmis binaarin osapuolia toisilleen alisteisiksi, vaan keskinäiseen performatiiviseen suhteeseen. Tiettyjen ikonisten eläinten, kuten poron, tunnistetaan edustavan Arktista aluetta. Eläinaktivistiset yritykset todistaa eläimen subjektiivista kokemusta eri dokumentointitekniikoiden ja teknologioiden välittämänä epäonnistuvat todentamaan eläimen kokemuksen eettisesti. Kyseiset tekniikat tuottavat eläimen sijaan hybridisen subjektiviteetin koostuen ihmisen, eläimen ja tallentavan teknologian yhdistelmästä, joka ei onnistu vapautumaan tappamisen genealogiastaan, kuten ansapyynnistä, metsästyksestä, teurastuksesta ja voitonmerkeistä. Eläimen subjektiviteetin autenttisen esittämisen problematiikka paljastaa "pienen toisen" läsnäolon subjektin ja objektin välisessä suhteessa, jolloin suhteen tarkastelu "toista" kohtaan muuttuu välisestä keskiseksi. Ihmisen ja eläimen suhteen genealogian tallentuminen artefaktiin, joka toimii niin säilönä kuin esiintulopintana, tutkitaan lopuksi osana poliittista debattia koskien Kanadan Inuiitti- yhteisöjen eri tarkoituksiin perinteisesti kivistä pystyttämien *inuksuk*-hahmojen käyttöä ja merkitystä. *Inukshuk* edelleen toimii maisemallisesti alkuperäiskansaan kuuluvia ihmisiä toisiinsa, elinkeinoonsa, sekä ympäristönsä eläimistöön konkreettisesti sitovana sosiaalisen ja poliittisena ruumiina, samalla kun kansallisvaltio on kolonisoinut sen käyttöä.

Kysymykset läpi tutkielman johtavat ymmärrykseen että "Arktinen" ei avaudu tai palaudu "totuudeksi" Lacanilaisessa ymmärryksessä, jossa "Todellinen" vastustaa kaikkia määritelmiä ja suhteellistuksia. Arktinen koostuu lingvistisestä, kuvitteellisesta, kuvallisesta ja symbolisesta hahmotelmasta, joka on "arktikuloitu" olevaksi vain "muutoksessa". Tämän kokonaisuuden voi ilmaista hahmolla, joka taipuu ja on luettavissa eri modaliteeteissa. Arktinen on siten asema ja suuntima, jossa voidaan säilyä ihmisinä, investoiden siihen oman inhimillisen jälkensä 'homunculuksen'. Tutkimustuloksen on tarkoitus mahdollistaa radikaali ja kriittinen tapa ajatella Arktista totuudellisuutta, joka on "otettu annettuna", kehitettyjen

metateoreettisten konseptien avulla. Homunculus toimii oppaana ymmärrykseen arktisen poliittisuudesta, uudistaen käsityksiämme yli politiikkatieteen rajojen.

AVAINSANAT: Arktinen, representaatio, performatiivisuus, havainto, modaalisuus, genealogia, kulttuuri, ihmis-eläin suhde, katse, välivalta.

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Ursa Major figuration

distance

Heritage Emergence Hauntology

The bow of Heraclitus

The ship of Theseus

"Destruction as a cause of coming into being"

graticule

The Overview Effect

Identity

Turning into one's opposite

Polar bear

"Is it real?"

Project 'Big Blonde'

Introduction

'Arctic in Change'

1

Conclusions

250 List of

mask Relation-ship

touché the Real

Phantasm barred Arktikum behind the glass

'little bear'

Bios Zoë

PETA anti sealing campaign

cultural transformation

missplacement

homicide & suicide

Regalia

Sovereign

political theology

King's two (or more) bodies

grammar of landscape

Inukshuk

Ilanaaq

Inuit

Richmond Inukshuk

Vancouver Olympic Games

200

50

φ

Perspective

Dimensionality

Golden plaque Pioneer
Golden record Voyager

virtual image

Golden ratio

scale   Golden boat   miniature

Aranda

microcosm ecosystem

minuscule

saddle

treadmill   chair

fitness   ergonomy

incorporeal animals

Cultivation

"It hurt my eyes"

Innu

A-M   Colonial school

circular & rectangular

Emotional Design

visceral Mnemonic   hylomorphism

behavioral   memory

memoryscape

brainscape reflective   a priori & a posteriori

abstract & concrete

Cultural violence

form & matter   Holon

WSPA

Camera obscura   Reindeer mistreatment

Animal activism   slaughter

violence   roundup

'aesthethics'

Cinéma vérité & Direct Cinema

(non-)interventionalism

Animal documentary

photography

hunting & trapping

time-lapse   slow motion

objet petit a

Wishfull seeing

jouissance

Gaze

in-the-midst

extimacy

References

100

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δ

The following academic work is a doctoral thesis in the discipline of Political Science, presenting an inquiry into what is known as 'the Arctic'. Due to the scope of the research, this work combines a variety of philosophical and theoretical approaches, methodologies, research materials and various forms of literature, breaching disciplinary boundaries to allow a new form of critical study. This shift is done in the spirit of post-humanism and post-qualitative research. The introduction ought to serve as a readers' guide on the matter of the thesis' contents, style, proceedings and structure in order to clarify and explicitly explain the possible liberties taken in conducting this form of academic work, along with the philosophical reasoning and practical engagement behind them. The description and depicturing of the choices made and those taking place are opened up to some extent to aid in engagement with the text and to guide this literal expedition. The introductory part proceeds by explaining the form (or formlessness) of the manuscript, the understanding of the literal form and its production of a thesis, how the scientific process and its reports are understood in this thesis, how its methodology and data are characterised and questioned, how the case studies and their selection are situated and how alternative methods of establishment are put on trial.

My drawing did not represent a hat. It was supposed to be a boa constrictor digesting an elephant.

— The Little Prince by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, 1995 [1943].

There isn't any particular relationship between the messages, except that the author has chosen them carefully, so that, when seen all at once, they produce an image of life that is beautiful and surprising and deep. There is no beginning, no middle, no end, no suspense, no moral, no causes, no effects.

— Slaughterhouse-Five or The Children's Crusade by Kurt Vonnegut, 1969.

Before we begin, we have already reached the end. The conclusion of the academic work to follow is presented in the figure above. One capable of reading a fictional language such as *Tralfamadorian*, characterised by simultaneity instead of linearity, would comprehend the full contents of the following thesis from the figure with a single glance. This fictional, alien language is described by the author Kurt Vonnegut in his novel *Slaughterhouse-Five* as a text consisting of a clump of symbols that constitute a brief message depicting a situation or a scene wherein the symbols are read in unison, all at once, not one after the other. Here we face a challenge. The English language, which is the main language used in the writing of this thesis, as with most Western languages, is linear due to its basic sentence construction, which focuses on linear and causal relationships rather than circular or mutually causative ones (Anderson & Johnson 2015 [1997], 17). A sentence starts with a capital letter and ends with a period. Within this frame, the parts

of a sentence take their places, each having a function related to one another. In language, a sentence thus has a direction, an occupied position and words and letters that take place one after the other, expressing therefore a certain temporality in the form of a timespan that begins, proceeds and ends. Some necessary or important parts—such as subject, verb, object, adjective or adposition—affect one another in form and meaning and may even indicate the presence of one that is, as such, absent. With its capital, its core and its joined members, a sentence appears to be some sort of literal body, where even the words themselves have their stems.

As we are tightly bound to literal expressions and linearities, we will continue by beginning the work at hand with a word. That word for this thesis is 'the Arctic'. The scientific objective of the inquiry is *whatever the Arctic is or may be*. We work with the word, the Arctic, to learn whether it is to be read as a subject, an object, an adjective or something else, as a whole or in parts. The literal expression allows us to proceed across the borders of times, places and forms of being in an attempt to learn, gain, give and engage—yet besides being captivating, it is imprisoning as well. In this sense, the possibilities of a written thesis are limited to writing and literal expression. As philosopher Jacques Derrida claimed, "language bears within itself the necessity of its own critique", where the written text is, at the moment of its doing, already under an undoing: "obliged to proceed by ellipses, corrections and corrections of corrections, letting go of each concept at the very moment that I needed to use it" (Spivak 1997 [1976], xviii). While searching for liberty from a term, I am imprisoned by language, bound to words and sentenced to sentences.

We ought not think that language is simply a matter of fact, nor that language is at odds with matter. It is neither a quality nor a signifier placed upon things, nor is it a separate and independent discourse. Language matters, and matter speaks. It does so in different tones, gestures and soundings, figures of speech, forms and puns. It is a matter to be encountered and treated with different manners. For the figure presented in the very beginning to begin to speak to us, we have to subject ourselves to a dialogue with it. So, to engage with the matter, what matters is in which manner we do it.

And who is the 'we' that I, as an author, have been addressing? It is you, reader(s), through your engagements with the text. This request for engagement means that the work at hand is not to be considered a *closed* work, but rather an *open* text. This difference in terminology was established by Umberto Eco in his work on *The Role of the Reader* (1984 [1979]). The author likewise must amend the idea of finality, shifting towards the horizon of possibilities and open-ended outcomes. As the philosopher Michel Foucault announces in *Entretien avec Michel Foucault 1971*, "I don't write a book so that it will be the final word; I write a book so that other books are possible, not necessarily written by me" (O'Farrell 2005, 9). Therefore, this is not the final word. To move towards open texts is to accept their processual nature and the risk of being constantly subject to erasure, if not rewriting, by the

author, nevertheless re-read by oneself and others, evoking thoughts. It is not that the author has the thought before the act of writing and simply records it for the reader to have after reading; rather, the thinking and the constitution of thought happens during the actual writing, where the language both allows and limits the thought as it takes a linguistic and drawn form. This occurrence is what Max van Manen calls the phenomenology of writing.

In Manen's phenomenological approach to writing, we "step out of one world […] and enter another, the textorium, the world of the text […] the landscapes of language" (van Manen 2014, 359). Following semiotician Roland Barthes, when seeking something in this textorium, this nature-as-language, the writing is itself the actual epistemological condition for knowing and proceeding. For existentialist philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, writing is at the center of thinking, and therefore thinking does not take place beforehand, but the writing itself is the essential moment. Sartre has given us a most succinct definition of his methodology: writing is the method. The nature of the inquiry is the nature of writing (ibid., 364). That which is phrased and cannot yet be (St. Pierre 2019, 3) is on the way of becoming in the act of writing.

Following Barthes, the text seeks collaboration from the reader to open it up and set it going, therefore not reducing the reader–text relationship to consumption (Barthes 1977, 163). Here the reader, according to Eco, is an active performer to whom the author may provide content "more or less like the components of a construction kit" (Eco 1984 [1979], 49). Therefore, writerly text requires work from both ends, from the writer and the reader, to work it out. According to Richard Howard, it is hard for readers to face an open text due to the plurality of signification and the suspension of meaning (Howard 2002 [1974], viii–ix). The value of writerly text, in contrast to the reactive value of readerly text, lies in undoing the institutionalised divorce between the producer and the user of the text, the authorship and usership, instead placing them in the same boat (Barthes 2002 [1974], 4). In matter and manner, the writerly text is co-conducted, and it proceeds as "novelistic without the novel […] production without product […] structuration without structure […] a perpetual present, upon which no consequent language […] can be superimposed; the writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world […] is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system […] which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages" (ibid., 5). To interpret the text is not to provide one with freedom of meaning but an appreciation of "what plural constitutes it" (van Manen 2014, 358).

For Mikhail Bakhtin, all texts are absorptions and transformations of another text and are therefore intertextual (Kristeva & Moi 1986, 37) by definition. A structure generated in relation to another structure is an apparatus, producing and transforming meaning (Still & Worton 1991 [1990], 17) by means of quotations of

and allusion to another text within the text. This relation figures an interpretation and meaning wherein the textual world moves beyond a singular body of work not through a simple line of references to an earlier work, but rather through a world where they both co-exist simultaneously as texts, complete and fragmentary, as the reproduced part of one is placed inside the other, while that other still has its borrowed parts as well, all located in an interreferential network rather than within bound and closed covers. For Julia Kristeva, the notion of intertextuality replaces intersubjectivity (Kristeva & Moi 1986, 37), in accordance providing subjectivity to the textuality. This quality of a text that has emerged not only borrows, but also returns: it is dialogic, allowing altering and conflicting characters simultaneously, "like that of the Unconscious" (Still & Worton 1991 [1990], 17) where "poetic language is read as at least *double*" (Kristeva & Moi 1986, 37, emphasis original). What is meant by these quotes on unconscious and double meaning in practice can be found for example from the work and dream of psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud: a singular bird in German is '*Vogel*', while two birds in the same context—or in the same dream—are plural and thus written as '*Vögel*'; '*vögeln*' is a German obscenity for the act of sex (Grubin 2002). Here the birds may remain merely as birds, or they may become plural 'birds', while the word presenting that plural also stand for sexual intercourse.

Kent D. Palmer depicts a textual world such as the aforementioned as a fractal landscape that can be explored in detail with overlapping and interpenetrating internal contexts and signs through the term intratextuality. In intratextuality, the text's unconsciousness rises from its artefactual characteristics and is therefore always building on otherness and beyond the full control or authorship of a singular writer, inexhaustible to any interpretative capacity of a critic, giving it a haunting quality. According to Palmer, "the text itself becomes a general economy of contexts, situations, milieus, and in general metasystems of signification and meaning beyond the intent"; it undergoes management by writing and reading, demanding "non-conventional ways of dealing with a text" (Palmer 2002, 1). According to Alison Sharrock, intratextuality in its modern and theorised form is composed of literary theory, post-structuralism, intertextuality, reader-response criticism and narratology brought together to understand the relationship between the parts and the whole of classical texts—"to analyse the meaningful relationship between digressions and their main text; to explore parallels between passages, scenes, images, or marked vocabulary, in disparate parts of texts" (Sharrock 2019).

As already illustrated at the very beginning of this thesis, the work is composed in such a way as to a form of a "ring composition" where there are "units whose parts may be connected in ways other than by linearity" (Sharrock 2019). Therefore, the text ought to be read beyond the conventional, moving from intertextuality further and deeper into intratextuality. This is not a passive process guaranteed by the structure of the text, but rather it depends on the notion that the "activity of a

reader affects response to the text" and makes "new and unusual connections and divisions within the linear stream of a text" (ibid.). Sharrock's example from Latin poetry, Virgil's *Aeneid*, shows how the opening lines that announce the subject of the epic, *arma virumque* ("arms and the man", i.e. Aeneas), are echoed later by the destruction of the Trojan *arma virum* ("the arms of the [Trojan] men"). This passage is not only about the "attempts to begin but also of risks of premature ending" (ibid.). As every ending has a beginning, so too does the thesis at hand begin from the end, echoing its inbuilt requirement to reach a conclusion.

The continuous quotes in the body of the text of this thesis from world literature, poetics, filmography, comics and other forms of popular culture may be read carefully either-or-both as intertextual and-or intratextual fragments. They allow us to pause, ponder, peer back and to pass through, offering a point of reference in the textual landscape, for rest and renewal, for the thought to develop further and take us back to summarise. Where the intertextual requires the reader to know the context from which the quote emerges, the intratextual reading cuts the text "together/apart" (Barad 2010, 244), not into "separate consecutive activities, but a single event that is not one" (ibid.). This process derives from what the feminist philosopher Karen Barad distinguishes as "[i]ntra-action, not interaction" (ibid.). In the body of this thesis, the quoted text is read anew as internal to this text—as referring to what has been written in the main text before or after (or both before and after) the quote slips or cuts in. Here the reader only needs to know the context of the thesis: the quote ought to summarise, illuminate or challenge the given argument, and the meaning of the quote is redefined in this new co-composition. As the quotes come from outside the text, they refer intratextually not to their previous context outside of the thesis but to its insides: they are not referential fragments of another story, but a rhythmic baseline of the thesis' textual form. In their ability to cut, to cause traumas, leading to associations and dissociations, they also serve as the subconscious of the text, a form of metatext, for the scientific discourse.

Here one should pay heed to Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre's assertion that while the texts become 'messy' in their experimental methods of challenging representativity, we should follow Judith Butler's notion of 'careful reading'. As St. Pierre recognises the role of writing in learning and in thinking itself, she refers to Jacques Lacan's notion of the necessity of reading (St. Pierre 2021, 164), to which I would add the necessity to read oneself, intra-reading, in order to realise that which one has not yet realised, but which nevertheless is already in the writing, emerging from what has been written down, the un- or subconscious of the text. As van Manen writes: "Writing is reading […] I am the first reader of my text" (van Manen 2014, 360). The writer is "the product of his or her own product", and writing "is a kind of self-making" (ibid., 364). As self-sustainable and self-absorbed it may sound and seem, such a manner of writing is not driven by some

reason coming from the self, from the individual author, but rather one coming from the quality of language. The idea that the individual and intentional 'I' author precedes and exists independently of a work is challenged by post-structural thought and practice (St. Pierre 2019, 8). Therefore, the thesis' positioning of 'us' concerns primarily the relation between its writer and its readers. The author is not relieved of responsibility by this reasoning; rather, the thesis bestows certain liberties and responsibilities upon the one who heeds the call of such authorship and readership. This is the position that I ask you, as my reader, to take—and it comes with both a great power and a great responsibility.

> *I compose myself. My self is a thing I must now compose, as one composes a speech.*
>
> *— The Handmaid's Tale by Margaret Atwood, 1985.*

> *If you stop to think about it, you'll have to admit that all the stories in the world consist essentially of twenty-six letters. The letters are always the same, only the arrangement varies. From letters words are formed, from words sentences, from sentences chapters, and from chapters stories.*
>
> *— The Neverending Story by Michael Ende, 1983 [1979].*

"The reason we go to poetry is not for wisdom, but for the dismantling of wisdom" is a saying of the psychoanalyst and psychiatrist Jacques Lacan. In the quote, I consider 'wisdom' to stand for practiced knowledge, where knowledge is an ordering of more 'neutral' information conducted from smaller 'particles' that are announced as 'data'. Language-wise, it means that things stand in a meaningful relation to other things, and this relation is managed by grammar, which includes both the rules and their exceptions. As for words, "Without a context, a relation to other words, they are everything and nothing" (Vola 2019). Poetry on the other hand may reduce language's role of informativity to gain different tones and sounds that come prior to its communicative means. Poetry may prioritise the rhythmic character of language or harness the double-or-more meanings of words, some of them emerging already when written, others in the phonetic pronunciation. Thereby, the words hold a world beyond fixed knowledge, beyond wisdom. Poetic use of words can stand for mistakes, lacks and madness; without such moral tones, it can be restated as a radical repositioning of standpoints, a transformation and the continuing process of becoming. To implement the wording of Barad, such destabilising establishes the "im/possibilities" of "non/existence" (Barad 2012, 8).

wulubu ssubudu uluw ssubudu

tumba ba- umf

kusagauma

ba - umf

— *Excerpt from poem 'Karawane' by Hugo Ball, 1916, typography imitated from the original.*

An inquiry into—and an act to restate—the way language, or arguably data, is organised took place in the European avant-gardist art movement *Dada* or *Dadaism* in the early 20th century. Dada was developed by various artists in reaction to World War I as an anti-bourgeois protest and attempt to reject the logic, reason and aestheticism of modern society in its totality by expressing irrational nonsense in their works. Even the word 'dada' was coined through the random application of a letter knife to a French dictionary, landing on the French word for "Hoppy horse", or possibly as an attempt to have a name with a different meaning in different languages—Dada would translate from Russian to English as *Yes-yes*. Other possibilities include the idea that it stands for babble, the first attempted words of a child, or else holds no meaning at all (Trachtman 2006). Its embrace of attempted words goes to the very roots, the very birth of language, when we figure out forms from a mass of sounds. Dada's reasons for doing so go much deeper into societal and political life than being resistance for resistance's sake. The unreasoning and illogical have a reason and logic in them, which is possible only through such radical use of language.

In the German historical television drama series *Die Neue Zeit* (2019), the characters of German Bauhaus artist Dorothea "Dörte" Helm and her father, Classical studies scholar Rudolf Helm, debate the objectives of art. Rudolf Helm attempts to ridicule Hugo Ball's Dadaist poem *Karawane,* published and performed in 1916. While Rudolf Helm relies on Aristotelian philosophy, where art is considered *mimesis*—an aim to imitate nature, the character of Dörte claims that *Karawane* does not go against such principles, since the cacophony of the poem is a mimesis of the sounds from the trenches, factories and metropolis, those of the modern war, of a capitalist and industrialised world. We can therefore understand the claim that the rhythm, form and composition of more classic poetry fails in its attempts, or refuses, to mimic such phenomena. The apparent incomprehension it produces itself has a meaning: the lack of sense in modernity. A critique follows: whatever the reason behind the poem, the result remains incomprehensible. The response to this critique expands the paradigm from the objectives of art to the relation of language and power. Dadaistic critique asserts that the current language has been claimed by the elite as its intellectual property, and that together with its

journalistic use in promoting nationalism and war, entangled in capitalist drives, it is corrupted (see Krame 2019, ep. 3).

What we can reason from this is that Dada denies both the ownership of language and the privilege of a certain correct form. Dada simultaneously ridicules and reclaims the language that, in its earlier use, failed as a mediator and had become an agitator, narrowing rather than widening prospects. Can we do the same when it comes to academic writing and scientific reporting? Should we dismantle scientific discourse, abandon its conventional wisdom and establish an alternative horizon of possibilities? Can we, as academics, be avant-garde, when it comes to the matter of writing? Any avant-gardist attempt in the sciences is not simply to satisfy oneself, to do differently for the sake of doing differently, but primary for the sake of science. As Dada, which seeks to escape rationality in order to discredit the rationality that rationalised intolerance and violence, aims for a renewal of language, writing differently also contains a risk towards the act of writing itself and the scientific objectives of the critique.

> *[...] we have the right to ask the question of the desire that lies behind modern science.*
>
> — *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan, 1977 [1973], 160.*

What Dada made of language and the use of language, post-structuralism has begun to do to the social sciences. Instead of preset and previously utilised research designs, processes, methods and practices, post-qualitative inquiry driven by post-structuralism derives from the description of major philosophical concepts—ontology, epistemology, the nature of being and human being, language, representation, discourse, knowledge, truth, freedom, rationality and so on. The post-structuralist approach enables the deconstruction of concepts and categories of humanist qualitative methodology, including data, analysis, validity and field. Instead of representing the empirical world of the human lived experience, it re-orients towards new forms of thought and life, concerned with *what is not yet to come* (St. Pierre 2021, 163–164).

When it comes to structures, structuring and post-structuralism, what do they mean for the form of the thesis? If the principle "form *ever follows function*" written by architect Louis Sullivan (1896, 408, emphasis original) goes for tall office buildings, would it not be sufficient for the structure of a text as well? If substance is a coexistence of form and matter, as Aristotle put it in *de Anima* (2001 [1908]), would a post-structuralist thesis not require a certain development from the form that concerns the matter? Thereby, the substance of a matter coming into being is co-constituted with its form, so that substantially there can be nothing

new brought out from the matter without producing new forms. To learn the new, and not to repeat the old, by implying and applying regular and regulated patterns, the very outline of a discourse that also sets the course for the train of thought, we will have to disrupt and disturb the pattern, not only to write differently, but to be capable of thinking differently. Since "writing is thinking", it is "another method of inquiry", as St. Pierre says in reference to the work of Laurel Richardson (St. Pierre 2019, 3). For me, writing is about learning, not so much about teaching. I would restate and rewrite my poetic claim: *I write, therefore, I think* (Vola 2019).

'Neat' writing already knows where it is going: it knows its pre-set goals, and it has chosen its literal co-writers and the phases along which to rest and proceed. A research report suggests a clear separation between the actual research and its reporting activity without thinking about research itself as a poetic textual practice fused into the act of research and reflection (van Manen 2014, 363–364). In my experience, there is no result before the writing, since the thought is produced while doing so, and the ideas are pinned down with the words before they escape me completely. I will follow a writing method that is a process of constant revelation, following anthropologist Tim Ingold's representation of Gregory Bateson's depiction of the world and mind (Ingold 2002 [2000], 9). I consider writing a journey with a few items, following a track, noticing something besides it, crisscrossing, getting lost, meeting sympathetic aid, colliding with obstacles and finding one's way by making a full circle. The text is written in such a way not to make the text writerly due to its sheer joy, but rather because for the thinking process this seemed to be the only unforced and non-violent way that this 'story' could be told. And writing is the method. The research 'results' come by and by in the process of writing, not as a final report. This post-qualitative inquiry is not a divine guidance or a channelling of transcendental ego (see Still & Worton 1991 [1990], 17), but rather an immanent process (see St. Pierre, 2019) where the matter matters and therefore becomes articulated in the co-constituting process. The text not only writes itself but also must be allowed to rewrite itself: there is a need to add and there is more left to find, *although it was already there*, as I have come to understand it in the end. I would say from my experience that if you would like to get to know a city in a short period of time, first you have to get lost, and then you have to discover a certain trail for your orientation. Economic or not, "Some lessons can't be taught, […] They must be lived to be understood" (Bowman 2005).

> *I mean it like it is, like it sounds …*
>
> — *Twin Peaks by David Lynch and Mark Frost, 1990, season 1, episode 2.*

He is not a duck at all; he is just a sound of a duck.

— Orly Goldwasser in The Secret History of Writing by DOX Productions, 2020, episode 1.

Besides literal wandering and wondering, to learn to read the figure we have to work with visual puns, the rebus and double(-or-more) meanings that ought to help in grasping the materiality and verbality of the world. We have to consider text also visually and phonetically, to understand from and of what it is constituted, or rather with what it is co-constituting. As the history of the written language and the birth of alphabets point out, a certain character can work in different ways. A logogram, a written character is a simplified picture that represents a word in accordance with the pictorial resemblance and the name of the referenced subject of speech. The same character might work as a phonogram, a written character representing a phoneme, a speech sound that, pronounced together with others, forms words with the logic of a rebus. Here the characters are not considered pictures but sounds that are generated phonetically when those pictures are pronounced out loud. When positioned in a certain way, the character can also function as a determinative to clarify how a certain text should be read, as pictorial writing or phonetically, pointing out which way to proceed, indicating the correct semantic category (see DOX Productions 2020, ep. 1).

Craig Thomson's graphic novel *Habibi* (2011) presents the way Arabic letters in calligraphy inhabit more than one mode or singular fixed meaning, sometimes emerging as words, landscapes, acts and events. A line of text may burst forth from the patches of a drying river flow perceived from an aerial perceptive, and its 'voice' finally disappears to desertification (Thompson 2011, 31). Those sounds either belong to the water, or to the stories of the people that were born and told along the river. The Arabic letter ب (bāʾ) written here in an isolated form, appears as a landscape in the story of Abraham's (Ibrahim) first son Ishmael, his mother Hagar (Hājar) and the birth of the blessed water of the Well of Zamzam. Where the upper curving line of the letter depicts Hagar's search between the hills of Safa and Marwa, the spot under it is the point from which Ishmael, by kicking the ground, brought out the spring water. The name Zamzam came from a repeated command in an attempt to stop the flow, whether the tears of a child or the waters of the spring (ibid., 43–45). Therefore, ب is not a mere letter, nor a topography, but an event taking place: intent and movement. The same letter in the word '*Bismillah*', 'in the name of God', in calligraphy can take various forms—from a circle to a palace or peacock (ibid., 38–39), from geometric shapes to dwellings and animals. It is not so much a question of adding to the letters and words as it is ceasing to reduce their characteristics.

The characteristics of certain pieces, objects or artefacts that aim to manifest the Arctic, while exhibited, are easily considered to exist mainly in a certain mode, whether textual, visual, auditive, kinetic or something else. But what if we ought to think about them in multiple ways, as multimodal? One definition of multimodality is the process of creating meaning through text, image, sound and movement (Skains 2019, 137). Some scholars begin by establishing a binary of 'mode' for the resources of representation and of 'medium' for the means of distribution for these representations as messages: in this view, writing is a mode and a book is a medium (Kress 2005, 5–7; Pink 2011, 262–263). Recognised modes may include writing, speech and images, gesture, expression, texture, size, shape and colour (Dicks et al. 2006, 82; Pink 2011, 263). They enable us to perceive the surrounding world in different forms of sensory 'information' through the five-sense sensorium based on the five differentiated sense organs (Pink 2011, 263–264). This differentiation and division is a modern Western cultural construct, not necessarily applicable to other cultures (ibid., 263–264), and may rather be considered an interlinked bodily synergic system, a general action of 'being in the world' (ibid., 266; Merleau-Ponty 2005 [1962], 272).

When the sensuous is categorised into certain 'modes', there is an expectation that they can translate from one to another. I would call this *a modular shift*. As anthropologist and sensory ethnographer Sarah Pink puts it, in a multimodal approach to communication, sensory categories are represented by human performances in forms that might be read as if they were text (Pink 2011, 263). Meaning can take place through the interplay of the used modes (Skains 2019, 137). Purely verbal discourse is a fallacy, since discourse encompasses a variety of modes, simultaneously present in interrelationships and mutually influenced in constructing meaning (Höllerer et al. 2018, 621). Here we may return to the dream of Freud, where the plural word for birds, which has a sexual connotation, did not appear as a written word but as an image of two men with bird's beaks (Grubin 2002), presenting a modular shift that must be made by the analyst. Even in writing, the author's ideation is multimodal, influenced by associations, and writing is a process of translating these pieces into a single textual layer (Flower & Hayes, 1984 as quoted in Skains 2019).

Within this work, what is meant by multimodality and how it is integrated as a working method does not concern so much the combining of different media or evoking of different sensory perceptions, separately or in unison. Rather, I want to raise the issue of the different sides of the same medium, 'reading' the same sign, letter, character, image, vocalization or figure in different modes so that they enable access to another approach to the topic, another reading of the same phenomenon. This is not only due to the aim to see a single 'object' differently but also to understand its connectivity to world-making, a means of access and a stepping stone to another sphere. Just as thesis and antithesis may enable a synthesis to be

born (see Hegel 1977 [1807]), a shifting modality, a certain kind of synaesthesia in reading, may enable a crossing: to see the touch, to touch with a look, to see a word as a lined-up set of characterised images, to know how the image that they evoke may alter or multiply when pronounced instead of read as a text.

> *One cannot say very much with mere letters and words. Sometimes I'll be writing a Greek letter, a theta or an omega, and tilt my pen just the slightest bit; suddenly the letter has a tail and becomes a fish; [...] or becomes a bird, [...] with them God wrote the world.*
>
> — *Narcissus and Goldmund by Hermann Hesse, 1968 [1930].*

As we are bound to the language, and this thesis is enfolded to literal expression, we ought to begin our journey of thousands of words and a few images. The travel will not be conducted in solitude: we are accompanied by characters who join the voyage at various crossings and turning points. The characters are those that together constitute the figure, and in order to figure out its meaning, we will have to become familiar with them, one at a time and in unison. They are, in the order of appearance: I, Ω, $-$, φ, a. The difficulty is that, to maintain their full capacity, or their modality, without reducing them to a certain reading, they should remain in such style of graphic presentation. Pronouncing them out loud is an inevitability demanded by speech, but it will only voice their phonetic characteristics. Giving them alternative names will be useful, but only in the sense of secondary names, since a specific terminology will engage them to a specific tradition of literature or a family of theories. Certainly, these characters are parented by a group of other, less abstract characters: academics, artists, events and acquaintances that join, move along, pass on and take another turn during the journey. Journeys rarely move in straight lines, and neither does this one. It takes spatial leaps and temporal jumps, breaking chronologies and geographical restraints while figuring out the Arctic's characteristics.

In the case of studying the Arctic, an approach that combines multiple traditions is not so much an unorthodoxy as it is a necessity. That is because the Arctic is not a discipline. As Michael Bravo and Sverker Sörlin (2002a, vii) point out, there has been no existing (Nordic or Scandinavian) unified science for the Arctic. Neither it is a fixed geographical, hydrological, biological, historical or politically coherent geopolitical, socio-cultural or geophysical unit (see Sale 2008, 15–21). Even one of the roughest defining guidelines, the line known as the Arctic Circle, moves back and forth. Ought we say that therefore the Arctic is on the move as well? In honesty, I could only refer to it as a phenomenon, without adding preceding words, such as 'natural' or 'social'. Even though the Arctic is not a discipline, we do have a variety of disciplines to discipline the Arctic. There is a desire to capture the

matter, the form and the essence of the Arctic by means of science. Or is it rather 'to cast' than 'to capture'? That is the question that we will have to face when we move along.

> *Most discipline is hidden discipline, designed not to liberate but to limit.*
>
> *— Heretics of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1984.*

Early in my academic studies I heard the parable of *the Blind Men and an Elephant*, which describes the philosophy of science. The story asks a group of blind men who have never come across an elephant before to describe what it is by touching it. Each of them gives a different description due to their limited experience based on the part of the elephant's body they have reached, whether it is a leg, a side, an ear, a trunk or a tusk. This is very much how science, experiments and Arctic studies function. The result consists of and from several standpoints—or, to put it linguistically, conducted from various *prepositions* for the word of our study, the Arctic. Then again, this parable presumes that the elephant exists, and that it exists as a whole; even though the blind men describe it differently, they still assume that they are observing and discussing the same source of phenomena. A reversed approach would assume that this source phenomenon is actually a joining of different phenomena under one discourse: a joining of parts, an articulation that the means and matters of language and scientific practice pronounce as one or belonging to the same. Rather than considering the elephant as found in a compromise between the 'views' of the blind men, this rather deconstructive method might compromise the very existence of the elephant. What if the current research traditions that have supported arguments around the existence of this pronounced 'həʊl' should come to the realization that it actually should be written as a 'hole' instead of the 'whole'? That approach may appear to be an elephant in the living room—at risk of collateral damage in a delicate situation, comparable to an elephant in a china shop.

The 'body parts' of this body of knowledge are often, in the scientific encyclopaedic literature, articulated as follows. In the book *The Arctic: The Complete Story* (Sale 2008), 'complete' consists of the natural environment, human history, habitats, a travel guide and the vulnerability of the ecosystem. In more detail, the environment is constructed from 'geology' and, characteristically for the Arctic, from 'snow' and 'ice', continuing with climate and atmospheric phenomena. The history of the area is divided to that of natives with additional indigenous modernity and one starting from explorations, the latter of which contains the discovery of passages, lands and access to the poles—plural, since the Arctic is paired with a most distant geographical location, the Antarctic, given their resemblance in geophysical and climatological conditions. As the Arctic is

often understood as untouched nature, the flora and fauna with their adaptable biogeography is in focus. When it comes to politics, the vulnerabilities related to exploitation of animals and minerals, pollution including nuclear weapons and climate change are addressed. As the Arctic closely relates to the circumpolar, it is polarity through which the definition often begins. That is the case also when such polarity is clearly presented as a stereotype that nevertheless is not free from the polarity that it builds upon. As an example, another work, *The Arctic World*, begins its foreword by presenting the "common southern thought" that the Arctic is "immense […] remote, empty, cold, hostile and lethal" (Bruemmer & Taylor 1989 [1985], 13), continuing later on that it is considered "dangerous and daunting […] bleak and barren". In contrast, the northerners have "accepted its hardships and gloried in its wildlife wealth, its space and freedom" (ibid., 19).

Besides being popularised, as it appears here the discourse is also put in accordance with scientific terms and disciplinary practice. Indeed, science has been central in the formation of the Arctic region, and for science the Arctic has been a place of cultural imagination, a natural laboratory for field sciences (Bravo & Sörlin 2002a, vii), where "collecting, sketching, measuring, recording, classifying" have been the means of knowing and describing the colonial frontier (Bravo & Sörlin 2002b, 18). Science is a material practice functioning as a ritual for identity making for the Arctic (ibid., 21) by articulating and joining things and beings together, as in the making of a collage. The same is repeated in geopolitics, where in simple terms the Arctic is perceived as a homogenous periphery (Bravo & Sörlin 2002a, vii). There different entities, such as, for example, Greenland and Denmark, are part of the same imaginary asymmetric whole, the contents of which have changed but the structure of which has remained the same (Harbsmeier 2002, 66).

> *They had to make pronouncements. This brought about a tendency to depend upon absolutes, to see finite limits. They knew this about themselves. It was part of their training. Yet they continued to act beyond self-limiting parameters.*
>
> — *Children of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1976.*

These asymmetric poles of a single whole are very much present in our understanding of how we can know the Arctic. 'Knowing' in the Arctic context involves the history and practice of colonialism. Therefore, *knowing the Arctic is colonial*. Native and non-native, indigenous and explorers, form the positive and negative poles, which also appear as centre and periphery. According to Bravo and Sörlin, the Arctic is a national colonial periphery made present in the metropolis, the capitals of the colonising nation states, by Latourian heterogenous networks

formed between the centre and periphery (Bravo & Sörlin 2002b, 12). Gísli Pálsson argues that a certain intersection is derived from this polarity, describing the Arctic as a kind of "slippery discursive space", which he names "arcticality" (Pálsson 2002, 277). It slides into a certain kind of 'semi-' state that categorically falls midway between the poles, such as domestication and wilderness.

Inclusion of 'foreign' elements may lead to another type of exclusion or *peripherisation*, an exoticisation that occurs, for example, in the attempt to include indigenous knowledge in Arctic studies, where it often takes the form of an Orientalist "other" (Bravo & Sörlin 2002b, 5). That tendency has been followed by the questioning of the authenticity, the realness, of Arctic representations based on whether they are produced and provided from internal or external standpoint. An asymmetry in the "division of power between the describer and the described" is an "description or account" that nevertheless is "a form of representation" (Thisted 2002, 328–329). Therefore, one could only qualify which one is *less less-true*. The blurring of resemblance and truth and their reversed priority, as presented by Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard, are not unlike that which can be called *Arctic Spectacles* (Potter 2007, 11). That is also the title of Russell A. Potter's book on the North in visual culture. Different representation techniques and technologies have been an inseparable part of the Arctic in the making, and the science, of exploring and exhibiting. Principally the visuals are produced by sketchpad and brush in the field, later on below the northern sky with a panorama consisting of a massive painting stretching around a circular room, magic lanterns and daguerreotype in the late 17th century and early 18th century (ibid., 4–5).

Orientalism and its representative representations, a problem concerning skilful pictorial representations, is emergent in 'arcticality' in the following example. What stands out from both *The Arctic: The Complete Story* and *The Arctic World* is that the persons portrayed in the photographs, with their expressive faces, captured in real life situations or pictured conducting tasks, appear without a name as a rule, with a few exceptions proving it (see Sale 2008, 181, 226–227). Since the photographic documents are mainly 'modern' rather than 'historical documents', the reason is not likely due to the fact that there is no access to information about the names. A person is simply portrayed as "An Inuk" (ibid., 28), "Lapps" (ibid., 36), "Yakut girls" (ibid., 37), "A Canadian Inuit artist" (ibid., 212), "Nenets reindeer herders" (ibid., 213), terms that give reference to maturity, gender, quantity and status in relation to a certain group of people, indigenous or native, to represent a certain ethnicity, culture and livelihood.

Provocatively, a specimen of natural sciences is documented with generalising categories of which they are examples. In comparison to the 'Western' history of the Arctic, the difference becomes much clearer with the names of the leading explorer, "Martin Frobisher" (Sale 2008, 95), the expeditions "Sir John Franklin's overland expedition" (ibid., 128) and ships "H.M.S. North Star" (ibid., 122), as well

as their findings and recordings "Inuit poem recorded by Knud Rasmussen" (ibid., 144), biographies that are contained in documents and memorials, emphasising the history of 'white men'. The natives' lives are documented and represented very much with the same technique as the native flora and fauna, almost as a response to the question "Can people who feel home in the North be fully human?" (Möller & Pehkonen 2003, 3). Then again, the more modern 'white lives' seem to remain absent from these descriptions and depictions almost completely, as if the history is completed in the exhibitions and is discovered continuously from aboriginal artefacts.

As the history of the Arctic *in making* indicates, it is not purely a matter of a group of disciplines, but also a variety of arts. As Potter (2007) has shown, art and science have worked and taken place in close cooperation, co-conducting the same phenomena. As a counter to the mimesis argument, the anti-mimesis claims that art does not imitate the visible, but it makes visible (see Krame 2019, ep. 3). How about science, then? Does science 'mimic' nature, in the attempt to prove that nature exists? Does it make visible something that cannot be seen, or even bring something into existence rather than imitate something that already exists? In the natural sciences, to provide proof of a natural phenomenon, one has to be able to simulate it in a controlled environment, to reproduce the same phenomenon, a manmade replication. But if these natural phenomena are manmade, is there a possibility that the manufacturing leaves a kind of fingerprint on the very essence of the phenomenon?

Let us return this argument momentarily back to an artistic process. Leonardo da Vinci is known to have left his actual fingerprint on a portrait while adjusting the paint. Besides leaving a biological marker of his own individuality on a portrait perpetuating a person, he, among other painters, has modified the paint with a brush, the hair of which neither belongs to the portrayed or the portrayer, but to an anonymous animal. It is a third element in the dialogue, leading to equation "1+1=3" (Cousins 2018, ep.3). This 'third party' is the '+' in the equation, since it enables the other two to merge together and to transform into something else. It is like the form of a zero subject in a sentence: not apparent as a word, but still implied. In the process of portrait, a posing subject is taken in by the vision and moved into a gesture, objectifying the pose on a canvas, recording both the perceived subject and the movement of the hand and the apparatus, the brush. The same goes for science, down to the most minuscule parts and particles. This argument closely relates to what could be recognised as the core paradigm in Barad's *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (2007), wherein the question moves beyond representations as reflections, as the 'mirroring' of nature, to performativity. Rather than supporting a thesis of anti-mimesis, Barad's work is about the totality of the process: the human or any other involved subject, object or apparatus does not reveal something that

is independently already there, but rather are influential and inseparable in co-constituting the very phenomenon which they seek to observe. In other words, there is no impartiality in science. So, that which is considered to be 'truth' about the world, is always manmade, manufactured, reproduced and represented as an object of science.

While the study of the Arctic does not have a single science, a single discipline or a single art, it raises a question: What is the nature of such attempt in the manner of theoretical hypothesis and in the matter of methodological approaches? How does such mix-and-match work? Such orientation has a tradition, in humanist sciences and arts, derived from manufacturing, known as *bricolage*. Claude Lévi-Strauss, known widely from his study of myths by means of structural anthropology, presented in his work *The Savage Mind* (1966 [1962]) the term 'bricolage'. The term stands for an outcome made from whatever is available in a creative and resourceful manner, disregarding their possible other intended purposes. It is how a 'savage', who is not bound by status, obligation or etiquette, but has something to gain, may make ends meet, whether it is a matter of patching, combining or bending. Therefore, similar approaches used in science take it closer to what is known as 'art', a word that not only refers to an expression but to the talent, the skills, the crafts(man)ship required to make it. Lévi-Strauss writes that when it comes to bricolage, as in art, there are several solutions to the same problem (ibid., 24). The collages of craftsmanship in transposition thus take place in the realms of contemplation as bricolage (ibid., 30).

> *"An elephant that ate a devil fruit with the powers of a sword!?"*
>
> *"Nope, the opposite in fact: my sword ate the elephant-elephant fruit. It's a long story."*
>
> — *One Piece, animated series directed by Munehisa Sakai, 2006–2007, season 9, episode 285, English dub.*

What can be interpreted from Lévi-Strauss's analysis is a critical remark on the "choice of one solution" that "involves a modification of the result to which another solution would have led" (Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962], 24). In a sense, this argument claims that, to choose is to modify: to choose is to consequent in a manner wherein the analysis ought to move on fixed terms pre-set by the scientific framework of theory, methodology and data. Furthermore, the observer, in the act of choosing, has included themselves as an inseparable part of the result, "in effect presented with the general picture of these permutations at the same time as the particular solution offered […] thereby transformed into an active participant without even being aware of it" (ibid., 24). The multiplicity of approaches, and combining them, does not undo the participation regardless. What it does do is abandon a straight,

linear development of a thesis, creating double-or-more images, a kaleidoscopic structure, setting into movement a turning-around of events.

Hence, the scientific argumentation of the thesis at hand looks for a resemblance to what Lévi-Strauss says about bricolage: "to construct a system of paradigms with the fragments of syntagmatic chains" (Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962], 150 footnote) with a tendency to fall upside down or turn inside out. Bricolage also concerns how we collect and treat research material. In Lévi-Strauss's comparison between myths and bricolage, the method is to "take to pieces and reconstruct sets of events (on a psychical, socio-historical or technical plane) and use them […] for the structural patterns in which they serve alternatively as ends or means" (Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962], 33). According to Derrida, "the means at hand" approach is based on using trial and error to adapt different traditions, having no hesitation to make changes between them, leading to heterogenous form with altering origins. In the manner of writing, it is a critique of language—or rather, bricolage is critical language itself (Derrida 1978 [1967], 285). Derrida disposes of any dichotomies in relation to the use of bricolage, such as Lévi-Strauss's engineer and bricoleur, since every finite discourse is bound by a certain bricolage and the concept that there would be any real difference is a myth (ibid.). Derrida emphasises the usefulness of such terms as bricolage and the fact that such terms can only exist in relation to defined difference and opposites: here, bricolage would translate as 'that which is not engineering' (Spivak 1997 [1974], xx).

> *Things have a life of their own, […] It's simply a matter of waking up their souls.*
>
> *— One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel García Márquez, 1970.*

Bricolage is not just a matter of choosing the best, as is done in eclecticism. It surely utilises multiple approaches, styles and concepts when it comes to theories and methods. It seeks complementary insights into the studied subject and applies them to particular cases, as is done by an eclectic. What bricolage may do differently is that it may not just engage in the question of forcing, luring or fitting things to work on one's behalf to reach a certain goal. Rather, these participatory powers may in the process alter the aim and suggest completely new paradigms. As Derrida notes, Lévi-Strauss has a double-intention: preserve concepts and approaches instrumentally by exposing them for use, which will also remark their limits. From this act, the criticism of their truth-value emerges in the practice (Spivak 1997 [1974] xviii). While they remain to exist as applied artefacts, they are also used in order to "destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of which they themselves are pieces" (ibid., xix). Therefore, while utilising the practice of bricolage, in a sense placing the artefact of bricolage in use with the

purely instrumental reasons of a bricoleur, the term itself is placed "under erasure" (ibid., xx).

Accepting the principles of new materialism that recognise the agency of matter—as a matter of fact, this should concern the conducting of research as well. If this acceptance concerns the manipulation of the matter of research to conduct data from it for analytical mattering, why should it not concern the selection of the matter of research as well? By this I mean that we are not to be concerned only by the fact that our research methods and instruments are an active, or, rather, fundamental part of the scientific outcome; we must also consider that the studied matter has agency as well, in whether or not it takes place. As for the question of how to choose and collect data, I had an intuition early on the research process: *the data will find me*, as it had before, always taking one by surprise and with forceful intensity. And so it did, several times. And therefore, the trouble did find me (see Haraway 2016). I did not choose it, but I made it my own.

> *You put water into a cup; it becomes the cup. You put water into a teapot; it becomes the teapot. You put it into a bottle; it becomes the bottle. Now water can flow, or it can crash!*
>
> *— Be Water, My Friend: The Teachings of Bruce Lee by Shannon Lee, 2020.*

Let us have a better look at the way the mentioned 'data', and its 'choosing', 'making', 'force' and 'surprise' ought to be considered. 'Data' is understood commonly as passive, neutral and unproblematic objects to be coded, organised and interpreted. It is 'dumb matter', intelligible only by the significance given to it by linguistic and cultural systems that 'represent' it. This approach presumes it is contained and controllable, something that can be collected and analysed "in order to arrive at research conclusions" (Koro-Ljungberg & MacLure 2013, 219). The forms that data may take are "survey responses, numbers, interview transcripts, artifacts, texts, observations, notes, images" (ibid.), to mention a few. As Mirka Koro-Ljunber and Maggie MacLure exemplify with this philosophy, they could also or instead include: expressions of will, intuition, material impact, substance, intensities, and being there in everyday happenings (ibid.). One problematisation of data that also applies to the methods which provide, manage or manipulate it is whether the data analysis approves the unexpected: whether it fits in the used schema or whether it is erased as unsubstantial or "covered up" (ibid.).

From erasure emerges a new issue, that of the "data beyond presence"—the importance of an absence and errors, what counts and what is accountable. From the 'data's' ability or its tendency to resist, to respond and to ask for responsibility in relation to its 'maker', one should ask also about the appealing, surrendering and inviting 'data'. What are the desires behind this encounter, whether it is imprinted

in the data-matter, the human factor or in the discipline and the scientific practice itself? Therefore, "potentially data is equally tainted by a persistent humanism [...] perpetually reinstating the autonomous human subject behind its own back" (Koro-Ljungberg & MacLure 2013, 220). Rather than using the word 'tainted', I would renounce it as 'stained', where handling of any kind leaves a fingerprint on the object of inquiry. Subjectivity gains a form in the data-matter, and the form of the data-matter has subjectively altered. From the unintelligible matter, controllable and containable data and representative language, we have to move to a realisation of the agency of the matter, the taint of data, the materiality of language and the cultivation of cultural settings. The agency of matter radically questions the treating and understanding of 'data' as controllable and contained. As Ljungberg and MacLure suggest, rather than addressing something as objectified 'data', we should consider it 'data-becoming', always in the making, to be found in its becoming, resisting any permanency or closure (ibid.).

> *Do not ask Why? Be cautious with How? Why? leads inexorably to paradox. How? traps you in a universe of cause and effect. Both deny the infinite.*
>
> *— Heretics of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1984.*

> *[...] to select and reject from a multitude of offerings in a system where answers change as fast as the question. There could be no fixed traditions. There could be no absolute answers to double-faced questions.*
>
> *— Children of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1976.*

According to St. Pierre, Jean-François Lyotard argues that in writing, something 'asks' to be put into words or is summoned by language (St. Pierre 2021, 3)—when rephrased, this point could mean that things come into being in enabling writing. Something similar concerns the way the research material and the research questions came to be in the study presented here. I did not have a well formulated question to ask regarding a specific matter, but rather I had a question about the way that the matter emerged as an 'answer to'. A piece of matter was, in a sense, a readymade conclusion in its becoming that I had to find my way around by questioning it. The matter en*tailed* questions. What I had was a predisposition and exposure, brought by scientific conduct, to a multidisciplinary working community and a shared space with science and museum exhibitions, staff, items and practice, all on the verge of the circumpolar Arctic. As the PhD research project did not start at a specific point in time, there was no systematic collection of data from a certain field across a period of time, but rather the long-term exposure to sources of knowledge with a multimodal character—those of spoken, written, gestured, exhibited and projected content, from stories and news reports to simulations, films, exhibition pieces and

performances, facts and fictions. According to post-qualitative inquiry, one does not have to be in some particular place, research site or field to do empirical fieldwork when the site or the field is limitless, immanent, 'not yet', and always becoming (St. Pierre 2019, 10). The research had already begun before any specific method was introduced, or any strict guidelines, research design or process procedure were established (see ibid., 12). Rather than through extensive reading on a given topic, the studied matters became significant to analysis in detail as when something obvious emerges as extraordinary, "an old encounter that won't let go or a new one that's become intelligible" (ibid.).

By 'detail', I mean for example a single storyline or wording in a lengthy series of presentations on Indigenous lives lived in the Arctic, the wondering of a colleague while taking a break from science exhibition maintenance concerning a worn-out part in the exhibition, a lack of something or sudden change in regular patterns, a single scene in a documentary film depicting the living quarters during field work, self-observation among these encounters, or a revelation aroused by a simple misspelled or misheard word. For me they appear, in Freudian manner, as a collective slip of tongue, where a 'mistake' is never to be considered a simple, individualistic variable, an insignificant stumble, but as a matter of involvement with others, peaking phenomena. These slips may come about in other ways than the ways of the tongue. They are not bound to written or spoken language. They may as well be slips of a foot, slips of a hand, slips of a blade, which are openings for sometimes unexpected outcomes, or outcomings. As Foucault puts it, to do history is to "identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us" (Foucault 1997, 81). What purpose they will serve depends on how they serve their purpose.

> I ask the reader to remember that what is most obvious may be most worth of analysis. Fertile vistas may open out when commonplace facts are examined from a fresh point of view.
>
> — The Unitary Principle in Physics and Biology by L. L. Whyte, 1949.

> History is not the past. It is the present. We carry our history with us. We are our history.
>
> — James Baldwin in I Am Not Your Negro by Raoul Peck, 2016.

Each of these glimpses could be characterised with a term that Bravo and Sörlin use in explaining the scientific history of the Arctic: that is, "accumulating material inscriptions" (Bravo & Sörlin 2002b, 4). This expression I interpret as a recognition that events carry the weight of history and, therefore, are extensively meaningful.

The event should not be considered only as a temporality. Since events take place, it is to be considered spatially as well. Therefore, I understand the event to refer as much to the time when it occurs as to its materiality, in the sense of an artefactual or documental piece. Understanding an event is to consider it in terms of *eventualisation*, as it is established by Foucault.

Foucault's eventualisation differs from the structuralist tradition, since it does not establish an event in a linear continuum of history as a given object, society being such an object, but rather treats it as a regime of practice (Haghighi 2018, 129, 131). Foucault states in *Table ronde du 20 mai 1978, L'Impossible Prison* that eventualisation is rediscovering encounters, blockages, forces and strategies which, in a given moment, establish the self-evident; it is the pluralisation of causes (ibid., Raffnsøe, Thaning & Gudmand-Hoyer 2016, 89). Therefore, it disrupts the continuity in contrast to traditional history. There is no promise of a return to the self, which is under constant destruction in a domain where origins are instable and forces are in conflict (Haghighi 2018, 131). The same phenomenon of events is studied extensively in another work of Foucault. Concerning Foucault's discursive method, also known as the archaeology of knowledge, Andrew W. Neal explains that the idea of a single break, interrupting all discursive formations in a single moment and reconstituting them according to the same rules, is not a coherent idea—but neither is the repetitive and the uninterrupted, in comparison to ruptures (Neal 2006, 37). Neal argues that practices add and relate to each other in a variety of ways, including in a non-coherent and non-predictable manner (ibid.). Foucauldian understanding of an event combines a description of historically situated discursive formations and assemblages of power, and it describes how those configurations are transformed in their expression and exercise (ibid.). In eventualisation, when something *capital* is studied, God is in the de*tails*.

To exemplify eventualisation in terms of investigated object—as a documented and recorded representation from which 'data' is derived, how this relatively small take or sample is supposedly a sufficient entrance to a larger phenomenon both in horizontal spatiality and vertical temporality, how it is applicable to the natural sciences working on samples and statistics—I will have to return to my very first days entering the academic community and glancing to scientific work on the Arctic. In the same corridor with my office, there was a glaciologist studying climate variability in the European Arctic by investigating the chemistry of the snow and new ice cores extracted from Svalbard ice caps. The objective was to create future ice core-based environmental reconstructions and climate model projections for the Barents region (see Beaudon 2012). She had a printout consisting of several pieces of paper on the wall of her office that represented the drilled ice core. An ice core is a sample removed from an ice sheet or a mountain glacier with an auger, a type of drill with a hollow barrel drill for removal. Ice core forms from the incremental build-up of annual layers of snow, a type of physical timeline

in depth. The ice cores are drilled kilometres deep and contain ice hundreds of years old: its physical properties and the material trapped within it are used to reconstruct climate conditions over the age range of the core (see Davis 2020; National Science Foundation 2021).

As I was looking at the printouts, I realised that while the diameter of the drilled-out cylinder is obviously very narrow in comparison to the vastness of the glacier, it is under the very same forces and conditions as the rest of the glacier from which it has been separated. While it has been taken apart from this studied whole, leaving a physical hole, it is yet a part of the whole studied phenomenon. This drilling of the core is a single event that yet contains all the histories of the forces that are invested in it, from natural to historical events, from volcanic activity to industrialisation, all emerging from the surface in the act of cutting of a part apart.

The second realisation was that what I was facing at that exact moment was not actually the ice core sample but its representation printed on a two-dimensional surface with a precise, geometrically standard form, consisting of pulp instead of ice. In other words, I was looking at and studying a document. This document and the recorded measurements from the core sample where probably much less vulnerable than the actual ice core that was stored in the cold room. As I came to acknowledge this fact, it was under a constant threat of being corrupted by the touch of the present moment and new forces influencing it. Any change in temperature after the core is drilled could taint the sample, could alter and ruin the 'data', since this 'container' of information is actually still water and may take any new shape or form when it comes into contact with a different temperature. A 'commoner' would hardly have an understanding of how vulnerable the sample was, or may not even recognize it as a sample, since it was simply ice. Any refreezing could not 'save' what was 'saved' in the sample in the moment of its taking apart, constantly under the threat of becoming a part of something new, entering the present as something else, making time fluid. Therefore, these photographic printouts were much more stabilised as frozen moments in time than the removed core. And yet, they were under different kind of alterations—I was admiring the golden, yellowish colouring of the prints that was actually the outcome of a mistake of colour adjustment.

As time passed further, the ice core sample met its next physical transformation after its deconstruction into data particles, broken into pieces to cool down drinks at the party after the defence of an academic dissertation. During this scientific study, the 'data' literally was more or less "wondered, eaten, walked, […], listen to, written, […] pictured, […], drawn, and lived" (Koro-Ljungberg & MacLure 2013, 220). Starting from the expedition to the glacier and ending up in the drink cooler bucket, the 'data' was reformed in the excavation into cylinder and sheet, contained and constantly under erasure, its history in the state of becoming and begone.

According to Derrida, this reasoning is fundamentally against the preferences of Western culture, which desires a stability that is nevertheless impossible, since all systems contain their own contradictions and instabilities (Klages 2006, 61–62). In language there is no fundament that determines what every word means. While we expect language to have definite relation to meanings, as in the manner of bricolage, language's ambiguous characteristics create multiple meanings for a single word, enabling, for example, puns and poetry (ibid., 62). It may not be that the language lacks accuracy in its ambiguity, but rather that it has been successful in capturing the ambiguity of the world in words.

> *The science in which we are caught up, which forms the context of the action of all of us in the time in which we are living, and which the psycho-analyst himself cannot escape, because it forms part of his conditions too, is science itself.*
>
> *— Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan, 1977 [1973], 231.*

In research, one is expected to know what one is searching for. Accordingly, the things which we are not searching for are distractions and to be ignored, moved away or taken apart. The way to find one's way around things is known as a method. Therefore, the method partially responds to what can be known or studied and from what matter. Inbuilt in the method is the way to knowledge, or, more accurately, a certain way to a certain kind of knowledge. Following this methodology, one is expected to know what to do. Here, St. Pierre stops to ask, "why do you think you should know what to do?" (St. Pierre 2021, 164). Given that the method gives way to research knowledge, "methodology is a trap" (ibid.)—it captures both the researcher and the 'data', but it also restrains and eliminates, and it may be passed by without being triggered. According to St. Pierre, methodology reached its limits in inquiring into the complexity of the world after the post-human and new material turns during the late 20th and early 21st centuries (St. Pierre 2019, 3). Therefore St. Pierre's understanding of post-qualitative inquiry does not have a pre-existing, formalised, systematised, procedural method or methodology that is comparable to qualitative research, which the post-structuralist traditions emphasise as over-determinising and increasing the control of thought (St. Pierre 2021, 163–165). St. Pierre encourages us to engage with the old and the new elements from the humanities, the natural sciences, history and literature, since much of the new is coming from the old (ibid., 164–165) or, as one could put it, emerging from its heritage (Foucault 1997, 80) on its way, yet to be, still in the state of becoming. This idea also concerns the 'methods' in the present study. These 'methods' for the research are, in a way, a way, away, on the way, on my way, and on their way.

"Tracking something," said Winnie-the-Pooh very mysteriously.

"Tracking what?" said Piglet, coming closer.

"That's just what I ask myself. I ask myself, What?"

"What do you think you'll answer?"

"I shall have to wait until I catch up with it,"

— Winnie-the-Pooh by A. A. Milne, 1926.

The breaking of a convention is usually expected to be done only by someone who knows the tradition that they are attempting to renew or resist. If this is so, the act of not following a tradition may serve as proof of mastery over it. Then again, to ask somebody to break the rules is paradigmatic, since in that asking or requesting, the breaking of the rule has become a norm wherein one actually follows an instruction instead of moving against or away from it. Therefore, the rule can be broken only when the rule remains in force. Following the thought of Derrida, "Knowledge is not a systematic tracking down of a truth that is hidden but may be found"; it is "a field of infinite substitutions in the closure of a finite ensemble" (Spivak 1997 [1974], xix). In this search of "the ever new and the never exhausted signification" Lacan emphasises the threat of "being trampled under foot by him who finds" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 7–8). Therefore, we are not impartial in the immanent world and its wordings, but taking part in it, affecting with our search what may emerge and what may be annihilated.

In the thesis, we will not be free from the failures of language. We will not be free from the positions set in history and set today. And first and foremost, we will not be free from the critique that will be presented of the various practices of conducting 'the Arctic' through science and art. In studying them and their occurrences, we will inevitably and unavoidably re-evoke them and rely on them. These practical, linguistic, institutional or other kinds of failures, if we ought not live and act in denial, need to be encountered and enacted with. I cannot deny the *ratio* and rationality of language as the Dadaists might have done, but I will work with the puns and riddles, linguistic and visuals "interruptively […] to break the illusion of smooth text or the dominance of argument" (Koro-Ljungberg & MacLure 2013, 220). In Thompson's graphic novel it is ﺏ that, by re-emerging and taking new forms, carries the story on. Our keywords provide access to closed contents, and they will guide and carry us: we will navigate and move further with a *bear* as our guide and a *ship* as our vessel over the troubled waters, to "orientate oneself" and to "find one's bearings in thought" (Deleuze & Guattari 1994 [1991], 37). What are we heading for, *we'll figure out as we go …*

Arctic, artic, artique, articus, arcticus, arktikos, arktos, Ursus maritimus… there it stands, on four legs, the living icon of the Arctic region, but its animate life has already left decades ago. The impression is glowing white, soft and furry, inviting with its lowered head and placidly staring eyes. The stand of 'ice' places the creature's nose on a reachable level for an adult human being, without kneeling or bending, almost allowing a mundane gesture such as a handshake or a hug—to become familiar with it. It seems to be the very opposite of representations such as Sir Edwin Landseer's *Man Proposes, God Disposes* (1964), which illustrate the bestial nature of polar bears in their habitat and in contact with people (Potter 2007, 162, 28–29 plate 11).

The figure described is a part of a diorama, a science exhibition piece belonging to 'Arctic in Change', a permanent exhibition located in the Arktikum Science Centre in Rovaniemi, Finnish Lapland. The diorama represents a polar bear in its natural habitat as a part of exhibiting and teaching "the conditions, nature, cultures and adaptation to extreme circumstances that occur in the far north as well as showcases multidisciplinary Arctic research in an interactive way that appeals to the general public" (Arktikum 2017). As the diorama well displays, the polar bear is the "key figure" (Yusoff 2010, 75), a "mythical and biophysical storyteller" in the "contemporary political aesthetics of climate change" (ibid., 74).

The difference in comparison with a typical museum is that the goal of Arktikum is to enable the visitors to learn not only by using text and audiovisual material but also by encouraging them to interact with most of the exhibition's objects by pulling, touching, moving, placing and choosing—by using all their senses and motoric abilities (Vola 2017, 57–58). Thereby and by, the bear has touched and been touched by many. The white fur on its nose has withered away while it has been *in* touch with its audience and the skin of the bear is bare, but that bareness bears a meaning—that of a change.

> *If I don't have real answers, it is because we still don't know what questions to ask. Our instruments are useless, our methodology broken, our motivations selfish.*
>
> *— Annihilation by Jeff VanderMeer, 2014.*

> *A wise person once said with a smile, the answer is within the question.*
>
> *— Twin Peaks by David Lynch and Mark Frost, 1993 [1990], season 2, episode 6, Log Lady introduction.*

Don't search for all the answers at once. A path is formed by laying one stone at a time.

— Twin Peaks by David Lynch and Mark Frost, 1990, season 2, episode 1.

We will take the bear as our guide, first to understand 'in change' and then to understand 'the Arctic'. These terms are taken here as answers instead of research questions. Having the answer before the actual research is conducted is against any scientific standard, but we will start from the answer, since the right question has proved to be more difficult to find. In terms of finding, Lacan quotes artist Pablo Picasso: "*I do not seek, I find*" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 7, emphasis original). Rather than expressing confidence or arrogance, Picasso is surrendering to the reality, where one does not know where one is headed, what one might face and what to look for. Following the quotation, one is rather drawn by the target than defining target themselves. Lacan continues by addressing a division between the research that seeks and the one that finds with a religious phrasing: "*You would not seek me if you had not already found me*" (ibid., emphasis original). As "[T]he *already found* is already behind" (ibid., 8, emphasis original), it has nevertheless been the first step, setting us to a certain track and is pushing us forward. It is actually the question that leads everything that is followed by it, dictating a predestined script. As Barad says in reference to Michael Frayn's play *Copenhagen* performed in 2000, questions remain long after their owners have died, lingering like ghosts, looking for the answer (Barad 2010, 242). The suggestion is that the questions might not even belong to ourselves, but to somebodies who have passed on and passed them on. In a new materialistic reading of research question setting, for me the questions, marked by '?', are like fishing hooks: '¿'. Throw them into water to lure and to catch something, but what exactly is caught (if anything) and when it happens is up to what is offered and what offers itself. Still, we do have an expectation of what to catch, which determines the reason we have placed the hooks in the water in the first place.

The power of a research question is enormous, since it indicates what we are seeking and are likely to find out. The paradoxicality of such a predeterminant setting was presented with good humour in Douglas Adams' novel *The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy* (1979), where the "Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything" produced a short numeric answer: "42". The answer indeed was claimed to be absolutely correct, but the question was wrong, and to figure out the right question was a much more difficult task to tackle. As St. Pierre writes, "One begins post-qualitative inquiry with a concrete encounter […], not with a research question" (St. Pierre 2019, 12). That is why we are lacking the right questions. We must find them first, in an encounter, to understand whatever the answer would be and mean. *Bear with me …*

And he drew off the skin of my head [...] and mingled the bones with the pieces of flesh, and caused them to be burned upon the fire of the art, till I perceived by the transformation of the body that I had become spirit. [...] And I saw how he changed into the opposite of himself, into a mutilated anthroparion [...] and sank into himself.

— Visions of Zosimos of Panopolis in Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 13: Alchemical Studies by Carl Gustav Jung, 1983 [1967], 60.

Representationalism marks a failure to take account of the practices through which representations are produced.

— Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning by Karen Barad, 2007, 53.

When you're dead, they really fix you up.

— The Catcher in the Rye by J.D. Salinger, 1951.

Come and join me, would you? I'm literally coming to pieces!

— Nighttime is Great by Ariel Pink, 2017.

The history of the diorama of the polar bear at Arktikum is known by some as 'Project Big Blonde'. The project of polar bear taxidermy was conducted by the Finnish Museum of Natural History in the winter season of 1991–1992 and the spring season of 1992, led by conservators Erik Weckman and Henrik Rosenius, who were assisted by Roni Andersson and a team of conservation students. The female polar bear (deceased) was transported from an anonymised animal park to the museum on 27 April, 1976, where it was carefully measured. The already tanned hide and bones were contained as well. The condition of the hide was poor due to the partial state of the polar bear's molting season and the drying and shrinking of the skin during the containing. The yellowish fur was chemically bleached to gain a white colour, but due to unsatisfactory results it was finally partially spray painted (Finnish Museum of Natural History, 1992).

In the making, the figure of the polar bear Big Blonde consisted of the support plate, made of 1.5cm thick chipboard, and the head, made of urethane. A picture board of photographs of polar bears assisted the artistic process. In the next phase, wiring the bones, the hips and the legs were joined together with wires and the back and front were connected to the support plate (Museum of Natural History 1992, 1–5). After building a leg support to carry the weight of the model (ibid., 8)

the smaller bones were connected and the structure was enforced with clay (ibid., 9). The body's shape was made by using metal net as a frame for burlap saturated in wet plaster (ibid., 10) and supported by a contemporary wooden outer frame (ibid., 11). The legs were made of clay (ibid., 12) and the humeri were connected to the core (ibid., 14). While the figure was shaped by covering it with clay, bare spots were left as markings for the connection points of joints, muscles and tendons, to correctly replicate the anatomy of the bear. The bear's stomach was shaped from urethane and connected with plastic wrap to the core, giving the bear's figure the correct shape without making the construction too heavy (ibid.,15). When the clay mannequin was ready (ibid., 17), its surface was divided into sectors with thin walls of fine clay to enable functional sizes for the pieces of the plaster mould. To get the dried plaster pieces detached, the clay mannequin's surface was oiled (ibid., 18). The upper part of the model was deconstructed and then reconstructed like a puzzle, while the lower part remained one solid piece including the lower jaw, stomach, the inner side of the legs and the paws. Separated pieces of dried plaster were tied together with wire, the holes were closed by plaster and the lower part of the cast was enforced with iron frame, after which the urethane was poured into the shoulders and back, forming the final core of the displayed bear (ibid., 22–23). The bear's bones, which were used in the clay mannequin, were separated out and cleaned of clay, then archived (ibid., 23). The moistened and rinsed hide was glued to the urethane mannequin with dextrin (ibid., 26) and connected with piercing nails of different sizes pushed deep into the urethane (ibid., 27). The hide was set in its final form when the skin dried up (ibid., 28). A great number of nails and pins were used on the sculpture, especially around the eyes, to give the bear the correct shape and expression, which was the most difficult and consuming task (ibid., 29). The head of the bear was made of clay, using the skull as a core frame (ibid., 32). Thin slices of clay were attached to the surface to divide the clay head into sectors (ibid., 33) and oiled (ibid., 34) before it was covered with plaster (ibid., 35). The dried plaster mould was then opened (ibid., 36) and support wires were placed inside before filling it with urethane. When the mould was opened again, the head was ready, with the wires coming out from its neck (ibid., 37) enabling it to be bound to the torso.

As the saying goes, the truth comes from the mouths of children. The truth might come out in a form of a question instead of an answer. That question might owe its truth-bearing nature to the 'elephant in the room'. When it comes to the diorama of the Arctic in Change, the polar bear is addressed with a question, "Is it real?", by many of the children visiting the spot, according to science communicator Marjo Laukkanen. Therefore, one must ask: through its surface and down to its core, what is the Big Blonde? Can it be approached in terms of 'real', 'artificial' or 'authentic'? The question falls into the problem of vagueness, that which does not clearly belong to a certain or singular category. It is somewhat similar to the

classical philosophical paradox in the field of metaphysics and identity, the *ship of Theseus*. This experiment of thought asks whether a ship that has had all of its components replaced one by one remains nameable as the same object.

The ship of Theseus is not just any ship. It carries the name of its fielder and the fame brought by a glorified moment in history. The renewal, conservation and further renewal are done overtime to restore its condition. Not doing so would lead to the ship to perish due to corruption. A ship that has no components replaced overtime would not be a ship that materially exists as a ship anymore. In another version, the question states that if the replaced pieces are kept, conserved and used for building a model of the same ship after its renovation, would we then have two originals, instead of one, or none? (see Swartz 2001, 346–348).

> *In that museum [...] You could go there a hundred thousand times, and that Eskimo would still be just finished catching those two fish, the birds would still be on their way south, the deers would still be drinking out of that water hole [...] The only thing that would be different would be you.*
>
> — *The Catcher in the Rye by J.D. Salinger, 1951.*

Another way to answer the paradox is to approach the object(s) as object-at-the-time or an event and emergence. A subject can be altered by time and experience; it is not the same after going through certain life stages, even without extreme physical changes. In the case of more radical change, identity or identification requires that the result of the change is spatiotemporally continuous with earlier parts, where the ship is understood as "identity-through-time" (Swartz 2001, 346, 348). In contrast to the way childbirth and pregnancy changes the body of a female down to the bone structure, the becoming of father comes with little physical change in the same nine months but radically changes the fathering subject. In addition, objects are marked by time and experienced differently when resituated in other spatial-temporal settings, either by placing the ship into a different harbour or seeing it in the same harbour after the perceiving subject has gone through other sea travels and seen other harbours (Bross 2020, 2.2).

The Greek philosopher Heraclitus's solution to the *ship of Theseus* paradox would be that the ship is itself ever changing, as are the waters upon which it sails, because the component parts are continuously replacing or re-arranging themselves. Regardless of the changes, we consider it the same because we perceive the nature of the object both at each individual moment of its existence and over time (Bross 2020, 2.1). Therefore, the identity of the *ship of Theseus* could be restated as its *ShipOfTheseusness*, a property and a quality with many interrelated parts, including both the ships and the surroundings withholding the ones perceiving, those who are naming and recalling the ship. This phenomenal

nature of the object, in Aristotelian terms, can be divided into four 'causes': formal, material, efficient and final (ibid., 2.3). In terms of the Big Blonde, the curators considered the physical and visual appearance of structure and texture (as a formal cause), its material (material cause), the process, methods and agency in making the object (efficient cause) and its purpose (final cause). This analytical categorisation differentiate, in most of the cases, the anonymous deceased female polar bear from the Big Blonde, as the object is dependent on the moment and standpoint from which the purpose is defined.

The Big Blonde mimics a polar bear in its form, lacking its momentum but containing a moment. When it comes to the material cause, the bear is transformed from organic to synthetic—but then again, only partially, and even the missing organic parts have acted on the creation of the mannequin. They also have a life of and on their own, archived elsewhere. Neither of these causes are fully completed or dismissed. This conclusion follows from Kristeva's concept of intertextuality, where poles presenting binary oppositions are non-exclusive and co-existing, refusing the Aristotelian 'true or false' claim (Still & Worton 1991 [1990], 17). Therefore, the Big Blonde's case escapes the logic of either-or, the claim that approaches yielding conflicting answers "cannot both be regarded as 'right'" (Swartz 2001, 348) and enters the thin surface of fuzzy logic, the concept of partial truth, where the truth value may range between completely true and completely false (see Estava et al. 2015, 3). The efficient cause—the making and being made, described above—would draw a fundamental line between the bear and the Big Blonde, animate and inanimate, unless this making process is understood in the light of the rules of the formal cause. In the formal cause we pay attention to the texture (that which is perceived as the 'outside'), and the structure (the unperceivable 'inside'), and how they take turns in the making, the efficient cause of the Big Blonde. There is a multi-layered de- and reconstruction process in taxidermy. What is at one point the inside of the Big Blonde-in-becoming, later emerges as its outside. Also, the forms of production with the inanimate object replicate the ones present in the reproduction of the animate subject: The plaster mould is built around the clay mannequin that serves as a container for the liquid urethane, as the womb with amniotic fluid for the reborn figure of the bear, a female parent to its cub. Such technological queering of 'natural processes' are not strange for biology when it comes to human influence in aiming for desired outcomes in the quality or quantity of the offspring (see Franklin 2003).

The lack of knowledge concerning the biography of the living anonymous bear successfully brings out the elusiveness and the flux of the final cause. We are unaware if the bear was born in captivity or if it was captured, which could affect how the purpose of its life is defined. This of course dependent on the standpoint from which the argument about the purpose is conducted. Arguably, a bear born free is filling its purpose by performing its biology in the ecosystem for

self-preservation and reproduction. A bear born in captivity is meant to perform or rather to represent its biology within the restraints of society for teaching purpose or for awe and entertainment for the public. Which of these is its primary purpose can be argued on both sides. Whether the bear 'is the same' as the Big Blonde depends on whether the bear exists for bears' sake or whether the sake of science and pedagogy, and possibly therefore for the sake of the preservation of the species, comes above the importance of the life of an individual animal.

What we have learned from the *ship of Theseus* is that when we discuss the ship, instead of a fixed object we may consider both the ship with replaced parts and the one reconstructed from the displaced parts to be *emergences* of the *heritage* of the s*hip of Theseus*, both ships generating from the same principle or phenomenon. This genealogical approach disqualifies the notion of the original, following the work of Foucault in Nietzsche's genealogical consideration of history and methods of studying it (Foucault 1997). Rather than speaking of origins, *Ursprung*, in genealogy one should employ two related and distinctive terms: *emergence* ('*Entstehung*') and *heritage* ('*Herkunft*') (ibid., 80). These two terms in unison comprise the genealogical study of beginnings, numberless beginnings (ibid., 81), which do not justify a specific discourse or final outcome on a state of affairs. They keep on becoming. The conceptions of the ship-at-the-time, the object-at-the-time or the identity-through-time come to terms with Foucault's eventualisation, wherein a singular moment is captured for analysis to deconstruct the forces that are invested in it and the relations that keep it together. We have to consider the Big Blonde an event, and a continuous one at that.

In Foucault's writing, the heritage is a "stock or descent" and "the ancient affiliation"; it is not the predetermined form of a group, but "the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult to unravel" (Foucault 1997, 81). Emergence is the moment of arising of a certain phenomenon from the heritage, "the principle and the singular law of an apparition", not to be thought of as "the final term of a historical development", as "the eye was not always intended for contemplation, and punishment has had other purposes than setting an example" (ibid., 83). I would recall or restate these descriptions of conditions by considering the heritage to be the undefined materiality of continuous history that surfaces in moments of emergence with various appearances and names, which reinvests into heritage as (dis)continuities.

It follows that we ought to study the heritage through the emergences, the moments in time, to figure out the history in the making, since it is only through these emergences that the time, differences and continuities are established. The surfacing of the heritage as emergence is not to be considered superficial; rather, that emergence is holding all the matter of the heritage of historical events under it, along with the full capacity to influence it. This is the case for the Big Blonde. Its realness, authenticity, genuine nature, identity and origins all come

into question through a definition that asks for spatiotemporal continuity, where to "identify a thing by its parts requires that the parts, at some point or other, be identified by their being spatiotemporally continuous with earlier parts" (Swartz 2001, 348). Surely different parts have been in touch with one another during the process, but this process includes many displacements—dismembering, tearing and wearing out, splitting the earthly remains of the bear both physically and institutionally and even replacing and restating its position and function within the science centre in the renewal of the exhibition, moving it from a high stand to the floor level to make it more accessible. Even the documented process of the 'Project Big Blonde' describes and depicts several 'generations', moments of passing and rebirth taking place, eggs being laid, their shells being broken and refilled. The figure of the bear is not atomistic by any means, but very much inherited. The emergence emphasises that identity can be re-established several times, both in the future and retrospectively. Eventualisation and genealogy replace the continuity and origins with heritage and emergence: in short, *the state of becoming*.

> *[...] always recalls the saying, that "Clay represents life; plaster, death; marble, immortality"*
>
> — *Jo's Boys by Louisa May Alcott, 1887.*

How are we then to approach the Big Blonde as an event where its identity is performed and emergent? As the *ship of Theseus* has a bow (baʊ), the foremost part of the hull, as a part of its anatomy, the bear is also a bow. Artur Przybyslawski studies the paradigm of the *bow of Heraclitus* as a language of becoming in the following way. Przybyslawski says that naming affirms existence, and that one way to confirm the accuracy of naming is to realise the function of the named entity and see if there is any contradiction. Then Przybyslawski presents how Heraclitus problematises this approach. Instead of harmony, Heraclitus brings up that the functionality might be based on the very nature of contradiction within the entity. Names do not comprehend how a thing agrees with itself. Heraclitus presents two concrete instruments, a bow and a lyre, which do not only agree with themselves but also are at variance with themselves. As such, they would lack identity and remain lifeless (Przybyslawski 2003, 155). It is use or practice that makes things/beings what they are: a bow is a bow only when stretched by the archer. At that very same moment, the bow is at variance, not agreeing with itself, splitting its form in two, stretched and relaxed (ibid., 156). Gilles Deleuze claims that for Heraclitus, names affirm only one side of reality: that which is forced by the act of naming to stop universal flux (ibid.). A bow, in principle, contains an act. It is not straight(ened) or bent, but bow(ing) (Vola 2020, 48–49). Therefore,

it should rather be treated as a verb than a noun. The method of treating nouns as verbs has been suggested by Ingold (Ingold 2017).

The existence of a bow has another paradigmatic feature. The use of the bow affirms its identity but simultaneously risks its being, since what is bent might also break. The bear's usage as an exhibition object and display has made it 'alive' for the people, but simultaneously it becomes threatened by its usage. The fact that people touch the bear indicates that it is considered an appealing body rather than an abject corpse, which consumes the bear to such an extent that it is slowly decomposed. In Przybyslawski's words, "the usage changes the bow into something different" (2003, 156); so too is a deceased polar bear made into an exhibition display, "and that usage contains the possibility of its damage, its destruction" (ibid.). The lifelike object while displayed is consumed and compromised by the touches of living bodies. While the Big Blonde falls into the category of inanimate, it stands for living beings, representing the polar bears that have adapted to the arctic climate under environmental changes. In short, "The name of the bow is life; its work is death" (ibid.), and the identification of the exhibition object as a living polar bear destroys it in the process, in the labour of being exhibited. While the *ship of Theseus* is a question of identity in relation to interchangeable authenticity, the bow of Heraclitus is about identity in relation to usage, acting and being acted on.

Taking a plank from a ship creates a void that must and can be filled. A thing cannot be replaced before it is displaced. Here we must take a step further. To continue existing—or, in other words, 'to become'—one needs to turn into one's opposite, the antithesis of one's self: "destruction as a cause of coming into being" (Spielrein 1994). In Sabina Spielrein's work, destruction is inevitable part of becoming, whether it comes to psychology, biology or any other form of conceptualising the phenomenon called 'life'. According to her, "During reproduction, a union of female and male cells occurs. The unity of cell thus is destroyed and, from the product of this destruction, new life originates. […] The fusion of germ cells during copulation mimics the correspondingly intimate union of two individuals: a union in which one forces its way into the other. The difference is merely quantitative" (Spielrein 1994, 156). Furthermore, "An alteration comes over the whole organism; destruction and reconstruction, which under usual circumstances always accompany each other" (ibid., 157).

> *Like the subconscious, like love, like memory, like time itself, like every single one of us, the church is built on the ruins of subsequent restorations, there is no rock bottom, there is no first anything, no last anything, just layers and secret passageways and interlocking chambers*
>
> *— Call Me by Your Name by André Aciman, 2007.*

Organic life at the cellular level can provide us with another fundamental notion. The joining of the cells while in the zygote stage for Spielrein means the loss of individuality and therefore a destruction of the self at a cellular scale. The cell division of the ovum therefore provides another perspective on the *ship of Theseus*. When the cell divides, two identical forms have emerged, while the 'original' cell disappears in the very same moment. There is no origin, no *Ursprung*, left. Then again, the heritage from the 'original' has not vanished; rather, it is contained by the emerging twins, but there is no other trace existing of what could be said to be the primary source, the first. None of them is more authentic or more a copy compared to another. As Swartz similarly points out, when an amoeba divides, the two exist simultaneously in different places, both being 'complete', not parts of organisms or scattered objects (Swartz 2001, 352). The moment of the split is the annihilation of the origin and the beginning of an indivi*dual*.

The remains of the anonymous polar bear and the Big Blonde are not just two identical cells. Like stem cells they have specialised to perform the different functions of the same body. In this division, the origin is no more—or, more accurately, it has never been—and instead the heritage is carried on in the emerging bodies of the bear, one known as the Big Blonde and the other as the skeleton of a polar bear in the museum archives. Rather than a totality of a bear, they are its outside and inside, its texture and structure. Still, the Big Blonde is not "less", but a rejoining of different materials and practices. It is, in a word, 'performative'. The manufacturing of the bear *post mortem* has given it a double life; the deconstruction and reconstruction of the body made it emerge as something to build on, or to be filled, a void or a structure, a surface or a container. The bear is the presence of those things which have given it shape but are not included *an sich* in the final product: a puzzle and a pin board.

We must accept the principle of constant change and therefore a constant state of becoming. A ship entering a sea voyage is not the same ship when it returns to the bay. If there was not a material exchange, there would be no sea journey to begin with, since the sea and the ship in their entirety need to collide for the voyage to happen. To generate, there must happen degeneration and regeneration. The bear's transformation from flesh to clay, plaster and urethane, are its contemporary bodies as it steps toward becoming an idea, an abstraction of polar bear, a specimen of a species. Every phase, every shift between the bodies requires a splitting of the body—disposing of the inside to create a void, to generate a form—and another split to bring the new surface out of the mould, disposing of the cast. Creation therefore is a destructive process. Every time the mould is cracked open or something is cast off, following Lacan, "something flies off" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 197). In every destruction something indestructible is moved on, since the destruction is not total. Something emerges from the lost 'original' that we have come to understand as heritage. Lacan calls this indestructible quality that

"survives any division" playfully with a name *l'homelette*, a small feminine man (ibid.), depicting the feminine and the masculine counterparts of reproduction. As the French pronouncement of *homelette* has a silent 'h', the little feminine man turns into an omelette, a dish made from eggs cracked open. In casting and moulding, solidified and liquified oppositions disappear and reproduce an object with their resemblance, and something is passed on …

> *A word contains its opposite in itself.*
>
> — *1984 by George Orwell, 1949.*

> *Half an arch won't stand.*
>
> — *The Silence of the Lambs by Thomas Harris, 1988.*

> *One cannot have a single thing without its opposite.*
>
> — *Children of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1976.*

> *"Jesus Christ Almighty, is he seamless like an egg?"*
>
> — *'Salem's Lot by Stephen King, 1975.*

These observations on "realness" have derived from the *ship of Theseus* and the *bow of Heraclitus*, as well as from the thesis of Sabina Spielrein, but in the matter of the examination of the Big Blonde, it has also opened a new spectrum. Reproduction and maintenance require its counterpart, an opposite, given that the word 'object' means something that is towards, against or opposite (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020a) to me. To summarize: more than a process of body alteration, Project Big Blonde is a form of reproduction consisting of concave and convex forms, a hollow and a filling, a chalice and a phallus, a cast and a spearhead, a womb and an offspring. The bones that were inside the living polar bear have been taken out to be later turned into the internal structure of the clay mannequin, after which they are taken out again. The constant cutting open is paired with giving birth, and the liquefied matter is paired with the solidified object.

This seemingly counterproductive yet reproductive process seems to share some significant features with philosopher Slavoj Žižek's (2003 [1993]) interpretations on Hans-Jürgen Syberberg's 1982 film version of Richard Wagner's opera *Parsifal*. In the story, the character Amforta has a wound caused by a spear, which in Syberberg's presentation is depicted outside Amforta's body as a separated partial object that is constantly bleeding. Peggy McCracken recognises the resemblance between Žižek's reading of the constantly bleeding wound—or menstruating vagina—and medieval illustrations of the holy wounds of Christ, which recall a

vulva. In certain Christian interpretations, Christ's wound on his side gives birth to the church, placing both masculine and feminine qualities into the polymorphous body of Christ (McCracken 2003, 107). This partial object similar to the one presented by Syberberg, in the form of a relic, has both the qualities of the deadly wound and the birth-giving womb. In the Big Blonde, these qualities emerge in the deceased bear and the animated display. As Christ's side wound was caused by the spear of Longinus, the wound contains the form of the phallic penetrating object. Therefore, where in *Parsifal* "The wound is healed only by the spear that smote you", in Christianity "the death of God is his resurrection, the weapon that killed Christ is the tool that created the Christian community" (Žižek 2003 [1993], 171). This is an organ, a wound and a womb, for which the "characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an organ […] the libido […] pure life instinct […] immortal [or] irrepressible life […] that has need of no organ (Lacan 1977 [1973], 197–198). In other words, these reproductive characteristics are non-existent in the counter-objects alone, in their singular physical bodies, object, relics, artefacts or organs, but emerge in their co-constituting. They cannot be placed 'here' or 'there', and therefore they do not take place: they simply happen, and happenings cannot be undone. Therefore, this co-production can be characterised as "indestructible life" (ibid., 198). It is still "subjected to the cycle of sexed reproduction" (ibid.), whether there are no genitalia or the object of reproduction is completely genitalia, like the separated wound of Syberberg's *Amforta*. In the making of Big Blonde, the shape of the outer surface of the clay mannequin becomes the inside of the plaster mould, which then again becomes the outer surface of the urethane model and vice versa, playing both counterparts in the reproduction. *L'homelette* is laid in the relation.

Therefore, *each object creates its own counterpart and contains it*. In other words, *to be an object, it needs to object something*, its existence as a substantive *object* being confirmed by its verb, *to object*, the naming being confirmed by its use. If we follow George Berkeley's principle *esse est percipi* and phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that "Being […] also contains its negation, its *percipi*" (Merleau-Ponty 1968 [1964], 251, emphasis original), where perception should be understood as active co-constitution between the perceiver, perceived and what comes between, then the claim *to be is to be perceived* should be followed by *to become is to turn in/to one's opposite*.

Studies on reversal are presented by Freud. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, a representation of any phenomenon could turn into its opposite (Freud 2010 [1900], 477–478) in quality, quantity, affect or effect. In a way, it could happen by means of censorship (ibid.), which masks the topics at hand with their reversals. Here the opposite, the object, is the very expression of and a support to that which it is not. As the name of the bow already indicates, the same goes with words, which Freud also notes. Context can transform words into their own opposites, as with

the Latin term *sacer*, understood as both 'sacred' and 'damned', which, then again, if understood as *taboo*, includes both (Agamben 1998 [1995], 50–51). The concept of taboo belongs to someone or something specific, such as a deity, and misusing it is a breach of this belonging, a breaking of taboo, sanctified and sanctioned. It could apply to any object and could indicate both 'belonging', and therefore, 'stealing'.

> *What is dead may never die.*
>
> *— A Clash of Kings, Book Two of 'A Song of Ice and Fire' by George R. R. Martin, 2011 [1998].*

> *Are you alive?*
>
> *No, but I am … Undead!*
>
> *— Nighttime is Great by Ariel Pink, 2017.*

When it comes to negations, philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel established the concept of the 'determinate negation' (*Bestimmte Negation*) in his dialectics. Hegel argues that one-sided view or knowledge is itself one of the patterns of incomplete consciousness. The second half, which a sceptic considers pure nothingness, is "specifically the nothingness of that *from which it results*", and "it is taken as the result of that from which it emerges […] a *determinate* nothingness, one which has a *content*" (Hegel 1977 [1807], 51, emphasis original). When the result is conceived as "a *determinate* negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself" (ibid., 51, emphasis original). Žižek popularized this concept with a joke in a television interview together with the hostess, philosopher Barbara Bleisch. A waiter offers to serve "coffee without milk" instead of a "coffee without cream" (SRF Kultur 2016). The obvious claim would be that the result in both cases is simply a cup of plain coffee, but since negation is a part of what the object is, it matters what it negates. Žižek also presents the difference in the linguistic expression of the determinate negations 'not dead' and 'undead'. The first signifies one who is 'alive', and the other is a categorical monstrosity, a living dead. This determinate negation emphasises what Lacan meant by *the myth of lamella*, another name for the same phenomenon as *l'homelette*. Since the lamella is undead, it cannot be killed and is therefore immortal, resisting death as a life instinct without being alive. Returning to a work of Freud on hysteria, a victim of sexual violence simulates the act by clasping her own hands behind her back while extending her body on a circular arc (Freud 1909, 230), playing the offender with and on her own body, being both the

absent other and the present past-self: as if caressing or resisting a ghost. Does it not matter whose body is embodied as a negation in the hysteric phantasy? Does it not matter what exactly, determinately, is not there?

> *Whenever I take up a newspaper and read it, I fancy I see ghosts creeping between the lines. There must be ghosts all over the world.*
>
> *— Ghosts by Henrik Ibsen, 1981 [1881].*

> *No, no evidence. Just a whisper ... I hear it in my ghost.*
>
> *— Ghost in the Shell (film) by Mamoru Oshii, 1995.*

A haunting, where something that is considered as belonging to the past keeps on coming back, where there is occupation of an absence by what is not there but remains significant and influential, takes us to *hauntology*. The term in its French form, *hantologie*, was established by Derrida in *Specters of Marx* (2006 [1993]) as a portmanteau of words 'haunt' and 'ontology'. In French the term is a near-homonym (Davis 2005, 373) due to the silent 'h'. Hauntology replaces the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost, that which is neither present nor absent (ibid.). As Derrida's works have a focus on language, the silence of the 'h' makes it a ghost haunting the term 'ontology', not heard in the pronunciation but *nevertheless* there. According to Barad, every concept is haunted by its mutually constituted excluded other: as per physicist Niels Bohr's *Complementarity*, the contingent determination of the meaning of any concept necessarily entails constitutive exclusions—what it leaves outside (Barad 2010, 253). It goes beyond antonyms and lands close to the determinate negation. Derrida's specter, ghost or haunting is a matter of deconstructive, vacillating certainties, not belonging to the order of knowledge, providing and opening meaning rather than necessitating a determinate content to uncover (Davis 2005, 376–377). Ontology, in comparison, is hauntology exorcised of ghosts (Barad 2010, 260).

The opposition between "to be" and "not to be" announced by *Hamlet* is already compromised in the driving force of the plot, the return of the dead king as a ghost, that according to Derrida figures as both a coming back of a dead man and the repeated appearance of his ghost (Derrida 2006 [1993], 10). This concept not only provides a new complicated understanding of a paradoxid concept that falls between defining categories and is therefore deconstructive, but also an understanding of the nature of an event from which we can capture a haunting and which, in my comprehension, shares a resemblance with *heritage* and *emergence*. In hauntology, each occasion is an event in itself, the first and the last time, since they are all singular (ibid.). The world resists acausality as much as determinism (Barad 2010, 246). It is the same in the case of repetition, the phantasy of a hysteric patient of

Freud's or *Hamlet's* ghost. Hence, the event is rather haunted than repeated, since the hysteria takes place in new unique moments in a person's biography, even if the acts simulate the past, and the ghost of the dead king influences the future of the descendent. Things that ought to confirm stability and patterns are compromised by themselves—in trauma and recovery, in crime and revenge—in order for them to become, and meet, their ends.

As the events are unique discontinues, they do not undo themselves, but rather they invest themselves into something and accordingly keep coming back. The relationship of continuity and discontinuity is not one of negative oppositions; they go together like im/possibilities (Barad 2010, 244). Looking back to Lacan's *homelette* and following the logic of hauntology, with its silent 'h' the little feminine man has its destruction already pronounced in its name: we have a ghost in the shell, since one cannot make an omelette without breaking a few eggs (see Žižek 2003 [1993], 275). Reconfigurings do not erase the sedimentation, the material effects of these reconfigurings written into the "flesh of the world", that is "ever new" and "always the same" (see Merleau-Ponty 1968 [1964], 248, 267). In other term, they *emerge* from the *heritage*. First-time-as-last-time may emerge anew, as a second last time, as a new last time. "One cannot control its comings and goings because it begins by coming back" (Derrida 2006 [1993], 11): the *emergence* happens in relation to the *heritage*. The *emergence* brings up the *heritage* as new; it redefines it, gives it a new name, and consequently begins by coming back. It is a "repetition not of what comes before, or after, but a disruption of before/after" (Barad 2010, 246). The complicity and complication of events as unique and as repetition, breaching their own preaching, is already evident on the level of language in the advice "never say never", a maxim where one has already said 'never' twice.

At this stage, we have already encountered the first, or the firsts, characters on our way, haunting between the lines:

'I' and 'O' stands for the 'identity' and an 'object'. Here identity means permanency, due to the act of identification, and the object means 'what is there', the ontology. But as we have come to notice, what matters is *what is not there*, and that the identity is about *becoming*. Here we have to consider 'I' and 'O' as a dichotomy made by cutting something apart. As the term "dicho-tomy—the cutting into two" indicates itself, there was something that was split into two (Barad 2010, 246). The term thus includes the notion of singularity in the binary. While "the birth or emergence of 'I' or 'individual' is a trauma, a cut, in the worldly flesh" (Vola 2017, 62), 'O' presents itself as a closed circle, an uncompromised ontological existence. By combining 'I', the cut, the split, the dichotomy, with the closed 'O', we cut open the loop and take a modular leap from a linguistic to a pictorial mode.

In a puzzle, the completed image consists of pieces joined together with an interface wherein the rear of one is pushed inside the side of another, locking them together. The same shape of the puzzle's interface marks the unity of binaries: Ω. We can either see an 'I' that has been bent into an arch or an 'O' that has been cut open on one end. In both cases, the outcome is Ω. A puzzle piece before it has found its place is defined together with that which is not there. The pieces of a puzzle are not ontological but hauntological. We can also imagine these two characters emphasising their opposite qualities but also becoming one in the myth of the holy wound, where the 'I' is the cut made by the spearhead that is also the resurrecting womb, Ω.

Ω can be written alphabetically as 'omega', which means 'the great O'. Lacan uses the term 'big Other' in his analysis. It bears a meaning, that things, such as hieroglyphs, only have significance or communicative capacity when they are placed in relation to each other. They therefore hold nothing like an inner essence standing alone, but only have meaning in relation to the others, as part of a system, whether the system is a language or comparably the human psyche (Lacan 1977 [1973], 199). When perceived as a figure, Ω is open: it is not a closed circle, but an open system. Systems are subjected to change. They are in a state of becoming as well. While being open, they are not under threat of a disposal but are enhanced by encounters, leaving or rather 'living' a trace of what may come. "Its past identity, its ontology, is never fixed, it is always open to future reworkings!" (Barad 2010, 260).

Barad asks for the "calling into question of the very nature of two-ness, and […] one-ness as well" (Barad 2010, 251). As 'I' stands for 'identity' and 'self' while 'O' stands for the object, for the opposite, the other that does not belong to the self, Ω confronts them as belonging to the same self, two sides

of a coin. Therefore, 'I' and 'O' alone are drawn as a barrier or a borderline, not to be comprehended as "a that". Their characteristics either block out or close in. The 'core' of their *thing-being* is always in their *in-betweenness*. As an example, a computer operates on a binary system using only two digits, 1 and 0—an I and an O—which together form its performance, proceeding from indicators of 'true' and 'false' towards complex functions. Existence lies between or in the joining of *one* and *none*, the beat of a heart, a pulse. "'Between' will never be the same" (ibid.). *Binaries contain the object together*.

Ω is an entering and it is an entrance. It is the standing particle and the moving wave pattern diffracted in the encounter. Barad illustrates the diffraction pattern (see Barad 2007, 78; illustration afore) wherein straight lines, in passing the border and proceeding through a hole, turn into half circles. The same characteristics are visible in Ω, with its straight line, with its gap and with its roundness. Barad explains that whether or not an entity goes through the apparatus is something that can be determined only after it has already done so, not only changing the past behaviour of a given entity but also the entity's past identity itself, keeping its ontology open to future reworkings (Barad 2010, 260). Ω is an open-ended object, an invitation, just as the Big Blonde is an outcome of de- and reconstructions, co-counter and encounter.

When we get from the documented making-of the Big Blonde to the way it is being displayed, we see another form of refiguring it. The current placement of the bear, due to the renewal of the permanent exhibition, relocated the bear from a high stand to an "open" diorama, where the bear's head and paws are relatively easy to reach. The outcome—that the bear became accessible for touching—was not an accidental consequence but intended to reach the pedagogical aims of the executive producer Nicolas Gunslay. In a more traditional museum setting, the exhibited object is restrained from physical contact with the viewers for the reasons of maintenance. According to Gunslay, he took the risk that the bear would be slowly consumed to achieve a deeper pedagogical encounter between the visitors and the display, allowing and therefore encouraging the visitors to feel the bear, to touch and be touched by it, to interact with it. Through such an interaction, the awareness of the polar bear as a physical being would more concretely influence the visitors of the science exhibition. In philosophical terms and as a follow up to the question of authenticity, in Gunslay's approach the bear is a bow, only effective when it is being acted on, made alive by the visitors' intimate, animating touch. To touch the bear is to attempt to confirm its realness, leaving signs of life, living and acting bodies, on its muzzle. The consumed fur and revealed skin follow the same logic as a path of withered grass and bare ground (see Ingold 2007, 44

Figure 2.2), which is not a sign of extinction but of survival and momentum. It records that there have been living beings walking on that line, and the fresher the tracks, the less time has passed from the moment of passage. In the case of the Big Blonde, certainly the renewal of the fur would be an abnormality, and therefore the recording of interaction follows the spatial, but not the temporal, momentum of the analogy of the path. Due to the lack of renewal of the fur, the past bodies are as present as the present moment.

Enabling a physical encounter with the Big Blonde has not only enabled feeling the bear. The physicality has unfolded its physiological features for the viewers, which illuminate especially the animal's adaptation to the environmental circumstances considered to be the 'arctic'. The polar bear's fur appears to be white, even though each hair shaft is without pigment and is actually transparent. The hollow cores of the hairs scatter and reflect visible light, in way similar to snow, enabling the animal to be camouflaged in a frozen environment. The transparency allows the light to penetrate the fur and be absorbed by the black skin beneath to keep the animal warm. Before molting season, the fur can take on a yellow colour due to the accumulated oils from their nutrition (Polar Bears International 2020; PolarBearFacts.Net 2020a, 2020b). Since the touches have consumed the fur of the Big Blonde away, its dark skin, another layer in the bear's anatomy, is exposed to the eyes when examined closely, offering a new concrete learning experience. In other words, knowledge does not emerge independently from the exhibition display; it is co-constituted between the visitor and the diorama within a science exhibition space, orienting the bodies towards each other.

Ingold, while describing the problematics of imagining, in terms of image and reality, notes that the cellular level of a tree leaf's image painted on a canvas cannot be seen even by using a magnifying glass (Ingold 2012, 3). Let us offer a follow up to this observation. If the canvas would be set under a magnifying glass or a microscope, one could discover a different kind of microscopic world than in the case of a 'natural' leaf. The 'image-leaf' enfolds the cells of the plants that form the canvas, cells that have been organised in a different kind of arrangement of fibers than those of living plants. Then again, if the cells of the canvas are fully covered by paint, then the magnifying glass discovers the strokes of a brush made of horsehair or even the fingerprints of the painter, a different pattern left by living cells or keratin. These things, combined with those on the perceptual scale of the naked eye, are co-constituting an image of a leaf.

> I'll pin you to the wall on your own weakness, I'll make you sell yourself like any painted whore.
>
> — *The Thorn Birds* by Colleen McCullough, 1977.

The familiarisation of the bear, provided by its pose allowing touch, is inevitably followed by the moment of alienation when the skin of the bear is taken in close up for more careful examination. From the dark skin, a set of metal pinheads shine through. This sight reveals another part of the nature of the bear. It is a carefully manufactured piece: a built attraction, strategic ensemble, life-imitation made by someone(s) who are aware of the appeal it creates. Touching the Big Blonde may make it what Kathryn Yusoff cites as Georges Bataille's 'unbroken animal', opening a familiar depth that attracts and has familiarity due to its tangible wildness that as our counterpart, separated by depth of distance, confirms the limits of being human (Yusoff 2010, 83). This state, according to Yusoff, is what Lucio Angelo Privitello understands as exteriority within (ibid.). The reason that this 'unbroken animal' has a broken hide with the pinheads showing reveals another type of depth, a shallow depth, and another level of otherness. Following the theory of Barthes, these shining metal heads are the small details that prick us like pins, tiny needles of truth, *punctum*, mirroring those depicted in the documentary film *Women Make Films*, which presents how believability is added to the moving pictures by, for example, showing a limping cat in a scene depicting traffic in a crowded city (Cousins 2018, ep.2), another kind of (un)broken animal.

The *other's* presence as worn-out patch on the bear's surface, the marks of touch that enabled familiarity to emerge, changes into alienation when the revealed pins indicate another type of truth about the bear. The bear is not approached by a freely circulating perceiving agent but by the predestined position of the viewer in relation to the bear, a subject subjected to the act of voyeurism towards the facing entity, the object. The bare patch is about our "obsession" with the "charismatic megafauna" (Yusoff 2010, 75). Furthermore, our presence as a human, as a counter and limit to the animal, is scripted and stitched to the hide as a destructive energy (see ibid., 83), a visibility for the barely visible sites of destruction, the breaking-down exhibition piece imitating the breaking down habitat of the polar bear, the absence's presence (ibid., 76). The strategic arrangement of the exhibition, which we are a part of, reveals not only that the others are visible for us on the hide but also that we were physical agents to the others from the moment we entered the display. The bear did not offer itself to us to be touched and looked over; it was offered to us by others. The wildlife was already broken. It is not only the bear's hide that is pinned down; so are we in its presence, with hidden pins. This awareness of the *other in us* is the emergence of the alienation of the self. These specters of Lacan in 'gaze' and 'other' (see Lacan 1977 [1973]) will return to haunt us on our journey.

> *When he shall die, take him and cut him out in little stars.*
>
> — *Romeo and Juliet by William Shakespeare, 1871 [1579].*

The shift from authenticity to alienation reformulates the paradigm of the meaning of the Arctic. A polar bear is considered the symbol of the Artic; at least, it is exhibited and commercialised as such. What do we mean when we say that it stands for the Arctic? This question can be approached through the act of naming, establishing a kinship from the Big Blonde to another kind of bear, simultaneously revealing how alienation and otherness intersect with kinship.

> *late 14c., artik, in reference to the north pole of the heavens, from Old French* artique *and directly from Medieval Latin* articus, *from Latin* arcticus, *from Greek* arktikos *'of the north', literally 'of the (constellation) Bear', from* arktos *'bear; Ursa Major; the region of the north', the Bear being the best-known northern circumpolar constellation. This is from *rkto-, the usual Indo-European root for 'bear' (source also of Avestan* aresho, *Armenian* arj, *Albanian* ari, *Latin* ursus, *Welsh* arth); *see bear (n.) for speculation on why Germanic lost the word. The -c- was restored from 1550s. From early 15c. as 'northern'; from 1660s as 'cold, frigid'. As a noun, with capital A-, 'the northern polar regions', from 1560s.* (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020b)

Etymology, when it comes down to its own etymology, is about the "true sense, original meaning", something that is *etymos*, "true, real, actual" (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020c). Here, the etymology is treated differently. Instead of truth or origin, it will be understood as truths and a lineage of origins, something that actualises in places and times, *emerges* from its *heritage*. Therefore, etymology is not about the origin: it is about genealogy. Moreover, as in genealogy, families do not simply descend from a single source, but rather they intersect and intermingle. This process concerns genealogy, even when discussing discursive material practices or, more to the point, performativity. Therefore, the bear bears kinship to more than one family, including a family of words. The words lead the bear from worldly to celestial kin*ship*.

The small pins and nails used in taxidermy to nail down the hide and hold it against the urethane core of the bear installation shine from the dark skin. The pins are a certain kind of point of reference, holding the hide, giving the bear its form, its outer-appearance, its shape, its spatial dimensions, its apparent being, its *figuration*. The concept of figuration is a phenomenon explained by Donna Haraway with the example of 'Jim's dog', based on a photograph taken by Jim Clifford, of a combination of a burned-out redwood stump, redwood needles, mosses, ferns, lichens and a California bay laurel seedling, which in winter light emerged to Jim's eye and to his camera as a silhouette of a sitting dog for one season, and for one season only, along the damp canyon (Haraway 2008, 5). For Haraway, figures are meant to help to grapple inside the flesh of mortal world-making entanglements, contact zones, invitations to inhabit the corporeal story told in their lineaments,

material–semiotic knots in which diverse bodies and meanings are co-shaped. In figures, the biological, literary and artistic come together with the force of lived reality (Haraway 2008, 4).

As in the example of the dog, figuration is perspective-bound, and for it to 'be' it may require a relatively fixed standpoint; otherwise, the figure will disperse. This concept is true of constellations. The northern circumpolar constellation Ursa Major, the Great Bear, consists of celestial bodies separated by great distances. Much of what comes between them is invisible to the bare eye and drowns in the dark background, the depth of space. From another planetary perspective, some of these points of reference would disappear while others would appear, or their formations would be significantly different. The Great Bear figures as a collection of bright points on a dark canvas connected by "imaginary lines" (Ingold 2007, 21, 50) drawn by the eye to the sky from a terrestrial standpoint and by hand on the star chart. While Ursa Major is a signifier of the Arctic region, it does not just signify or name, but also performs, since its situating enables taking place, acting or being in the world as a human. In short, it enables navigation. Therefore, the fact that anything is considered 'imaginary' does not mean that it would be without material consequences or usage. Ursa Major is a perception of the Arctic placed into the world and is a starting point from which to approach it.

> *Second star to the right, and straight on till morning.*
>
> *— Peter Pan film adaptation by Walt Disney, 1953, from a play with a same name written by J. M. Barrie.*

How does the imaginary work in practice? According to Giovanni Bernardo, the Micronesian solution to navigation and computing location differs from the Western solution (with a vessel, stationary island and directional frame) by conceptualising a 'moving island', also known as an 'imaginary' or 'phantom island'. The imagined fixed point of reference, combined with the other fixed points of reference provided by the sidereal compass, is used to compute movement to and away from itself (Bernardo 2009, 189–190). Thus, that which is considered 'imaginary' aids one in reaching something that is considered 'real'. It is something that assists you to reach something that you could not reach without it, while the assistant itself remains unreachable. Or, maybe even more so, if you approach it, it turns into something else, losing its cohesion, its realness, not revealed as non-existing, but by becoming non-existing, or by becoming something else. *It refigures*.

Back in the Arctic hemisphere, pointing out the center of the north, or the "true north" as it is called in navigation, Ursa Major has a "counter" part in the zodiac, Ursa Minor, which seems almost to mirror the shape of the greater bear, save for the fact it has turned around into its opposite. Together these constellations guide

the vision to capture the signifier of north, the northern star, Polaris, belonging to Ursa Minor's body, and then its substructure, the Small Dipper. As in the myth narrating these constellations, they are related, a mother and a cub. These two separated bodies are connected by the line drawn between them to point out the location of Polaris, and the offspring and the bearing mammal are connected by the umbilical cord.

But where does the gazing eye lie here? It does not lie where the celestial or polar bear dwells, and the place is not named "of the bear" by those who dwell among them. This historical gaze lies further to the south, on Mediterranean grounds, with eyes fixed on the dark night sky. The perspective from which the Arctic is still seen as 'beyond' and from which it has gained its modern geographic form resides with the dawn of the globe, in the shift from horizontal ground into a three-dimensional spatial object.

The modern representative form of the globe is inherited from the cartographic work *Geography* by Claudius Ptolemy. To illustrate the third dimension of cartographic projection, Ptolemy establishes a perspective by using a grid consisting of two sets of intersecting lines, vertical and horizontal, to assign what are known as latitude and longitude, giving the two-dimensional surface the impression of a third dimension due to the closing up of the arching lines. Furthermore, these lines establish a system of coordinates consisting of latitude and longitude (Neugebauer 1969 [1957], 220). The ruling points of reference for measuring and drawing are the following: latitude from the equator, expressing the length of the longest day, and the meridian of zero longitude in the westernmost land known to Ptolemy, Canary Island El Hierro (James Ford Bell Library 1999–2001; Feeman 2002, 7). Ptolemy's

oikoumenè, the inhabited world, extended from about 63° northern latitude (Thule) to 12;25° southern latitude, and his maps spanned half the globe (Neugebauer 1969 [1957] 220–2021; Feeman 2002, 46). Maps based on scientific principles had been made long before Ptolemy, but *Geography*'s tradition was useful in allowing the map makers who followed to represent larger areas of the world because Ptolemaic geographers systematised the use of latitude and longitude for organising space and standardised images of the hemispheres (Mukerji 2006, 655).

To extend one's vision beyond the horizon is not possible by looking straight at it. One has to look above the horizon. Here, geography draws from astronomy, since the shape and extent of the earth became knowable only by viewing the location and the movement of celestial bodies and planetary objects (see James Ford Bell Library, 1999–2001), many of which are only visible in the darkened night sky. As the stars had served for navigating ships on the sea, they also enabled navigating a pen on a paper with additional guiding instruments and apparatuses. The terrestrial and celestial grid are related, and the pole star was used in measuring latitude in the northern hemisphere (ibid.). To see 'near' and 'far', Ptolemy had to look 'further away', not to the ground but to outer space. To face, to object the earth, Ptolemy had to turn to its opposite: to look over in order not to leave overlooked. The vision of the globe was therefore gained by reflection, through a set of apparatuses fixing the eye in relation to distant reference points. The "ghostly lines" (Ingold 2007, 49) which connected the separate celestial bodies into constellations emerged on surface of the Earth, capturing it in the shape of a grid, starting what could be named the age of *reticle vision*.

The grid used in the geographic coordinate system consisting of latitude and longitude is known as graticule (lat. *craticula*, 'gridiron'), reticle or reticule (lat. *reticulum*, 'net') (see James Ford Bell Library 1999–2001). It is a pattern of fine lines or markings built by engraving lines or embedding fibers into the eyepiece of a sighting device. It is applied to telescopes and microscopes to provide references during visual examination. Variations include dots, posts, circles, scales, chevrons or a combination of these. A crosshair, represented as intersecting lines in the shape of a cross (+), is commonly associated with telescopic sights designed for aiming firearms and in optical instruments used for astronomy and surveying. In all these cases, the net establishes a connection between the eye and the fixed object in shared space. This space is known as a projective space, a space that relates to perspective, the way an eye projects a three-dimensional scene onto a two-dimensional image. All points that lie on a projection line, a line of sight intersecting with the entrance pupil, project onto a common image point. From a graphical perspective, if we look at the lines of latitude and longitude, the lines narrowing down and closing up to the poles, the axis of the Earth, they create a projective space. The closer they get to each other in the second dimension, the greater distance they represent from the point of view of the representational third dimension. Following reticle vision, the projective space reaches the horizon and proceeds towards the point at infinity; when the map is projected onto the round globe, the point at infinity is located at the Poles.

The use of graticule vision in representing projective space can perhaps be best explained by the function of Albrecht Dürer's machine. A famous illustration of this machine in use was published in *The Painter's Manual: A Manual of Measurement of Lines, Areas, and Solids by Means of Compass and Ruler Assembled* by Albrecht Dürer (1977). The machine was designed to maintain the same perspective during the process of drawing a (life) model. Between the artist and the model was placed a frame with a grid of equally sized squares. On a platform on the artist's side was a horizontally placed (or elevated) gridded paper aligned to the vertically standing gridded frame. Between the frame, drawing platform and the artist was also placed a miniature obelisk or stick with looped head, which worked as an aim, a fixed locus for the eye of the artist to sit in relation to the frame. The model on the other side of the frame is therefore seen from a static point of view through the frame, where the seen object is separated by the lines into different parts and then moved by any drawing instrument to a corresponding square on the paper. Therefore, the relationships between the different parts do not become distorted or alter the shape of the object in the projective space during the drawing process. It is like navigating on the object without getting lost or losing it. The representation that is transferred onto the paper respects only the primacy of a single viewpoint.

When this machine is compared to the cartographic projection of the globe, it becomes evident that the single viewpoint, the fixed eye, is aimed directly at

the equator and away from the poles when it comes to the grid of latitude and longitude. The same visual dimension of the phenomenon can be created by placing a magnifying glass on top of gridded paper. The even squares with straight lines will bend slightly under the focus and form a projective space, a third dimension for the flat surface.

Dürer's machine did not only enable the aim to perpetuate the object under the artist's eye but also enabled it to reformulate a new object. John Berger (1977 [1972], 62) claims that in producing a nude, Dürer's ideal outcome was achieved by combining parts from different models: "taking the face of one body, the breasts of another, the legs of the third, the shoulders of a fourth, the hands of a fifth—and so on" (ibid., 62). The illustrated object in the tradition of nudes was a woman, from which Berger makes the following critical observations. The relationship between the individualism of the actor (the privileged vision) and the object of their activities is treated as a thing or an abstraction, an exercise undifferentiating the owners of the parts from which the glorified figuration is made.

What is done for the object follows the terms of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, concepts established by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their joined work *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (2000 [1977]). If territorialisation means living in practice with the territory, shaping and being shaped by it, co-constituting terrain into a territory, deterritorialisation would mean undoing or withdrawing from these practices. This withdrawal would inevitably displace the bodies on the terrain and shift how the terrain is figured and figures out. A mismatch emerges that will create gaps, voids left from those societal practices of symbols, believes and rituals that, following Deleuze and Guattari, offer a ground to be filled with something. Deterritorialisation offers a ground for reterritorialisation, for bodies to emerge in relation to the terrain, to co-constitute a refigured territory, a design governed by new power relations. Reterritorialisation establishes a takeover of the land in the form of distributed information on a wide scale. We cannot point out any single origin from which the Arctic is de- and reterritorialized, only that such an activity has taken place, and it has happened in a multitude of territories.

Even though there are several alternatives for Eurocentric historical maps, when it comes to maps that hold the status of being scientific and geographically correct, of enabling internationally recognised locating systems, including places of permanent inhabitation and pin-pointing the movement of animals wearing a satellite transmitter, longitude and latitude are engraved into each and every one as north and south, which do not disappear even if the map is drawn upside down. This structuring is enforcing and redefines territory not simply by creating a representation with a fixed perspective but also by establishing a spatial structure for performing recognition and movement. M. H. Edney claims that imperialism and mapmaking are both fundamentally concerned with territory and knowledge,

where the empire exists because it can be mapped (cited in Farman 2010, 870).

The main political problematisation when it comes to maps is that they are assumed to be "neutral and outside of cultural interpretation", to which Jean Baudrillard adds that they are dangerous cultural artefacts if they are naturalised and without critique (Farman 2010, 874). The grid model of the globe draws the Arctic onto the margin of the map. Even though this location inevitably marginalises the Arctic, one must acknowledge that marginal does not stand for 'unimportant' but for 'edge', a border for the limits of known. As Dürer with his machine cut apart and combined parts to create an ideal, from his perspective, by de- and reterritorialising women's bodies while erasing the lines from the final image which they nevertheless constituted, it is reasonable to doubt that the lines of longitude and latitude are material manifestations and markers of Ptolemy's gaze and that of his predecessors, which in time became the heritage for states, imperialism, colonialism and globalisation.

> *Science has eliminated distance.*
>
> — *One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel García Márquez, 1970.*

The lines of longitude and latitude capture the third dimension of the Earth and the dynamics of time related to light and dark. Still, at the same time, these lines restrain and draw boundaries. Graticule lines are drawn on the surface of a mathematically precise ball, even though the Earth is known to be more asymmetric and irregularly shaped by many geological forces (King-Hele & Cooke 1973). Latitude and longitude are not perceivable as physical lines, but they are lived into reality. They are imaginary but simultaneously consequential lines (Ingold 2007, 50). The time zones are one example. These zones do not respect the alteration on the earth, every curve, high ground and step taken. They are approximations, on a large scale, and their shift from one to another is unnegotiable, a proxy. Still, societal life follows these borderlines, creating a phase of 60 minutes. Alteration is replaced with approximation. The grid that performs a viewpoint, establishing a static location for the eye in relation to the globe, not only captures and stabilises the viewing eye but also the planetary being. The planet's movement is pinned down by the axis, and its shape is restrained by the grid, its uneven surface smoothed.

The graticule lines thus perform distance. To clarify with great urgency, the word to be used is not 'distant', but 'distance', which can be either short or long. Therefore, the word applies as much to the microscope as the telescope, which both also use lines to position the eye, to maintain perspective and avoid the distortion of the observation. Because the Earth was observed by using lines, the lines figuring the constellations and mathematical lines used in geometry to formulate objects came to consist of lines. Returning to Berkeley, *to be is to be perceived*, and how

one is perceived makes one what one is. The invisible lines are haunting the visible objects, or the ghostly and hollow shape is held together by the visibility of lines.

David Beaver argues that geographic representations of the globe merely focus on the continents, missing the much more dynamic image of "a riot of every imaginable colour presented in unending diverse patterns that look for all the world like imaginative living abstract paintings" (Beaver 2012, 19). How can there be a vision where static perspective and balanced shape are dismissed and the much more dynamic and altering sight which Beaver describes is achieved? How can we formulate an image where the Arctic is not drawn on the margin and pictured beyond the horizon but is seen as an inseparable part of the whole? The question must be reframed from 'how' to 'from where'.

The astronomer (Sir) Fred Hoyle declared in 1948 that "Once a photograph of the Earth, taken from outside, is available … a new idea as powerful as any in history will be let loose" (Reid & Kennedy 2012). This announcement is also the starting point for the search for the answer to the question 'from where'. In 1968 the crew of Apollo 8, in one of their 'home videos' filmed inside the spacecraft, turned the camera around to show the Earth. Seeing the Earth 'hanging' in space was described as a profound and shocking experience. While going to the stars, the sudden look back gave a different perspective and raised a new kind of self-awareness. One of the interviewed astronauts said that even though the focus of their space travel was on the moon, the most important reason to go to space might have been adopting this new perspective while looking back on the Earth (ibid.). More than offering a profound individual experience, space traveling seemed to provide an extraterrestrial standpoint for new emerging ideology. According to astronaut Gerald Carr, people returned from space with a new interest in ecology, feeling a little more humanitarian than when departing as technician (Reid & Kennedy 2012; Beaver 2012, 4) and becoming more of a global citizen (Beaver 2012, 4). This experience of space shifts the "internal models" and "cognitive barriers" on which our perceptions are based (ibid., 7), resembling a religious experience (Reid & Kennedy 2012). This perceptional phenomenon was conceptualised as the *Overview Effect* by Frank White in 1987. According to David Beaver, space has historically helped to create a global perspective, as the first pictures of the Earth from space influenced the environmental movement by showing the thinness and fragility of the biosphere (Beaver 2012, 8–9). While making the totality of the ecosystem visible and relatively more concrete, the invisibility and abstract nature of political boundaries (ibid., 9) became evident from outer space, from which they are not perceivable.

In the time of the Cold War, an idea of one shared world to be cared for had a radical political importance in a polarised world, where the invisibility of certain borders did not make them inconsequential. When the Overview Effect is paired together with graticule vision, the borderlines and their lack is apparent, but more

in relation to the politics of science than of ideology. By politics of science, I do not refer to science politics, but to the scientific artefacts, methods, practices and representations that were born in the world of politics, within social and societal life and under different power relations. They all have their histories, and when history happens, politics happens. The Overview undid, for a moment, for some, what Ptolemy had done when giving the globe its shape. Projective lines illustrating spatiality were undone by a projectile entering space. Now the distant gaze was no longer provided by a fixed eye upon a collection of lines drawn between a set of known reference points but by one moment of sight from the eye towards the globe. Since this view was not constituted from lines, its object was not either. The Arctic, the polar regions, did not appear anymore as 'up' or 'down', nor were they even 'above' and 'under', terms which had lost their meaning in the world of zero gravity. They had become edges in the edgeless world, moments to be grasped in the rolling of temporality and spatiality: glances rather than frontiers. The observing body no longer stood in the terrain of the Mediterranean but on an extraterrestrial point; no longer was it gazing at stars but gazing *from* the stars. One thing that the Overview Effect did not change from Ptolemy's globe but rather took further was the objectifying of the Earth, since now the planet was being faced as a material entity, opposite to the viewer because the very meaning of being an object is to be something opposite me.

Beaver, Reid and Kennedy, while emphasising the groundbreaking vision brought on by the Overview Effect, seem to argue for the possibility—and furthermore, the need—of a new episteme, a form of knowledge that can only be generated by outer space experiences that can be transferred back to the Earth. Beaver recognises the challenge of adapting such a new vision by referring to Dale Purves' work on cognitive neurosciences, where the "raw sensory data" and the patterns on the retina are ambiguous without the organising effect of previous experience. In other words, "sight is a learned ability to interpret largely ambiguous sensory data and construct perceptual images rather than simply receiving them whole from the external world" (Beaver 2012, 10). Beaver emphasises that scientific visualisation concentrates on the physiological aspects of space travel rather than on more internal perceptual shifts, having little to do with the Overview Effect (ibid., 15–16).

Beaver lists the main problems with traditional representational techniques and formats, which differ significantly from the "Earthgazing" (Beaver 2012, 19) experiences described by the astronauts (ibid., 18). One is the nearly complete lack of stars in photographs of the Earth, moon or spacecraft, since bright objects in a dark field overload the camera's light-sensors and "delete" other stars from the images. Also, focusing the picture closely on the dominating object diminishes the surrounding space, and on the dark background the extreme "backlighting" of the subject flattens the impression of a three-dimensional object, which then again will

be represented in a two-dimensional format, projected on a screen or printed as a photograph. This context, according to Beaver, differs from the dynamic eye (or arguably adds, since instead of one viewfinder there are two eyes) and a constant awareness of the surrounding environment (ibid.).

> *It is like the surface of an orange: if you look at it close up, it is all curved and wrinkled, but if you look at it from a distance, you don't see the bumps and it appears to be smooth.*
>
> *— The Theory of Everything: The Origin and Fate of the Universe by Stephen Hawkins, 2002, 128.*

> *"Is the sky painted?" [...] "Are there really brush strokes that show up under magnification?" [...] "You're too close," [...] "You have to be a long way off"*
>
> *— Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? by Philip K. Dick, 1968.*

To discover the root problem of the specific case that Beaver presents in relation to space photography, let us return to the earlier example of the painting described by Ingold. The 'natural world' of the leaf, when it is perceived with a magnifying glass, should reveal the cells of the leaf, which are not perceivable from the painting. What must be realised here is that they are not necessarily apparent to the naked eye. In other words, the cellular level is not part of our experience of the world as something to engage with by using our senses without a mediating apparatus. Cells are present, but they are not perceivable as cells. We see them as organs or organisms. Cells *per se* are only for other beings or entities of the same microscopic scale. The cellular scale is in a different world of experience. When the cellular scale is made visible for human perception by a magnifying glass, it is not the cells *per se* in their 'original' location that we see. Instead we adopt a vision mediated by the magnifying glass, where the focus of our eye does not meet the cells increased in size, but an image screen, a new perceivable space or surface created by the magnifying glass. This image surface is different from the surface formed by the cells, and the distance to the location of the virtual image from the viewing eye is actually optically 'greater' than the distance between the 'natural' object and the observing eye. The distance between the object, magnifying glass and the eye is always fixed so that the image world of the 'natural' can emerge and make sense to the human senses. To 'know' the cells is only made possible by and from the fixed distance created by the magnifying glass: where the distance between human–organism is relatively small, on the scale of the cellular level, for the perceived entities it is significant.

POSITIVE LENS

VIRTUAL IMAGE

OBJECT

FOCAL LENGTH

This phenomenon and its 'tragedy' is narrated in the myth of Narcissus. Narcissus, seeing his own reflection on the surface of the water, falls in love with his own image. In the reflection he perceives himself outside of himself and therefore as somebody else, dwelling in the body of water. The tragedy in the myth is that Narcissus remains unable to reach the object of his love, which either disappears or always stays at a distance, and to exist requires his constant attention. The desired object only exists at a certain fixed distance, position and perspective. Nor does the image leave the water's surface and move towards Narcissus. If this dividing surface of the water between the perceiver and one's reflection is breached or altered, the perceived image object alters and becomes something else. If we reach to look closer, we are no more able to have the reflection on the surface. We begin to overshadow it and see through the surface from which the reflection emerges, seeing instead to the bottom of the pond. If we keep our field of vision fixed but try to reach the image with a hand, the reflection seen by our eyes is diffracted by the touch of our hand, causing waves on the even surface. This object that is animated and responds to our every movement, destroyed in diffraction and coming into being in the reflection, only exist in certain precise conditions, ontologically defined by relational distance. And as Narcissus encountered his desire in his partially objectified self, so too does ours look back from other objects of desire, aroused, allured and emergent from fixed distances.

Yet, this alone does not fully function as a counter or supporting argument to the phenomenon that Beaver has brought to us. Both examples of the photographing of space and the magnifying of a painted leaf are arguably failures to mimic the full materiality of the represented objects. They have a static focus, presenting features that will turn into something else if approached differently. What I argue here goes beyond the lack of representations' materiality to a question of scale—the scale of the perceiver and the scale of the perceived in the moment of perception—and of whether there is an opportunity for a direct encounter. In the case of optical

manipulation, an observation mediated via an apparatus, there is no direct or equal encounter, but the objectified entity is subjected to an observing gaze. The eye never meets its object, but instead it goes beyond it, sees one where one is not. The observer never encounters cells as individuals but as an organism or as a cell subjected to his gaze-apparatus. How does the Overview Effect differ from or commit to such a mediated encounter?

When it comes to optics, what kind of new vision for an emerging episteme does the Overview Effect have to offer? This question can be approached by comparing the Overview to the central and parallel perspectives (see Krygier 2018) and the projections that they create. The central perspective has one observation point from which the rays of vision diverge. The further they move from the observation point and the closer they get to the observed entity, the farther apart the distance between them grows. When meeting a geometrically flat and layered surface in the form of pyramid of stairs, the rays of vision leave blind spots or dead angles on the inner corners of the levels caused by the edges of the previous upper level. The proportion of the blind area in relation to the visible area is dependent on the distance of the observation point; the greater the distance, the smaller the dead angle, and vice versa. In the parallel perspective, the rays of vision go through a flat 'transparent' surface before meeting an identical object (the stair pyramid). The surface functions as an apparatus, redirecting the rays of vision to meet the surface of the object at a direct angle, leaving no blind areas, or rather consisting of

several parallel points of view. Since it is the apparatus that manipulates the vision, the apparatus must cover the whole perceived area, whether by its size or by its movement, multiplying the points of view. In practice, the central view could be a single aerial shot of an area below, while the parallel is constituted from several satellite images and can therefore never be perceived in real time with the naked eye, only in retrospect as a representation.

When it comes to the projections, the perspective views require a distance between the theoretical eye and the target point, since small distances produce severe perspective effects, and vice versa—large distances produce mild effects (AutoCAD 2010). Even though both type of protections are considered realistic (ibid.), the projection of the parallel perspective is completely lacking in depth of vision. Along with the depth, the deepening parts, the walls and the window frame in the picture afore representing a room, also vanish. This disappearance causes a spatial arrangement where the theoretical eye, the standpoint of the perceiver and the fixed distance become unrecognisable. There is no (perceiving) body in the picture. The subject nullifies. On the contrary, it can be claimed that since there is still a projection there is also actually a collection of bodies, but their number is infinite, and their presence is simultaneous and linear. To summarise, the central perspective's projection is constituted by a singular subject at a spatially and temporally static standpoint, where the distance directly influences the perspective effect. The parallel perspective is constituted by an indefinable number of subjects in a spatially linear and temporally simultaneous arrangement from the same fixed distance.

Do these conclusions apply to the Overview Effect? Earth gazing happens during the free time of the astronauts through a window without special observation instruments, save for the spacecraft or station itself. Accordingly, the observing body resembles a central perspective. The great distance to the ground will diminish the invisible area when compared to the visible area. A fundamental difference between these illustrations of optic modelling is the fact that the Overview Effect

does not concentrate on flat surfaces but is constituted by roundness and rotation. These factors are significant in relation to the coverage of the sight, since the round and rotating surface does not create edges that shadow and generate dead angles. The movement changes the point of vision to reach the 'hidden' parts (such as the globe's other side) as well. The phenomenon of the Overview Effect should not be approached as a still moment but rather as something that is fundamentally based on the mobility of the sight and sights. Therefore, it also resembles the features of the parallel perspective.

Following these perspectival and optical observations, the viewing subject's body has been identified, but what about the location of these bodies? To see the whole Earth, it must be viewed from a distance of nearly 240,000 miles above its surface (Farman 2010, 870). Anthropologist Michael Jackson provides us with an insight into the matter through the following example from his life and research in Firawa. While studying the village, Jackson "climbed the hill overlooking the village to get things into perspective by distancing myself from them" (Jackson 1989, 8). While sharing the view from the hill with his daughter and asking about her opinion on the sight, she responded "It's all right […] except you can't see anyone in the village from here" (ibid.). Jackson considers that such a visual approach, where the studied entity is formed by distancing oneself from it and setting it *under* one's eyes, therefore setting oneself over it as superior, fails to capture its essence. Such an approach is common in what could be called the Western tradition of science, with its objective and therefore objectifying approach. Jackson refers to Gaston Bachelard's work *The Poetics of Space*, to bring out an alternative to what he calls the bird's eye view, sharing same optical features as central and parallel perspective, by "replacing the space conception of perspective with that of cubism" to suggest "a topoanalysis which emphasizes the sense of living in a place, of experiencing it from all sides, moving and participating in it instead of remaining on the margins like a voyeur" (ibid.).

The perspective that relates to the art style of cubism is called simultaneous perspective. It means that an object is illustrated as if it is simultaneously viewed from all sides. The outcome resembles our mundane experience of the object's features, but the object as a whole appears as a distorted collection of flat surfaces with separate features. Such artistic expression does not raise from an aim of purely unnatural expression; it shares a scientific principle that emerged during the same years as cubism. The theory of relativity developed by Albert Einstein brought out the question of what an object would look like if one perceived it while moving at the speed of light. Cubism offered one interpretation by showing a piece simultaneously from multiple perspectives, as seen with the eyes of a perceiving subject circling around the perceived object, breaking also the linearity of parallel vision. In Jackson's metaphor, such a perspective, including all the sides of life, would form a complete picture of live lived in the village. Jackson's expression

requires combining parts of life into a collage, a more complete picture through time and change. Then again, the subject in cubism would be a fleeting and invisible figure for the world, a body with a location that cannot be reached due to its maximum speed. Could the eye be capable of vision in such circumstances? Could the reflecting and bending light reach the eye in the optical order if its holder has an equal speed as the light itself? The light visualising an object might not reach the eye of the perceiving subject in time to create an individual image. And is it not likely that a person living in a village does not actually discover and see everything, that there are moments of secrecy that are not shared by all and all at once? Cubism does not show the world that we used to see and to know. It is a deconstruction of the world.

Following the positions of perspectivism and cubism, pointillism is another artistic technique that highlights the effect of distance between the perceiver and the piece of art. Small, distinct dots of colour are applied in patterns to form an image, where the technique relies on the viewer to blend the colour spots into a range of tones. This technique applies to many printed comics that use only basic colours. From close up, the colours are seen as separate dots of colour on a white background; however, from far away the eye does not distinguish them from each other but "blends" them together as if the colour pigments were mixed. Yellow and blue dots give the impression of green colour from afar—or, more precisely, the green colour emerges from yellow and blue dots when perceived from a certain distance. As discussed in relation to the Overview Effect, the common image of planet Earth as a blue-white marble is only true from a greater distance than its orbit (Beaver 2012, 19). As I have experienced while swimming in a swimming hall, "Seeing cannot be affected by the seen colour itself but must be affected by what comes between" (Aristotle 2001 [1908], 33). Since the blue light penetrates water the best, the tiles on the bottom of the water remain blue when perceiving them underwater, while the red tiles turns into something closer to a brown colour. In other words, different perceptive phenomena emerge from different distances, affected by *what comes between*.

> *From a distance the world looks blue and green [...] From a distance there is harmony [...] God is watching us from a distance [...] From a distance I can't comprehend what all this war is for.*
>
> — *From a Distance by Julie Gold, 1985.*

> *Would you feel any pity if one of those dots stopped moving forever?*
>
> — *The Third Man directed by Carol Reed and written by Graham Greene, 1949.*

The episteme of the Overview Effect, according to its promoters, concentrates on pacifism, environmental awareness and arguably even some level of antinationalism by emphasizing global citizenship. In short, they emphasise a wholeness that can be obtained when observing from a significant distance. Ideally, this concept would involve looking from afar to see what is close. But are political and social borders back on the surface of the planet so imaginary or abstract? Planetary and orbital life share a different set of physical and social rules, formulating a different kind of discursive material practices, shaping and moving the bodies as well as being moved by and within the bodies. If these two distant points of location do not share some episteme-ontological ground, the same would apply to their ethics. Common identity and McLuhan's "global village" (Farman 2010, 870) easily translates to imperialism and colonialism, and earth gazing plays into an autocratic hierarchy where the enlightened above see what is good and right while missing locally grounded knowledge and practices, not because of maleficent and corrupted minds ignoring something on purpose but simply because of the inability to depict details that are not only unperceivable from a distance but which actually do not exist in that same level of reality.

From the Overview, the astronauts have started to occupy the standpoint of the god's eye perspective instead of passively viewing Earth. To grant some perspective, the title of 'god's eye' is reasonable when it includes elements of holism, a superhuman standpoint exterior to mundane experiences of the multitude and care wherein the perceiving subject is not only observer but also guardian, not passively knowing but actively maintaining with one's vision and, when returning to earth and becoming back to flesh, incarnating this celestial knowledge. This maintenance with vision is arguably a significant part of the Overview project.

What is there then that might be overlooked with mere vision? Jackson's note––"I surveyed the village, took panoramic photographs, and achieved my bird's-eye view, believing that my superior position would help me gain insights into the organization of the village when, in fact, it was making me lose touch with it" (Jackson 1989, 8)—entails a more important message in one word than what is the intention in the whole sentence. Where the sentence is a strong critique of the Western tradition of science in claiming superiority towards the researched entity and the right to observe, interpret and intervene, it emphasises subtly that while viewing from a distance, Jackson had lost *touch* with the village.

The word "touch" is the key to opening the paradigm. Sight works with distance, and it takes a while before one can lose sight of something. Touch does not. It requires a corporeal presence. Pink, in her work on sensory ethnography (Pink 2009), has offered an opening for new approach extending the analysis of visual culture into sensory engagements. Such an approach requires the inclusion of all senses to make sense of something. In Jackson's radical empiricism, fixed viewpoints are to be avoided by "working through all five senses, and reflecting

inwardly as well as observing outwardly" (Jackson 1989, 8) to give rise to understanding that "suspends the sense of separateness between self and other and evokes the primordial meaning of knowledge as a mode of being-together-with" (ibid.). This approach would entail becoming one of the villagers to understand how the village works or, moreover, what there is to being a villager. That would mean accordingly, *becoming-together-with*. The globe is far too great to be perceived as one planetary unity while living on the ground. From space, perceived from afar, from beyond great distance, it becomes perceivable, but it forms a completely different relation with the body. One cannot be considered a "villager" any longer. What does one become while living in space? In the end, is the relevant question here the rising of a new episteme from a new perspective or an even more profound ontological change in the observing agent, the subject itself?

Where the Earth used to be the overwhelmingly dominating environment, it is now equal to other celestial bodies in a same way as the astronauts discovered, or rather experienced, the sun as one of the stars (Reid & Kennedy 2012). From outer space, even the blue sky is not 'unearthly' but part of the planet. Where the astronauts living on the space station have definitely felt how exposed they are to the threats of this new environment and how adapting to this environment causes significant stress on their earthly beings, they also relate this new sense of vulnerability towards the Earth. Such expressions of vulnerability appear in the description of the 'thin' layer of atmosphere protecting all the life beneath it (ibid.). This experience is meant to be affective and effective not only when told by the witnesses but also when directly witnessed via the performing body in the outer space.

Space psychology has recognised some of the ways space changes human performance, such as space sickness, disorientation, visual illusions, sleep disturbances, bodily fluid shifts and bone loss (Kanas & Manzey 2008, 2). Microgravity in the spacecraft resembling similar physical circumstances as the free fall combined with typical human body consisting of circa 60 percent of water causes a phenomenon where the body's fluids float upward, causing the legs to atrophy, face to puff and pressure inside the skull to rise. Scientists suspect that the eyesight problems that many astronauts face, especially when living longer periods in space, results largely from the adverse effects of this fluid shift, including the higher pressure of the cerebrospinal fluid in the skull pushing on the back of the eyeballs. For some unknown reason, it affects the right eye more than the left, and men far more than women. It is also possible that a zero-gravity environment might launch biochemical processes in the body (Chang 2014). What is explained here simply demonstrates that the perceiving agent is transforming on a structural level due to being physically located in space. Therefore, the surroundings of the perceiver are an inseparable part of the perception made of the perceived object, where corporeality links two spatially distant arrangements.

The time effect (Kanas & Manzey 2008, 7–8) should not only be understood in simple terms of mission duration, since the sun, the moon and the stars are significantly different from the way they are perceivable from the surface of the Earth. These celestial bodies, as measurable cosmological and mathematical variables, as well as physical beings, create the effect which is understood as 'time'. When the sun is shining in space, instead of the blue sky on a black sky, it is simultaneously present now as a star among other more distant stars (Reid & Kennedy 2012), and as such experiencing time is relatively and significantly different. Since even an overseas flight can lead to difficulties with sleep, appetite and disorientation in balance while still remaining in similar conditions with regard to climatological atmosphere and gravity, it is reasonable to suggest that these elements are far greater in space due to rolling perceptual standpoint on the orbit, even without zero gravity.

Even one's understanding of social circumstances differs when it comes to living in space. Space crews have generally consisted of fewer than eight individuals, which is less than in other isolated and confined circumstances, such as submarines and Antarctic bases (Kanas & Manzey 2008, 102). Group-level factors influencing performance in space are not as easy to conceptualise as factors affecting individuals, and they include such issues as intra-crew tension or changes in cohesion over time (ibid., 89).

> *Nothing is lost ... Everything is transformed.*
>
> *— The Neverending Story by Michael Ende, 1983 [1979].*

Since the physical, physiological, psychological, social and perceptual factors differ in such a significant matter and scale, one could argue that such a phenomenon as the Overview Effect is not only a question of epistemology, what we can know and how we know differently during and after the outer space experience, but is rather about a partially or profoundly different ontology. That ontology would therefore differ from the ontology of the Arctic. It is also likely that while finally being able to perceive the Arctic as a physical whole from the distance it would instead emerge as a globe without visible lines to help figure it as something separable. The bear, the Arctic, escapes us; while we approach it, it transforms into something else. The myth of the Great and Small Bears is about transformation and escaping to an unreachable distance, eternalised by immense space. Callisto, a mortal or a nymph, gave birth to Zeus' illegitimate son Arcas. Zeus' wife Hera punished them by transforming Callisto into a bear, who Arcas was about to hunt down, when Zeus saved them by transforming the mother Callisto into the constellation of the Great Bear and Arcas into the Small Bear, her cub.

It is not only the observed object (the globe) that is different when perceived from an extraterrestrial standpoint but also the subject, which in the adaptive boundaries of the human body becomes an extraterrestrial subject. It does not perceive from a different perspective but rather perceives differently in fundamentally different circumstances. It is not claimed here that the outer space experience is somehow illusionary, but rather that the perceiving subject is a truly coherent agent under the ontology of space, which only exists in and from space, from a fixed distance in relation to the Earth.

The character that we have already encountered from the Dürer's machine, from the graticule, from the telescopes and microscopes, is –. It can be called a 'line', 'radius', 'segment', 'tangent', 'diameter', 'secant', 'chord' or 'beam', but rather than representing any mathematical term or variable, it is here emphasising a(n) in/visible distance. If the – is marked in short as -, it reads as 'minus'. Minus emphasises the absence or lack of something, an undoing. As we have acknowledged, negations are a mattering, a part of the object. Therefore, - is in fact, *a-part* of the object. It marks the apparent 'absence' only in the manner of 'distance', whether we measure it as a quantity in spatial or temporal matter, and where these quantities go together as one. Something that has been taken or has fallen apart is not an undoing; it remains a part from a distance. The relation remains, but it is also altered by what comes between. This phenomenon is called here the *episteme of distance*, the alteration of what can be known emerging between the different ontologies. This *knowing from a fixed distance* which remains a(n) in/visible and inseparable a–part of the current and the historical aesthetics of the Arctic is the *aesthetics of distance*.

The argument of visual psychology concerning the inability to know *a priori* whether perception is illusory or not (Ingold 2012, 5) is not just a question of the theory of mind but also of physics and how it is applied in technology. As Barad claims, "knowing does not come from standing at a distance and representing but rather from *a direct material engagement with the world*" (Barad 2007, 49, emphasis original), since matter and meaning are not separate elements (ibid., 3). Chasing the unaltered form of an observed entity comes down to a question of stabilising the observing body to provide it a standard of what is to be considered 'human', or something that is relatable to human experience. Research conducted

from outer space has already moved the body to a habitat where the human could not survive without preserving and containing infrastructure. But how to come up with such a body that abides by the standards of a human figure, fitting to a scientific and societal context? Such a body cannot be found; it must be sculpted.

> *And having skinned him, cut his flesh from his bones, divide him, member from member, and having brought together again the members and the bones, make them a stepping stone at the entry to the temple and mount upon them and go in, and there you will find what you seek. For the priest whom you see seated in the stream gathering his colour, is not a man of copper. For he has changed the colour of his nature, and become a man of silver whom, if you wish, after a little time, you will have as a man of gold.*

> *— Visions by Zosimos of Panopolis.*

Unoccupied research spacecrafts Pioneer 10 and 11 both carried a small golden plaque with engraved human images into the home galaxy. Voyager 1 and 2 had a golden record containing pictures and sounds from Earth, intending to combine a time capsule and an interstellar message. The golden plaque of the Pioneer spacecrafts was invented by Carl Sagan, who wanted any alien civilisation who might encounter the craft to know who made it and how to contact them. Carvings on the golden plaque identify the time and place of their origin, providing our location in the galaxy and depicting a naked man and woman. Pioneer 10 travels towards the star Aldebaran located in the Taurus constellation, and will take more than two million years to reach it. Pioneer 11 moves towards the constellation of Aquila and will pass near one of the stars in the constellation in about 4 million years (NASA 2020a).

The 12-inch record in the Voyager spacecrafts is constructed of gold-plated copper. After being plated in gold the records were mounted in aluminium containers, the cover of which is electroplated with an ultra-pure sample of the isotope uranium-238, which has a half-life of 4.468 billion years. The contents of the record were selected for NASA by a committee. It includes printed messages from President Carter and U.N. Secretary General Waldheim, 115 assembled images and the remainder of the record in audio, designed to be played at $16^2/_3$ revolutions per minute. It contains spoken greetings in 55 languages. Following is a section of the sounds of Earth, an eclectic 90-minute selection of music, including both Eastern and Western classics and a variety of ethnic music. After the Voyager spacecrafts passed the orbit of Pluto in 1990, they left the solar system, and will take forty thousand years before making a close approach to any other planetary system (NASA 2020b).

Creating the golden plaque and record with representations of human figures and landscapes coded in inorganic material enabled them to be transferred to an

environment where their organic forms could not exist. Gold is a chemical element that can be found in free elemental form; it has high malleability, ductility and resistance to corrosion and most other chemical reactions, which means that it does not react with the human body and it is easy to shape. Therefore, a being concealed in gold will unlikely change its nature and will maintain a standard form in varying surroundings beyond the organic limitations of humanity and life on the planet Earth.

Since such bodies do not change, they cannot learn either. In contrast to the learning bodies in Apollo 8, the Voyagers and Pioneers were designed for collecting and sending data to bodies back on the ground. Thus, the golden figures have not only exceeded the limits of the known world but have also moved beyond knowing. They can simply be known by someone, 'if' they are able to encounter and perform on the bodies of others. Likely, due to this otherness, the performance will change the maintained contents into something else. The golden artefacts only contain information that may or may not emerge while encountering other bodies. They may know from where they come, where they are going and how to communicate; they ought not know more.

The question at hand involves the minuscule bodies, bodies that seem as incomplete, disabled or partial bodies, bodies that ought to preserve, to communicate, to negotiate, to accumulate and disseminate information but that are not considered freely acting agents in comparison to organic human bodies. The same goes with the Big Blonde, dismantled and reconstituted figure, a science communicative display offered for interaction and learning. If the golden plaque is turned so that the edge is moved towards the eye, showing the side of the plaque, the illustrated bodies would not show their sides but simply flatten, distort and finally disappear, while their background would narrow down to a golden line. This is due to the dimension of the figures, dwelling on a plane.

The dimension of a mathematical space is the minimum number of coordinates needed to specify any point within it. The dimension of a point is zero, the dimension of a line is one and the dimension of a plane is two. Two points connected create a line segment, two parallel line segments connected form a square, two parallel squares form a cube and two parallel cubes form a tesseract. A point can move on a line only in one direction or its opposite. A plane or sphere has a dimension of two, such as latitude and longitude, whereas the inside of a sphere is three-dimensional and requires three coordinates to locate a point within it. In other words, these figures dwell on the two-dimensional surface, and if they are subjected to the third dimension, they will emerge as *something else* and ultimately disappear. From a static point of perception, the figures on a moving plane do not maintain the same body proportions, but their mutual fluctuation makes them 'thinner' or 'shorter' to such an extent that no known humanoid could remain as a living being under such conditions, like going through astrophysics' spaghettification. They are only

to be considered figures of human beings within a narrow range of momentum in the third dimension, not when fully exposed to it. The same would go for a living human body rotating in space, if it was not sealed within a spatial relation that creates an atmosphere that allows the body to function. That state of functioning would be undone with full exposure to outer space by the pressure, temperature and lack of oxygen, making the body as immobile, cold and uncorrupted by oxygen as the golden figures.

The data in the golden record is contained in two ways: as a physical piece, directly engaged with organic senses, and as a code to be 'read' by a device, such as a stylus (needle). For a humanoid, the latter also requires another device to project and reproduce the contained images and audio. The 115 images are encoded in analogue form, composed of 512 vertical lines, and the remainder of the record is audio (NASA 2020b). The soundtrack discs are sounded by touch, the touch of the needle reacting to the hollows on the smooth surface to read out the contents of the record. This resembles how the Big Blonde is animated by touch, consuming the recording while reproducing it. The hollows do not matter if they are not part of matter, just as a digital zero does not stand for data without its counterpart, and vice versa.

The golden figures dwell in the second dimension of the golden plaque as a lack. The lack in engravings is invoked and invaded by light, creating its own counterpart, the darkness/shadow. As a contrasting element, it creates a detectable object between them, the line of the figure. To the touch this object would have a smooth surface and a sharp, cutting edge: a plane and a gorge. What is lacking is the matter of gold, engraved away from the smooth surface, which is now lacking its parts and its smoothness. But more profoundly, when it comes to the arrangement of lines and what they depict, instead of a segment it is the bodies they represent that are missing. Every feature of those bodies is drawn from a different body, lacking the rest and rejoining together, from a distance, the –.

Linda Salzman Sagan in her artistic work depicting the two human figures aimed at creating a representation of two genders. Instead of the Western abstraction of a human being, she aimed at representing the generic heritage of multiple ethnicities. According to the authors of the golden plaque, in this representation's "degree of detail, it was not possible to avoid some racial stereotypes, but we hope that this man and woman will be considered representative of all of mankind" (Sagan, Salzman Sagan & Drake 1972, 883). Upon taking a closer look, these features emerge as wavy hair, a broad nose and narrowing eyes. Since there is no differentiation between the background of the bodies and the hair, the colour of the skin are supposedly the same, blond or dark, or to be considered a colouring book for the viewer to decide. Rather than complete bodies, these figures are chimeric bodies—a bricolage—and their present blend of characteristics present also the lack of others, as in the method provided by Dürer's machine. They ought to be

understood as plurals, as somebodies, and therefore also as nobodies, abstractions made out of what is concrete. As in the project Big Blonde, which split into a scientific display of a polar bear, natural historical archived samples and the unknown remainder, somewhere there is, or has been, counterparts with organic lives from which these features have been separated as the spearhead is separated from its cast. As the bear is remade from bits and pieces, so too are these 'standard humans'. Selecting and deciding comes into question not only in the representative ensemble of the figures but also in adjusting their position as an expression of openness: the bear's lowered head and the man's raised bare hand. As such, they are not to be considered closed objects, but invoking surfaces.

The authors of the intergalactic message make two noteworthy statements. First, "Pioneer 10 and any etched metal message aboard it are likely to survive for much longer periods than any of the works of man on Earth" (Sagan, Salzman Sagan & Drake 1972, 881); second, "We do not know if the message will ever be found or decoded; but its inclusion on the Pioneer 10 spacecraft seems to us a hopeful symbol of a vigorous civilization on Earth" (ibid., 884). Taking into consideration the fact that it is not only a vast space that the vessel needs to overcome but also a vast temporal difference one, if the vessel is considered a means of communication, its purpose becomes doubtful, and the actual means seem to identify it as a time capsule. To be a means of communication, one requires the message to be received and possibility to send a response.

If on Earth one is to discover an archaeological artefact, one may be capable of decoding and recreating the circumstances from which the relic is inherited, but it is not possible to communicate back to the past, which has now turned into the present. The moment that Pioneer was launched represented modernity, but by the moment that it may reach something it will have become a historical relic—not only to the assumedly more technologically and culturally developed aliens that may encounter it as a meaningful message but also to the ones who sent it. When the two statements from the authors of the golden plaque are read, it becomes more and more clear that they hold an intention—whether this intention is to be considered as a human-intention or not—of capsuling and maintaining humans after we are gone. These notifications then reopen the (science) communicative

capacity of the Big Blonde, whether it communicates out the Arctic in Change and the acts required to preserve it or whether it becomes the only thing that there is left after the Arctic is gone, including its animal inhabitants.

The question of what the intergalactic message tells the aliens remains hypothetical. Therefore, what it tells us about ourselves should be readdressed. An attempt, however moderate it might be, at producing an intergalactic or universal message is inevitably an attempt to define a human, a humanity and all they bring along. In a way, the features defining the human contain the assumption of what it is to be a human, and therefore what is not, the definition of the alien other. Furthermore, in the attempt to communicate with the aliens, one has to present oneself as alien to the other, to define oneself through the eyes of the other. Therefore, the golden plaque and record also contain the assumed other in us.

To apply these findings concerning the golden objects carried by Pioneer and Voyager to studying the Arctic, one must seek an object with resemblance: a vessel made of gold on a passage of time. The National Museum of Ireland holds an artefact dated to 100 BC, found in Broighter in Northern Ireland: it is 18.4 cm in length, 7.6 cm wide and 4.9 cm deep, and represents a golden boat with such details as oars, seats, a mast and a square sail. It is supposed to represent the first boats used by 'Europeans' that were able to approach northernmost waters (Lainemaa & Nurminen 2001, 20; Farrell, Penny & Jope 1975, 19). Such an object could be treated as a miniature of a boat, possibly even serving as a blueprint for its construction. If it is put side by side with the golden objects of the modern age on their voyage, the interpretation of its meaning can be taken a step further. The golden boat is simultaneously an exploration vessel, an archive and a representative, to whom*ever* it may concern. The full-sized model of the boat, made of wood, leather, iron and other materials, was meant to transport the non-arctic human to the Arctic, often considered a demanding and hostile environment, to gather whatever was the purpose of their voyage. Inevitably, it took them on a

voyage to encounter the Arctic. All these golden vessels were reaching out into an unknown space, inhabited by non-human and alien life. A miniature made of organic material, such as the full-sized boat or other metals subjected to corrosion, could not have managed the other travel that only the golden boat was capable of: travel in time. The miniature bodies of the ship's crew are only encoded as a ghostly non-presence in the detailed blank plank seats. This gives us a clue about the hypothetical alien encounter with the Pioneers and Voyagers, a contact with a past society beyond the passage of time.

The authors of the golden plaque say that "The message inadvertently contains anthropocentric content" (Sagan, Salzman Sagan & Drake 1972, 881). For example, the "Ten fingers and ten toes may provide a clue to man's arboreal ancestry, and the fact that the distance of Mercury from the sun is given as 10 units may be a clue to the development of counting" (ibid., 883). Such numeric contents compose a being that is defined by mathematics, a scaled and calculable unit that, whether it is considered big or small by its patterned proportions, is the centerpiece, the axis, of the whole universe. The structure of its biology transfers to the measurement of the cosmos, and the body's rations scale the distance between celestial bodies. Rather than being anthropocentric, such an approach could be called anthropometric. More than anything, a human, on the Pioneer, is a ratio on gold—a *golden ratio*.

Here we have encountered our next character, φ. The character appears in Lacan's algebra, but it is more commonly used to signify the golden ratio, also known as the golden section, golden mean, golden proportion, golden cut, golden number, extreme and mean ratio, medial section, divine proportion and divine section. It is a concept known and used for centuries in various fields of science and art, including mathematics, aesthetics, architecture, design and music, and it is recognised in the patterns of 'nature' and human perception. In mathematics, two quantities are in the golden ratio if their

ratio is the same as that of their sum to the larger of the two quantities. If so, it is marked with the Greek letter phi (φ) and its numeral value is 1.6180339887…. German psychologist Adolf Zeising found the golden ratio expressed in the arrangement of parts of plant and animal organisms, the proportions of chemical compounds and artistic endeavours. For Zeising, the golden ratio operates as a universal law containing the ground-principle of all formative striving for beauty and completeness in nature and art, which permeates all structures, forms and proportions, whether cosmic or individual, organic or inorganic, acoustic or optical, finding its fullest realisation in the human form (Zeising 1854, v). In the theoretical approach of macrocosm and microcosm, there is a schema of seeing the same patterns reproduced on all levels of the cosmos, from the largest scale to the smallest. Therefore, φ figures as a body-organ, 'placed on' as a ratio to reproduce, to repeat and to transfer the physicality of 'human' as a measurable entity and impose it on things, beings and worlds.

"There is in all things a pattern that is part of our universe. It has symmetry, elegance, and grace [...] We try to copy these patterns in our lives and in our society [...] Yet, it is possible to see peril in the finding of ultimate perfection. It is clear that the ultimate pattern contains its own fixity. In such perfection, all things move towards death."

— Dune by Frank Herbert, 1965.

Phenomena such as the golden ratio fall back to the paradigm of mimesis and anti-mimesis. As a mimetic representation, its correspondences to the physical world are equated with a model for beauty, truth and the good. In anti-mimesis, life is understood to imitate art far more than art imitates life, whether this is due to the

form which art offers to nature to manifest or to the fact that it dictates the practice of perceiving the life and nature through a set of artistic schemas. In the current post-humanist reading, it could rather be co-constituted in inter- or, with respect to performativity theory, *intra-play*—or simply *figured out*.

More important than the essence or truthfulness of the golden ratio is what it is believed, acknowledged or made to be. In other words, it is a standard: a standard enfolding what ought to be considered natural and beautiful and therefore good and just. A standard that is a ratio of gold instead of an ingot of gold makes it possible to scale it up and down, from macro to micro. To define macro from micro, one requires a pivot point from which to move inwards or outwards, up or down. What Zeising's claim points out is that the pivot for a human is, unsurprisingly, the man himself. As the golden ratio, in its very self, seems to be considered the pattern of life and living, it inevitably claims that life does not perish when one moves between the different scales. The difference would be rather the same as that between a seed and a tree: a possibility for life, inherited, contained and emerged. In the argument presented here, the golden ratio is not to be understood as a mathematical formula or a natural pattern. It is a claim that life has a specific form and it follows a regular pattern, and that if anything would fall out of it, it would not be considered a possible or acceptable outcome, fighting as it would against the principle of beauty, good or its very existence—against nature.

"The Pioneer 10 spacecraft is displayed behind the human beings and to the same scale. A society that intercepts the spacecraft will of course be able to measure its dimensions" (Sagan, Salzman Sagan & Drake 1972, 881). This part of the representation points out that the size of the human figures is not their actual size, the magnitude or dimensions of a thing, measured as length, width, height, diameter, perimeter, area, volume or mass. They are miniatures to be rescaled based on the dimensions of the actual craft that is carrying the golden object in which they have been carved. To draw this connection, the Pioneer carrying the golden plaque also carries the representation of the spacecraft, carved in gold with simple geometric lines indicating the size and shape of the craft, along with a representation of the plaque itself, *Spiegel im Spiegel*, a mirror containing another mirror and therefore extending the space to the infinite. If we are to acknowledge that the figures on the golden plaque's surface are on a second dimension, as is the image of the Pioneer itself, while the 'actual' Pioneer dwells in the third dimension, and that it provides the scale for the natural bodies of the human, it is then as if there are human shadows cast by the Pioneer, ghostly projections traveling with it. If the second dimension has the capacity to assimilate the phenomenon of the third through projection, would it be followed by the assumption that the same would go for the figured bodies of the golden plaque? Just as is the case for the projection, this ability requires a specific standpoint, a fixed standpoint, to emerge. Then again, if the figures are

turned into figures, from images to numbers, they ought to emerge wherever they are constituted by mathematical standards.

The ratio contains a body and restrains a body, as it is the super- and substructure, micro and macro; it shapes the body into a standard by surrounding it with a standard environment. Science requires both knowing bodies and known bodies, bodies that are capable of studying and learning and that are also returnable to society and acknowledged by the political order. Such an understanding of ratio come close to what Martin Skrydstrup depicts as a life-support system in a distinctive form to "'cultivate human beings' and shape the ideal citizen-scientist of the globe" (Skrydstrup 2016, 870). As the bodies learn, they ought not merge into that dimension, become something else, but remain as controllable reactions, a chemical reaction in a decanter.

Thus the very fundamentals of science are made by intervention and applying borderlines to enable the uninterrupted constitution of a controllable phenomenon. For example, to 'see' an atom with the scanning tunnelling microscope (STM), moving from the scale of thousands of nanometres down to the individual carbon atom, one must actively intervene to enable a large number of interlocking low-level generalisations to create phenomena in the microscope (Barad 2007, 51). To produce evidence for the existence of the atom, the specimen is prepared and positioned on the scan head, the system is isolated, and a scan range is selected (ibid., 53) to fill Ian Hacking's criterion of reality of entities: stability and directness in standardised experimental success and routine techniques (ibid., 41). The technique of how the STM makes the atom visible does not follow the rules of geometrical optics as a magnifying glass does, but of physical optics (ibid., 52). Scanning uses a tunnelling current to 'feel' the surface of the object and map it onto a computer screen (ibid., 52–53). The atom could never fall under the ocular domain; it is visual only through technology-mediated representation. Therefore, an atom does not exist freely in 'nature'; it is 'real' only by eliminating and isolating variables. In a sense, the atom was not discovered: it was made.

If one cannot put the observed compound under a looking glass or into a test tube, can it be done the other way around? What if the observer is captured within the looking glass, into that artificial space, so to speak, that is normally created for the observed specimen? How to make one into the golden figure without turning organic into inorganic? How to make a body that not only contains knowledge but is also able to attain knowledge? How to have a body in a fixed dimension supporting an uncorrupted form? How to make the living and acting organic body of the observed into a ratio? Once again, that result requires a process of turning things *around* by creating physiological surroundings, an artificial ecosystem and microclimate, to mimic the environment required for a subarctic species to function and flourish. A subarctic bubble to live in.

R/V Aranda is a modern ice-reinforced research vessel. Aranda was launched in 1989 as the first research vessel owned by the Finnish Environment Institute. The vessel is able to operate in all seas and has made scientific expeditions to Antarctic waters and to the Northern Atlantic. It is powerful enough to drive in the ice conditions of the Baltic Sea. Aranda is adapted to year-round multidisciplinary marine research, including biology, physics, chemistry and geology of the sea. Advanced automation enables the vessel to be managed by a crew of 12–13 members, which is less than that required by its predecessors. The vessel has its own versatile weather station, drinking water can be produced out of seawater by an apparatus using reverse osmosis and the ship has its own biological treatment plant for the purification of sewage, which is extremely important on long cruises (Finnish Environmental Institute 2020).

The documentary film "Aranda" (2011) directed by Anu Kuivalainen gives an insight into life in the research vessel. Besides looking into the practice of research, the documentary looks into the practitioners themselves. The pictorial and spoken narration in many ways emphasises the way they are cut off from their regular socio-material surroundings, their isolation on the sea. The documentary also expresses their re-evaluation of their ways of life while set in new surroundings with profoundly different natural forces and a vastness of spatiality and temporality in relation to their very own physical existence. What is expressed less but is inevitably present in the film is the materiality that Aranda offers to maintain for these practitioners. This idea moves our attention to the background of the film setting, the infrastructure, the built material settings supporting the living in the vessel surrounded by the arctic seas. In other words, the performativity of science

is studied by exploring the performances of the bodies through a representation that is categorised as a documentary film.

> *the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea and that […] it goes as far as the colonies in search of the most precious treasures […] the boat has not only been for our civilization […] the great instrument of economic development […] In civilizations without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates.*
>
> — *Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias by Michel Foucault, 1984 [1967], 9.*

A vessel is on an *expedition* or *exploration*: both terms indicate a movement that takes place ('on foot' or a hunting 'cry' pointing out a location) 'out' (*ex-*) from something (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020d, 2020e). The dynamic form of the vessel cutting through ice-covered waters seems to be self-evidently fully and foremost a phallic object, the Arctic being a virginal objective for a desire for conquest. Then again, *each object creates its counterpart*, or rather *contains its counterpart*. What Aranda contains are non-arctic human organisms, the researchers that it nourishes and shelters. Aranda, like all the boats in general, is referred to as "she". As a feminine entity, Aranda is figured as a chalice, not instead of but as well as a phallus. Accordingly, Aranda is about reversals. On the waters, it is a liminal space, encountering the Arctic sea while keeping it out, a foreign body with foreign bodies within. Aranda, from the inside, serves as a chalice, a womb for the bodies to be preserved. This womb consists of different horizontal layers, arks within the ark. Martin Skrydstrup speaks of spheres, which in Peter Sloterdijk's *spherology* are retraced formations of shapes among imminences that appear in the ordering of human and extra-human systems. As 'micro-spheres' or biologically as 'micro uteri', they are comforting forms of secluded space into which a person enters (Skrydstrup 2016, 859). This idea presents another reversed process, since one does not fully re-enter a womb as an adult human being but may enter a ship as seamen. Accordingly, Aranda seems to have an ecosystem of its own: a world within a world, turning into the opposite of what surrounds it with its reversed processes. It goes from liquid to solid, from fluid to static, from cold to warm, from arctic to subarctic, and from the state of nature to natural science.

"Most of the time this is how we study the ocean, without actually seeing the world we're exploring" (Satu Viitasalo in Kuivalainen 2011). Besides the surrounding and everchanging sea, a more static landscape is constituted by the research vessel itself. As it is the only piece close to 'land', it is also a 'scape'. As

has come about in the word's etymology, the suffix representing Middle Dutch '*schap*', Old Dutch '*skap*', Proto-Germanic '*skapiz*', from '*skapaz*' ("shape, form") and cognate with Modern Dutch '*schap*', German '*schaft*', Swedish '*skap*', Old English '*sceap*', '*scipe*'—they all stand for a 'ship' (Wiktionary 2020a). So, the ship is a 'scape', a shape taking place in a space. The shape of a ship, or the ship as a shape, is present in shaping and placemaking when it comes to the reversal of expedition: that is, in exhibiting that which has been brought back from the discovered, studied, recorded and colonised land.

In the conquest of transporting more southern organisms up north and keeping them alive in such a different climatological circumstance due to the vast geographic dis- or relocation, the ship's architecture has a twofold role. To give an example, we have to move away from Arctic waters and make a shift between tropical and temperate climates into a district of the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames. The Palm House at the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew was built in 1840s for tropical pants shipped back by the Victorian explorers. Due to its massive size, the construction, consisting of steel and glass, borrowed techniques from the ship-building industry, which is apparent by its shape, which looks like the "upturned hull of a ship" (Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew 2014). Taking the ship as a shape for mobile transport and more static occupation, a kind of a spatial bubble, works both ways. As a ship on an expedition, the shape could dislocate the plants by carrying them over the sea and, by turning into its opposite shape, could reverse the climatic conditions and preserve the plants in their relocation. For the plants, the ship's shape becomes their landscape, terrain and atmosphere.

> *Throughout all these Human Lands*
>
> *Tools were made & Born were hands*
>
> *Every Farmer Understands*
>
> — *Auguries of Innocence by William Blake, 1950 [1863].*

Aranda is not only equipped to serve as a ship and scape but also to train and maintain the occupying bodies in shipshape. One fleeting detail appearing in the documentary film is the seats in the vessel, which in one of the scenes are swinging and rolling according to the rhythm of the moving ship. One of these seats is a saddle chair (see Spilling 2017) for riding-like sitting. Its design could be characterised as a classic in the field of office ergonomics. In the man-machine relationship, ergonomics involves improving worker comfort by changing postures with furniture to reduce fatigue, improving workers' wellbeing and efficiency (Bayazit 2004, 23). The saddle chair's function lies in improving the maintenance of the physical health of a person who needs to remain seated while working for long

periods of time, typical for white collar labour. A tall seat allows an open angle in the hips to avoid the constant bending of the knees and feet, which restricts blood circulation. Saddle chairs can be good for the back when a balanced posture is achieved; one can sit upright with a healthy lumbar curve without constant tension (see Mandal 1976; Mandal 1981).

Yet again, such a description does not fully explain the object itself, just the other half of it. One needs to see under the chair, its substructure, the horse, *equus ferus caballus*. When it comes to the ecosystem, it was typical in earlier sea voyages for animals to be kept on the boat for different purposes, mainly to provide nutrition and enable better mobility for the explorers when landing, as well as to help maintain the ship by controlling the amount of vermin that the ships also carried and maintained with them. While animal species besides the human have almost disappeared from Aranda, their functions and forms are still incorporated into the vessel, encoded into a different matter as part of the synthesised ecosystem. Unlike the description of the function of the saddle chair, the shape of the saddle was not developed to enable a long-lasting static posture, but for mobility, to enable horseback riding. Early saddles appeared, according to some investigation, soon after the domestication of the horse 4000 years ago, serving as a buffer between the horse and the rider during bareback migrations and battles among, for example, the Assyrians in around 700 B.C. The first wooden frames of about 200 B.C. kept a rider's weight off the horse's tender, sensitive vertebrae, preserving the animal's well-being (Equisearch 2017).

The shape of the saddle is constituted by what is not there. It is a lack and invitation. It is not simply an extension of the horse or the man. It is what there is in between, a relation constituted by the steed and the rider. That relation, a human-animal relation, is what materialises in the form of a saddle. In a saddle chair, the body and labour of the horse, in its full physicality, is lacking, although the horse's function as a steed remains in the saddle. That function is the enabling of mobility, whether to accommodate for its lack in static office work or its presence in horseback riding. That mobility enables the body of a human to become the body of an explorer, where its bodily capacities are limited otherwise. In Aranda, this heritage of conquering long distances emerges in ergonomics.

> In the end, we self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages are little miracles of self-reference.
>
> — *I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter, 2007, 363.*

While the saddle chair presents as the preserving of a body in productive work, another documented piece of scenery in Aranda presents the body as a consuming product. While the saddle chair is part of the scientific labour process with its

seated, static body posture, a treadmill aims to mobilise the body in leisure and within a restrained environment. In the vessel's narrow indoor space, which is filled with machinery and equipment and is under the forceful arctic sea, the climate outdoors full of wet and frozen surfaces facing a cold and hard wind, the positive benefits for health achieved by running are nullified by the direct risk to one's life. A treadmill can simulate the distance of countless kilometres with a track of couple of meters indoors, providing a smooth, stable and non-slip surface. The counterpart of each step is designed to be a standard, without alteration and with an adjustable time and distance equated to speed. Instead of moving through a landscape, the landscape under one's feet is moving. Running on a treadmill combines the power of the treadmill resisted by the power of the body, with the opposite directions of movement synchronised together so that the running body remains in the same location within the training room. Both opposite movements consume, whether kilowatts and kilocalories, but do not take us anywhere. It is an abstraction of running without a goal or somebody to reach besides one's own body.

Treadmill performs a manipulation of space, movement and power in its contemporary use as well as in its historical development. The treadmill was designed as a device operated by an animal's treading steps on a wheel, transferring muscle power and bodily weight for mechanical work. It was a technology to utilise and adjust domesticated animals' physical power to farm and factory work. Human-powered treadmills were also used in prisons, introduced in 1817 in England. The prison treadmill was meant to both reform the offenders and to use their power for good in the form of controlled labour. It was in the early 20th century that treadmills were first introduced to the health field as a cardio workout machine and were used to test patients for heart and lung diseases. In 1933, *Popular Science* published an article describing how treadmills could be used as a "training track" (Efitology 2013).

Besides the historical genealogy of treadmill, the running device has a resemblance to the conveyor belts used in material transportation; in the early stage of the system, it was designed for moving heavy parts short distances. Henry Ford applied the technique from meat packing business, to car factory work, creating the part of the system known as the assembly line. The primary target was to increase efficiency by taking the work to the men instead of the men to the work, placing the tools and the men in the sequence of the operation so that each component part could travel the least possible distance while in the process of finishing. The net result was the reduction of the necessity for thought on the part of the worker and the reduction of his movements to a minimum, each doing only one thing with only one movement (Ford 2005 [1922], 80–81; CBS 2013). Just as the treadmill has an abstracted, 'flat' running surface derived from altering topographical and environmental circumstances, the conveyor belt of the assembly

line has abstracted labour into a reduced choreography of the working tasks of individual bodies.

What we have come across in the case of the saddle chair, the incorporeal presence of the animal, also applies to the treadmill due to its genealogy of practice and thought. Just as it was the farm animals that were producing the power transferred to the treadmill, it was the meat packing industry where Henry Ford applied the idea of stationary labourers and moving product. It is the animal that is the producer and the product, moving or moved by this transferring and mediating technology, where the aims is in cultivation, whether it is about farming, punishing or exercising for the benefit of humans.

So, is it then the man or the animal that is moved or moving in the performance of running? Bern Heinrich claims that, in the natural history of human species, for millions of years our ultimate form of locomotion has been running. Therefore, "We are, deep down, still runners [...] our minds, as much as our lungs and muscles, are a vital force that empowers our running" (Heinrich 2008 [2002], 9). Heinrich refers to the argument presented by James F. Fixx, that running is reasserting kinship with ancient man and the preceding beasts (ibid., 10). In other words, the exercise of running, on a treadmill or on another surface, is about coming into the pre-historical, running towards the previous—to become the forthcoming. Running, when it was part of an ancient type of hunting, required long-distance vision, holding the desired outcome in our imagination even when it was out of sight, smell, and hearing (ibid., 177–178), the aim being to outrun and hunt down an animal for food. Here the same rules apply: on the top of the line and at the end of the line is an animal within, both as a producer and as a product, the self-preserved *us* and the desired *other*. By running, we are to re/gain an animal with/in us.

The spatial arrangement of Aranda has brought out an interesting controversy, a paradigm of mobility. Restraining while engaging momentum, static within dynamic and vice versa. While the research vessel ought to move on the sea, to study and discover, the specimen needs to be stabilised. The exploring researcher's body as part of that specific arrangement needs to be immobilised as well, but it must remain with the capacity to return to momentum. The saddle does not have a steed, but it has wheels and can rotate around its axis. A treadmill enables the runner to move—it takes one nowhere, but makes one into something. Running on a moving platform nullifies movement and engaging with the floor of the vessel by standing immobilises the body in a vessel that is still moving, the body remaining in sync with its primary exterior landscape, the inside of the vessel. In an exterior example presented by Martin Parker and Elke Weik, mobile academics in international activities spend a great amount of time in 'non-spaces', to use the term of the anthropologist Marc Augé, such as hotels and transit systems that minimise friction (Parker & Weik 2014, 167). Aranda on the other hand seems

more like an 'all-space', its own ecosystem, managing the resistance by releasing and subjecting the body with it, maintaining the organisms as they were. While there has been a history of institutions attempting to "create a body of able minds" that "generated 'applicable' knowledge" (ibid., 179) and where our necessary embodiment is a condition of being human and the ground of politics (ibid. 177), what we are facing here is the creation of able bodies for minds to ground on the *polis*.

The researcher's academic freedom needs to return to academia. As this freedom was historically about defending the university from the "hostile environment" (Parker & Weik 2014, 168), now this hostility is the Arctic waters, the subject for which the researchers and crew have an "attachment or detachment from the world which they comment upon" (ibid. 168). These claims, drawn from the different academic environment and practice critiqued by Parker and Weik, are much too harsh when taking into consideration the long, isolated and uncompromising work conducted in Aranda, far from many comforts and social attachments (a discomfort and limitation also acknowledged by Parker & Weik 2014, 167). Still, such a comparison emphasises the spatiotemporal restraints of knowing—those of a human body, enhanced to occupy an academic body.

In many ways Aranda appears to be an environment where the exterior interacts with the surrounding space but where the internal processes are isolated from the direct influence of the Arctic sphere. To exist within the arctic environment, it is likely that the human bodies slowly acclimate and adapt to the conditions and requirements that the environmental pressure conveys to them within the range that the physical structure of the body allows. When we look at the golden bodies of the Pioneer, the human figures are meant to remain, not to change: to serve as a representative of a certain civilisation, products of culture and society. On the other hand, the labour of the scientists must be returnable to the society that has served as their place of origin. In this sense, the exploring bodies must be able to be reinstated to the society, to the *polis*, not lost to the surrounding state of nature.

This is the stage where the importance and the political life of the saddle-chair and the treadmill emerge as ergonomics, the negotiation between the arctic research and becoming arctic. The term ergonomics is derived from the Greek words *ergon* (work) and *nomos* (laws). Ergonomics are implemented to fulfil these two goals: health and productivity, "in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance" (International Ergonomics Association 2020). The goals take place in the design of safe furniture and easy-to-use machine interfaces, the 'fit' between people and their technological tools and environments. Working ergonomics and fitness training seem to manipulate bodies to keep them as they were within a society, as they are now exterior to their native surroundings. The heritage of the human–animal relation and labour materialises in these objects and emerges in their use. When discussing the effect of design standards, such as

the conceptualising and modelling of human dimensions in interiors (see Panero & Zelnik 1979) central to practitioners of Bauhaus, the architecture critic Mark Wigley argues that when the human is the most designed thing there is, it is better to find a new concept to design, better to own a design than to become one (Deutsche Welle 2019, ep. 2). That is to say that the ergonomic standards given to the objects and instruments are inevitably shaping and a part of human performances and bodies, not only recording but also making the performing bodies into standards.

These observations take us back to what was brought out earlier by the plaque, the disk and the boat: they are on a voyage to conquer space or to conquer time. Aranda's mission during the filming of the documentary was to study the Deep Ocean Current that travels around the globe over 1600 years, whereas the longest documented lifespan of a human had been 122 years and 164 days (Kuivalainen 2011), claiming the boundary of the biological life of an individual body in studying a phenomenon known as the ocean current, out-scaling the man. These two timespans can only cross, not join for life. They may join as numeral variables, of measured and recorded body dimensions and estimations of ocean currents speed, distance and volume. The distance can be overcome only by artifice, by manipulation, by alteration and simulation. As with the looking glass, we can only perceive a thing where it is not.

We conclude that Aranda contains and conserves learning and abled non-arctic bodies that do not fully and directly engage with the surrounding Arctic environment, their encounter being negotiated by instruments and apparatuses. Such an ensemble corresponds to the golden plaque and the golden record in the Pioneers and Voyagers, the figures and recordings being part of the spacecrafts and a part of the learning system while still claiming to remain unchangeable. Aranda is its own environment, which maintains these bodies, where their maintenance entails a disabled merging with the exterior environment. With its reversed processes, such as the osmosis that reverses the water circulations in the living biological plants according to the physiology of water and the animal labour minus the animal, Aranda emerges as an arrangement of opposites. What we have learned is that managing something as an object requires us to stand opposite to it. Aranda in its totality is an antithesis for the Arctic, forming together with its exterior the synthesis that is *the Arctic known by humans*, the scientific thesis. Therefore, there is no Arctic *an sich*, only this co-constitution joined together from oppositions. "Intra-actions are practices of making a difference, of cutting together-apart" (Barad 2012, 7), which take place while Aranda cuts across the waves and sea ice.

In the process of becoming minuscule, the components for below-arctic living requirements are not only scaled down but also cast into a different matter, creating artificial space. In some sense, this environment is lacking the 'real' organic life that it is imitating, being animated by the living bodies of others while being perceived and enacted. The same seems to go the other way when comparing all

presented *golden-ratio-nalised* bodies, whether the body is artificial or the space is artificial, one or the other, taking turns. In addition, does it fall far from the making of the Big Blonde, with its in/organic organising and replacing of parts in turns? It is life concealed in the inanimate to overcome death, enacted and pursued in one moment in time.

If human tendencies are matched to the structure of our bodies and adapted to the environment faced in the past, and if this 'fit' is not performed since we do not get the exposure, Heinrich argues that we become culturally biased (Heinrich 2008 [2002], 176). Therefore, what happens in Aranda closes out the opportunity to adapt and become arctic by altering our tendencies and structural match. Then again, if we would fully adapt to the Arctic, would this object of 'Arctic' not by then disappear, since instead of facing it we would be embraced by it, and it would therefore become part of our self-recognition, our identity? That identity could not handle such word as 'Arctic', which has always been an expression of otherness and distance.

According to Skrydstrup, to reproduce societal structure and scientific working community on the "featureless terrain" in which the research station at North Greenland Eemian Ice Drilling is placed (Skrydstrup 2016, 856–857), "the aesthetic grammar of the architecture of science" (ibid., 854) was designed to cultivate collectivity across surface spheres for residential and leisure space and subsurface squares for work space (ibid., 872). Spheres and squares define a constitutive distinction between science and the society built within the micro-cosmos of the research station (ibid., 867). The fact that Skrydstrup speaks of "a global ecumene" to which the science is addressed (ibid.) has an echo of another type of expedition to Greenland, that with missionaries reinstating Christianity among the natives. Seeing a miniature of a ship hanging from the nave of a church in Ilulissat, among the other significations that it carries, made me think about the connection between the miniature and the building itself, the ship and the nave, how one brought the other, theologically and materially foreign, to the place, and how the one is now contained within the other, with similar structure and name, constituting another type of body-collective, the parish as the divine body on the earth.

As Skrydstrup's case study with spheres and squares indicates, when discussing the body, the collective or the landscape in which it dwells, as well as the tendencies and exposures, what requires further study is what is meant by culture in a very material sense. This materiality is that which enables and disables, supports and restrains the senses, sensuousness, sensitivities, sensibility and sensemaking. It seems to be the culture that enfolds what is considered interior and exterior to the self and societal: the borderlines and the circumstances.

Leonardo da Vinci's *Vitruvian Man* from around 1490 depicts the proportions of a human body. Furthermore, the drawing does seem to indicate alternative positions for the limbs and illustrate their movement. The enfolding circle and square, besides indicating the bodily proportion, demonstrates their reach. If only one enfolding figure is set around the body, the outcome will be a standing body without a support provided by the frame, a reaching body that will breach the boundary of the figure or a frame that is out of reach of the body. Therefore, the position—or the prepositioning—of the body depends on its frame. It is the frame that limits and separates the capability of the body from its full capacity. The enfolding frame enables and disables how the body may be and perform. Furthermore, it indicates what type of behaviour is fitting by constraining or separating the body with its limits from those parts that are extending beyond its scope and providing support for a specific type of standing. As it seems, the *Vitruvian Man* indicates that shapes and forms are both preserving and restraining bodies. They are generalised standards, and they generalise by implying standards.

Such an influence on living bodies would seem at first quite distant from the mundane experience, but such a case presented itself through coincidence in a biographical narrative with a single sentence. The context for the sentence is the following. I had an opportunity to participate an event where the Innu people First Nation representatives of northern Canada (written here as D, A-M, J and E) visited the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland on the 18th of September 2012 for a Thursday afternoon coffee chat. The Innu homeland areas are located in the northeastern parts of the province of Québec and some eastern portions of Labrador in the Arctic tundra below the Arctic Circle. The event included a presentation of Innu culture and traditional knowledge, including clothing and tools made from caribou, and an explanation of the utility of and legends connected to the animal,

the tasting traditional bread *bannock* and berries, the hearing of storytelling and participation in Innu dances. Furthermore, the discussions concerned the current and future challenges regarding culture, land rights, indigenous rights, education and health.

The Innu, meaning 'people' in their native language, were known in the Western world and to the early missionaries encountering them in St. Lawrence River French settlements as the 'Montagnais', 'mountain people', and the Innu groups living in the tundra region of northern Labrador and Québec were known as 'Naskapi'. Anthropologists later recognised them as belonging to the same culture of 'Montagnais-Naskapi'. Not until the 1980s was the Innu name emphasised by the people themselves, along with their traditional territory Ntisinan. The Innu are the easternmost group of the Cree, inhabiting the boreal forest and sharing a broadly similar cultural tradition. Innu life has a history of being both nomadic and, for the Quebec-Labrador Innu, also involving longer-term migration based on the movement of animals and various environmental factors. The requirement for mobile lives led to and was enabled by the development of the art and technology of travel, due to which items were often left behind and new ones made over the period of a year (Tanner 1999). Whether we consider Innu as the indigenous people living in the Arctic depends on its definition, but their traditional area of inhabitation extends to the arctic tundra.

> *This is your car. This, your house. Your office. Your bed. The metro. The airplane. The elevator. The coffin. Always in a box. Look. They do not seem very glad. Inside is everything. […] the age of iron, the golden age … and now age of the box. And of the standardization. If you are not in agreement, if you do not fit, you do not enter the box, only left to burst […] 6 walls and 24 angles. Simple, effective, unstoppable one. The solution to all the problems. We pass from one box to another […]*
>
> — *The Lacemaker by Claude Goretta, 1977.*

During the presentation, A-M told an autobiographical story in French, which was interpreted into English by D, about her experience concerning the circular worldview of the Innu people and the colonial school environment. According to what A-M described, the basis of an Innu dwelling is round: so too is the fireplace and the bread baked by the fire. One can reflect on the story and assume that the same roundness dominates the perceived landscape, the wide-open space common in the Canadian arctic tundra, and is repeated in the movement of the nomads following the seasonal migration of the caribou. When the Innu children were taken into a residential school of the state of Canada in Quebec, the first impression for A-M was a rectangular object, the school building. The rectangular house was

entered from a rectangular doorway, and it held inside rectangular desks and seats at which the children were supposed to sit. One can continue imagining that the rectangular forms continued with the black board, squared paper and even in the landscape when it was seen through the rectangular window. "It hurt my eyes", A-M concluded when depicting her story, without any further explanations of or reasoning for the sensation.

This statement raises a peculiar question, whether a form, an 'encounter with' or a 'perception of' a form can cause an experience or sensation of 'hurt'. It is as if the rectilinear sharp surfaces and objects could cut or pierce one's eye. Whether this is considered a physical pain or an emotionally pressing feeling would underline a Cartesian body and mind division that may not be rewarding for an analysis that extends 'body' beyond its organic matter of concern, placing the mind upon objects as well. Another critical issue could be raised about the political nature and intention of the event within which the sentence was pronounced, for promoting indigenous peoples' agenda and therefore creating a binary between the colonial power and the native culture. Still, there is something in the simplicity of the description that urges to see the forest for the trees, to look at the meta-level of this specific narration, the moment where the form emerges as a phenomenon contrasting with another and dictating the matter of the human-being, a conflict within *hylomorphic* substance. For the first time in this analysis of the Arctic, it emerges as a hurt, a violating phenomenon.

The presented case study, the emergence of the school's interior in the narration, is a matter of design, where the design not only stands for making shapes but also for signifying and identifying them. The story emphasises an urgency to look from the morphology of linguistics to the morphology of the study of shapes. Where the substantial matter of language, oral tradition and livelihood are often recognised as being subjected to colonial projects, it is less so for the study of forms and their intersecting and intertwining with all of that which has been previously mentioned. To understand the influence of the design, design studies are applied to confront the 'hurt'. Besides the post-colonial critique that has been more commonly applied to revealing forms of violence, the focus is set in depth to the aesthetics and performance of the design.

Hurt may be in the process of the labouring body due to confronting certain environmental stressors. In design-based environmental ergonomics, the effects of temperature, vibration, noise and light on the health, comfort and performance of people are recognised, along with the human characteristics which determine human sensitivities and responses (Parsons 2000, 581). Different visual environments, as well as atypical body posture, clearly hold the potentiality to cause physical discomfort and stress. It is another question whether it is environmental ergonomics alone that can explain the sentence "It hurt my eyes" as hurt on an organ or hurt on a visual cortex. Maybe the wording in the sentence could and should be read

as 'aɪ', with 'I' for an 'eye', as the hurt of the self. Since 'me' and 'my body' are *the same*, *from the same*, or *belonging to the same*, the hurt is physical, but determining only whether the hurt can be pinpointed to the function of an organ is an unsatisfactory approach. Certainly, figuring out new forms with one's untrained and strained eyes can cause hurt, as reading small text can tire the eyes, but could such experience carry through all these years in the memory of the person if it did not hold any other significance? Therefore, ergonomics require complementation from approaches that juxtapose sensations and emotions.

> *A sophisticated human can become primitive. What this really means is that the human's way of life changes. Old values change, become linked to the landscape with its plants and animals. This new existence requires a working knowledge of those multiplex and cross-linked events usually referred to as nature. It requires a measure of respect for the inertial power within such natural systems. When a human gains this working knowledge and respect, that is called "being primitive." The converse, of course, is equally true: the primitive can become sophisticated, but not without accepting dreadful psychological damage.*
>
> — *Children of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1976.*

Jakob Trischler and Anita Zehrer define the emotional context of design, which consists of the five senses and the personal meaning held by the person (Trischler & Zehrer 2012, 58). The authors form different experience cues from the technical function and quality of the design, which comes from the actual objects or environments, and from the sensory design and human qualities derived from their behaviour, attitude, and appearance (ibid., 60). Donald Norman in his work *Emotional Design* traces human attributes as resulting from three different levels of the brain. These are the visceral level, the behavioural level and the reflective level (Norman 2004, 21). The three levels in part reflect the biological origins of the brain, starting with primitive one-celled organisms and slowly evolving to more complex animals (ibid., 22). The visceral level, the so-called lizard brain, controls fixed routines, analysing the world and responding to it. The behavioural level, common among mammals, analyses a situation and alters behaviour accordingly, controlling well-learned routines. The reflective level is a feature of the human brain, analysing its own operations, reflecting and learning new concepts and generalisations about the world (ibid., 23). Accordingly, these 'levels', attributes or outcomes are not in the design itself, but rather awoken or activated by the design in the brain and experienced and acted out as sensations, behaviour and reflections in relation to it.

In designs, the visceral is concerned with appearances, the behavioural with the pleasure and effectiveness of use and the reflective with the rationalisation

and intellectualisation of a product as a part of self-image (Norman 2004, 5), something that comes close to an identity. All three are interwoven through any design (ibid., 6). These levels could also be temporalised as 'before', 'during' and 'after', as inherited reflexes, learned behaviour and social reflections, although Norman assigns both the visceral and behavioural levels to 'now', as feelings and experiences 'during' the seeing or use of the design. The reflective level on the other hand extends through the entire experience, recalling the past and contemplating the future, forming a long-term relationship and the locus for a person's self-identity (ibid., 38).

The visceral, considered the simplest mechanism in the brain in Norman's analysis, is listed as the first level. For the analyst, I would claim, it should be the one that is to be discovered last, since it lies under the other parts. These parts are very much influenced by social life, as according to Norman the reflective can overcome or suppress the influences of the visceral level. Therefore, it is more likely that these influences, if studied with humans, not with lizards, would remain hidden, since the other two levels would lie over the top of it or rewrite the reactions before their recording. Whatever is taking place in the visceral is filtered and numbed by the behavioural and negotiated by the reflective.

Another issue concerns the problematics of temporality. Where the visceral and behavioural are occurring 'now', in a societal context, the visceral is considered primitive and therefore most distant to reach in the historical line of development of the human brain. If it lies in the bedrock of the biological construction known as the human, while digging it out the human must be simultaneously inevitably moved out of the way. That would mean disposing of or sidelining the human attributes. What is most troublesome in Norman's analysis is the claim that "We can overcome our biological heritage" (Norman 2004, 30). Can we? Do we rather overcome a level of biology with another level of biology? Is it rather that the reptile, subjected to Pavlov's dog, which is leashed by a cultivated primate, are all biological? Is the brain not biological, or is the living world and human society not biological? If we relate the visceral with reflexes or with the autonomous nervous system, how do they go together with the reflective? First, a nerve pulse reflects back before reaching the brain, leading to action of the body, which can then be reflected in brain. In psychosomatic order, the mental processes and the visceral nervous system are not one directional, but work both ways. Being happy may lead to the contraction of muscles in the face, unintentionally causing a smile, and by intentionally smiling one may improve one's mood, and possibly those of others as well. These features compromise any simple linearity or hierarchy between the structure of the brain in human performance.

To overcome one's biological heritage, can one negotiate with the visceral? As a self-reflection, when I stepped on a transparent cube-shaped glass platform on 103rd floor of Willis Tower in Chicago, I could not get over the accompanying

feeling of anxiety, even though I was capable of standing on it. I tried to spread my bodyweight as evenly as possible by sliding my feet along the glass surface as if I were walking carefully on thin ice, supposing that I learned this in my childhood and that this tendency was manifesting at the behavioural level. The visceral level remained active, while the reflective one was constantly overwriting the sense of not being capable of standing on thin air based on my social trust and the perception that the floor was holding the weight of people stepping on it before me. All three levels were simultaneously present, at war in my mind, but were nevertheless constituting my performance. That is, if we can divide experience into layers: in less obscure circumstances I have not succeeded in doing so. My feet did not come off the ground when I wanted to jump flat-footed on a chair, but they did not resist me jumping onto the bed, even though the height was the same. Only when I placed my hands on the back of the chair did my feet let go and leap into the air. However, not even after that could I make them move by my free reasoning will if I loosened my hands from the back of the chair. Was it then the visceral, behavioural or reflective level that held me back? For me, it felt like a risk estimation, which could only be passed through when lowering precautions, at which point it would be considered an outcome of careful consideration—not one of will, but of all those powers that are invested in and inhabiting me, trying to keep me unharmed.

We ought to reform our analysis of colonialism, and that should apply to the study of materialism as well. Examples from the field of design, whether one is discussing the environmental ergonomics or emotional design, include the human factor—whether it is to be recognised as sensation, perception, cognition, mind or emotion—in the human body or, so to say, in the brain. As the presented case indicates, one is not simply discussing a border between the individual, experiencing human body and the built environment as a designed object where the influential features of one cross the border into the other and intelligence is only located in one of them, either as the one under the influence of the designed object or the one designing them, not asking under which influence the designer is.

The extent of the intelligence and the influence of the design on the world—as in the autobiography, the 'hurt'—did not take place in an ahistorical, spatial isolation, but in a place where the very landscape was under a reformation as seen through the window frame. This ridicules the model where the 'lizard is in the brain' as an independent, encapsulated entity in isolation that reacts to stimulus but does not change, a closed system. This animalism should be looked from the perspective of where it came from. Therefore, it should be restated here that *the lizard is not in the brain*, but *out there*. This reactive and animated agential structure and behavioural impulse should not be understood from the brain but from outside of it, in relation to its surroundings. We ought to put the brain into the design and consider its capacity to hurt.

Think of it as plastic memory [...] It is all around you [...] And the swarms of alienating devices [...] I despair of teaching you other ways. You have square thoughts which resist circles.

— God Emperor of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1981.

In the manner of research design, to know is to make rectilinear. As Ann H. Kelly and Javier Lezaun summarise, Michael Lynch's 'spatial grammars', the features of the physical locale in which research takes place, occur in relation to the reach that particular instrumental complexes enable (Kelly & Lezaun 2013). In a historical and contemporary frame, cultivation does not only take place in the landscape, in the disciplining, but in the disciplines as well. As an example of spatial knowledge, to make vegetation measurements per area, the simplest way is to delineate an area with a quadrat frame, a quadrat. Multiple quadrats, when distributed, allow one to extrapolate quadrat measurements for the whole community (Wilson & Oregon State University 2007). To know the vegetation formally is to adjust it to a certain form: to place a rectilinear standard frame upon it. A direct and momentary contact with such a frame does not leave severe marks on the plants or the landscape as physical entities, but is the very scaffolding structure of knowledge that emerges in this intra-action. You cannot take the rectilinear out of the vegetation measurement. As one places children temporally within a school building to make them 'know', the land is put temporally within the quadrat to 'know' it. To know such a world makes it flat and rectilinear instead of round and moving, even when the measurement consists of multiple quadrats. It has the same composition as a digital picture, a group of pixels forming the 'big picture'.

What happens in such spatial measures is mainly horizontal, while knowing the temporal takes place vertically. By this I mean the method of archaeological excavations. That is, to physically *dis-cover* what has been invested in the landscape by plants, by animals and first and foremost by the humans and their culture: to access the past. For example, a stratigraphic excavation involves the orderly procedure of isolating contexts and edges which are definable in their entirety or in part (archaeologyskills 2020) using a rectilinear entry into the site. Depending on the near future of the site, the excavation may be re-covered after dis-covering it by placing the layers of ground back, piece by rectilinear piece back into the landscape. Nothing is unnecessarily removed or replaced: all is rectilinearised. The standard of knowledge is imposed by and adjusted to time and space, extending from the present life on surface to the past lives beneath the terrain. Therefore, it is not only the present affected by the rectilinear way of knowledge, but the past as well. And as the excavations have destructive characteristics (thearchaeoanthropologist 2012), in the dis-and recovering of past the cause of coming into being is possible destruction. 'To know', to reform into knowledge, holds the capacity to hurt.

No matter what the ship is … when you start building it …

It's neither "good" nor "evil" …! […]

You mustn't deny that which you've created!!!

The ship isn't to blame!

When a man's made a ship …

He makes it a part of himself with a DON!!!!

— One Piece by Eiichirō Oda, 2010, Vol. 37, Chapter 356.

The question asked by Norman in his subtitle—why we love or hate everyday things—is taken here further by asking whether everyday objects hold the capacity for causing love or hate or hurt, and whether this capacity is context dependent. The capacity for hurting is something that could be explored from the primary function of the object. Primary function therefore would be something *a priori* of the object, experience that is in the object before the user has 'added' to it, free from prejudice. This built-in quality refers to the 'experience' or 'intelligence' that is in the object, not in its user. That which is *a posteriori* would then be based on one's own experience with and in relation to the used object or experience coded into the object by modification by the user.

A priori of an object would mean, for example, the shapes by which the object-user's body is fitted into, therefore guiding the user to take a certain stand. For example, a well-developed grip with the shape of a palm, a soft and non-slip surface will lead a hand to grasp it, unlike one that is sharp, cold, unbalanced and composed of slippery parts, in other words the blade of the knife. Such prepositioning, besides offering out the surface of encounter, would also lead its use by guiding movement towards the path of least resistance and away from the highest resistance, targeting power towards the most susceptible objectives. Still, *a priori* and its a/morality, the good or the bad, the loving or hateful characteristics of the intellect, may prove to be problematic to point out.

Let us take a knife and name its primary function 'cutting'. This may involve cutting vegetables, cutting a finger, cutting free or cutting a throat. All of these, in the sense of function and form, are equal acts, but due to co-operation come to mean something else, a/moral statements, 'freeing' or 'wounding'. A knife may cut well whether it is done by accident or by purpose, but the built-in intention is nevertheless 'to cut'. Or is the knife also a constitution of other parts? A blade for cutting and a handle for holding, and in their midst, the parts for joining? Does it matter whether the blade cuts both ways or has just one cutting edge? The paradigm takes us back to our earlier analysis with the bow of Heraclitus and containing one's opposite within oneself that can be demonstrated by adding

one more element to the knife, a sheath. A sheath alone has no function except in relation to the knife's blade. That function is twofold, to guard the blade from 'cutting', 'not-to-cut', so that it would not wound without intention, and from dulling and losing its sharp edge. So, the sheath prevents blade from cutting, so that it can cut well, to prevent the knife's bearer from cut, to protect the blade from itself and to withstand the blade's function by emerging as its antithesis, concealing the sharpness with dullness.

The study of the knife and the assumption of a primary function of an object falls back to the question of objects as co-constitutions of the self and their own opposites, as well as the state of constant becoming, where things might emerge as a cut through heredity but not claim 'cut' as their original form, only as one possible outcome in relation to the slashed and slasher. The fundamental function of an object, whether explained by its matter or form, is as elusive as ever, since breaking a dull object may make the breaking point into a sharp edge, making one countable with two. Cut is an event that takes place in-between, not belonging to any named entity. This definition does not deny the 'cut' or the 'hurt', but it restates that any object, in the shape and form of its materiality, may emerge as either/or, comfort or hurt, subjected to spatiotemporality, a *spatiotempomorality*, when set against a certain relation, moved from one arrangement to another, merging in or reconstituting the whole pattern anew. The latter is what likely happened in the eyes of A-M.

> *Evil is the product of the ability of humans to make abstract that which is concrete.*
>
> — *Jean Paul Sartre.*

> *You see, you can use a hammer to build a house or crack a skull.*
>
> — *Castlevania animated series by Warren Ellis, 2021, season 4, episode 3.*

In a fictional dramatisation of history, Leonardo da Vinci developed the cluster munitions (Wiebe, Borrie & Smyth 2010, 1–2) while he studied the structure of the pomegranate (Goyer 2013, season 1, ep. 4). The fruit contains a rich number of seeds concealed within, which disperse all around when the fruit breaks. Therefore, da Vinci derived a grenade from a pomegranate by abstracting the form enfolding the function, scaling it up and casting it upon a different matter. The seeding of life became a scattering of death, where the raising seedlings on a field were replaced by the falling bodies in the battlefield. The function of the form is to spread particles to a vast area, away from the center. In a pomegranate, this is due to the probability of reaching fertile ground without competing with the parent plant, and in a grenade or cluster munition the goal is to hit small moving

targets whose exact movement cannot be predicted and therefore are understood to proceed randomly, like the dispersing ammunition. The form holds the capacity for both, hurt and cure, by turning into its own opposite in a lengthy process, from concrete to abstract and back again.

The term 'abstract' is a noun, an adjective and a verb. As adjective, it comes from Latin *abstractus*, consisting of words *ab*, 'away' and *trahere*, 'draw', meaning "withdrawn or separated from material objects or practical matters" from mid-15th century. According to a recording from 1560s, the general explanation is "a smaller quantity containing the virtue or power of a greater" (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020f). Its usual counterpart, 'concrete', origins from Latin *concretus*, consisting of the words *com* and *crescere*, literally meaning "grown together", referring to being hardened, condensed and thickened (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020g). In the process of abstracting, something that has grown together is drawn apart.

As the a/moral evaluation of the object's capacity for hurt has proved to be a difficult one, as well as intellectually and ethically unavoidable, the same goes with Sartre's sentence afore. Once again, one cannot take one explanation for granted or choose one from two. The answer can only be twofold, both-and. First, the quote can be explained as a denial of metaphysical evil and the existence of evil deeds as such, as stated in some sort of origins of moral. In such a world, there is no good and evil to begin with, only concrete acts that later on can be judged and categorised into one or the other. This concept could also mean that the same act in a different context may lead to varying outcomes, and it is the process of judging, the relation to others, that makes the act to fall into one of the categories. Therefore, evil can never be concrete but is produced when made abstract. Still, *evil as abstract* does not equate to as evil as *non-existing*, since *evil as abstract* need to be pinpointed into something concrete, as an evil person, evil entity or evil deed. Accordingly, concrete and abstract are the co- and contra for each other.

Second, the quote can be explained in materialistic terms, where it is not the 'evil' that is questioned but rather the process of abstraction, while evil as its possible side-effect rather than inevitable outcome is brought up. This argument is presented well by Nishant Irudayadason in his answer concerning the meaning of Sartre's sentence. According to him, to abstract is to remove a thing from its concrete roots, leading to generalisation by removing all the details. Irudayadason sees abstraction as the isolation and purification of an object from all confusion of other meaning, losing the concrete existential experience, which goes against the very nature of our existence. Evil relates to the abstract, since the abstraction may enable us to forget of the concreteness of individuals and to treat them as categories, to subject them therefore to maltreatment (Irudayadason 2018). To conclude, abstraction removes varieties and creates an arithmetic mean, an average of being, one that does not actually exist anywhere in the concrete.

Evil as a product of abstraction on the other hand can be taken further from the idea of alienation, through categorisation and towards the idea of abstraction as standardisation. Here the other is not subjected to violence, since they are abstracted into a category, such as 'savages', that does not belong to us and therefore falls beyond ethical consideration. They are rather subjected to the same standard treatment as 'us', leading to the mentioned purification. Purification therefore concerns the disciplining of the 'savage' to raise them into docile bodies constructing a society.

In a matter of form, a strong rule of purification lies in mathematical formulas. If the rectangular school is scaled down into coordinates, to the first dimension, what is left is a straight line. In algebra, a line is defined by the equation of two terms, each of which is the product of a constant and the first power of a variable. Non-linear equations constructing curves are bound to the same principle of straightness in mathematics, since they are composed of straight lines as well. According to Ingold, in Western societies, straight lines are ubiquitous, representing modernity, rationality and purpose in designs over the natural world. A line represents a binary between science and traditional knowledge, civilisation and primitiveness, and culture and nature (Ingold 2007, 152), but its hegemony is a phenomenon of modernity, not of culture in general (ibid., 155). The function of a line is "to separate, to define, to order, to measure" (ibid., 153; original in Billeter 1990, 47). These functions are an exercise of power and emerge in a ruler—a sovereign governing a territory and an instrument for drawing straight lines. It marks the course of actions and aids in navigation (ibid., 160), to represent and perform 'rule'. As in school, a ruler may be used for studying or for physical punishment, for discipline and disciplining.

Following the enforced straightness as purification by abstraction, we end up with another opportunity for the 'evil' causing 'hurt' that takes us to dynamics of the ecology of systems, environments and invasive species. Here the evil is not caused directly by the concrete acts of people but by the other species that they have accidentally or unthoughtfully brought with them, whether to benefit from them or for the species opportunist to benefit from the people. Since the invasive species are not considered as a part of the balanced ecosystem, they cause disruption, destruction and reorganisation, either leading to their own disappearance or to the damage, diminishing and destruction of native species. Since the ecosystem is considered co-constitutive, not fixed, the whole system is renegotiated while it takes its new form, differing or resembling the old. What, then, are these 'abstract' species emerging as evil in their destructive and hurting appearance? One must seek the answer by returning to the hidden animals on the vessels crossing over the vast sea.

Rather than discussing the biology of the human (brain), the question should be turned around to its opposite to consider the biology of the design and the object.

This is no different from the incorporeal animals performing in Aranda. There lies an animal, something comparable to a visceral lizard, a behavioural dog or a reflective chimpanzee along the lines of the rectangle and the circle, as the horse lies under the chair and on the top of the treadmill. We can only proceed to form a conclusion by considering culture as biological, not as something outside biology. The level or the layer is the biosphere and the system is the ecosystem, since one is looking for the organic in the inorganic and the biotic in the abiotic.

Heinrich claims that knowledge about ourselves as biological beings is learned from other organisms. The basics of inheritance derive from peas for Gregor Mendel, from mould for George Beadle and Edward Tatum, from corn for Barbara McClintock and from fruit flies for Thomas Hunt Morgan, and the science extends to other animal species in vivisections (Heinrich 2008 [2002], 3). What Heinrich does not mention is that the listed findings from different species are mostly from cultivated species, not wildlife, or from tests executed in a laboratory. That is the reason why these phenomena are witnessed and recorded in the first place, and they are to be considered therefore very much as intra-active, influenced by generations of human–animal co-constituting. While discovering the small animal in us, it is constantly followed by the small human in the animal.

> *Their journey leaves a ghost where they were*
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> — *Women Make Film: A New Road Movie Through Cinema by Mark Cousins, 2018, episode 4.*

Animals' movement without and with humans leaves tracks and makes paths by reducing or adding to the material of a surface or by reshaping its texture through frequent or multiplied movement over the same course (Ingold 2007, 43). In agriculture and landscape planning, modernisers enclosed the land within rectilinear bounds (ibid., 155). Through the history of descripting the line, Ingold speaks little of the line and linear pattern in agriculture, and even less about the domesticated animals in the agriculture. Besides the modernity of the straight line, the ancient straight line is embedded in early civilisations, evidently in the Middle East and Northern Africa along the rivers Euphrates and Tigris and the Nile where the water channels and the ploughings shaped the land into rectilinear patterns. Water, in the long run, seeks to proceed according to the path of least resistance. An ox, attached to the plough and controlled by a human, digs its way straight forward to meet altering resistance that is equal from the left and from the right, since one ploughing line is to be mirrored by the next, and is thus encouraged not to cross the line. To optimise the use of the land, the straightness seeks to avoid and overcome the asymmetries of the landscape, which would otherwise cut the ploughing midway or make two ploughings meet and intersect. And then we

come to the physical symmetries of the ox, that if ploughing in circles or spirals would strain its body unevenly, especially if the curve was steep. Circles side by side, then again, leave empty spaces. Linear movement is easier to predict and to visualise, not so much by the pulling ox, but by the directing man.

In hunting and herding communities, circular forms are much more common. For example, with reindeers in roundups, the fence is round so that they will not be squeezed against the corners. For the Innu, who are hunters (Tanner 1999) rather than herders, instead of a roundup the circular form resembles the seasonal movement of caribou in the vast grazing lands, accompanied by the nomad people. Caribou have been seen to perform movement in large circular patterns in their post-calving periods (Hemming et. al. 1971, 8–9). Observations with GPS collars show that some of the test subject caribou made circular, clockwise movement around a lake in the test area (Yokel et. al. 2011, 6). When an unknown entity appears on the horizon, caribou will try to identify it and circle downwind of the entity to pick up the scent if they cannot catch it otherwise (Madsen 2001, 8). Circular movement therefore happens on the micro and macro scales. Due to the entangled lives of the Innu and caribou, much of the culture focuses on relationships with the game animal both in pragmatic and spiritual ways (Tanner 1999). It very likely entails and relates to the formation of perceptual apparatus figurating their worldview and concepts of thought. Yusoff speaks of our animal companions that "have historically been the prosthetic of our understanding of environmental change […] through migration and movement" and "extend our sensory capacity to both notice and respond to environmental change" (Yusoff 2010, 76). Besides indicators of change in the environment, they should accordingly be considered part of the environment and part of the change, not apart from it.

> *Don't disturb my circles.*
>
> *— Archimedes.*

> *Think outside the box.*
>
> *— Unknown management consultant.*

For objects, "surface appearance is less important than their ability to evoke the memory of particular people and events" (Norman 2004, 48–49). The reflective level of design (ibid., 39) concerning self-image and memories offers another approach to A-M's experience, since the two are bound together. Identity requires continuous self-recognition, as identifying something requires recognition. In other words, there is a need for a point of reference to hold against, lean on or move along with: a locus for memory. It is a path along which the *drawn away* has *grown* back *together*.

The 'method of loci', also known as the memory journey, memory palace or mind palace technique, is a memory enhancement strategy using visualisations and spatial memory to efficiently recall bits of information by relating them to a familiar environment. This method, which uses a mnemonic device, was adopted in ancient Roman and Greek rhetorical treatises. Beyond antiquity, it is noticed that memory and memorising has links to landscape. For example, learning long lists by heart is a landscaping of the words or numbers so that they follow each other in certain order as the features of landscape or the "spatial context that is vital to episodic memory", as James J. Knierim defines it (Knierim 2008). Norman expresses something similar, a function of the behavioural level when, for example, playing piano. A piano player letting their fingers play automatically may lose their place in the music and have to listen to themselves play to find out where they are (Norman 2004, 23). It is as if one seeks a route in a forest by moving from one orienteering mark to another, carried by legs, connected by sight and placed on a map. In playing, these marks are replaced by notes, fingers, hearing and sheet music.

This phenomenon of the mnemonic involves any procedure or operation designed to improve one's memory, a strategy that reconstructs target content with the intention of tying new information to the learner's existing knowledge base (Scruggs et al. 2010, 79). Information that is already familiar and concrete can be represented by mimetic pictures, and for familiar but not concrete information, with symbolic pictures (ibid., 81). In a way, the process ties up something abstracted into something concrete. Unrelated visual objects, such as a pile of papers, help me to remember a thought that I have forgotten, not by reading it from the papers but by reconstructing the conditions that were present in the moment the thought emerged. What one was thinking earlier may re-emerge while simultaneously passively perceiving the items on the table by recreating the earlier circumstances (see Lindström 2008, 227).

> *And that has remained an important mental landscape for me, a reference point. It teaches me something—or tries to. People need things like that to go on living — mental landscapes that have meaning for them, even if they can't explain them in words.*
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> *— 1Q84 by Haruki Murakami, 2011 [2009–2010].*

> *[...] removal of all limitations meant removal of all points of reference. In the landscape of a myth he could not orient himself and say: "I am I because I am here"*
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> *— Dune by Frank Herbert, 1965.*

According to Kati Lindström "when human beings move in a landscape, experience different feelings, solve their problems, simply live their lives, it is as if the physical environment witnessed all" (Lindström 2008, 227). Following this idea, many things that have disappeared from the familiar environment might lead to a loss of memories that one had while looking at its features (ibid.). It is as though the second half of that which constitutes the event is missing. Since the landscape has been shaped by the preceding generations of a given culture, carrying the marks of previous events, it has "a ready structural element for its memories", producing "mnemonic sites" (ibid., 228). Therefore, if the mind is not in the head, neither is the memory.

Memory is a selective and social process: Edward Relph's 'selective vision' and Eviatar Zerubavel's 'mnemonic socialisation' lead to Lindström's 'landscape socialisation' (Lindström 2008, 228), where a landscape image functions as a mnemonic tool, remembering and ignoring those parts which culture has taught us to (ibid., 229). Therefore, a landscape image is more than a space for subsistence: it is the conceptualisation, mapping and ritualisation for successful operation in a space, as well as a tool of the auto-communicative construction of identity and memory, functioning as a key to the mnemonic resources of a given culture (ibid., 236). Lindström, following Yuri Lotman's distinction of cultural change, asserts that a gradual cultural change absorbs new elements, leaving cultural debris behind and keeping mnemonic codes stable. In contrast, explosive change opens up unlimited possibilities for subsequent change, requiring a creation of new codes, ideologies and memory (ibid., 229).

Heritage places are created in the past and assigned a meaning and value in the present (Thomas & Ross 2013, 221). Storytelling as a form of mnemonic device is used in the resurgence of knowledge about places that no longer exist in a physical sense (ibid., 223). These notions of storytelling and memory that link a place to past and present human activity, evoking a sense of movement through space and time, are an entanglement of genealogies. Events and memories are as central to the place as the physical artefacts (ibid.). A 'memoryscape' contains the physical remains of memories in the form of the settings of events (ibid., 225). In Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands' reading of David Abram, oral cultures develop collective meaning and memory by inscribing their stories on the landscape, in topography, where the land is the primary mnemonic (Mortimer-Sandilands 2008, 270). Iconography of monuments does not suffice to grasp fully what the monuments are, since the objects have agency beyond their aesthetics (De Jong 2008, 196). Mnemonic practices are the social invocation of past events, persons, places and symbols that shape individual and collective memories, making sense of the transformation of political terrain and action in identity formation, contestation and cultural production and reproduction (Khalili 2007, 732).

The process of self-reflection and its relation to the surrounding space can be evaluated based on Ingold's perception of environment and ecology of life. He

starts by comparing two approaches to mind and nature. Claude Lévi-Strauss emphasises that the perceiver could only have knowledge of the world through the passage of information across the boundary between outside and inside, a process involving encoding and decoding by the sense organs and the brain. Gregory Bateson did not approve of this boundary, which he demonstrates with the blind man's cane, a metaphor in which the mind is not in the head of the man or the cane but extends outwards into the environment along multiple sensory pathways of which the cane in the hand is only one. The processing of information is based on one's own movement through the world. Movement is critical, because mind and the world do not remain immutable; information only exists in the movement of the perceiver relative to one's surroundings, not as coded messages sent from the world but as a process of revelation (Ingold 2002 [2000], 18). What Ingold's example offers to the analysis is a demonstration of how people 'grow' into their material objects and how the material culture is the outcome of a process of revelations in movement.

To apply the case of a blind man, if the cane is removed, one of the pathways is cut up, as if cutting away a limb. What we know about amputated limbs is that, since they were once an inseparable part of the body's entire nervous system, they remain as 'ghost limbs' and can cause 'ghost pain'. A cane can be replaced with another, and a limb with a prosthetic one, but depending of the structure of the replaced entity, it takes time and effort to adapt and, to some extent, causes hurt for the individual. Languages are understood as focal point of identifying oneself, but in the context of memory and material culture, any other form that interprets spatiality has similar value and, simultaneously, the threat to be subordinated or replaced in colonialist practices. Here the prosthetic organ or the emotional and sensory device (see Yusof 2010, 76) that is replaced may actually be the animal, or its ghost. If the question is not about dismembering, it may be about dislocation.

The profound condition of the transformation of surroundings in A-M's life becomes evident only when it is realised that one was subjected to an obscure environment when being placed inside a school building not only by its interior but also by its exterior as well. From that moment, the outdoors was perceived and accessed through a rectangle it had become part of the perception and enactment. Skrydstrup describes how, at the ice core base in Greenland, the windows turned inwards toward the camp to create an impression of a town square in an environment that, in the ethnographer's experience, seems to be a vast, open and empty sphere of snow, but where the organisation of dwellings give orientation even if the 'square' is simply a patch of snow (Skrydstrup 2016, 864, 868). One can imagine how geometric shapes may also emerge on the snow when the polar night occurs and the lighted buildings project their framed window shapes out into the open. For A-M, if there was something 'off' with the rectilinear form, it was now 'off' with the environment itself. Whether the land itself was to become rectilinear

through the practice of European agriculture is one more question. Nevertheless, the new form of being within the school, reshaping the children and refiguring the world, in many ways appeared as a disturbance to those circles that lead the lives of Innu, starting to guide the living according to new horizons. Whether within the box or outside of it, the box is in the picture nonetheless.

> *Objects speak: objects possess will and form, why should we wish to interrupt them!*
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> *— Franz Marc, painter of the "Fighting forms".*

The etymology of the word 'culture' derives to the Latin *cultura* as 'cultivating', figuratively 'to care'. Cultivation through education is first attested circa 1500, meaning 'the intellectual side of civilization' (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020h). Cultivating, whether as the cultivation of land through care or agriculture or as educating people to meet certain intellectual standards, seems to materialise as a selection and exclusion of certain objects and objectives and a multiplying of the number of the chosen ones. This education, as an attempt to civilise the uncivilised, or to harness the undisciplined ones into docile bodies (see Foucault 1995 [1975], 135–169), willingly or unwillingly ruptured the educated children from the practice of their families' lives by directing their time and efforts towards a civilisation that was not in accordance with their inheritance. The cultivation of minds requires the weeding of old habits, beliefs and language, while attendance behind the glass within the school already cut the children out of their daily tasks with their parents and relatives.

These given metaphors, even appearing as such, should not be considered a figure of speech: they must be understood in a very material sense. Cultivation is not a matter of the body–mind division. Education may stand for *educere*, with reference to bodily nurture or support, while *educare* refers to the mind (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020i), but it should be understood holistically. Education as studying and learning, and the practice of shaping land and living from it, are the one and the same. The land, in its materiality, teaches as "the school building was to be a mechanism for training" (Foucault 1995 [1975], 172), not only to serve as the quarters for education. Taking an example from London's city districts, class society and education "striated and enclosed space of the schoolroom would use this space against that wider space: it set the moralising space of instruction against the demoralising spaces of the towns and their milieu" (Osborne & Rose 2004, 217). Cultivation is not only about planting, but about weeding as well.

In attempting to conclude the cause of 'hurt' in the school, I evaluate it by recognising those occurrences that indicate displacement, disciplining and discordance. Displacement is a perception that something is 'off' with the

encountered entity. The visceral experience of appearance on a direct and instant level relates to the experience of appearance in a direct and instant way—that is to say, the moment when the first impression emerges. Viscerally, design is about the initial impact of a product, about its appearance, touch and feel (Norman 2004, 37). Norman claims that the visceral level alone is incapable of reasoning by comparing a situation with past history. The pattern-matching cognition recognises situations and objects that offer food, warmth or protection and gives rise to positive affect. In sketching such forms, Norman lists both symmetrical and rounded objects (Norman 2004, 29), coming close to rectangular and circular. Again, to consider what is spoken here as visceral, placing it alongside ahistorical evolutionary biological process leads to a dead end that can only be evaded by placing the visceral alongside that very same entity that presents the food, warmth and protection, the surroundings. Here the symmetrical invades the space that was previously occupied by the rounded, the visceral-versus-visceral, a lizard wrestling a lizard or, as in the case of the northern hemisphere, an ox ploughing the pasture of the caribou.

A-M's first encounter with this concept, even before subjected to the educative practice within it, emphasised a displacement of self and engaged with something 'off' with the landscape, a disruption in the landscape as it had been before in its full socio-materiality, its inbuilt and outreaching culture and lived-through history. When it comes to products, Norman says the behavioural level is about use: function specifies what activities it supports, performance is about how well it fulfils those activities and usability about how easy it is to get it to perform (Norman 2004, 37). The function that the rectangles and rectilinear forms were designed to support was to Westernise the Innu, to adapt them into a society based on European national doctrines in the colonisation of the Arctic. These forms were able to give structure: structure to support, to enhance and to limit, and, in short, to create order. That form may well perform to fulfil those desires, but for the disciplined bodies it did not emerge according to good standards of usability. Rather, they were in contrast and in conflict with previously learned forms of life, its circularity in the co-composition between caribou and Innu in the seasonal landscape. At the behavioural level, the rectangle emerges as a poor design, causing hurt by restraining and disabling behaviour 'natural' in the Innu homeland.

For Norman, the reflective level is the most vulnerable to variability through culture, experience, education and individual differences, but it also holds the power to override the others (Norman 2004, 38). Arguably this would mean that if the reflective level is overwritten, it would reform the whole structured system. Rejecting and disabling space is an element of learning disability and social exclusion. It possibly leads to self-reflection and identification of oneself as 'unfitting' for the social and built surroundings. As Mortimer-Sandilands specifies, reflection is supported by perception, both located in and bound together with place

in ways that reveal the inextricable connection between physicality and reflection, socially sanctioned and culturally meaningful interactions (Mortimer-Sandilands 2008, 271), to be considered here as intra-actions. A different visual environment, as well as atypical body posture bound by the rectilinear chairs and rectangular pulpit that had been very likely strictly observed with great discipline in the schools, clearly has the capacity to cause physical discomfort and stress. Dismissing and replacing a set of mnemonic tools with a new conceptual frame is a process where the Innu children had to learn to forget or to redefine the very fundaments of their earlier living. *Accommodation*, besides a house or a hut, is also a term used by Jean Piaget to describe the process in which existing cognitive schemas are modified in order to include new information, enabling its assimilation (Block 1982, 282). The question whether the effect has possibly cumulated in a learning difficulty to A-M is not documented or looked for here. The question of 'hurt' is likely part of the process wherein the human adapts to the new environment. The new environment should be understood here in a very deep and concrete sense, since the school was not simply a house but also an imported object in a colonial project, a standardised, transportable spatial arrangement.

> *Sermons in stones, books in the running brooks*
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> — *Little Men by Louisa May Alcott, 1871.*

The loss of language is understood to restrain access to one's own cultural heritage. In shaping the landscape and reading its tracks and traces, pathways and dead ends may serve as language, containing and transferring knowledge from the past. Lancelot "Capability" Brown, influential English landscape architect living in the 18th century, was said to have a 'grammatical' (Gregory, Spooner & Williamson 2013, 20) manner: "'Now there' said he, pointing his finger, 'I make a comma, and there' pointing to another spot, 'where a more decided turn is proper, I make a colon; at another part, where an interruption is desirable to break the view, a parenthesis; now a full stop, and then I begin another subject'" (Kuiper 2020). In a landscape, individual trees, grasses, stones, slopes, hills and waters constitute a sentence, like individual letter form words, and are put into a context while lined up and ordered with punctuation. Landscapes, whether considered natural or cultural, articulate and give out their invested knowledge when read out.

Another question is the capability of landscape to restore and replay memories, and whether this is connected to the exact composition of the landscape. According to Mortimer-Sandilands, landscapes, like books, are "warehouses of memory, external to the individual body", and then again, not external, since "the act of reading a page and that of walking through […] might be different both in terms of the portion of the brain involved and in terms of the relationship to place engendered

in the act, […] the act of remembering involves a recognition of a relationship […] not only determined by internal forces" (Mortimer-Sandilands 2008, 274). An opening to such approach is given by the case of Greg, a patient of Oliver Sacks suffering from amnesia caused by an extensive removed brain tumour. According to Sacks, Greg was passive and his mind had lost its coherence, inwardness and autonomy, but would "awaken" when stimulated by sound, especially music (Sacks 1995, 55, 57), "having an organic rhythm and a flowing of being, which carries and holds him" (ibid., 65). In the film adaptation *The Music Never Stopped* (Kohlberg 2011) of Greg's story "The Last Hippie", the first awakening occurs when the music therapist plays a certain record and Greg begins to speak and to memorise. It is as if Greg's memory was located on the disk, or the stylus would play on Greg's brain's folds. When the music stopped, Greg became passive again. The memory of music was stored in Greg's brain as much as in the disk, and it was lived, memorised, between and only between them.

Obviously, A-M was not suffering from amnesia or any diagnosed neurological disorder, since as much it was a 'hurt' for an individual the amnesia concerned the collective memory, a cutting off from access to the memory stored in the landscape, a rhythmic constellation that is lived into reality. Let us imagine the brain, especially its cerebral cortex, as a kind of landscape, a *brainscape*, a physical entity, where the self can move upon the valleys and the plains. The cerebral cortex has a key role in memory, perception, thought, language and consciousness. Now we place the brain not in the head, but into the world. There every incline and every slope holds an event—their resistance or guidance actualises when moved upon and is relived and shaped by every entry. Those pathways that are taken more often stand out clearer from the surface, becoming the significant feature, and they begin to define our very being, expressing towards what and how we are moving. Sensations and movement emerging from and recorded on the *brainscape* are like a cortical homunculus, a topographic figuration of areas and proportions dedicated to the processes of motor and sensory functions of the body in the brain (see Catani 2017). Accordingly, while placing the brain in the landscape, a vantage point is like a sensory homunculus, where the high point in the landscape stands for an eye, and the path is a motor homunculus, which stands for the walking.

To recall something is to revisit a specific place. Since one does not have a complete or, even less so, shared image of an event taking place in one's brain, the memory can be joined together in a place, not by one person but by many. Even in language, a memory exceeding a single generation requires a pathway, a line to follow, whether it is a narrated story or a list of names. Words follow one another to make sentences and notes one another to compose music: so too is the path a configuration of proceeding footsteps. Phase by phase the place is recollected, and the remembering only takes place when revisited.

Humans live best when each has a place to stand, when each knows where he belongs in the scheme of things and what he may achieve. Destroy the place and you destroy the person.

— Dune by Frank Herbert, 1965.

When you lifted the needle preemptorily, you scratched a groove, so that forever after the song would skip and keep repeating

— We Need to Talk about Kevin by Lionel Shriver, 2003.

A relative of mine, suffering from Alzheimer's disease, in a social encounter had difficulty orienting to mundane conversation. In a discomfort and disconnectedness, she looked around and began to talk about the same issues, such as the signs of spring on the lake's ice cover or the lit candles that had burned unevenly, over and over again. Anything that appeared as a stimulus, whether based on its familiarity or the arousal of a sense that something was slightly 'off', could function as a reference point for repeating the same topic for conversation. This repetition happens because when "a particular route is followed, the more chemically sensitive particular neurons become to one another", and therefore "in the act of remembering something, the world is, quite literally, written into our brain structure" (Mortimer-Sandilands 2008, 273). The same, without a diagnosed memory-related illness, applies to myself. Seeing a certain item reminds me of a task, which leads to another and repeats a whole chain of thought. If the first trigger for the line of thought is not made or moved, re-encountering it often leads to going through almost precisely the same line of thought. The thought process, or the memory of it, is built within certain entries and gateways, almost like placing a stylus at the beginning of a certain track that, when placed correctly, plays a song instead of producing an endless loop of white noise. According to these findings and experiences, in a landscape, language or any other arrangement, we ought to return, or are easily lured, to repeat the same train of thought and the actions it leads to, entering *a route of routines*.

The difference with total environmental determinism and such a phenomenon as the *brainscape* is more or less the same as with the following examples of amnesia. A person with serious amnesia, such as Greg, has a lack of distance between them and their environment; they cannot distinguish themselves from it, and the self becomes slave to every passing sensation (Sacks 1995, 57). Then again, in another example, a musicologist unable to remember events or facts for more than a few seconds was able to remember, learn, elaborate, conduct, perform and improvise musical pieces with the organ. What he had left was a frame, a language, a concept, an instrument, a certain profound structure—that is, he had a music constituted out of rhythmic patterns and co-constituted while engaging the body

with an instrument, and while he played he perceived a flow of constant elaborated revelation, engaging organ with organ. The remaining conceptual structure enabled not only repeating but also adding and altering. Possibly participation in an organic unity can bypass amnesia (ibid., 65). This intra-relation exceeds pure determinism and enters the collective over-generational memory in its capability to enter and co-constitute the living world.

If one's entry to the *brainscape* were to be cut off, or its ridged surface levelled out, one's ability to see, to speak, to acknowledge and to think with—to figure oneself out—would become nonexistent. Since the land is 'scaped' out into living culture, it is a memorial of the past and a foundation for the present, the interface for a memory that can be considered collective as it is not held by any individual and the memories are always reshaped when relived. As the vinyl record was able to perform Greg's memory, in a way it was able to reproduce a person that Greg was before, a partial representation of a complete Greg, a phenomenon resembling the Voyager's golden record. The record contains partial representations of life on planet Earth that ought to indicate the existence of their sources: rain, crickets, footsteps, laughter, fire, speech, a tame dog, herding sheep, tractor, a kiss (NASA 2020b). These recorded sounds indicate weather, the biosphere's soundscape, movement, social interaction, technology and domestication. They serve as a collective memory about the human on Earth, a certain type of human with an inseparable connection to its environmental factors and variables. The performing human body is not recorded in its entity—that remains absent—but body in a moment, in a place, is engraved and encapsulated in the disk and can be replayed, 'awakened' and brought back to life.

The film *Sami Blood* (*Sameblod* in Swedish) directed by Amanda Kernell (2016) presents another example of reproducing memory with rhythmic constitution. In the film, Sámi sisters on their way to a boarding school go through a dialogue wherein the younger sister ends up asking the older one to *yoik*, to sing, a certain fell, since she was just told that by memorising sounds one would never be far from home. Somehow, the characteristics of the fell, a significant formation in the landscape, was translated and contained in rhythmic vocal sounds produced by vocal cords. In the *yoik*, the fell is recorded and performed while being sung. The form of the rhythm likely does not resemble, imitate or reproduce the topography of the fell but rather integrates the singer's relation to it, as well as the relation to those and with those who may hear the *yoik*, scaping the land in actions, tasks, perceptions and living-with, toned by what may be called knowledge or emotions, effects and affects. Musical landscaping is likely a synesthetic process, where auditory sounds are replicated, visual elements are rhythmetised, movement is marked by tempo and moods are turned into tones. To reflect with Ingold's (1993) concept 'taskscape', more than being descriptive; the *yoik* could maybe be characterised as *taskscriptive*. The specific auditory order that reproduces the landscape, recorded

only in the *yoik* and contained by the people, goes through slight alterations each time the *yoik* is performed, which does not make it less accurate, since the fell, the singer and the fell-singer go through changes of relation as well. While one lives beside the fell, it is alive as well.

If we consider the traditional Innu landscape as a composition of collectively enacted recordings of living, changing the circular form into a rectangular one prevents an entry to it, as if changing the standard format of a recording to another. By changing its format, the memory does not vanish from the record, but it cannot be read or played. It is the same as placing a square-shaped plaque onto a disk recorder. The record remains a container without content, as the content emerges only when enacted. The memory is not on the record, in the needle or in the speaker, but is co-composed between them, just as the memory was not in Greg's brain, and not in the music, but emerged between them, as if the recording would intra-play the human.

If we apply the logic of the time capsules in the spacecrafts to the Innu landscape, understanding them both as recordings of human heritage which emerge while being displayed, the following analogy and hypothesis can be made. It is not the human figures, like the ones within the golden plaque and golden record, that change, but these golden formats, plaque or disk, that are reshaped, as the landscape, circular or rectilinear, surrounding and capsuling the body, are changed, disabling the body to re/play.

Sociocultural diversity and animal biodiversity go hand in hand (see Stammler 2010; Granberg 2010). This fact becomes evident when thinking with Antonio Briceño's photographic artwork *Mika Saijets' 520 reindeer* (2011). It displays a photograph that is divided into two partially transparent and overlapping layers. The one in front presents reindeer-related names 'cut off' from the background, which presents a herd of reindeer. In the superimposed two-layered image on flexible methacrylate, the figures of the reindeer do not show, and the characters of the names do not read out if one does not move along Briceñō's work. They do not emerge from the heritage without movement along. Also, the names do not join with the reindeer if the distance between the two layers grows too large. The words become purely abstract prints of vocalisations, and the reindeer figures remain a partially hollow and disfigured mass. If, for example, the number of names for different types of reindeer based on their appearance and character are reduced from 520 to a few, the importance of those 520 variables in successful herding are lost. This change might not mean that there are less named 'types' of reindeer, but it might indicate their actual remaining number when the ability to read out and utilise different properties of the animals are forgotten. The living culture dies out. Language of tongue and the language of landscape both forget and lose the animals that they do not touch upon as names, words and narratives, shelter, nutrition and tasks. Deserted words are equated to deserted land.

Sometimes I think it is a great mistake to have matter that can think and feel. It complains so. By the same token, though, I suppose that boulders and mountains and moons could be accused of being a little too phlegmatic.

— The Sirens of Titan by Kurt Vonnegut, 1959.

A question remains: is cultural violence first and foremost violence towards human individuals, a collective or the culture itself? A person may perish, resist or adapt within the boundaries of biological being. The people, a joined community of persons, may not maintain the same consistence under violence endangering the shared culture constituting that boundary and binding that makes many into one. Still, the community may apply and adapt into a new set of rules, norms and ways of communicating and living and, by doing so, remain. The outcome of cultural violence may therefore be integration or breaking up, but in both of cases, what happens with the culture? Are symbols replaced with others and habits forgotten, or do they merge together with the new influences? Do they interbreed? Do they change over time or live side by side, in connection or separation? When one is not talking about cultural integration, but violence, it is to be deprived, disabling and fatal for any such entity. In such a case we do not discuss any more the man within the circle and rectangle, being contained or restrained, but the rectilinear lines penetrating the circle and the circle holding the rectangle as a captive; one is drawn over the other and the other is erased and forgotten. That would be cultural violence in its deepest sense, one violating the sphere of the other and mortifying its form, writing over it and casting it into oblivion.

In the Green Machine there is no mercy; we make mercy, manufacture it in the parts that have overgrown our basic reptile brain. There is no murder. We make murder, and it matters only to us.

— Red Dragon by Thomas Harris, 1981.

So, what lies there in the basis of the form that enfolds, endears and endangers the human figuration? Is the human figure the scaffold for the forms, or is it the other way around—is the human figure made out of these forms? Which one is the sub, which the super? Arthur Koestler took part in this structural dilemma in his work *Ghost in the Machine* (1967). According to Herbert Simon, complex systems evolve from simple systems faster if there exists a stable intermediate that leads to a hierarchic constitution of the complex forms (Koestler 1967, 4). As in the golden ratio, when drawn as a geometric figure, there is a smaller circular and rectilinear shape within the other. Rather than claiming complexity, these forms are simplistic abstraction of complex ecological and social systems, agriculture and nomadism. These building blocks or components are functioning in themselves, subsystems with interfaces, meaning that the constituted outcome will be more resistant to damage, easier to maintain, regulate and repair, than "unstable mosaic of atomic bits" (ibid., 47), autonomous, unregulated and ahistorical particles. Therefore, the hypothesis suggests, the previous versions of the simpler functioning systems are still within the latest complex system, as in Norman's layering of the brain. The dominance of a certain form is likely to occur since it is easier to follow, to repeat and to multiply, than to always refigure it. The form does not only originate from the surrounding new environment but also from the environment from which we have co-constituted ourselves and which is therefore an inseparable part of our very selves.

Morphologically this concept emerges in the ontogeny of different animal species (Koestler 1967, 47), since their embryos resemble one another in the earlier development stages. The picture afore is inspired by George John Romanes' copy of the sketches of diverse embryos by German biologist Ernst Haeckel (Romanes 1892, fig. 57, fig. 58). It does not proof that the human individual goes through phylogenic evolution within the womb, but rather indicates a common ancestry with other species, or at least the tendency to see this fundamental substructure in all the living beings the same way the golden ratio is perceived from organisms. Therefore, there is as much a small human within the animal as there is a small animal within the human. Instead of being within one another, both are laid upon the landscape moving along each other. The answer lies in heritage of the human–animal relations, the evolution of human–animal–landscape. The animal is not under the human but with the human, and the shape of the circle and the rectangle perform this joined path of life.

Another word for the inter-layered presence of beforeness and afterwardness, for sub- and super-structures, is what Koestler calls *holon*. The word combines the Greek '*holos*' (whole) with a suffix suggesting a particle or part, since in an absolute sense 'wholes' and 'parts' do not exist in organisms or organisations (Koestler 1967, 48). "Phonemes, words, phrases, are wholes in their own right, but parts of a larger unit; so are cells, tissues, organs; families, clans, tribes" all fall under the 'Janus effect', having two faces, "a self-contained whole" and "a dependent part" looking in opposite directions (ibid., 48). Therefore, it is not the whole particle that holds two qualities, but rather the 'facing', the relation that defines its being not *in* but always *in-between*.

Rather than considering *holon* as a proof of an existential hierarchy, it should rather be considered open-ended, interfacial, or actually intra-facial. Instead of building a pyramid, it is building a loop. There is no sub or super, no master or servant. For life to begin, it needs to start all over, to reduce to increase, to go from organism to cellular and, where two cells reduce into one and the one becomes two, to make the first one disappear. Hierarchy does not apply, since the identity of existing is compromised in the very act of living and the placements are renegotiated and refigurated constantly. Is it the lizard that the human has built oneself atop, as a stepping stone, or is it the lizard that dwells in the human that it has built around itself as a commodity and convenience? King in a castle or a king's castle? The answer would be: *both-and*, *neither-nor*.

'A' is the beginning of the first man, 'Adam', but appears as ox when it is turned 'around', *re-turning* to the animal. The bar '-'in the otherwise pyramid or V-shaped 'A', according to the genealogy of the sign from hieroglyph to alphabet, may illustrate the line formed by of the ox's forehead, and when extending across the V-line, also its ears in contrast to its horns (see Ingold 2007, 122–123, 125). The Egyptologist Orly Goldwasser describes the ox as "sleeping forever in the letter-A, because this is just the bull turned on his horns", where the animals "are always hiding" (DOX Productions 2020, ep. 1). Another possibility is that the line represents a restraint between the horns, a simple bar attached to them that is used to harness the animal's power to draw a plough by linking them together with the plough managed by a man. The wild animal needs to turn into a domesticated animal, 'nature' into 'culture', before it can become a literal particle in the name of the man whence a certain myth of humankind began. It is not just a human and an animal that are present in the 'A', but also the technology, the rod, ploughing and writing, that bounds them together. As Mortimer-Sandilands writes of memory, it is "social, technological, and physical in that the conditions of the relationship […] located in a complex range of conditions that offer the subject to the experience, and experience to the subject" (Mortimer-Sandilands 2008, 274).

> "Fruiting bodies," I replied, almost as if in a trance. "Forming words."
>
> — *Annihilation by Jeff VanderMeer, 2014.*

What we have recovered is the animal other in us, enabling and restraining our human agency as a discovering and learning body in encountering the phenomenon of the Arctic. The findings concern the animal in relation to the ecosystem, cultivation, livelihood and modernity, which all emphasise the human standpoint, speaking on be*half* of the human. Yet, what remains to be discovered is how this invisible other is to illustrated as an object of inquiry instead of its tracks and traces in the landscape and within human embodiment, livelihood and economy. Not to be forgotten is the remark that the use of technology as their interface alters these

images, or more accurately that technology is an essential part of the phenomenon, their intra-face. Circular and rectilinear, inherited from specific historical materialities, are both canonised forms: *abstraction of perceivable human–animal performance co-constituting the landscape*. Yusoff argues that "traces of animals are trapped inside natural history […], arranged through *reification*, the abstraction and quantification […] as if it were money" (Yusoff 2010, 90, emphasis original). I would follow by claiming that their traces dwell already in the straight and curved lines, in the very core of economic production, on the top of the treadmills and as the head count of cattle as capital. While "we witness animals making their escape from the destructive categories of natural history's tableaux" (ibid.), I would add that they are not held within the pen or the square: they are ploughing those lines and making those fields. "Animals are everywhere full partners in worlding, in becoming with" (Haraway 2008, 301; see also Yusoff 2010, 76).

The remarks and interpretations made here indicate that forms hold the capacity for both preserving and violating beyond the dichotomy of good and evil. If forms are beyond existential good and evil, it remains yet unanswered whether they can judge good and evil instead of being judged with these terms. To make a canon of judgement, a material standard for ethics, a technological compound like the function of the rod between the horns of an ox, we will need to combine the circular and rectilinear in our search for the *animal objectified*, moving from the light of outdoors into a dark room.

From the very early days of Western science studying the Arctic, the experimented upon and recorded landscape has been *rectangled*. This process is evident from the material instruments of investigation and scientific experimentation, starting from the rectilinear research stations in Swedish Lapland and Svalbard at the end

of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century (Sörlin 2002, 94 fig. 4, 97 fig. 5) and proceeding to rectilinear items like "air filtration instrument" in a box in the area of Svalbard at the end of the 18th century (ibid., 100 fig 6). This history of research has also been rectangle in a recording and framing process, that of photography, by the machine and by the print. Therefore the 'rectilinearisation' is not only a method of accommodating Western knowledge to Arctic subjects but also to subject the Arctic to objectification, assimilate it for Western knowledge, in order for the 'Westerner' to be able to know the Arctic.

The World Society for the Protection of Animals organisation, WSPA International (from June 2014, the name changed to World Animal Protection) released on the 6th of December 2010 video material (duration 1:33) on their webpage and their social media service channel on YouTube with commentary and the headline "Christmas cruelty: Investigation exposes reindeer mistreatment" (WSPA 2010). Different versions of the original title, with the same audio-visual contents, have been published in different online channels over time. The video shows short clips filmed from close range at different destinations during the reindeer roundup, ear marking, transport and slaughter. WSPA stated that the video was filmed in Sweden and Finland but does not specify the locations or which parts are from which destination. The style of the filming is intensive, consisting of a stream of short takes with a hand-held camera. The original audio is missing, replaced with instrumental Christmas music, *Carol of the Bells* composed by Mykola Leontovytš in 1916.

WSPA describes the content of video and asks the viewer to act and help to end the suffering:

> "Reindeer are forced through a process that prohibits their natural behaviour in several ways. The reindeer, used to roaming free in the wilderness with no prior contact with human beings, panic visibly and attempt to flee as they are herded in massive groups of well over a hundred reindeer […] The animals' distress continues to increase as they are forced into corrals, have their ears mutilated and left to bleed, and in more than one instance visible on film, get mishandled as they desperately resist being loaded onto trucks for transport to slaughterhouses" (WSPA 2010).

The video received just fewer than 50 comments on the WSPA website, mostly in English. In the comments, viewers agreed completely with the WSPA's statement or questioned it, asking for more details. One clearly forbidden method of handling animals was discovered in a scene where the animal is slaughtered by pushing a knife/sharp object into the back of its head. Otherwise, positions taken in the comments shifted from vegetarianism to indigenous rights. The question at hand here is not the rightfulness or the legitimacy of these statement, acts or standpoints.

What we need to look at is the film as a canon of judgement, what is it made of and how it functions—in other words, the performativity of a film.

In the 1840s, the photographic camera was considered a type of scientific instrument (Downing 2013, 68) with the common assumption being that photographs do not lie (Plantinga 2013, 44). The studied basic unit, the atom of film footage, is the photographic image. To continue with the analysis, we need to return to the conclusive claims made earlier in this line of thought. To enter the sphere of ethical consideration, one needs to be recognised as an existing entity, a being, upon which judgment can be placed. For an ethical subject, *to be is to be perceived* and *to become is to turn into one's opposite*. In the optical order, that is how the objects emerge as visible images.

The simplest captivating and recording technology is known as the camera obscura. The camera obscura, 'dark room' from Latin, is a device that enables the optical phenomenon known as the pinhole image to emerge. It occurs when rays of light travel through a small hole in the screen, projecting an image of a scene on the *other side*, on a surface *opposite* to the opening, *reversed* and *inverted*, retaining information about the colour and brightness of the surface of that object. Lit objects reflect rays of light proceeding in straight lines in all directions, and a small opening in a screen lets through rays that travel directly from different points in the scene and form an image of that scene when collected on a surface opposite the opening. Later, when this "physical order" is combined with a "chemical order" (Barthes 2000 [1989], 10), a surface of light-sensitive material, the captured image can be recorded on the matter, which in the development of the modern film camera is called a *negative*. That is to say that the photograph is the opposite of the object that it illustrates, moving in the process from one side to the opposite surface, reversed, inverted and negated, meaning that to become an image is to turn into its opposite. For the 'world-out-there' to become an image it is required to move through and merge according to two material standards, a pinhole and a surface, one of them round and one of them rectangular, the very same principles according to which the *Vitruvian Man* with his posture and reach is figurated.

The camera obscura was used to study eclipses without damaging the eyes by directly glancing the sun. As a drawing aid, the camera obscura allowed for the tracing of the projected image to produce a highly accurate representation, placing the drawer or painter within a darkened room with a small round entrance for light through which the image would project on the wall and canvas onto which it was then replicated. The full-sized room was later scaled down to a size of a box with a lens in the opening in the second half of the 16th century and was then developed into the photographic camera in the first half of the 19th century. When the camera became smaller, its objects scaled down as well, from the observation of macroscopic celestial phenomenon to more mundane and grounded events. In a way, its objectives still remained mainly the same: to bring close something distant

or enlarge something small, something that is out of reach or escapes, where it could be captured on canvas or on film as an aesthetic phenomenon.

These observations form a set of boundaries for the objectifying process. The suggestion is that the camera's photographic objective is to produce objects objectively. The turning around, the re-scaling, the indirectness in the attempt to achieve accuracy in both science and art do replicate a visually perceivable phenomenon. The same attempt, as in this recording of the natural world, occurs in the attempt to record, to show and to verify, by splitting a single image into a plural and by linking the separate photographic images into a linear order, into a film. For such a societal verification of any phenomenon, the film came to be recognised as a document, and, as such, it gained a political significance as a particle in the material collective memory, a repeatable order of things, without the flaws of a human and therefore failing memory. People now had ocular access to a place that had gone by, to see it for themselves and become the eyewitnesses of the 'past' and 'elsewhere'.

> *Every portrait that is painted with feeling is a portrait of the artist, not of the sitter. The sitter is merely the accident, the occasion. It is not he who is revealed by the painter; it is rather the painter who, on the coloured canvas, reveals himself.*
>
> — *The Picture of Dorian Gray by Oscar Wilde, 1993 [1890].*

The ability to by-stand and witness incorporeally can be already recognised from the pre-documentary film *The Arrival of the Train at Ciotat Station* in 1895 (Winston 2013, 2). This phenomenon included both the illustrated and illustrator, the train and a camera, both standing for modernity in a single artefact, the film. One owes its visibility to the other, while that other remains invisible, or visible only in the display of the other. In other words, they both, the train and the camera, owe their visibility to one another as a co-constitution that is the film, and the 'arrival' is their continuing intra-play on a thin transparent surface. One does not see a train arriving but a projection of light through a plurality of photographic images, one after another, at a fixed speed. Camera does not attempt to show in the film. Still, it is recorded as its frame. It is in the film, containing and representing the arriving train, that is not there. 'Arrival', 'train' and 'station', when presented as separate phenomena, express the powerful manipulation of objects in time and space, since the train can emerge where it is not, as it did in a time that has passed, to the station where it is not. The mentioned incorporeal by-standing is only to be understood as a distance between physical entities, not as the absence of their intra-active characteristics. The film was in the camera materially, it was in the projector in the cinema and the effect of the moving train was at least as impressive for the audience in the cinema as it was for the people standing on the platform.

It did not take long before the manifestation of modernity turned to frame what was considered as its own opposite: the life that was exotic, distant and beyond one's mundane environment. A silent documentary *Nanook of the North* was born in 1922 (Winston 2013, 2), as an attempt to represent life in the Arctic, placing it under the technological frame of modernity, the film camera. Based on this technology, the life of a person and the people was edited, re-imagined and re-formulated into the life narratives of a figurated being, to be known as the Nanook of the North.

Such methods as the ones used in the *Nanook of the North* were later questioned, and a request for a *direct* access to the events, enabling the viewer themselves to *verify* the actual state of relations. This was an ideal rather than an actual outcome. In the UNESCO's report from the year 1964, Louis Marcorelles announces that in the new filming approach, the makers "fastened on to human lives that were followed in the thick of public affairs and in the intimacy of homes. Direct contact was established, far from the studios and the splendid, organized lies" (Marcorelles 1964, 3). This contact was made possible due to adapting new technologies; a silent 16 mm camera and portable tape-recorder enabled the creators "to get through the partitions that divide us off from one another" (ibid.).

This request for authenticity existed already in the post-World War II world, tied to the technology itself. Filming was coupled with classical editing techniques, creating an intersection of technological and personal imperatives, a form of reactive observationalism (Saunders 2013, 159). The usual technique of shooting sound and pictures together was often abandoned, and the visual material was filmed to fit the sound (in the case of interviews), filmed with a hand-held camera and put together in the cutting room. The movement took cinema toward greater realism and demonstrated a different approach to documentary film making (Encyclopædia Britannica 2011). The genres of *cinéma vérité*, 'truth cinema', a French film movement of the 1960s and its American relative, *direct cinema*, were born and came to be recognised as the canon of documentary film making.

The objectives of cinéma vérité vary depending on the film conductor and changes in the trends, but still some of its aims and objectives can be listed to give an overall image of its contents and context. Cinéma vérité's ambition was to show people in everyday situations authentic dialogue and naturalness of action. British documentaries in the 20th century and the 'free' documentaries of the 1950s that deal with the significance of ordinary situations, as well as the neorealist movement of post-World War II Italy, influenced the development of the French cinéma vérité (Encyclopædia Britannica 2011). In Dziga-Vertov's *Kino-Pravda*, 'Film Truth', the objective was to make the cinema function as a newspaper, with news straightforwardly presented live and the director giving a coherent shape to the recorded events. Edgar Morin, instead of competing with the news, wanted with cinéma vérité to "get reality inside daily life as it is really lived"

(Marcorelles 1964, 3). In the 1960s and 70s, the members of civil rights and other social movements told their personal stories in documentary films to bear witness to injustices (Kellner 2013, 60). In the field of the social sciences, a branch which later developed into visual anthropology and visual sociology was pioneered by Margaret Mead's work to harness the visual to support research objectives and provide a realist recording of objective data (Pink 2006, 25).

Early American direct cinema in the 1960s only accepted non-professional subjects, excluding actors, and was filmed with hand-held cameras and long synchronous-sound takes under only the available lighting (Winston 2013, 4), thus differentiating itself from fictional films done in a studio. Before direct cinema, staging and recreation were accepted documentary practice (Plantinga 2013, 44). In Griersonian practice, ideally a documentary denies any interaction between the filmmaker and the subject; this principle excluded interviews and commentary as a means of narration, as they would inevitably transform the subject (Winston 2013, 4) into something other than what it would be without the interaction and manipulation of circumstances for the actual filming. Such limitations for the documentary genre are very demanding, but they hardly suggest a totality of intervening or intervention when it comes to the pure presence of the filmmaker and the camera, not to mention the possible involvements and influence enabled by the film. Still, the dogma of early American direct cinema aimed for a standard of documentary wherein, besides the actual subject of the film, the others are *not there*, *present*, *alive*, and *involved*. They simply serve as the lack, a capacity to see and hear things and beings, as they are, as such.

Faye Ginsburg emphasises that cinéma vérité and direct cinema are very much interlinked, but their practice is still very different from each other. Where direct cinema relies on a 'fly-on-the-wall' type of relatively passive camera movement, following people and observing them with as little interference as possible to capture events as they are, cinéma vérité intervenes and provokes its own kind of truth, emerging in the film, not hiding the presence of the camera but acknowledging it fully, where the filming process is part of the contents of the film (Ginsburg 2013). Such an approach in a documentary exploits the camera to get access to things that the filmmakers normally cannot and to produce exceptional reactions. Practicing the methods of cinéma vérité has been criticised through its history. For example, Edgar Morin's approach became synonymous with exhibitionism, where on the other hand it was over-simplified by claiming that it revealed only the truth (Marcorelles 1964, 3). Christian Metz declared in the 1970s that all films are work of fiction, a statement which includes the documentary film as well, as a reaction to the technological development in filmmaking raising the issue of authenticity and the social relevance of documentary (Winston 2013, 1–2).

Mind if I use that portable keyhole?

— Rear Window by Alfred Hitchcock, 1954.

The genre or documentary canon that 'Christmas cruelty' falls into must be uncovered by taking into consideration its filming methods, editing and aims, which emerge from its total aesthetic constitution. The urge for an answer is because the video is not only claiming to represent one a way and form of *how the Arctic is*, but also *how the Arctic should be*. Therefore, it is not simply describing but also judging, not only observing but influencing as well, and it is doing so not only in the Arctic but (with)out of the Arctic. Its capacity to lay judgement, whether based on beauty or the good, through the aesthetics of the film can only be estimated after recognising and analysing these factors that are essentially another way of naming and stating the same phenomenon. Yusoff encounters this phenomenon with the terms of Foucault's 'aesthetics of existence', a connection between aesthetics and biopolitics (Yusoff 2010, 77) and the consideration of aesthetics as a form of ethics (ibid., 78), where to witness is to participate (ibid., 79). I suggest that the phenomenon should therefore be refigured due to its inseparability or unity by adding a single character to one or by eliminating the space inaccurately separating them, as a portmanteau: *aesthethics*.

In 'Christmas cruelty', the camera is hand held, dynamically moving, almost hectic, creating an expression of authenticity through this rough and raw momentum, an organic feeling of "being there". The camera penetrates its way from the background of the event to a close range, almost forcing its way into the sphere of intimacy to reach its visual objectives. The camera appears to engage closely with the acts, entering from the sides of the event into the reindeer fence and the slaughter house, moving among the persons on the film. For example, in the scene where the men are lifting a reindeer into the back of a truck, it seems almost as if the camera operator is lifting too, pushing with them. These clear features of cinéma vérité, the active presence of the filmmaker through his camera, are evident in the video.

In direct cinema, the practitioners remain hidden, giving the impression to the audience that the behaviour filmed is 'real' (Winston 2013, 23) and not provoked due to their direct involvement. Occasionally, in contrast to cinéma vérité's appearance of participation, in 'Christmas cruelty' the camera seems to be partially hidden, making the film more direct cinema-like. For example, the camera peaks through the gaps between the boards on the truck flatbed and over the reindeer collar. In some of the close shots of the more intimate scenes, those scenes that likely emerge as the controversial ones for the viewer, the camera angle is pointed down and the lens fails to capture direct contact with the people. This tendency is either to imitate the level of the reindeer's eyes or to simply look away.

This 'looking away' could be an expression of tact, to avoid the exact moment of killing the animal. But since the act of killing the reindeer by pushing a sharp object through its neck, a legally forbidden method of slaughter, is directly shown, it gives the act of looking away rather the impression of hiding the camera and avoiding direct engagement with the persons in the slaughter house. Therefore, if the unseen method is illegal, the direct focus of the camera on the killing does not serve the purpose of revealing an illegal act as it does on the scene filmed outdoors.

There is no direct communication between the camera and the human subjects on the film. In most scenes, only the backs of their heads are filmed; their faces are distant or even blurred. It resembles Dziga-Vertov's idea of films made with hidden cameras and without sound (Marcorelles 1964, 3), since 'Christmas cruelty' is without the original audio, excluding the sounds of any spoken conversation, background noises or the vocalisations of the animals. In that sense, it is a mute film, narrated only by the non-digestive musical score and with words that are only written, not spoken. Then again, the lack of sound and speech, using textual narration and music instead, place 'Christmas cruelty' in the genre of pre-documentaries (on the pre-documentary stage, see Winston 2013, 2), except for one aim beyond the aesthetic choices in editing: the film's contents and aim of bearing a witness, the filmed truth that both cinéma vérité and direct cinema claim and aim at doing.

In documentary film, "The crucial element is always witness" (Winston 2013, 8). The word 'witness' can mean either a piece of evidence, such as a document, or a person, who "bears witness". Holding knowledge, or 'wit', on the issue may be done by, for example, signing a document to establish its identity (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020j). In the documentary film practice of direct cinema, the only legitimate and direct witness is the camera, whether or not the set was considered authentic (Winston 2013, 8). What is achieved is the observer's perception of what happened in the presence of the camera (ibid., 9). In the case of 'Christmas cruelty', since the origin of the footage remains unclear, the 'witness', or the number of witnesses, besides and behind the camera remains unidentified. Therefore, the ones witnessing the event are the audience of the video who watch through the screen and the camera's lens. In the dogma of direct cinema, editing was not forbidden or to be seen as an obstacle for the directness of the witnessing (ibid., 8). While even the editing of the film footage is as an interventionist technique as any (ibid., 9), WSPA does not claim that they have not adopted the manners of the interventionist. Altogether, they do consider the outcome of their practices as evidence.

For Dziga Vertov, the camera's capacity is not only to create images but also to enter the world "penetrated by the camera's eye" and enact its own reality, "to produce new film 'truths'" known as *Kino-Pravda* (Winston 2013, 15). For Vertov, to present 'truth' was to reveal and remind the audience of the processes

of filming, the "willingness to acknowledge the inevitability of mediation" (ibid.). The "camera's iconic capabilities" (ibid.) should be therefore considered more in a theological than semiotic sense. The icon is not an image but a window, an entrance to a world beyond, a gateway to a truth different from the truth of earthly life. It does not only show the world but also changes it, and it does not remain without the recognition of such interventions. The truth of cinema is therefore to be considered performative—not as a representation, not as an image, but as an icon, where the image is not the two-dimensional surface of the reflection of reality but an entrance to another space, a diffractive gateway breaking the spatial order and rather engaging truth than giving or showing it. In the case of cinéma vérité, it is "only a kind of truth" (ibid., 17). That is to say, cinéma vérité is truthful about its truthfulness.

A feeling of 'being there' as a witness can be drawn out by different filming techniques in cinéma vérité. For example, in *Tongues Untied* released in 1989 by Marlon Riggs it is done through "a frame-cut sequence of lips in extreme close-up uttering racist names for African Americans in both literally and metaphorically in the audience's face", which works as a reconstruction of prior witnessed behaviour (Winston 2013, 23). It can be considered a type of point-of-view shot, placing the camera-perspective-as-viewer in direct and close relation with its object. The same goes for the WSPA's dynamic camera close ups, framing the eyes of the animals with their expressions of attention that are easily turned into signs of terror when considered as the eye of a human, wide open, known from many thriller and horror films.

To speak of cinéma vérité and direct cinema's ethics and authenticity is not to claim the pre-eminence of one or the other. In filming 'Christmas cruelty', the element of intervention is present, but the self-revealing and therefore self-critical element of filmmaker's involvement is absent. The narration is not mostly in the context of visual footage but is set by the campaign's 'fore speech', for the filming and the 'interviewing' does not take place in the film but in the comments of the footage, separating the ones who are 'talked to' from those who are 'talked about'. The campaign has a revealing power to express the 'truth' and to 'verify' its claims following the objectives of cinéma vérité and direct cinema, but while combining their methods it forms a conflicting situation for the ways in which these aims are reached and how the truth is sought. However, according to Geneviève van Cauwenberge, the geographical division of the traditions, the American observing camera and the French participating camera, does not fully explain their complexity (van Cauwenberge 2013, 190).

Whether or not we could conclude that 'Christmas cruelty' is a documentary film belonging to one school or the other, it does apply their aesthetics. The camera has the capacity to furnish evidence of reality (Henley 2013, 309). The normative ideal of objectivity bears the weight of traditional photography, placing the

camera into a mode of reproducing reality that therefore moves against political journalism rather than creating it. As far as the realist aesthetics reign, so too does the objectivist notion of truth (Kellner 2013, 59). Direct cinema may have become an inseparable part of the aesthetics that it produced with its impressions of hand-held cameras and gritty picture quality, whether in feature films or low-budget documents posted online, claiming to be 'real' and "out there with the action" (Saunders 2013, 165).

The duration of 'Christmas cruelty' is 1:33. The actual film footage covers 0:05–1:30 and consists of 43 takes. The cross-cutting of events is to be rejected in the tradition of direct cinema (Winston 2013, 2–3), which is uncertain but likely in the case of this film due to the claim that the footage is collected from Finland and Sweden, leaving it unclear which parts are from which location. The possibility of cross-cutting places this video outside of the genre, or violates its norms, should the makers insist on its evidential documentary value for exposing mistreatment. Besides editing takes by cutting the film, the actual issue of using retakes has been an issue when it comes to authenticity. As in the case of the *La Sortie de l'Usine Lumière à Lyon*, it is unclear whether the situation is to be considered authentic when the event takes place with a third shot. As such, "the workers are the workers, the dog is a dog, the gate is the gate" (ibid., 6), but whether the series of occurrences that build up the event are to understood to happen without a technical and technological involvement is a troublesome question, as if to say that the reality was not real enough, or its pure meaning without given meaning still was not meaningful enough.

> *I wonder if it's ethical to watch a man with binoculars and a long-focus lens? D'ya suppose it's ethical even if you prove that he didn't commit a crime?*
>
> — *Rear Window by Alfred Hitchcock, 1954.*

The determination of what the film footage is evidence of depends on its type, context of appearance and nature of use (Plantinga 2013, 43), meaning that it is fluid at least. Direct cinema could illustrate any given situation, but it does not necessarily explain the significance of it (Winston 2013, 22): that task must be done by other means. A moving image may support an argument, but it cannot in itself prove its correctness (Plantinga 2013, 41). Yet again, that fact does not undo the truth that the picture is an argument. To say that it is argument 'alone' or 'in itself' simply goes against the whole idea of performativity, where nothing emerges alone but only in relation to something, in their coalition, colliding, and co-constitution. Narrating life involves intervention at more than just the editing stage (Winston 2013, 6), and the investment of more than the presence of a

single actor, entity or practice. Approaches within the documentary genre vary from surveillance to fictional set-ups, from complete refusal of contact between the filmmaker and subject prior or during the shoot to directed actors performing according to a script (ibid., 8). The close observational intrusion was made possible by new technology, simultaneously raising a new level of ethical challenge for the documentarist and the question of the influence by the presence of the camera (ibid., 10) even without an attempt to lead the events to a certain direction. In a way, the 'permitted intervention' is the intervention that is not filmed (ibid., 8); that is to say, the intervention that does not leave a 'stain' in the film but is inside the very fabric of the film.

Even though the video footage presented by WSPA concentrates on the animal, rather than being a nature documentary it falls to the category of 'victim documentaries' (Winston 2013, 22). In Griersonian victim documentary, the exposure that may disrupt the subject's lives is considered ethical as long as there is consent given to filming or the chance the documentary would give them a voice (ibid., 11). This procedure gives the responsibility for the possible harmful outcome to the subjects themselves due to their expression of will or considers the good intention of their just cause, or any means necessary for the necessitated outcomes. Defining 'harm' is problematic since documentary subjects can be placed under a hostile public glare, leading in the case of 'Christmas cruelty' to economic loss endangering livelihoods, especially when the WSPA in the video or in other media does not name the actual subject or the presence of those who do not appear on the film violating the reindeer. Fully informed consent is beyond the power of most subjects to give due to the limits of imagining the consequences of public exposure (ibid.).

Is it then the reindeer herders who should be considered the ones receiving and accepting the fully informed consent? In 'Christmas cruelty', a film presented by an institution dedicated to the animals, the aim is likely to give a voice for the reindeer. Therefore, consent should be given by either the people managing the animals in the film or, if following the actual subjects of the film, from the reindeer. Considering the subjects on the film, the documentary is not attempting to give a voice to the herders, simply framing them as the violators of the reindeer and those reindeer as the stated victims. The argument that it provides a voice, therefore promoting agency, remains flawed in the way the reindeer are characterised as powerless victims, subjects of violence, objects instead of actors, and their relation to the humans portrayed as ill. Paul Henley argues that the Buffalo Bill Cody's Wild West Show films on dances of Sioux shows much more about the entertainment industry in late 19th century America than they do about traditional Sioux culture (Henley 2013, 309); in the same way, I claim that 'Christmas cruelty' reveals more about the animal activism of the 20th century than about human–animal relations in the Arctic.

The principles of ethical documentary are considered crucial, since they are involved with 'real lives'. These principles concern accuracy and honest dealing with the contributors in the acts influenced by the filmmaker's ambition and responsibility. The ethics occur in the choices made on the topic, the location, framing, directing and editing, in order to tell somebody's story, where the issue of contextualising grows more complicated due to the development of more mobile and interactive online formats of documentary (Rughani 2013, 98). Here 'Christmas cruelty' serves as an example, as it was published online and republished or linked to on many different online media platforms. When it comes to the digitalised world, the photographs are not in principle more deceptive, but it provides an ease that may also ease the deception (Plantinga 2013, 44), since the digital pictures and footage can be more easily and more widely copied and altered without the involvement of the original authorship. Being online has added to the mobility of the portable camera, not only by means of distribution but by the change in the audience and context, altering the standpoint of the footage, subjected to the agency of the human machine assemblage (Dovey & Rose 2013, 374) to which the internet and computers, different programs and applications add another layer, effect and filter the picture of the 'reality'. This epistemological shift in the conditions of networked media reconfigures the documentary's public and political purpose. According to Thomas Elsaesser, this is a group of "strange organisms, pushing, moving and mutating, depending on the tags one enters or encounters" (ibid.), indicating that an image online has a life of its own when it comes into contact with new authors, platforms and viewers, feeding its constitution and contents and being consumed by unidentified audiences.

> *That's a secret private world you're looking into out there. People do a lot of things in private they couldn't do in public.*
>
> *— Rear Window by Alfred Hitchcock, 1954.*

Contents including nudity, sex and violence are especially delicate issues due to the potential harm they pose to the subject's privacy (Rughani 2013, 99). Since the claimed acts of violence do not occur towards the human subjects in WSPA's video footage, it would be the privacy of the reindeer that is insulted, if the fact of getting caught while conducting a violent act is not considered to compromise the privacy of the herders. The power of the camera lies in revealing the subject to itself, as one would never perceive oneself otherwise (Barthes 2000 [1980], 12–13). This claim of telling the story of the reindeer is very much the same as the shame of nudity that Derrida confronts under the gaze of his cat (Ito 2008, 125) that nevertheless is not the gaze of the animal but the human collective behind it, the viewers behind the transparent and invisible walls consisting of the lens and the screen through

which the images are projected before meeting the eyes and entering the retinas of the public. The eyes of the cat are the mirror that subjects us to our own gaze, the moment when "*I see myself seeing myself*" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 80, emphasis original). One is forced to confront oneself—where the 'I' is revealed to oneself, not to the cat, that may be ignorant or already aware of it all. Jean Rouch describes the camera as having a double function, being a two-way glass that is "a window that delivers the pro filmic to an absent gaze and, at the same moment, a reflective surface that reintroduces us to ourselves" (Saunders 2013, 193).

Another question is whether the activism by definition needs to be practiced with ethical consideration or if the ends justify the means, and if the video is to be considered purely as propagandist, ignoring WSPA's claim of 'evidence'. In the field of documentary films, the expression of opinion according to continental European radicals falls into the genre of agitational propaganda, agiprop (Winston 2013, 2). On the other hand, that would lead to falsifying the document and a denial of the message without giving its possibility a trial to establish animal ethics and animal agency in the given society.

The ethical stand that WSPA asks the viewer to take in practice is done by donating. To act ethically is outsourced to an economic transaction, and the power to act is given to those who know the best and are most capable of doing so, the holders of the truth. To help the victims of the mistreatment is not to aid directly. Shoving the truth toward the public, at least in the first stage, turns into economic income, not ethical intervention. As Winston comments, in victim documentary "almost inevitably, film-makers more obviously benefit from a documentary than do their subjects" (Winston 2013, 11). Truth becomes an item of transaction in the political economy of ethics. Reindeer, even as victims, remain an economic product. They are so in the meat industry, and in the state-paid compensation for the losses caused by predators to reindeer husbandry. When it comes to the ethical concerns of "commercial interest" (Rughani 2013, 99), while 'Christmas cruelty' is not a commercial film, its author WSPA asks for a donation with their video campaign, therefore including a solid economic and commercial aspect. That is to say: "a contributor's pain can be a documentarist's opportunity" (ibid., 99). Performs in the film is not only the technology-negotiated relation but also the financial status of filmmaking, the economy. For example, the inauthentic audio in many documentary films is used not only to manipulate the visual narration or because of the lack of developed technology but due to the sheer lack of money (Winston 2013, 2).

Similarly, a lack of money plays a part in Stern–Gerlach experiment in quantum physics, where silver atoms were sent through a spatially varying magnetic field, deflecting them before they struck a detector screen. Physicists Walther Gerlach and Otto Stern could not have perceived the nearly invisible results of their experiment, to trace the patterns of the silver atom beam on the plates without

Stern smoking cheap cigars with a lot of sulfur in them in a close range so that the silver on the plates would absorb the smoke and would turn into jet black silver sulphides, easily detectable, as if developing a film. As Barad's example of cheap cigars and the visibility brought about the scientist's gender, societal class and low pay on the scientific proof (Barad 2007, 161–167), so too does the audibility of a documentary film perform as such.

If we ought to consider a documentary film an ethical intervention, the presence of the filmmaker becomes a critical question. Documentary journalism in the broadcast sector speaks not about objectivity, but impartiality. An activist's stance, as in the case of Michael Moore, according to Pratap Rughani, appears ridiculous (Rughani 2013, 102). The difference between the exploratory documentary tradition mainly known from the work of Michael Moore on the political left using film as a medium to probe social problems (Kellner 2013, 62) and WSPA is that Moore is openly present as a face, voice and a name. Then again, by showing social and ethical problems, is it rather a non-interventionist record of unethical behaviour? In the matter of 'here and now', the filmmaker is non-interventionist, letting the scene take place, the crime happen, and the evidence for ethical enquiry be provided at the price of violence and mistreatment taking place. The damage is irreversible if we consider the animal an individual subject rather than an abstraction in utilitarian matter. Whether the filmmaker had a realistic account to intervene with efficient ethical outcomes sets another issue to the question but does not turn us from exploring whether there is a fine line, a slightest possibility, between resistance and cooperation.

The intentions and outcomes problematise the question even further. In Carl Plantinga's example of the Rodney King case of police brutality, the film footage evidencing the crime committed by the police but excused by the court led to six days of riots, resulting in 63 deaths and a billion dollars of financial losses (Plantinga 2013, 42). Carl Plantinga states that intentionality is not required in proving brutality, since "the mechanics of the camera and the physics of light became relevant factors in determining the evidentiary status of the video" (ibid.). What must be specified here in accordance with Plantinga's argument is that the camera did not stand in the spot on its own two legs held by its own two hands. The filmmaker was there. The camera is not a manifestation of the pure intention of evangelic light; it holds a human agency, even if the corporeal human is absent. Absence does not mean independence. It is simply a matter of distance that does not make things undone or render the corporeal genealogy non-existent. Non-interventionist witnessing resulted in to the prolonged assault towards King, and the evidence led to the deadly riots. Whether this was an unnecessary high price for revealing the truth or a necessity for revealing and resisting a societal injustice with a cost of many more lives than the riots is yet to be known. The trigger and capacity to shoot is built into the weaponry of the police officers. The

camera obviously has the capacity to shoot, monitor, record and replay violence, to simulate and reproduce the wrongs.

How just and objective the possibility to stop or undo violence might be is another question, existing in an intra-play of more than a system of optics. For Brian Winston, the ethics relate directly to the degree and nature of intervention, not its absence or presence (Richards 2012, 12). Susan Sontag goes further by arguing that "the act of photographing is more than passive observing […] encouraging whatever is going on to keep on happening [...] To take a picture is to have an interest in things as they are, in the status quo remaining unchanged" (Sontag 2005 [1973], 9). Judith Butler continues by claiming that photographs enable one to repeat and continue the event, that photographing possibly even prompts, frames and orchestrates the act due to its presence (Butler 2009, 83).

As Bill Nichols claims, every discourse externalises evidence outside itself to a domain beyond and before interpretation, which is true also of documentary film (Nichols 2013, 33). Such a procedure is a rhetoric attempt to guarantee the ethical credibility of a speaker, but it leads to ideology rather than knowledge (ibid., 35). According to Nichols, it may be deceptive, but it is the only means for a social actor to convey perspective and conviction (ibid., 36). In other words, the documentary film as a discourse is denying its agency in the making of the film to the world it depicts. It does not produce evidence; it simply encounters it. It does not seek, but simply finds, since the act of seeking has a built-in aim to find, and the evidence has an aim to exhibit. Therefore, the extent of the question should go beyond the rhetoric, what is done in film by editing and narrating, by telling a story that therefore has a built-in interpretation. The actual extent starts from the very act of filming, accessing a space with a camera, carrying the constant presence of the filmmaker and the aim of the practice of filming. It is not simply an act of manipulating evidence afterwards but of producing actual evidences by entering the yet-to-become scenery. Reality is not recorded and re-cut by the filmmaker but performed-with the world, shaped by the sheer presence that is imprinted in the film.

> *Justice consists in seeing that no harm is done to men. Whenever a man cries inwardly: 'Why am I being hurt?' harm is being done to him. He is often mistaken when he tries to define the harm, and why and by whom it is being inflicted on him. But the cry itself is infallible.*
>
> — *Selected Essays 1934–1943, Human Personality by Simone Weil, 2015, 30.*

Can a camera guide us in finding and revealing truth about violence, or does it hold also the possibility to emerge as an act of violence? David Riches argues that violence is a word for those who are victims or witnesses of certain acts, rather than

for those who perform these acts (Riches 1986, 3). In a way, violence emerges as a combination of performance, object and viewer. Stella Bruzzi emphasises that the documentary is performative, since it only comes into being as it is performed and given meaning by the interaction between performance and reality (Bruzzi 2013, 48–49), and therefore it ought to be considered intra-action. Riches continues by saying that in the Anglo-Saxon context, legitimate and illegitimate use of force is the focal point that makes an act violent (Riches 1986, 3). Such an approach makes the understanding of violence complicated, due to the socio-political and situational nature of recognising violence.

The possibility of the existence of a documentary promoting animal ethics with photographic evidence of brutality and mistreatment comes into question in the form of *The Cove* released in 2009, which shows images of the slaughter of dolphins. The photographs are objective with respect to their mechanistic production, taken from surveillance camera footage, but they are subjective in the sense that they imply a visual perspective through shot composition, choice of subject, focus and focal length (Plantinga 2013, 42). It is not legal or scientific, but 'rhetorical', based on the trustworthiness of the maker (ibid., 44). Documentary filming also has a history of violence. Morgan Richards provides examples in relation to wildlife documentary making and ethics. The CBC documentary *Cruel Camera* in 1984 uncovered evidence of the mistreatment of animals by several leading wildlife filmmakers, for example using tethered animals as bait to attract predators and using staging and editing to make highly constructed sequences. In the mid-1990s, American wildlife filmmaker Marty Stouffer in particular was publicly criticised for flagrant ethical violations in his *Wild America* series on PBS, as was the late Steve Irwin for his willingness to interfere with wild animals in the *Crocodile Hunter* series on Animal Planet broadcasted from 1996–2004 (Richards 2012, 323–324). Richards argues that the ethics of wildlife documentary should concentrate on the complex ethical relationships between wildlife documentary makers and the animals and ecosystems they film rather than on the audience's abuse or deception (ibid., 325). Richards' example from 1996, *Big Cat Diary*, resembles the production methods of cinéma vérité, as practitioners openly declared their interventionist and subjective approach by including themselves in the film and the story of how the footage was obtained (ibid., 327).

In the WSPA campaign, the animal subject emerges into the field of politics through suffering. The relations between becoming a subject and suffering relates to the heritage of Peter Singer's animal ethics from the mid-70s. According to Mimei Ito, Singer assumes that the capacity for suffering is the fundamental characteristic that gives a being reason for equal consideration, because the ability to suffer or enjoy are the prerequisites for having interests (Ito 2008, 122). Being a subject becomes a question of having a precarious and vulnerable life (see Butler 2009, 75–76), including those whose 'life' is recognised and acted on.

What then are the means through which to mediate the experience of suffering between human and non-human animals? Can we recognise and verify them from the images or video footage? William John Thomas Mitchell formulates the reasoning behind why images are considered 'natural' as being predicated on Western idolatry, where the idol is constituted as an embodiment of the real presence that it signifies. They are the sign we share with animals; they are objective, scientific demystified rationalism and are naturally fitted to our senses; the strategic perceptual skills man must have for survival in a hostile environment (Ito 2008, 126). According to Carl Plantinga, many animals, for example pigeons and dolphins, are able to glean accurate visual information from photographs and videos (Plantinga 2013, 42), meaning that visual appearance and gestures might function as a shared language between human and non-human animals, a rule that applies to both parties. Within the discipline of anaesthesiology, WSU's College of Veterinary Medicine has developed the first study on how a non-human animal's face can express pain; they published the "mouse grimace scale", which can be applied to animal drug testing and veterinary care (Sorensen 2010). Here photographic images are used to replace the missing linguistics between humans and animals in expressing pain.

In light of the previous claims, we cannot include pictures as belonging only to the domain of human senses and sensemaking, and we could therefore add them to the formulation of animal ethics, where the animal is not simply an object subjected to ethical review but is considered thoroughly as a material and acting subjective being. Still, whether a photographic and cinematic perception is to be thought of as animal perception seems inaccurate since the claimed accuracy of information only emerges from the already given standpoint that one needs to adapt.

That standpoint in an image is provided by a human. Verifying the severity of the pain felt by the animal is entering the same body of knowledge as news pictures, war photography and medical science, constructing forces of lived social reality and the physiological performance of humans. As Ito points out, in the attempt to criticise man's dominion over animals, "the identity of animals is not only socially constructed but it also shapes human culture through representational practices" (Ito 2008, 120). That goes also with the footage published by the WSPA. The acknowledged pain makes the non-human animals into acknowledged subjects. Pain and self-recognition may be the beginning of ethical inquiry and demand, but it should not be where it ends, to be a subject only through suffering.

By all mentioned means and matters, the presented discussion more or less circles around a human subject, still incapable of recognising the viewpoints of animals. These are only the standard procedures of critical investigations into depicturing and documenting societal issues, civil rights, political activism, economy and ethics belonging to the domain of humane and inhumane behaviour. This conclusion follows Yusoff's analysis on Jacques Rancière's understanding

of the space of political aesthetics as *a priori* forms, determining what presents itself to sense experience, an act that creates new modes of sense perception and political subjectivity (Yusoff 2010, 79). It is not about the non-human. What is discussed is how the animals may be displayed on a film, how they are treated to get them on display, how the filmed animals may affect humans and how the animals may react to pictures. These approaches only answer how they are seen, not precisely what they can see, and especially not how they see and how they see differently.

> *You never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view [...] Until you climb into his skin and walk around in it.*
>
> — *To Kill a Mockingbird by Harper Lee, 1988 [1960].*

The question remains, then, if documentaries are able to adapt the animal's field of vision to simulate or experience how they are affected. Temple Grandin, American doctor of animal science and a consultant to the livestock industry on animal behaviour, in the early stage of her career used a camera to simulate the animals' perspective by, for example, kneeling down and taking pictures from the cow's eye level and using wide-angle video camera to imitate the vision of cattle with eyes on the sides of the head. By imitating the sight of an animal, it was possible for her to observe small details which scared cattle (for example shadows and bright spots of sunlight), and by making small changes she was able to ease their handling and lower their anxiety. The use of black-and-white film was based on the understanding that cows could not see colours, which has been proven wrong based on later research (Grandin 2006, 4, 6). This example shows that even though photographs enable gaining information, they are dependent on pre-assumptions, which are then performed in the photographic simulations.

Reindeer represent an especially challenging question, because they are semi-domesticated animals and categorically fall into both wild and production classes of animals. The approximate field of view of an individual human eye is 95° away from the nose, 60° toward the nose, allowing humans to have an almost 180° forward-facing horizontal field of view. Hoofed herd animals (cattle) have 360° vision, leaving only a small blind spot behind their rear ends (Grandin 2006, 170). The difference is that humans have a stereo view, our eyes having evolved to give us predator sight specialised to estimate the distances between objects. Reindeer are gregarious, and for them it is crucial to detect movement instantly, since this movement might be either caused by a predator or by other members of the herd. The camera angle and the field of vision in 'Christmas cruelty' represents a human point of view rather than achieving the level of animal perceptions, more likely the reindeer's carnivorous counterpart than its insight.

Even though the violence is "highly visible to the senses" (Riches 1986, 11), 'visibility' often fails to recognise the rest of the senses. Pink, from a sensory ethnography point of view, raises the issue of the limits of film to represent and evoke the same sensory embodied experiences (Pink 2006, 53). Pre-assumptions, standards and associations may also be misleading and limiting for the spectrum of life. Something that can visually appear as violent and inhumane might perform an opposite effect. As an example, Grandin recognised that the cattle squeeze chute used to hold cows during vaccinations actually relaxed some of the animals, even though mechanically restraining the animal with a metal harness may seem cruel. The same mechanic pressure actually helped Grandin to control her autism-related panic attacks and anxiety, which would have been triggered if the same contact had been performed by a person, for example by hugging her (Grandin 2006, 59).

To follow methods which seem 'natural' might also be misleading. Grandin argues that, for example, playing a radio in the fattening pens at a reasonable volume level will prevent excessive startle reactions to noises such as a door slamming (Grandin 2000, 412), even though this might not seem a 'natural' and therefore suitable environmental stimulus for the animals. This concept does not only apply to domesticated animals. My personal experience of feeding wild mallard ducks during the hunting season close to the human settlement showed that playing a radio quietly in the open air covered sudden sounds and seemed to make the ducks less tense and the feeding more successful.

Faulty interpretations are not only based on excluding senses of touch, taste, smell and hearing but also on misunderstanding visual sensations. The anxiety of production animals is easily interpreted as fear of death, but according to Grandin's observations, in meat plants the things that frighten cattle usually have nothing to do with approaching death. For example, seeing a small piece of chain hanging down from an alley fence can make a lead animal stop to look at it and move its head back and forth in rhythm with its swing (Grandin 2006, 167). While designing cattle races and corrals, Grandin noticed that it was important that animals cannot see people and other moving objects in certain locations (Grandin 2011). Many visual details invisible to a 'standard' human eye when acknowledged can reduce the stress and suffering of animals.

Where Grandin's examples first and foremost concern domesticated production animals, they have similar anatomical features—with some alterations—as their wild animal relatives, though their behaviour may differ due to their heritage and maturing in a different environment. One anatomical adaptation of reindeer to the Arctic conditions concerns its visual sense. Scientists have investigated a reflective layer behind the retina of the reindeer's eyes. The retina contains the eye's light-sensitive cells, and reindeer apparently increase the pressure inside the eyeball during the winter to compress collagen fibres together, making the reflective layer bounce bluer light back through the eye, helping the reindeer to see better during

the Arctic night. In the summer, their eyes turn from blue to golden, reflecting most light out the eye in the continuous daylight (Yong 2013). Human beings are able to see light with wavelengths ranging from around 700nm, while the reindeer's vision can see wavelengths down to ultraviolet around 350–320nm, exceeding the extreme of the so-called visible spectrum of colours (BBSRC 2011). Many objects that absorb ultraviolet light offer high contrast against the highly reflective snow surface. Therefore, the reindeer can see the lichen that is its source of nutrition. Reindeer can also detect wolves better, since they appear dark against the white snow with fur that absorbs the ultraviolet light (Bowdler 2011).

> *You cannot get through a single day without having an impact on the world around you. What you do makes a difference, and you have to decide what kind of difference you want to make.*
>
> *— Jane Goodall.*

Animal behaviour might be recorded with the camera and the violations against them might be documented, but the animals may also be provoked and aggravated by the photographing or even the camera's lens, leading to aggressive and violent behaviour. Hidden cameras or camera traps have recorded impressive pictures without the presence of single human being and have proven useful for science, fundraising and conservation, for example by collecting evidence on declining populations and producing first-ever photographs of certain rare species. Traps are usually set along a game trail and are triggered by infrared beam, collected weeks or months later. Conversely, the cameras may be hurting the animals they are set to study. Their impact is obvious from the images: the animals are startled by them, fleeing from them and investigating or even attacking and breaking the traps. Whether their violent behaviour is due to anger or curiosity is uncertain, but clearly they are provoking. Increasing the popularity of camera traps may lead endangered animals to waste energy while fleeing or to make them avoid fruitful areas for foraging or hunting. Nobody has systemically studied the impact of expanding the culture of surveillance into nature's last redoubts for wildlife (Benson 2008). As Etienne Benson says, these cameras have become more quiet, capturing images without a flash, and people are more informed about covering their sent while operating the cameras in the wild (ibid.). Still, for the animal there is something slightly out of place with the camera that concretely hides in the landscape, their only function the same as the hunters' trap, to detect or be triggered, to capture. The unblinking glass eye is stalking them without rest.

It is possible for a camera to raise aggression in wildlife. Another issue concerns, again, the human presence in documenting and how it is negotiated with non-human actors. Dr. Jane Goodall became famous during her long period of close

engagement with the chimpanzee that she was researching. One of her findings was a high level of aggression that later proved to be missing from chimpanzee communities that were more—or totally—isolated from human contact and influence. At the research location, Gombe, the chimpanzees were fed by Goodall on a daily basis for 15 years, continuously and sporadically for another 22 years, so that they would quickly lose their fear of human beings and could be studied. Apparently, the feeding had an enormous impact. The feeding caused more tension between the chimps and also with the baboons that the easy food attracted as well. Goodall realised she had heightened the violence and tried to reduce the aggression by, for example, putting bananas in boxes and then opening the bananas one at a time to ensure a fair share of fruit, but the chimpanzees knew the content of the boxes and became increasingly aggressive, even towards Goodall herself (BBC Horizon 2005 [2004]). The negotiated human presence for documentary proposes changes the profile of chimps' societal environment and leads to aggression and violence towards the other animals and humans.

The trap cameras carry the heritage of animal trapping, where the object of desire is the animal and feeding is a human-societal gesture of sympathy; they manipulate the object of desire, the animals, affecting their social relations with each other and towards humans and other non-human animals. The gesture has a hidden object of desire in itself. The desire to become one of the chimp community by bribing them or by contributing to the community was deep down the desire to 'capture' the animal by documenting its essence and returning with it to the human scientific community. The gesture of kindness is therefore a camouflage, a deception used by a predator. Whether its influence on the aggressive behaviour was considered an ethical issue became especially alarming when it led to the kidnapping and killing of a human infant by the leading male chimp, and whether he and his actions should and could be judged by the measures of a human or as belonging to the natural and therefore just behaviour of unintelligent or amoral animals (BBC Horizon 2005 [2004]). Was it by creating a human–animal interface that the animal adopted both violent and destructive behaviour, which was thought to belong to the human domain only, and should the animal therefore be treated as a murderer? Or was it the case that the animal still had no judgemental abilities whatsoever, and that even with the behavioural changes it only returned to the previous actions of humans and therefore to their responsibility? The first suggests that there is no pure chimpanzee left, but a more(-or less)-than-chimpanzee subject.

> *"It's beautiful, but it's not art. Humans create art by their own violence, by their own volition."*

> — *Children of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1976.*

The sword cuts both ways, and mimesis echoes in the anti-mimesis. Since the recording apparatuses are physical items in the surrounding mimicked entity, they also 'leak', leaving long lasting patterns on the very matter that they study with objective and non-intervening means. The observed is not passive, and the environment is never a totally controlled party; the materiality as a sensory phenomenon has a tendency for modular change. Such is the change from visual to audio, how the attempt to see can be heard. One example concerns an animal known as the lyre bird, which has a great capacity to incorporate the surrounding soundscape by means of recalling and imitating it. It has been documented that the lyre bird has included in its singing vocabulary the sound of a camera shutter and a camera with a motor-drive (BBC Earth 2009). Whether or not the bird itself was the focus of the camera is another question, unknown as long as the camera has been in hearing distance of the bird. It has recorded the recorder: it has become a picture, and it echoes the voice of its taking. The creating of the virtual photographic double has also influenced the 'original'. Now the bird, in its variation of song, incorporates the auditive mode of the human desire to see and capture. What is more, this 'trapping' is also in the behavioural intent of the bird, to 'trap' the female's attention with its song. Nature imitates the art imitating nature.

The more general problem here is the issue of whether studying the animal inevitably make it more like a human. Questions can be asked here concerning not only whether an animal can be measured by human standards and judged according to our moral principles but also whether the very idea of placing these standards on the animal makes it more human that it would be without such a frame. Another example, besides 'Christmas cruelty', where the documentary canon and desire to reveal societal issues is put upon the suffering animal, comes from a radical representative technology, technique and narration used in the natural documentary *The Private Life of Plants*.

"The countryside is so still that it looks almost lifeless, but these trees and bushes and grasses around me are living organisms just like animals" (Attenborough 1995, ep. 1). These are the words said by David Attenborough that start the BBC nature documentary series *The Private Life of Plants*, which concentrates solely on plants and fungus in the wild (differentiating it from gardening programs) and aired in the United Kingdom from 11 January 1995. The ambitious aim of Attenborough was to make the growth, movement, reproduction, interaction—in short, the life cycle—of plants perceivable for the television audience. The challenge of such attempt was to popularise a phenomenon that exists on a different timescale than human or animal performances. The solution was to 'translate' the biography of plants into the language of humans, to use time-lapse photography for "speeding things up visually" (ibid.) or, in other words, reducing the distance between the temporal scale and extent of mobility of the perceiving subject and observed object.

Time-lapse is a photographic technique using a still or video camera where each frame is captured at a slower speed or greater interval compared to the speed at which it would usually be played back in a film sequence, producing the appearance of events unfolding at a faster pace than they actually occurred (Simpson 2012, 431). The stationary camera is focused on something that changes slowly, taking a series of photos over hours which are compressed into a video with a few minutes of playtime, thus creating a time lapsing effect (Kelle 2013). In time-lapse, images can capture the dynamism of movement and facilitate the development of another way of looking, unsettling how we habitually figure things (Simpson 2012, 432). Plant scientists have also been able to identify with time-lapse observations unknown competencies by making phenomena that, from the standpoint of the observer's timescale, is too subtle to be noticed more pronounced (Garzón & Keijzer 2011, 168).

In the time-lapse, plants do not grow more quickly, nor do the people get slower. The life itself is not adapting into a new timescale; we are simply looking at a series of still photographs that have major gaps between them: that is, the untold story of the plants. Instead of illustrating the tempo of the plants' mobility and performances, they enter representative practices through a technological apparatus and simultaneously become a part of a discourse of human behaviour, or more precisely part of a very specific political setting. In time-lapse, plans do not only grow quicker: they pop and twitch almost violently. There is most likely a 'natural' variety in the rhythm of the growth, but undeniably time-lapse consisting of different rates of growth make the change more radical or, to refer to Attenborough's words, it is "revealing" how "dramatic" the life of plants is.

In a more recent sequel by Attenborough, *Kingdom of Plants 3D*, which premiered on 26 May 2012, the time-lapse is said to reveal that plants are aggressive and competitive (Attenborough 2012). The *Private Life of Plants* also emphasises how plants, like animals, have to fight, to compete for mates and invade new territories, thrusting ahead relentlessly over anything that stands in their way (Attenborough 1995, ep. 1). Some of the plants are also pictured in slow motion when their seedcases snap open, quickly throwing their seeds around, and the narration tells us they 'use explosives' and 'jet propulsion' when the seeds burst out from the seedcase with fluid. The splitting of the 'explosive' seedcase in two uses an audio resembling the sound of an animal roaring, which, combined with the moving images, gives the impression of an opening jaw. The jet propulsion has a sound of dropping bombs and rapid fire. Apparently, the sounds do not originate from the plants: the soundscape is added to support the narration, specifically the use of terms like 'using explosives' and 'jet propulsion'. Such terms connect the plants arguably with human intelligence discourse. Instead of saying 'plants seedcases open explosively', they are 'using explosives', which implies such things as gun powder. In other words, plants are using technologies instead of performing their

biology, which is very much the way the human is narrated as separable from nature due to their culture. The aggressive competitiveness of plants in conquering new territories being combined with references to weaponry not only makes the plants enter the world of human intelligence, reasoning and drive but also presents warfare as a state of nature, something that does not only concern humans and non-human animals but furthermore even plants and fungi. Instead of presenting plants meaningless, mindless and passive matter, their agency is expressed with great talent to the public, but it simultaneously privileges the human reasoning for natural phenomena and naturalises warfare.

Narration, audio, time-lapse and slow motion are not just used in animating plants, animalising them as roaring lions or simply anthropomorphising them as having a will and an orientation toward technology. More specifically, the documentary is planting them into a certain human discourse. Within this discourse, humans are not aiming to sustain but to grow, not emphasising harmony but rather a continuing conflict between living beings, depicting evolution as the struggle of life. Through expressions of aggressive competitiveness, hunger, will and power, as well as the speeding up of time from hours to seconds, annual performances have changed into quarters and are already shifting from ecology to political economy, turning ecological niches into economic ones.

The noble and undoubtedly successful way to use documentary and cinematic methods to bring the life of plants to common knowledge, to make them interesting and popular for television audiences and to question their passive nature by unfolding the forms of their agency, has its serious manipulative side effects. By manipulating the timescale, size, and narration, the plants' agency emerges via the human reasoning discourse; the life of plants is translated rather with economic than ecological terms. By 'lapsing the time', cutting parts of the movement away, the distance between human and plant is reduced. Rather than looking at the plant, we are looking away, looking to somewhere else to fill the gaps, to another form of aesthetics of distance and the episteme dwelling in it. This lapse of distance evidently alters perception, creating a hybrid being that consists of human, technology and plant, the outcome of the observation and representation processes.

To return to the example of Goodall's tamed and aggressive chimpanzees, creating new cross-species interfaces, such as feeding, is not without risk. By gesturing to the animal or plant, we are placing our intentions upon them. The 'interface', then, is an illusion, and the 'intra-face' is the more likely outcome. Furthermore, this arrangement is not a gesture presented by the animal but a practice dominated by human influence, intervention and intentions. The animal/plant must access the human domain so that the human can understand it. Those characteristics that enable the encounter and engagement with these figurations, human and animal, are inevitably the ones that will dominate the relations as well. We are capable of approaching the part of an animal that is the most humane and the part of us that is

the most animal-like, just to remind ourselves that there is actually no human, plant or animal to begin with, only the practising of such entities.

> *Your choice [...] Your pain. If you take all the eyes you've been given ...*
>
> *... and still choose to remain blind, how am I to blame?*
>
> — *X-Men 'Soul Possessions' by Stan Lee, 1994, Vol 1, No 32.*

While *The Secret life of Plants* seeks to look at plants through the eyes and intentions of a human, Tuula Närhinen's animal-cameras, *Eläinkamerat*, attempt to make human look through the eyes of an animal, a sense that humans and the presented animals share. The artist built pinhole-cameras in 1999–2002 that replicate the structure of the eyes of different animal species, such as a moose and a ladybug, and placed them in spots where these animals hypothetically move, giving access to perspectives that the human eye could not provide us with. In the exhibition, the photographs and illustration of the structure of the camera differed from both human perception and the projection created by the classical camera, which imitates the human eye (The Finnish Museum of Photography 2011). The transparent border provided by the lens has been the common fence through which people have appreciated wild animals, as Tim Ingold emphasises, as long as they remain at a safe distance without closer involvement (Ingold 2002 [2000], 111). In a way, the cinéma vérité type of camera work and the animal-based pinhole cameras break this rule by forcing their way to a close range or by adapting into the animal's vision. This moving from one side to the other only takes place in the visual domain. The 'Christmas cruelty' stays behind the computer screen, and the animal eyes only project within the art museum of a common human dwelling place. Moreover, we do not see like the animal, but we see how the animals sees. We are an eye behind an eye, but our eye does not adapt; it only perceives two-dimensional projections provided by complicated multidimensional sensory systems. We remain humans.

Another approach to understand the animal or non-human other is to stop manipulating them by altering the scale of their performance to resemble human performance or by deconstructing them into projective displays. We can try to become one. The aim would be 'looking as' the animal, not 'looking at' the animal. One possible example is the participatory environmental art performance project *Reindeer Safari* ('*Porosafari*') led by the Helsinki-based live arts collective, Other Spaces ('*Toisissa tiloissa*'), founded in 2004. Other Spaces performances take a form of collective physical exercises with the audience, where the exercises are taking the human shape and state of being into a metamorphosis with the audience (Other Spaces 2013a) by undoing the regular theatrical setting, stage and auditorium. *Reindeer Safari* performance takes place in a semi-urban landscape.

The participants of *Reindeer Safari* form a small herd, moving autonomously according the rules that correspond to the group behaviour and the rhythm of wayfaring of reindeer, where the aim is to move 'from human to reindeer' experience step by step. It is also a path through restoring the urban landscape to a state of nature by observing it as a semi-domestic herd animal (Other Spaces 2013b). The *Reindeer Safari* performance was also arranged in Rovaniemi in Autumn 2013, facilitated under the Rovaniemi Art Museum and Korundi House of Culture (see also Veijola 2014). I personally took part to the experiment with a small group of people (starting with seven and ending with four) forming the small herd, known as '*parkkio*'. The performance started in the late afternoon with a short introduction and reindeer 'education'. The actual performance's duration was between three and four hours. The experiences were discussed and deconstructed on the following day. The performance and its debriefing brought up a clear potential for educational and experiential purposes.

Did we engage with different kind of ontology that enabled a new type of episteme to emerge? As pointed out earlier, the spatial relations, distance and perspective are enabling *what there is*. As the name of the artist group emphasises, the spatial relation is transformed in a way that redefines the space, but only with respect to the ability of the individual bodies to adapt to the change. That request was also part of the mission, to keep the herd together, typical behaviour for reindeers, not leaving anyone behind regardless of their stamina or speed. The guideline in the performance was not to 'act out' reindeer but to 'act as' a reindeer, since the purpose was not to convince others that one is a reindeer but to transform oneself through the experience. Therefore, the participants, for example, did not walk on all fours but remained on their hind legs. Every individual body was transformed, not visually but based on their joined performance.

Since reindeer communicate in different ways than humans do, or at least in forms of communication are mostly unperceivable to most humans, the participators were not allowed to talk to each other during the performance, only to grunt in dire situations. In this way, the community enabled by communication was narrowed down to small bodily signs and suggestions, mainly proposed by postures and movement. Decisions were not made in a traditional sense; they simply took place as outcomes due the pressure created by the collective that either slowed down, hurried, stopped, looked around or headed towards something. In a pedagogic sense, the learning and interaction was made mostly kinetic by restraining the auditory side and limiting manual gestures. Even visual perceptions could be altered by trying to concentrate on detecting the location and movement of others by relying on one's peripheral vision and avoiding focusing on a single target in the way predator animals do.

The urban space thus opens up differently. The people followed the types of tracks that the reindeer would prefer, such as grass, open wide green areas for

grazing and resting and paths where they can move in lines, consuming less energy. Being a reindeer affected the participants during and after the performance by breaking the socio-normative restraints of the city space, opening up places that do not exist for oneself, since one has never entered them or they have not been allowed in social practice. It provided a new way to perceive the possibilities for finding new routes to take in familiar or new environments. Another significant change in addition to spatial preferences and communicating methods was the perception of time, since the reindeer were not allowed to check the time on their watches or phones. Control of the time was given to the guides, and only the lack of sunlight could give a hint of the approaching night. Also, it was impossible to estimate the passage of time, since moving was slow compared to average human movement in a city and there was no decided destination to proceed towards. This combination enabled the reindeers to return to the same places without any other purpose than favourable tracks or a direction to follow.

Coming to Lapland from the Southern Finland, the 'safari guides' were aiming to teach the performers, only explaining some basic information while respecting the fact that some of the participants, being local or from the region, might have a deeper and wider understanding of reindeer behaviour. This information was something that could be brought out later in the discussion session. In this way, the local expertise concerning the issue could be collectively produced in the performance and then collected and transferred to the next performance in a different district, including now the standpoint of the North. One of the issues as an example was the log where the observing guides or 'reindeer dogs' had written down when the reindeer herd encountered dogs and how they reacted to a large dog. When they noted that "the reindeers were not scared by the dog", it was brought up by the performers that if the dog is not determined when shepherding or chasing the reindeer, the reindeer might not escape but stand still or even attack the dog. It means that the dog–reindeer relation is not only a prey–predator relation but a cooperative relation that depends highly on the skills and experience of each of the individual animals and their operating as a herd.

Through the physical limitations, holding back from common socialising, verbal communication, control of space and control of time, *Reindeer Safari* challenges regular human perceptions, and its participants partially free themselves from being recognised as human by disobeying social and societal patterns. This freedom became very noticeable during the performance when people passing by expressed curiosity and worry about seeing people wondering around carefully in silence. The paradigm of division and distance from the non-human is to be overcome step by step by the process of becoming a reindeer and a part of the herd. In the end, this experiment on becoming an animal was more successful in revealing about being a human than in giving coherent information on or an experience of the life of an animal. It was rather about the deterritorialisation of

social norms and patterns of behaviour and communication towards the city space and the other members of the performing group. Looking through the body of the reindeer, we rather encountered and perceived the human and the human society. This experience of othering therefore turned our view towards ourselves, not to understand the animal but to question and confirm the human.

> *Well baby, you're already in that cage. You built it yourself. And it's not bounded in the west by Tulip, Texas, or in the east by Somali-land. It's wherever you go. Because no matter where you run, you just end up running into yourself.*
>
> *— Breakfast at Tiffany's (film) screenplay by George Axelroth, 1961.*

It does seem that wherever or however we go, we end up running into ourselves. The camera, with its built-in objective, ought to provide us with objective visual representations. Whether or not we are capable of perceiving these objects objectively is an entirely different question. How 'objective' is one's eye? Theorists after World War II suggested that people's internal states shape perceptions to create the phenomenon of wishful seeing. For example, the higher valuation of an object made it appear larger when its concrete size was estimated (Dunning & Balcetis 2013, 33), and when people formed representations of the dimensions of the natural environment they influenced size, length and slope. Desirable objects appear physically closer than undesired ones. Furthermore, people also act as though these objects are actually closer. One possible psychological mechanism underlying wishful seeing involves perceptual sets that are activated before an object comes into view, subtly guiding the visual system during processing once the item is detected. Also, when a source of desire appears, observers' attention narrows, possibly affecting perceptual representations of the environment and limiting access to depth cues, which are necessary for accurately coding distance (ibid., 35).

One sees what one seeks. People represent objects of their environment as aligning with their preferences, a phenomenon that has been demonstrated using different measures of perceptual experience and corroborated behavioural measures (Dunning & Balcetis 2013, 36). In studies of wishful seeing, tests were performed by using 'natural' objects, such as money, in three-dimensional space or ambiguous figures with rivalry stimulus signs (ibid., 33–34). In the case of natural objects, the perception is very much dependent on individual performance, whereas ambiguous figures have clearly restrained interpretative possibilities between two options. For example, one can see either number "13" or capital letter "B", or in a simple drawing the figure of a seal or a donkey (see ibid., 34, fig.1,).

In the terms of social sciences, it would be fair to consider people's "internal state" (Dunning & Balcetis 2013, 33) as a relational state. What is considered internal is very much in intra-play with the external, whether it is about such issues as class, gender and ethnicity and stated and shaped by the surrounding conditions, social, societal or other. The same goes for the internal state and the wishfulness of the photograph. On a film or in a photograph, one does not see *what there is* but only *what somebody has seen there is* through a camera's lens. Rather than the image being free from wishful seeing, it is already coded in the contents of the picture. For example, the distance from the depicted object is already manipulated and narrowed down by reducing the third dimension to the second. In Barthes' words, the perception of a photograph is about "what I add to the photograph and what is nonetheless already there" (Barthes 2000 [1980], 55).

What Barthes, from the field of semiotics, calls *something that is already there* in the picture and the way Lacan separates the eye as an organ from the gaze (Lacan 1977 [1973], 101–102), takes us further into an investigation of wishful seeing, where visual perception is described as both an individual characteristic and a social/societal one as far as the individual is influenced by it. To rephrase the latter, perception should be considered an individual characteristic as far as individual is seen as material outcome of the social in the societal. How then does the eye, as an organ, and the sight provided by the eye differ from gaze? Where lies their split? In Yualong Ma's analysis of Jean-Paul Sartre's theorisation on gaze, the other is, in principle, the one who looks at me (Ma 2015, 125), and because the other is, in principle, the one who looks at me, the preoccupation is to differentiate the gaze from the eye (ibid., 125). 'Being-seen-by-the-Other' is therefore 'seeing-the-Other' (ibid., Sartre 1993 [1956], 257), since the other emerges as something outside of me, the self, in the act of seeing. Only the possibility of being seen establishes the concept of the other.

Although the term 'gaze' seems to privilege the eye and the sight, for Sartre it is not limited to this sense; instead it covers other sensory signals and the traces of presence as well. The rustling of branches or the sound of footsteps or a scent on a breeze or touch could each evoke the awareness of the other. It is one of these sensuous presences that evokes the subject or emerges from the self to inhabit a consciousness that was missing while being "drunk on by that which I desire to listen to or watch" (Ma 2015, 126), having in a way stopped being a subject to become merged into something else, whether this could be the perceived object or the act of perceiving itself. "I come into being as a self by means of the reflective consciousness on the very moment when I feel someone is looking at me", since "the person is presented to consciousness *in* so far as *the* person *is* an object for *the* other" (ibid., emphasis original). Instead of claiming that the 'I' is the foundation of one's nothingness, 'I' has a "foundation outside myself" since "I am for myself only as I am a pure reference to the other" (ibid.; Sartre 1993 [1956], 260). Ma

summarises Sartre's analysis by saying that the gaze of the other provides self-consciousness but also reduces oneself to an object of the other (ibid.).

In my dream, I was two cats, and I was playing with each other.

— Frigyes Karinthy quoted in Ruben Brandt, Collector by Milorad Krstić, 2018.

According to Lacan, both positions, subject and object, can be occupied simultaneously in the gaze of each other. One can be both a fascinating object and an arresting subject, while these two opposite effects strengthen each other in dialectic way: the more the viewer is arrested by the object, the more one is a desiring subject (Ma 2015, 127). Yuanlong Ma's example of a cover girl follows the same presented relation as Berger's effect of a female nude and spectator–owner/buyer relation (Berger 1977 [1972], 63, 134). This triadic relation includes the subject who sees, the visual object as the other who is seen and the gaze as a third locus (Ma 2015, 127).

Sartre's other is the one who looks at me, whereas Merleau-Ponty's 'I' is the being who is looked at, meaning that there is always a pre-existing gaze from the outside world, where 'I' is able to look from one point while being seen from all sides (Lacan 1977 [1973], 72; Ma 2015, 127), causing a split and establishing a given-to-be-seen subject (Ma 2015, 128). Paradoxically, given the gaze's pre-existence and ubiquity, it is excluded from the subject's consciousness (ibid.). That which is always and everywhere cannot be comprehended as recognisable, and therefore it is acknowledged to be nowhere and non-existent. "The split of the gaze from the eye is […] the split of the unconsciousness from the consciousness" (ibid.). Whether or not we ought to accept the pre-existence of the gaze returns to the question, and the denial, of the origin discussed earlier. What counts here is the split, since there is no entity to count or to refer to before the moment of the split, where the object and subject, the gazing and the gazed upon, come into being, since their coming into being is due to the split. Rather than speaking of pre-existence, one should consider it as contemporaneity. To perceive of being perceived by the other requires one to recognise the phenomenon of perception that occurs 'between', and the 'between' only emerges in the split; therefore, the understanding of the 'before' or 'pre-' happens retrospectively. What has 'always' been emerges to the subject as 'now'. These concepts, 'pre-' and 'post-', are intra-dependent and are taking place in-between, in the state of 'now'.

Furthermore, a term that is related occasionally to Freud's earlier work, later to be systematically replaced by 'unconscious', is 'subconscious' (see Freud & Strachey 1969 [1926]). Within this thesis, both terms are used interchangeably. Rather than being the antithesis for the term 'conscious', with 'sub' it claims

to form a basis for what lies above as its co-conducting counter. In the terms of genealogy, the idea of the subconscious pairs with the *heritage* that *emerges* in acts, derived from Lacan's claim of remembering and behaviour (Lacan 1977 [1973], 129). Therefore, historically, if not ontologically, the pre-existence of the gaze has a solid basis. It places the influences on human actions beyond the individual, rather describing a phenomenon that creates, brings into being: the individual. The ground upon which one takes their first steps has been walked on before 'I', in which the 'I' also leaves its traces. Where the emergence can be interpreted as an expression of singularity ('I' as a Roman number 'one'), it emerges from a heritage in which it is also invested and which is characterised by plurality. As in Lacan's work, this is named as the Other, with a capital letter, and it is certainly an expression beyond singularity, to the singularity of plurality coming together in the 'I', an individual, the subject constructed by the omnipresent gaze. 'I' is made by many, many in which the 'I' belongs to.

Is it not exactly the gaze that Lacan explains, the same phenomenon described in the perception of the Innu Arctic landscape, as a multi-layered and palimpsest space, continuously 'read' and 're-written'? The singularity of the landscape is *scaped-out* by the multiplicity of beings passing through and dwelling in it, where the history has not passed away but passes 'below', acting out or emerging from the 'sub-' terrain, the 'sub-' conscious, the 'sub-' structure. In its full materiality, the subconscious is therefore to be understood, always and without a need to rename it, as a collective subconscious or unconscious. We do derive from and return to it. The gaze is brought into existence when "the gaze is screened by the eye" (Ma 2015, 128) and when our feet are joining the steps of the others. In the world, the subject not only looks for but also shows the Other (ibid.). We emerge from and invest in heritage; we push up and return to the ground. When I adopt the gaze of the other, it is veiled. I screen it, since I cannot see what I see with, looking through it, not at it. Consciousness emerges from the gaze, from the subconscious, and I become an acting subject and also subjected to the gaze that 'aɪ' (I/eye), screen: "it is only because the gaze is veiled, screened by the eye that my consciousness and subjectivity can come into being" (ibid.). Therefore, I'm not a subject without the Other, but the gaze of the Other must remain hidden or it would compromise my subjectivity.

Although the gaze is intangible, it is material in its effects. Insofar as our relation to things is constituted by way of vision, the gaze slips away from the consciousness (Ma 2015, 130). In the visible, determined according to the gaze that is outside, we look at ourselves and mould ourselves and the world in accordance with the gaze of the Other, as long as it remains veiled (Ma 2015, 131; Lacan 1977 [1973], 106). Ma claims that becoming a subject does not occur in birth but results from social constitution and comes into its being by way of alienation, following Jean-Jacques Rousseau's argument about the social man living outside himself and

Lacan's example of Chuang-tsu, whose identity is imposed on him by the society but who, outside the society, in the state of a dream, became a butterfly instead of a man (Ma 2015, 129). While I walk on a path, I do so due to its pre-existence, but I keep it existing with the power of my foot pressing the ground and treading the grass; I also make it a path by using it as such, by giving it that very meaning of a passage to take. Simultaneously the path supports me as a being walking on legs, which might not happen if there were no paths, no flat and solid ground. I may recognise it consciously as a passage, while those who have passed on it remain in the subconscious. As Lacan expresses: "In our relation to things, […] ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, […] eluded in […] that is what we call the gaze" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 73). This means that we are not only subjected to the gaze but that we also carry it on and carry on with it. It is very much like a stain, a sensory-motoric trace imprinted on all things and between things that moves on and is reproduced in our actions, always with alteration. The subconscious, as a collective phenomenon, is not to be considered the same for all, since even if everyone is gazed at from all sides (Ma 2015, 129) simultaneously, they do stand in a different spot, and through momentum the objects open and close up.

Lacan developed the term *objet petit a* (object little-a) from Freudian psychoanalysis. This term is part of the attempt to describe the relation between the subject, the object and the gaze. The letter 'a' stands for French word '*autre*' (other), written in lower case and italicised, denoting the little other in opposition to the capital '*Autre*' of the big Other, never to be attained (Ma 2015, 129). This *objet a* is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself from as organ, serving as a symbol of the lack (Lacan 1977 [1973], 103). This definition can be deconstructed as follows. Lacan describes *object a* as a privileged object that determines the split of the subject, emerging from this "primal separation", in a "self-mutilation" (ibid., 83). This split serves as a symbol of the lack, of the phallus, insofar as it is lacking. *Objet a* is an object that is separable and has relation to the lack (ibid., 103; Ma 2015, 129).

Objet a is the symbol of the phallus. The phallus is neither an object nor a genital organ: it is the signifier of the desire of the Other. Differing from Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic order, where signs are composed of signifier and signified, *objet a* has no corresponsive signified; it is empty, a pure signifier (Ma 2015, 130). To place this statement, we have to look back to the Pioneer's golden plaque and its human representatives. These figures illustrating a man and a woman, these bodies, refer to and belong to nobody; they are bodies that are nobodies. They are pure abstractions of the multiplicity of bodies in an idolised, eternalised, uncorrupted form and matter. They are to be considered desirable and can be found nowhere in the 'real' world, except as an illustration inscribing everybody at once and therefore nobody in any moment in time. If we take the claim back to Lacan, he marks the

phallus, which lacking is symbolised by *objet a*, in his algebra with the sign of phi (φ), the very same character that in mathematical context plays out as golden ratio. Is it not the case that we can find this phallus in Dürer's drawing machine, as the obelisk positioning the line of sight, and in camera as the photographic objective, expanding while zooming? The pictures that they co-compose refer to something else, that which they depict, not directly to these phalluses. The obelisk or the system of lenses are not visible as such in the picture, even though the picture owes it visibility partially to them. The picture has in its constitution the *objet petit a*, which stands for, but does not represent, the presence of the phallus; it appears as the lack, -φ, or more accurately with a longer segment, given its distance: −φ.

> *I'm like cat here, a no-name slob. We belong to nobody and nobody belongs to us. We don't even belong to each other.*
>
> *— Breakfast at Tiffany's (film) screenplay by George Axelroth, 1961.*

The subject has language to capture the primary pleasure, but the language as the absolute other is marked by lack: the object has been cut off forever by the language while also leaving something beyond the power of the language (Ma 2015, 129). What is under study here is not the individual psyche of a human being or a full-scale psychoanalysis of humankind. The primitive pleasure is not that of the human organism; it is the co-constituted practice known as the human being, the pleasure, desire, or the lack defining and casting upon the figuration that claims to be a being known as 'human'. In Lacan's work and Ma's analysis, the question returns to language. In language, words are abstractions. To say 'a cat' is to refer to a singular animal, where 'cat' is a species, a singularity of multiplicity, or in Jean-Luc Nancy's terms of coessence: *being singular plural* (Nancy 2000 [1996], 30). The ability to differentiate 'this cat' from 'that cat' indicates that they differentiate from one another by other means than sheer number of appearances, since they "could not be similar if they were not first different" (ibid., 9). A cat, as a reference to a specific subject, is therefore impossible, only existing as a singular category provided by language, belonging therefore to the Other. By referring to 'a cat', I simultaneously ought to refer to something specific as a part of something else and therefore to something very much unspecified, something with an elusive location, and therefore to *none* rather than *some*. "I want *a* cat", means that I want *a* part of something, that belongs to nothing if I take it *a*part. It is not *a* cat without *cats*.

The idea of the empty signifier, and its meaning in linguistic-material world, is displayed by this sentence: "*Stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus*" (see Eco 1996 [1980], 624), "*Yesterday's rose endures in its name, we hold empty names*". A rose that has already perished due to biological decomposition remains still a 'rose' in name. The name 'rose' is the linguistic signifier for a physical

framed entity, a blooming plant. When the flower has perished, the word 'rose' has nothing to refer to, but may remain as an empty signifier, the only way for a trace of the once flourishing form of life to endure. The sentence can also be approached through the concept of abstraction. The name is empty since there was not *a singularity of multiplicity* to begin with, and therefore 'rose' refers only to something that never existed, never had a material counterpart to signify, only an abstracted and categorised thing called 'a species'.

> *For them, one and one and one and one don't make four. What do they make? [...] Just one and one and one and one, he said.*
>
> — *The Handmaid's Tale by Margaret Atwood, 1985.*

The claim for the non-existence of such entity as 'a cat' or 'a rose' goes beyond a purely philosophical argument, which would ignore the so-called mundane experience and functionality of the term. The same sort of outcome may be common among humanity, in its different ways and forms of being and performing 'a human' that also would evidently deny the concept of 'a human' as well. Grandin, in her work on autism, claims that she thinks in pictures (Grandin 2006 [1995], 3). While she was confronted with such linguistic category as 'a dog', instead of picturing the word or a certain abstract form of a dog, all the dogs she had ever confronted in a form or another, meaning things which were named to her as a dog, were triggered in her memory and emerged in a linear order, from the first confrontation to the latest. Therefore 'a dog' was actually 'a dogs', since her way of perception and knowledge did not allow such abstraction to emerge from the heritage of individuality. In Grandin's description of the dog race Great Dane, it emerged to her as chronological and specific, never generic or generalised (ibid., 12).

According to Ellie Ragland, autism, in the extreme, could be seen as an attempt of approval by self-annihilation, a refusal of the gaze and a name (Ragland 1995, 129; Ma 2015, 132). Even though autism is considered not a psychological but a neurological condition, this difference is not so great when the issue is discussed in societal terms instead of medical ones. The word 'autism' refers to self-absorption (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020k). The autistic person keeps physically distant and isolated due to sensory overload, while their social communication is often limited by the use of spoken language. Therefore, what may be originally a great sensitivity towards one's surroundings emerges in the social context as self-absorption, a turning inwards. The resistance that Ragland signals in her work is towards the common and acceptable, defying language and escaping abstractions. This is very much a resistance towards the big Other as a sub-structure for making 'a human' through the practice of language and signs, the referential figurations that they provide.

Objet a is suspended between the subject and the other, belonging to both and neither. That suspension would suggest it belongs to the *in-between*, although its characterisation as something that designates the most other in the Other while being intimately bound up with subject itself (Ma 2015, 130; Boothby 2013 [2001], 243). That refigures us from the *in-between* to the *in-the-midst*, localising *objet a* to a space that is both shared and belonging in a most fundamental and definite way to the figuration of what may be called a subject or an object, a thing or a being. I believe that this *in-the-midstness* is profoundly in the nature of intra-actions that Barad describes, in her contribution to performativity theory, as a radical understanding of co-constitution and co-dependence in coming into being.

This characterisation of *in-the-midst* is known as *extimacy*, coined by Jacques-Alain Miller from the words 'exterior' and 'intimacy'. In this constitution, the most private space, in the very centre of the subject, is forbidden even for the subject itself, and thus the most intimate becomes the most alien at the same time. In a theological reading of Augustine's *Confessions*, in the most intimate centre of oneself there is God (Miller 2005 [1986], VI). This exemplifies the relation of the *objet petit a* and the big Other, the small inside and the capital surrounding it. The absolute of the individual is breached by the God, where God's exteriority is around and within oneself. The same phenomenon is established in the diffraction of light, known as the Arago spot, where the shadow cast by a disk or a ball has a bright spot in the middle of it (Barad 2007, 93). The shadow, the lack of or lesser light, surrounded by brightness, has in its darkest centre a bright spot. That example shows again the meaning of intra-action in contrast to interaction, where the occurrences and beings as interactions take place impartial to the constitution of the acting subjects. An act, influencing the exterior of the individual, is at the very core of the individual. And while the exterior and intimate are in play, the 'I' once again is said to be taking place not as a hidden, uncompromised core

of a being or as one's appearance, but between these two, 'I' being an *extimacy*, something *in-the-midst*.

Where Freud acknowledged the importance of the inner self emerging in slips of the tongue, dreams and hysteria, Lacan brought it to the outer sphere, stating that the big Other, the unconscious, is "constituted by the effect of speech, on the subject, it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently [...] structured like a language" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 149). In language it is the order that gives things and beings their meaning, their referential links and hierarchies. Miller emphasises that the relation with the 'A' (the Other) as symbolic order and the small '*a*', *objet petit a*, is problematic, since there seems to be a gap due to the Saussurean structure that builds on the articulation of signifiers, on their joining together with such non-signifying characters as *objet a* (Miller 2005 [1986], VI). What then provides this gap that defies the structure of articulated signifiers, called the big Other, and the fleeting, non-signifying surplus of *objet a*? In Augustine's reading, would this not be the 'I', the individual as a container within which *objet a* remains in secrecy from the self, that which is a barrier, a surface facing and being faced by the Other? These two faces, facing and being faced, resemble Janus' characteristic *holon*. This abyss, this rupture, this liminality, *the original trauma* pronounced as 'individual', is what the *a* and the Other share, and it is what sets them apart.

The *objet a* as surplus *jouissance* (Miller 2005 [1986], V) is an effect of pure aim—aim rather than goal, since the goal can be reached and breached, but the aim moves forward, insatiable, as pure reason and nothing to reason with. Therefore *jouissance*, as a force proceeding beyond, breaching the pleasure principle, paining the subject (ibid.), returns to the argument made by Spielrein on destruction as a cause of coming into being. In Barthes' literary theory, the division of pleasure and enjoyment, *plaisir* and *jouissance*, and their relations to the subject, goes as follows. The pleasure does not challenge the position as a subject but confirms the homogeneity of identity (Barthes 1977, 9). The *jouissance* allows one to break out of one's subject position by fracturing the signifying structures through which *plaisir* operates, enabling the subject to know itself (Middleton 1990, 261).

This aim (*a*I'm) of becoming goes beyond and loses it ground. Cut off from the subject as being (as 'I'm') and signifying nothing in particular (*a*) it becomes attached and stains an object with the hereditary *jouissance* of the subject. To become one (I), to fulfil the desire forever, to become complete, to undo the cut known as 'I', the becoming of the individual, would be to undo the subject itself. This undoing is thus impossible for the subject as a subject. For a subject to prevent its own destruction, the aim of becoming needs to be separated from the goal of being. If this goal is to be reached, in that very moment it would lose its meaning, due to its totality. There would be no subject left to celebrate the ultimate fulfilment of desire. "It is for this reason that we have such truth as that desire has no rest"

(Ma 2015, 130) in the constant intra-play between the practice of subjectifying and objectifying. What 'being a human' is provided with is an aim, not a goal. As in the term 'human being', the words have a gap between them. Spatial thinking allows for a perspective on the relation between them, a thing and a doing, from which the aim may emerge, one reaching for the other. If the distance between the 'human' and the 'being' is undone, the result would be 'humanbeing': that is, a solid object, without the subjectifying verb—a death of the subject.

> *Behold, I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him: On the left hand, where he doth work, but I cannot behold him: he hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see him: But he knoweth the way that I take: when he hath tried me, I shall come forth as gold.*
>
> — *Job 23, 8-10, the Holy Bible, King James Version.*

Philosopher Maurice Blanchot, according the Barthes, has said that the essence of the image is to be outside, without intimacy, and yet more mysterious than the innermost being, *absence-as-presence* constituting the lure (Barthes 2000 [1980], 106), a type of hauntology. That is also a very similar description to *extimacy*, which by combining binaries comes to terms with the Christian theological concept of two natures, *dyophysite*, full deity and full humanity, where one of the natures does not undo or reduce the other; they remain equally total. In a photograph, *objet a* is inseparably coded into the contents and composition of the picture. Since it is all, it cannot be detected or separated. It is 'all' and 'nothing' simultaneously and profoundly. Lacan argues that in seeing, "I see *outside*, that perception is not in me, that it is on the objects that it apprehends" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 80) while "The privilege of the subject seems to be established here from that bipolar reflexive relation by which, as soon as I perceive, my representations belong to me" (ibid., 81). The camera or the photographer, the model or the target, are not there, and the process of making is washed away, remaining only as a stain, as a surplus of the enjoyment of the intra-act of photographing. A photograph is the surplus of seeing, not signifying the camera but only its aim. It is a composition that is 'no more': its gazed-at desire is separated from the phallus of the camera's objective (expanding and shrinking) and, in the womb of the dark room, rises from the liquids of photographic development chemicals, the amniotic fluid of pictorial world, under the blood red light shifting from the third dimension to the second. As a three-dimensional object, the photo emerges as a stain, containing only the physical qualities of a photograph as a piece of paper, not those of an image, which only emerge in the second dimension.

In the film, "what is subtracted from the living being […] the forms of the *objet a* that can be enumerated are the representatives […] its figures" (Lacan 1977

[1973], 198) are "extra flat", like lamella (ibid., 197). The quality of lamella can be approached through the concept of determinate negation because that is what the film is by definition, a negation, consisting of enumerated negatives, reversals of its depicted objects. Where Žižek reads the meaning of Lacan's lamella through Freud as that part which is lost in the moment of birth by both parties, mother and newborn, the placenta (Žižek 2003 [1993], 275), its part could also be played by the foetal membrane. The meaning of the word 'film' (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020l) is the same as 'membrane', or a thin skin—that too is left behind by the reindeer, and it is reanimated, coming alive and being slaughtered time after time enveloped by the film, a hide through which the projection casts a ghost, a hollow or flat object of what used to be made out of flesh and blood, a living organism under the cover, skinned in the filming. This lamella is not alive, but undead, since the filmographic images were not alive in the first place. Still, "it can run around" (Lacan 1973 [1933], 197) while it is replayed and reanimated on a film reel, depicting the continuous circle of life and death, and it may be distributed digitally, being copied "like the amoeba in relation to the sexed beings" (ibid.) in a cycle of reproduction. Reindeer on film is the undead part of the reindeer slaughter.

Since we cannot see the filmmaker, only the scopic field provided by the camera, his subject is presented as a lack. Because this empty presence is vivid and very much alive to the viewer, our eye viewing the pre-existing gaze of the film, and since the world (the film) looks back at us, we occupy the lack: we are invited, drawn in and forced to the locus of the witness and of the violator as well. We are not the same as the films—in that case, we would lose our subjectivity and would be unable to make any judgement or reasoning in relation to the event the film represents. We would hold no agency in allowing or stopping it. While the lack on the film pulls in like a vacuum opening up, invoking, the surface of the screen cuts off, the subject is barred out, as organ. In the film's display, we are present, while in our physical materiality we are elsewhere, in front of a screen. In this relation of view and viewer, in-between emerges a split: we occupy the pre-existing, the preposition of the unknown other, not by repressing it but replaying it, since, as Ma frames it, "the gaze is rather screened by the eye than repressed" (Ma 2015, 130). This *preposition* is therefore a *proposition*, an urging one. The other is in us, partially, and we are in the other, partially, where this partiality does not turn into a specific mathematical value. In our looking at the film, we cannot really *see the other*, since we are *seeing as the other*. It remains veiled. In the event of seeing the film, something slips past and is passed on. There is a stain on the film, but it is not on either side of the screen. It is somewhere between, merged and cut off, shared and centred.

For Lacan, the *objet petit a* is the gaze in the scopic field and can be best explained as an optic perceptual phenomenon equated with anamorphosis. First, we have to clarify what the scopic field stands for. 'Scopic' is derived from the word 'scope',

which comes from the Latin '*scopium*', an instrument for seeing, from Greek '*skopei'n*, which means to "look at" or "examine" (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020m). Therefore, 'scopic' stands for 'something aimed at or desired'. The scopic field indicates all visual angles, but for the individual subject this field is limited by the medium of the eye to a single point of view, while the acknowledgement of other angles of seeing, and of seeing the subject itself, are maintained in the subconscious. The scopic 'aimed desire' has its counterpart, the vocative, that expresses, addresses, calls, appeals or invokes (Tunis 2007). These figurations are hardly different from the convex and concave, pushing and pulling. In psychoanalysis, the agents of pushing and pulling are the subject's desires and fears. In politics and ideologies, they could be called sympathies and antipathies, mathematically + and -, positive and negative. These pushes and pulls provide the distorted standpoint of the subject that able to recognise the shape, the influence or the stain that is *objet a*, which in itself has no substantial consistency. In Žižek's poetic reference, *objet petit a* is depicted as "nothing but confusion" (Žižek 2016, 188). Rather than being "nothing", this "nothing but" confusion is everything: everything coming together in complete fusion. That is how Mary J. Gregor suggests that Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, in his work on aesthetics, should be read: by separating to "con" from the "fusion", placing emphasis on the inseparability of the characteristics of a thing from how it presents to the senses (Gregor 1983, 364). Therefore, the perceived object as an entity does not bend into separable analytical units to help us to understand the function and the essence of the whole.

> "I've often seen a cat without a grin," [...] "but a grin without a cat!"
>
> — *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll, 1865.*

In Žižek's words, *objet a* is nothing but the inscription of the subject itself into the field of objects in the guise of a stain that acquires form only when part of this field is anamorphically distorted by the subject's desire (Žižek 2016, 188). The way in

which the anamorphic functions is presented by Lacan in Hans Holbein's painting *The Ambassadors* (1533). In the forefront of the classical painting presenting two young highly esteemed men, their status is expressed by their represented clothing, appearance and a collection of items held and presented in the background. This classically appealing constitution of the painting is haunted by an uncanny and irrational stain-like object in the foreground. This stain emerges as a skull only by adapting to a different location in relation to the complete painting, by approaching it as a three-dimensional object instead of a two-dimensional image, peering at it from an extreme side-angle. Here, according to Lacan, "as subjects, we are literally called into the picture, and represented here as caught" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 92). Lacan points out that by following the traces that the painters gaze has left for us, we are physically moved to a different location. By performing this movement and finding *object a* in the painting, we become aware of the painter's intention to move us, led by our desire in relation to the object. When we detect the shape of the skull, we realise that we have been lured into a visual trap, following the vocative in the painting. Our desire is represented in the picture, constructed by anamorphosis, and revealed only by our bodily performance. Our desire to objectify the unobjectified is revealed to us as a grinning symbol of death. "It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects [...] the gaze is the instrument through which light is embodied and through witch [...] I am photo-graphed" (ibid., 106). "Smile! You're on Candid Camera" (Funt 1948–1992).

Even if the change in the angle would release us from the confusion caused by the stain, it does not release the fusion of the stain. When we abandon the perspective of facing the painting's canvas directly and evenly from the front, we may begin to perceive the painting as a three dimensional object, but we cannot do so without abandoning the three-dimensional representation of the painting, the impression created by the composition of the painting where we see the stain on the foreground and the men within the frame and the walls of the painted room behind them not as flat but as a space with extending dimensions. Furthermore, the shift does not only concern where the dimensions emerge but also what part of the painting emerges as a stain. When the stain (re)gains its proportions as a skull, the figures of *The Ambassadors* are stretched and squeezed beyond the natural appearance of a man, becoming non-representative abstract stains on the canvas. The stain/skull is the same substance laid on the same canvas by the same author as the rest of the painting. If it would be washed away, or cut separate, it would distort the rest of the painting. If it would be painted over, it would only be veiled, not undone. As an "extra flat" (Lacan 1977 [1933], 197) object on the canvas, the anamorphic skull is the lamella, revealing also that the actual figures on the canvas are as undead as it is, since they cannot die, as they were never alive in the first place, only replicating living bodies exceeding the life expectancy of

a human organism in a same way as the flat golden bodies in the Pioneer and Voyager.

As the grinning skull is hidden in the perspective, looking back to Ptolemy's work, another grin is provided by the very perspective of the three-dimensional projection of the globe. The grid, the crossing lines of longitude and latitude, bending towards the horizon, form a grin. Unlike with the skull in *The Ambassadors*, which emerges as an attainable figure by adapting into a different perspective, this grin can only be perceived as a margin of the grid. If the drawn globe could be rotated, the shape alters and the grin moves further, emerging always from the margin. It is like the grin of the Cheshire Cat from *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* hanging in the air, a grin that remains and becomes visible while the rest of the body disappears. Note that it is not the mouth that remains, but the grin, the expression of enjoyment, *jouissance*, the very essence of the *objet petit a*. A grin without the cat, a form of Freudian reversal, is a desire that has left its organ, as the gaze has left the eye, occupied as a lack. Still, this grin it is not immaterial but incorporated in the representation of the globe, the dimensional projection of a physical object. It is escaping, a hidden imaginary of the desire, embedded in the object, detached from the observing organ from which it is inherited. It attaches like a stain. Where the cat is corporeal, the grin is incorporated. As the projection of the globe only entails the round form, the Earth as matter is only represented as a lacking substance. From this geometrically precise emptiness emerges the desire for scientific accuracy and control over the 'natural' world, the very same hubris that stains the prestige of *The Ambassadors*, the grinning skull. The *gridiron* re-emerges as a *griniron*.

In light of what has been encountered so far in relation to *objet a*, it can be said that it is *detectable as a deformative transformation of an object insisted upon by the desire of the subject.* This non-signifying surplus is inherited from the subject and is e/merging in/to the object. This emerging appears simply as confusion while figuring the object out until one fuses oneself with the trace left by the other, adapting into the positions proposed, *preposed* or even more so *adposed,* where the term 'adposition' does not demand temporal or spatial hierarchies but rather emphasises the phenomenon wherein something has been 'added' while being adapted into. This small other accesses the intimate space barred by 'I', revealing the desire of the self that is then provided by the exterior, led by the subsuming gaze of the big Other. Getting back to *The Ambassadors*, what happens to the subject? It becomes the preposition for the articulation of the image. One acts out the dimensions from the painting. It is suspended in a solid standpoint and is reduced to that dimension, offering one perspective from which the skull or the men may emerge, losing itself to perform this singularity of subjective angle.

'God' spelled backwards is 'Dog'.

— Author unknown.

How does then this world of ideas manifest in materiality? It requires a little help from the best friend of humanity, a dog. I would go as far as to say that the term *objet petit a* consists of the partial other that makes it the object by attaching it onto something. It is the stain that the recognition of the gaze of the Other leaves on the world. To take a linguistic example, if *a dog* loses the *a*, there is no *dog* to be found. *Objet a* alone does not signify anything specific, but it does address something as '*a* this' and '*a* that'. In a linguistic sense, the *a* is what addresses something as an object, since for something to emerge as an object it needs to be set into relation with the other, the other that perceives and faces it as an object. As the article 'a' appears in the linear sentence before the object, it is this *a* that addresses the relation to the object, its quality and quantity. Therefore, to attach the small other, *a*, is to objectify, making any object fundamentally an *objet a*.

Dog spelled backwards is God. Backwards, inside out, upside down or the other way around. These expressions do not add or reduce anything, but they may de- and reconstruct by playing with binaries, changing their places or our relation to them. More precisely, a dog is not equated with God by the saying: the sentence addresses their linguistic relation. 'Backwards' in this case means to switch from moving from left to right to moving from right to left. This phenomenon in visual studies is called the 'lateral gaze bias' (Racca et. al. 2012, 2). Domestic dogs display a left gaze bias when viewing human faces in a way similar to how humans and other primates perceive. This bias is interpreted as a right hemispherical dominance in processing emotions and their expressions. In contrast, dogs do not present such a bias towards their own species (ibid.). This indicates that dog–human relations, due to evolution and cultivation, has led to the dogs' ability to read human emotions efficiently or, in other words, to adopt a human-driven gaze.

God mirrored is boꓤ, and dog mirrored is ꓱob. They are perceivable but not meaningful, rather cryptic or enigmatic. It is a stain, a complete confusion, that cannot be simply reflected in the optical order of a mirror. It only opens up when adopting a new perspective, turning into its opposite. Therefore, the dog, which is outside the human, can turn into ('into' standing for facing, accessing and transforming) the human by adopting a gaze that is not its own but a surplus from the human. It can peer within the human to the most intimate places where the expressions of emotions are evoked, whether consciously or subconsciously becoming the *extimacy* of human and therefore, by occupying both binary positions simultaneously, turning into God. 'You dog' is a phrase said to someone who is secretly deceptive. Does this not beautifully exemplify the revolutionary claim that this turning of the gaze furthermore breaks down and turns around the binary of

master–slave, where for a human being the dog is the very manifestation of a loyal servant, the lowest of the low in comparison to humans? But before the eyes of a dog, the human becomes the object in front of his own transferred gaze, enslaved by it as an object, nothing more than an open book.

In order to establish a level of certainty by controlling the number of variables, the desire of the scientist being laid aside in the attempt of achieving truth, the study was conducted with pictures of humans and dogs instead of humans and dogs *per se*. That lack is something Lacan would consider inevitable, since the subject is turned into a picture under the gaze of the other, since it is 'I' who shape and design myself for that gaze (Ma 2015, 133). "I am a picture" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 106), and the author of the picture is itself led by the Other (Ma 2015, 134). This author is present in the materials of scientific test procedure run with the photos. Here 'I' truly has become a picture, which the dog can read with the gaze of the Other, that Other which has already reduced 'I' into a picture. And if the asymmetries of the face are turned around as a mirror image, the bias on the dogs gazing, its direction, does not change, but the shift of the asymmetries on one's face in the dog's interpretation happen for the perceived subject (Racca et al. 2012, 5), making oneself substantially a picture. In this pictorial being, dwelling in the scopic field, where the "subject of representation" and "the gaze" meet or *intra-sect* on the image screen, "the gaze itself is screened by the eye" (Ma 2015, 133), being part of the picture and under the eye. "So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them" (Genesis 1:27).

If "God is love" (John 4:7-21), then to read it backwards in relation to dog, it would be 'evol', close to the word 'evolve'. Dog "evolved unique human analogue communicative skills during the course of domestication and through sharing our ecological niche", where love and affection is hormonally produced to a certain extent by oxytocin, associated with dogs' human-directed social skills (Persson et al. 2017, 85). Peripheral oxytocin concentrations increase in humans and dogs as a result of interaction, where mainly central oxytocin influences behaviour (ibid., 86). That is, the love is located in the *extimacy*, in the midst, as Augustine's God. The locus of love is in the relation, while it emerges in the bodies. 'God' is abstract and so is 'dog', a uniformed variation categorised as a 'breed'. They are intra-connected relations rather than individual subjects.

The anamorphosis of a dog, in simple terms, is 'breeding'. Dog breeding, to some extent, moves beyond the pleasure principle, and the dog breed becomes the playground for *jouissance*, the unreasoning desire with a singular aim in accordance to shape, size or other qualities, breaching the border of tolerance and changing into pain. The evolutionary transformation led by the desired features co-constituted by environmental species-specific preferences are replaced by deformation. In some cases it is a behavioural pattern of retrieving, guarding or chasing, while in others it is aesthetic. Softness, smallness, hairlessness or large

eyes and flat noses. The human subject's desire has been attached to the very genome of the dog and the practicing of human–dog relations, making it an object, a display of certain features, or pragmatic instrument for a predestined aim, such as tracking, retrieving or guarding. As in *The Ambassadors*, death is painted into their very fabric of existence, but unlike the self-destruction thesis might claim, the death drive is the very essence that overcomes and passes beyond the limits of a living organism. This is how a breed of dogs becomes something besides a living subject, *a* breed, *a* carrier of various characters beyond their life expectancy compromising their health and wellbeing.

Even if this surplus *jouissance* transferred to an animal makes the animal run into heavy traffic, not aimlessly but as pure aim, it may undo the individual but not the species or the breed, which with certain variants carries on a standard imposed on its environment and its structure. This attachment of surplus *jouissance* does not unify into one standard but rather establishes a variety of parameters for a unified specificity, differentiated desires, like the seven deadly sins incarnated. Therefore, we have a multiplicity of dog breeds, a greater variation than would exist without the human factor, but the distinctions between these breeds multiply as well and expose the animals to more standard characteristic requirements. *Objet a* is a profound part in the very essence of the organism, as much as a mirror image no matter how distorted by the concave and convex surface of the glass is derived from the dog in front of it. This fusion only emerges as a confusion brought out in us by the peculiar characteristics if we do not perceive the organism as the very playground of our desires and see that their evolution is not only due to their subjective desires or determining biology but also the human desire that surpasses the extent of pleasure sought from others.

> *And that self is made by old Bog or God [...] But the not-self cannot have the bad, meaning they of the government and the judges and the schools cannot allow the bad because they cannot allow the self.*
>
> *— A Clockwork Orange by Anthony Burgess, 1962.*

"The importance of a fetish to a pervert is unthinkable unless we take correctly his desire into account, as the stain is unreadable unless we look at it from a standpoint distorted by the subject's desires" (Ma 2015, 132). Therefore, the only way to understand the formation of the objects of desire and the subjectivities conducting them is to adopt the vision provided by film as an effect of a corporeal presence in the scene. The fusion of the *objet petit a* to an object, whether it is a breed of dogs or a painted picture, is described by Žižek. In the context of a picture, *objet petit a* cannot be discovered from the subject but is instead placed into the object, and the gaze is the place in the picture where the object is looking at you: the frame

of the photograph, where the gaze is already coded into the content of the picture (Žižek 2009, 12).

In a way, this complete fusion in the photograph is what makes it the *objet petit a*. Is that not, in a totally materialistic sense, the surplus of 'to see', the separation of gaze from the eye, where the projection that momentarily takes place on the back of the eye is enclosed by a physical object? A photograph, when perceived as an image from the front in two dimensions, presents a perfectly ordered manifestation of the world, considered real, proof and evidence, without a distorted stain. When it is placed in the third dimension, where the viewer can freely move around it, it does not reveal another side of the composition within the picture but becomes distorted completely, narrowing into a thin line and finally turning, in a sense of the contents of the representation in the image, into nothingness. That shift reveals that the complete photograph has become a stain and is therefore a surplus of seeing, the *objet petit a*, where its totalising power urging to 'see' or, when turned around into a relation, 'to be seen' is also its downfall. It is total and nothing. It lacks the ability to negotiate. It appears real, as the actual seeing happens only from a precise place, and its forceful aspect distorts and diminishes from the slightest alteration and completely disappears when approached from the opposite direction, its backside. Photographing captures the object of desire 'to *see*', and the photograph is the object of desire 'to *be* seen', literally turning the vision into a physical object.

> To be seen—to be seen—is to be [...] penetrated.
>
> — *The Handmaid's Tale by Margaret Atwood, 1985.*

And then again, the photographs still lure, compel and convince us, and they still take place. Let us place ourselves in a situation where a family is placed in front of a television set. It is likely that only one of the family members can face the television image directly from the front. The distortion, a flattening of the image, is reduced when looked at from farther away, which affects the experience of the size of the represented phenomena on the screen. Still, the family members are tempted and willing to follow together the same news, advertisements, movies and shows. We adjust ourselves to the gaze when perceiving images on flat surfaces from the side. We fix our point of view to accommodate for the narrowing dimension, following its lure. I see only from one point, but the family sees the television image from multiple perspectives, negotiating and nullifying the distortion caused by locating it in the third dimension and therefore being collectively perceived as real.

To understand the composition of the lure provided by the photograph, "the interest the subject takes in his own split is bound up with that which determines it [...] a privileged object, the object a" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 83). We must look to

the act and apparatus of photographing. In a photographic document, the physical absence of the photographer is a lack. We see the gaze of the past subject, but the presence of the subject is behind, not in front of, the gazed-at object. This is also the non-signifying element of the *objet petit a*. The perceivable object as a photograph, which is cast in front of us, is not ours to choose but is the privilege of the gaze, a gaze where the domain of vision has been integrated into the field of desire (ibid., 85), the vision and desire of those who cast the object for our eyes to see. That is why "The gaze in question is certainly the presence of others as such" (ibid., 84). In a very material sense the subjectivity of the maker is transferred to the viewing subject via the gaze in a "geometral dimension of the vision" (ibid., 92). Lacan describes a painting: "due to some moment of reflections on the part of the painter, of showing us that, as subjects, we are literally called into the picture, and represented here as caught" (ibid.). Our desire is represented in the picture and revealed only when enacted by our performance, when adapting this specific viewing point. Lacan states that a painter does not wish to be seen himself, but that he creates a painting for the eye to look it. In this process of looking, we gaze because we are lured by the medium to see what it is that it wishes us to see by covering what is actually there (Geiger 2003). That said, in the denial of 'actual' and 'illusionary', I would restate that what is covered is *what* or *how else* is there.

$$\alpha$$

... *a*nd so, we have come to discover that the stain, *a*, is the last character on our journey, and it might be the first one as well, since it is a stowaway by definition. It is a mark, sign, track or trace left by the other in the self, 'I'. It is what is left by the gaze. It is a distortion and a lure, sensation or momentum that has left or is left by the organ (φ), separated by distance ($-$) that alters and distorts its signification into anamorphosis. They are in the one and the same but not themselves one and the same; as *The Ambassadors* and the skull, they are in the same fabric, on the same surface, but taken from a different standpoint, in another dimension. It is what is added into the very fabric of our existence, our subjectivity, while simultaneously being the most alien, the small other dwelling in us, encountered in objects and objectifying us in that intra-relation. It is the signifying singularity of

plurality, therefore something that is not a matter of fact. As God is referred to as the beginning, alpha, and the ending, omega, so the *a* and Ω owe their characteristics to one another, their relation. In principle, *a* is for Ω what *emergence* is for *heritage*, what *punctum* is for *studium* (Barthes 2000, [1980], 26–28, 32), standing for in/differentiable con/fusion, like the portmanteaus *extimacy* and *holon*.

In a camera, the 'objective' is the optical element that gathers light from the object being observed and focuses the light rays to produce a real image. The term bends to 'objectivity' as the opposite of subjectivity and furthermore 'objectives', the goals of desire. Photographing holds all these qualities. According to Sontag, "Photographs furnish evidence […] a more innocent, and therefore more accurate, relation to visible reality than do other mimetic objects" (Sontag 2005 [1973], 3), and simultaneously "photographs alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at and what we have a right to observe. They are a grammar and, even more importantly, an ethics of seeing" (ibid., 1). Sontag claims that the act of photographing places oneself into a certain relation with the world and appropriates the object that is photographed. This act relates knowledge to power (ibid., 2), the ability to evaluate and define and then to (re)present, or in other words to tell to others what is out there. Such connection between knowledge and power is significant, and it is also the point where photographing becomes political: "In deciding how a picture should look, in preferring one exposure to another, photographers are always imposing standards on their subjects" (ibid., 4).

Barthes underlines the difference of the arts of photography and cinema as being based on the cinematic continuing flow as opposed to the pose in the photograph. Still, for him cinema derives from photography, and the photograph is its raw material (Barthes 2000 [1980], 78, 89). Especially in cinéma vérité, something has not simply "passed in front of this same tiny hole" (ibid., 78) of the camera: it is intensively followed by the camera's movement. The captivating gaze is as much present in cinema as it is in a photographic event. A photograph is abstracted from the world, and a film is an abstraction of photographs.

Whether the question is about wishful seeing, the gaze of the other or the *objet a*, the self, the perception of the self and the perceiving self are all influenced by negotiated and forceful standards, taking us back to where we started our inquiry, the canon of judgement. As we recognise the violent power that, while claiming the objective truth of life, actually forces living things into objects of truth, we learn to understand the full materiality of the term canon not only as a measuring standard but also as a material instrument holding that measure and compelling it. The term canon origins from the Greek '*kanon*', a rod used for measuring (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020n). And, what else can one do with a rod, if not hit, whip or push and poke with it, whether to enforce knowledge on a disobedient

student in a classroom, lead a lost sheep back to the flock or defend this flock against predatory wolfs circling around it. From a concrete physical object, it later became more abstract, a 'standard', known in arts such as music and, let us say, as a *theolegal* measure, in church law (ibid.). Canons can be tailored for a specific use or can become recognised as such retrospectively. It is an authorised, legitimate practice that is therefore repeated and becomes dominant. As we have discovered from earlier examples, the change of the material object into a material standard or an abstract concept does not undo but rather expands its power beyond its physical limits, incorporating the bodies of others, shaping, guiding, protecting, maintaining and violating them.

> *I want you to see the corpse. We've got to get a shot of it.*
>
> *— Blow-up by Michelangelo Antonioni, 1966.*

Where then lies the material genealogy of the instruments and practice of photography? Where is the 'rod' or its 'measure'? Besides the one already mentioned, the primal technology of the dark room, the 'camera obscura', there is another linguistic, practical and applied linkage, an analogy to hunting and guns. For Lacan, the gaze in itself terminates the movement, arrests and literally kills life (Lacan 1977 [1973], 117–118). The act of photographing, even though it is often understood as standing passive witness, and in some contexts even a pacifistic one, due to its capacity to reveal, for example, the horrors of war, shares the same acts, objects and language as the use of firearms, both in their general use and, especially, in their use in hunting. Loading, aiming and shooting are basic terms in using both the camera and a gun, and the telescopic sight on rifle is replaced with the viewfinder on a camera (Sontag 2005 [1973], 10–11). Also, the hunting term 'snapshot' is used in photography to describe a quick shot of a rapidly moving target (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020o). The snapshot is common in hunting birds with a shotgun, the two rapid shots, one instantly after another, enabled by double-barrelled guns. The 'camera-gun', where a regular camera is connected to a wooden frame resembling the dimensions of a gun, was designed to enable quicker and more precise aim in photographing flying birds (Clifford 1938). Here the camera is adjusted to the performance and structure of its predecessor, to reach the same level of aim with more semantic goals. There is certainly a linguistic and technological genealogy combining hunting and photographing, not least due to the shared centre of their aim. Following Barthes, the central organ is not the eye but the finger, which is linked to the trigger of the lens (Barthes 2000 [1980], 15). In the case of WSPA's video campaign, the heritage of killing wild animals emerges in the methods and mediums of animal rights activism on semi-domesticated animals.

Whether or not one should consider the act of hunting as an act of violence returns to the definition of violence, the legitimacy of the act in the eyes of those who are aware of it. In hunting, as well as in the act of slaughtering, the goodness of the conducted act depends on how 'clean' the act is; in practice, how quick, precise and painless the act of killing is. The animal can be killed 'well' or 'badly'. Therefore, a failure in slaughter or wounding an animal in hunting could change the status of the conductor and the nature of the event from justified into violent. Jan Guillou, the Swedish author of the book *Ondskan* ('Evil') published in 1981, reflects on the issue in an interview by depicting the act of killing as the essential attraction in hunting. The person who claims to go hunting to enjoy the landscape, fresh air and company, could just as easily choose a basket for picking mushrooms (see Håfström 2003). There is simply a spoken evasion of the pleasure of conducting a clean shot (ibid.): an act of killing, violent or not. This principle of pleasure, or manifestation of inner drive, goes beyond moral good and evil.

The same question emerges in the context of 'sight safaris', where instead of shooting the animals with a gun they are shot with a camera. Barthes notes that photography transforms subject into object (Barthes 2000 [1980], 13), producing death while trying to preserve life where "the paradigm is reduced to a simple click" (ibid., 92). Instead of hunter's trophies, the activists' aims produce photographs, which in both cases originate from the dead animal. A trophy and a photograph. Both hunting and photographing may make a living, but the way they produce and portray the animal is the impression of life in death. The relation of the binaries is very much the same as in *The Ambassadors*: one approach reveals the vitality, prosperity and power eternalised by the oil-paint on canvas, while the other is the expression of death, the predestined course despite its current appearance, printed on the same matter, emerging from the same surface. A trophy, such as the head of a deer, does not attempt to create an impression of a carcass, and neither is the hunter looking for a carcass, a dead animal, but for a living thing. On the other hand, a living severed head nailed up and hanging from a wall is, within the frame of the currently known world, a pure impossibility. The same goes for the mobility, this living impression that does not even raise and lower its chest while breathing. Its movement is completely arrested by the shot. So too for a photograph, which captures the impression of a living animal while permanently arresting its posture and deflecting its movement. The artificial eye of the camera obscura turns the protective eye, witnessing eye and maintaining eye into the imprisoning room of a slaughter house, a destructive "evil eye" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 117–118). If the photograph has the power to terminate life, the film has the power to capture the living thing. In the film representing mistreatment and slaughter, the animal is chained to an endless loop of suffering by slicing it to slides, following one another, on a film reel.

Even multiplying the figure of a living animal so that it can therefore be shot several times, the practice still does not escape ethical paradigms. It simply takes new forms. As a material practice, its form cannot escape its material causes. As an example, both in hunting expeditions and sight safaris aiming to capture large predators, the animal needs to be lured into the aim. That is done by using a carcass to hold the animal in sight and make it appear on the spot regularly. Such feeding is problematic, since it manipulates the territorial behaviour of the animal, making them more used to humans, and enables later conflicts by attracting wild animals among human dwellings on routes where they are considered a threat (see Penteriani et. al. 2017, 173–175).

'Christmas cruelty' constructs an event of violence where the animals are the victims, audience is the witness and the reindeer herders are the performers of violence. On the other hand, to "photograph people is to violate them, by seeing them as they never see themselves" and "it turns people into objects that can be symbolically possessed" (Sontag 2005 [1973], 10). Also, the question how the footage was filmed and collected from the different locations raises a moral dilemma of trust between the filmmaker and the filmed people. The close shots and recording practices are not performed in public (for example inside the slaughter house) and require the cameraman to be and act as one of those being filmed, in a sense to perform mimicry, which Lacan emphasises is to be "exactly like the technique of camouflage practised in human warfare" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 99).

Even though the statement and comments in the report avoid condemning indigenous groups, and even though there are illegal (stabbing through the neck) and legal-but-harmful methods shown in the video, it does not offer a narrative or wider vision into the event which it represents. If the supplementing comments, which are mostly provided by readers, are ignored, the report represents herders as cruel animal torturers whose actions should be stopped as soon as possible. WSPA emphasises a division between the practice of indigenous (Sámi) and commercial reindeer herding, but it does not make any distinctions in the film footage or in the lead paragraphs. Even if the film would not cause economic losses or affect the livelihood of the people it depicts in any way, it makes a moral statement and defines them from outside of their daily lives, makes them see themselves as they never would otherwise, regardless of whether they accept what they see or not. It also fails to negotiate different worldviews through the viewfinder, different ontologies of deer and hunting when it comes to violence. The same stance may have completely different interpretations, even when the outcome is seemingly the same, just like the pose which the deer takes while aimed at; it either emerges as a willing sacrifice or a tactic of self-preservation (see Ingold 2002 [2000], 13–14), which translates into either generous lifegiving or violent life-taking.

Father, don't you see I'm burning?

— *The Interpretation of Dreams by Sigmund Freud, 2010 [1900], 513.*

If you don't see something, does it not exist? No harm in seeing.

— *The Grandmaster by Wong Kar-wai, 2013.*

The harm in seeing, the harm in ignorance and the harm in refusing to see. In a futile attempt to come up with concluding remarks, I have to return to a more personal conversation that I had with my grandmother years back. The talk concerned her childhood home, a common agrarian household that hosted many different farm animals. We came to the topic of slaughter. I asked how the slaughter was conducted. She responded that it was done by her father without assistance from outsiders. She then continued that the children were not allowed to have a look or to peek while the slaughter took place, since according to her father, "The animal must be let to die in peace" because "it dies better that way". In this translation, I place great importance on using the word 'let' instead of 'left', with the moral distinction between 'letting' and 'leaving', as to be 'left alone' or 'let alone', where the Finnish word '*antaa*' would also directly translate into 'giving'. Whether the wisdom in these words is actually in protecting the children's eyes from seeing the killing and death of an animal or to protect the animal from the eyes of outsiders at the moment when it dies is uncertain. As it often goes, it might serve both purposes.

We have already noted that the sheer presence of a surplus, whether the stench of an unknown person or a reflection caused by a convex lens, may distress the animal in such a way that is not undone by killing the animal—it may remain as a bad taste in the meat. A fearful and painful death leaves a bitter taste, the 'bad' incarnated in the flesh. Another question concerns the difference between 'being there' and staring. That would be a difference between an eye as an organ and a gaze with the power of an evil eye; it would mean letting one's vision pass rather than drill into.

To understand this idea, I must continue the conversation I had years back with my grandmother's younger sister on the topic of the children's participation in animal slaughter in such tasks as mixing the blood drained out of the slaughtered animal. That is to say, there never really was much of a discussion; it was rather an evasion. Our shared dialect allowed her to respond without addressing anything directly, but doing so gave away a certain truth, that this is a highly, highly sensitive topic, and even questions that were addressed directly to ease the memories out were intrusive. Where is the ethics in such an inquiry, and what purpose does it serve? Some things had to be done, even against one's will, and against one's character as an animal lover. If it was not a carnival, it was not carnage either. If it seems that this insight is left veiled, I will state the following: there is a shared

common understanding that animals, if harmed, wounded or dying, avoid contact and seek shelter from the eyes of others, and this fact led to their father's approach of *carrying on,* of performing slaughter rather than providing a performance of a slaughter. In one sense, it was not to be considered an act of violence because it was lacking witnesses and therefore also the performer and a victim. It possibly provided the animal with the cherished word, 'peace'.

In light of the previous observations, it can be claimed that the heritage of violence in the presented WSPA case study emerges first within the representation where we become aware of something that was once invisible to us but is now animated and violated in front of us. Second, the representation performs as an intervention but also as a non-intervention into the represented practices by stating that these acts should be stopped but also reproducing them in a film without trying to stop them during the actual filming. The video has also a potentiality to cumulate as hurt and harm for the herders who are not present in the film or participating in the ill practices of herding. Third, the method and language of photographic documentation derives from hunting, which aims to cause the death of its targeted object. Fourth, the issue needs to be brought out here more carefully. Barthes argues that the photographer's second sight consists of 'being there' (Barthes 2000 [1980], 47). To clarify the importance of this claim, one must see the performative nature of the used apparatus and the phenomena produced while measuring. For Barad, 'to see' one must actively intervene (Barad 2007, 51), which leads to a situation where the measurement necessarily disturbs the object (ibid., 107). Barad's apparatus is not simply the observing instruments but the boundary-making practices and material reconfigurations of the world, which come to matter (ibid., 140). This locus is where the ontology, epistemology and ethics merge into *ethico-onto-epistem-ology*, because in this process of 'becoming', knowing and being are inseparable, and that is why they also emerge as a matter of ethics (ibid., 185). The presence of the camera operator in the situation where the animals are handled, coming into close range with a strange instrument compared to those used in herding, can cause more stress to the animals and herders and increase the risk of failure in handling the animals, adding to their suffering.

The documentation process known as 'Christmas cruelty' is not a neutral or even politically activist representation of the state of relations, but rather a violent performance of technology-mediated human–animal relations. It does not only hand over something, but takes it as well. It takes a stand on the issue, it takes a toll on the viewer and furthermore it takes place in the core of the making of the event—it takes part in the happening. Since the hand gives and takes, it is not 'clean', but has left its fingerprint all over the scene, manufacturing a phenomenon by "agential intra-actions" (Barad 2007, 139). It does not deliver us an arctic human–animal relation as such, but a social representation of a kind, determined by a specific discursive-material genealogy. These genealogies include the aim

for humane treatment driven by the means and matters of documenting social injustice and the horrors of war on film, applied almost directly to the evaluation of standards for slaughter procedures in the closed quarters of industrialised food markets.

> [“] Which is why it was eventually decided to cut through the whole tangled problem and breed an animal that actually wanted to be eaten and was capable of saying so clearly and distinctly. And here I am.” [...] “I'll be very humane.”
>
> — The Restaurant at the End of the Universe by Douglas Adams, 1980.

> If Slaughterhouses had glass walls, everyone would be vegetarian.
>
> — Sir Paul McCartney.

If our perception of the animal and human–animal relation is so greatly obscured by the closed space of a camera, what happens if we turn the apparatus around? In contrast to Barthes, I believe that the genealogy of the 'dark passage', the camera obscura, should not be ignored but, in one aspect, emphasised and furthermore compared with the spatial ensemble of its anterior apparatus, the camera lucida, after which Barthes has named his critique on photography (Barthes 2000 [1989], 106). Instead of concealment and entrapment provided by a camera obscura's narrow passage of light, an instrument that enables hiding, intervening and intervention, how about the opposite? In the camera lucida, the light travels out in the open through a transparent prism and the depicted object is glanced at by facing down, drawn by hand on a surface, where the momentum of the drawn object is held by the objectified being/thing itself, not arrested by cutting it separate from the stream of light by a shudder. The difference between camera lucida and obscura is a paradigmatic shift similar to what Noëlie Vialles (1994) calls a shift from confusion to dissociation, which in that work concerns the development of the slaughterhouse.

Vialles describes how the slaughtering and butchery that took place in the open market places, fusing with mundane, societal and sacred spaces and activities, was removed outside the walls of the town into the abattoirs in 18th century France, transferring the blood shedding and people stained by it to closed, distanced and administrated whereabouts (Vialles 1994, 15–17). Richard Sale presents one such image, a number of hunted seals, in his book, declaring that “The Arctic is occasionally no place for the squeamish as this discarded group of heads from skinned seals indicates. But is it really so much worse than would be seen (but is more carefully hidden) at a slaughterhouse?” (Sale 2008, 579). What the WSPA's campaign and Sale's images both indicate is the change in the political economy,

where the demographic reformation alters the form of economic production due to its sheer volume. Slaughtering a reindeer on a fence for the family is different from the commercially manufactured, packed, distributed and sold meat that has led to the transport of the reindeer to slaughterhouses and backing them into trucks as seen in the video. The fact that the number of skinned seals is more than a few possibly indicates that the event is the result of a commercial hunt that includes exporting the seal-based products overseas. The question of whether the events have political importance emerges from the concealment or surfacing of the phenomenon, including the conducting bodies and collective powers present. The question at hand will be studied in terms of containers and surfaces (see Warnier 2009 [2006]), as one of *heritage* and *emergence*.

In the city of Richmond, British Columbia, Canada, a 16-metre-tall figure consisting of standard shipping containers was erected for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games in the attempt to tell the story of the local economy, people, heritage and natural environment through the means and matters of public art. The shape of the construction is meant to resembled an *inukshuk*, part of the traditional culture of the Inuit peoples of the Canadian Arctic. The *inukshuk*, according to the

art project, is "increasingly serving as a mainstream Canadian nation's symbol", where here its targeted message was to welcome the world. Comparable to its indigenous predecessors, it was pointing the direction to important location, the Richmond Olympic Oval and Richmond O Zone Celebration Site (Richmond.ca 2010).

Besides the shape of the statue, the containers directly relate to the place due to its role as a 'Gateway to British Columbia', having flight, shipping and road connections to the border, enabling Richmond's transportation and logistics industries and their distribution sector, which employs over 40,000 people. The construction was designed with high engineering standards partially to meet the ideals of sustainability by preserving and returning the containers to use after the Olympics. Detailed information of Richmond's *inukshuk* reveals it to be the outcome of regional history, the collective effort of skilled individuals, special equipment, land and economic subsistence. Its designed functions are to provide a recognisable point of reference, to direct movement, to contain substances and maintain togetherness (Richmond.ca 2010).

In this analysis, Richmond's *inukshuk* will operate as a paradigmatic setting and serve as a starting point and a finishing line. This is due to its identity as an intra-face between local, regional, national, international and global spaces, combining stationary and highly mobile qualities. It does not stand only as an important symbol but also, in its full materiality, as a practice that breaches and merges together with elements that are in the very core of the political economy. We will begin this journey not in space, but in time, before the establishment of standard shipping containers, to a spatial-temporal arrangement from where the form of the *inukshuk* is inherited.

"The basic insight that 'things matter' consequently applies just as much to colonial context as to any other situation [...] people organize their living spaces in practical terms and their views of how life should properly be lived" (van Dommelen 2009 [2006], 112). The Inuit peoples of the Canadian Arctic in pre-colonial times did not live in permanent settlements. Their livelihood was based on hunting and fishing, and the living conditions altered according to seasonal changes in the northern climate and due to the behaviour and migration of the animals. The form of community varied based on these changing circumstances. During the long winter, a number of Inuit families gathered together in camps and hunted seals for food, clothing and lamp oil. After winter the camps broke up into smaller hunting groups, often the size of a single family (Historica-Dominium Institute 2013 [renamed in 2013 Historica Canada]). During summer hunts, Inuit families built stone pile sculptures called *inuksuit* (ibid.), figures built to resemble human beings (Bournes 2000, 146).

The *inukshuk* (alternative spelling *inuksuk*, plural *inuksuit*) is a figure made of piled stones or boulders constructed to communicate. They are traditional and

integral to Inuit culture, with *inuk* meaning 'a human being' and *-suk* 'similar', as for *likeness* (Hivshu 2020). *Inukshuk* is understood in translations to mean 'to act in the capacity of a human' (Hallendy 2015 [2013]). *Inuksuit* have been found dating from 2400 to 1800 BCE in the Mingo Lake region of southwest Baffin Island (ibid.). Peter Irniq, Inuit cultural activist, describes *inuksuit* as land markers and foremostly signs of survival. Within Inuit the homeland it marks survival, a lifeline, by expressing the presence of the Inuit that have lived on that same area before (Irniq 2007). The key question regards how the stones, or rather their figurations, 'act', and furthermore what 'capacity' both ties them to the human and, as it seems to be the very element which enables their consistency, their being in the arctic landscape. The answer is to be discovered when we have a more careful look, *inukshuk* by *inukshuk*, detail by detail, rock by rock, around, behind and through the stone, to discover their *intra-relation*.

Inuksuit are built by placing one stone upon another, or are composed of a single upright stone, or take the form of cairn-like structures created by stacking boulders. The locally available stone largely determines the shape, size and method of the built *inukshuk*. Irregular and rough igneous rocks and flat boulders with varying thickness enable multiple shapes, whereas the rounded boulders can only be stacked into a pyramid (Hallendy 2015 [2013]). The height of an *inukshuk* varies and may extend to over two meters, which often indicates a collective effort to build it (Historica-Dominium Institute 2013). It is therefore the very materialisation of a collective and the indication of its capacity and agency.

These stone figures are known to have multiple meanings and functions based on their individual structures, and their names alter accordingly from the *inukshuk*. *Inuksummarik* or *inuksukjuaq* consists of boulders with a more massive base-to-height ratio, serving mainly as directional aids. *Nalunaikkutaq*, the 'deconfuser', is a single upright stone placed on its end, marking an important place. *Tikkuuti* are pointers indicating the direction to be taken, made out of triangular-shaped rock laid flat on the ground or rocks laid in a straight line, scaling down in size, constituting a narrowing-down shape. *Inuksummarik* or *inuksukjuaq*, as main coordination points, are larger than average in size and can therefore be detected from a distance (Hallendy 2015 [2013]).

Inuksuit, with the means that could be called an *incorporeal presence* of the passed bodies, can carry important messages for maintaining the bodies of others. They may tell the: "depth of snow; safe or dangerous crossing places; where ice is dangerous in spring; the deep or shallow side of a river; where there is plenty of game or where fish spawn; where food or supplies are cached; where there are good hunting grounds for seal, walrus or whale; and where there are hauling-out places for seal and walrus, or landing sites for boats and kayaks" (Hallendy 2015 [2013]). A *tuktunnutiit* marks good caribou hunting grounds with antlers, scapula, driftwood or walrus skulls. *Inuksuit* on the southwest coast of Baffin Island are

seasonally erected and dismantled to warn about dangerous currents beneath thin ice. The major *inuksuit* with much more permanent nature may also function as message centres with additional configurations known by a more limited group of people, such as hunting partners or family members. As an example, a lost harpooned seal in shallow water may be marked with aligned stones pointing the spot for later retrieving (ibid.).

Where the *inuksuit* signal caribou hunting places to lead the hunters, they may also herd the caribou towards the hunters to certain killing sites. This is done with caribou drive systems made of *inuksuit* stone lines and cairns, forming for example a single-line or V-shaped funnel known from southern Victoria Island, Nunavut, utilising and manipulating the aspects of landscape and caribou behaviour (Brink 2005, 1). Furthermore, in some traditions the *inuksuit* functioned as a hideout while ambushing the caribou. In the caribou trails the animals could not tell the difference between an inanimate stone figure and the woman and children starting to make alarming noises behind them from their hideout. The caribou escaping from the suddenly animated stone-human figures erected from the ground run to the end of the trail and are trapped by the hunters with bows and arrows (Kid World Citizen 2013). In a way, this strategy multiplies the number of participating bodies in the demanding ambush and hunting task, including also the women and children. With the *inuksuit*, their number extends even beyond their biological bodies, since their presence is now occupying the stones as echoes. These echoes also add another axis in the relations between the incorporeal bodies in play. *Inuksuit* that have worked as signs of survival, indicating the localised temporal axis of the presence of predecessors in the place and in the tasks, now extend to the axis of spatiality. The *inuksuit* not only signal that others from the past were involved in the substance as holders of knowledge but also actively participate in the hunt as figures in several locations, not through but with the bodies of the human participants.

Niungvaliruluit have a larger gap, a 'window', in their structure, which together with other windows forms a sightline when looked through. The alignment may proceed below the horizon. They can also act as astronomical sight lines pointing the way to a mid-winter constellation, the pole star and the mid-winter moon (Hallendy 2015 [2013]). They may aid in orientating oneself to the time during the polar night. Besides serving as a navigation aid, the aligned windows not only provide a map for already experienced dwellers but also provide a physical frame to attach one's thoughts to familiar places, to homes far away from the traveller's dwellings (ibid.). While this sounds like quite an abstract purpose, it does not fall far from that of a pocketed photograph, a letter kept or a recorded video call from a research vessel via satellite to a family member far, far away.

It thus provides the capacity to find one's way in unfamiliar territory like a compass—or to mark a trail, as people travelling across the open tundra could see an *inukshuk* in the distance (Bournes 2000, 146)—together with the alignment of stars. These different forms and functions of the *inuksuit* relate with the ways in which the celestial bodies have aided in seafaring and geography. The tundra, with non-existent treetops, is limited only by the horizon, just as the starlit sky. As figurated points of reference, *inuksuit* appear to be the *terrestrial bodies* of the Arctic landscape, enclosing and opening it up, overcoming distance and internalising externalities.

The gap in the *inukshuk* serves as a lack. It is a lack in the construction like a hole in the wall, meaning that it has no matter in itself while it still manifests something substantial. In its lacking, it provides the opportunity to see, and not only to see but also to *see through*, in both meanings of visual perception and of surviving. In both cases, the act is enabled by framing the land, landscaping it without physical manipulation except for the piling up of stones, using the careful manoeuvring of its perception. This nothingness in the core of the *niungvaliruluit* is therefore the lead for the desire, providing the framed goal for its fulfilment. And while it surpasses the distance with the reach of the gaze, it closes into the frame of the desire sought in the other, whether a seal, a fish or another person, and by the effect of *trompe l'œil* it minuscules them when the panoramic view is provided with a flattening frame. This framing necessitates the emergence of an object, something that is cut off from the surroundings, constituting the small other, *petit a*, placed to and from the landscape. Even though it provides a visual pathway and aimed objective, it remains still a non-signifying element, where the hunted or captured animals may remain imperceivable from a distance and under the ice and snow cover.

The window in *niungvaliruluit* abstracts the concrete by cutting off the space between the body-organ and the object of desire, placing our gaze on the landscape while allowing it as an object, a desire sought in the other, to enter our eye, becoming the small other in us. By following this line of thought, the *inuksuit* have the characteristics of Ω, where the total landscape withholds the collective subconscious—that which cannot be seen, remembered or vocalised but which nevertheless sets a baseline for the living. It characterises the *heritage* in the land below, *sub*, which *emerges*, stone by stone, becoming *conscious*. And if it is structured like language, then we can approach the landscape as having the same capacity as language. This is how the land knows, how it remembers and how it speaks. They are like the hieroglyphs, alphabets or stars, which do not form a meaning or a message alone but do so in-their-midst, translating the land into something readable, passing time, seasons and generations, that surpass the knowledge and skills of so-called individual body, oneself.

"Times are tough, huh, Bud?"

My mind must be going off. It's Rocker! I'm sure I heard that dog talk!

— The Talking Dog by Carl Barks, 1953.

Whereas "Capability" Brown adjusted grammar to landscape planning, Abram describes how the landscape, its dwellers and elements, speak to us. According to Abram's narration, a Zuñi elder focusing her eyes on a cactus' printed marks, with Abram and his company following her example, could hear it speaking with words, bringing out scene and experiences from the lives of others (Abram 1997 [1996], 131). Abram argues that the alphabets and writing derived from this animistic reading of the surroundings has been lost or rather enfolded and blocked by letters and words that now hold this power and allows us to enter the world (ibid., 131–132).

Brown inflicts the land and its descendants with the characteristics of that language: letters, punctuations and markings. In both examples, the environmental entities and characteristics can speak, can be read or heard of and spoken to; or they can be grammatically corrected, deducing, subsuming and subjecting them from and into a discourse. While both examples involve capacitating language in relation to the environment, there is a major difference. Where Brown imposes language onto the land, Abrams is closer to suggesting a dialogue with environmental entities due to their recognised capacity to speak, if not being spoken to. Brown's cultivated language does materialise in the land, so it is not left unheard, but it does not ask or negotiate: it simply demands.

From ethnographic studies on the functions of the *inukshuk*, it appears that the stones can speak to people when arranged in a certain way, just as letters need to be arranged to form speech. Then again, with whose voice they speak is another question. It is uncertain whether they are emphasising their own existence and influence or are rather simply mediating, repeating a given message that their own material articulation affects but which they do not really understand or own, only record and repeat. Therefore, they are used by language if they are not using it by themselves. Among the Inuit, the stones can be recognised as speech, and it does have a dialect as well. Certain messages are only accessible to hunters or members of a certain family. The dialect is thus one used among a specific 'profession' or within a certain locality.

While we discuss the ways in which language holds a power relation to the land, the agency of the land comes into question. To be able to act would, according to one approach, suggest that agent has to be alive. When it comes to linguistics, Ingold describes a conversation between an anthropologist, Alfred Irvin Hallowell, and an elderly man of the Ojibwa people. Hallowell had learned that there is formal distinction between animate and inanimate nouns in the Algonkian family

of language. He therefore addressed the elder man with a question, asking whether all the stones around are alive. The man, after perceiving them, responded, "No! But *some* are" (Ingold 2002 [2000], 96, emphasis original). The confusion of the response was due to the fact that the categorisation of Western linguistics, not articulated by the Ojibwa themselves, failed to capture the difference not of grammar but of ontology (ibid., 97). Therefore, the question had to be rephrased: how were some of the stones alive and some not?

Ingold emphasises that in the Western tradition of thought, "life is a qualifying attribute of objects", a world consisting of "things-in-themselves […] without regard to their positioning and involvement within wider fields of relations" (Ingold 2002 [2000], 96). For the Ojibwa, the cases where attributes of the living have emerged from stones is contextualised to their close involvement with people, making their animacy a property of experience in accordance with their positioning, including persons as "foci of power". In other words, "the power concentrated in persons enlivens" (ibid., 97) the stones, the stone being alive instead of a living thing, treating entities rather as verbs than nouns, which is common in Ingold's analysis. While Ingold's presentation of the animacy of artefacts is closely bound up with the lives of persons and an ontology wherein life is not a property but condition (ibid.), in a materialistic account it could be said that a stone lent it power to a person and is *an sich* no more powerful than the stone without the person, where the stone holds the power for a human to build shelter and to harness other native and natural powers. Here the understanding of co-constitution requires that the attributes of living or power do not consider a person to be a person without a stone, to pick up, to throw, to cut, to build, to stand on and to make into one's own image.

To understand the *inukshuk* as an expression of how "man commenced designing [...] to translate his though into matter" (Layton 2009 [2006], 30) is a useful starting point while moving away from the representative approach, in which *inuksuit* would be purely understood as symbolic and artistic expressions, into a performative and agential understanding. *Inukshuk*, in its full material presence, becomes instead of a statue an intra-active part of the landscape, directing and defining agency, not only overcoming geometrical distances of the physiologically limited sensory perceptions of the body by using material culture as an "extension of the senses" (Spyer 2009 [2006], 125) but also furthermore overcoming the temporalities of asynchronous bodily presence. An art object, according to Alferd Gell, can extend its maker's or user's agency (Layton 2009 [2006], 31), highlighting the art's role not as representative or expressive technique but as transferred enskillment.

Translating thought into matter does not mean simply making a material construction based on a projection of a blueprint within one's head onto material. It is rather to see the matter as a thought. Instead of a mere object, it is a container of the subject's intellectual agency that has made it, containing traces of its creators' or co-producer's presence, which it holds within the movements of the eye and

hand. This thought is not be perceived as representation of a thought. As much as the thought takes on matter, the matter forms a thought, demanding the design, giving the thought something to think with, the eye to reflect on and the hand to handle, occupying the mind, tiring the eye and hardening the hand. And then again, they are moving along, embodied and performed in relation to the surrounding landscape, where the agency is not located in the *inukshuk* or the body but in-their-midst, leading through them into a certain kind of movement.

How do the stones as *inukshuk* incorporate power, whether that power is harnessed from people or enables them with power? Examples have already been raised, such as the way that the *inukshuk*, serving as a 'passive' structure sheltering people from a wind in an open landscape (Historica-Dominium Institute 2013), could become actively working bodies in a hunt (Kid World Citizen 2013). Patricia Spyer, building on the works of David Howes and Nancy Munn, states that artefacts may serve as extensions of the senses, projecting prioritised body parts or virtually extending an embodied subject's space-time (Spyer 2009 [2006], 125). This conclusion does not necessarily need to concern only bodily decorations or ceremonial exchanges; it takes place in relation to the *inuksuit* as well. A window prioritises the eyes and extends the vision by focusing it in a specific destination. As mentioned above, the ancestors occupy the temporal axis in the historical *inuksuit* while in the spatial axis the sensuous perception multiplies the expected source of the vocal sounds from the human bodies to the stone bodies. That understanding comes close to Spyer's description of the "material complexes, networks, bodily conducts and sensescapes extending out from and accommodating among embodied subjects and sensuous things" (ibid.).

But how about the phenomenon of power as power between people, which is the question lying at the heart of political science? Is there a meaning and importance beyond the immediate and instrumental use of the *inuksuit* that would rather express not only the individual humans performing in the landscape but also how they are in relation to one another, as the people, an indigenous nation? That question takes us further into the social intra-action provided by material culture and then to another axis besides the horizontal connectedness between the people, a vertical one that provides a hierarchical structure, privileging some bodies over the others. This hierarchy differs from the previously stated extended agency of individuals through objects, where material culture is a transferring of bodily and sensory elements, in the sense that the social is understood as something that is shared between a party of two or more. Other social elements construct the collective and hierarchy, power relations among people and their limitations or privileges to the landscape and its resources.

The supporting study for this understanding is presented by Robert Layton concerning *Kula*. *Kula* are valuables exchanged between leading men in the Trobriand Islands of the Pacific, and these objects were associated with their

power, making them, in Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotic terms, *indexes* of one's bodily presence even when passed further on (Layton 2009 [2006], 31). Here the material objects are not only, to use Maria-Anne Dobres' definition of agency, an inter-subjective quality unfolding process of knowing, acting and being-in-the-world (ibid.). They are also a proof of collective effort, collectively shared norms, acknowledged connections between agents and the architecture of power materialising the hierarchy among them, with some having and others lacking access to certain resources and ways and forms of being. This is where a more neutral signpost suggesting 'direction' becomes 'directing', shifting from instrumental use into an expression of sovereign power.

How does power function with the *inukshuk*? What are the thresholds that limit its access to power and agency? The ethnographic approach lists a group of specific *inuksuit* that, in one way or another, are beyond common access. *Angaku'habvik* are used for the initiation of shamans in the Keewatin region and kept at a safe distance. Shamans hold a special status in relation to the environmental phenomena, in their reading and control of it. Similarly, spiritual possession is held by *sakkabluniq* and *tunillarvik*, where the latter is given gifts for protection. Where their power extends, in Western conception, beyond the natural towards supernatural, that same beyondness emerges in the *Inuksullarik*, an ancient *inukshuk* on southwest Baffin Island that is believed by the Inuit to have been built by their predecessors, the *Tuniit*, taking it beyond ancestral heritage. They are respected even though their possible function may remain unfamiliar (Hallendy 2015 [2013]). Here material agency goes beyond the functional use. The intra-actions with it are not so much conscious as they are subconscious. What may be achieved or enacted with the ancient and sacred *inuksuit* goes beyond their comprehended instrumentalised use, which does not undo their influence. As Lacan states in his public lecture in 1972 as a definition for the unconscious: "they don't know that they know" (Connolly 2016). 'I' may not know, but the Other in me knows. I may hold it, but I do not comprehend it. Therefore, it is holding me rather than the other way around. These constructions have remained as signs of those that have been there before, shaping and becoming part of the substructure of the landscape that they do not occupy anymore horizontally as humans. Archeologically, they have become spatio-temporally vertical with such depth that they are not perceivable or comprehensible. Their presence in the topography of the landscape emerges in the ancient *inuksuit*, from which their influence is more likely emergent vertically than horizontally, where the material traces of their lives are under the ground level and above it in the form of the *inuksuit*. In the presented line of thought, practical instruments have turned into symbols that hold and grant access to something beyond comprehension, a genealogy of privileged bodies, collectives and substances, vertical rather than horizontal—in other words, a form comparable to the power of a sovereign.

The term, sovereign has its etymological root in late 13th century Old French '*soverain*', relating to the Latin '*super*', literally meaning 'over' (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020p). The others are subjected to the one over them. To understand the function of a sovereign power, we have to look into the functioning of the body of the sovereign. Jean-Pierre Warnier gives an anthropological example from the highlands of western Cameroon, a kingdom in which the technology of power involves the mobilisation of sensory-affective-motor conducts, containers and contents (Warnier 2009 [2006], 188). To withhold such capacity, the king had to have more than one body. He therefore has three bodies: the city, the palace and the skin. The 'skin' in the local language covers the same meaning as the 'self', indicating the king's own biological skin (ibid., 189). Therefore, the king does not hold simply three separated bodies, but rather a three-layered body, the layers interior and exterior to each other. The layers further on multiply and overlap. The king's ample gown expands his 'skin', the door being linguistically the 'mouth' of his house, the house having a couch lined with leopard skins identified with the king, receiving his wife on that couch, making her 'full', containing his offspring, who in turn contain his heritage (ibid.).

The complexity of the king's bodies as space-within-a-space is comparable to that of the camera and the dark room, simulating the physical effect of the eye while having a human inside and a device held in a hand, capturing the outer substance projected inside as an object, a form of *extimacy* of spaces. This depicturing lets different temporally placed spatialities overlap and emerge simultaneously to reveal the full complexity of its heritage and how such enfolding reveals the full manipulative capacity of the instrument and practice on the categories that it both ridicules and produces. To put it poetically: *A human hides within an eye, to see close by what is outside, to draw it on a wall of a room by the hand that holds the room before one's eye, looking through, an eye behind an eye.*

Warnier differentiates the king's corporate containers, inalienable and sacred, from their alienable and profane containers, which besides the exchangeable 'goods' include the bodies of the people as well. The king's body as a material container possesses all the physical substances for the reproduction of his subjects. The king's bodily substances—breath, saliva and semen—are complemented by palm oil, raphia wine and camwood powder. Offerings on the previous kings' graves invest his own bodily substances and their extensions with ancestral life essence. He disseminates these substances further from his own body-container with his breath and speech directed to his subjects, spraying wine onto their skin from his mouth. Literally, matters are spoken to the subject when spilling out from the mouth (Warnier 2009 [2006], 189).

In classical Western political theology, Ernst Kantorowicz presents the famous argument of The King's Two Bodies in 1957. According to Kantorowicz's work, the King has in him two Bodies, a *Body natural*, and a *Body politic*. The *Body*

natural is mortal, subject to all infirmities and aging (Kantorowicz 1957, 7), a physiological and organic entity known as the human body. The *Body politic* on the other hand consists of policy and government, constituted for the direction of the people and the management of the public wealth. The imbecilities of the *Body natural* cannot invalidate or frustrate the *Body politic*. The King takes the land in his natural body, conjoining his *Body politics*, and the *Body politic* includes the *Body natural*, where the *Body natural* remains the lesser. A *Body natural* and a *Body politic* are together indivisible, and these two Bodies are incorporated in one Person to make one Body (ibid., 9). Kantorowicz highlights the fact that in medieval times, a sovereign was a concrete "organic or organological whole" (ibid. 270). It did not exist apart from its members, where *regnum* was not personified but bodified (ibid., 270–271). A sovereign person in his human body, therefore, is not an omnipotent individual with absolute power. A *Body natural*, as much as it is connected to the land, as a matter of fact is included in the land and a *Body politic*. The natural person as a King is subordinated to the very same power which one is using.

A more modern perception of a sovereign, the state, has the definitional qualifications of a permanent population and a defined territory according to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933. Therefore, it can be stated that there is no king without the people. The king acts in and through the bodies of the individuals, where his own body is one of the bodies at play in power. Sovereignty becomes apparent in the form of an act, which defines the relation between the body and land, in the sense of inclusion/exclusion, access/inhibition, recognition/non-recognition and preservation/desolation. The 'collective' is something rarely concretely present in a situation where it is represented as an abstraction and where its power is concretely performed. Another question is, how does the sovereignty shift from one *Body natural* to another after the physiological death, as from the king to the prince? How does a *Body politic* become *bodified*? How is the privileged connection between the body, land and the collective re-established and expressed?

To respond, we have to return to *kula* and *inukshuk*. Both have an ancestral quality. The graves of the old kings are part of the ritual played with substances, and the *inuksuit* that are believed to have been built before the Inuit culture form a temporal link in the landscape through generations and families. Due to this reason, when their instrumental functions have diminished, their symbolic value in social exchange increases. The concrete is abstracted, withholding and generalising the power relations established in the concrete material arrangement. A complicated enmeshment of relations are directed toward a certain artefact, horizontally extending on and over the landscape and vertically extending to the buried and erected bodies. This crossing establishes the inherited and immortal bodies of the sovereign, the emergence of the heritage, a hauntology. In Western political

theology, I claim, this crossing and joining of *Body politic* and *Body natural* is established in the sovereign insignia known as regalia.

Probably the most common forms of regalia among the sovereign are the crown, sceptre, sword, orb, mint and seal. Each of them as a material artefact has likely been inherited from instrumental function in warfare (headgears, swords and maces), livelihoods (sceptres), communication (seal) and the economy (mints), in striking, guiding, confirming and exchanging. Regalia's adjective form, *regal*, originates in the early 14th century from the Latin *regalis*, meaning 'royal'. This derives to the genitive form of *rex*, *regis*, 'king', which comes from the root *reg-*, 'to move in a straight line, rule, guide', leading to the Latin *regere*, 'to rule', and *rectus*, 'right, correct' (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020q). It also follows the early 14th century Anglo-French *regioun*, from Latin *regionem* meaning 'direction, boundary, district, country', and the noun of state from the past participle stem of *regere*, 'to direct, rule' (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020r). It seems that the term regalia has a link to region, where the language also links the 'ruling' closely to movement, to deciding the right direction to move and lead others, to move oneself and others in accordance to norms and power. Imagining an early society from which this language is inherited, such a concrete form of rule becomes understandable. One leads the movement of one's people on the land, giving directions in a certain area to gain and maintain the society by hunting, gathering and dwelling, as well as through cultivation and breeding.

For the monarch to establish themselves as more than a decaying mortal body of flesh and blood, to be recognise as more than such materially and visually by the court and their subjects in a world without modern media, the regalia and the privilege to carry it signified the body of the sovereign, where the living body and the body of the state merged together. Where the mortal human body returned to the land, the regalia consisting of valuable metals and stones did not rot and could be passed on to the proceeding human body. The body of the sovereign, in relation

to death, was not deceased, since the surplus of life was enclosed within the domain of another royal body, where this excluded element became of paramount importance (Catlaw 2005, 451). Where the sovereign body is considered the container of the subjects and substances, the regalia are the containers, the intra-faces where two, or more, bodies join as one. This joining of bodies, sovereign as the head, carrying crown, sceptre and sword, was already illustrated in the cover of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, as Thomas J. Catlaw writes it: the "royal body both consisting of and constituting the individual subjects of the realm" (Catlaw 2005, 452). Where regalia as a term is a *plurale tantum*, a noun that appears only in the plural form, so it appears to be also with the sovereign body.

There is a certain morphology of the sovereign's appearance in the heritage of European courts, with an interior design and architectural profile that places and decorates the *Body natural*, both contained by those forms while being a surface from which they emerge. Is it not the case that the throne that places the 'Highness' above the subjects has a similar silhouette as the castle, with its high walls and pointy towers, or the palace that contains the court repeated in the design of the crown? The king both sits in and on the castle simultaneously, as the interior and exterior for the court, its *extimacy*, *natural* and *politic*. Is it not the case that the crown, with all of its decorative details, its curves and the orb and cross on the top, is like the dome of a church or temple, having the king as its head, basis, and the body, divine and mortal that is formed by the parish? Is it not that the sceptre is the staff of a shepherd that directs and leads its subjects, by gesture or by force, and the sword that has a primary function of emphasising always the power over the life and death? And is it not that the sphere of the Earth and the entire Christendom, the known land extending to the horizon and all the souls living on it, are held in the palm of the sovereign's hand, the world which his body also inhabits? Is it not the regalia that are the loop from which the two-or-more bodies are *intra-sected*, contained and surfacing from one another, holding oneself within oneself, encircling, enfolding and enclosing the spatial-temporal conducts like a tesseract, a four dimensional object, swallowing and pushing out from itself in its constant rotation of becoming its own *extimacy*; or is it like a traveller on a non-orientable surface, like a Klein bottle, or like a lithographic paradox drawn by artist Maurits. C. Escher, in *Drawing Hands* (1948), or in *Hand with Reflecting Sphere/Self Portrait in Spherical Mirror* (1935)? Is it not the sovereign who is both within and outside this space (Catlaw 2005, 451)?

Inuksuit built on ancestry and beyond direct as navigational aids and embody the collective, containing substances and exercising power over life as 'signs of survival', having subjects under their protection. If we look again more carefully to the *niungvaliruluit*, we can more clearly understand the link between the performing bodies of the people and the access to substances through manipulation of space and perception. The landscape, which by acreage is much larger than

the window within the stone structure, when peered through appears to contain that larger area within the frame it provides. And within that frame, the valuable substances, such as the seals, are contained, and from the surface which it indicates they emerge. The one who looks through the window not only gains a passage to the vital substance but also occupies the ancestral perception of the landscape, a power inherited beyond the biology of individual body and personal teachings.

The *inukshuk* does not emerge as the body of the sovereign, but rather as regalia that links the bodies from past and present to the future, to the landscape. Or rather, it should be said that to make the landscape, rather than forming a link to a pre-existing entity, since it is the *inuksuit* that while being made from the locally available matter, standing up and out from the ground, are very much the reason that the land is inhabitable for the people, makes the basis for their whole existence in the area. Not only are they a sign of survival but also a sign *for* survival, the means and matters for survival. Here the *Body politic* does not seem to belong to an individual *Body natural*, but the *Body natural* in the plural, where then again they are not as privileged as the sovereign insignia of the king. Many of the signs are readable only for the hunters or a certain family, but still, they are significant for all Inuit as a mark of the collective presence, the essence of *the People*.

Is it applicable to extend the logic of the Western body of the sovereign, ruling over the region and signified by regalia, to Inuit material culture? In the context of indigeneity, the term indigenous regalia is commonly used. Amanda Robinson describes indigenous regalia as "a living art that incorporates a variety of materials, including cedar, cotton, buckskin, beads, ribbons, porcupine quills, eagle feathers, bones and leather as well as shiny precious metals, for example silver, brass and copper" (Robinson 2018). In North America, indigenous regalia refers to items worn by chiefs and spiritual leaders and to items that bestow honour to citizens, worn during special events, including political gatherings, ceremonies and celebrations. In Canada, there is no standard practice of indigenous regalia due to the culturally diverse communities. Regalia tell a story, transmit heritage and mark honorary status, constructing personal and cultural identity. Their making reflects personal attributes and complex craft patterns and skills. The Indian Act, in effect from the late 19th century until 1951, restricted ceremonies, preventing the wearing of regalia, requiring the permission of a federal administrator to appear in ceremonial dress off reserve and forbidding traditional dress in residential schools. Indigenous rights activism, beginning in the 1960s, aimed to revive banned customs and ceremonies that nowadays enable wearing indigenous regalia as a sign of autonomy and heritage (ibid.).

Whether or not one should consider regalia a universal phenomenon among societies that are monarchies, tribal, indigenous or other may become largely problematic. Simply imposing a Western standard or rule on various heterogenous societies, communities and populations may mean imposing on them a certain,

even apparently sophisticated form of cultural violence. It may not be a sustainable way to enforce such governmental practices and conceptions of ruling on a culture from which that specific word does not originate. It would only mean supressing another way of life into a canonised form. Also, that interpretation may prove to be valuable only as a cultural analogy on political history. What one can and should do is study whether these cultural artefacts are used, in terms of regalia, in the encounter with the colonialising culture. The colonizer has the ruler in their governmental heritage, and that cultural heritage may emerge from those indigenous artefacts, consuming, transforming, diminishing, decorating and redoing them in the exercise of power by the sovereign state in their nationalistic, imperialistic and colonial practices.

> *It's more like a telegram, a verbal semaphore. Amputated speech.*
>
> — *The Handmaid's Tale by Margaret Atwood, 1985.*

According to Robert Layton, Foucault-oriented research on artefacts has brought up an effort of the colonised to subvert the interpretations of the dominant party and transformations of value given by exterior cultural traditions (Layton 2009 [2006], 36). This argument leads us to a certain type of re-establishment of the *inukshuk* in relation to the area of Nunavut in a post-colonial practice. The official flag of Nunavut was established at the same time as the official territory and government of Nunavut in Canada on the 1st of April, 1999. Designing of the flag included public participation. 800 submissions were received from across Canada and input was drawn from a committee consisting of local artists and elders. The final drafts where developed with the assistance of local Inuit artist Andrew Qappik and accepted by the committee, the Governor General of Canada and Queen Elizabeth II. The flag has a standard 9:16 proportion, its background divided vertically into two blocks, the left coloured yellow and right one white. In the middle, along the vertical line, is a red *inukshuk* with black outline, and in the right corner there is a five-arm blue star representing *Niqirtsuituq*, the North Star. The colours gold and blue symbolise "the riches of the land, sea and sky", while the red colour of the *inukshuk* refers to Canadian flag, sharing also the white background colour. The blue star, like the *inukshuk*, refers to navigation and is symbolically bound to the leadership of the elders (Governor General of Canada 2019).

While the design of the flag respects the symbols significant to the Inuit, presenting them with an officially gained status and acknowledgement, it also assimilates them into the Canadian narrative. Nunavut is acknowledged as a part of Canada. The flag, as a physical instrument and a symbol, is used for signalling. While it grants power to Nunavut, it also adopts that power. And what exactly is that 'it' mentioned here? It is the symbolic practice of emphasising a nation state,

including, besides its name, the flag as its official image. While the flag recognises its carriers as 'the People', equal among other nations, it is first and foremost a Western form and concept, and therefore a continuum of nationalism and a colonial project. The power of the artefacts and their link to the landscape and the resources that it contains have been abstracted to a two-dimensional object, on fabric, on paper and on screen. As explained earlier, this is a rectilinear conception and conceptualisation of space, working very much with the same logic and power-imposing method as cartography. It makes something manageable.

According to Abram, what I would call the sensory-motoric traces hold a relation to a more-than-human field of discourse, an explicitness that the written alphabetical, human-made sound-based characters has lost, making speech and language exclusively a human power, a self-reflexive mode of animism (Abram 1997, 132). The trees become mute, animals dumb and stones silent (ibid., 131–132). The stones of the *inukshuk* have lost their local dialect and speak in terms of international relations, a lingua franca of the Western understanding of communities, nations and rule. The flag and the *inukshuk* upon it holds agency, but only within a certain rectilinear frame, in a manner introduced and canonised by others.

The surrealist painting of René Magritte, *The Treachery of Images* (*La Trahison des images*, 1929) says, "*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*", meaning 'This is not a pipe'. The 'not a pipe' in the painting stands not only for a representation but also for a representation of a representation, a picture of a picture of a pipe, a painting based on a commercial image of a pipe. You cannot smoke it, only look at it. Therefore, the flag of Nunavut should state 'This is not an *inukshuk*'. By saying this, I must clarify that there is nothing 'wrong' with the design or use of the flag of Nunavut—that is, if we accept the post-colonial order of nations. If we do not, then what is wrong with the flag is simply the flag itself. It is a form of marriage, whether forced one or one joined for the sake of love. And in this marriage, the respectful figure of the *inukshuk* is kept inside the rectilinear house with the four surrounding walls of the flag. The flag provides agency, but only in a given frame and form. It both enhances and tames the power of the *inukshuk*, the power that has been acknowledged by the colonial project. The flag of Nunavut is therefore, as a locally assigned project, an acceptation of the current form of governance, not its restriction or a form of resistance.

Even though images and imitations of *inukshuk* are quite commonly used in the Canadian Arctic, it became an internationally recognised symbol due to the Vancouver Olympics held in 2010. The official logo, '*Ilanaaq*', was designed by Elena Rivera MacGregor of the Rivera Design group. This graphic design illustrated a human-shaped *inukshuk* consisting of five individual parts of different colours, and its name means 'friendship' in Inuktitut (CBC 2005a). The blue and green colours represent the Canadian west coast's islands, forests and mountain ranges, the red represents the Canadian maple leaf and the yellow is for the sunrises

on the Vancouver skyline and the surrounding snow-capped mountains (ibid.). As in the structural *inukshuk*, each stone relies on each other to support the overall structure (Free Spirit Gallery 2020).

The decision to choose *Ilanaaq* as the official logo of Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games did not remain an issue of political consensus; it also brought up regional questions and conflict concerning the non-indigenous context of its usage. While Nunavut Premier Paul Okalik and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami president Jose Kusugak both supported the design, the former commissioner of Nunavut and at least two British Columbia native leaders were not satisfied with the decision. Former Nunavut commissioner Peter Irniq announced that every *inukshuk* has a meaning and a reason it was built in a certain location and that the building of figures should not be taken lightly. He compared it to the significance of the Canadian flag. A critique was also raised about the lack of west coast influence. For example, Grand Chief Edward John of the First Nations Summit concluded that the decision makers did not reflect the First Nations or Pacific region in the design of the logo (CBC 2005b).

Even though the critique in public discussion and the media sources already gives a point of view to the regionalities of Canada and its Arctic area, it also expresses the relation between colonial practices and traditional material culture as an event where the change in *regalia* comes together with the change in the *region*, affirming their connection rather than weakening it. Irniq's announcement concerning the relation of built *inukshuk* and the environment wherein it is built is consistent with Arnold van Gennep's critique concerning how rituals are taken out of their original context that defines their meaning in the "dynamic whole" (Layton 2009 [2006], 29). In accordance with rituals, Arnold van Gennep presents three aspects of territorial passage: separation from the place of origin, transition and incorporation into the destination. In the process of changing status in a society, each phase makes sense only in terms of its place along the journey from old status to new (ibid.). Even though the original argument concerns the status of a person within a ceremony, such as in those of marriage, rituals of birth, entry into adulthood and death (ibid., 30), it also contributes to the analysis of the phases of transformation or transition of the *inukshuk*.

> *[…] for what was a map but a way of emphasizing some things and making other things invisible?*
>
> — *Annihilation by Jeff VanderMeer, 2014.*

The *inuksuit* are *made of*, not *off*, the landscape. They emerge as a 'natural' part of the land with a minimal transition of minerals; at the same time, they also need to *stand out* to *carry out* human heritage. As the *Ilanaaq* logo, the *inukshuk* is

passing from a three-dimensional stone-built construction, locally made and locally significant, by artistic means into two-dimensional resemblance of map carrying on Canadian regionality. The meaning of this change comes close to Barbara Bender's notions on the works concerning the *Western Gaze*; whether internal or external to the region which it objectifies, it is a colonising gaze (Bender 2009 [2006], 307). In comparison to the flag of Nunavut, whether nor not the logo was chosen or designed by the representatives of indigenous groups or by other Canadians, the context of using it in the Olympic Games subordinates it into a group of norms which arise from a different source than the ones which have guided the practices of building *inuksuit*. When the *inukshuk* was given colours representing the regions of Canada, the *inukshuk* stopped being a point of reference in the landscape for the human eye and became a map of the state of Canada for the colonial gaze. The mapping of the landscape via Western cartography in the history of Canada, as well as other areas, was not just a cause of exploration, monitoring and colonisation, but the very instrument that enabled conditions for such enterprises to emerge (ibid.). Such aesthetics of distance as discussed earlier allow a 'safe' distance from the objectified target of manipulation and intervention, where one can declare impartiality to any form of violence that may occur.

The region where the *inuksuit* are located, became a limb, core or head of a bigger *inukshuk*, *Ilanaaq*, the grand design of the Western state. While it may seem that an Inuit artefact has therefore gained power as a cultural symbol over all of Canada or the entire Canadian Arctic at least, I would argue that the sovereign power, that of the nation state, has appropriated a piece of regalia that emphasises abstractly the rule over the sphere of the earth, the orb connecting the landscape to the body of the sovereign. Furthermore, the colours did not only change the regions of Canada into the state (body) of Canada but also connected it to international relations, to a system existing between the states. This change happened when matching the colours with the Olympic rings, which with their colours symbolise the different continents connected to each other and together forming the globe. Instead of the acts of hunting, fishing, gathering or dwelling being bodily activities connecting and conducting the people within the landscape, the global unity of nation states is performed by the bodies of athletes, led by written rules and drawn guidelines, on and off ice in a ritualistic event under the figure of *Ilanaaq*. Speaking of rituals, taking one from its original context does happen, but it does not appear here as external to the social reality. It is an expression of the material change that is confirmed by the ritual, changing the status of the people. The transition of the *inukshuk* is the incorporation of the Inuit into the state of Canada.

> *Ever notice how milestone turns into millstone by changing only one letter?*
>
> *— We Need to Talk About Kevin by Lionel Shriver, 2003.*

[…] bore screams as a sculptor bears dust from the beaten stone.

— Red Dragon by Thomas Harris, 1981.

On the one hand, *Ilanaaq* does manifest another serious consequence of misplacement, since rather than resembling an *inukshuk* like the one in the flag of Nunavut it looks more like a stone figure called an *inunnguaq*, 'in the likeness of a human', having a head, body, legs and arms, considered more symbolic than functional (Hallendy 2015 [2013]). Such misconception emerges as much more severe when Irniq notes that it is erected on the spot of a homicide or suicide (Kaste 2010), a sign of a breaking of social norms rather than an embracing one of welcoming. The head of *Ilanaaq* has another feature that not only emerges as problematic in this context but might also express the heritage of colonial misplacement. It has a slit of mouth, a 'crack' in the side of the stone, giving the illustrated head a slight smile. The fact that this smile was slit open on the head of a figure associated with death provoked the subtitle "A Smiling Marker Of Death?" (ibid.) for the NPR radio programme *All Things Considered*. To understand the actual importance of this outcome of misplacement beyond irony, blasphemy or sacrilege, we need to look back to the painting *The Ambassadors*.

The two bodies invested with power in the painting, possessing wealth and wisdom, have death as their forecasted shadow. It is a stain on the pretty picture, indicating that something is 'off'. It is a *memento mori,* a classical artistic symbol reminding one about one's own mortality. The anamorphosis exaggerates the feature of the fleshless skull with the exposed jaw bone and teeth, the grinning mouth. The markers of death, slit or wiped on the face of the image presenting the sovereign body, show that power does not come without a monopoly on violence and rule over life and death. Instead of reminding us of the mortality of the sovereign's *Body natural*, it emerges as a stain of enforced death at the hands of the sovereign. That cut, that stain, as a regalia, is the sword of the king. In *Ilanaaq*, it is very likely without any artistic intention, but is rather a material consequence of the misplacement.

I think human beings matter more than stones.

— Death on the Nile by Agatha Christie, 2007 [1937].

The outcome of the misplacement is replicated in another form of *inukshuk* building. "Stone by stone, the memories of the missing and murdered indigenous people are being resurrected through an Inukshuk-building movement across Hamilton" (OpHardt 2015). According to the report, a group of mostly aboriginal men and women have erected thousands of *inuksuit* in parks and near trails, intended to provoke emotional reactions and a response from the federal government to start an

inquiry. 1,017 murdered aboriginal women between 1980–2012 and 169 missing women dating back to 1952 have been reported by the federal government, and according to the members of the movement, aboriginal women are missing in disproportionate numbers. In the setting sun the shadows grow longer, and the *inukshuk* gains a greater level of resemblance to the lost human which, according to the report's interviewee, each one of them represents (ibid.).

The *inukshuk* incorporates the incorporeal, binding the lost bodies, living or dead, to the landscape. In a way, the act of building re-establishes the relation on and over the land, the same way as the *kula* functions. Stones standing for the lost members of the people are, besides activist environmental performance, a link to ancestral power, as the king visiting the graves of the former kings. The act of building the *inukshuk* is an ancestral practice, while it also emphasises the lost, 'to-be' ancestors and their presence in the land. This presence is both the reason and the outcome taking place in the *inukshuk*: they were the reason for the building act, and they are constructed in the act of building. This temporal and spatial binding, from individual bodies to the collective one, establishes the people as a sovereign being.

The effect and affect of the growing shadows are very much the same as the anamorphic phenomenon in the painting, the stretched skull and the growing shadow. The stones' shadows 'stain' the landscape, standing out from the face of Hamilton, stretching to a human measure in the light of the setting sun, similar to the missing human body casting a shadow, except that they are separated by an unknown distance. The *inuksuit* are erected from the ground, while their shadows move along the ground, occupying different dimensions. The still men in *The Ambassadors* are like statues, and the skull, which is not materially there in the same pictured spatial arrangement but within the same ontological frame, stands for the temporality, as do the passing shadows, which are visible but do not occupy the space in a same way as the piled stones. They serve instead as a dynamic lack in the landscape, haunting and disrupting the public image.

In 2011, Canada had registered 59,220 Inuit living in the state. Among the registered number of Inuits, an estimated 250 deaths were registered as suicides in 2011–2016, which makes the suicide rate nine times higher than among non-indigenous people. Within that rate, the number of suicides among Inuit men is three times higher compared to Inuit women (Kumar & Tjepkema 2019, 10). While the highest suicide rate was among young Inuit males 15–24 years of age, between Inuit and non-indigenous females of the same age group the risk rate was 33 higher among the Inuit (ibid., 11). The uncertain reason circles around higher poverty rates among the First Nations peoples' employment, the lack of income, education and food security and gaps in access to health services. Distal determinants concern colonialism, racism, social exclusion and lack of self-determination opportunities. Colonial practice has caused marginalisation and forced relocation to permanent

settlements, residential school attendance, intergenerational trauma, historical and contemporary social inequities and family history of mental health problems, suicide, substance abuse and violence. Un-accountable determinants involve pride in the Inuit identity, living in a community with more positive social interaction and ease of hunting (ibid., 13).

In light of the missing figures and the number of suicidal Inuit, it dawns that *Ilanaaq* as the smiling symbol of homicide and suicide in such sense seems to have earned its place as a regional symbol of the Canadian Arctic. As the intended positive representation of an Arctic identity, indigeneity, locality and welcoming, it has not been able to cover the material outcomes that are the counterparts of those very same terms: loss of identity, colonialism, globality and intrusion. Such conferential 'stains' on a pretty picture, giving a grinning irony to an attempt at kindness, is well illustrated in the intentions of the photographer protagonist from the film *Blow-up* (1966) by Michelangelo Antonioni. Protagonist's works presenting social injustice are paired with a picture of a loving couple in a park where he accidentally also portrays a forthcoming murder. The materiality of the world cannot be excused even in the most innocent attempt to hide it; it dwells in it, lurks from it and emerges from it. Instead of providing lightness, it provides the coldest and sharpest irony.

This misplacement of people, the power over territory and the life of its dwellers with devastating outcomes, continues in the misplacement of *inuksuit* in the landscape. Due to its popularity as a regional icon, more and more stone cairns are constructed in places where they do not signify those qualities, aims and actions that they traditionally do for the Inuit. This is forbidden, but it is still taking place in many natural parks along the paths, where they are considered as misleading and dangerous. They do not belong to the natural or national landscape, as they have not stood in historical context (ExploreNorth 2016). The park areas that tend to have no traces of permanent human presence are now recording the motoric-sensory traces of the passers-by along the tracks, through the landscape.

Even though a continuity with this building practice among the non-indigenous population expresses the power of such cultural forms, to become adopted, adapted and applied, they have a significant negative impact. It sounds like the language spoken by the *inuksuit* is turning into a type of white noise due to the growing number of replicants, noise without a message or speech, simply creating noise in the sake of noise. This white noise, as harmless as it may sound, may cover and drown important messages that are considered to be 'beeps' as unimportant as the rest of the peaking stone piles. Instead of strengthening the cultural influence of the *inukshuk*, this malpractice rather 'stretches' it with overuse and production. More than cells in a growing body, they resemble a virus, bursting out fast and violent. When the stone figures, and the figures dependent on them, become voiceless, the possibility of being misguided or tumbling over becomes a highly rated risk.

The importance of the doctrine of the king's two bodies lies in the ambiguity it created in the passage from life to death (Catlaw 2005, 451). Within the sovereign power sphere, it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice (Agamben, 1998 [1995], 53). That is the privilege of the sword regalia: the sovereign's monopoly of violence. How about the exchangeable valuables, the goods that the sovereign embodies and provides to one's subjects, as happens in the *kula*? This dimension takes us back to the *inukshuk* of Richmond, but before the full circle closes, there is one more metamorphosis to look into. This is where the indigenous subsistence, industrialised economics and animal activism, local and global acts of transaction, collide and merge together. That is, this is where the profile of the sovereign, the capital, is minted to the face of the Earth.

You Can't Spell Slaughter Without Laughter

— Drawn Together by Dave Jeser & Matt Silverstein, 2005, season 2, episode 1.

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) during the Vancouver Winter Games published a graphic design similar to the use of the *inukshuk* as the official Olympics logo *Ilanaaq* on their anti-sealing campaign website, 'Olympic Shame 2010'. The minimalistic design of *inunnguaq* is swinging a club at a seal, which is lying in a pool of blood (CBC 2009). Below it, the red Olympic ring is dripping blood, creating a type of stain by stretching the colour beyond the borders of the ring, a sign of death very much like the grinning skull of *The Ambassadors*. The posture of the hunter and the seal are both adjusted to the Olympic's logo from a photograph representing a seal hunter during the act of hunting. This semiotic act links the two bodies, those of the seal hunters and the *Ilanaaq*, the 'natural bodies' and bodies of political dispute. Furthermore, it emerges as a stain and merges with the bodies of the Olympic Games' athletes. Irniq criticised the original design for its resemblance, with its fat legs and outstretched arms, to a hockey goalie (Kaste 2010), and this resemblance becomes much clearer in the PETA's campaign logo.

As the misplacement of *inukshuk* tempts us to provide a dangerous or harmful misinterpretation of the subject to which it refers, so it is with PETA. The logo does not only cast a shadow on the commercial seal hunt allowed by the Olympic host, Canada, but does so also in relation to the Inuit living in Canada, who exercise seal hunting as their traditional subsistence. The president of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami of the national Inuit organisation, Mary Simon, stated that the campaign insults traditional hunting culture and is misinformed by being very selective in aiming to affect the public emotion (CBC 2009). Simon's statement connects the aims of the anti-sealing campaign to economic factors such as the seal product

ban of the European Union (EU) and fundraising of animal right organisations to maintain their own activities, where both of their intentions are very selective in deciding what is opposed. CBC clarified later that PETA did not state that the hunters were Inuit (ibid.). The protest is aimed at the Canadian government's support for the annual commercial hunt, separate from the Inuit subsistence hunt: even so, this distinction has not won over some native leaders. PETA also sees the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver as a time when Canada is especially open to outside pressure (Michels 2009). If we follow the interpretation presented by PETA, the economic transaction is sealed with red substance on a white surface and minted with a club.

Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products prohibits the placing of seal products on the EU market, applying to seal products produced in the EU or imported. The EU seal regime provides two exceptions, allowing seal products coming from hunts conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities, provided the specific conditions set out in Article 3(1) of the Basic Regulation are fulfilled, where the Article 3(1a) regulates that a seal product shall be accompanied by a document attesting compliance with the conditions set out for benefiting from the Inuit or other indigenous community's exception. Article 3(2) of the Basic Regulation allows the import of seal products of an occasional nature for the personal use of travellers or their families (European Commission 2020). This exceptionality demands that the hunt is traditionally conducted by indigenous communities, conducted for and contributing to the subsistence of the community in order to provide food and income to support life and sustainable livelihood, not primarily for commercial purpose or regarding animal welfare (European Commission 2016). For the EU, it seems that it is not so much about *what*, but more about *by whom, how* and *why*: the bodies that perform the act of hunting, and the bodies, as a collective, to which the subsistence, as animal substance or the exchange from it, should return. Hunting seals as such is not an act to be condemned or forbidden, but it may be protected, supported and cherished when it is conducted by a specific collective of bodies, abstracted and enacted, whether they are considered as privileged or marginalised.

According to Jon P. Mitchell, the performing body in the act is a microcosm through which society is expressed. The approach differs from the representational theories that would consider the performing body as a representation of something other than itself. The natural body may provide a source of natural symbols, but the nature of the body is still subordinated to, and is the object of, society (Mitchell 2009 [2006], 385). We can see the body in performance as a material object moved by a performative subject, and the same could be said of material artefacts in performance, seeing artefacts as active subjects in relationships between persons and things (ibid., 391). If we follow this train of thought, the

same should work the other way around: that is, it should be possible to consider the hunter's body as an artefact when it is placed in an act establishing tradition and community, not as a contemporary body but as an indigenous one. The hunt conducted by a single person with indigenous status by just any means is not 'correct'; the correct one is that performed by the People, in the People's manner. The constitution and composition of the act is that it establishes the subsistence as indigenous, as it does for the bodies acting it out. Is it not the practising of tradition that makes the bodies emerge as indigenous and not of the incorporated, invisible heritage? Is it not a question of performing bodies as much as of the bodies performed?

Besides ancestry, 'being' indigenous is performing the living culture, which in the case of material objects, language, nutrition and economy is concretised for example in seal hunting. Henrik Bruun and Richard Langlais speak of the difference between types of action and tokens of action, using seal hunting as an example. The hunt is a type of action constitutively dependent on the existence of seals. That would seem to be a relatively context-independent type of action, requiring the hunter and the seal to perform seal hunt. However, when we consider hunting seals as a token of action performed in a historical situation by a particular agent, the constitutive context becomes much more specified. Modern seal hunting is dependent on particular hunting technologies, national and international regulations, the cultural perception of seals and seal populations, meaning that seal hunting cannot be isolated from these contextual features. The act of hunting is not simply the attempt to kill seals, but must be understood as an action that is contextually empowered (Bruun & Langlais 2003, 43).

Agency actualises in an act, a spatially and temporally oriented phenomenon. Action, according to Bruun and Langlais, is often separated from any uncontrollable physiological process (of humans) by its intentionality (Bruun & Langlais 2003, 31). Also, the specific intentions are limited by particular bodily capacities and the dependence on non-intentional elements of the world (ibid., 32). In other words, what can be done and the will to do so is determined according to how the body and surroundings provide a fit. Such context dependence actually questions the ways in which intention is understood, not so much to deny the existence of intention but more likely to reformulate the question into *whose intention*. When it comes to the question of the agency of the *inukshuk*, it emphasises the presence of materially bound practices. The *inukshuk* in a sense 'assists' in performing an act, but this act happens according to not only one's own intentions but also the intentions of the architects of the *inukshuk*, the constructing and significance of which directly depends on the environment where it is located. It has hardly any meaning as such, except in relation to the surroundings. This leads us to understand agency as being in the world (ibid., 33). The world, on the other hand, should not be understood as rules and facts but, as Hubert Dreyfus puts it, as dispositions to respond to

situations in appropriate ways (ibid.). This is something that must be considered when the question in the conversation concerning the 'legitimacy' of seal hunt is set under evaluation.

> *A governed populace must be conditioned to accept power-words as actual things [...] In the maintenance of such a power structure, certain symbols are kept out of the reach of common understanding—symbols such as those dealing with economic manipulation [...] Symbol-secrecy of this form leads to the development of fragmented sub-languages, each being a signal that its users are accumulating some form of power.*
>
> *— Children of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1976.*

What is really invested in the act of the seal hunt? Does the seal hunt go beyond nature and nurture? I suppose that the answer is 'yes and no' inasmuch as we can consider an individual capable of existing without the collective, which in principle appears self-evident but becomes unlikely when put into practice. Let us study the suggested outcome of this question more carefully. Émile Durkheim, when analysing totemism, noticed that in many cases the animal itself was less sacred than its representation and understood this tendency to be based on clan identity, which is related to some concrete form or symbol that was essential for the existence of a society (Layton 2009 [2006], 30). When it comes to the inalienable importance, the sacredness, of a single seal, it might have significant value in the single event of hunting, for the reason of the pure physiological survival of the hunter. In such a practical matter, the question of identity, that of a hunter or one's tribe, seems very marginal. Durkheim's argument on identity and totem can be placed in a different context, as a matter of colonial resistance where the indigenous substance plays central role in the representing the nature of relation as a form of livelihood of the people and therefore their belonging and right to the land. Then again, such approach to politicised social representation is a trap. It diminishes the power of culture and identity into a simple politico-normative game. It should be considered more substantial than that.

A totemic representation, the seal as an abstraction, keeps within it an embodied human–animal relation, a way of being in the world. It does so through and throughout the form of seal(ing), where the transfer of understanding, whether it is named knowledge or skills, onto the seal is the key to emplacing the human in the arctic ecosystem of a certain region, a way of survival and living a good life. This understanding lives through language, art, handicraft, clothing, items, daily practices, food and thoughts. It is a shared performance defining the collective, gender, communication and exchange. The ability to make a seal into a representation—in other terms an abstraction, object, image or word—lies in the

moment where the 'nature' enters or transforms into culture, where the sacredness of the individual seal is surpassed by the idea of a seal, holding within it the human–animal relation of the past and present seals and humans. The seal is not just a representation of a collective identity, because without the seal there would not be a collective, only individual human beings or no human beings at all. In the terms of the *Body politic*, the seal has the quality of currency, a signifier of a region and a regulated privilege, a mint and a seal. The seal hunt is a performative act that expresses sovereignty in relation to the region and defines the collective as the people, the *Body politic*, extending beyond their individual characters and biology. It is not only economy, not only political, but a form of political economy.

While the totemic, artefactual or regalia-like items seem to preserve lives, livelihoods, communities and indigeneity, in the ritualistic reading of legal norms, such as the EU policy on seal products, seeming almost to conserve the act of hunting, they also hold the opening for change. This concerns the change of status and values. While the power to alter them is still preserved, it may be channelled by others than the Inuit or the state of Canada or the EU. In the field of performance studies, the focus is on performative events rather than the embodied form of living everyday life as performance (Mitchell 2009 [2006], 384). Here a ritualistic event is thought to have the power of transformation and transition. Addressing Edward Schieffelin's analysis, Mitchell describes a performance in principle as a creation of presence, and through these presences they alter moods, social relations, bodily dispositions and states of mind (ibid., 384). For example, the Olympic team of ice hockey players bodily perform their nation, its strength, capability and obedience, dressed up in ritualistic and uniformed outfits with practical and representative features in a normatively controlled environment with a given goal, on ice. Their success is equated with the agility of the nation, always in relation to the others, as in combat. That is not so different from seal hunting, with its environmentally determined limits and the performative capacity of the individual and joined bodies.

This described way of treating a performance may show how the power is in play in PETA's street performances that contribute to and built on the same discourse as their campaign logo imitating the *Ilanaaq.* It is to be understood more as a ritual event, which has the ability to effect major transformations of character or status on persons, things and institutions, where everyday and extraordinary performances are then again inevitably linked when the transformations in the latter effect transformations in the former (Mitchell 2009 [2006], 384). According to a newspaper report of the *Dallas Observer*, a dozen protesters organised by PETA held a performance with signs, pamphlets and stuffed baby seals splattered with fake blood, the protestors posing with a spiked club pointed down at one of the seal's heads, some dressed as seals sitting on the corner of St. Paul Street and Ross Avenue in Dallas (Michels 2009). The street performance and its

media representations aim for a change in status related to bodies, norms and the landscape. The Olympics' *inukshuk* logo on the pamphlets, with the same posture, is within the same photographic frame and at this point concretely linked due to the performance. Therefore, the sovereign is present in the form of the regalia, a sovereign insignia.

Where one of PETA's street performances linked the body of the hunter and the body of the *inukshuk*, another demonstration in London back in 2005 showed painted female bodies lying, eyes closed, on the stairs of Canada House, imitating dead and skinned seals, equating the animal bodies to the bodies of the people (NowPublick 2005). The bodies of the performers should not be understood here merely as representations of seals. Erving Coffman approached the idea of a self-presenting body with a particular identity as performative subject rather than material object (Mitchell 2009 [2006], 384). However shocking and abject they may seem, the performers remain still recognisable as human beings. The animal is not represented only as a victim, but as a humane being that should be therefore considered equal to humans. It is a moral statement on the sameness of the seal and the human if and when they are ripped out of their skins. This inclusion and exclusion of life under the protection of the sovereign is at the very core of sovereignty. As the skinned seals or the street performers are bare, so is the life that the sovereign rules over.

Philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in explaining different modes of inclusion, exclusion and exception, returns to the two words for 'life' used by the Greeks. *Zoë* means life in common with all living beings, having only the singular form in the language, and *bios* indicates a particular way of living that is proper to an individual or a group. *Bios* is not simple natural life but a qualified life (Agamben 1998 [1995], 9; Catlaw 2005, 449). *Polis*, the city state from which the term *politics* is inherited, where certain characteristics of the public life were held, would therefore consider life as a qualified *bios*, excluding *zoë*—pure, unordered life—outside of its walls (Catlaw 2005, 449). Therefore, it is the *polis* as a habitat that enables the (hu) man to become a political animal, called *zoo politikon* by Aristotle, animal with the additional capacity for political existence as Foucault has addressed it (ibid.). Then again, the city state's walls held within them biological facts of life that were excluded from political life, including women, children and slaves, where the *demos* only consisted of adult men. This excluded part was included within another set of walls, those of the *oikos*, the home (ibid., 450).

What seems to remain unwritten about the *zoë* taking place in the *oikos* is that it includes a certain so-called biological fact that enables the *bios* to take place outside of the *oikos* later in life: that is, reproduction. While sexual life is yet another matter, sexual reproduction presents another interesting paradox of exclusion and the exception that it includes. The mother bearing a child belongs to *zoë*, while the male offspring are to become part of *bios*. This distinction yet again places

the women in the role of mothers, as exception, as included exclusion, a bare life due to their capability to bear children. Mothers, as mothers of men, mothers of kings or as the mother of God, are another living example of the *extimacy*. *Zoë* is the exterior of the *polis*-maintaining *bios*, within which order the *oikos* is located, which includes the *bare life* that women bear in their living body as the becoming of *bios*. As Thomas J. Catlaw expresses the state of affairs, the exclusion of bare life is not total, but it is the reason that made political life possible (Catlaw 2005, 450). As the child is not yet part of the *bios*, the question extends from a spatial arrangement of walls, made of rocks or flesh, into a temporal one. The juvenile's body is a preformation, a miniature for the upscaled adult male. Also, this becoming of children into adults, bearing mothers or political animals, suggests that the status of life as *zoë* or *bios* is not a given by nature but given by (hu)men.

How does this question return to indigeneity? If we follow the thought that every object co-constitutes its counterpart, as the word 'object' as something opposite to oneself expresses, indigeneity as a concept is very much the counterpart, coproduct or aftermath of colonialism. As the analysis so far has brought up, the 'opposite' is not external but very much internalised in the constitution of any thing, being, subject or object. The term and the practice that falls under the noun 'colony' (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020s) means company or body of people migrating, inhabiting and cultivating an area exterior to their native country while remaining internal to it as its subjects. The colony is therefore an exception for a sovereign state, exterior to the geography of the motherland, while internal to its rule and exercise of sovereign power. Where the etymology of 'colony' derives from cultivation, the agriculture of land, for the colony the orderly life of *bios* is the cultivated land. *Bios* takes place in planting, weeding and harvesting. Beyond the fields of the colony resides the surrounding wilderness and savagery, that belonging to *zoë*. When it comes to the ecosystems, another set of exterior and interior in one another takes place. While the inhabitants of the colony, its population, have exited their homeland and are foreign to the natives, the same goes for the cultivated plants on some occasions. Sometimes they are adopted for cultivation from the ecosystem in which the colony is placed, but many times it either cultivates plants from the motherland or from other colonies, transported from one continent to another, as happened for example with cacao and coffee. So too for domesticated animals. In the colony, the 'unorderly' land of *zoë* is organised into *bios*, contributing to the political economy of the state. The bare life of the land is that from which the *bios* may emerge.

There seems to be a tendency for things to *turn around*, and that is what seems to be the matter in the shift from colonies to colonialism. Where the *zoë* tends to be the surrounding exterior of the colony, in the case of colonialised land it becomes preserved and reserved in a type of *oikos*, for example in reservations. Within the reservations, surrounded by the colonial sovereign state, *zoë* is maintained and

isolated from societal life. While a body enters from it to the colonial state, it is adjusted to living practices proper for the political order, that of *bios*. Thereby and by, indigenous politics works through a mode of living, not that which is considered as *zoë* but that of *bios*, while it enters governmental, non-governmental and international institutional practices with defined and refined procedures, etiquettes and language. Indigeneity may be represented under its own regalia, for example within the international political frame of the United Nations' permanent forum for indigenous people and in how they are portraited and seated within it (see Lindroth 2011, 550, 554); it is the included exclusion, an exception that is vital for the very constitution of *bios*, something to be preserved, not annihilated. As a type of *oikos*, the 'indigenous' or 'reservation' can be interpreted by borrowing Catlaw's words: a "creation of political equals, in turn" that "demanded the sovereign reign of a particular equal over his household, […] equal only insofar as they were all equally dominated" following and constituting a "logic of exclusion […] a particular political ontology" (Catlaw 2005, 450).

The doctrine of the king's two bodies made the sovereign a liminality, an exception, both mortal and immortal, individual and collective, laying in the ambiguity it created in the passage from life to death and therefore enabling the sovereign to decide on bare life itself (Catlaw 2005, 451). To return this train of thought to the problem of seal products, we have to go through a slightly incoherent, partly unintelligent and analytically displeasing scramble with the binary conception of life. The seal hunt is arguably a liminal set of acts within which the life, that which is the bare or political life constituting 'the People' as in a binary with another set of people, is defined. If we look at the EU's policy on imported seal products, the definition of seal life, as animal life, would seem to be *zoë*, something that is to be kept out from the *polis*, and as an excluded quality and quantity it regulates the *bios* within the EU as a *union of people who do not consume seals*. Then again, this regulation and regularity needs its exception, and that is the Inuit and the hunt performed by them. That defines the Inuit as *the People*, a collective that lives a regulated life and that in order to constitute itself as *bios* manages the seal as *zoë* for nutrition, shelter, clothing, warmth and light as the very basis for the *bios* to exist. Since it is not an industrialised hunt, it falls to the sphere of *oikos* as the site for *zoë*, and *zoë* emerges as the very *extimacy*, as both alien to the human community and the most profound part of it. Since it is the sovereign who possesses the right to decide what constitutes the extraordinary and the status of exception (ibid., 453), the EU seal product ban with the exception of indigenous rights emerges as the use of sovereign power.

Having said that, there might be a room for serious confusion due to the standpoint from which the argument is derived, Western ontology and political theology. If I claim that the dominance over the seal gives the state system, including a sovereign state like Canada and the EU consisting of sovereign states, a power over the Inuit,

I do not claim that this correctly represent the Inuit–seal relation or follows their ontology. The given interpretation follows simply what is imposed on the Inuit by the Western reading of sovereign power. From the Inuit standpoint, the seal may not be considered such a far relative or such a natural exteriority for cultivated life. Therefore, the division of *bios* and *zoë* might go against the very principles of Inuit cosmology or ontology, where both human and seal may share the same form and concept of life. Still, the seal and its hunting can maintain the biological fact of life for the Inuit, and if life around the seal is to be considered apolitical but still social communal life, in its involvement with the exterior of the Inuit community, that is the Western world, the seal at least becomes a question of defining a political and regulated life. Nevertheless, one needs to bear in mind and regard this difference of ontology, or the possibility for it.

One relief for the ongoing paradigmatic affair is provided when one throws away the image of the sovereign as the singular body of a ruler and considers it as a form of power. Sovereignty is not owned by indigenous people, the state or the activists. Therefore, it does not have to be localised to or embodied by a certain entity. While the sovereign has the power to move and direct and set the borders of recognised life, the *Body politic*, it is not bound to a single person but linked to the *Body natural* by regalia. As the sovereign is not limited to single body, or a single lifetime, or belonging to one or another category of life, it should be rather seen as a phenomenon emerging between and *in-the-midst* of these characters.

While the human-seal relations are discussed in terms of administration, activism and indigeneity, it is the seal that seems to remain somehow intact, unaltered, even when it is in the very heart of the intra-play of power. It is as if in occupying the characteristics of regalia it links the two bodies but remains as an artefact, even when it is changed from hand to hand. The political struggle is about the status of the people. Even when the markets were targeted from the EU to China, it became an issue of racist bias and imperialistic attitudes, where sending the seal meat to Chinese markets was considered to be a claim that "Chinese eat everything" and "do not care about animal suffering", as expressed by the director of the China Small Animal Protection Association, professor Lu Di (Watts 2011). That claim would declare them as brutes, not as civilised people. By making such political claim and placing such blame, the issue once again becomes a question of politics, not one to be solved by markets.

Inuksuit, in both indigenous and colonial matter, come in close resemblance to Benedict Anderson's imagined communities (1983), where even the members of the smallest nations and primordial villages will likely never meet and know most of their fellow-members, and "yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" knowing that "they are connected to people they have never seen" (Anderson 2006 [1983], 6). As signs of survival, the community is seen and imagined in the *inuksuit* as an effect of the communion.

Some thought-provoking considerations can be derived from Anderson's arguments in relation to *inuksuit*. Anderson connects print-capitalism and use of national language in religious communal practices to the spreading of the imagined community, that now with a shared, highly mobile discourse in readable print is rather inclusive than exclusive (Anderson 2006 [1983], 40). Therefore, the "convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation" (ibid., 46). Certainly the *inuksuit* functioned as a shared, even if sometimes limited, language amongst the Inuit 'printed' onto the landscape, but it has been greatly multiplied in the colonial nation-building project of Canada, from which the Olympic logo, public art, stones erected along the trails in national parks and PETA campaign are proofs of.

According to Anderson, "the nineteenth-century colonial state dialectically engendered the grammar of the nationalisms" producing the census, maps and museums (Anderson 2006 [1983], xiv). Is it not the case that this grammar has influenced the ways the *inukshuk* is currently pronounced, how its contemporary dialect is an outcome of the dialogue between the cultural influences and infusions of coloniser and colonised? That is, an outcome of how the stone figures indicate the number of the missing and the victims of homicide and suicide as a form of morbid census. *Ilanaaq* is a colour-coded map of indigenous groups of Canada, and the living culture often becomes a question of commercialised artefacts. The way they may function as a form of cultural preservation and resistance toward the colonial project is also a matter of imagined communities, which includes also the 'imagined adversaries' (ibid.) that may not be encountered face to face on a daily basis. And speaking of adversaries, even though I cannot provide any historical fact, if the *inuksuit* have functioned as an element in Inuit warfare, they do so at the colonial level too. An *inukshuk* stands as a war memorial in Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, rededicated for the fallen comrades in a ceremony held by Canadian and other NATO forces in 2008 (CBC 2008), extending the imagined community outside the state's borders, a haunting from another landscape and by foreign bodies.

According to W.G. Hoskins, the landscape is the material embodiment of people's activities, a palimpsest, imprints left by changing land use, residences, social and cultural attitudes (Bender 2009 [2006], 304). The *inukshuk* contains the tradition that contains the indigeneity. In the traditional form of making an *inukshuk*, it is the collective effort of socio-material constructing, a collective body and a continuum for inheriting the power of ancestors. By following the transferring and transformation of *inukshuk*, its present nature as palimpsest becomes evident. It is a multi-layered 'text' consisting of perceptions of the landscape, traditional knowledge and practices, colonial regionalities and

contemporary forms of politics. The *inukshuk* has undergone the transformation from indigenous to a national, international and activist figure. What remains is a link, that of human–region relation. It is not an expression of sovereignty belonging to a specified group or individual but sovereignty understood as a form and exercise of power. Furthermore, it is as an agency, not only a quality held by a fixed subject. It is a hybrid of various intersecting phenomena and a sediment of history, a heritage emerging in the material object. In other words, it is a collective body, a genealogy of those powers and counter powers which invest in it.

Returning to Richmond, all these ideas come together. The connectivity, controversy and conflict with which this piece of public art interlinks between individual bodies, collective, landscape and economy are the constructing elements of sovereignty and region. Local material, that of containers available from the shipping yard, are substantially part of the landscape. As discussed, the traditional form of the *inukshuk*, as well as the one made of containers, is a marker and pointer. Without closer engagement, they emerge as symbols of the community in numbers and in cumulated efforts, both physical and mental. And it goes much further than its statuesque appearance. While being demobilised, the constituting part still holds the capacity to, so to speak, return into action. The containers, as the stones, are both bare surfaces and containers of substance. Where the window in the stones is a frame containing substance when peered through, overcoming the distance, the same goes for the shipping containers. Having a solid structure and a void within, an opening, and although having a heavy and un-aerodynamic rectilinear shape, they are mobile by their character, taking the seals overseas while the piled stones take us to the seals. Both require labour, that of hunting or shipping. In these containers, the *glocal* markets of the seal meat, the substance of disputes, is mobilised and stationed. As one stone does not make an *inukshuk*, one container does not make a shipload; one is not enough for subsistence, and one does not make an economy. Where *Ilanaaq* was intend to symbolise and connect the indigenous and international community, Richmond's *inukshuk* is in its acting materiality purely global, shipping containers being the material basis and established standard for the global economy.

Richmond's *inukshuk*, regardless of its narrative, is making what is regional and embodied into a standard. It makes the bodies into rectilinear shapes, it measures them, it industrialises them, it detaches them from a specific locality and it connects them to another type of *glocality*. It is intended as a signifier of the Arctic, and is so without a doubt, since it proves what has already been stated concerning the term itself. The Arctic is about the aesthetics of distance, internalised exteriority, only an approachable or perceivable entity from afar, most alien to itself. A figure constructed of shipping containers is something that has been imposed on the local landscape from outside. This terrestrial body is kin almost as close to the land as

the celestial body of the Ursa Major. Such a figuration goes far beyond cultural appropriation, since in a very profound way it de- and reterritorialises, constituting a place called 'the Arctic', which it is supposed to signify.

Rising, flashing, piling up—

another moment and it's done!

A grand design may seem insane at first;

but in the future chance will seem absurd,

— *Faust II: The Second Part of the Tragedy by Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, 2014 [1832].*

Am Ende hängen wir doch ab

Von Kreaturen, die wir machen.

— *Faust II: Der Tragödie zweiter Teil in fünf Akten by Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, 2013 [1832].*

You can call me the Dwarf in the Flask, Homunculus.

— *Fullmetal Alchemist: Brotherhood by Yasuhiro Irie, 2011 [2010], ep. 40.*

An Inuit artefact from this area of Canada, *fish hook with carved seal*, dated to the late 19th –early 20th centuries, made of ivory, brass or copper, sinew and fishing line, enhanced the charms of hooks and sinkers with the power of the greatest fisher, the seal (Stuckenberger & Lambert 2007, 65). This totemic mimicry of a seal is another expression where the seal manifests as regalia. This fishing hook invested with the crafted representation of a seal is a material artefact of the relation between the landscape, body and the collective. Such commonly recognised cultural characteristics as language are based on material realities rather than on regulated vocabulary and grammar. Given a lack of contact to the key animals of the region via herding, hunting, eating, wearing, teaching and learning, there is not much left of the perceptions of and approaches to the surrounding landscape.

Another totemic miniature resembling an animal, a key species of its kind, dwells in the archives of the Arktikum Science Centre in Rovaniemi, part of the collection of professor Juha Pentikäinen. Between December 3rd of 2012 and May 5th of 2013 it was showcased as part of a contemporary exhibition *Voyages Beyond* by science communicator Marjo Laukkanen and exhibition designer Anna Hyvönen based on their collaboration and the anthropological field work conducted by Pentikäinen concentrating on *shamanhood*, constituted from the biographies and possessions

of two Nanai shamanesses, Lindza Beldy and Maria Petrovna (Arktikum Science Centre 2012). The miniature is wooden, rough and minimalistic by design, brought from the Lower Amur River in Siberia, Russia. It is labelled a 'little bear'. The spot where it was exhibited was only separated by a few meters and a wall with an entrance from the Big Blonde.

> *Certain things, they should stay the way they are. You ought to be able to stick them in one of those big glass cases and just leave them alone.*
>
> — *The Catcher in the Rye by J.D. Salinger, 1951.*

Due to its artefactual and spiritual nature, the little bear was placed, with respect and protection, among other 'spirit shaped animals', wooden animal manikins within a glass case. The case is constructed of a wooden stand, a frame and glass walls, all sharp, linear lines that construct a cube. This rectilinear container exhibits, exposes and isolates the objectified characters within. Steph Berns has studied glass cases as display technology especially when it comes to exhibiting objects with religious quality. The case provides physical but transparent barriers between exhibits and visitors. Besides disrupting, distancing, dislocating, plasticising and inhibiting relics from their pre-museum context and pre-'museumification', glass cases also enable certain socio-material conditions and political meanings (Berns 2016, 153–154). Glass cases determine visitors' behaviour by focusing attention and highlighting, dividing and grouping. In doing so, they add prestige to exhibited artefacts (ibid., 155–156) by preserving them and keeping them out of reach of the commoners. On the other hand, they also allow them to be observed up close while remaining at a distance (ibid., 156) due to the isolation that disables touching by accident or even by the breath. This confusion of closeness and distance is very much the same as in the earlier depicturing of the aesthetics of distance, including the virtual space created by optics, where magnified objects remain isolated, barred and separated by the very same technology that enables them to emerge for the visual sense, here the glass barrier.

While the little bear is exhibited differently than its relative, the Big Blonde, the way it is displayed to sensory-motor encounters has the capacity to record these encounters as well. The attempts to approach a glass-cased item leave a human-stain on the almost invisible barrier and therefore also make this barrier visible. These encounters with the barrier can be made visual by dusting glass-front museum cases for prints left by touching in order to measure their popularity (Berns 2016, 155). Dusting for prints does not fall far from Barad's example of Stern-Gerlach's experiment on so called 'space quantification'. In the experiment, the silver sulphides from the cigarette smoked by the examining scientist near the glass plate's surface on which they aimed to examine the patterns of radiation

made a pattern emerge. This accidental and embodied presence of class, gender and professional positioning was performed, providing them with a visualised phenomenon (Barad 2007, 162–165). A similar occurrence is recorded with the glass, visitor and a professionally designed positioning of exhibited objects, with a hint of added dust.

Even if the frames of art pieces are only supposed to be sensed marginally, as Ernst Gombrich argues (Berns 2016, 155), they still remain present as a structure allowing each of the presented objects constituting the Arctic to emerge and hold on. The glass is not only a protective barrier but also an apparatus that, together with its contents, co-constitutes the perceived phenomenon. That becomes much more obvious when the question is taken from the glass cover of a painting and the glass cover of an exhibition piece to scientific experimenting. A microscope slide, a test tube, a magnifying glass, a camera's lens; all of them form a frame that is also the scaffold for the produced phenomenon to stand up, to manifest and not to escape from sight or take uncontrollable or unperceivable forms.

The particular difference between the little bear and the other animal-shaped spirits is actually what is not there. That is, all the other animals go in pairs, like in Noah's Ark, but the little bear is standing oddly alone. This lack is, then again, an invitation, a preposition for occupation, a surface for emergence. While the glass may keep us physically apart from the little bear, it provides a surface for a device that enables a change of modality. This is done by the written narrative attached to the glass cabinet, which says the following:

There was only one little bear.

When I asked where the other one is,

Maria answered:

Don't you understand that

the other one is a human.

The lesson was the same I got as a young student

from Marina Takalo:

Bear is a human being,

believe it or not.

When the visitor of the exhibition gazes from the presented object to its frame, the cabinet, the eye may catch the text through which the purely visual mode of interpretation is altered to a linguistic one. This modular key on the presented barrier enables the visitor to engage with the little bear as intimately as with

the Big Blonde. The key is part of the text: '*the other*'. If we take it a little further, it says '*the other one is a*', '*Bear is a*'. While the text, with its symbolic systems of reference, is like the subconscious Ω, *the other* for the little bear is the '*a*', *objet petit a*, with the emphasis. That '*a*' is attached to the words 'human' and 'human being'. Therefore, there is not actually a claim that the bear is the small animal within the human, an *animalcule*, but that we are its minuscule, a *homunculus*, invited through this keyhole provided by the big Other, to adopt the lack left by the side of the little bear. As Foucault extended the meaning of discourse outside a document into an event in which the rules of formation define how the subject occurs (Reckwitz 2002, 248), so too does the little bear extend outside its representative frames, the glass cabinet, to the visitor's body, which in the discursive event is defined as a subject in a genealogical relation with the object. Unlike the Big Blonde, the wooden body of the little bear does not hold the capacity to record perceptions, nor it is consumed by the viewer's touch, but inevitably it is intra-connected.

A way to understand the liminal barrier constituted by the glass is to read it as a 'bar' based on Lacan's algebra. Beginning in 1957, from Ferdinand de Saussure's algorithm 'bar', the line that separates the signifier from the signified (Belsey 2005 [1980], 33; Lacan 1989 [1977], 149), Lacan's use of 'bar' is related to Martin Heidegger's way of crossing out the word 'being' (Heidegger 1959 [1956]). This practice of *sous rature*, being 'under erasure', is the crossing out of a word within a text while keeping it legible and in place (Sarup 1988, 35, 49), since it is "inadequate yet necessary" (ibid., 35), which is also known from the further work of Derrida in his grammatology and hauntology. This example shows a failure of language and its wording but is used as a necessity of linguistic communication. What is said is a lie, but it is a useful lie, so to speak. Meaning is derived from difference (Belsey 2005 [1980], 105), which language facilitates with words like 'me' and 'you'. 'I' or the 'other' do not exist as independent entities, so they are false claims, but they have their place in a sentence, where they can hold meaning in relation to each other. An abyss is not an abyss if it does not have edges from which to peer down and over and fall. The abyss can be found as close as within each of the s p a c i n g s between letters and words. It creates difference from which the meaning is derived. *Things&beings* occupy these spaces: they emerge between the lines, in their midst, owing their existence to such occupational emptiness. Derrida's *sous rature* line or crossing over "is the mark of the absence of a presence […] always absent present […] the lack at the origin" (Spivak 1997 [1974], xviii), sharing its denial of origins, its origins under erasure, with Nietzschean genealogy. Concerning the matter of the display of the little bear barred by the glass, Derrida's argument can be reformulated as its reverse: *the presence of absence*. As for the little bear, in that specific constitution, 'I', the emergence of the self, identity and identification, develops between the wooden animal-shaped spirit and the viewer

on the almost invisible surface, becoming visible on the dividing and uniting bar in the form of print.

In Lacan's use of bar, the combination of Saussure's algorithm and Heidegger's *sous rature* constituted the *barred S*, the barred subject, which represents and designates the split of the divided subject due to language. When this concept is placed upon the exhibited little bear, the subject is on both sides of the glass, not cut but rather centred. A bar does not necessarily cut: it may also pin down, meaning that it does not only create division but also may facilitate and stabilise a phenomenon, such as in the process of exhibiting. The glass is not supressing any relation or resisting some form of emergence. It is the core of the intra-action, action that is circling around the bar, the glass cover. It is like the barred horns of an ox, becoming an alphabet, a beginning for certain cultivation and culture. This surface of emergence is the *extimacy*, bearing the relation, a state where the subject is both inside and outside of the barrier, the other and the brother.

The function of the 'I' as a bar, a surface for the emergence for a type of third presence that is nevertheless absent but around which the two parties constitute their relations, can be further elaborated by looking into two different techniques used in composing music and exploring how it emerges in the act of performing music. The first technique is 'music written in three staves'. Here 'I' is the added middle stave, a surface on which the pianist's 'third hand' takes its place. As the third stave may indicate the use of another instrument, including a human voice, it relates to the three-hand technique. The technique creates a three-hand effect in the performance, produced typically by keeping the melody in the middle register decorated by a arpeggio figuration in the treble and bass registers with high and low sounding notes (see Hamilton 1998, 58). These notes may continue playing through the echo of the pedal. In the act of playing the interlocking hand positions, having parts that overlap or fit together, crossing arms create an intersection, an X-line, from where the third hand parts. The third hand cannot be seen, but it is audible. It is therefore co-constituted by the two hands *in-their-midst.* The second technique concerns a ghost note, where Derrida's barred word is crossed over, *sous rature*, a hauntology written in music. It is a musical note with a rhythmic value and without discernible pitch when played, represented in written music with 'X' replacing the note head or '( )' written around the note head (see for example Strong 2020, 118). The notes that are hardly there, hardly audible, nevertheless create a difference in the complete performance of the musical chord. As the *sous rature* marks the absence of presence, the absence matters *in-the-midst* of the presence.

Now that we have studied the scale that covers glass surfaces and containers for microscopic conducts, and that of the exhibition cases, we should extend it to the architectural scope. In the Arktikum building, not only are the visitors sharing the glass case of the little bear but that of the Big Blonde as well. This cohabitation is provided by the very architecture of the building that houses the Science Centre. The

most distinctive feature of the building, which was constructed before including the Arctic Centre's research institute's semi-arc of the building, is a glass tube, or what the architect Claus Bonderup calls a "string" (Bonderup 2012, 32–33). We, the visitors, are glancing at an exhibition object through the glass that contains them, and so too are we being captured by a gargantuan test tube, which, at least for me, is the most iconic item of science.

The tube not only contains us in this environment exhibiting scientific outcomes but also provides us a specific perspective, extending at an "angle of 270 degrees" (Bonderup 2012, 34) toward the Arctic out there, at the end of the string, the bottom of the test tube. As always with test subjects and apparatuses, there is the gaze glancing through from the other side, the preposition built within this constitution. If for nothing else, this mind game is to clarify that the experimented and exhibited Arctic includes a small human, a *homunculus* that gazes back through the barrier that by enfolding enables its very existence. While the invalidated reasoning of *homunculus argument* has been used to depict an internal observer within one's head (Kenny 1971), I consider the *homunculus* as a way to place the gaze outside oneself to a distanced standpoint, to peer back down and by such gaze objectify oneself as a scientific paradigm. For such architecture or the design of exhibits, whether the small human under the eye is within a small glass case or under a glass roof differs only by scale.

In the architect's vision, the Arktikum is supposed to merge into the landscape, therefore being constructed partially underground and made almost transparent by the structures that stretch above the ground level (Bonderup 2012, 32). While it is presented as a portal, the gateway to the north, pointing towards the Arctic, it is also a cut in the landscape "a simple geometrical […] figure" (ibid.). And no matter how concealed, the water leaks in the world of intra-actions, either from the flooding Kemi River or from the glass and steel roof due to the thermal expansion. The Arctic does not stay out: it slips in without being sterilised into an isolated experience and experiment. Therefore, the tube is not to be considered merely a barrier but also an ensemble of various forms of materiality and practices.

Just as glass can be a barrier, it can also be turned into magnifying, reflecting, refracting, diffracting and kaleidoscopic apparatuses. One of the most revealing applications of glass is possibly one of the most mundane as well. Have you ever looked into eyeglasses when they are being worn? The source of light, the angle at which the surface of the lens meets, the quality of the lens and its frame and the place from where you see it can come together to provide the following visual phenomenon: the surroundings, captured by the glass-provided vision, are reflected on the lens, so that you can see what the perceiver with the glasses peers at. What is more striking is that when frameless eyeglasses are looked from the side, one may see both the eye behind the glasses and its double within the glass, eyes peering through the eyes, minuscule in size compared to the organic pair.

Now the lens not only shows what is seen, but the intention to see, the seeing. This example depicts very well the characteristics of this small human, and the *homunculic* nature of perceptions adjusted by apparatuses, common for intent of clarity and central in science. A human must turn in/to a *homunculus* in order to make scientific inquiries, whether it is done through the borderlining, magnifying and framing glasses splitting the eyes in two or making samples, ratios, statistics, diagrams, pixels or vectors. They have their own pair of eyes, minusculed and doubled, split, a gaze that has left the eye, hidden in their structure, peering back from a queer angle.

What ought we say about the scientific constituting the Arctic, such as that presented in the Arktikum Science Centre? In the metaphor of *Blind men and an Elephant* presented in the introduction, it is assumed that the characteristics belong to the same authentic entity and the perception and interpretation is just a matter of the aspect or point of entry. In Haruki Murakami's short story *The Dancing Dwarf* in the collection *The Elephant Vanishes* (Murakami 1993), the elephant factory shows this entity as something that can be manufactured. In Murakami's description of the factory, the matter of assembling an elephant is a very complex one, requiring a huge area and several departments for manufacturing different parts, such as ears, heads, trunks and toenails. Gaining a complete picture of the elephant requires the employees of the factory to take turns in different departments of the factory. The term 'reconstitution' is used due to the fact that the factory elephants are only one-fifth genuine and four-fifths imitation, having some authenticity but mainly aiming to produce something as an answer to the 'want' of people. Therefore, Murakami's approach to the elephant is that it is something assembled from separated parts that are joined together afterwards. That is to say, elephants are 'articulated', whether or not we consider the joined parts as having been originally taken apart from a whole (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020t). In Murakami's short story, the viewers of the elephant and the elephant itself are not aware of which parts are authentic and which are not, as long as it functions properly. Only the co-constitution matters.

What else is the matter? What else does the analogy drawn between scientific knowledge and the elephants, that of the blind men and those of the elephant factory, give us? The hands. For the blind men, their hands are their access to the unknown surrounding world. They may discover, but they do not make anything out of it. In the elephant factory, the elephants are manufactured, made by hands, *manus*, man-made. Hands do not replace the blinded eyes, but they constitute the elephant for the eyes. These hands, on the other hand, are visible only as the elephant; they have their presence in the elephant. The imprinted humanity is yet again not a fingerprint on the genuine or artificial leather of the animal but on its entity, on its reproduction and on the want that demands it come into being, to be set under its gaze.

I realize now that the reality of things is not something you convey to people but something you make. It is this that gives birth to meaning.

— The Elephant Vanishes, A Window by Haruki Murakami, 1993.

As this Arctic world within the glass tube has its bears, so too does it have its boats as well. The titanic test tube has real resemblance to the Palm house of Kew Gardens' ship design. Furthermore, it has served as a part of an 'impossible bottle', more precisely a 'ship in a bottle', occupied by such items as the Viking boat (Kivilahti & Heikkilä 2012, 44). Learning about the actual difficulty of getting the boat inside the glass tube is a story of its own. In any case, the lesson here is the impossible act and how it is conducted. As with the bottle and a miniature boat inside of it, it is made 'possible' due to de- and reconstruction. The object is assembled into one piece, a singularity, inside the bottle, not by placing a full object through the narrow passage. Another method is to mould the bottle afterwards around the contained object: that is to say that there never was an empty bottle in the first place: a practical matter in the making of magical realism. The same goes for exhibitions. Bonderup himself writes: "The experience of seeing and exhibition is, of course, in itself a fiction—something unreal" (Bonderup 2012, 33). While Bonderup emphasises that the shape of the building is adjusted to the landscape, therefore a naturalistic element, it is also supposed to be a chance to dive into a fairy-tale (ibid., 34). For the architect, the building and what it represents is a fairy-tale, a phantasy.

One could claim that since Bonderup's understanding does not emerge from the intimacy of actually dwelling in the Arctic, it will inevitably lead to the constructing of a milieu that is more or less based on a phantasy. And even though Bonderup narrates the design as connected to the landscape, it is very much simply adjusted to it—or rather, the landscape is adjusted to it, since its characteristics are owed to the reforming of the land after the erection of the building (Bonderup 2012, 33). The claim for the imported nature of the design and the argument that it does not emerge from the locality becomes apparent when seeing the vacation house of Bonderup in Blokhus, Jutland, built before Arktikum already in the 70s, with two glass openings with steel frames pushing into the daylight from the structures buried underground. That makes the Arktikum as locally inspired a design as the rectilinearity of the Canadian colonial schools. But then again, is it not the case that the whole concept of the Arctic is an external, imported term, emphasising distance, otherness and, by implanting close to the geographical borderline of the Arctic circle, first and foremost an act of self-alienation? And is it not the case that the whole term is a phantasy, that the most central feature of the Arctic, that which matters, is that it is a complete phantasy, if ever completed? Then what about "the real, that lies behind the phantasy" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 54)? The Arctic as

something Real, with a capital R following Lacan, is impossible, since the *Real is the impossible*.

> *I'm the existence which you all refer to as 'the World'. And 'Universe', and 'God', and 'Truth', and 'All', and 'One'. And I am also yourself.*
>
> — *Fullmetal Alchemist: Brotherhood by Yasuhiro Irie, 2011 [2010], ep. 63.*

> *It's a symbol that denies the absence of meaning, the meaning that's necessitated by the delineation of one system from another. In analog, that's God. In digital, it's zero.*
>
> — *Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex by Kenji Kamiyama, 2005 [2003], ep. 15.*

> *I sometimes think we are merely passing figures in a godless universe.*
>
> — *A Passage to India (film) by David Lean, 1984.*

The Real for Lacan opposes the imaginary and exists beyond the symbolic, therefore evading representation and language, pictures and words. Philosophically, it relates to Immanuel Kant's *things-in-themselves*, which are defined as absolute and complete in themselves; it is language and representations that create lacks, gaps and missing pieces (Johnson 2018 [2013], 2.1.3). One way to state the Real is to consider it the surplus of reality that is irreducible to language, stating also that the difference between reality and the Real is that reality is something accessible (No Subject - Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis 2006), while the Real is something "that eludes us", a missed encounter (Lacan 1977 [1973], 53, 55). The Real cannot be symbolised, and therefore it constitutes the limits of the Other and the subject itself (Böhm & Batta 2010, 352). Where the symbolic consists of differentiated and differentiating symbols, the Real is undifferentiated. Due to this differentiation, signifying is a cut in the Real, producing the world of words that states the order of things. The Real cannot have a positive presence empirically or in a text, and it is analytically impossible to point out, as by its very definition it is an ontological negativity without a positive ontological status (Hoedemaekers 2010, 380–381, 384). Therefore, the Real is impossible, since it cannot be imagined or pronounced. Things can only materialise as something significant, something different, always in relation, never as the Real, which is indifferent and without significance. *In reality, nothing is Real*.

In the practice of psychoanalysis, this impossibility and resistance to symbolisation lends the Real its traumatic quality, since the experience of whatever disobediently differs from the mundane state of affairs compromises the fabric of reality, and

where commonly the signification of event and matters are returned to symbolic and imaginary, the encounter with the Real does not bend to such management. The Real remains "'outside' discourse that can be identified and described, but it is something that operates at a point of breakdown of representation" (Parker, 2005, 176), and therefore it remains as a cut in the fabrication.

There is another interpretation of the traumatic cause, which is caused by the symbolic and imaginary. While the symbolic is based on meanings that derive from a differentiation from the other and therefore produce separations between things, the imaginary, whether with reflections, mirrors, cameras or prints, split the self into self and image of the self with framing surfaces and containers. What I can make out of this is that these cuts are not breaking the fabric of reality: rather, the fabric is woven from these separated strands. As Lacan says, "I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an object", where temporally the self is "the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming" (Lacan 1989 [1977], 86). Therefore, existence in itself is traumatic, since it is based on this differentiation from non-existence, and existence also enables any other becoming trauma to take place. What there is not cannot be cut, but what is cut makes two out of none. There are no existential and permanent things and beings *an sich* to cut apart: the cut emerges in the same moment as the articulated entities happen, *touché*.

> *The touch was still there within me. More real than this reality.*
>
> — *Dance Dance Dance by Haruki Murakami, 1994 [1988].*

Lacan adopts the term *touché* from Aristotle, in whose work, according to Lacan, touch emerges as search for cause (Lacan 1977 [1973], 53). It is limited to beings capable of choice, excluding therefore, for example, objects (ibid., 69), which do not have or do not carry intention, differing from the Lacanian reading of *objet petit a* and the object's capacity to gaze back. In Lacan's reading, he gives *touché* the meaning of the encounter with the Real (ibid., 52), "encounter so far as it can be missed […] essentially the missed encounter" (ibid., 55). I have come to understand that for Lacan this kind of 'close call' with the nothingness of the Real that cannot be negotiated with symbolic and imaginary orders is a traumatic encounter, a disturbance compromising the cohesion of the subject that has touched upon it but that, by missing it, has remained a subject without turning into nothingness or non-subject.

In his philosophical study *de Anima*, Aristotle concludes, based on his empiricism and analysis, that the sensory organ becomes like the object that it senses. In the case of touch, this would mean that warmth is sensed by the organ that is cooler in relation to a hot object by the transfer of warmth: that it therefore heats

up—that is the sensation—and becomes more like the sensed object characterised by warmness (Freeland 2003 [1995], 227, 231). The same would go for sensing pressure, enabling us to make sense of textures, smoothness and hardness, where handling stones would inevitable harden the skin of the hands. Aristotle therefore recognises sensing also as "some kind of suffering" (ibid., 233), which makes sense, since overheating the hand may lead to the sensation of burning and feeling out sharpness may lead to cuts. In comparison with architectural objects, the Arktikum house's "'icy finger' pointing the north" (Arctic Centre 2019), the glass structure, is touching and being touched by the Arctic hemisphere. During the nightless night it grows overly hot, and it is chilly during the polar winter for the people inside. For the building itself, its extending and shrinking structure is compromised due to the encounter with the Arctic seasons, without even mentioning the river flood, which has been institutionalised in the memory of the building with a marking on the wall indicating the level of the flood that entered the corridor.

It seems that being in touch and sensing compromises the organ. Even though Aristotle's study is biologically and neurologically outdated, the philosophical questions, in the light of this thesis, are not. As it has already been brought up, both sensing and being sensed withhold the capacity for suffering, the capacity to cause it and to perceive it in representations, as in the case of A-M's perception of the rectangular school and that of the presence of a camera among the reindeer. Aristotle's idea of *becoming like the other* may be truer when it comes to the apparatus that senses and the objects that it provides and produces for the senses. It could very well be said that in these co-constituted objects and outcomes, the sense and the sensed object have come together. For example, the camera resembles the anatomy and function of an organic eye, and it can constitute the object within it when photographed, also reducing the target into a visual entity. The outcomes for the organic eye and for the target of photography may be various, but in the apparatus of vision, the camera, they have become like the other, closer to one another, both the 'seeing' and 'the seen' in one object.

> *[...] I mean, it was really real, what I felt, but if I try to explain it in words, then it sort of starts to slip away. [...]*
>
> — *Dance Dance Dance by Haruki Murakami, 1994 [1988].*

> *'You can pass right through the wall.' [...], but you'll never get back. It's different over there. That's the otherworld. [']*
>
> — *Dance Dance Dance by Haruki Murakami, 1994 [1988].*

Another question arises from the compromising side of the sensing, the alteration of sensing in the organ and likely in its objects as well. If the sensing organ may

alter, would that not make the identities involved much more fluid in sensing? What is compromised in the touch? In her revised essay on touch, Barad applies the question to particles and quantum physics, with an outcome that moves away from the understanding of classical physics where the negatively charged electrons disable touch and toward an understanding of the totality of touch, queering it, opening up endless possibilities of becoming, demoralising, annihilating, re-emerging and inevitably compromising identities fundamentally in touch (Barad 2015). What Barad's account on touching and Lacan's *touché* share is that the both compromise identities, whether as a missed encounter on the way to nothingness or the queering of the linearity of such passage. They both indicate the possibility of being or becoming something else. While we have the infinity of becoming something else, starting from the fundamental and natural features of the particles, to some extent we may remain, if not the same, then similar to what we were a moment ago. I may be becoming myself, instead of something else or some other. I will suggest that *touché*, as a missed encounter with the Real, fundamentally compromises the cohesive identity of a being, and therefore the missed encounter confirms the identities through repeated trauma.

By touching, I risk and re-establish. I am a human, touching the other, which is a bear. This is a close call to becoming something else, but we end up calling it different identifying names. And in the detached touch, after the touching ends, the trauma, the cutting apart, is repeated. The old scar of 'I' is cut fresh open. To repeat Spielrein, time after time, the destruction is a cause of coming into being. The word and act of touching entails the difference, the division, since it is not to 'merge' but to 'touch', a momentary state of affairs. And all the sentences "I touched / I was touched / it was touching / touch me" have the subject, the self or the other, executing the act. Still, that act is an intra-act. The parties did not hold each other from a distance: they came together, and where they cut loose, they re-established both from the same momentary partial unity. Writing and reading oneself is to "touch and self-touch […] in-touchness" (van Manen 2014, 360). In *touché*, if we don't change into the bear by touching it, we *make sense of the bear and we bear the touch.*

> *A hole, after all, is something. This is nothing at all.*
>
> *No eye can bear the sight of utter nothingness.*
>
> *— The Neverending Story by Michael Ende, 1983 [1979].*
>
> *The only unbearable thing is that nothing is unbearable.*
>
> *— Total Eclipse by Christopher Hampton, 1996 [1982].*

'What is', in a way that is both paradoxical and self-evident, concerns the ability to know the Real. How does one make sense of something that is not sensible? To say that the Real is less than nothing must be supplemented with the fact that it would go even beyond comparatives, which are always relational. Since the Real is nothing, then nothing is Real. Nothing more, nothing less, only Real. Writing about ~~Real~~ should be only done under erasure, since the word does not apply. It cannot even be defined as negation, since a determinate negation happens always already in relation to that absence in presence that it negates. It is still beyond our language, and there is no way to pronounce, to prove its existence by language. Due to its character, the Real is something that cannot be studied in the manner of writing, speaking, gesturing or illustrating. If I succeed in writing something down about the Real, I have already failed, since the Real does not allow itself to be bent into letters and cannot be signified by its name, which is based on language and symbols. I cannot include it in any graph or image, pattern or formula, since it does not figure out in any figuration. It cannot be made comprehensible, since it is, by its very non-existing essence, incomprehensible. And what would be the point, when there is not even 'a point' in the Real, since you cannot count even to one, 'a', without more than one (Nancy 2000 [1996], 39), to draw a line that is already a relation, belonging to the Other? *The Real is the undoing of all figurations*. But I dare to say that I can begin to imagine the Real…and only to begin. In proceeding to do so, in moving further on, one would lose the thought and the self on the way: there is a point of no return in encountering the Real, since the reason to do so is also already lost. If one loses one's reason to exist, one might as well cease to exist. That is as far as my thought takes me in order to write it down. What is captured in the writing must therefore be, not the Real, but actually the barely-missed encounter with the Real, *touché*, since the Real is unbearable.

Barad raises the very same problematics, that the attempt to say anything about nothing would be "a performative breach of that which one means to address" (Barad 2012, 4). To Barad, this also comes down to the question of measuring, which would include the given scales and metrics and the instruments that conduct them, and which in the attempt would introduce nothingness to something and would be "thereby destroying the very conditions we seek" (ibid., 5). "Measurements are world-making: matter and meaning do not pre-exist, but rather are co-constituted via measurement intra-actions" (ibid., 6). Could it then arguably be that nothingness could be achieved simply by giving up metrics, measures and their means, as these are always comparative, systematic, and therefore imaginary and symbolic, always in relation to the other? Then again, in a post-humanist and new-materialist account, as Barad presents, intra-active measuring is not limited to human practices but those of other entities of physics as well (ibid., 8), and they make sense of the world and therefore make the world.

No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality; even larks and katydids are supposed, by some, to dream.

— The Haunting of Hill House by Shirley Jackson, 1959.

The truth is death, he wrote. I fought nicely against it as long as I could ... danced with it, festooned it, waltzed it around, decorated it with streamers, titillated it...”

— Slaughterhouse-Five, or The Children's Crusade by Kurt Vonnegut, 1969.

A humane experiencing of the Real comes probably closest to what we can imagine as death. If it is not the death of a being, it is the end of what we know to be a human being. Whether or not living in the Real is possible, it is not so for a human; it may require one to become or decompose into something other beyond what we know as the characteristics of human intelligence. As has been clear in the light of the presented examples and paradigms, this intelligence is not something that is only structured in the brain or in the body; it extends far beyond that. *One cannot dwell in the Real as a human being.* As if the golden plaque representing humanity would turn in space to such position where significant bodies would first distort and then turn into surreal shapes, finally disappearing from sight, narrowing to a simple line. Such a state is described well in the documentary *Hugo Pratt, Trait pour trait*, where comic book creator Pratt's death is narrated using a single illustration from his comic, an explosion, announcing with free translations that maybe *death is a condition where the dots do not form anymore a line* (Thomas 2016). That would mean that any number of dots, when not placed in a relation with others, their totality nullifies their meaning, since without relation, comparison or count they do not carry a meaning in themselves and are not returnable to any means or outcomes. The Real is something that I would call *the end of figurations*.

Time wavered, sequentiality twisted, gravity lost its force. Memories, old memories, like vapor, wafted up. [...] The sea was one enormous idea, [...] A void enveloped the phantom figures and was encompassed by a yet greater void. Flesh melted to the bone and blew away like dust [...] My body decomposed, blew apart—and was whole again.

— Dance Dance Dance by Haruki Murakami, 1994 [1988].

If the aim of scientific contribution is to discover truth, how does it line up with the Real if the truth is to be unchangeable and absolute? For reality, which I find to be intra-changeable, indivisible truth is the impossible. Such truth does not return to reality. This paradox is described well by the analogy of a black hole, which

is characterised as a singularity and not an object, a state where the normal rules of nature conducting reality do not apply, and around the unsymbolisability of which the known and acknowledgeable reality orbit (Johnson 2018 [2013], 2.1.3; PlasticPills 2020). A similar paradigm is presented in the film *Interstellar* (Nolan 2014), where the possible answer to a problem, the truth, is in the centre of a blackhole, from which it can be achieved but from which no knowledge can escape and no radio wave can carry it back over and beyond the event horizon. *Truth loses its meaning when we achieve it*. It becomes *pointless*.

> *It's not a question of making yourself believe there is an orange there, you just have to forget there isn't one.*
>
> — *The Elephant Vanishes, Barn Burning by Haruki Murakami,1993.*

To forget nothingness is to be achieved by repetition, a manoeuvre, a practice reproducing the figuration, whether it is a non-existing orange made to exist by peeling, chewing and spitting, or what I have written in the title of this thesis as *arcticulation*, a portmanteau consisting of 'articulation' and 'arctic', therefore the practice of *the joining of parts constituting the Arctic*. De-dismantling, forgetting, this evading of knowing the Real may come close to what, according to Miller, Lacan claimed, that there is "no desire to know […] only […] the drive not to know" (Miller 2005 [1986], VI). This might be due to the fact that, frankly speaking, the truth, *the Real as the truth behind the truth*, might be an antithesis for the self.

In a conversation with associate professor Frank Sejersen on the 14th of November 2019, he asked me whether it might be that *the 'individual' is the biggest hoax of our time*. That question resembles the Lacanian Real, the encounter of which would present one's life as a fiction and, in discovering the true self, would have the danger of finding nothing at all, the lost object that we never had, a significance (see PlasticPills 2020). It does not only bear the risk of not finding oneself but also coming to the realisation that there was nothing to be found in the first place. When it comes to the lost object, let us have a look to the moment of birth. There was not something to be lost, since in a corporeal manner we were considered part of it, this different entity, a baby-bearing mother. This conclusion requires revising, since we could not have been a part of something as a matter of fact, since "we" did not exist at that point, only in retrospect, in a *preformative* manner. Borrowing from Lacan, it is like waking up from sleep due to a knocking on a door, before which the knock enters the dream: "When the knocking occurs […] my consciousness reconstitutes itself around this representation – that I know that I am waking up, that I am *knocked up*" (Lacan 1977 [1973], 56). The Real hides behind this lack of representation (ibid., 60). What Lacan probably did not mean, or what his translator did not intend, is that the phrase 'knocked up' is an euphemism for pregnancy. The

self is impregnated with consciousness in the knocking, constituted around an act, perception and event.

Since the self is unable to dwell in the Real, at least not in such form as that which we consider 'human', how can one manage the Real? The self can be equated with the character 'I' as one of its meanings. 'I' is not only to be pronounced as 'aɪ' (for 'me', 'self' or 'ego'), but also for as Roman letter 'one'. The 'aɪ' is also the way to pronounce 'eye', where 'I' stands as a first letter in an 'image' or 'idol', where idol holds the meaning of both a statue and mirror-image. As we already know, 'I' is a split, whether separating self from the other or, as a countable, proclaiming that there is to be another countable, or at least that there is one that is counting the countable, a split of the self. Indivi*dual* is *in* the division. The risk that the true-self is non-existing makes the 'I' a cut through which to fall into nothingness, into the abyss of the Real. Then again, if 'I' is considered a cut, it should have the two edges, the two facing cliffs over the gorge to bridge over. The split is therefore the first place for a relation to emerge. As Derrida claims, "There is no real end to methodological analysis, no hidden unity to be grasped once the breaking-down process has been completed. Themes can be split up *ad infinitum*. […] they are knitting together again in response" (Derrida 1978 [1967], 287), both pointing out the possibility of continuing endlessly to divide particles further while they start to reconnect from another end. The analyser while disconnecting from one figuration will simultaneously engage with another one in order to make sense and co-constitute meaning.

> *And from then on I bathed in the Poem*
>
> *Of the Sea, infused with stars and lactescent,*
>
> *Devouring the azure verses*
>
> — *The Drunken Boat by Arthur Rimbaud, 2005.*

Let us say that the Real is a sea. The horizon of truth moves further on while we tend to approach it. The way to encounter it is like Arthur Rimbaud's *Drunken Boat*, by sinking below the surface, to move on the level of the horizon and below it. The boat both consumes and is being engulfed by the sea, drinking and sinking (Lawler 1992, 33). A sunken boat loses its consistency as a boat and becomes a wreck. The horizon is the aim to move towards, a drive, but as a goal it would mean sinking below the surface, the end of the journey, *jouissance*. Reality on the other hand is the surface, with its stillness and its movement, its altering shapes and patterns of waves and the reflection on the surface confirming one's being above the surface, constituted by the doubling split. At the same time, this doubling is not only reassuring but also presents the opposite, the mirror-image, as belonging

to the same beingness, shatters the unity when the barring surface is breached and hides the depths of the Real under this doubling. The Real is beyond, behind or beneath phenomenal appearances (Johnson 2018 [2013], 2.1.3). To get over the Real is possible only by relation*ship*.

Such *relation*ships have been plenty on our journey so far, whether deconstructed and reconstructed, forged from gold, following sea currents, encapsulating exotic plants or exhibited in a corridor under a glass roof. Greek explorer and scientist Pytheas wrote about sailing to the Ultima Thule in his lost work *The Seas of the World*, which during the antiquity referred to an area or island situated in the extreme north, surrounded by cold sea, the existence and location of which was doubted (Lainemaa & Nurminen 2001, 12). In a sense it was a pre-arctic, a known-unknown region, which in its depiction seemed to resist the natural laws of the Mediterranean reality. This northernmost space did not appear to be a humane environment for the many that first approached it during the Western history of the Arctic. For example, there were the perceptions of what was most likely sea ice and snow, which Pytheas could not categorise as solid, liquid or gas, the basic compounds of the reality in which he dwelt. Also, Adam of Bremen in the 11th century, while describing what is now understood as the flood tide's effect on sailing, wrote about an unstable sea and profound chaos (ibid., 83). Human agency also seems to be beyond recognition. In the time of antiquity, it was believed to be the home of 'hyberboreans', barbarian inhabitants (ibid., 10, 16). Much later, in the 1500s, when English Martin Frobisher for first time saw Eskimos (Inuit) in kayaks, they thought they were seals (ibid. 75), likely due to the animal hides under which their human features vanished.

> *In size. Of their bodies. The elephant's and the keeper's. The balance seemed to have changed somewhat. I had the feeling that to some extent the difference between them had shrunk.*
>
> — *The Elephant Vanishes, The Elephant Vanishes by Haruki Murakami, 1993.*

> *Well, he manifests himself as an absence; as though he weren't there at all.*
>
> — *Brave New World by Aldous Huxley, 1932.*

On this journey in a *relation*ship I have already taken along at least a bear, a cat, a dog, a horse, an ox, a reindeer/caribou, a seal, a songbird, a snake and… an elephant. We have to take the analogy of scientific knowledge one elephant further. In Murakami's *The Elephant vanishes*, both the elephant and its keeper suddenly disappear from the zoo. The traces left behind by the human and the animal are only their incorporeal presence, the matter of not being there. All their

material bindings seem to be completely intact. By vanishing, they are influencing and infusing with the discourse, haunting the surroundings which they tended to corporeally occupy. The community, authorities and institutions all need to react, to contribute to the facts that are not there. How can one accept that a local icon is no longer, or that a possible dangerous natural force is roaming free or that someone's property might have been stolen? Does that not sound like the Arctic?

Finally, the only hint given in Murakami's short story concerning the vanishing is the eye witness claiming that the difference in size between the keeper and the elephant had shrunk. That is to say that we are not discussing about actual disappearance, not about absence, but about distance in scale. The fact that they either seemed to shrink or grow, with diminishing difference in size, coming closer to one another, stands for the impossibility of differentiation. When it comes to the scientific study of a phenomenon, we study this 'elephant', like the blind men, through our senses and sensibilities, like the employees of the factory manufacturing them to our likings. And then they suddenly disappear, because they become a likings-of-the-human-beings. They have shrunk in size to become so minuscule that they slip out of our conscious perception, while still leaving the undertone, the baseline for our being as a reasoning *homo sapiens*. But that would mean only that the elephant vanishes and not its keeper. We ought to know how the human vanishes.

While the elephant is namely object and the keeper is an agent holding the act of 'keeping', this agency makes him subjected to the object, since their joined constitution is elephant's keeper, where the elephant also claims ownership over the keeper and the keeper is such as long as he is keeping the elephant, without which he would not exist as its keeper. Science makes the scientist, the tamed makes the tamer. When the distance between them nullifies, they vanish from the perception, leaving an empty elephant chain, a material surplus of their co-existence. Let us consider this chain as a rectilinear standard, or as a circular cosmology. The hunting, the herding, the ploughing, the roaming is moving along one with the another, *chasing-being-chased*, *leading-being-led*. What this co-movement constitutes when the corporeal beings, the ox and caribou among the humans, vanish is the tracks and traces on the ground, their corporeal being left in the plants, soil and ground, as left lacks and leftovers, dents, cuts and transitions.

As abstractions, the tracks are recorded, inherited in the canons, standards, practices, designs and thoughts. When the biodiversity of plants, the effect of grazing on the land or historical human inhabitation are studied by measuring, documenting and excavating, the human–animal presence re-emerges in modern science. The same happens in vertical measurements when digging from present to past. History as a physical entity, destruction as a cause of past coming into being. How about the 'nature' of which it is recorder? Yet again, the ox ploughs with the man, and the herder runs the caribou. The land is managed with the same

measures, whether in economy or in science, and the same forms are forced, adjusted or placed on it as before. One lives rectilinearly and then documents this life rectilinearly. Rectilinearity does not show, since it is not visible on the picture but as the frame. When these practices are exercised, they become repetitions, the emergence of the heritage, the subconscious of the material. The elephant chain surrounds the incorporeal leg that the incorporeal hand has chained.

Vanishing does not mean undoing. Something that cannot be traced or located to a static object is nevertheless something that can be incorporated, since while the incorporeal is nowhere to be found, it is everywhere to be searched from. To be more precise, we have to add an emphasis, *in*corporated: while keeping it connected to the body of the word, we also give it an emphasis to express itself as a preposition as well. And that is where we have reached our preformatted answer: *Arctic in Change*. What it suggests is not actually to say that the Arctic is changing, but that the very essence of the term is to be located and placed *in the change*!

In change places the Arctic beyond any geographical location or geophysical conditions, which both then again are changing in a long run. The key difference is the total destabilisation of the term, placing it into impermanency. It is like saying that it is in the flow of water, impossible to grasp or to exhaust. While such condition may seem to be a politically intolerable state of affairs, it is actually at the very core of politics—debatable, negotiable, and merged together with knowledge—whether scientific, traditional or indigenous. And like water with its constant flow, the *Arctic in change* is still something that can be acted on, to be managed and adjusted to accumulate power. For the politics, it is the lost, and therefore discoverable, object that never existed in the first place. As one ought to present recommendations based on the research conclusion, mine is that *if we are to write 'the Arctic' with a capital letter*, I would suggest *we bar the first letter*, Ⱥ. Therefore, the spelling would be 'the Ⱥrctic'. Placed into symbolic order, it crosses out the Ⱥrctic as an object, as a noun, whereas the lowercase would treat the term rather as an adjective or verb. Barring the 'A' makes more than a mere word, since as an image, Ⱥ becomes an iceberg, where the top emerges above the line, where the rest rests under the surface. A great deal of the matter remaining invisible in the peeking phenomenon is the heritage that only shows in the emergence.

According to Heraclitus, the only constant in life, or the only thing permanent, is change. That gives the permanency to its very opposite, the change, wrapping the two opposites around each other. With the preposition *in,* another *extimacy* is displayed. The tail has reached the mouth. The Ⱥrctic dwells in the change, and 'arctic' is a constant circle of becoming, where destruction is the cause of coming into being, whether this becoming of the being is also to be located to the 'past'. By this I refer to the way the Arctic enters into political discourse through the change that compromises the preformatted identities of, for example, ecosystems, natural resources and native-indigenous cultures. The *beforeness* only comes into being

when compared to the present, another lost object, the past defined by the current moment, a loss or replacement. As neurologist and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl claimed: in transition, the past is not annihilated but restored (Noetic Films 2019). Therefore, the history of 'arctic' comes into being in its compromising destruction, restored in changes such as colonialism and climate change.

When we look at where the different approaches towards the Arctic come from, starting at colonialism and moving through ecological and climatic change to exoticism, at the core of all of them is alienation. Foreign cultures, foreign knowledge, foreign animals, foreign environment, foreign region, foreign history. These actualise in the arctic discourse through the discovering of the other, whether it is the Arctic as foreign or the being foreign in the Arctic. To mention a few, the gaze described earlier on in the aesthetics of distance depicts the Arctic as something out there in the distance, while the Big Blonde can be interpreted as an attempt to familiarise and tame this otherness, while Aranda sampled an artificial sub-arctic bubble as an alien ship sailing on its waters and the ox emerged as an incorporeal but incorporated alien, an invasive species brought in by rectilinear shapes.

As an alien, the Arctic is a type of anamorphosis, bound to this specific alien perspective that makes it pop out from the background that could be also called the rest of the world. Given the fact that 'arctic' is rather an aspect that makes certain adjectives emerge, acted out as verbs, the concept is also on the move, fleeting, distorted and not in unison with the rest, simply because of the fact that it is pronounced as other. Therefore, the second recommendation derived from the research at hand is that *while writing the arctic with lowercase letter 'a', to write it with an italicised first letter*, as '*a*rctic'. That is to say that *a*rctic is first and foremost about the incorporated other, about the *petit a*, always fleeting, always *in change*.

> He takes care of this world here. He sees that things are tied together, makes sure connections are made. […] he wears a sheepskin. This is where he's been living. In hiding.

> — *Dance Dance Dance by Haruki Murakami, 1994 [1988].*

In Murakami's short story, the elephant factory is just the background story for something else, and the same goes for the Arctic here. The Arctic is a sheet of paper on which to write, or a canvas on which to project. Something else along the journey to discover its essence, the right question to open it up, has been peeking through. The driving force in the story is the minuscule man, a dancing dwarf, emerging in dreams, embodying people, teaching and taking over, influencing the course of kingdoms. According to Murakami, the dwarf is not dancing: it is the

dance. A pure *jouissance*. In the novel *Dance Dance Dance*, another strange figure dwells in a space of decade and darkness, wearing a sheep's hide, keeping up the connections of the world that might otherwise fall apart. In my interpretation, it is a figuration surrounded by the uncovering Real. A very similar figure figures out from the characters that have been presented within these pages. Hiding, lurking, popping up and moving along, in the shadow or casting its own through and throughout. On the hide of the polar bear, in the wording of the Arctic, on and under the saddle seat, as a window frame, inside a dark room, left on something that it is not by someone it is not, a bordering beingless being, an in/corporeal being or a making rather than a maker or made. When it comes to research, it is not as much studied by science as it is the cause of science. It is the sensory-motor ensemble, a preposition, a liminal encounter, a trace, track and a stain, left by and leaving behind a human. ***Homunculus***.

> *Who told you that you were naked?*
>
> — *Genesis 3:11, The Holy Bible, English Standard Version.*

> *"Silly old Bear," […] you went round the spinney […] and you went round again together […] He sat down and thought, in the most thoughtful way he could think. Then he fitted his paw into one of the Tracks […] "Yes,"[…] "I see now," said Winnie-the-Pooh. "I have been Foolish and Deluded," said he, "and I am a Bear of no Brain at All."*
>
> — *Winnie-the-Pooh by A. A. Milne, 1926.*

The narration of the little bear in Arktikum and other artefacts bearing similar features, such as the 'Man-Bear' or the 'Bear with human head' in Churchill Eskimo Museum (see Yusoff 2010, 86), indicate that besides being similar in habitual, dietary, perceptual and motoric skills, bears share a resemblance in corporeal features and traces with humans. Bears' paws leave similar prints on soft surfaces as a bare human foot, and a skinned bear looks rather like a bare naked, stocky, short-legged man (Dolson 2009, 60). In other words, bear is a human that bears a fur coat to hide his bareness. To suggest the very name of the bear is to consider it as *doing*, making it a verb, the bearing of something, to sustain, to carry and to hide; making *bearing* into something that both constrain and contain, restrain and enable gives one appearance and hides something under it. 'Bear' and 'bare' are phonetically identical—'beə'. The word 'hide' refers to both a 'skin' and a 'hiding' place. A bare human foot is the track of a bear, and a bear without a hide uncovers a human. As Maria Petrovna and Marina Takalo have said, or as it was narrated in the *Voyages Beyond*, a human is the other bear and a bear is a human being. Since 'arctic' is the name of a bear, like Umberto Eco's yesterday's rose, it bears

empty meaning. That is to say that the Arctic is a bearing, ***a bearing of incorporeal arcticulations***. As the hypotheses of the nature of the Real claims, all, including the Arctic, in truth is nothing, non-existing, emptiness within a hide consisting of imaginary and symbolic figurations. This bearing and hiding bareness are apparent also in the imagined communities and their crucial symbols: armorial *bearings* and a *coat* of arms. When imposing scientific inquiry onto the Arctic, the aim is to be refocused from unveiling and discovery to bearing.

As the skinned bear bears a resemblance to a bare man, Žižek depicts lamella as a "skinned body" (Herzogenrath 2003, 60). As this characterisation may sound too "biological" (ibid.) for an immortal quality without an organ, it gains a new meaning in accordance with *bearing*. Lamella is bareness; since it does not have an organ, it has no form on its own, indestructible ghost, ontologically a void, existing in that rəversəd relation where 'beə' has a pronounced phonetic unison, a literal difference in writing, and with written phonetics there is a reversal—'eə'—and opposite meanings appear in the same act—to 'carry' a hide, and to be 'naked' without a hide. Hide is what is seen, and a hide prevents one from seeing what it hides. In bearing, that *what-is-not* in a *determinate* way, counts. And as a bear is 'carrying' its hide, the word to 'carry' is a synonym for 'ship(ping)' and 'bear(ing)'. Here the bear and the ship, our guide and our vessel for these expeditions, our orientation mark and the means to get there, have carried us on…as they were intra-linked from the start.

Ingold, by his recordings and interpretations on the indigenous figuring of the world in the Circumpolar North may bring some clarity to how we should understand a bearing as an arctic matter. According to Ingold, the carving of wooden masks depicting the faces of non-humans is a widespread practice among, for example, the indigenous peoples of the Circumpolar North, the Inuit and Yup'ik people of Alaska. An experience where an animal pulls its fur hide away, revealing its real face to a human, is a state caused by a situation where the human, in order to obtain the animal, moving so close as to trace the animal, being adopted into its performance, has crossed over into the animal domain, such that in the encounter with the animal it appears as a human to oneself, where the self appears for the human-others as an animal. One has turned into an animal by taking its subject position and has lost one's bearings in the human world (Ingold 2002 [2000], 123). Being capable of seeing the real face of the animal—or, to rephrase, the animal reality—while facing it by turning into our opposite in the human–animal binary, is a dangerous turn in order to return to humankind (ibid.), endangering not necessarily one's life but one's existence as a human.

Arguably, there is also a risk for the static nature of affairs, since the turn presents the alternate of being, which therefore falsifies the absoluteness of being a human. The difference of domains rather seems to be socially constructed, since the close socialisation with one makes it emerge as similar to oneself, and therefore from

the growing distance to the previous associates it as somehow different compared to 'us'. Equally, it may not just indicate the shift between two binaries but also, by showing human and animal as variables, that relatively speaking they are both false. The shift from one to another is like throwing heads or tails, and if the impossible would happen and the coin would land on its side, that would be not something between the two but a gap, the Real.

What else is revealed by the mask is the countering and altering quality of *extimacy*. The mask-bearer's human-subject position is taken over by the visible manifestation of the animal's inner being, where the face and mask are ontologically equivalent (Ingold 2002 [2000], 124). When the intimacy of the animal, its spirit as "inner being" (ibid., 123), is revealed as humane, the core of the animal seems to be the most alien to its identification as animal, but it is also familiar to the observer in the encounter, while in the eyes of human-others it seems to be exterior to them, an alien for the human kind.

With the term "the *look* of human being" (emphasis original) Ingold summarises the phenomenon of the face/mask as a visual appearance, *the look*, and as the capacity to perceive, *to look* (Ingold 2002 [2000], 124). It is both the frame and the image, that which alters the perception and that which is perceived. The Arctic as a bearing is therefore about the *look*, both *through* and *at*. Ingold refers to Ann Fienup-Riordan, who says the mask bearer is rather displaced than disguised by the mask (ibid.; Fienup-Riordan 1987, 44), as the skull in *The Ambassadors* is only disguised by a displaced perspective. If we relate achieving *the look* with *make-up*, it refers to a "manner in which something is put together", an artful fabrication, to "prepare for impersonating a role" (Online Etymology Dictionary 2020u). Make-up is therefore about the *look* that is made. The *look* is *made up*, composed of parts, articulated, like the elephant in the elephant factory. Speaking of the impersonation of 'the Arctic in Change', the Big Blonde, she has got the *look*, and one cannot make or put her down, since she is up in the north, so one can only have *made* her *up*.

Even though masks, representing animal and nature's spirits and deities, have been anthropomorphised, their faces are often "grotesquely distorted", bearing resemblance as much or as little to the human as to any non-human (Ingold 2002 [2000], 124). The techniques of visual punning and figure–ground reversal are used in the structure and performance of the masks: for example, in a whale's-tail mask, where the rather realistic tail from one angle turns out to be a mouth, a nose and brow ridges from another (ibid.). This technique of two co-constituting images dispersing and reforming is familiar from the anamorphosis where the figure emerges from the ground, occupying the same surface from a fixed *pre*position. What the bearing of a mask has taught us is that whether we bear a mask or carry on with *Arcus,* this structuring, this figuration is scaffolded around the human, which appears to be passive and absent corporeally but remains as an active

pre*sence, pre-sense*, in the morphology; it is anamorphic due to the distorting displacement. It 'hides' as a modular shift, like in a visual pun and rebus, or in a dimensional 'pocket', as those of figure–ground reversals, shifting which parts are to be considered as the figure and which represent the background. Such reversals are also at the core of explaining why the characteristics of the mask, or those of the Arctic, are as they are. What bears the Arctic is the *homunculus*.

Whether we assert that it is the figure of the human or the figure of the bear that we should interpret from the 'Arctic', both are wrong. We figure them out one at a time, or we are to see the co-constitution and pay attention to the separating line of contraction, the non-space between them, the surface that belongs to both and neither and their framing off from the rest of the world. As it is with figure–ground reversal illustrations, to have two entities simultaneously in the same limited space they have adjusted to each other and statured to a certain fixed position as co-constituting objects, one to the other, *a*nother.

The representation is not to be considered 'natural', since inevitably it is cultural, where neither the non- or the human is to be depicted as independent but rather as dependent in their intra-relations, their intra-dependence. The characteristics that are given or require significance are joined together, becoming figurations, cultural consumables. Biblically speaking, "The Word became flesh and made […] dwelling among us" (John 1:14), meaning that so-called evolution and cultural evolution, cultural diversity and bio-diversity go hand in hand. From the aspiration new forms of species are becoming and others are begone, those that compared to the others may seem distorted and grotesque in with their surplus-appeal, as presented earlier when speaking of dog breeding. The human influence tends to passively 'hide' in the body of the animal, since the bodily presence is concealed in the animal body, while still it remains characteristic of the animal. And then again, we live from these animals.

To summarise, what the Arctic bears and what it inhabits is the incorporeal presence of humanity as *homunculi*. All that can be known, said or drawn about the Arctic, or rather *as* the Arctic, is tangled around the tongue, reflected by the eye, excavated from the *brainscape* or touched upon by the hand from the skin of a bear. We require a ground for our figure in reverse. Since we cannot bear the Real, we bear the Arctic.

> *Do not try and bend the spoon, that's impossible. Instead, only try to realize the truth...there is no spoon. Then you'll see that it is not the spoon that bends, it is only yourself.*
>
> — *The Matrix by the Wachowskis, 1999.*

I'll always be around and around and around and around and around

— Highwayman by Jimmy Webb, 1977.

To be certain that the connections are made, let us bring all the characters that we have encountered so far together. In order to do so, to line them up, we start from the first one, 'I', or **I**. To proceed further we have to refigure its dimensionality and constitution and find inspiration to do so. In the film *Contact* (Zemeckis, 1997), based on Carl Sagan's book with the same tittle, in order to decode a data set consisting of rectilinear and transparent sheets of symbols with an alien origin, one has to think in a manner of unorthodoxy to find the decoding key. The problem was that the sheets did not line up to form a complete chart when placed on a flat surface. The linearity was to be overcome by thinking in multiple dimensions: by joining the three rectilinear sheets into a three-dimensional object and, due to its transparency, to peer through it from certain angle to discover the key. Therefore, to find the conclusion is to place **I**, this singular character dwelling in the 1st dimension, as a freely rotating entity into the 3rd dimension. This is the same phenomenon as seeing the Pioneer's golden plaque from the side, undiscovering the bodies carved to its surface. This linearity thus turns into circularity, and the static characteristics of **I** are compromised by seeing it simply as one side of the

3rd dimension of dynamic intra-actions. Here the bar emerges as circle, where one character characterises the other. We are ought to turn **I** on its side, to see it in part and in unison, to set it in movement, to see how the presented *characters* line up, or rather circle up. To restate the concluding remark, the bearing is more precisely a bea*ring*.

The **I** that otherwise appears impenetrable has been cut open to reveal the anatomy of the *homunculus*. **I** is conducted with the big Other and with the binary of objectification, convex and concave, phallus and chalice, one and nil. **I**, bent into Ω, forms a compromised barrier between the spatial-temporal intra-action, –φ and *a*, that in one sense are also one and the same but are now separated by distance, the segment –, and are distantly, both in spatial and temporal terms, present in Ω. If φ is a foot, it manifests in the flat surface **I** of clay, bending it into Ω. After the φ has left it as –φ, Ω contains the presence of the other as such, *a*. But the circle is not closed. It can lure the eye, it can be used for casting the feet, it can be photographed…it is a repetition, but it is still never the same, since it goes through not only a temporal and spatial but a modular passage as well, from motoric to sensory, from visuals to linguistics, from auditive to drawn graphics, from analog to digital.

> *Eppur si muove*
>
> — *Galileo Galilei.*

The characteristics are on the move. Therefore, following Ingold's example of drawing a circle that comes into a closure, the act of drawing is creating a surface inside and outside the circle. Here the line is considered as "totality […] a static perimeter […] in the world of already-existing things" (Ingold 2008, 1796). Ingold contradicts this assertion by considering the circular line to be not an object but a drawing, an act, "as a trajectory of movement" (ibid.), drawing a world that is "woven from the strands of their continual coming-into-being" (ibid., 1797). Following Ingold's division, the presented characters do not *occupy* the world; they *inhabit* it (ibid.).

> *[…] disappear into her own eyes like a snake swallowing its tail, until she drifted through the universe as an almost invisible shaft of glassy grey light, seen only from the corner of the vision where shadows lurk and black things crawl down a white wall.*
>
> — *The Thorn Birds by Colleen McCullough, 1977.*

How about the boa constrictor digesting an elephant? The drawn circle inhabited by the characters is *ouroboric* by its nature; to summarise, it is in a constant state of

becoming, where the destruction is the cause of coming into being anew. To grow, the snake needs to consume itself and re-establish itself. The word 'ouroboros' means, 'tail-devouring' (Wiktionary 2020b). If we interpret the circle, the ring as *ouroboros*, we can see how the Ω represents the mouth closing around the tale. From the mouth extends the tongue, –φ, and *a* is its eye. The snake is a charming metaphor for destructive recreation due to its ability to cast its skin, its cannibalism and use of its deadly venom as antidote when milked into a chalice. Temporally speaking, *ouroboros* is the manifestation of Foucault's Nietzschean genealogy, where at length the circle illustrates heritage and where the head and tail meet, formed by the characters, the surface of emergence takes place. There are no origins, since the past is only present in the constancy of presence that consumes the past. In the manner of Derrida's hauntology, the word's body is the character Ω, from which the letter h is silent, the lacking –φ, while still haunting what is left as the *a*. Timewise Ω expresses how the past's presence inhabits the occurrence of any subjectified object or objectified subject, how every emergence carries on the heritage. In devouring itself, the *ouroboros* is under erasure, while the biting of the self cuts the circle together-a-part.

The characters presented here as temporality go together with topography if we follow further the Lacanian reading. As the Other's desire is conducted by **I**, Lacan illustrates this transference by drawing the *interior 8*, a Möbius surface, the outside of which continues its inside, the closing curve traversing the preceding surface (Lacan 1977 [1973], 156), like a snake devouring itself. Where Ingold set the occupation into movement, into inhabitation, Lacan's topography merged the interior and exterior to *extimacy*.

> And dust you shall eat all the days of your life.
>
> — *Genesis 3:14, The Holy Bible, English Standard Version.*

> For dust you are and to dust you will return.
>
> — *Genesis 3:19, The Holy Bible, New International Version.*

What is left in the centre of the circle, or what might as well be the same thing that is outside of it, is nothing at all, the Real, if the Real could be drawn in a form of a graph. As Lacan states, the drive that surpasses the instinct of biology as a cultural order, an automaton of signifiers, symbols and images, this 'coming-back' all circles around the Real, which remains 'beyond' and 'behind' the automaton (Lacan 1977 [1973], 53–54). This *homunculic ouroboros*, or *ouroboric homunculus*, consumes and grows out from the materiality of the human, out of dust. As St. Pierre's takes on Foucault's work point out, the same goes for the (human) sciences, where the man, as the centre of the project, both the subject

and object of knowledge, was invented, forming the object which it handles (St. Pierre 2019, 4), self-touching the invented self. By combining etymological and biblical readings of the origins of the human, the human is '*humus*', referring to the earth, ground and soil (Online Etymology Dictonary 2020v; 2020w). It is shaped manually by unearthly hands, according to Latin word '*humanus*' (Miller & Swift 2000 [1980], 26). 'Manually' from '*humus*' has in it the presence of mortals and the godly through the recognition of decaying and decomposing body and the way it is sustained by and in the manual labour recorded in the matter of items that extend over generations exceeding the composition of one's biological body. The human being is handmade by one's own hands or, if a man has created God, then God has created the man by one's hands, in one's own image, establishing the imaginary. In such creation, if we add Barad's touch, by touching oneself "one may sense the otherness of the self, a literal holding oneself at a distance in the sensation of contact, the greeting of the stranger within" (Barad 2012, 1), two opposites in a close relation, owing all, to the point of bare existence, to that relation.

> *If it's not an airplane, then what is it?*
>
> — *The Elephant Vanishes, TV People by Haruki Murakami, 1993.*

> *[...] it was an extremely convoluted statement, employing a pronominal object separated from the infinitive. It was a syntax which allowed each set of internal phrases to turn upon itself, becoming several different meanings, all definite and quite distinct but subtly interrelated.*
>
> — *Children of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1976.*

"Even if, it is not just a diagram or blueprint. It manages to synthesize these intrinsic properties with properties which depend on a spatial and temporal context. The final product is […] as it is but so that at the same time its appearance is affected by the particular perspective. This accentuates some parts and conceals others, whose existence however still influences the rest through the contrast between" (Lévi-Strauss 1966 [1962], 25). This extract from Lévi-Strauss' work on bricolage describes well the purpose and function of the figurations constituted from the characters, where the ends meet the means and the ways it could be altered. Some of them are the following:

If the figuration is stretched, it comes out as the *bow of Heraclitus*. The **I**dentity of the bow is realized in the act of bending; it becomes Ω, resembling the form of a reflex bow. Here, φ presents the organ, whether it is the hand drawing the arrow or the eye aiming towards the closing goal, where the sharpened *a* is the *a*rrowhead and the *a*im, placed toward the *autre*, the desired target, and where the l e n g t h e n e d – is both the expression of a distance as well as the arrow's shaft, which will overcome that distance.

Dürer's machine, the masculine gaze depicting a feminine object of desire, is conducted in the similar fashion. Here φ is the phallic obelisk, in which the artist's eye is integrated; **I** is the perceptive apparatus, which is flat but frames and captures the extending third dimension, conducting the phenomenon of Ωbjectification. The – is the fixed line of sight, and the *a* is the filtered, framed, distanced, aspectual and objectified form of the desire encoded within the artistic outcome, the stain of the gaze of the other in the core of the representation, alien and integral. It does share a significant resemblance to Lacan's drawings *Schema of the hoop net* (Lacan 1977 [1973], 144), with a small *a* joining two ends of the loop, or his illustration of the dimensions of *Verkehrung* (ibid., 178), with the aim, rim and goal all coming together in a similar manner with a circular Ω. Or is it depicting a door, a keyhole and a key? **I** is the barring door, which may be Ωpened with a key φ that, if drawn off –, will offer *a* lure to the eye, a narrow access for the gaze seeking a hidden object of desire on the other side.

How about the cultivation of the land? In this agricultural pattern, **I** is the levelled ground, and the Ω is the ploughing furrow, a trail made by the ox (ɒks), by the *a*nimal-adjusted plough, the human-animal-object ensemble from which the literal alphabets begin. The – emerges as - (minus) for weeding and reducing biodiversity, increasing the distance to the plant 'others' and decreasing it between the plant 'selves' that are characterised by φ, a sprout with the opening, divided structure of a bean. Or is the figure a *holon*, where Ω presents the face of Janus, joining to super and substructure, as a piece of a puzzle? Is the φ the lizard buried deep in the brain as an organ, that surf*a*ces from the deep – in the behavioural pattern? Or has it 'escaped' from the head and left a deep impression to the brainscape as a st*a*in?

Or is it a holy wΩund, pierced by Longinus' spear –, and from this wΩmb does the growing communion, φ, enter the world? The immaterial eternal touch of the s*a*cred remains under the Ω-arch of the temple. Or is it writing, where the spearhead φ leaves *a* cavitation that when placed into a linear – Ωrder is structured into a language where any literal canon may emerge from this wound-womb?

Is it a regalia, a body decorated with sovereign insignia, Ω for *globus* and φ for *cruciger*, a *Body natural* placed on the *Body politic*, with the subjects as stains of sovereign's bodily substances? As the Christian empty cross signifies the body as absence, which is marked by –φ, a resurrection from the Ωpen grave, an outpouring of the divine surplus for communion, in a form of a haunting, with the Holy Ghost. Does that therefore indicate that the Arctic is first and foremost a regalia signifying the sovereignty, a crown jewel shining on the topmost, as conqueror places a flag on the northernmost spot from which all below it are subjects, receiving substances from furs to oil, hauntings of a kind, from bodies that have passed and passed them on?

Is the *a* for *A*dam, φ for the serpent on a loop, – for Eve, since she is the minus, the lacking rib from *A*dam, and the uniting line between *A*dam and the serpent? Therefore, Ω would be the for*bitten* fruit, the consciousness of the two opposites of good and bad knowledge, where the self, **I**, opens up as the Other, reveals bareness under the gaze, makes one see oneself. Or is **I** the wall with an Ωpening, a Plato's cave, φ being an object in the world, carried by the – ray of light and cast as *a*namorphic shadow? Is it the anamorphic effect a *trompe l'œil*, where the Ω is an open eye with p**I**nched fingers in front 'holding' the φ, where the other eye remains closed and is undoing the 3rd dimension, the distance, with its absence of sight? This narrows φ down into a sm*a*ller object that fits right between the fingertips.

The technique of Plato's cave happens in the camera obscura, with a small opening, carrying the objectified body by the light as a trace recorded to the surface. In a modern camera's anatomy, the tube is phallus φ, shutter is the bar **I**, shutting 'in' and 'out', and creating therefore a difference, an **I**denity by cutting *a*–part. The target as *objet a* is materialised in the sensor, a set of convex and concave lenses Ω, refracting the light, and manipulating the distance — while recording the object on rectilinear standards, on film, file or a printed photo, a ratio for image, φ. Photographing then again has an *a*im, and an eye and a finger as an organ, φ, d i s t a n c e d but lin–ked in the spl**I**t and conducted around the act of ph Ωtography.

Is **I** the surface of the looping record, φ the stylus, a point on which the needle – reacts to the distance, the lacks in the surface, playing out *a* note that, when joined together, constitutes music? Ωr is it a tuning fork, metal bent to a U-shape that, when struck on solid matter, resonates, sounding out only one specific canonised note, φ, on a stave –, one commonly used being '*A*' at the frequency of 440Hz. Is it a reindeer ear mark, a cut auricle, where the lack of organ is that which signifies the presence of the human-other while making it into an object of ownership, which also establishes both human and animal **I**dentity, where *a* small other is left by the marker and one is joined with the big Other, a system of signs readable for the herders by the language cut on, not off, the skin and gristle? Is it an 'ulu', a woman's knife, familiar among Inuit, Yupik, and Aleut? With its rounded blade and handle, ℧, with its centre piece cut out and attached from both ends of the

blade, due to its shape it can be rocked to take the body φ *a*–part and with its width carve the whale blubber out, the surplus of the animal, for human maintenance.

It could figure the Russian surgeon Leonid Rogozov in the Soviet expedition to the Antarctic. As in the saying, "Physician, heal yourself" (Luke 4:23), as the only doctor available in a reasonable d i s t a n c e, he had to cut out his own vermiform appendix (Lentati 2015). The operation splits or bends the cohesion of the subject into two roles, the surgeon and the patient, adjusted by mirror and self-touch. Besides the compromised and confirmed simultaneous **I**dentities, Ω is the surgical wound, –φ is the removed appendix, and *a* is the small animal others that have dwelled within the human physiology as gut flora, earlier considered or *emergent* as an evolutionary relic, vital only for other animals with a common evolutionary *heritage*.

Has φ as phallus, in the intercourse risking the **I**dentities of the individual subjects, after withdrawing –, left its golden ratio, the code for life in the gamete, to the wΩmb, in which it has merged together with the maternal gamete, transformed by the desire? In times to come, is *a* the veiled head of a mother, *Matryoshka*, that becomes the lost object after the open wΩmb has in labour carried out the child grown from foetus φ, distanced by the cutting of the – umbilical cord? **I** is therefore the barring line that cuts the growing body into individual offspring from its earlier constitution as child-bearing, where the great mΩther remains as the parental discipliner.

Or then is *a* for *A*randa, tracing the fleeting *a*rctic object on the sea current of changing permanency? Ω stands for the opening corpus of knowledge, for a spatial bubble within which it encloses the φ bodies, maintaining their **I**dentities while

overcoming – distance. Or is it the treadmill, composing the body **I**deal, φ, by the apparatus, Ω, emerging as a flat surface that actually bends under and on a loop, containing the continuous distance, the –, where both in the corporeal heritage of the body and the historical development of the treadmill the animal is below, sub-, the appearance of the humane body and the body-providing apparatus? The same is repeated in the saddle seat, rounding up like Ω, from the flat ground **I**, cast in the ratio φ of the horseback and rider's legs, pelvis and behind, where their relation is recorded on the convex and concave barrier as *a*, the desire and intent to ride placed on the other as object, to overcome distance with the body that is now distant as well.

Is the Ω, the Rebis, *res bina*, a dual matter, a result of the great work, *magnum opus*, the divine hermaphrodite, the co-existing opposites in one body, through putrefaction and purification? Here Ω is the rising sun above the horizon, or on its side, sickle of Moon, pairing the male and female forms, the convex phallus and concave chalice. Here φ presents the matter of the mortal body and *a* is the pure spirit without an organ, joined together in reconciliation. It is then like the Big Blonde, which has gone through the stages of death and putrefaction of the flesh and the purification of its hide with bleach. It has been cut Ωpen and its guts, –φ, are removed; it has been made into a pure im*a*ge through constant reproductions taking place between, –, the concave mould and convex solidified casting. Is it then also like a *l'homelette*? When cracked Ωpen, *a*moeba like l*a*mella flies off without the organ, –φ, and with the silent h, the Rebis-like hermaphrodite becomes a mere omelette, extra f**I**at.

As a display, the Big Blonde's h**I**de is consumed by the touch of desire leaving a lack –φ, opening the Ωbject, carrying on the tr*a*ce of the sensory-motoric encounters. In the case of the little bear, it is isolated by the bar **I**, and the wooden miniature is lacking its pair –φ. The lacking Ωbject is related by a shift in linguistic modality, where the narrative reveals that the other, '*a*utre', when turned around is actually the body-organ φ, which is barred by the differentiating **I**dentification and their fixed – distance. Then again, it could be the Arctic, **I**dentified based on the barring line of the polar circle, rounding up as pΩlar sphere, φ as the placement of body-organ at a distance – drawn by lines of latitude, from which the Western gaze breaches over the horizon line to *a* reference point, naming the world beyond. And if we look up to the starlit sky to peer the namesake of the Arctic, we will see both of the bears, the major one, Ursa Major, the great Ωther, and the minor one, Ursa Minor, the little be*a*r, both circulated by the constellation of Draco, the Dragon, in a shape of ∞ infinity, the *ouroboros*, that has been there all a l o n g.

> *What I've started I must finish. I've gone too far to turn back. Regardless of what may happen, I have to go forward.*
>
> — *The Neverending Story by Michael Ende, 1983 [1979].*

[…] the attitude of the knife - chopping off what's incomplete and saying: 'Now, it's complete because it's ended here.'

— Dune by Frank Herbert, 1965.

Some actions have an end but no beginning; some begin but do not end. It all depends upon where the observer is standing.

— Children of Dune by Frank Herbert, 1976.

And the other said at the same time as the casting out of the lead by all the liquids, "The Work is completed."

— Visions by Zosimos of Panopolis.

It's already here. It's inside everything. You don't have to leave your planet to find it. In the fabric of space and in the nature of matter, as in a great work of art, there is, written small, the artist's signature […] The circle had closed.

— Contact by Carl Sagan, 1985.

I have lived to understand and be understood, and while preparing these pages so far that understanding goes as follows: The Arctic is a performed bricolage of artefacts co-constituted by science and artistic collaboration. The Arctic is a concept co-conducted by fixed settings of apparatus-observer-observed relations. The Arctic is a feminised object under the masculine subjective gaze, distorted, bound and alienated, never met by a bare eye. And whether the 'masculine' and 'Western' gaze are proven to be matters of repeated and false binaries, their gaze on the matter is inevitably 'human'. The desire behind the Arctic in modern science is to constitute an object of knowledge and establish oneself in relation to it as a knowing subject, in between which identity is established and in-the-midst that it occupies. The Arctic is a phenomenon emergent from a fixed distance, acknowledgeable and perceivable due to the episteme and aesthetics of distance. The Arctic is the incorporation of the significant other of humanity, the inclusion of the anomaly of human, the animal, in and around ourselves. The Arctic is about animality. The Arctic is an antonym, and the world to the Arctic is a determinate negation in its anarcticness. The Arctic intra-actively reads as intratext, where 'a–part' "joins and disjoins" (Barad 2010, 244), joints and disjoints in the "dis/jointedness" (ibid. 240) of the *arcticulations*. Therefore, the Arctic is about joining-together-apart. Arctic lives, lifeforms and liveliness are to be considered beə life. The Arctic is that which is not Real. The Arctic is a phantasm: a ghost and a phantasy. The Arctic is a figuration. The Arctic is a bearing. The Arctic is be-*a*-ring.

If one comes up with similar, resembling or identical conclusions regarding another matter than the Arctic, in total or in part, it will serve to show that the Arctic is *no different* from it, due to the shared constitution made out of differences conducted by sheer differentiation. It is due to this differentiation that our voyage has included such a number of odysseys, locations and *logos*, considered as 'non-arctic' in order to constitute this difference and offering us insights into other problems and questions. What follows is that studying the Arctic or arcticness is not a matter of contents or quality: it is *a matter of bearing it*. As we have listened, the truth has emerged in the form of a question from a child's mouth concerning the 'realness' of a display representing *the Arctic in Change*; we might as well hear a token from a little child from the fairy-tale *The Emperor's New Clothes* by Hans Christian Andersen (1987 [1837]). In the story, the making of the new clothes requires high investments and expensive materials, while they are in actuality manufactured from thin air. Nevertheless, they are being manufactured in the performance of weaving, and their form, colour and richness is co-conducted in social discourse and imagined. The imaginary and various descriptions were produced to support the viewers' position, since the cloth would appear invisible only to those who are unfit for the job they held or simple in character. For the undisciplined mind and the eye of the child, the Emperor, the highest author, while displaying his new clothes, is wearing nothing at all, walking bare naked. The inquiry to the Arctic is enabled by bearing the bareness.

Having been guided and being a guide: in the end, did we get lost on the way? Going through the co-s and counters, the thesis and its antithesis, did we figure out a figuration? What to call it? A formula? A pattern? A synthesis? A graph? A *synthegraph*? In the end, have we not learned the problem of naming and the exhaustion of a single modality? As the characters should be treated as redefinable based on their intra-relation, we should have the same understanding of the figuration as a conceptual becoming. Summarising it with a single pronounceable term would turn into a real bear's service for the endeavour and would not bear fruit. It is not so much a question of *what we should name this figuration*: rather, it is about *how to draw it*. After having presented a variety of positions, directions and extensions regarding how to alter and apply it, I will leave it at that. I leave it to change. And I leave it to you, to meet the ends. One who gets lost will return to the same spot from where one left. So, this end holds its reversal. Reaching the end of the teɪl is the beginning.

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