“This study brings the importance of the Arctic down to the lived experience of industrial city-dwellers with state policies beyond abstract climate change models and offshore resource games. Nuykina’s work is valuable not only for its policy analysis, but also for its focus on the consequences of resettlement policies for residents and their responses. It is worth reading for all those interested in the study of population movement, Russian northern development and the anthropology of the state.”

Florian Stammler, coordinator, Anthropology Research Team, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland

“The northern regions of Russia are crucial for the country’s development and the right-sizing of the population in the north is an important element of northern development strategy. Elena Nuykina’s excellent study skillfully combines analysis of Russian government laws and policies of northern resettlement policies with on-the-ground research of the implementaton and unintended consequences of those policies.”

Timothy Heleniak, Department of Geography, University of Maryland
Resettlement from the Russian North: an analysis of state-induced relocation policy

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Abstract

During the 1930-1980s, the north-east territories were one of the main priorities of Soviet state economic policy. The strategy of northern development was built upon centralized redistribution of both human and financial resources to the northern territories aiming at industrial development of the North and exploitation of mineral wealth such as oil, gas, coal, gold, etc., bearing export revenues for the national budget. These objectives were achieved by planned populating of the area, both voluntary and forced, and the creation of a state-guaranteed system of northern benefits. As a result, during a relatively short period of time, a large number of people moved and settled in the North.

However, with the USSR’s disintegration, the government perspective on the North changed significantly. The introduction of market-based principles and neo-liberal logic of economic functioning revealed that the economic, urban and demographic organisation of the Russian North designed under the state-planning system did not suit market conditions. Following a neo-liberal agenda, federal authorities intended to re-organize the far northern frontiers and implement new patterns of population mobility and settlement of the North.

This work studies the state’s approaches to northern development, focusing on the (re)settlement issue in particular, and evaluates how these approaches work in practice. It focuses on administrative migration assistance programs and their implementation results on the example of two northern regions, Murmansk Oblast and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (district, YNAO hereafter).

By looking at the tensions between policy-planning and policy-implementation, this study aims to find the reasons for the unexpected outcomes which were not initially considered in the programmes. Empirical findings from field research demonstrate the lack of feedback mechanisms between programme-designers and implementing institutions, and shed light on the tremendous regional diversity within the Russian North, which was not properly considered at the stage of policy planning.

This study therefore contributes from the ground to a refined understanding of - to say it in James Scott’s words (1998) - how certain measures, planned by central states to improve the well-being of the population and provide continuous development, achieved the objective or failed. This refers particularly to the applicability of economic approaches to population distribution in the North, which was developed during the Soviet Union along political and social principles and was succeeded by the contemporary Russian state.

Key words: Russian North, Soviet and post-Soviet northern development, resettlement, migration-assistance programmes, northern restructuring, viable communities, anthropology of the state, the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project.
Table of contents

Abstract ................................................................. 3
List of figures and tables .............................................. 6
Preface ........................................................................ 7
Acknowledgements .......................................................... 11
Introduction .................................................................. 12
1 The role of the Russian state in northern resettlement policy ...................................................................... 16
   1.1 Defining the Russian North .................................................. 16
   1.2 State approaches towards Russian northern development ............................................................ 17
      1.2.1 Soviet development approach .......................................... 17
      1.2.2 Russian development approach ....................................... 20
   1.3 Different perspectives on why the northern population should be resettled ........................................ 21
   1.4 Resettlement programmes .................................................. 22
2 Theoretical perspectives on state-induced relocation ............................................................................... 24
   2.1 Anthropology of the state ..................................................... 24
   2.2 Neoliberal perspective .......................................................... 25
   2.3 Migration theories ............................................................... 27
3 Northern resettlement programmes: from design to implementation .............................................................. 30
   3.1 General overview of resettlement programmes .......................................................... 30
   3.2 Target population ................................................................. 32
   3.3 Implementation arrangements ............................................... 34
      3.3.1 Housing construction scheme ......................................... 34
      3.3.2 Guarantee letter scheme ................................................ 36
      3.3.3 Housing certificate scheme .......................................... 37
   3.4 Programme governance ....................................................... 40
   3.5 Policy outcomes ................................................................. 41
4 Implementation problems .................................................. 44
   4.1 Programme underfunding ..................................................... 44
   4.2 Unequal distribution of programme budget ........................................ 46
   4.3 Programme design imperfections .......................................... 47
   4.4 Underestimated diversity of local conditions ................................. 47
   4.5 People’s responses to the programme ...................................... 48
      4.5.1 Refusal to participate in the programme ................................ 48
      4.5.2 Local creative strategies ................................................ 48
5 Analyzing reasons of limited implementation results ................................................................................. 51
   5.1 State-state dimension ........................................................... 51
   5.2 State-society dimension ........................................................ 56
Conclusion ...................................................................... 60
Biography ...................................................................... 64
Annex I: Summary: Переселение из районов Российского Севера: анализ миграционных программ и их реализации .......................................................... 70
Annex II: List of experts interviewed ........................................ 76
List of figures and tables

Figure 1-1 Regions of the Russian Far North. Source Heleniak 2009a ........................................ 17
Figure 1-2 Soviet agitation posters ................................................................................................. 18
Figure 3-1 Geographic dimension of the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project ...................... 31
Figure 3-2 The official queue of citizens participating in the federal relocation
programme in the town of Kovdor according to the priority categories, 2008 ................................. 33
Figure 3-3 Resettlement procedure under the housing construction scheme .............................. 35
Figure 3-4 Amount of housing subsidy ....................................................................................... 37
Figure 3-5 Resettlement procedure under the guarantee letter scheme ..................................... 38
Figure 3-6 Resettlement procedure under the housing certificate scheme .................................. 39
Figure 3-7 Administrative structure of the Federal Resettlement Programme ............................. 40
Figure 3-8 Administrative structure of the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project ............... 41
Figure 4-1 Distribution of federal funding among five categories of programme participants ....... 46
Table 1-1 The dynamic of population growth in Murmansk Region, 1926-2008 ......................... 19
Table 3-1 Rate of state housing subsidy depending on length of work (length of residence) .......... 36
Table 3-2 Number of citizens registered for receiving federal housing subsidies in all regions of the
Russian Federation as of 01 January 2008 ................................................................................. 42
Table 4-1 Subsidizing of resettlement policy under the Federal Law 125-FZ, 1998-2010 ............. 44
Table 4-2 Amount of housing for northern resettlers, 1998-2008 ............................................... 45
Preface

The steering of population distribution continues to be one of the tools used by various states for what has been probably the most massive development project in the Arctic ever: the industrial exploration and opening up of the Eurasian North. From northern Norway all the way to the Bering Strait, this region is home to forty indigenous minorities for which living with their environment has been everyday life for centuries and millennia (e.g. Konstantinov 2005, Stammler 2005, Vitebsky 2005). Yet, more than 95% of the population of the vast Eurasian North are non-indigenous northerners. For many of these people, from blue-collar workers to decision makers, the Russian Arctic continues to pose extreme challenges for industrial development and human inhabitation (Stammler 2010). In the 20th century, these challenges were approached systematically by the Soviet Union and its Russian successor state. As early as 1928, when industrialisation in the Russian North started just east of the Finnish border, resettlement was seen to be necessary for "the planned opening up of uninhabited or sparsely inhabited areas and the use of their natural resources" (CCUSSR 1928, § 4, art. 23). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state once again took this intention as a starting point, but this time for an agenda in the opposite direction: for controlling and steering the downsizing of what became categorised as a 'surplus' population in the Arctic according to a new post-Soviet idea of lean northern development. As this work convincingly shows, this has not only involved creating incentives for people to leave the North, but it is a part of a larger development idea for which demographic engineering continues to be one instrument.

Nuykina shows in this work how 'seeing like a state' (Scott 1998) in the case of Russian northern resettlement implies a lot of historical awareness: the Russian state now resumes responsibility for those who had been induced generations ago to leave their more temperate places of origin to work in the North. Russian resettlement programmes currently have a component that provides opportunities for the outmigration of those people who had given their working lives to the ideas of Soviet industrial development; but this should be seen as only one part of the state's attempts to steer population movement in the North in general. Particular categories of people are still attracted to move to the North to work in industry, even though the extractive industry increasingly relies on commute work (Eilmsteiner-Saxinger 2010). On the opposite end, this work shows convincingly how there are immense gaps between abstract considerations, plans and programmes designed in Moscow and the lived experience of relocating to and from the North. Following the state inducement to move is a process of making oneself at home, and maybe eventually responding to incentives to relocate back to more temperate areas again.

Scholars have previously highlighted that people, including forced migrants, are not just victims or passive recipients of state policies (Pilkington 1998, Pilkington & Fisakli 1999), but actively shape them through their feedback and can therefore be conceived of as agents rather than only recipients of policies. Nuykina’s work shows what this actually means in practice, for example, when she refers to people’s creativity in ‘interpreting’ the regulations and principles of contemporary Russian resettlement programmes from the north (chapter 4). From such responses we see that human agency can have expressions of such diversity that it is hard to imagine how laws could ever close all possible gaps for what Humphrey (1998) has called "manipulating resources". In such a context, this work speaks to the inherent tension between laws that claim to be standardised throughout the whole country and valid for all citizens, and human practice on the ground, which has a sheer endless diversity to respond to such standardised models of development.

The INNOCOM project that provided the framework for this work studied processes of mobility and locality as induced by the Soviet and Russian State in the two northern Russian regions covered here: Murmansk Oblast (Region) and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO). The main focus was on life histories of non-native northerners living in industrial cities there, their sense of place and their movement and settlement decisions (Stammler & Eilmsteiner-Saxinger 2010). A short overview of the insights from

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1 Assessing senses of place, mobility and viability in industrial northern communities (MOVE-INNOCOM), funded by the Academy of Finland, 2006-2010, decision number N118702, in the framework of the ESF BOREAS programme, IPY project # 436.
that project may be useful here to understand how the policies analysed in Nuykina’s work are being dealt with on the ground, in people’s individual lives.

When they relocated to the North, hardly any of the then newcomers thought that they would stay for long, but life developed differently for most of them. That is why we hear over and over again: "We came for a year, and stayed for ever". Social anthropological research in the INNOCOM project has traced the process of temporality becoming permanent and has examined what this change means for inhabitants of northern industrial cities and for life in these cities (Bo lotova & Stammler 2010). We found that the process of how a new place of human inhabitation becomes permanent is among the decisive factors for community viability. Important traits of this process are the physical and emotional involvement of residents in the construction of the built environment, as well as the increasing attachment to the surrounding un-built (natural) environment through practices there (e.g. berry and mushroom picking, hunting, fishing). As most people perform these practices in groups, permanent interpersonal ties evolve that help to make a community viable. Understanding this process has larger implications for urban anthropological research, namely for the factors that make integration of northern city inhabitants with diverse origin more likely, and what leads more to disintegration, e.g., when a keystone industry in town closes down. Interestingly, a permanent or temporal atmosphere of a place on the community level is not necessarily causally linked to the ideas of inhabitants on the individual level. In other words, a Russian Arctic industrial city such as Novyi Urengoi (YNAO, Russia’s 36-year-old gas capital) may seem to be very permanently established, yet hardly any inhabitant would plan to live their entire life there. Many develop intimate links, practical as well as emotional, to their northern cities. Nevertheless, most of them still have the idea of a 'historical homeland' to which they also belong. As one woman said: "we are like migratory birds: when the summer comes we move to our previous places of origin, and as soon as we get there, we can’t wait to move back home, back to the North". This seems like a beautiful rephrasing of Ulrich Beck’s (2000) theoretical models of what we might call 'home-land pluralism’, which means that people can have a sense of belonging to several places simultaneously, and these places occupy different parts of their personality and different components of their identities.

A general conclusion from this is that migration and relocation analysis should go beyond the dichotomies of 'place of origin vs. host place’. The simultaneity of belonging to different places is a continuum with numerous grey scales. This can help explaining why many inhabitants of cities like Kirovsk in the Murmansk Region or Novyi Urengoi feel they belong very explicitly to the North, and if they move away from there, they might move to completely different places from which they have not originated. At the same time, however, an increasing number of pensioners stay in the North, something that was not intended for these northern cities at all. As social scientists we know that the diversity of possible human life trajectories is incredibly rich, and therefore policies result in unexpected consequences, as Nuykina shows well in chapter 4 of this work. Many people have developed such strong senses of belonging that even if they move away, they keep coming back to their northern cities; they develop multiple homelands, and commute back and forth, as the quote above shows.

As a result, northern industrial cities have changed significantly in their outer appearance, their quality of life, and their affordances as places of identification. In the 1940-1980s, the ideology of inhabitants and policy-makers was still more temporary. Houses were built to last for only a limited time; inhabitants lived in these temporary conditions for years or even decades and did not bother to invest in proper furniture, dishes, cutlery or cars. The acquisition of many creature comforts was somehow 'saved' for the future when they would finish working in the North and would move back to the South. Then recently this changed, and people have started to refurbish their apartments, buy cars in the North, build dachas2, and exhibit many other signs of permanent residency. Simultaneously, some city authorities have begun to invest more than earlier in making their cities look nice. They paint the houses in bright colours, install bright public lighting for the long winters, create parks and recreation zones, invest in cultural infrastructure, etc. Some cities, such as Novyi

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2 A summer cottage and garden plot around it at the outskirts of town, see http://dacha.webnode.com/about-us/ for an interesting project outcome that explores the place-dimension of dachas in the North.
Urengoi, run big PR campaigns for the promotion of a common city identity.

All of these recent efforts illustrate an attitude towards northern resource towns of 'living in the here and now', yet our research revealed that this does not necessarily mean that people intend to live in the North for their entire lifetime. After all, as one informant remarked: "no matter how permanently you establish yourself here, you can still sell all this stuff any time and leave if you want and have somewhere to go". Developments and processes like this let us only sense the multiple facets of the phenomenon of resettlement in the Russian North and what it means for the population that has become the vast majority of Arctic residents.

Within a project that studies such processes, it was clear from the outset that understanding the overarching political framework for resettlement in the Russian North would have to become the focus of a separate baseline study. Thus, it was a perfect match that a student in political sciences from one of the field regions (YNAO) became interested in the topic as well as in the anthropology of the state. Not only did the project get the baseline study for in-depth anthropological analyses of mobility and locality in northern industrial cities, it also contributed to capacity building from the field, helped to make a Western research project relevant locally, and advanced a young intellectual’s excellence. Throughout the project, Nuykina developed an enthusiasm and dedication to this work that goes far beyond the usual student’s motivation. She took the suggestion to take the analysis of resettlement policies to the ground very seriously and embarked on her first fieldwork endeavour in both case-study regions even though for a thesis the policy analysis alone would have been sufficient.

It should be noted that - as throughout all INNOCOM research - Nuykina’s research in the regions followed a qualitative social science method, where the goal was to understand principles of people’s responses and local variations of overarching policies. This complements well the quantitative research done on the topic by geographers and demographers within the study of Arctic resettlement (Heleniak 2008). When she introduced the results at our final project conference, it was for these insights into the principles of the policy-people interface that several scholars highlighted how relevant the general findings from this work are even beyond the Russian North. Consequently, the decision was made to again intensively review and comment on the text that had already served as the basis for the thesis. In the version published now as an Arctic Centre Report, Nuykina has considered the comments made by two reviewers and turned the text into a stand-alone publication that the project team is proud to recommend as informative and worthwhile reading for students and scholars of state-induced population movement, the anthropology of the state, community viability and northern development in general.

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This study was born thanks to the collective effort of many wonderful people. First of all, I would like to thank my parents who came to the Russian North as a young couple pushed by romanticism and strong beliefs in the future of the North. For the last twenty seven years, they live and work in an industrial town, gave birth to their three children there and consider this harsh periphery their true home. Thanks to them I always feel myself as a northerner and keep strong connection to the North both in my private and professional life.

I am deeply grateful to all the people helping me in the field, especially the regional and local government officials in Murmansk oblast and YNAO who shared with me their knowledge of the relocation policy from the ground level. I was very lucky to interview people who have dedicated their professional career to the northern resettlement from the very start of this policy. I thank the northern experts for explaining the complex mechanisms of policy implementation and bringing into discussion practical examples. For this I extend my thanks to the World Bank experts who kindly provided me with updated information on project implementation as well as analytical reports.

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Introduction

Between 1955 and 1975, almost eight hundred new towns (Engel 2007: 285) were built in the Russian North as part of the giant Soviet development project for its northern periphery. Leading to an influx of millions of non-indigenous people to the North, this project, called “Conquest of the North” (Osvoenie severa), was destined to fuel the Union and prove Soviet domination over an environment perceived as hostile and uninhabited. Since the end of the Soviet Union, northern communities, established by this development ideology and consisting of relocated to the North non-indigenous population from all over the Soviet Union, have been inherently unsustainable. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the opening up of the Russian economy towards global markets in the early nineties revealed that the socio-economic and demographic organisation of the Russian North, as designed under the state-planning system, was not suitable to the market conditions introduced. New calculations based on principles of cost-efficiency, competitiveness, and rationality, put emphasis on the expense of maintaining economic activity and living in the harsh northern environment, as well as ‘overpopulation’ of northern territories. Following the neo-liberal agenda, federal authorities strove to reorganise the far northern frontiers according to the needs and requirements of the market-oriented economy in order to create a basis for economically viable industries and cities.

In the economic sphere, the Russian government promoted the privatisation and restructuring of enterprises, closure of non-profitable industries, dismissals and early retirement, and shift-labor and seasonal workers instead of full-time employees. This reorganisation of the production sector caused a reshaping of the socio-demographic landscape of the North and created new patterns of population distribution. In the social sphere, the reforms of the nineties intended to cut social programmes and special northern benefits, reduce public expenses, transfer social responsibilities from city-forming enterprises (around which industrial cities had been built in previously hard-to-populate areas) to municipalities which created additional pressure on local and national budgets. Changes in the demographic sphere included closing and downsizing communities, facilitating out-migration, state regulation of settlements, and mobility through different resettlement programmes as demanded by the Russian government as well as citizens who could not leave the North at their own expense. By providing migration-assistance, the national government expected to solve the problem of northern ‘overpopulation’. The state’s approach to the North, however, was not simplistically geared to ‘depopulate’ the place, but more to regulate the population structure by pushing out economically non-productive population and attracting the required labour force at the same time. Resettlement from the Russian North, therefore, provided an example of a social engineering scheme. It was the state which, in the first place, had induced people to move to the North to exploit northern resources and hence ensure national security. After the crash of the Soviet system, when the economic conditions changed and it became costly to maintain a permanent population in distant regions, the central government considered itself obligated to take responsibility in moving ‘surplus’ population back to the ‘mainland’.

Despite the measures taken and the various schemes implemented, the question of northern resettlement is still relevant, both for the residents and for the state. According to the Ministry of Regional Development, as of the year 2008, more than half of one million northern citizens (or 215,500 families) had applied for participation in the federal relocation programme and were expecting migration assistance sponsored by the state (Committee for Problems of the North and the Far East 2008). The relevance of the issue and the raising interest of the central government in relocation is shown though the increase of the programme’s funding and continuous discussions about resettlement and its problems in the mass media (Sorochenko 2000, Holley 2004, Chubatyuk 2006, Petuhov 2008) and among political leaders (Putin 2004, Oleynik 2007, 2008, Medvedev 2008). Relocation is one of the main questions the State Duma Committee for the problems of the North and the Far East constantly works on, since this issue is closely linked to the future development of the Russian North (Committee for Problems of the North and the Far East 2007, 2008).

(Stammler 2010) and has contributed to the broader discussion of the role of the state in population movements in the circumpolar regions and state-induced migration in general (Oliver-Smith 1991, Cernea 2000, de Wet 2009). The economic approach (Pivovarov 1995, 2002, Hill & Gaddy 2003, Hill 2004) considers relocation as a necessary step towards efficient and competitive market economy. The authors of this theoretical direction review the economic geography of the country and argue that the economic and human organisation of the space inherited from the Soviet Union limits the state’s capacity to ensure economic growth. According to this perspective, the resources of the North should be developed by reducing the dependency on huge fixed pools of labour and shifting to more technologically intensive methods of extraction and temporary work schemes that do not require a large permanent population or extensive urban infrastructure (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 213). The spatial perspective on northern demography (Heleniak 2008, 2009a, 2009b) provides a general framework on population characteristics and change, as well as migration patterns in the Russian Far North, with the particular focus on place-specific social capital having both a push and pull role in making the decision to migrate. It also describes Russia’s shifting policy towards the population of its northern territories in the example of the World Bank restructuring project and the federal resettlement programme. Social and anthropological analysis (Thompson 2002, 2004, 2008, Round 2005, Khlinovskaya-Rockhill 2009, Bolotova & Stammler 2010) looks at non-economic motives influencing people’s desire to continue living in the region and their responses to administrative resettlement. It shows how the non-indigenous population brought to the North by the Soviet state gradually developed a sense of belonging to the place, social ties, experiences of adapting to the harsh arctic conditions and a collective creating of living space, feeling of home, attaching them to the area (Stammler 2010). The authors criticise the administratively-induced relocation programmes for not taking into account the strategies, identities and people’s histories that are all deeply rooted in the region. They suggest more a culturally nuanced reading of the situation which needs to be taken into account by those steering the development of the region (Round 2005: 723).

This work complements existing studies by applying theoretical insights from the anthropology of the state, migration theories and neo-liberal economics for evaluating the performance of resettlement programmes. It describes development principles the central administration has taken towards its northern territories and how these approaches have been implemented in practice; arisen implementation problems; complex relations between the federal and regional levels of power vertical as well as interaction between the structural constraints and migrant agency.

More particularly, this study aims to reveal the causes of failure of administratively-induced resettlement in the Russian northern periphery. It is important to agree from the beginning on how we define success vis-à-vis failure, since aspects examined generate various understandings of programme outcomes. In an analytical sense, policy failure can be said to occur when policy does not achieve its stated objectives (Castells 2004: 207). This work investigates to what extent resettlement policy has fulfilled its ambitious plans, in which ways it has affected people’s life and the development of northern regions. As this analysis shows, policy failure or success can not be defined as absolute. Relocation policy has achieved some, but not all, of the stated objectives and produces a space for unexpected consequences which were not initially intended in the programmes. By focusing on both federal and regional state agencies and also northern citizens, we identify two analytical dimensions as being central in our evaluation of policy achievements, namely: “state-state” and “state-society” perspectives. Through referring to the examples from the ground we seek to provide a refined understanding on why certain measures planned by the central authorities to improve the well-being of the population and provide continuous development brought little success.

The post-Soviet relocation policy declared that relocation is beneficial for the Russian state, because it reduces government costs for subsidizing the North and for northern residents, as it provides migration assistance for the economically vulnerable population to move to regions with warmer climate conditions. The state defines the economically vulnerable population as economically disadvantaged, unemployed, pensioners and disabled (Federal Law 125-FZ from 25 October 2002). Based on policy analysis and field work, we argue, however, that relocation schemes induced by the federal government do not work as they were intended.
and, moreover, became reinterpreted in the process of realisation. This work consists of five chapters, which present an overview of relocation problem in the Russian North from a theoretical, empirical and analytical position. On a general scale it aims to contribute to a more comprehensive discussion on the state’s role in shaping territorial population distribution and its success in regulating migratory movements. The first chapter provides a thematic framework of the resettlement problem, summarizes the Soviet and contemporary policy approaches of the central government to the North, looks at the challenges and trends of post-Soviet northern development, and describes the rationale beyond administrative out-migration projects. The second chapter provides a literature review of key concepts and underpinnings used for analyzing empirical material, namely, it focuses on the neo-liberal perspective, migration theories and anthropology of the state. The third chapter describes particular resettlement programmes, schemes and implementation mechanisms, instruments of programme governance, target population groups. The fourth chapter evaluates how efficient the measures of ‘state-inducement’ were and highlights implementation achievements, structural difficulties as well as grassroots responses to the policy. The last chapter synthesizes the main findings of the analyzed cases. We examine the reasons for the programmes’ limited implementation results and unintended strategies developed by beneficiaries as well as northern development in general. Chapter 5 demonstrates in detail how the state operates on federal and regional levels and how it produces interaction of different state layers within the vertical structure. Through the lens of the anthropology of the state, it shows that the state is not monolithic but a multi-faced actor that may have different characteristics, migration tendencies, and even the ‘remote-ness’ of these places is perceived differently.

Reference resources used in the study include theoretical and topic-relevant literature, local newspapers, reports, working papers, legislative acts, statistical information, and expert interviews from the field work. The study is based on a Russian-language and English-language literature review, including Russian legislation on resettlement issues and northern development, and original empirical materials. It uses both quantitative and qualitative data; the latter is applied to determine the factors behind migration decisions and to examine the changing role of the Russian state in populating northern territories and regulating people’s mobility.

The research focus of this work is a comparative analysis of relocation experiences in northern communities of Murmansk oblast (European Russia) and YNAO (North-West Siberia). The comparative method is also used to find out similarities and differences in policy design and realisation of two resettlement programmes: the relocation programme under the Federal Law 125-FZ and the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project, as well as between Soviet and post-Soviet development strategies. Qualitative data analysis is used to describe and explain the different sides of resettlement process from two points of view: the state as a multiple actor, and the programme participants. Special attention is given to implicit practices people develop in response to the state’s measures. Linking material from fieldwork with the broader Russian context provides relevant insight from the ground.

We should acknowledge that the results of this research are very much limited by the cases we based them on. The performance of resettlement policy and migration motives could be different in the far distant northern regions of the Russian East and economically depressed territories. Fieldwork for this study was conducted in Murmansk oblast, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO) and, additionally, the city of Moscow in the year 2008. Murmansk oblast and YNAO started as industrial outposts in the North and economies of both regions are heavily dependent on resource extraction. Still, they have a different history of population growth, different socio-economic characteristics, migration tendencies, and even the ‘remote-ness’ of these places is perceived differently.

Murmansk oblast produces nearly 100 percent of Russia’s apatite concentrate, 41.2 percent of all its nickel, 13 percent of its copper, and 9.8 percent of its ferrous metal ores (Vuorinen 2008: 54). It is one of the first Russian northern regions which has been industrialized. In a way, it represents an experimental case where Soviet development principles were first applied. Finishing the railway that connected central Russia and the Kola Peninsula in 1916, and exploitation of the first deposits in the 1930s caused migration inflow. Early settlers came from southern agricultural territories and Leningrad oblast, to which the Murmansk Region was administratively subordinated at the time. It was both voluntary and involuntary migration contain-
ing GULAG prisoners and a forcibly relocated population (spetspereselentsy) that created the early city communities of Khibinogorsk and Monchegorsk - the first urban centres. Currently, about 92 percent of the population of Murmansk oblast lives in mono-industrial towns and cities (Murmanskstat 2007). Because of the developed transport infrastructure, the ice-free port of Murmansk, and its close proximity to the Finnish and Norwegian borders, the region is well-integrated into international and domestic life, which is different in the case of YNAO.

YNAO is located in the centre of Russia’s Far North. Because of its mineral wealth, the region has become one of the economic engines of the Russian economy. Development of YNAO heavily relies on inter-regional and international migration in order to supply labour to local enterprises. Industrialisation of the place started in the 1970s with the discovery of oil and gas deposits. Most of the population growth, especially after 1979, resulted from in-migration and only a small portion was due to natural increase. The early incomers were young specialists arriving to the region under the agitation of the communist party from Daghestan, Kurgan, and Bashkortostan as well as Ukraine and Belarus. In 2007, the population of YNAO reached 538,600 inhabitants (Yamalstat 2007) against 857,000 in Murmansk oblast (Murmanskstat 2007). But only 27 percent of the population was born in this northern region, the second-lowest share in Russia, and 30 percent were born outside of Russia, the highest share in the country. Today, YNAO is Russia’s most important supplier of natural gas, with more than 90 percent of the country’s natural gas and 12 percent of oil production originating there. Despite the Okrug’s economic significance, the Moscow administration perceives Yamal as a more remote place than Kola region. The transportation system in YNAO is not well-developed compared to Murmansk oblast and many settlements can be accessed by air only.

Selection of these cases was preconditioned by the framework of the MOVE-INNOCOM project. In the first case, our research was carried out in the mining town of Apatiti, being famous for its science centre and academic activity, and the regional capital Murmansk city in October 2008. For two weeks we worked in the library archive, reviewed local newspapers, collected statistical information, and interviewed officials of municipal and regional administrations, including experts working in resettlement implementation offices, as well as journalists of the city newspaper “2x2”. As the second case site, the gas-production centre of Novy Urengoy and the district capital of Salekhard were chosen. During one month working in YNAO and Moscow city in November-December 2008, we conducted semi-structured expert interviews with regional and municipal authorities, officials of resettlement implementation offices, participated in a session of the State Duma Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems on resettlement policy, had meetings with World Bank officials responsible for implementation of Northern Restructuring Pilot Project and the representative unit of YNAO region in Moscow.

It needs to be said, however, that the results of the field work can not pretend to be representative and objective for all Russian northern regions, since they were conditioned by our position in the field. It was more difficult to obtain information concerning programme outcomes and to get access to the administrative agenda that was responsible for programme implementation in Murmansk oblast, because we came to the region without having previously-established contacts. The questionnaire was modified in the course of carrying out our study, but in general, five main subjects were addressed: the necessity of the relocation programmes, changes in policy design, policy implementation, stories of resettling people, and relations between local offices and the central government.

Along other intentions, this work seeks to contribute to a balanced understanding of the consequences of the state relocation policies in their influence on the viability of industrial communities in the Russian North. By bringing together understandings of Soviet and contemporary policy approaches towards the northern development (chapter 1), logic and mechanisms of depopulating the area (chapter 3), policy performance and its achievements (chapter 4 and 5), including social feedback, we would like to finish the analysis with some suggestions how to improve relocation project’s outcomes and offer our position on the relocation problem.
1 The role of the Russian state in northern resettlement policy

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a thematic background for the following discussions on the trends of Russian northern development and, in particular, socio-demographic restructuring of industrial communities. This chapter identifies the policy approaches and practices shaping Russia’s northern development policy, explored in greater details in the subsequent sections. It introduces the concept of the Russian North from economic, geopolitical and social perspectives and outlines Soviet and post-Soviet approaches on the northern development, especially related to population mobility and settlement. This section explains ideas driving resettlement policy-making and forming conditions for (de)populating the northern periphery. It also provides historical review of populating the northern periphery and description of Soviet and current migration patterns. The third section of the chapter looks at the economic and political rationale behind state-projected resettlement and answers the question of why the Russian North has to be depopulated. Finally, it provides a general overview of the relocation schemes being implemented in the Russian North, namely the Federal Law 125-FZ and the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project.

1.1 Defining the Russian North

The concept of the Russian North has been well-studied by Russian and Western theoreticians. Its interpretation is based on one or a combination of geographic, economic, political and socio-cultural aspects (Slavin 1961, 1972, 1982, Blakkisrud & Honneland 2006, Stammler-Gossmann 2007). The definition of the Russian North offered by Soviet scholar Samuel Slavin includes four characteristics: first, its location to the North of the long-standing settled and economically developed areas and its remoteness from large industrial centres; second, harsh climate conditions; third, extremely low population density; and, forth, a greater expenditure of man-hours in the exploitation of natural resources than would be required for exploitation of similar resources located farther South (Slavin 1972: 38-39). Slavin’s understanding of the Russian North emphasizes the distance from the core (geographical dimension) and the high costs of the Russian North (economic dimension) as a main characteristics affecting northern development in general. In this sense, economic remoteness is of greater consequence than physical isolation influencing development paths. In addition to economic and geographical dimensions, the North is perceived as a social construct, as an area which has a specific role and function for Russian society (Stammler-Gossmann 2007: 57). The North is a home for indigenous and non-indigenous population, “living” the North every day.

Russian legislation defines the North as the high-latitude part of the Russian Federation territory, characterized by harsh natural-climatic conditions and higher expenses in production of outputs and maintaining population (Federal Law N 78-FZ from 19 June 1996). For purposes of planning, economic development, and statistics the Russian government defines two different types of “North” – the Far North, and regions equivalent to the Far North (Rosstat 2006: 190-197). Analyzing the Russian North in this work, we particularly refer to the far northern territories that comprise sixteen federal subjects, including the sides of this case study: Murmansk Region and YNAO. In 2006, 53 percent of the total territory of the Russian Federation was defined as belonging to the Far North, a region that contains 5.6 percent of the country’s total population (Heleniak 2009a: 33 Fig 1.1).

The perception of the North as well as the boundaries of the region has been altered over the years according to changing development priorities. When the term first came into official use, it was defined through the Soviet policy towards indigenous peoples of the North (Blakkisrud & Honneland 2006: 9). Understanding of the North was reviewed with introduction of the northern compensation system in 1932, intended to attract a labour force for newly-established industries and retain the workers in the region (Stammler-Gossmann 2007). Since then the area of the Russian North has been determined by the policy of northern incentive payments and special benefits which were partly inherited by the Russian government. This included higher salaries, lower retirement age, better supplies of goods, paid holidays and paid travel expenses.

Michael Bradshaw argues that the patterns of northern development in Russia both during the Soviet and Post-Soviet times have been conditioned by priorities of the core (Bradshaw 1995). Underlining
the importance of the North, theoreticians and policymakers emphasize its richness in natural resources and significant regional contribution to the national economic growth.

“When we talk about the North – it is two thirds of the resource potential of the country, a quarter of tax revenues and sixty percent of all currency earnings. Each worker in the North brings almost three times more to the state revenue than an average working citizen.” (Oleynik 2008).

Besides its value for domestic economy, the Russian North has a central role to play in international circumpolar arena, being geographically the largest arctic territory and an important global actor in energy markets and geopolitics. Therefore, the question of present and future directions of northern development has growing significance, not just at the national level, but also on a global scale.

The analysis of this study focuses on development principles and federal approaches to the northern periphery, particularly underlying socio-demographic and economic dimensions. Since the scope of northern development is broad and depends on the perspective applied, for the purpose of this work we particularly consider demographic changes, social processes and economic situation. The latter is examined from an administrative dimension emphasizing how political leaders see the economic value of relocation and what role economic factors play in policy-making.

1.2 State approaches towards Russian northern development

1.2.1 Soviet development approach

The Soviet leaders saw the northern regions “as a key part of the country’s geography, an untapped resource to be integrated and exploited to the benefit of the national economy. Soviet mythology presented the North as the land of the future, where the Soviet man would
demonstrate his ability to tame and subdue nature. And so, under the slogan “the conquest of the North” (Osvoenie severa), the Soviet authorities set about colonizing this vast realm” (Blakkisrud & Honneland 2006: 26).

The direction of northern development was driven by the state’s economic interests in exploiting raw materials, as well as by the idea that industrial activities and population should be equally distributed across the Russian territory for ideological and national security reasons (Hill & Gaddy 2003). It was strategically important to make the Soviet Union self-sufficient in mineral resources and independent from the Western economies. However, there was no integrated regional plan for developing the northern frontier; rather northern development proceeded from the discovery of resources that pushed industrialisation further and further to the North and Far East. To realise the Soviet ambition of large-scale modernisation, it needed a massive relocation of workers to become permanently settled in the North.

In the 1930s, the Russian North experienced the first wave of resettlement through the organised requirement of specialists and contract workers, which, however, did not provide sufficient human resources for labour-intensive production. Bolotova and Stammel note (2010: 197) that even though physical force was not applied to command these labourers to relocate to the North, it was a completely state-induced relocation. “Many of those who came voluntarily (namely Komsomol (The Communist Union of Youth) members, specialists in mining, constructors, and NKVD secret police staff) did not have much choice of where to go. They were sent by the authorities to a place where workers were needed at that particular time.”

In the early period of northern development, forced migration to the North was a significant component in encouraging population growth. Labour shortage was compensated by the use of spetspereselentsy, the former peasants forcibly deported from central and southern regions, and workers from the labour camp GULAG (Sokolov 2004, Kiselev 2008). “GULAG and its pool of slave labour became fundamental tools in Soviet industrialisation. At its peak in the late 1940s and 1950s, GULAG accounted for an estimated 15-18 percent of all Russian industrial output and industrial employment” (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 86).

From the end of the fifties, individual intentional migration became the major form of movement to the North. Second-wave northern incomers were often

1963, Bolshakova I.I., Smirnov V.S.

Figure 1-2 Soviet agitation posters.

1972, Babin N.S.
members of the Komsomol organisation, driven by patriotism, romanticism and enthusiasm. They were working at construction of new northern cities, transport infrastructure, electrification of territories, and extraction of mineral resources. Along with Komsomol, the distribution system of institute graduates was established. Soviet agitation encouraged young professionals and graduates to move to strategically important or/and remote areas in order to serve the socialist state and national interests (Fig. 1-2).

As a result of active pro-Northern campaigns and the system of material and non-material northern benefits (Epshtein 1968) the migration inflow to these territories gradually increased. For example, the total number of inhabitants in Murmansk Region in 1926 year was 32,100 people (Table 1.1), mainly rural population. Between 1926 and 1991 years this number increased 36 times and at the end of Soviet epoch there were 1,159,000 people living in the oblast.

Table 1-1 The dynamic of population growth in Murmansk Region, 1926-2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population, thous.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>32,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>291,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>567,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>799,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>965,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1164,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1159,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002*</td>
<td>892,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008**</td>
<td>850,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ** The data reflects the territorial borders of Murmansk region at the time of data collection.

A new policy to influence spatial allocation of people based on the principal of labour rotation was implemented in the 1970s. The rotation system implied turnover of the work force and the labour policy was based on the system of fixed term employment contracts and long-distance commute work (vakhtovaya rabota). “It was expected that, after having worked for a period in the North, the migrants would return “home”” (Blakiksrud & Honneland 2006: 27).

Qualitative research (The World Bank 1998, Thompson 2002, Bolotova & Stammler 2010) shows that northern incomers did not consider their stay in the North as permanent. “Migrants typically viewed their residency in the North as short-term, and most came on three-year contracts; a northern sojourn was a means of saving money, accessing deficit goods (cars, furniture, and even a flat), and perhaps experiencing an exotically different lifestyle, but most planned to return to temperate zones within a few years” (Thompson 2002: 273-274).

“Temporality” can be also observed in the way northern industrial towns were established. Many of towns located in the Northwest and Northeast founded in the 1970s as commuters’ camps (vakhtovie poselki) serving northern industries with working force and then developed into permanent settlements with viable communities. It is important to note that the Soviet development strategy of West-Siberian Fuel and Energy Complex originally planned industrialisation and urban growth as a linked processes. “Cities were planned as bases, or concentration points for social infrastructure, and as supply or residential centres for extractive industries in isolated areas” (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 91). Thus, as industrialisation was progressing, northern cities were enlarging, gradually becoming a place for permanent habitation. The joint experience of constructing new cities and overcoming hardships created social cohesion and a sense of belonging to such places among early incomers (Bolotova & Stammler 2010, Stammler 2010). Northern residency, thought to be temporary for some, became in many cases to be until retirement or beyond. Having been brought to the North by the state in the first place, these people have made these places their true home.
1.2.2 Russian development approach

With the demise of the Soviet regime, the approach to northern development and regional distribution of population has altered significantly. The introduction of market-oriented principles, along with economic rationality, revealed the cost of the North and its over-population in relation to its economic capacities (Hill & Gaddy 2003). “After seven decades of intensive Soviet colonisation, industrialisation, and urbanisation of the North, the new Russian authorities inherited an infrastructure and settlement patterns poorly suited to the market economy” (Blakkisrud & Honneland 2006: 25). The reforms of this transitional period aimed at adjusting northern development to meet neo-liberal agenda by cutting down federal subsidies to the northern industries, restructuring enterprises through divesting social assets (and other measures that permit industrial rationalisation), introducing market-driven contractual labour practices, downsizing and closing non-viable communities, and reducing the federally subsidized supply of food and fuel to the northern regions (The World Bank 2001).

The democratic government took attempts to rethink Soviet welfare provisions and to reorganise the exclusive socio-economic treatment of northern residents based on the system of special benefits and privileges. Arguing that the Soviet benefits (l’goti) scheme is difficult to administer, is incompatible with a market economy, and impedes the liberalisation of the public service sector, Russian authorities launched a process of monetizing of l’goti which converted the benefits into cash allowances (Wengle & Rasell 2008). When the law came into force in January 2005, monetisation reform has faced with mass protests across the country, mainly because people were losing their privileged social status as l’gotniki. “Besides its material value, the in-kind benefits system included symbolic capital that became an important source of pride and identity among recipients, with Soviet society coming to believe that the l’gotniki deserved and were legitimately entitled to these special privileges” (Wengle & Rasell 2008: 741). Therefore, eliminating northern compensations system in a certain sense meant eliminating the northerners’ high position in society.

Post-Soviet Russia does not have an integrated northern strategy to identify broad political and socio-economic objectives and challenges for the North; rather, northern policy is spread across a variety of fields, from interregional migration to energy policy. The existent programmes apply centralistic principles of development, to some extent reflecting the Soviet mode of governance characterised by prescribing detailed and fixed standards that leave little leeway in implementation, and combine it with neoliberal logic, which promotes cost effectiveness and rationalising budgetary expenses. The state still provides welfare provisions to its citizens through different social programmes; however, the moves to limit consumption of welfare services and to make recipients bear greater responsibility for their well-being are key aspects of neoliberal governmentality (Lemke 2001 cit. in Wengle & Rasell 2008: 748).

Centre-periphery relations are a crucial element influencing on the elaboration and implementation of northern policies, since the development of the North is still very much driven by the interests of the federal centre, leaving limited space for local interference. There are two opinions on the perspectives of northern development presented in Russian political discourse. On the one hand, the Far North is viewed as a place for permanent habitation which has to be developed according to the needs of its indigenous and industrial population as well as its economic potential. Advocates of a permanently populated North reason that the North should be further infrastructurally developed and provided with comfortable living conditions (Gryzlov 2007, Medvedev 2008). On the other hand, the North is considered as a resource base which should be governed according to federal economic priorities and national demand in revenues. This requires restructuring northern communities and the relocation of surplus population, along with the greater use of commuting labour force. For example, the former governor of Tyumen Region, Sergey Sobyanin, has pointed out that the North does not need large-scale settling.

“Population distribution by the “checkrow method” was necessary in the early stages, when the northern territory was developing and its infrastructure growing. Therefore, those who live in the North should be the ones who can not leave it: an indigenous popula-

5 Mode of governance in this context is understood as combination of different instruments of political steering (Treib, Bähr, Falkner 2005).
tion and the population employed in regional industries. The only way for the North to be competitive is to focus on extraction of natural resources” (Sobyanin 2004).

This latter approach was taken as an underpinning by the World Bank experts and Russian federal authorities who addressed the issue of northern resettlement in the middle nineties. The details and implementation of relocation programmes in great depth will be examined in the third chapter.

1.3 Different perspectives on why the northern population should be resettled

Administrative relocation programmes were elaborated in the situation of economic stagnation and overall uncertainty concerning the future of the North. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the transition of the Russian economy away from centralised controls have set in motion a number of processes that have weakened Russia’s capacity to sustain past levels of northern development and, by extension, population (Heleniak 1999: 156). Extensive northern development, designed by Soviet economists according to the principles of centrally-planned economy in market economic conditions was no longer profitable without massive state subsidising. Following neoliberal agenda, new democratic government has taken the course on restructuring northern periphery through reduction in both the number of residents and budgetary expenditures. Since 1995, national, regional and corporative resettlement projects have been introduced, the main idea of which was to optimise population size in the North and to create economically reasonable distribution of population (Federal Law N 78-FZ from 19 June 1996).

An economic rationale of relocation initiatives emphasises that because of geographical remoteness, long distances between settlements and harsh climate conditions, the expenses of living in the Russian North are much higher compared to the central and southern territories. This includes transportation expenses, the cost of supplies, costs associated with the cold such as use of cold-resistant materials and extra energy consumption, plus social and human costs. It is asserted that each resident of the North costs the Russian state four times as much in subsidies as a 'regular citizen' living in European Russia (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 125). According to the World Bank calculations, the total federal and local government budgets and extra-budgetary funds allocated to support the northern population have been accounted for 3 percent of GDP annually (The World Bank 2001). Thus, it was considered to be a cheaper option for the national budget in the new market situation to assist people in relocation than to maintain them in the North.

Advocates of resettlement projects point out an overpopulation of the Russian far northern territories of 14 to 30 percent compared to other northern latitude regions (The World Bank 2001, Pivovarov 2002, Hill & Gaddy 2003). According to the official estimation, the absolute overpopulation of the Far North at the beginning of 1990s reached 14 percent, which includes: 3 percent unemployed population of working age, 5 percent pensioners and 6 percent people prescribed to settle due to health problems (Government resolution N 700 from 10 July 1995). Most of the circumpolar cities were established during the Soviet times as result of a labour-intensive industrialisation project which required permanent pools of labour in the northern periphery. With the eradication of a centrally-planned economy, progress in technologies, and higher reliance on foreign markets, industries operating under northern conditions met with the necessity to shift from labour-intensive methods to labour-saving technologies, as well as from full-term employment to part-time jobs or shift-labour. The restructuring of town-forming northern enterprises and general economic decline has resulted in early retirement and growing unemployment among northern residents. Consequently, it has increased the demand for housing, health services, pensions and social services. Along with lower local revenues, reduction in federal transfers and the higher cost for heat and energy due to price liberalisation, municipal budgets experienced a growing pressure. The proposed solution to alleviate the consequences of social and economic transition required shrinking the northern municipalities, closing economically-declining settlements as well as out-migration measures, targeting socially vulnerable categories of the population: mainly unemployed, retired and disabled persons, who can not contribute to the economic life of the region but demand institutional care and social welfare (The World Bank 2001). Thus, by building or subsidising apartments in target areas in the South, the Russian state have intended manageable out-migration of non-
productive population, reduction the number of northern inhabitants and, as a result, solving the problem of surplus population in the northern periphery.

The demographic reason for relocation stresses the ageing of the population living in the Russian North. The analysis of human development shows that with the general tendency of changing population size in the northern cities, there is fairly constant growth of elderly citizens. During the short period between 1989 and 2001, the working population age 25-39 years declined by 32 percent, while the pension-age population increased by 35 percent (Heleniak 2003: 338).

Very similar policy approach was developed in some northern regions, particularly focused on mechanisms of relocation (Busalov 1998). Regional administrations have argued that resettlement positively effects on viability of northern municipalities in terms of long-term socio-economic consequences, such as lowering unemployment rate by relocation of economically passive population, positive impact on social-microclimate in the northern settlements, improvement of criminal atmosphere in the northern towns, setting up regulations over migration processes and making them controllable, decrease in unemployment compensations and retraining of specialists, etc. In general, advocates of depopulation of northern periphery have argued that administratively supported relocation is socially and economically reasonable. For example, municipal administration of Noyabrsk in YNAO calculated that budgetary costs for maintaining 8,5 thousand of surplus population in the town can be reduced by 1,066 milliard RUB (in the prices of 1997 year). At the same time, the total budgetary expenses for supporting relocation of the same number of northerners, including financial assistance for settling down in the recipient region can be amounted 553,1 milliard RUB (Busalov 1998: 50).

Due to the liberalisation of prices and high inflation in the 1990s, formerly established social guarantees and northern benefits lost their attractive value and “pull in” effect for in-migration to the North. As a consequence, between 1989 and 2006, there was an out-migration of 17 percent of the population from the Russian Far North, or one in every six persons (Heleniak 2008: 30). However, not everyone wishing to move was able to leave. The economic crisis, money depreciation, bankruptcy of enterprises and unemployment deny a large number of citizens the opportunity to leave the North and to return to the main land at their own expense. A citizen of Vorkuta city says:

“They just closed the mines and there was nowhere to work. But you can not leave either, because there is no money at all. It turned out that we are here forever” (Holley 2004).

In order to support the most vulnerable categories of northern population that have got stuck in the region due to reforms of transition, the Russian state elaborated complex measures of administrative assistance aimed targeted encouragement of migration from the North. In state-leading discourse these measures have been considered as direct obligation of the state, its responsibility to help people in moving to the South since it was the state which brought them to the North in the first place.

Thus, the combination of economic, geographical and demographic forces mentioned above provides a basis for substantiating the implementation of resettlement programmes. While underlining the importance of economic factors, social, psychological and cultural aspects have been poorly taken into consideration by policy-planners. However, at the individual level, these motives very often become a crucial element affecting people’s migratory behaviour and decisions to move or stay in the North. Our study reveals a complex picture of socio-cultural factors strongly influencing on success of policy implementation and outcomes.

1.4 Resettlement programmes

Considering diversity of regional and corporate relocation projects the research focus of this survey concentrates on federal initiatives - the resettlement programme implemented under the Federal Law 125-FZ and the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project - and the local differences that have emerged in the process of policy performance.

Before describing northern relocation programmes, it is necessary to clarify that post-Soviet resettlement is not directly linked to migration policy, as it can be expected, but is carried out within the framework of the national housing policy. This structural feature can be explained by the importance of private housing in Russian culture and social sphere. Privately-owned housing in Russia is perceived by population as a symbol of well-being, stability and economic wealth. To a certain extend it ensures secured future of differ-
ent generations of the household. Moreover, reserved dwelling is a significant factor in an individual’s decision to relocate (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999) as inter-regional mobility in Russia as well as attachment to the place, among other factors, is conditioned by availability of private property. A survey conducted by the World Bank experts on motives for migration from the North which had been obtained through six hundred interviews in four recipient regions showed that family reasons and solving the housing problem were the leading arguments (The World Bank 1998: 22). The analysis of reasons for choosing some particular region fully confirmed the return character of migration from the North to the places of previous residence as well as importance of social and family ties: 62 percent of respondents marked “my parents, relatives, friends live (lived) here”, another 21 percent of respondents marked “I lived here in my childhood, before moving to the North” (The World Bank 1998: 23). On the other hand, respondents marked the important role of dwelling: 16 percent of migrants have moved to the central and southern Russia because “dwelling was reserved here”, 7 percent of the total “managed to obtain a free dwelling” and 8 percent found housing relatively inexpensive, so they “managed to buy it at a reasonable price”. Finding a job appeared to be an insignificant reason for moving to a particular place. Only 6 percent of migrants chose resettlement on the basis of employment opportunities in the recipient regions. The relative lack of priority attached to finding a job can also be shown by the fact that more than 60 percent of all respondents first found a place to live and only then found a job (The World Bank 1998: 23-24).

During the Soviet era, both the government and state-founded enterprises were responsible for provision of dwelling to the citizens and workers. Centrally-organized distribution of housing was accompanied by long queues of many years. As previously mentioned, inhabitants of the Far North were treated as a privileged group with better prospects of receiving a separate flat. Not least of all reasons, housing factor motivated people to move to remote northern areas. Post-Soviet authorities have continued to be involved in solving the problem of housing shortages and have taken over obligations in subsidizing dwellings for certain categories of citizens, including northerners. Therefore, relocation from the North in practical terms means receiving a grant from the government for purchasing a dwelling in the central or southern areas.

The federal resettlement policy is regulated by the Federal Law 125-FZ “On housing subsidies for citizens’ migration from the Far North and equivalent regions”. It applies the same mechanisms to all far northern regions and the territories equivalent to the regions of the Far North. Our empirical research has shown, however, that success of policy implementation varies from territory to territory. Some regions, like the YNAO, have been very active in promoting resettlement and supported the federal relocation policy by allocating additional funds and initiating regional migration-assistance projects (Busalov 1998). In other regions, for instance in Murmansk oblast, resettlement of northern residents has not had primary importance and was realized to the degree defined by the central government. The second programme examined in this work – the World Bank Restructuring Pilot Project - started in 2002 in three arctic territories: the Susuman Municipality of the Magadan Region, Norilsk city and Vorkuta city and was abolished in 2009.

The main difference between these two approaches is that the World Bank programme explicitly considered resettlement being part of broader restructuring processes. The World Bank project intended to liberalize the northern economic environment, restructure it according to the free market conditions and make it viable in terms of self-sufficiency and competitive capacity. It also purposed reviewing the northern pattern of social and demographic development and to assist the Russian government in re-approaching regional development and gradually deregulating the national economy (The World Bank 2001). Thus, the World Bank project aimed not only solving social-economic issues in the North, but also setting a broader agenda for northern development. In spite of differences in strategic objectives, there was a tendency towards convergence of policy mechanisms applied in both programmes: resettlement schemes developed under the World Bank pilot project framework were further adopted by federal relocation policies.

In general, contemporary Russia is torn between different development paradigms and path dependencies that at times stand in contradiction to one another. On one hand, there is the influential past with its all-pervading state power and economic and human geography inherited from the Soviet planning system. On the other hand, neoliberal ideas took root in Russia dur-
ing the Yeltsin period and continue to live on, while, in addition, contemporary Russia has returned to a more centralistic mode of governance that takes away autonomy from the regions and reasserts an authority over the remote territories of the country. This is especially true for the northern regions experiencing both socio-demographic transformation and economic transition. Neoliberal paradigm has been taken as a guiding principle for defining priorities of post-Soviet northern development; the emphasis has placed on optimisation of population size living in the Far North and equivalent regions by creating conditions for retaining qualified labour and out-migration of persons unable to work (Busalov 1998). The plan of northern restructuring includes downsizing northern settlements, closing economically non-perspective communities, assisted outmigration schemes, cutting federal subsidising (The World Bank 2005a, 2005b). With that, there is a strong tendency within the Russian state of centralising competences and authorities as well as strengthening greater control over its entities from above (Young & Wilson 2007). A complex combination of state-induced development practices is to rationalize and reorganize the social system so that it has to become more predictable and controllable (Scott 1998). Through introducing special programmes and regulations, the policy-makers intends to create a particular migratory behaviour, which would answer economic and geopolitical interests of the state at the particular historical moment. In the case of the Russian North, government policies gave rise to formation of two dominant migration trends. During the Soviet epoch the state moved people to the northern frontier in order to exploit national mineral resources and strengthen its position in the region. In contrast, the post-Soviet movements were mainly towards southern direction, resulted from the state liberalisation reforms and various relocation programmes encouraging mobility (Heleniak 1999).

In practice, however, population engineering schemes introduced by the state often do not achieve planned results. The social studies of migration policies emphasize the gap between institutional objectives and the actual policy outcomes (Cornelius et al. 1994). “This does not mean that state policies do not matter – they do influence migratory patterns in important ways – but often not in the ways policy-makers say that they intend” (Castells 2004: 205-206).

Among the factors causing failure of government’s efforts in controlling human mobility two could be mentioned as particularly influential, such as: bureaucratic belief in rational planning of social processes.

2.1 Anthropology of the state

The anthropology of the state studies every day practices of the state bureaucrats and their clients as well as public cultural representations and performances of the state through which the state comes into being (Sharma & Gupta 2006). One of the central questions it raises is how the state policies influences social processes and how society both explicitly and implicitly responds to the state’s measures. “The state itself can be imagined as reaching down into communities, intervening, in a “top down” manner, to manipulate or plan society” (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 983). “It has the capacity to influence social life to the extent that allows state managers to develop the ‘infrastructural power’ of the state, which in turn infiltrates, controls, supervises, polices and regulates modern societies” (Hay, Lister & Marsh 2006: 8).

The purpose of state-induced development practices is to rationalize and reorganize the social system so that it has to become more predictable and controllable (Scott 1998). Through introducing special programmes and regulations, the policy-makers intends to create a particular migratory behaviour, which would answer economic and geopolitical interests of the state at the particular historical moment. In the case of the Russian North, government policies gave rise to formation of two dominant migration trends. During the Soviet epoch the state moved people to the northern frontier in order to exploit national mineral resources and strengthen its position in the region. In contrast, the post-Soviet movements were mainly towards southern direction, resulted from the state liberalisation reforms and various relocation programmes encouraging mobility (Heleniak 1999).

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and economic belief in market behaviour based on neoclassical cost-benefit calculations. “Together these two beliefs add up to the idea that migration can be turned on and off like a tap by appropriate policy settings” (Castells 2004: 208). Both these beliefs ignore the importance of informal practices, experiences and socio-cultural contexts which generate diversity and dynamics of the migratory process. “Formal schemes of order are untenable without some elements of the practical knowledge that they tend to dismiss” (Scott 1998: 7). As in the case of Northern relocation projects, large-scale planning carries out in isolation from the grassroots processes and undervalues regional specificity. Even though regions of the Russian North have similar characteristics, still they differ in history of populating and industrial development, geographical location, transport connections to the main land, economic activity, etc. Thus, performance and relevance of resettlement programmes changes from region to region as well as their outcomes, which will be examined more closely in following chapters.

Frequently, social modelling refers to abstract individuals generalised in their necessities and their actions and it does not take into account the skills and experience of ordinary people; moreover, it undermines an individual’s capacities (Scott 1998). This brings us to the second gap inherent in social engineering projects: the gap between policy objectives and people’s needs and desires (Shrestha 1987).

Another dimension of anthropology of the state analyzes state-society relations through governmental practices and focus on the principles of verticality and encompassment that provide a basis for establishing and legitimating the state’s authority over the regions (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982). On the one hand, the state is considered as an organisation “above” civil society, community and family. In the top-down manner it aims to organize and regulate the social processes and relations between actors. From the other hand, the state is positioned within an ever-widening series of circles that begins with family and local community and ends with the system of nation-states. These two characteristics create an image of the state that has control over the localities and is structurally embedded into the everyday practices of communities (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982-3).

The question is how the state reproduces itself at the grassroots level and through what procedures and mechanisms? Ferguson and Gupta show that vertical encompassment of the state is supported by routine bureaucratic practices, state representational mechanisms, instruments of surveillance and regulations, and by cultural and symbolic devices that are rooted in local activities. “The state makes itself present with power structures that overarch its constituent entities. By doing so, they (the states) help to secure their legitimacy, to naturalize their authority, and to represent themselves as superior to, and encompassing of, other institutions and centres of power” (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982).

Thus, the state itself produces spatial hierarchies which make it legitimate and authoritative, and with that, in the light of neoliberal principles and processes of globalisation, the state’s claims of verticality and encompassment are being challenged. First, the neoliberal regime insists on reviewing the role of the state, its traditional functions and the scale of interventions. Second, the nation-state is questioned by transnational governmental actors addressing local problems (Ferguson & Gupta 2002). Both tendencies can be observed in the case of Northern relocation analysed in this work.

2.2 Neoliberal perspective

Neoliberalism refers to the works of Friedrich von Hayek and the group of economists and philosophers which made a considerable contribution in promoting ideals of competitive market, deregulation and individualism in opposition to the state interventionist theories, namely Marxism and Keynesianism. Neoliberal perspective on development is based on pursuing economic needs and objectives, rationalisation of human geography by building up social processes around economic sector, measuring results of development primarily by economic variables, reduction of the welfare spending, and re-examination of state functions. Market competition, it is argued, best defines and serves the “public interest”, because individuals can best express their choices through the market; individual freedom and prosperity are maximized as funds are allocated efficiently, people can purchase what they want at prices determined according to supply and demand, and wealth generated by private effort “trickles down” to the benefit of all (Hildyard 1998: 5).

Neoliberal rationale for relocation policies is brightly described in the book of Fiona Hill and Clif-
ford Gaddy “The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold.” As the authors point out, “for reasons of economic efficiency, Russia needs to shrink distances and grow warmer by having people move back to the western and southern regions of the Russian Federation and away from Siberia” (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 196). It argues that development of Russia should be aimed towards a competitive market economy and sustainable growth, which cannot be achieved under the present economic and human geography resulting from Soviet industrialisation projects. Because of previous non-market distribution of labour and capital across Russian territory, post-Soviet Russian North and Far East have been experiencing a misallocation of people and production excluded from national and international markets. Therefore, following Canadian experience, the Russian North should be considered predominantly as a resource base and should be developed towards resource extraction and not settlement (Hill & Gaddy 2003). Regarding the necessity of relocation from the Russian North, Fiona Hill mentions that “many who live in Siberia do not want to move at all, and leave behind families, friends and the places where they have grown up and worked” (Hill 2004: 329). The author does not explain the reasons why those resisting resettlement reject relocation efforts. We believe, however, that response practices are an inherent part of policy implementation, therefore we seek to fulfil this gap in present survey.

Similar set of ideas were elaborated in Russian academic literature. Yuri Pivovarov develops the notion of the contraction of Russia’s economic oikoumene under the influence of market economy mechanisms (Pivovarov 1995, 2002). He criticises the northern strategy of urban development as designed by Soviet planners who did not take into account objective economic factors. The new economic environment of the 1990s revealed the non-competitiveness of industrial production, the overpopulation of circumpolar territories and the expense of northern life in general. To accomplish better efficiency, Pivovarov suggested concentrated economic development, which requires shifting the core of Russian regional development from newly industrialised regions to the central and southern territories containing about 80 percent of the country’s economic capacity. The shift in regional development should be accompanied by relocation of both population and production forces from the North-East to the South-West, and by further development of the old industrial urbanized territories of European Russia whose capacity is still not exhausted but should be better used (Pivovarov 2002: 69). The author stands for a targeted elaborate development of comparatively few regions, east of the Ural Mountains that are rich in oil, gas, gold, diamonds and other resources of national importance. Instead of permanent northern settlements Pivovarov advocates utilisation of shift labour resources, working in the North on the fly in –fly out basis.

Neoliberal approach towards northern development has been thoroughly criticised both by Russian (Melnikova 2006, Voronov 2006) and Western academics (Lynch 2002). First, because of long distances and the climatic and geographical conditions conditioning economic and social processes, a purely neoliberal model of development is unsuitable for the Russian North and Russia in general. “There are specifically Russian aspects of economic geography that tend to make the costs of production in Russia a multiple of what they are almost everywhere else in the world. Under these circumstances, the Russian state must play a central role in economic development” (Lynch 2002: 31).

Second, opponents of neoliberalism question the idea of shrinking economic geography. It is argued that “contraction unavoidably means the expulsion of economically developed territory from Russia’s economic space, and also the further polarisation of regions by level and conditions of life, and even greater contradictions within regions; not only their disintegration, but also the emergence of antagonistic contradictions” (Bandman cit. in Melnikova 2006: 38). Pro-northern advocates promote an active state involvement in regional policy, further development of social and production infrastructures as well as improvement of life conditions for the northern population (Oleynik 2007, 2008). They insist on overcoming the understanding of the North as a ‘resource base’, since its mineral wealth is naturally limited. Instead, the North should be fully integrated in the spiritual, cultural, military-strategic, industrial, social and financial space of Russia (Dugin 2000).

Third, depopulating the northern territories raises the question of sovereignty. In order to assert sovereignty and to prove its right to the territory and arctic resources, the Russian state has to claim the northern periphery as an integral part of the country populated by Russian citizens. For the same reason, during the
1950s the Canadian federal government forcibly relocated Inuit people from northern Quebec to the high Arctic (Dussault & Erasmus 1994). It is argued, therefore, that Russia needs a populated Far North as an important condition for maintaining the region’s strategic geo-political position. Moreover, with the future prospects of increasing North-South out-migration, national authorities should contemplate reiterated settlement of the northern areas (Dugin 2000).

2.3 Migration theories

Spatial mobility can take different forms, including all kinds of territorial movements, both temporary and permanent, and over various distances. This work concentrates on internal migration and resettlement in particular. The former term is defined in terms of “people’s movement from one area of a country to another for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence” (International organisation for migration 2004: 32). Migration always involves a change in permanent residence, caused by different combinations of push and pull factors influencing an individual’s and household’s decision to move, as well as by variety of personal reasons.

Resettlement is commonly studied within the framework of international refugee law and policy as a mechanism for refugee protection (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2004). The emphasis is placed on involuntary nature of resettlement as consequence of development-inducing programmes (Cernea 2000), environmental or human-created disaster event, ethnical conflicts, etc. In the context of northern policies, we define resettlement as movement of northern population to the South under the administrative programme of Russian government or the World Bank. The distinctive feature of resettlement from displacement is compensation for resources lost or left behind, assistance with housing and other services provided in the new area by the state or company (de Wet 2009). In our case, federal authorities provide housing subsidies to long-term residents in exchange to their northern flats. Relocation from the Russian North under state policy has been stated as voluntary; people are not physically forced from one territory to another and they can choose whether they want to participate in the relocation programme or not. The person or household individually decides to which destination he or she wishes to move – the main condition, however, was that the new place of residence should be located outside the North. The post-Soviet Russian state has not displaced people forcibly, but has supported out-migration through financial incentives and migration assistance. Those who do not want to relocate but are induced into moving, however, may see the whole resettlement policy as involuntary. This is especially true for citizens living in economically-depressed communities undergoing official abolishment. Russian authorities do not give much choice to these people: they either agree to leave on the determined conditions or stay in the place without public services and support. This is what Bolotova and Stammler describe as state inducement (Bolotova & Stammler 2010).

Since no single migration theory can explain all migration movements we selected particular aspects which seem to be of special importance and relevance to the present research: push and pull factors, length of residency, place-specific social capital, and migration networks. We also examine the centred explanations of migration, structuralist argument as well as institutional dimension of migration processes and, specially, the role of the state in regulating and controlling migration flows.

From a theoretical point of view, the cost-benefit perspective on migration was elaborated in neoclassical economics, which stresses economic variables causing and effecting migration processes, like income between the outgoing and incoming regions, though underestimates social-cultural factors (Sjaastad 1962, Todaro 1969). At the micro level, an individual decides to move because he or she believes that migration will increase his or her living standards (individual utility). Potential migrants reasonably estimate the expenses and benefits of moving and migrate to an alternative location where net returns are expected to be higher (Borjas 1990). Migration, in this paradigm, conceives as rational individual choice for income maximisation.

In contrast to this centred paradigm, the structuralist argument was developed under the influence of the Marxist political economy and focuses on the macro-economic processes that produce socio-spatial inequalities and constrain the life chances of individuals as members of specific social groups in particular places (Pilkington 1998: 13). This approach places the study of migration in the wider context of political, economic and social structures (Castells & Kosack 1985), and
an historical context encouraging or retarding human mobility. Migration is seen not as the aggregate consequences of individuals exercising rational choice but as the result of and response to structural changes. An individual as migratory agent can not be completely rational in making a decision to migrate because he is preconditioned by objective factors that can not be individually controlled, for example in-migration control policy (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999: 83).

Third theoretical perspective, linking “structures” and “agencies”, emphasizes intermediary social phenomena such as family, household, and social networks that support and drive migration. The ‘new economics of migration’ considers migration as a collective decision taken by families or households, not only to maximise expected income but also to minimise risks to the family’s well-being (Stark 1984, Taylor 1986). Thus, migration decisions are often made not by individuals but by families (Castells 2004). Pilkington & Fisakli (1999) argue that household strategies are central to the migration processes because they are not oriented towards one particular objective, but intend to provide stability and future prosperity for the whole family. Northern resettlement practices examined in this study have been developed by families and for the family’s own interests and practical needs. Participation in relocation programmes, in many cases, has become a household strategy for improving life conditions of extended family rather than relocation itself.

The migration network theory states that the process of migration and particularly adaptation to the new place of residence are facilitated when supported by the informal and formal migrant networks based on personal contacts as well as institutionalised communities representing northerners in the host regions, for example YNAO diaspora in St. Petersburg. “Migrant networks comprise a set of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin” (Massey et al. 1993: 448). Network connections, in a way, constitute a form of social capital that can be used to gain access to material such as housing, subsidies and non-material resources like, for example, information (Taylor 1986, Massey 1990).

To conclude, in practice, “structure” and “agent” are deeply interconnected, and, because of that, migration can not be clearly defined, whether it is voluntary or forced (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999). For example, those who voluntarily migrated to the former Soviet Republics or to the Russian North under the Soviet development plan now perceive their resettlement as “duty to the country” and not as individual self-interest in economic and professional advancement. Therefore, it is important to apply qualitative social science research that looks in depth into the complex motivations behind migratory decisions (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999: 89).

According to Ravenstein, migration is caused by a series of unfavourable conditions encouraging (push) an individual to leave one place and favourable factors attracting (pull) him to an external location. Explaining migration patterns, both within and between nations, Ravenstein stated that: the primary cause for migration was better economic opportunities; the volume of migration decreases as distance increases; migration occurs in stages instead of one long move; population movements are bilateral; and migration differentials such as gender, social class, and age influence a person’s mobility (Ravenstein 1885, 1889). The theoretical framework of push and pull forces was further developed and considered more factors (Lee 1966, Bogue 1969). Lee concludes that migration needs to be viewed within a framework of factors associated with area of origin, area of destination, intervening obstacles, and the migrants themselves (Lee 1966). He argued that variables such as distance, physical and political barriers, and having dependents can impede or even prevent migration. Lee pointed out that the migration process is selective because differentials such as age, gender, and social class affect how people respond to push-pull factors, and these conditions also shape their ability to overcome intervening obstacles. Furthermore, personal factors such as education, knowledge of a potential receiver population, and family ties can force or retard migration.

Migration has a cumulative inertia (Gordon & Molho 1995) and “the probability of an individual staying in a particular place increases with increasing length of residence” (Speare 1970: 456). The latter is a crucial factor influencing migration decision in both cases of this study: the longer people live in the North, the less likely they are to leave. On the other hand, the more recently a person has arrived in the region, more likely he or she is to move due to the lack of attachment to place and place-specific social capital (Heleniak
The latter summarises “the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998: 243). “Place-specific social capital compiles the ties of friends, neighbors, family members, business connections, and familiarity with a place that a person develops by virtue of having been born in or having lived in a region for a longer period of time” (Heleniak 2009a: 32). Recent literature emphasises how social capital invested in a place can act as both push and pull factors in migratory movements to and from the region (Heleniak 2009a, Bolotova & Stammler 2010).

The institutional approach on migration points out set of forces encouraging and channeling migration flows, such as, for instance, resettlement programmes and government restrictions in one’s ability to move freely or to choose the place of residence. The state can prohibit or reverse migration, redirect people’s movements, encourage population influx as well as stimulate depopulation of certain regions. The government influences distribution of population through direct policies, explicitly designed to mold migration behavior, and indirect measures. Direct policies are those that prescribe residence and movement patterns. They include bans on urban immigration, travel restrictions, and resettlement programmes (Oberai 1983: 11). Indirect practices do not focus on migration issues in the first place, but intend to influence on socio-economic conditions making one area more attractive for living and working than other. Thus, indirect actions bring far-reaching and continuous effects on human mobility, as they reach broader population groups.

There is a question, debated in the literature, how necessary is state involvement in controlling migration? Advocates of government interventions stand for regulatory measures to control human mobility and to moderate consequences of migration. Akin Mabogunje reviews economic, environmental, social, administrative and political arguments in order to indicate the importance of state policies (Mabogunje 1981) to manage human mobility and settlement. He stresses out that regulation policy is essential for efficient use of physical, human and natural national resources as well as for protecting national economic and political interests.

The economic argument of institutional approach stresses inequity between the regions in the distribution of income and welfare which have had an impact on the spatial misdistribution of population. Thus, the efficiency in the use of natural resources does argue for government intervention to reach desired population redistribution and reduce spatial disparities. The administrative argument concerns state intervention in the growing costs of maintaining isolated, small, and depressed settlements. The pattern of population distribution in many cases is “immature” in which there is a mismatch between the distribution of resources and population. Therefore, it is argued, government must induce movement of people to areas where their labour will be productive (Mabogunje 1981). This later position is very much shared by the Russian policy-makers responsible for northern resettlement projects.

The opposite approach argues against institutional interference to influence territorial population distributions (Stohr 1981, Oberai 1983). First, because state planning violates basic human rights: it restricts the freedom of the individuals to move and to choose their own residential and working location. Second, it disturbs an automatic equilibrium mechanism which would otherwise balance the spatial distribution of population with economic opportunities. Third, it is often very costly and administratively difficult to implement relocation projects. Because of the complexity of the factors which govern population distribution, those projects often bring poor results. The strength of this later argument will be further demonstrated by the example of state-induced resettlement policy in the Russian North.

To conclude, all the above mentioned theoretical ideas have influenced on our analytical view and the interpretation of the fieldwork material presented in the following chapters. Neoliberal rationale was taken as a starting point in reviewing both economic and human geography of the Russian northern periphery as well as a principal basis for designing resettlement policy. The guiding role in adapting neoliberal principles and establishing market-friendly regime in Russia have been in the hands of the global financial organisations such as the World Bank. The influence of the international actor over nation-state has had critical importance in ensuring pro-market policy environment favourable for the economic sector thought creating new restructuring strategies. In case of northern development, it meant rethinking the policy of populating the high latitude areas in particular.

From the other side the northern relocation policy
3 Northern resettlement programmes: from design to implementation

Since the middle of the 1990s, different federal projects encouraging human mobility from the Russian North have been developed, namely: Own House; Building Houses in the Territory of the Russian Federation for the Citizens Moving out from the Far North Territories and Equivalent Regions; Housing; and the World Bank Northern Restructuring Pilot Project. As the names indicate, relocation policies have been realised under the roof of housing programmes. Following the logic of Soviet social engineers, new democratic government has declared strategic necessity to control the processes of settlement and migration at the state level. Rational regulation of population flows out of the Far Northern regions and equivalent territories has been organized through construction or purchasing housing in the regions with congenial natural and social-economic life conditions.

In parallel with the pushing out economically passive citizens, it has created special conditions aimed to attract skilled labor and working-age population to the North included higher salaries and northern benefits package. By means of economic incentives, Russian state not only assisted out-migration, but stimulated in-migration to the area at the same time. The ‘pushing away’ and the ‘pulling in’ policies, therefore, are two complementary sides of one ‘population regulation approach’.

This third chapter describes the principles of the resettlement programmes, details of design, implementation arrangements, instruments of programme governance, main implementation outcomes. In this chapter we introduce three implementation schemes encouraging northerner’s resettlement, specifically housing construction scheme, guarantee letter scheme and housing certificate scheme, through which participants of relocation projects were receiving apartments in the South. It reviews the legislative basis for regulating resettlement policies and provides fieldwork-based examples showing how citizens have responded to state-induced regulations.

3.1 General overview of resettlement programmes

On 25 October 2002, The Federal Law 125-FZ “On housing subsidies for citizens’ migration from the Far North and equivalent regions” was introduced. This law provides a legal framework for current northern relocation policies and defines the mechanisms for policy realisation. It applies the same relocation scheme to all far northern entities and the territories equivalent to the regions of the Far North. The Federal Law 125-FZ determines who is entitled to apply for migration assistance, conditions for receiving federally-sponsored housing grant, the algorithm of calculating housing subsidies, and the principle of distribution of subsidies among beneficiaries. The principles of the Federal programme will be discussed further in this chapter.

The different angle on northern demographic rescaling is presented in the Northern Restructuring Pilot Project, financed from a loan extended by the World Bank and regulated by a number of government resolutions. It aimed to improve self-sufficiency of municipal budgets and facilitate out-migration of socially vulnerable groups. Every stage of the project implementation requiredapproval by the federal government both in terms of funding and realisation mechanisms (Government resolution N336 from 22 May 2002; Government resolution N306 from 22 June 2004; Government resolution N772 from 31 December 2005). The project implementation started in 2002 and generated structural changes in state approach towards relocation. Initially
it was designed for a four-year period, but, due to the slow rates of project implementation the programme was suspended for nearly two years and then was abolished in 2009 (The World Bank 2010).

Compared to the Federal Law 125-FZ, which encompasses all northern regions, the World Bank programme covered three arctic territories – the Susuman Municipality of Magadan Region, Norilsk city and Vorkuta city (Fig. 3.1) – that represent the diversity of the economic and social environment of the Russian North.

All three sites were established as mono-industrial cities during Stalinist times as a result of forced movement of GULAG workers. Previous presence of indigenous peoples on the land did not play a role in industrial and urban growth. The economic development of Susuman was driven by the gold industry, Norilsk by nickel, and Vorkuta by coal. During the transition period, all three cities struggled for survival and suffered significant industrial downscaling, which caused social tension, unemployment, economic vulnerability of population and a decline in living standards. The aim of the World Bank project has been similar in all three cases: assisting the out-migration of selected groups of the non-working population, as well as downsizing and transforming these cities into self-sufficient commercial bases for industrial production (The World Bank 2001). Focusing on creating economically viable communities of working population in the remaining industry, it planned to resettle up to 6,000 people from the Susuman Municipality, 6,500 citizens from Vorkuta and 15,000 people from Norilsk. Instead of a permanently settled population, the World Bank project suggested a model of a commuting labour force moving between the North and more temperate regions (The World Bank 2001).

On the general level, the World Bank project’s development objective was to test a set of actions in assisting northern municipalities to cope with the effects of economic transition. These actions particularly include: voluntary out-migration assistance schemes for people whose economic perspectives are limited, and measures that will allow municipalities to realize potential economic benefits resulting from a decreased population (The World Bank 2001: 2). It was expected that the development patterns elaborated and tested by the World Bank programme will be extended to other northern communities in order to make them more viable. Viability, defined by the World Bank experts, primarily refers to self-sustained economic devel-

![Figure 3.1 Geographic dimension of the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project. Source: The World Bank 2010.](image-url)
opment reflecting stability in the economic productivity and average material wellbeing of the population. Viable communities, in this context, are those that are prosperous economically (The World Bank 2001).

In contrast to the federal programme which specifically and largely focuses on resettlement measures, the World Bank Pilot Project consisted of five interlinked components. First, the Migration Assistance Component provided a one-off migration allowances issued through housing certificates. The out-migration support package for socially vulnerable groups included a) a housing subsidy for purchasing a dwelling in the central regions of Russia, b) transportation of household belongings, c) reimbursement of travelling costs, and d) legal assistance and information about housing possibilities, regional specifics, job opportunities, and the healthcare system in the host region. Second, the Local Restructuring Support Component aimed to economize and reorganise northern settlements in terms of changing municipal infrastructure. It applied technical measures based on institutional reforms in housing and utility services management and in the demolishing of dilapidated and abandoned housing stock as well as other facilities (The World Bank 2001: 7). Third, the Monitoring and Evaluation Component monitored the economic outcomes of restructuring, social aspects of out-migration and the evaluation and dissemination of project impact (The World Bank 2001: 7). It purposed to reflect on the project’s impact on northern municipalities, migrants, and socio-economic trends in general. The evaluation component, being partially integrated into the project at its development stage, was created to ensure mobility of information, greater interaction between the planning and implementation phases, as well as between the central office and the municipal ones. But as the World Bank administrators interpreted empirical data through an economic lens, they ignored important factors standing beyond a cost-effective model and actually impacting migratory decisions. Fourth, the Federal Component aimed advising the Russian government on legal, economic, fiscal and social aspects of northern reorganisation in order to further liberalize and deregulate the northern economy. Fifth, the Project Management Component financed and carried out the programme at both central and municipal levels.

Thus, compared to the Federal Law 125-FZ, the World Bank Pilot Project applied complex strategic approach as it intended structural changes in socio-economic environment of the northern territories and strengthening neoliberal principles of development.

3.2 Target population

The northern resettlement policy implemented under both projects has addressed to economically and socially vulnerable categories those who can not move out of the North at their own expenses. According to the Federal Law 125-FZ, the right to receive non-repayable state housing support belongs to residents of the Far North and equivalent territories who moved to the region during the Soviet time, before the year 1992. The policy focuses on the most insecure social groups and defines five priority categories: 1) residents of closing communities; 2) disabled; 3) pensioners with northern working experience not less than 15 years; 4) the unemployed and 5) working population with long term northern residency. The law artificially establishes a ranking order that gives participants of the first group priority over the second one. The main criteria for receiving state financial support is willingness to relocate, northern residence status, a length of work in the North not less than 15 years, and objective need in improving housing conditions. In order to prevent people from participating in the programmes more than ones and creating withdrawing practices, the programme restricts receiving migration allowances more than once.

On the other hand, the initial version of the World Bank project determined specific groups of beneficiaries, including veterans of the second World War, political victims, pensioners with 35 years northern working experience, residents of non-viable settlements\(^6\), former prisoners of labor camps, people with limited abilities, families with disabled children, single mothers and large families with non-adult children (Government resolution N 336 from 22 May 2002 Fig. 3-2).

\(^6\) Non-viable communities in this context understood as settlements and towns experiencing economic decline due to bankruptcy of town-forming enterprise, resource depletion or similar events causing unemployment, out-migration and deterioration of physical infrastructure, social marginalisation and impoverishment. These communities also considered as non-perspective due to their low economic potential.
Moscow Project Implementation Office commented:

As priority was given to the least mobile categories of population, the first and the second phase of project implementation did not bring planned results: people simply refused to move out. In order to increase population mobility, new criteria for participation in the project were brought in. (The World Bank expert, Moscow, 19.12.2008)

Two years later, Government resolution N 306 from 22 June 2004 extended the target group of the Pilot Project to disabled, pensioners and citizens of non-viable settlements located in the territories selected by the project. According to the statistical analysis of people signed for participation in the programmes, both the federal migration assistance programme and the Northern Restructuring Project, the group most active in participation in relocation schemes was pensioners (The World Bank 2006a). It can be explained by the fact that people were coming to the North for work with the plan to return after retirement. Russian legislation prescribes those who have worked in the North earlier retirement age compared to the rest of Russia: fifty years for women and fifty-five for men. It means that northern pensioners are still of working-age, mobile and, theoretically, can continue labour activity in the region of relocation.

In the Federal Law 125-FZ, northern pensioners hold the third position in the programme queue. In practice, this category of participants does not benefit financially because it is not prioritised by the programme. Pensioners are entitled to migration assistance but the prospect of actually receiving such assistance extends up to many years.

With the purpose to overcome this policy shortage, the World Bank Pilot Project has concentrated on pensioners as a priority category. The World Bank quantitative report shows that the most numerous category in absolute number of successful migrants, which comprises 7,300 participants, is that of pensioners (The World Bank 2006b: 5, 10-11). With that, distribution
of programme participants according to the age criteria demonstrates broader prospects stemming from relocation for the people of mature age that are able to work. In all pilot territories, the ratio of successfully resettled participants is higher among those of the age of forty and below. The percentage of citizens dropping out of the programme increases in the age group over sixty, and among participants older than seventy years, this ratio reached a relatively high level (The World Bank 2006b: 5). This fact can be explained by strong attachment to the place, reduced mobility of older population, little knowledge of the Russian legal system and real estate, fragile health, long length of residency and by other factors which influence migration decisions. The later will be reviewed in greater details in the chapter four of this study and partly in the session describing implementation problems.

3.3 Implementation arrangements

According to different implementation procedures and financial mechanisms, we distinguish three phases in development of relocation policy: the first period (1992-2002), the second phase (1998-2002), and the last period (2002 until the present).

3.3.1 Housing construction scheme

The federal relocation policy started with the presidential decree N 1122 from 23 September 1992 “On Measures for Increasing House-building in the Territory of the Russian Federation for Citizens’ Migration from the Far North and Equivalent Regions” Fig. 3-3. This decree called for initiation of a state programme aimed at building dwellings in central and southern regions for northern resettlers on the principle of shared funding. It suggested mobilisation of federal funding, regional budgets, corporate social responsibilities and personal savings to provide the basis for people’s out-migration.

As a result, the first relocation programme was launched in 1995 (Government resolution N 700 from 10 July 1995). The responsibility of implementation and bringing the programme to the local level was delegated to the State Committee for the Development of the North (GOSKOMSEVER) which was disbanded in spring of 2000 due to the restructuring in Federal government. The GOSKOMSEVER controlled the construction process as well as the distribution of newly-built dwellings among northern regions. The coordination of resettlement process at the regional level was given in the hands of the local administrations.

The people who applied for participation in the resettlement programme were ranked according to the length of their northern work experience and arranged into a single queue. Before the year 2002, the minimum length of work required was to be not less than 10 years. Beneficiaries received a federal grant at the rate of 30 percent of commercial house price based on the social norm of the dwelling (18 m$^2$ per person). The remaining 70 percent could be paid out of the regional budget, by city-forming enterprises and the beneficiary himself, in varying proportions. This financial mechanism of partial subsidizing was formulated differently in different regions. For example, in YNAO and the Kamchatka Region, the regional and federal budgets financed resettlement on proportionally equal terms of 30 percent. The leftover 40 percent of the total sum was paid by the programme participants themselves. In contrast, the administration of the Murmansk oblast implemented a policy based on federal transfers without its own budgetary involvement. Thus, funding of resettlement was determined at the cost of residents (70 percent) and federal allocations (30 percent).

According to the programme, northern residents would receive housing subsidies in addition to their northern apartment. Since the federal subsidy did not cover the full price of the flat but one-third only, residents had the right to keep their northern house. The mechanism of partial subsidizing was designed to stimulate out-migration and to support those lacking the financial ability to move. In practice, many used this assistance for getting apartments in the South rather than resettling. They were using federal money for buying second dwelling in the “main land” while continuing living in the North. This was taken into consideration in further developments of the relocation policy.

The housing construction scheme purposed providing newly-built flats to northern citizens in target areas. Very often, residents of one region received apartments in the same building. Thus, being members of a community in the North, they became neighbours in the South. Experts in the regional administration repeatedly underlined that this collective way of resettlement helped people to adjust to new conditions and to develop social capital built on similar experiences and a
common past. With that, programme participants could not freely choose the place of future residence because their migration choice was limited by the regions where houses were built.

In order to illustrate how this scheme was working in practice let us refer to a fictional case description based on the fieldwork material. Let us imagine a family of pensioners Petrovy from the northern town of Apatiti who decided moving to Kamishyn located in Volgograd Region, because of the warmer climate conditions, possibility to have a garden and, most importantly, their children living in the area. They went to a consultation at the Apatiti Implementation Unit and found out that the closest city which was targeted in the relocation programme is Saratov. After discussions and advising with the family members in the South, Petrovy decided to step in the federal programme and started to collect money. As the resettlement project was not additionally sponsored neither by regional administration nor by town-forming enterprise, Petrovy, in addition to the family’s savings, sold their car, parking garage and summer cottage to be able to pay 70 percent of the flat’s price in Saratov. The other 30 percent of the flat’s price were covered by the federal government funds. Three years passed and Petrovy received confirmation that their new flat in the South was completed, so they can resettle as soon as the official papers are ready. But during these three years the granddaughter of Petrovy, Olga, became married and derived a child. As many other families in Russia Olga and her young family are living in the same two-rooms flat with the parents in Kamishyn. Therefore, when the housing in Saratov was finally built and officially registered, Petrovy agreed to transfer the ownership of this

Figure 3-3 Resettlement procedure under the housing construction scheme.
apartment to Olga, so her family can live separate from
the parents, while the pensioners Petrovy continued to
live in the North and visit their relatives ones a year in
the summer.

This example shows how participation in relocation
project became a strategy of extended family Petrovy,
including four generations, according to the needs and
priorities of the whole household. Instead of resettlement,
Petrovy were using the programme for solving
housing problem and improving living conditions of
Olga and her new family.

3.3.2 Guarantee letter scheme

The programme supporting housing construction for
the northern migrants was in force until 2002. In parallel,
a new resettlement law appeared in 1998. The Federal
Law 131-FZ “On Housing Subsidies for Citizens’
Migration from the Far North and Equivalent Regions”
(Federal Law 131-FZ from 25 July 1998) was designed
to provide migration assistance to economically vulnera-
tble categories of the population. The rate of federal
subsidy under this new framework depended on several
conditions: a) length of work which also means length
of residence in the Russian North, b) number of family
members, c) social norm of housing determined by the
state at the rate of 33 m$^2$ for a single person, 42 m$^2$
for a family of two, and 18 m$^2$ for each family member in
a family of three or more d) and the cost of housing in
the region of destination according to the estimations
of the state. Citizens who worked and/or lived in the
North between fifteen and twenty years would receive
state assistance amounting to 80 percent of the total
value of housing in the recipient area (Table 3-1). 100
percent subsidy would be awarded to residents of non-
viable communities in the process of closing, or those
who had worked and/or lived in the region for more
than thirty-five years.

According to the Federal Law 131-FZ, the estimation
of housing subsidy, was based on the normative price as defined by the Ministry of Regional Develop-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of work/ length of residence (years)</th>
<th>15-19</th>
<th>&gt;20-24</th>
<th>&gt;25-29</th>
<th>&gt;30-34</th>
<th>&gt;35+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of state housing subsidy (percent)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in the first scheme, we would like to give a fic-
tional case example helping in understanding how the
relocation process was organized in practice. This time
we talk about Andrey and Svetlana Ivanov and their
two children staying in one-room flat in an industri-

Table 3-1 Rate of state housing subsidy depending on length of work (length of residence). Source: The Federal
Soviet distribution system of institute graduates; they were living and working in the North for the last eighteen years in mining until the company was shut down. Andrey and Svetlana have heard from their neighbours Sidorovy who moved to the South last year about state relocation project. While finding details about the programme and preparing all required document, Ivanovy visited a real estate agency for a consultation. It provided them with preliminary information about real estate sector in Znamenka as well as market housing prices.

Based on the terms and conditions of the relocation programme and taken into account Ivanovy’s length of work in the North, a need in improving living conditions as well as a size of the family, the officer in the local administration calculated the amount of housing subsidy in the way explained in Figure 3-4.

Thus, the federal housing assistance for the family of Ivanovy in total amounted 1,630,800 RUB or about 53,373 USD. According to the Federal Law 131-FZ Ivanovy were registered in the fourth category of programme participants i.e. non-working population. By using social contacts and the influence of their family member working in the local implementation office, Ivanovy managed to jump the queue and move in front of citizens who have been applying before Ivanovy and waiting for the government subsidy already for several years.

In the spring of the next year Andrey and Svetlana were officially informed about receiving housing subsidy. Following advises and recommendations of Sidorovy which also relocated to Tambov Region, Ivanovy received an official letter from the regional administration guaranteed a subsidy at the amount of personal savings of Ivanovy. After all the official details clarifying transfer of the ownership were solved, Petr received the second part of payment transferred by the northern municipal administration within the following ten days. This second part of the payment was initially funded by the federal housing subsidy in the prescribed amount.

The whole summer Ivanovy spent in Znamenka, working in the garden and renovating the house. In September they came back to the North in order to pack belongings and to transfer their ownership right of northern flat to the municipal property, as it was defined by the rules of relocation programme.

### 3.3.3 Housing certificate scheme

The previous implementation mechanism was replaced by the housing certificate scheme, which was applied
in both the Federal Law 125-FZ and the World Bank northern project in 2002. According to the definition given in the Article 4 of the Federal Law 125-FZ, the state housing certificate is a nominal document, confirming the citizen’s right to receive a housing subsidy, which can be used only for purchasing or building a house (Federal Law 125-FZ from 25 October 2002). In exchange for a northern flat, participants of resettlement programmes receive a housing subsidy for purchasing apartment in the South. As in the guarantee letter scheme, the certificate provides participants the opportunity to choose preferred housing and the destination of in-migration without previously applied restrictions (Fig. 3-5).

In contrast to previously tested relocation mechanisms, this new scheme develops a system of federal control over financial flows and turnover of documentation. The state subsidy is transferred directly to the grant receiver in the form of a non-cash registered official document. Since all financial operations are managed and controlled by the Sberbank, it supposedly shrinks room for corruptive behaviour among officials involved in the implementation process. Established procedures for these payments allow neither programme officers nor programme participants to use allocated subsidies for purposes other than specified. Nevertheless, field research shows that beneficiaries find different ways to cash certificates and to invest available money into something different than relocation.

Another difference between the second and the third schemes refers to the length of validity. Compared to short duration of guarantee letter, the period of housing certificate’s validity has increased to nine months that gave resettlers more time in choosing apartment and preparing the documents.
The main critique of two previously implemented relocation schemes mentions the issue of transparency and bureaucratic complexity. Contrastingly, the resettlement procedure built upon housing certificate applies direct mechanisms for provision of migration assistance and builds upon three pillars: state, bank, and beneficiary (Fig. 3-6). Through reducing involvement of regional and local administrative officials in the resettlement process and putting more responsibilities on individuals and households, the state transforms policy and creates vertical links between the federal level and the individual level. The role of the regional implementation office has been narrowed down to a “secretarial duties” meaning collecting required papers and documents from the participants, sending them to the main office in Moscow, and delivering participants housing certificates. The function of local offices under the Federal Law 125-FZ is only in taking over apartments from resettled citizens. Compared to previous relocation programmes the new scheme leaves very limited space for regional interference.

The housing certificate scheme is not a new instrument of state social subsidizing. It was previously applied under the government-financed programme for retired military officers and victims of the Chernobyl disaster. The average rate of housing subsidy under the World Bank Pilot Project totals 2,485 USD per person against 7,270 USD per person under the federal programme (The World Bank 2006: 11).

According to the Federal Law 125-FZ, calculation of the housing certificate has been based on the same principles described in the previous section and the normative prices as defined by the Russian state. Housing certificates under the World Bank project were composed of the total amount of basic social transfers paid to each member of the household participating in the resettlement project, multiplied by a special social coefficient. From 2002 till 2006, the basic individual payment amounted to 2,400 USD for Vorkuta and Norilsk and 2,180 USD for settlements of the Susuman Municipality; in 2008 it was increased to 7,200 USD for all three territories. Government resolution N772 from 22 October 2008 defined different rates of multiplication (so called social coefficients) according to the size of the family applying for resettlement: single person – 1.9; family of two people – 1.2; family of three and more people – 1. The certificate provided under the World Bank project could be also used for covering transportation expenses. In this case, the housing subsidy would be decreasing by the amount of ship-

Figure 3-6 Resettlement procedure under the housing certificate scheme
ping costs.

To conclude, before 2009 the Russian state took leading role in organising out-migration, which made relocation less bureaucratically complicated for people. It faced, nevertheless, complaints related to organisational problems: in many cases, flats were not finished on time, federal subsidies were spent inefficiently, and local officials exceeded their authorities. The new scheme, implemented since 2002, assigned participants more responsibilities, including self-searching for apartments in host region, drawing up documents, shipping household belongings, official registration in the new place of living, etc. For invalids and older pensioners – target groups of the programme – participation in the programme became more challenging because they had to deal with the issues related to relocation by themselves. In comparing the previous and current approaches, we see that the resettlement policy developed from collective resettlement schemes in a more “individualistic” direction. The role of the state has been reduced to providing housing certificates, and the duties of applicants have been considerably extended.

3.4 Programme governance

The administrative organisation of the state resettlement programme is based on a vertical mode of governance (Fig. 3-7). There is a central implementation unit, founded under the roof of the Ministry of Regional Development, as well as regional and municipal branches, usually working within the housing committees of local administrations. The programme is financed directly from the federal budgetary funds, and then subsidies are allocated to regions and beneficiaries according to the number of applications and funds available. The size of the programme’s resources is defined by the Ministry of Economy on an annual basis.

As it was mentioned, before 2002 northern implementation offices had greater administrative functions and regulatory capacities. Operating within the legal framework provided by the federal government, regions still had the power to decide on how the programme should be realised and what the priorities according to the local specifics were. The northern region was eligible to modify the normative base that regulated the implementation process in its territory. This system of governance, however, was criticised for its massive administrative apparatus, lack of transparency, corruptive behaviour of officials, return migration and high level of mistrust in officials and migration programmes in general. In 2002, the resettlement policy adapted a new scheme that made the implementation process more centralised and direct. Regional and municipal units became, in a sense, a “technical hand” of the federal implementation unit and got deprived of their decision making power. The duties of local offices were narrowed to consulting citizens about their resettlement opportunities, registering participants, making personal files, sending documents to the central bureau in Moscow, and ensuring that all procedures were carried out legally.

In comparison, operation of the World Bank project has been coordinated by an Inter-Ministerial Working Group, including the Ministries of Economic Development and Trade, Finance, Labour and Social Development; the Government Apparatus; and the Federal Centre for Project Finance (The World Bank 2001: 10) (Fig. 3-8). Since the project addressed multidimensional problems, such as economic and municipal restructuring, human mobility, and the social costs of transition, it applied principles of interdisciplinary cooperation at both the federal and municipal level. At the municipal level, the project combined interested parties who were important for programme implementation: representatives of local administrations, local legislators, major employers, major labour units and representatives from the settlements to be closed. “The policy changes and restructuring elements of
the project required the support of these stakeholders in order for the changes to be successful. Therefore, Coordination/Supervisory Councils were established on each side” (The World Bank 2001: 10). The main function of these units was to have control over project realisation and provide general management at the local level.

The technical implementation function at the federal level belonged to the Project Implementation Unit, which reported to the Inter-Ministerial Working Group. It also carried out financial management of project funds, monitoring and evaluation. Each municipality have been participating in the project had its Local Project Implementation Unit that was responsible for project’s management.

3.5 Policy outcomes

According to the Ministry of Regional Development, as of 01 January 2008, there were 530,784 people (or 215,500 families) in total who had applied for the government house subsidy (Table 3-2). Statistically, this means that more than half of the one million northerners wishing to leave the North but they cannot do so without financial support from the state. But resettlement programmes do not distinguish between those who want to leave and those who want money to improve their material situation.

The relevance of resettlement is not changing and the queue is not shortening significantly whether because demand on relocation is still high in the North or, it could also be that more and more people perceive the programmes as additional source of revenue. For the period 2005 - 2008, the line of people willing to leave the North decreased by 15 percent, from 2006 to 2007 it decreased by 6.4 percent and from 2007 to 2008 it decreased by one percent only (Committee for Problems of the North and the Far East 2008: 3). In actual numbers, this is a decrease from 677,075 people on the waiting list in 2005 (or 250,311 families) to 530,784 in 2008 (215,472 families). Distribution of programme participants according to the five priority categories is presented in Table 3-2.

As previously mentioned, The Federal Law N 125-FZ is carried out under the broader national project “Housing”. During the first period (2002-2005) of its implementation, 7,100 housing certificates were allocated to northern migrants. In financial figures this is about 3,400,000,000 RUB or 112,663,911 USD (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 3). In 2006, according to the Ministry of Regional Development, there were 1,300 federal housing certificates distributed (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 3). The total amount of housing subsidies allocated for resettlement during the period 2002-2006 reached 6 percent from the required amount (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 1). The Federal Law N 198 from 24 July 2007 “On the federal budget for 2008 and planning period 2009-2010” specifies 2,4653,30 mil. RUB which is equal to 22,000 housing certificates to be allocated during the period 2008-2010 (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 2).

Statistical information provided by the Project Implementation Unit shows that during three waves of the World Bank project relocation, more than 3,200 households (or 7,300 people) were resettled, including 3,700 residents of Vorkuta city, 888 residents of Norilsk and 2,700 people in the Susuman Municipality of Magadan oblast (The World Bank 2006a: 10-11). The programme expenses on housing subsidies amounted to 18,200,000 USD, which is 21.1 percent of the total loan. With that, federal budget spending on relocating the same quantity of citizens under The Federal Law N125 exceeded the costs of the World Bank project by three times and amounted to 48,000,000 – 53,200,000.
USD (The World Bank 2006: 11). Considering that the amount of a housing subsidy under the Pilot Project was on average about 40 percent of the amount of a housing subsidy under The Federal Law N 125-FZ (The World Bank 2006a: 6), reduction in state expenditure on relocation policy in comparison with estimated expenses under The Federal Law N125-FZ amounted to about 30,000,000 - 35,000,000 USD (The World Bank 2006a: 11). The most popular regions accommodating northern settlers under the World Bank project included the Belgorod Region (9.3 percent of total),7 the Krasnodar territory (6 percent), the Kirov Region (5.5 percent), the Rostov Region (4.6 percent), the Tula Region (4.5 percent), the Vladimir Region (4 percent), the Nizhny Novgorod Region (3.9 percent), the Voronezh Region (3.4 percent) and the Ivanovo Region (3.3 percent) (The World Bank 2006a: 14).

As a consequence of the World Bank out-migration assistance, municipalities of the territories participating in the programme obtained 2,023 housing objects with a total area of 93,040 m² at the cost of 13,480,000 USD (The World Bank 2006: 11). As in the case of the state resettlement programme, after receiving the housing grant, the beneficiary was obliged to transfer the ownership of the apartment in which he lives in the North to the municipal property. Available housing could be used for solving different social problems in a municipality, for instance, providing these apartments for citizens living in poor or dangerous housing conditions. The leader of the Project Implementation Unit in Moscow concludes:

Realizing the relocation policy caused a synergistic effect which was not considered nor initially planned for in the project. First, municipalities received additional available dwellings for relocating people living in dilapidated houses and closing satellite-communities. Second, due to reducing expenses on infrastructure, housing and utilities which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of the northern population, specified in the Federal Law N 125-FZ</th>
<th>number of people</th>
<th>number of families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st category</td>
<td>Residents of closing settlements</td>
<td>2049 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd category</td>
<td>Invalids</td>
<td>55,261 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd category</td>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>303,628 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th category</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>976 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th category</td>
<td>Working population with northern working length not less than 15 years</td>
<td>168,829 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount:</td>
<td>530,784 people</td>
<td>215,472 families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-2 Number of citizens registered for receiving federal housing subsidies in all regions of the Russian Federation as of 01 January 2008. Source: The State Duma Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern Problems, 2008.

7 The destination of Belgorod is preferred by those who moved to the North from the Ukraine. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union when the Ukraine became a separate country, they either can not or do not want to go back, so people resettle close to the Russian-Ukraine border, but still remain on the Russian side.
accomplished. It stimulated an elaboration of new ap-
proach towards spatial allocation of people, which was
further taken by the federal relocation policies.

To conclude, before 2002, resettlement from the
Russian North was taken in the form of collective
targeted relocation. The state provided northern reset-
tlers newly-built apartments in selected regions in
the South. By this means, the state tried to influence
the direction of out-migration and population distribu-
tion, making it easier to control. After 2002, market me-
chanisms regulating people’s mobility were introduced. It
significantly shifted federal policy towards individual
resettlement. People received freedom in choosing
housing and a region of residence, as well as greater
responsibilities related to proceeding documents, pur-
chasing a dwelling, transferring their northern apart-
ment to municipality administration, and actually mov-
ing to the South.

Our analysis reveals an important role of the World
Bank experts in changing the principles and direction
of resettlement policy. Being involved in the imple-
mentation and evaluation of the World Bank Northern
Restructuring Project, they also participated in rede-
signing federal relocation policy (Federal Law 125-FZ
from 25 October 2002) and expanding the neo-liberal
perspective on reorganisation of the North. As a con-
sequence, the housing certificate scheme became a prin-
cipal resettlement mechanism in both programmes.

We argue that the World Bank Pilot Project has be-
come a transnational governmental actor and addressed
local problems by creating ‘vertical encompassment’,
similar to the ‘vertical encompassment’ produced by
the nation state (Ferguson & Gupta 2002). It does not
necessarily mean that the World Bank as a transnation-
al agency built its hierarchy ‘above’ the nation state;
rather it operated ‘within’ the Russian power structure.
In the same way as the national state, it has created a
network of agencies (implementation offices) operat-
ing at different levels, both federal and local, and has
formed spatial and scalar hierarchies, theoretically de-
scribed by Ferguson and Gupta. By incorporating itself
into the existent regime and inventing certain policy
mechanisms, the World Bank influenced federal reset-
tlement policy and gradually redirected it to a desired
direction. Thus, the World Bank provided a loan, but
with this financial support it also has instituted meth-
ods, techniques of northern socio-economic and popu-
lation administrative development based on neoliberal
principles.
4 Implementation problems

In attempt to describe main implementation challenges, this chapter particularly discusses the issues related to programme underfunding, unequal distribution of programme budget between northern regions, imperfections of programme design due to underestimated diversity of local conditions, people’s responses to the programme. It seeks to find out what causes implementation problems and what the local responses are.

4.1 Programme underfunding

The main challenge slowing down out-migration from the North which was commonly mentioned in the interviews as well as government’s reports on relocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding allocated/planned for the programme, mil.RUB</th>
<th>Factual funding of the programme, mil.RUB</th>
<th>Cash execution of the budget, mil.RUB</th>
<th>Number of people who received housing subsidies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>868.4</td>
<td>798.54</td>
<td>25 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>1197.5</td>
<td>18 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>10 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>500*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>764.2</td>
<td>764.2</td>
<td>764.2</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>812.13</td>
<td>812.13</td>
<td>812.13</td>
<td>4 000 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>812.1</td>
<td>812.1</td>
<td>811.1</td>
<td>no available information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1012.1</td>
<td>1019.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1471 housing certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1166.64 (2185.74 after changes in federal budget)</td>
<td>2185.74</td>
<td>1276.96</td>
<td>1389 housing certificates (1331 certificates were allocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1252.97</td>
<td>1252.97</td>
<td>1606.8</td>
<td>1031 housing certificates (905 certificates were allocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7485.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8450.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8717.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-1 Subsidies for resettlement policy under the Federal Law 125-FZ, 1998-2010. * In 2001 allocated subsidies were transferred to the disaster clean-up operations in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). ** Incomplete data, because not all regions provided information to the Ministry of Economic Development. Source: The State Duma Committee on the Northern and Far Eastern problems, 2008
policy implementation is continued under-financing. According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of Regional Development, during the period 2002-2004, the programme budget totalled only 3.9 percent of the required amount for the same period of time. It means that only 1.3 percent of people applied for the state assistance and being registered in the programme waiting list actually received relocation certificates.

During the last several years there has been a yearly decrease of programme resources allocated. In 1998 it was 1,200,000,000 RUB or 39,685,534 USD (Table 4-1). In 2000 the programme budget changed to 850,000 000 RUB or 28,108,889 USD (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 11). Alongside with that, housing prices did not stay at the same rate. For example, between the fourth quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2006, the average house price grew by 17 percent, from 11,650 RUB per m² to 13,600 RUB per m² (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems, 2007: 4). The reductions in allocations, as may be supposed, reflect decreased interest of central authorities in northern resettlement as well as lowered relevance of relocation problem for the Russian northern periphery.

In 2006, the issue of relocation re-established its importance for Moscow politicians, which directly resulted in a more than two-fold increase in the programme budget. As can be seen from Table 4-1, the Russian state has ambitious plans to push resettlement further. However, the budget increase did not bring significant changes in programme realisation. The question is: why, with the generally increased funding in 2006, were only half of the subsidies spent? And why were the housing certificates not fully allocated?

The problem of programme underfunding has to be viewed in the context of rapidly growing housing pric-


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average housing price (average rate), RUB</th>
<th>Funding provided for the programme, mil.RUB</th>
<th>m² of housing which can be purchased with programme money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2 980</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>420 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4 427</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>271 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5 542</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>153 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5 870</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>85 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8 510</td>
<td>764.2</td>
<td>89 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10 026</td>
<td>812.13</td>
<td>81 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10 056</td>
<td>812.1</td>
<td>80 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11 055</td>
<td>1012.1</td>
<td>91 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13 600</td>
<td>1166.64</td>
<td>85 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 (1st half year)</td>
<td>17 460</td>
<td></td>
<td>71 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 (2nd half year)</td>
<td>22 430</td>
<td>1252.97</td>
<td>55 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (1st half year)</td>
<td>23 400</td>
<td>7485.35</td>
<td>31 900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
es, which were not properly taken into account by policy designers. For the period 2007-2008, the increase in housing prices reached 26 percent in the Republic of Karelia, 33 percent in the Komi Republic, 27 percent in the Murmansk Region, 23 percent in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and 23 percent in Primorskiy Kray (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 3-4). In 1998, the average housing price in Russia was 2,980 RUB per m². In 1999, it increased to 4,427 RUB per m². Growing annually, it reached 10,056 RUB per m² in 2004 and 23,400 RUB per m² in 2008 (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 2). Based on the average rate of housing price and the annual programme budget, there were 402,700 m² of dwelling space that could be purchased for relocating northerners in 1998. In 1999 this number decreased to 271,100 m², in 2004 it amounted 80,700 m² and only 31,900 m² in 2008 (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 4).

4.2 Unequal distribution of programme budget

The second aspect as mentioned by regional officials concerns the distribution principle of the programme’s financial resources (Fig. 4-1). It is mentioned that the budget of the resettlement programme is not equally distributed between participating regions and between categories of the target population. Regions like the Komi Republic, Magadan oblast and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) receive more funding then other northern entities because they are experiencing numerous closures of economically non-viable communities, which are classified as the first priority group to be addressed by the programme. For example, in 2006, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) received 5.4 percent of the total programme budget and 28.3 percent of total funding in 2007 to support 12,344 residents relocating from seven closing settlements (Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems, 2008).

As it was described in the previous sections, the article 2 of the Federal Law 125-FZ defines five categories of population entitled to apply for state subsidy which, however, are not equally prioritised. As our fieldwork material shows, the second priority group benefits only when all participants of the first group have received a housing certificate. The third group - pensioners - takes advantage of the resettlement programme when all applicants of the previous group - disabled persons – have received a grant. This principle applies to the fourth and fifth categories in the same manner. Considering the programme’s underfunding, it means that the non-working population and long-term residents have a small chance to obtain the state assistance to which they have the right. Housing subsidies are received mainly by residents of closing settlements, disabled and, rarely pensioners.

![Figure 4-1 Distribution of federal funding among five categories of programme participants](image_url)

In response to this disproportionate allocation of programme resources, different solutions were proposed. The administration of the Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous District suggested distributing financial flows proportionally between the five target categories, so that each group would receive 20 percent of the programme’s total allocations respectively (Project of The Federal Law N 184275-4). The State Duma Committee on the Northern and Far Eastern problems recommended shared distribution of the
budget between programme participants based on the retention of prioritisation principle (Project of The Federal Law N 46124-4). Taking the total programme budget as 100 percent, 30 percent would go to the first group, 25 percent to the second group, 20 percent to the third, 15 percent to the fourth category and 10 percent to the last. In 2006, the Murmansk regional Duma proposed to the federal authorities the project of a law where the northern regions possess a right to distribute programme funding between programme groups according to the regional situation and specifics (Project of The Federal Law N 327943-4). It was also offered to establish a special Federal Law with a separate programme budget for citizens living in closing localities, so that the programme budget specified for relocation problem would not be used for closing economically non-viable communities. However, these initiatives were not taken into consideration as contradictory to existing legislation.

4.3 Programme design imperfections

Informants in both cases do not consider the programme’s failure as a consequence of implementation steps but rather the programme’s design itself, its theoretical character, structural discrepancy and complexity. The State Duma Committee on the Northern and Far Eastern problems pointed out, among other implementation challenges, a discrepancy within the provisions of The Federal Law 125-FZ. Specifically, the statutory wording of the Law’s articles do not correspond with the wording of the government resolution clarifying procedures as established by the Law, leaving room for varying interpretations. For example, according to Article 1 of the Federal Law 125-FZ, the queue of programme participants is formed on the grounds of the length of work in the North. However, paragraph 20 of the Government resolution N879 from 10 December 2002 defines the principle for forming the queue as participation according to the number and date of submitted application.

Resettlement programmes were planned in the way that participation in them demanded time, practical knowledge about the real estate sector and Russian legislation, skills in purchasing and selling, mobility, and substantial patience to go through bureaucratic obstacles. The relocation under both certificate letters scheme and housing certificate scheme has had complicated and time-demanding procedure of drawing up a purchase contract. The expert in Kovdor, commenting on the relocation programmes, says:

*The difficult thing was in drawing up documents, because there were very specific requirements set up by our regional administration. But people were coming through all these organisational formalities. They were sending us the copy of purchase contract by fax and we were advising them.* (Expert, Kovdor, interview was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2006)

Another issue, mentioned in the interviews is the fact that, according to the law, the transfer of ownership rights is needed to be done before actual payment. The officer in Apatiti explains:

*Generally, there are not many real estate agencies that agree to work with these certificates. Who sells the flat without getting money before? Therefore, there is a problem.* (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 2008)

4.4 Underestimated diversity of local conditions

Despite the fact that all three pilot cities of Vorkuta, Norilsk and Susuman belong to the Russian Far North periphery and have similar development problems, the implementation of the World Bank project illustrates different challenges and different results in each case.

The World Bank project was implemented with greater success in Vorkuta and the Susuman Municipality. People were induced to leave by the declining socio-economic environment and by extensive promotion of the resettlement programme, including individual work with participants and supplemental payments to the housing subsidy allocated by the Susuman municipal administration (The World Bank: 2006). In the Susuman Municipality, realisation of the project achieved 56 percent or 3,348 resettled people from the planned 6,002, and in Vorkuta it accomplished 97 percent or 6,233 people from 6,422. In Norilsk, the pilot project was not as effective as planned. A relatively favourable socio-economic environment, plus a working system of northern benefits and social welfare programmes became strong pull factors for people to stay in the North. In spite of additional funding allocated from the local budget, implementation of the programme in Norilsk reached 8 percent of the intended level, or 1,155 actually relocated citizens against the planned 15,105. (The
4.5 People’s responses to the programme

The field research, conducted in the Murmansk oblast and YNAO, shows how state measures aimed redesigning the socio-demographic landscape of the North became re-interpreted in the process of implementation. People have responded to the policies in both explicit and implicit ways through refusing relocation, backward migration and developing withdrawing activities.

The evidence from our case study contributes to the theoretical argument that resettlement project as an institutional process produced a space for unintended consequences (de Wet 2009). “This clearly suggests that institutional objectives are not in alignment with individual needs and aspirations” (Shrestha 1987: 329).

4.5.1 Refusal to participate in the programme

Because of growing housing prices, inflation and the significant difference between the market price and the normative price used for calculating housing certificates, in more and more cases people can not find an apartment in their preferred destination that can be covered by received state subsidy.

Very often the price of housing in the region in which they want to resettle is higher than the amount of migration assistance they receive. Practically, it means that participants would need to pay in excess of the certificate. But since relocation policy focuses on socially vulnerable categories, it is difficult for people to make additional payments, especially if the grant receivers do not have family or relatives who are able to support them financially. As fieldwork material demonstrates, beneficiaries refuse housing certificates and stay in the North even if they wish to move to a different area, or they start to create financial tricks. The officer in Apatiti’s implementation unit comments:

Last year certificates were allocated only for disabled. Still, there were not many willing. People were not stepping in the programme, although we were sending letters and offering citizens to participate in the programme. (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 2008)

People refuse certificates. First, because the value of certificate is not enough for purchase housing in the region they intend to relocate. The second reason is that the procedure is very complicated. (Expert, Apatiti, interview was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2007)

There is a very similar tendency which has developed under the World Bank Pilot Project. In the period from 2002 to 2006, 48.6 percent of programme participants (3,470 households) quit the programme. The main reason for rejection was named as “non-application of housing certificate” (The World Bank 2006a: 4). Since the basic part of the social subsidy was small and did not reflect the growing housing prices, it did not allow northern migrants to purchase a preferred apartment in the market. Moreover, the duration of the certificate is nine months and it can not be extended. Grant holders are restricted in time to find a suitable flat in the South and to execute the necessary documentation.

At a more general level, refusal of participation leads to a default on programme performance and non-fulfilment of planned objectives. Notwithstanding the fact that the Russian government increased subsidies for northern resettlement in later years, the actual number of certificate applications decreased, and so decreased the number of resettled residents. Observing the amount of finances for a programme does not tell us much about policy success. Rather, it is important to look at how participants respond to the state’s measures and what the real practices standing behind statistics and bureaucratic procedures are.

4.5.2 Local creative strategies

Vertical allocation of programme funding to selected categories, prioritising long-term residents, complicated programme rules and extended responsibilities of participants along with underestimated role of attachment to the place, social relationships in the community, the law of cumulative inertia influencing people’s mobility, have been resulted in participant’s refusal to leave the North and return migration.

Many citizens do not leave. Mostly, they do not relocate, because the certificates have been received by disabled persons, especially in the latter years. Before we were giving subsidies to pensioners and
According to the Russian law, the social norm of housing for a family of two is 42 m². Thus, the federal housing assistance for this family amounts to 842,520 RUB or 27,427 USD. In contrast, a two-room flat of 38-41 m² in secondary market in a residential district of Voronezh city costs 1,360,000-1,400,000 RUB or 44,273-45,575 USD (“Iz ruk v ruki” 2009). Obviously, if the family members do not have considerable savings, they would not be able to purchase housing in their preferred destination since the difference between the state certificate and the real market price of housing is about forty percent. This is the situation that almost every resettling individual or household faces with.

There are two options the exampled family has. First, they could resettle to a small town or village in the Voronezh Region, where housing prices are lower. The second option would be to sign for resettlement to the Moscow Region, Moscow city, or St. Petersburg instead of Voronezh. In this case, their housing certificate would increase to 1,533,315 RUB, 2,634,660 RUB and 1,581,510 RUB accordingly. Then the family would find a dwelling in their declared region, let us assume in St. Petersburg, purchase it, process the certificate, sell the presently bought apartment in St. Petersburg and buy another one in Voronezh or another preferred area. Alternatively, they could cash in their certificate at a real estate agency at a cost of certain percent of the total amount. Our interviewees in both case studies mentioned different rate of the payment for real estate bureau’s services, namely from seven to ten percent.

Another strategy would be if this elderly couple bought an apartment from their distant relatives living in St. Petersburg, realised the certificate and registered the flat back in favour of the relatives. With the received money, the family would buy a dwelling in Voronezh. Technically, the purpose of the policy is reached: people move out the North and buy an apartment in the region where they would like to settle.

It is also so that the pensioners could live in the same apartment with their adult children. When the elders receive a certificate, they would have to return their flat in the North to the municipality, and the children would be left without housing, although they were born, are needed and employed in the North. What the beneficiaries would do is cash in their certificate at an agency, and with that money purchase a cheaper flat in the North for the children and another one in the South for the parents.

Still, very often those who apply to the programme do not consider resettlement an option at all. After cashing in the state certificate, they move back to the

---

**Notes:**

- **Policy Context:**
  - The resettlement programme is a social policy designed to help older adults, typically those from the mining industry, move to more suitable regions for their age.
  - The programme offers housing assistance and relocation benefits.

- **Economic Considerations:**
  - The cost of housing in Voronezh is lower than in Moscow or St. Petersburg, influencing resettlement decisions.
  - Financial constraints limit the ability of families to purchase housing in their preferred areas.

- **Social Norms:**
  - The preference to live closer to children influences housing decisions, especially if the children are needed in the North.

- **Examples:**
  - A fictional family of two pensioners living in Apatiti, Murmansk Oblast, illustrate the challenges and opportunities of resettlement.
  - Their children, who prefer to live closer to the family, influence housing decisions.

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**References:**

- Ministry of Regional Development
- Census data
- Market studies
- Local administrative officials
- Municipal and regional officials
North, buy a flat in the same region of previous residence and use the rest of the money to live, buy a car, or other family needs. Either the family can buy a smaller apartment in the North, plus another flat for their adult children or to rent out, either in the North or in a different area. Return migration is one of the unintended programme results. Return movement is commonly pointed out in the Murmansk Region and less often in YNAO. An expert from the town of Apatiti says:

Mostly they are all here, those who received certificates. They all come back. You can even remember how they look; most of them live here [in Apatiti].
<...> We do not force them to go. They received this subsidy certificate, but it does not mean that they have no right to live here. The prerequisites are fulfilled and so be it. (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 2008)

Another interesting aspect mentioned in interviews is that people participate in the state programme, and create strategies and tricks encouraged not by individual interest but by household needs, particularly the needs of younger generations like children and grandchildren. Parents participate in the relocation programmes, get housing in the South in their name, and give this housing to their children, while they themselves prefer to stay in the North (Bolotova & Stammler 2010).

Participation in the programme makes sense if the amount of federal subsidy is higher than the market value of the northern apartment a family lives in. Otherwise, people would sell their northern housing on the market and buy another one in their preferred destination. It shows, therefore, a different relevance of resettlement programmes in different regions as well as towns:

We have Kirovsk next to Apatiti. Housing costs two times less there compared to Apatiti, therefore it is more beneficial for them [to participate in the resettlement programme], and they have more applicants. (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 2008)

Participation in the federal programme demands physical resources, business skills and knowledge of the housing market and support from the family to prepare the required documents and to go through all the formalities, especially if the grant receiver is old-aged and/or is in poor health:

Certainly, there is a lot of fuss and trouble. Old pensioners come to submit an application and I ask them: Do you have anyone to deal with this? You would need to go to Murmansk to obtain a certifi-
outcomes require a paradigm change. Russian state should be flexible enough to hear the people’s voices and to adapt to their needs, rather than imposing reforms driven by economic calculations.

5 Analyzing reasons of limited implementation results

The main question which will be discussed in the chapter is why resettlement policies have had little success and what measures should be taken to improve performance of relocation projects? This question was partly touched upon in the previous sections which presented results and implementation challenges of both Federal relocation programme and the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project. This chapter analyses the causes for the programme’s poor outcomes and unexpected consequences that enables us to contribute to general insights into the viability of northern industrial city communities as well as to think on policy suggestions for improvement. Empirical findings from field research conducted in Murmansk Oblast and YNAO demonstrate the lack of feedback mechanisms between programme designers and local implementing institutions. It reveals the importance of regional diversity within the Russian North and a gap between centrally planned policy schemes and local concerns and practices.

The state resettlement programme in the Russian North was introduced in the middle of the 1990s as an answer to the changing political-economic environment. Its purpose was resettling economically non-productive population, and, as a result, to solve the problem of northern overpopulation. Elaboration of relocation policies were brought into line with the post-Soviet northern restructuring reforms aimed at rationalizing spatial allocation of people according to neoliberal principles.

Our study demonstrates, nevertheless, that the objectives of population planning were not fulfilled and brought only a minor impact on both population change in the Russian North and northern development. The programmes do not work as they were intended by their authors due to numerous reasons, namely: lack of regional involvement in policy-planning as well as feedback mechanisms between programme-designers and implementing institutions, lack of local knowledge, misconceptions of northerners’ will to relocate, unprofessional assessment of financial needs, inflexible mechanisms of policy implementation, underestimated social and cultural factors influencing migration decision as well as diversity of regional conditions creating different demand for relocation, lack of trust between the state and the people. These causes have resulted, first, from an inconsistency between the central government, which developed the resettlement programme, and the regional institutions that actually implemented the programme’s procedures and, second, from complex relations between the state in the face of administrative officials and programme participants.

5.1 State-state dimension

The resettlement programmes analyzed in this work were initially developed by the federal authorities in order to restructure the northern periphery both economically and demographically and to decrease the burden of budget spending on northern subsidies. The policy was transferred to the northern regions for implementation through establishing regional units within the body of already existing structures - regional administrations. The network of regional implementation bureau have had a particular function of regulating relocation within the territory and coordinating the work of municipal and district offices. The Russian state reproduced itself at the local level by creating representative agencies (implementation offices) and specific bureaucratic practices (implementation-related procedures), making the power hierarchy spatial. It has constituted a branched tree of implementation entities that provide the basis for “vertical encompassment of the state” (Ferguson & Gupta 2002).

The northern regions responded to the federal policy in different ways: by lobbying for amendments to the Federal Law 125-FZ, promoting northern interests, co-financing relocation from the regional budgets, and by developing additional regional resettlement programmes. The Committee on Northern and Far Eastern Problems and the Committee for the North and Indigenous Peoples represent northern territories and their interests in the State Duma. Together with the regions, they worked on improving performance of relocation projects and initiated a re-examination of the government approach. Still, regional attempts have not caused a significant impact to policy changes. Suggestions
brought forward by the territories did not find support at the national level, mainly because the proposed changes demanded greater federal spending, which is inconsistent with the official position of “equalising” Russian regions. This reflects principal contradiction within the northern development approach: on the one hand the Russian North is perceived by central authorities as an integrated part of regional development, on the other hand it still applies the system of northern benefits elaborated under the Soviet welfare regime.

The resettlement policy in the Russian North is a top-down process, giving very little space for regional interference and decision-making power. According to the implementation mechanism applied by the Federal Law 125-FZ, northern entities got deprived of the right to adjust the law and regulate resettlement based on regional needs. The regional units have a rather technical function narrowed to consulting citizens, listing programme participants, examination and collection of required documents and delivering them to the bureau in Moscow.

"Fewer duties and responsibilities rest on us now; currently we only receive documents and send them on. We do not have a commission; do not take local regulations, nothing like that. But it appears to be more complicated to work under new rules. Record-keeping is more complicated. How many people have received a certificate this year? I am not able to tell you. (Expert, Apatiti, interview was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2007)"

The centralised mode of programme administration hinders information exchange between different levels of the state body and generates a gap separating programme-planning and implementation into two processes loosely-coupled with one another. The structural problem results from such an institutional disintegration, lack of cooperation, feedback mechanisms and transparent information.

The resettlement policy was uniformly applied to all northern districts assuming they have similar characteristics and facing similar challenges of transition. Our empirical findings give evidence that in spite of regional similarities relocation policies have had different relevance; federally sponsored relocation projects in different territories were used for different purposes, like closing economically non-viable settlements through prioritised subsidising the first category of participants, relocation of surplus population, improving living conditions of the remaining northern population, or benefits to local bureaucrats.

One can assume that the relevance of relocation would be higher in economically declining and/or remote regions. And, by contrast, resettlement policies do not bring expected results in areas with better development prospects, greater physical links with European Russia and stronger attachment to the place (Bolotova & Stammler 2010, Stammler 2010). However, this assumption does not always reflect the actual processes on the ground. Relocation is not equally relevant for both cases: Murmansk oblast and Tyumen oblast. We can see this from how much local budget was involved in co-financing resettlement, how easy or difficult it was to get access to the information about programme realisation, how local officials perceived resettlement, and how often it was mentioned in the local mass media.

In Murmansk oblast, the resettlement policy has been realised at the scale determined by the federal government. The regional administration has not sponsored out-migration in addition to federal budget allocations, but used available sources to assist population in out-migration. Contrastingly, relocation issue drew more attention in municipal and regional administrations in YNAO. The district actively provided regional funding along with national subsidies. This was allocated in the framework of a regional cooperation project ‘Sotrudnichestvo’ between two regions in the North and one not belonging to the North (southern part of Tyumen Oblast). An economic explanation of such different perspectives would stress the material well-being in YNAO. Due to increasing world demand in energy, high oil and gas prices, and the energy reserves concentrated on the Yamal peninsula, YNAO has more revenue which can be invested into resettlement, compared to Murmansk. Another point is a difference in geographical location and infrastructural development. Compared to Murmansk oblast, YNAO is perceived as a more remote, colder and more peripheral area with an underdeveloped road and rail network. It is more expensive for the local budget to maintain urban life there. In order to reduce the burden of social obligations and to prevent overpopulation of northern towns, the local administration found that it is cheaper to relocate non-working, economically “expensive” residents rather than support them in the North. One government official in the town of Novy Urengoy says:
We do not plan Novy Urengoy to be expanded; it has to remain within currently existing city boundaries. Those people that are not involved in the economic sector should relocate to the South. At the same time, after long-term living in the North irreversible processes start in the human body. Therefore, it is necessary to create conditions and give a choice, so people decide themselves whether they want to move or to stay. (Local government official, Novy Urengoy, 06 December 2008)

Relocation should be considered as an investment project. We also should consider intra-regional options for resettlement, for example, to the south of Tyumen oblast (Local government official, Novy Urengoy, 06 December 2008)

On the other hand, in a situation of strong return-migration to the Murmansk Oblast, as our interviewed experts working with relocation programmes commonly evidence, the regional administration might have had a reasonable incentive not to subsidize resettlement, as it did not generate the intended effect of depopulating the territory. This does not explain, however, why programme participants chose to stay in Murmansk Oblast, which is economically less prosperous than YNAO, and, contrastingly, much easier leave the well-provisioned towns of YNAO. Apparently, factors influencing the decision of residents of northern industrial towns to stay there under harsh climatic conditions, withstanding the large trend of relocation to the South supported by the Russian government, are not limited to financial factors.

At the personal level, often social, physiological and cultural motives become more important than cost-benefit calculations. People follow complex processes in their decision-making, weighing factors such as social well-being, friend and kinship networks, place attachment, health, preferences for particular natural environments, habits acquired throughout their life, all influencing economic consideration. Place-specific social capital based on social relationship in the community appeared to be both push and pull reason in determining personal motives to stay or to move out of the Russian North (Round 2005, Thompson 2008, Heleniak 2009, Bolotova & Stammler 2010). Incomers, who arrived there for work and decided to settle permanently, connected with the place and have discovered a new homeland in the North. This is especially true for the long-term residents who moved to the Far North at the very beginning of its development. Old-timers - the main beneficiary group of resettlement policy - resist relocation as they have established strong ties in the North and have lost the social capital that attached them to their previous place of residence. In contrast, “persons leaving the North were often those with few ties to the region and were most often pulled to regions of origin, where they had considerable social ties” (Heleniak 2009a: 55). They stayed in the North as long as it was economically beneficial, with a view to return back home to their family and friends. But it is not only the social and individual networks that root people in the North, but also an emotional attachment to the particular environment, memories and personal histories.

While interviewing government officials in Murmansk Oblast and YNAO we got an impression that return migration among beneficiaries of relocation projects has greater scale in the first case; the attachment to the place in the Murmansk oblast appeared to be stronger than in YNAO which can be explained by the history of populating these territories. YNAO still is a region of newcomers: only 25.4 percent of the population has lived there since birth, against 73 percent of in-migrated people. At the beginning of the nineties the average length of residency in YNAO was from six to nine years and only 2.2 percent of citizens have lived there twenty or more years (Heleniak 2009a: 40). In Murmansk Oblast old-timers compose one fifth of all residents: 47.9 percent residents were born there and 52.1 percent in-migrated from elsewhere (Heleniak 2009a: 45). Industrial development and large-scale populating of the Murmansk Oblast started in the 1930s. For the needs of the manufacturing sector the Soviet government created a great influx of manpower to the region. Labour policy in Murmansk oblast

8 There is no statistical prove for a higher return migration to Murmansk oblast compared to YNAO, since this data have not been recorded in the regional centers at the first place. However, the question regarding backward mobility was included in the questioner and was discussed with administrative officials in both regions. Our conclusion, therefore, is based on expert’s commentaries and information extracted from the interviews.
mainly relied on a permanently settled working force serving city-forming enterprises. On the other hand, exploitation of mineral resources in YNAO started only in the 1970-1980s and relies more on the labour of commuting workers. Even though the contemporary landscape of YNAO is shaped by industrial towns, circulation of labour flows, high population mobility and comparatively short length of residence in the region have slowed down the process of attachment to the area among non-indigenous incomers. According to the law of cumulative inertia in migration theory, attachment to the place increases with time spent in the area, so the longer a person lives in the place, the less likely he or she is to decide to migrate. Attachment to the region and a sense of community might be weak in such regions composed of so many of newcomers, like YNAO. This assumption still can be questioned by the anthropological observations made by Florian Stammler and Alla Bolotova who indicate strong place attachment among those who moved away but keep strong connections with the North such as, for example, YNAO diasporas (zemlyachestva) in Moscow, Petersburg, Tyumen. Based on in-depth interviews with former residents of industrial cities and those, who remain in the periphery, the scholars conclude that community-feeling is extremely strong because of the experience of building places up jointly is still so much alive in people’s minds, gluing them together (Bolotova & Stammler 2010).

Another important issue to be mentioned is that implementation mechanisms applied in relocation programmes have not reflected the actual economic processes. For instance, according to the Federal Law 125-FZ, housing subsidies are calculated based on the prices determined by the state, which are significantly below the market rate. In practical terms, this means that the value of a housing certificate is not enough to buy an apartment in the market and the person has to use his private savings or family savings. But since the target group of the programme is the socially vulnerable population with little financial ability, very often people reject resettling and stay in the North, even if they are willing to leave. On the other hand, those who agree with the programme rules submit for resettlement to Moscow or St. Petersburg. Housing prices there are higher than average and therefore the value of the certificate is as high as possible. Meanwhile, few northerners really wish to move to Moscow or St. Petersburg; many do not want to leave the northern region at all (Zhelnina 2009). As examples from the field show, the money received from cashing in housing certificates is often spent on purchasing a flat or a house for resettling parents or children in the preferred region, for purchasing a bigger apartment in the North, or for children’s or grandchildren’s education. Thus, the existing legislation and its prescribed resettlement procedure activated the mechanism of withdrawing compensation from the state as compensation for long years of working in the North. This mechanism was not planned for by the state itself, but resulted from the gumption and enterprising of northern residents (Zhelnina 2009).

Our field research reveals that administrative officials from the local implementation offices are well-informed about people’s tricks and return migration. Surprisingly, it was local officials who told us about withdrawing strategies of the participants and various mechanisms of cashing-in certificates, which were described in detail in the previous chapter.

Yes, the programme is not used correctly. It is also difficult to say, because the people worked, they got a long length of work, they have the right to get an apartment and they have the right to use it how they want. (Expert, Kovdor, interview was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2006)

It happens that people moving out of the North return back. There is a recent example. A Woman migrated to Rostov Region under the relocation programme and now she writes to the administration that she wants to move back. She agrees on any housing conditions in the North, just to live there. (Regional government official (b), Salekhard, 12 October 2008)

The fact that beneficiaries use allocated subsidies in their own ways rather than for relocation was not taken by governmental officials as serious infringement of the programme’s conditions. At the local level, the human right to free movement and settlement was prioritised over policy objectives.

We can not relocate people from here by force. We provided them a certificate; they transferred their northern apartment to municipal property. Even though they moved back, bought five new flats and continue to live here. We do not resettle anyone from here forcedly. (Expert, Apatiti, interview was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2007)

It was officially recognised that northern resettle-
ment projects have not worked in the way they were planned (The World Bank 2006, Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008). But the reason for poor policy outcomes, as seen by local authorities, was not associated with practical misinterpretations of the programmes. Both programme participants and northern administrations criticise Moscow politicians for making wrong steps at the stage of policy-designing and loose coupling with the real market processes and regional needs.

This example reveals the double identity of the state officials: local authorities descending federal order in one word without division to the community have a strong local identity as northerners that make them more concerned about well-being of the region as opposed to keeping within the structures imposed by the state. Again, the position of local elites has another - corruptive - side resulting from the lack of public control and the state’s incapability to perform efficiently and maintain coherence between different governing bodies.

Thus, our analysis contributes empirically to the theoretical argument that the state is not a monolithic unit coherent within its structure, but consists of multifaceted practices developed by state bureaucrats at federal, regional and municipal levels. The state is perceived as intervening in a top-down manner into communities through creating vertical network of institutions (Fergusson & Gupta 2002), aimed to implement government regulations and ensuring the functioning of a relocation regime. Because of insignificant involvement in policy-making, northern authorities refer to these regulations as externally imposed by Moscow politicians and being unsuitable for regional context.

Estrangement between the federal and the regional institutions and internal disintegration within the vertical axis of governance unintentionally produces space for financial manipulations and corruptive cases. Relocation policy was misshaped in the course of implementation and has become what overstretched local officials make of it (de Wet 2009). It is the very complexity of the resettlement process that results in its taking on a life of its own, with outcomes that its implementers cannot control, or only to a very limited degree. It is in the ways in which the complexities of the resettlement project as a process limit the state’s control over resettlement outcomes, over what happens, that the resettlement process, and thus the state, may be said to ‘evoke agency’ (de Wet 2009).

People developed various tricks and strategies in response to the state’s attempts to reorganise life in the Northern periphery economically. In a broader sense those tricks can be considered as a signal for policy makers to adjust the programmes according to practical knowledge accumulated in the process of policy implementation. Here we come to the next point – the lack of evaluation and information exchange between state agencies. The Russian state does not have a comprehensive picture of what is happening on the grass-root level. For instance, there are no officially proven statistics on how many people actually left the North after receiving a subsidy and how many of them moved back to the North and why. An administrative official in the town of Apatiti says:

I remember that before Moscow [programme implementation office] required us [regional implementation units] to provide information on who left the North under relocation programme and who did not. We started to collect data on who received housing subsidy, who left and who moved back. But then everybody gave up and things stayed as they are. [If people] left, so [they] left; [if people] did not leave, so [they] did not leave. (Expert, Apatiti, interview was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2007)

The absence of transparent information on policy implementation and feedback mechanisms limits the capacity of the state to improve current policy.

The examination of state-induced relocation in the Russian North touches upon characteristics generally relevant to state theory, including multi-dimensional relations between formal order and informal practices, planning and implementation, simplification and complexity, centre and locality. It shows that creating new patterns of population mobility and placement goes beyond administratively-invented instructions and schemes. “By themselves, the simplified rules can never generate a functioning community, city, or economy. Formal order, to be more explicit, is always to some degree parasitic on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not recognize, without which it could not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain” (Scott 1998: 310).
5.2 State-society dimension

A relation based on social trust between the state and the citizens is a crucial element in successful social restructuring. Lack of social involvement, representation of people’s interests and social control over policy implementation processes can provoke negligence and corruptive behaviour in local officials when the federal transfers allocated for relocation programmes are misallocated or used highly ineffectively. For example, in the case of Zaozersk, widely discussed in Murmansk regional newspapers, the resettlement programme budget was partly used for paying off debt obligations, 3 million RUR, which were spent for the mayor’s election campaign in 2004. The other part of the federal allocation, about 5,700,000 RUR, “disappeared in the air” (Petuhov 2008).

Moreover, budgetary losses have been caused by juridical negligence on the part of regional administrations. In the mid 1990s, when relocation was carried out through construction of housing for northern migrants, there were several cases when a construction firm responsible for building northern houses did not fulfil its contractual obligations. For instance, in one region a construction company illegally re-sold newly built northern apartments; in another case the company received money but the flats were not constructed at all. In addition, distribution of housing subsidies among programme participants in many cases has not followed the official queue, lined up according to the length of work in the North. There were cases when parents and relatives of governmental officials received housing assistance in the first place while other participants had to wait for their turn for more than ten years (Chubatuk 2006).

In some regions, special commissions have been established in order to encourage a dialogue between local administrations and the representatives of local communities as well as to exercise control over policy implementation. These commissions have been organised under the roof of municipal administrations and appeared to be rather formal institutions with limited decision-making power. Still, there is a niche for social trust between the state and the citizens is a crucial element in successful social restructuring. Lack of social involvement, representation of people’s interests and social control over policy implementation processes can provoke negligence and corruptive behaviour in local officials when the federal transfers allocated for relocation programmes are misallocated or used highly ineffectively. For example, in the case of Zaozersk, widely discussed in Murmansk regional newspapers, the resettlement programme budget was partly used for paying off debt obligations, 3 million RUR, which were spent for the mayor’s election campaign in 2004. The other part of the federal allocation, about 5,700,000 RUR, “disappeared in the air” (Petuhov 2008).

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In some regions, special commissions have been established in order to encourage a dialogue between local administrations and the representatives of local communities as well as to exercise control over policy implementation. These commissions have been organised under the roof of municipal administrations and appeared to be rather formal institutions with limited decision-making power. Still, there is a niche for a society to influence policy-making through self-organised initiative groups, collective measures, lobbying, discussions in the mass media, etc. Why then are cases of grass-roots activists taking decisive power and bargaining for resettlement conditions a seldom rather than common phenomenon in Russia? We emphasise a combination of two factors to explain the passivity of social groups as a collective actor in Russia.

An ethnographic survey conducted by Niobe Thompson shows the “dependency mindset” of the average Northern resident, who still believes in the idea of a moral economy of sacrifice and entitlement (Thompson 2004: 77). Long-term northern citizens see their residence in the North as “service to the motherland”, which has to be compensated by material and non-material benefits. Such an “expectative” position, in a way, continues the Soviet pattern of state-society relations, when the former, by attracting people to work and live in the harsh northern conditions, entered into a “moral agreement” with them. People ended up in the North because of the Soviet relocation policy, therefore they expect the state to help them return. The moral obligations of the state were nullified with the collapse of the Soviet system; the successor state applied different methods and principles in population management. But for the people themselves, it does not matter that the contractual party has disappeared. The expectation, at least in discourse, that the government is responsible for social caring, still exists. This psychological attitude makes people seek help from the state and causes unequal relations between the people and the state if the former behave as if they depend on the latter.

On the other hand, northerners are not dynamic in lobbying their interests and controlling programme implementation, perhaps because resettlement from the North is not a primary issue. The intention is rather to withdraw state funding for other private purposes. Participants use the resettlement programme as an excuse to manipulate the government in their own interests. The phenomenon of how people use policies and resources in manipulating the Russian state was first described by Caroline Humphrey in the example of the Soviet collective farm. She calls it “manipulable resources” (Humphrey 1998). The existence of creative agencies explains our next argument concerning the state’s misinterpretation of northerners’ will to move.

As any other social engineering initiatives, the Russian resettlement programmes were created for abstract citizens standardised in their need without taking into account the following: who are these people to whom funding was provided, and what is the history of northern residents and northern communities in general, why did people come to the North in the first place, and why did they not leave after the period
they initially planned to spend there finished? By focussing on economic characteristics of programme participants, such as material status and economic position in the society, relocation policies have considered resettlers as economic actors underestimated in their willingness to move. According to the Murmansk regional newspapers, 30-40 percent of those who receive state-subsidised housing in central Russia immediately sells it and buys an apartment in the same region they were living in previously and effectually do not move from the North. Twenty percent of participants keep their received housing as a summer cottage. And 50-60 percent of participants actually resettle. For example, in Oleneegorsk, in a five-year period, 64 percent of residents who participated in the resettlement project stayed to live on the Kola Peninsula (Sheremey 2002). This gives us a reason to assume that people apply for the programme not so much because they want to leave the North, but to use available state subsidies and raise the living standards of the household. Participation in the resettlement programmes is not necessarily reasoned by resettlement plans, rather by pursuit of family welfare. Recipients of migration assistance use government subsidies for purposes other than those specified in The Federal Law 125-FZ.

According to the 1989 census, more than 60 percent of the northern population was not born in the region. “For many in the North, it was a place to spend a tour or career, with retirement to the mainland (materik)” (Heheniak 2009a: 32). They viewed their residence as short-term, yet stayed there permanently, dedicated their life to the North, and developed social connections and a sense of belonging in the place. This was especially true of the early migrants, who helped to construct much of the region’s infrastructure, and developed a collective bond through this shared struggle under harsh climatic conditions (Heheniak 2009a: 32). They came to the North when there was no proper housing, transport infrastructure, or public services. New towns were growing from scratch and only because of manpower and intense work, enthusiasm and solidarity did they transform from workers’ temporary camps into viable communities. With time, former migrants identified with the hostile northern place through the joint experience of constructing new towns and building up industries, through landscaping a common living space, becoming familiarised with the northern environment, and creating a chain of relations within a community. They established intimate relations to their built and un-built environment, which attached them to the North (Stammler 2010). This is the practical face of a Soviet mode of governance that is built upon the centralised regulation of human resources provisioned for remote resource bases.

Many retired individuals wish to remain in the North that they perceive as home. Even if people relocate to the South, quite often they move back. What holds people in the North and why do they return soon after resettling? There are several reasons, similarly confirmed by scholars studying resettlement in the Russian North (Thompson 2004, Bolotova & Stammler 2010).

First, it is commonly mentioned that different climatic and environmental conditions in the South often impact adversely on northerners’ health. People experience problems of “backward adaptation”, such as allergic reactions and deterioration of health. Respondents bring examples of when, shortly after relocating to the South, their acquaintances die there. The narratives I have heard from local residents make me think that the southern climate’s negative effect on health whether it is proven or not is a very important issue for northerners that believe in climate impact. This issue must be taken into consideration when analysing migratory behaviour.

Second, since people have defined their lives through work and family resettling to the new place, they meet with professional and social needlessness. Several scholars mention that it is particularly difficult to find something meaningful to do in the South, especially in terms of employment (Bolotova & Stammler 2010). The lack of social networking and established contacts including relatives, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances, impedes adaptation to new conditions.

The majority of the elderly population leaving in the North is migrants in the first or second generation. They created the history of the Far North by being there at the beginning of its industrial and urban regional development. Today, many newcomers are retired, but they are respectfully treated as heroes and honorary freemen. In the North, they hold a privileged status, providing them access to services and social resources that they would rarely obtain in the South. Thus, social capital and social importance, an opportunity for self-realisation, and personal history are tightly connected to the history of the region and retain people in the North.
The third reason very much relates to the previous one, since it emphasises physiological discomfort in the new social environment, nostalgia to the spirit of northern collectivity among long-term residents and hostility against “rich” northerners:

“People in the North are more open and supportive than in the mainland.” (Expert, Salekhard, 12 December 2008)

“Society in the North is different; relations between people are built on trust and support. He can easily loan you money without asking what for. He can take you 250 km away to the tundra if your car is broken. Such [relations] do not exist in the mainland.” (Expert, Salekhard, 12 December 2008)

“People [in the South] look with jealousy and hostility at our resettling citizens. They think that if people came from the North and received a state-sponsored flat, they are in a better position, they are rich.” (Expert, Kovdor, interview was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2006)

‘Rootedness’ and attachment to the place are underestimated when analysing the efficiency of relocation programmes by state authorities, especially for non-working pensioners. Originally targeted relocation candidates choose to stay in the North, while handing over flats and other benefits of the relocation programmes to their children in hope for better chances in education or employment elsewhere (Bolotova & Stammler 2010). As in any other region, northern residents are divided between those who would be willing to resettle and those who would not leave the North even if it improved their living conditions. Tim Heleniak points out that many of the migration assistance programmes have failed or been ineffective because they did not fully take into consideration migration selectivity among different groups in the North (Heleniak 2009a: 55).

While conducting our field research we often heard local people saying: “Who is waiting for us there?” The process of adaptation proceeds better in a place with an extensive migrant network. The migrant community in the South, in a sense, reconstructs the social environment that resettlers used to have in their home region. Once people depart, they continue to be in contact with colleagues and friends remaining in the North, and to exchange information about life opportunities, different resettlement options and practicalities.

Taking the argument of a migration network further, one can come to the idea of collective resettlement – relocating a whole community rather than giving individuals the freedom to choose a place of residence - as an alternative policy. A communal relocation scheme was applied in Chukotka over the years 2001-2003. “This was the first programme in post-Soviet Russia to offer a full resettlement package on a voluntary basis to all long-term residents” (Thompson 2002: 271). “The programme was sponsored by Chukotka’s governor, Roman Abramovich, and intended to relocate a relatively large number of residents in a short period of time so to create a more compact but economically active population, based in fewer locations that are easier to supply with a more concentrated system of regional infrastructure (hospitals, schools, energy generation, airports)” (Thompson 2002: 276). The procedure of resettlement was built on the same principle as the federal scheme at the stage of housing construction. What differs in the case of Chukotka is that the resettling residents were assisted at all stages of resettlement, from processing the documentation to moving into a new apartment. Programme participants transferred the ownership of their northern flat to local authorities and received equivalent ones in the South in the same building with other fellow citizens. In addition to housing, participants were provided with transportation money, shipping for their belongings, and support services. As a result, neighbourhoods of Chukotka’s resettled residents appeared in Voronezh, Tula, Omsk, and other locations. “The process of adaptation is difficult, but participants have benefited from the “colony” pattern of resettlement, whereby communities are preserved in a single destination location, often in new “micro-regions” built expressly for this purpose” (Thompson 2004: 77). Thus, Chukotka residents in Voronezh or Tula were not merely migrants, but a ‘mirror Chukotka’ in the South.

Even with positive outcomes, collective relocation has not become the main resettlement principle all over the Russian Far North. First, because providing a full resettlement package is hardly a manageable task for the state. Second, it involves the sensitive problem of human rights incidental to all social engineering policies, as people become limited in their freedom as to what place to move and where to live. In spite of the fact that resettlement is not forced, choice of residence appears to be not completely free, but predefined by policy decisions and resulting in unintended conse-
quences. Communal resettlement could work if all members collectively agree to move into one place, which is apparently unlikely in practice. Nevertheless, the state should consider different options for resettlement, both communal and individual, even if it is more complicated to realise.

The example of Chukotka’s resettlement brings us to the discussion on the viability of communities. Among other factors making community coherent and sustained, it is important to stress the social dimension of viability, the social capital that glues members of community together. The latter includes a strong local culture, socio-cultural linkages and joint experiences. Social infrastructure, therefore, is a crucial pre-condition of a viable community. We apply the concept of community viability to resettling residents, but the same is true for the communities remaining in the North: northern societies are stronger where there is a good sense of community and a feeling of closeness, belonging and solidarity among those habitants who stay in the North (Bolotova & Stammler 2010).

Through taking a community social value into account when making plans for restructuring the state produces the basis for viable economic and social development of the region.

To conclude, by introducing resettlement programmes in parallel with in-migration measures, the Russian state, to some extent, has attempted to reshape the demographic landscape of the North. It has been clearly defined what type of people the state needs in the North and why: working-age, healthy labourers, employed in the resource-extraction and construction industries, which stimulate regional growth. The North needs people who can contribute to the economic growth of the region, and national wealth in general, since it is very much reliant on arctic mineral wealth. Economically passive, socially vulnerable members of the population past the age of production, invalids, and the unemployed should be encouraged to relocate. From there it is obvious that the Russian state applies an economic perspective towards settling and mobility. Regulation of migration processes arises from the necessity of regional economy in labour resources, the interests of national security, and economic development in general. In both in-migration and relocation policies, the state uses a system of economic incentives as driving-in and driving-out mechanisms. It provides people with economically-favourable conditions that, in theory, should influence their migration decision. However, a major mis-assumption of the central government as well as the neo-liberal paradigm is that people act only in an economically rational way. A policy that is designed mainly along financial lines may therefore be unrealistic. The resettlement policy, in the way it was designed and implemented, has failed. It appeared wasteful of federal budget funds, since it did not reach its planned goals. The Federal centre’s trust in the local administrations’ ability to successfully manage the resettlement process was lost; this resulted in strengthening centralisation, direct financing of programme participants through the housing certificate scheme, and reducing regional involvement in policy implementation. It also did not fulfil the expectations of regions and participants, and discredited the state in the eyes of the community. State policy does not reflect the motives behind economically driven logic, lived experiences, and regional diversity. One can say that programme participants sighing for resettlement feel a sort of moral entitlement to trick the state because the latter failed to deliver on its promises, designing policies that do not match the people’s practical needs. Therefore people do not feel obliged to follow policies that are too distant from their real life needs and see their only way to improve their situation in re-channeling resources to where they make most sense for them. From another point of view, even if the state would design policies according to the needs of people, without social trust it would not reach a desired success. The state-society relationship requires a fundamental transformation of perception of the state in the view of regions from an external superstructure, imposed on them in a top-down manner to an institution with which people can identify.
Conclusion

In the period from 1930 to 1980, the North was one of the main priorities of the Soviet state’s development policy. The strategy of northern development was built upon the centralized redistribution of both human and financial resources to the northern territories, aimed at the industrial development of the North and exploitation of mineral wealth to bear export revenues for the national budget. These objectives were achieved by the planned populating of the North, both voluntary and forced, and building up northern towns. As a result of Soviet demographic engineering, during this relatively short period of time, a large number of people moved to the North to live and work there on a permanent basis.

Liberalisation of the economic and political spheres in the early 1990s significantly transformed the state’s approach to its northern periphery. New democratic government underlined the importance of the circumpolar edge, but took a different angle on its demographic composition. The federal state perceived its northern territories, in the first instance, as a resource base contributing to the country’s economic growth and as a geopolitical outpost, protecting and securing national interests in arctic resources (Medvedev 2008). In this view, permanently inhabited northern cities retain their importance as a fortress of state power in the Arctic region and centres of further exploitation of northern mineral wealth. On the other hand, previous state-planning and extensive subsidising changed to a development strategy that relied on profit-oriented cost-cutting measures, including restructuring northern industries, downsizing northern settlements, eliminating “unpromising communities”, and facilitating out-migration. Current development measures focus on rescaling the demographic geography of the North according to the economic viability principle, insufficiently taking into account socio-cultural factors. Since the late 1990s, the federal government has continuously reduced public expenses including special northern benefits which was one of the main motivations for coming to the North and has moved towards the rationalisation of population distribution to and from the Northern periphery. The post-Soviet principle of population distribution has claimed transition from the policy of “residency in the North” to the policy of “presence of population in the North” (The World Bank 2001).

Our study has shown that the current approach of the federal government towards population distribution is not simplistically geared to ‘depopulate’ the area, but more to regulate the population structure through creating economic incentives pulling in and pushing out migration flows. The important question arising from the regulatory perspective on demographic changes is: What population is ‘welcome’ to reside in the North and who should leave? The Russian government makes this distinction clear: those who cannot contribute to economic growth should be encouraged to move. “The intention of the resettlement projects was to increase the proportion of young, healthy, and working-age residents to the retired or disabled, and thus to low social costs of the state, appeared to be producing an opposite effect, as this and previous research confirms” (Thompson 2004: 78).

The paradox is that the state has neoliberal goal following substantial decrease of northern subsidies and gradual withdrawal from influencing population distribution by letting ‘the market forces’ do it. But in order to reach the objective, it actually applies very similar subsidy policy and social engineering measures elaborated during the Soviet time. In order to encourage population mobility, two federal resettlement projects were introduced: the state relocation programme realized under the Federal Law 125-FZ and the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project applied in three selected arctic regions.

What does the implementation tell us about the similarity and diversity of these relocation strategies? Both programmes concentrate on residents of closing settlements, disabled, pensioners and non-working citizens, those who ‘create a burden on northern budgets’ and, therefore, should be relocated. At the current stage, the resettlement process is carried out through a housing certificate scheme that allows people to choose a place of destination and type of housing according to the individual’s preferences and needs. With that, compared to previous resettlement mechanisms, certificate subsidy requires more work and individual responsibilities for beneficiaries and less involvement of local implementation offices into the process.

The difference in programmes’ approaches is that the World Bank Pilot Project set a broader agenda than depopulating the northern territory. It was positioned as a strategic, political project aimed at introducing
new principles of reorganising northern municipalities towards economic efficiency and changing northern development approach in general. And at least in one sphere it reached its objective. The World Bank project has had a significant impact on how the federal resettlement policy was transforming, as the latter has adopted the certificate scheme designed and tested in practice under the World Bank Pilot Project. The expansion of social and economic restructuring schemes over a larger number of northern communities demonstrates the intention of Moscow political elites to generalise the neo-liberal approach and to apply market mechanisms in population distribution on a country’s scale. The problem is, however, that both relocation approaches are too mechanistic. The attempts of the state to artificially ‘engineer’ the social structure did not meet its objective and caused an insignificant impact on either population change or northern development in general. The northern resettlement policy has not worked as it was initially aimed.

The problems negatively affecting the policy outcome resulted from inapplicability of neo-liberal principles to the northern territories which were industrialized and populated under the Soviet development scheme. The role of the state in maintaining socio-economic stability in the northern frontier as well as people’s expectations from the state is still high in the North. Our study shows that northerners rely on the state in helping them to resettle since it brought them to the North in the first place. However, when they get migration assistance in many cases beneficiaries use the subsidies for the different purpose. In practice, the decision to migrate is not simply planned in accordance with the logic of neo-classical economics. It includes determinants poorly considered by policy planners, such as accumulated social capital, personal experiences, and memories attaching people to the place. Even having signed up for a relocation programme, many do not consider resettlement as an option and stay in the North, in that place that once became a home. The overestimated willingness of particular groups of northerners to relocate is one of the mentioned impacts that make relocation policy less effective. Purely economic solutions, therefore, work against the programme and need to be reviewed.

“Theoretical” character of the policy mechanisms, elaborated in isolation from actual practices, has generated structural problems and caused failure of administrative initiatives. Evidently, market-based implementation arrangements have not corresponded with the actual processes happening in the market, aggravated by continuous under-financing, lack of clarity in the programme design, incorrect assessment of the financial needs of resettling northerners, long waiting in queues and complicated participation rules. The programmes intended to increase population mobility prioritized less-mobile population groups and disadvantaged those capable of and, perhaps, willing to leave. Thus, for a migration assisted scheme to succeed, it should target those who are capable of rebuilding their lives in a new region (Round 2005: 720). The neo-liberal schemes ignore local specifics and the socio-cultural aspects standing behind development, trying to simplify the diversity of life to cost-benefit relations. Ignorance of regional characteristics negatively impacts on the programmes’ success and increase the gap between policy design and actual implementation. Thus, one important conclusion which we would like to emphasise is that unsuccessful realisation of resettlement policy results from a discrepancy between planning and implementation.

The analysis of the state-induced resettlement policy in the Russian North has shown the lack of comprehensive understanding within the state of how its northern periphery should be developed. Our case study reveals different “faces” of the Russian state at the central, regional and municipal levels. Interestingly, each of these units has its own priorities for development and different perceptions on what the Russian North is about. This finding has repercussions on the anthropology of the state insofar as the states should be theoretically revisited as a multifaceted rather than a unified actor.

The relevance of resettlement is different in different areas, however, the inflexibility and general character of the federal projects limit their capacity to reflect the local specificity and regional diversity that was illustrated in the example of the Murmansk oblast and YNAO. Restricted involvement of regional and municipal authorities in policy-planning, the lack of feedback mechanisms and poor cooperation between different levels of state agencies involved in relocation creates a gap between the core (policy-planners) and the peripheries (policy-implementers). Resettlement policy in the Russian North has been a top-down process, leaving a limited space for regional interference. Apparently, this
centralised system of administration does not reflect regional position; as a result, it makes resettlement policy alien to the needs of regions and beneficiaries. One option of bringing programmes closer to the target population would be through delegating the decisive power to the regions, allowing them to determine how the programme should function in their territory and adjusting relocation schemes according to the local context. And, secondly, through stimulating a cooperative dialog and information exchange between northern administrations and federal authorities, providing a solid foundation for policy-planning. Reformulating a thesis of James Scott, we argue that the knowledge of actual processes and local responses has to be properly considered while planning social changes (Scott 1998). This approach, though initially more time consuming and costly, can prevent long term economic and social costs by taking into account the need and views of residents rather than depending on outside pressures and physical characteristics of an area for policy (Keczerski & Sorter 1984).

The decision to migrate is not simply planned in accordance with the logic of neo-classical economics. It includes determinants poorly considered by policy planners, such as accumulated social capital, personal experiences, and memories attaching people to the place. Their “identities and histories are all deeply embedded in the region and they are unsure whether they would be able to build a life in a new location” (Round 2005: 723).

The factors shaping migratory behaviour and influencing on decision to move or to stay are complex and cannot be narrowed down to a general framework or theory. Moreover, they closely interact with other complex processes related to policy formation and implementation. It is essential, therefore, for social scientists as well as policy-makers to examine these factors in connection with local context and actual social dynamics in order to achieve more balanced and realistic policies. In order to achieve not only economically but social and culturally healthy communities, the state needs to go beyond quantitative economic analysis and to consider the diversity of factors and contexts and reflect on local responses being inherent outcomes of policy-making.

Concluding, we would like to look at whether the resettlement project can be classified as a result of individual choice or of structural constraint. By imposing different programs, the Russian government encourages the migration of socially vulnerable groups out of the North. Russian northern relocation projects stand for a policy which considers population groups as passive elements “moved by the state” due to economic, military and geopolitical interests. By using structuralist arguments Russian government tried to regulate human mobility; in this sense populating and depopulating territories is a consequence of particular state needs (Government resolution N700 from 10 July 1995). According to Castells (2004: 209), migrants are not just isolated individuals who react to market stimuli and bureaucratic rules, but social beings who seek to achieve better outcomes for themselves, their families and their communities through actively shaping the migratory process. Administrative resettlement was approached by northern beneficiaries explicitly in courts and local mass media and, most commonly, implicitly through strategies and tricks aimed at withdrawing subsidies from the state. Our field research shows how active and creative programme participants were in developing reinterpretations of official schemes in order to improve their own living conditions. Grassroots responses developed by people demonstrate that migration, if not physically forced by the state, is still a private choice made by the relocation candidates and their families, rather than a result of structural inducement. They individually decide on a degree of interaction with the structures of the migration regime, and, moreover, use these structures, whenever it is possible, to suit their own interests (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999: 96). Our fieldwork materials show strategies of proactive migrants who seek better living conditions for themselves, and, more importantly, their families, no matter how much the state tries to ‘induce’ it. The decision to relocate depends on various conditions that can play as both push and pull factors, including the socio-economic situation in the location, access to social welfare programs and medical care, how secure people feel in the North, where the family members (children) are, whether they have social capital in a place other than the North, attachment to the place, how complicated the procedure of preparing documents for resettlement programs is, etc.

In order to improve relocation project’s outcomes, policy reform requires several changes. First, we suggest greater realism in the formulation of policy goals. As we demonstrated, this large scale top-down ap-
proach taken by federal authorities does not work in practice. Probably, it would bring better results if it would be applied in selected number of northern regions according to their needs and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, northern relocation policy should be constantly reviewed and adjusted to the coming challenges. It should take into consideration people’s responses and responses from the local implementation offices. By reinforcing the feedback mechanisms and adapting relocation policy in line with actual practices and regional interests, the Russian state may gradually change the perception of the state as an external structure, imposed from above.

Second, we believe that successful achievement of policy goals depends to a certain extent on social trust between the state and the citizens (Sztompka 1999). As we have seen in our case study, the lack of social trust may lead to misuse of policy objectives and unintended withdrawing practices negatively contributing to policy success. In order to overcome this shortage we propose necessary flexibility of the state when it comes to long term planning. Third, it is important to consider paradigm change at every level of government hierarchy: the duty of the state is to serve its citizens and not the other way around, when people move after the changing interests of the state, first to the North under the Soviet ideological call, and then from the North under the neo-liberal economic regime.

Finally, when initiating social-engineering projects it is important to keep in mind that the principles of northern development go beyond resource extraction and national economic interests. Besides resources, the Russian Far North is also about formed communities and about people committed their life to the North. Many of them discovered a home there.
Bibliography


and Economics 45: 1, 73-81.
Annex I: Summary: Переселение из районов Российского Севера: анализ миграционных программ и их реализации

Данное исследование является одним из результатов проекта «Локальность, мобильность и устойчивость в северных индустриальных городах» (MOVE INNOCOM). Проект поддержан Академией Наук Финляндии, при содействии Европейского Научного Фонда (European Science Foundation), и одобрен как проект Международного Полярного года (International Polar Year) №436. На протяжении последних четырех лет сотрудники проекта MOVE INNOCOM проводили качественные социологические и антропологические исследования в Мурманской области и Ямало-Ненецком Автономном Округе, послужившие эмпирическим базисом для анализа процессов мобильности и закрепления жителей индустриальных городов Севера России. В частности, эта работа представляет политический и экономический взгляд на демографическое и территориальное развитие Российского Севера через комплексный анализ программ административного переселения и их реализации в регионах. В данной работе детально рассматриваются две программы переселения, а именно: Федеральный закон № 125-ФЗ «О жилищных субсидиях гражданам, выезжающим из районов Крайнего Севера и приравненных к ним местностей» от 25 октября 2002 и его предыдущие редакции, а также «Пилотный проект реструктурирования районов Крайнего Севера», реализуемый на заем Мирового Банка.

Масштабная индустриализация, а вместе с ней заселение северных районов, началась в тридцатых годах двадцатого века и была напрямую связана с плановой экономикой и административными подходами к развитию территорий. Для освоения природных богатств Советское правительство применяло принудительное переселение (ГУЛАГ, переселение народов) и поощрение (система экономических и социальных привилегий) привлекало на Север население из других регионов. Вокруг производственных центров строились новые города и поселки, в которых приезжие рабочие и переселенцы жили на постоянной основе. Такие города становились «проводниками» рабочей силы и инфраструктурными центрами для северной добывающей промышленности. В период с 1955 по 1975 годы без малого восемьсот новых городов было основано в рамках гигантского Советского проекта освоения северного края (Engel 2007: 285).

Значимость северного направления была обусловлена не только национальным экономическим интересом, но и стремлением центральных властей объединить регионы в единое пространство, тем самым легитимизировать своё право на территорию. В этом смысле Северные города выполняли функцию форпостов, обеспечивая национальную безопасность и Союзные геополитические интересы. Идеологическая составляющая, определившая характер экспансивного индустриального развития Севера, опиралась на положение Фридриха Энгельса о необходимости равномерного распределения производственных и трудовых ресурсов по всей территории страны (Hill & Gaddy 2003). Однако модернизация северных районов не была стратегическими промышленным планом; напротив, освоение территорий явилось результатом геологических открытий, именно они заставляли промышленность и население продвигаться все дальше и дальше на Север и Восток. Для того чтобы контролировать миграционный поток населения, в отношении северных территорий на государственном уровне проводилась особая социально-экономическая политика, учитывающая специфку этого региона. Система северных привилегий предусматривала высокую оплату труда, централизованное снабжение, специальные северные льготы, компенсацию расходов при выезде в отпуск, северный коэффициент с первого дня работы (Kozlinskaya 2009). Эти зоны преимущественно были закрытыми, и туда можно было въехать только по специально пропущенным билетам. Даже билеты на самолет или поезд продавали только в том случае, если у человека была «северная прописка», либо приглашение от организации, либо гостевой вызов от родственников - северян.

Распад Советского Союза, рыночные реформы 90-х и сопровождающих их социально-экономический кризис обусловили изменение государственного подхода к развитию северных регионов. С одной стороны понимание Севера как ресурсного резерва и донора остается прежней (Medvedev 2008). В это же время советские не-
ханизмы ведения хозяйства в условиях рыночной экономики показали свою неэффективность. Как в регионах, так и на федеральном уровне подчеркивается необходимость поиска новых, экономически оправданных подходов к освоению северных природных запасов.

Так главы северных регионов предлагают развивать Север, опираясь на уже существующую систему постоянных поселений. Север должен стать органичной частью единого экономического пространства страны через развитие не только сырьевых отраслей, но и производств глубокой переработки местных ресурсов, через повышение уровня социально-экономической жизни северных территорий. Представители такого подхода подчеркивают значимость государственных субсидий и специализированных северных программ, поддерживающих жителей Севера.


Из-за высоких транспортных расходов, трудностей эффективного межрегионального взаимодействия, суровых климатических условий экономическая деятельность России, как и человеческие ресурсы, необходимо концентрировать в центральных и южных районах, и переходить к выборочному, тщательно продуманному освоению сравнительно немногих районов Севера, богатых нефтью, газом, золотом, алмазами и другими ресурсами общегосударственной важности. Основное же внимание должно быть направлено на дальнейшее развитие урбанизированных старопромышленных районов европейской части России, потенциал которых еще далеко не исчерпан (Pivovarov 2002, Hill & Gaddy 2003).

Одним из инструментов государственной политики на Севере являются программы переселения, предполагающие административное регулирование демографических процессов через стимулирование мобильности определенных групп населения. Цель таких миграционных программ – дать возможность пенсионерам, инвалидам, нерабочему населению и старожилам выехать в центральные и южные районы страны и этим сократить государственные расходы на их обеспечение, которые в четыре раза больше на Севере, чем в средней полосе России (Hill & Gaddy 2003). По мнению авторов программ, политика переселения призвана решить проблему перенаселенности северных территорий и оптимизировать численность жителей северных городов в соответствие с нуждами предприятий, работающих в регионе, а также экономической целесообразностью. С точки зрения федеральных властей на Севере должно оставаться экономически активное население, содействующее росту благосостояния региона. С этой целью необходимо административно воздействовать на процессы расселения и миграции, регулируя выезд нетрудоспособного населения из районов Крайнего Севера и приравненных к ним местностей, и привлекать на Север высококвалифицированных специалистов (Government resolution N 700 from 10 July 1995).

В результате такого социального проектирования, должна обеспечиваться необходимая ротация населения. Политика переселения решает и другой вопрос. В результате проведенных реформ денежные сбережения, накопленные за годы работы на Севере, оказались обесцененными. Многие граждане лишились возможности выезда в благоприятные для проживания регионы России за счет собственных средств. С этой точки зрения программы переселения выступают гарантом государственных обязательств по поддержке незащищенных групп населения и обеспечению северян жильем. Принятие таких решений, однако, не всегда соответствует бюджетным возможностям государства, что снижает не только уровень обеспечения социальных гарантий, но и степень доверия граждан к ним.

71

Обе программы, рассмотренные в данном исследовании, нацелены на одну целевую аудиторию – жителей закрывающихся поселений, инвалидов, пенсионеров и безработных граждан, то есть социально незащищенных и неработающих слоев населения, которые напрямую не участвуют в создании экономического капитала региона, но нуждаются в поддержке со стороны местных администраций. На современном этапе обе программы осуществляют переселение через выдачу жилищного сертификата, который позволяет участнику программы приобрести жилье в центральных и южных регионах страны. Величина государственной субсидии устанавливается в зависимости от того, в какой именно регион хочет переехать получатель. По сравнению с более ранними проектами административного переселения жилищный сертификат дает большую свободу в выборе нового места жительства. Вместе с тем, он налагает значительные обязательства по организации переезда на самого участника, такие как, например, поиск жилья в регионе вселения, заключение договора купли-продажи и другие. Обязательным при переселении является сдача «северной» квартиры в муниципальную собственность, что, по мнению разработчиков программ, должно помочь северным администрациям решать вопросы населения, нуждающихся в улучшении жилищных условий. Например, такие квартиры могут быть переданы семьям, проживающим на Севере в ветхом и аварийном жилье, молодым семьям и другим льготным категориям граждан.

Разница в подходах к переселению между Федеральным Законом N125-ФЗ и Проектом Мирового Банка в том, что последний не ограничивается исключительно проблемой переселения, он ставит своей целью реконструировать северные сообщества социально и экономически. Проект был заявлен как стратегический, цель которого - принципиально изменить государственный подход к освоению Севера, исходя из объективных принципов рыночной экономики, эффективности и бюджетной оправданности. Можно сказать, что, до некоторой степени, проект Мирового банка оказал влияние на трансформацию политики переселения, регулируемой Федеральным законом N125-ФЗ. Так, механизм переселения через выдачу участнику программы жилищного сертификата, был разработан экспертами Мирового Банка, опробован на практике в трех регионах Российского Севера (Воркуте, Норильске и Сусуманском районе Магаданской области) и позже перенят федеральными властями. В результате, подход экономической эффективности (cost - efficiency approach) в распределении населения на территории страны и аппелирование к рыночным механизмам и стимулам миграционного поведения был перенят федеральными властями. Проблема заключается, однако, в том, что оба проекта оказались механистическими. Попытка искусственно перекроить социальную структуру уже сложившихся сообществ посредством выселения экономически пассивных групп населения и привлечения к север трудоспособного населения не достигла поставленной цели. В ходе реализации политика переселения привела к незначительным результатам. Так, в период с 2002 по 2006 годы в рамках Федерального Закона – 125 было переселено 8400 семей, что является 6 про-

Недофинансирование программ – это одна из самых часто упоминаемых причин, негативно влияющих на темпы реализации проектов. Другая сложность – в несоответствии неллиберальных принципов экономической географии российского Севера, индустриально обустроенного и заселенного некоренным населением методами плановой экономики. Роль государства в поддержании стабильности северных монопрофильных экономик, а также социальные ожидания населения все еще высоки на Севере. Наши исследования показывают, что северяне полагаются на государственную поддержку в переселении их на «большую землю», так как именно государственные экономические интересы стали причиной их приезда на Север. Однако, когда участники программ получают сертификат, не все из них покидают ставший родным Север. Многие грантополучатели используют государственную жилищную субсидию для удовлетворения первоочередных потребностей семьи, часто не связанных с переселением. «Люди не столько пытаются уехать с Севера, сколько занимаются приращением – пытаются и сами не прогадать, и детям, и внукам что-то выкроить» (Zhelnina 2009).

На практике, решение уехать с Севера или остаться формируется в зависимости от многих факторов, среди которых социальный капитал и социальные отношения, опыт, накопленный в процессе строительства города и «обживания» изначально неприветливого места, воспоминания, связывающие человека с Севером, могут явиться гораздо более значимой причиной, чем экономическая мотивация. Идентичность и история людей глубоко связаны с регионом, его индустриальным становлением, поэтому многие из тех, кто посвятил свою жизнь освоению Севера, не видят своей жизни за его пределами. Это подтверждают многочисленные биографические истории северян, собранные и проанализированные сотрудниками проекта MOVE INNOCOM (Bolotova & Stammler 2010, Stammler 2010). Априори принимаемая готовность северян уехать с Севера и пренебрежение нежэкономическими факторами, влияющими на миграцию и на реализацию политики переселения в целом, негативно сказывается на эффективности последней: государство выделяет жилищный сертификат для пересезда граждан в более теплые климатические зоны, но сколько северяне в действительности уехали - остается открытым вопросом. Таким образом, исключительно экономическая логика, принятая для планирования программ переселения в итоге оборачивается против целей, которые выдвигаются программами.

Неуспех переселения является следствием расхождения между планированием (policy design) и актуальными процессами (policy implementation). Теоретический характер механизмов реализации политики переселения, разработанных в отрыве от реальных практик, стал причиной структурных проблем. Например, основанный на рыночной логике принцип переселения через обналичивание жилищного сертификата, не соответствует процессам, движущим рынком недвижимости. Эксперты разного уровня подтверждают, что сумма жилищного сертификата, которая высчитывается с учетом средней государственной, а не рыночной стоимости квадратного метра жилья в том или ином регионе, является недостаточной для реальной покупки квартиры. Поэтому большинство северян указывают в своих заявлениях заведомо ложный регион, чаще всего это Москва или Санкт-Петербург, в которых стоимость квадратного метра самая высокая, а поэтому и сумма сертификата в итоге получается выше. Обналичить сертификат и получить «живые» деньги за вычетом комиссионных помогают переселенцам московские и петербургские агентства недвижимости. Полученные деньги северяне могут использовать для покупки дома или квартиры в регионах, там, где они действительно хотели бы жить. Такой некорректный расчет жилищной субсидии отягчается постоянным недофинансированием программ, многолетним ожиданием в очередях и сложными правилами участия в проектах переселения.

Цель политики переселения в том, чтобы уве-
личить мобильность населения, но ставит своим приоритетом наименее мобильные слои населения, так как чаще всего получают сертификаты инвалиды и пенсионеры с многолетним северным стажем работы, и не поддерживает выезд тех, кто наиболее способен и, возможно, желает уехать. Поэтому для достижения успеха в переселении, разработчикам программ необходимо дать возможность выехать тем, кто способен построить жизнь и адаптироваться в новом месте жительства (Round 2005).

Значимость переселения и успешность его реализации неодинакова в разных регионах. Негибкость и общий характер программ не позволяет учитывать специфику конкретного региона и его реальных потребностей для административного регулирования численности населения. Так, территории экономически и пространственно более связанные со старопромышленными областями, регионы с более давней историей индустриального развития и заселения, а также стабильной экономикой, могут представляться комфортными для проживания в глазах местных жителей, несмотря на неблагоприятные климатические условия. Для таких областей, в которых значительный процент участников программ предпочитает оставаться в регионе, переселение оказывается «манипулятивным ресурсом» (Humphrey 1998), дополнительным источником федеральных субсидий, даже если они используются не по прямому назначению. Это подтверждает пример Мурманской области. Эксперты, которых мы интервьюировали в Мурманской области, говорят об обратной миграции: многие, получившие жилищные сертификаты для переселения, предпочитают оставаться в регионе, используя программные деньги на другие цели. Об этом же сообщают местные СМИ (Sheremey 2002, Zavyalov 2006), по данным которых 30-40 процентов из числа получивших жилищную субсидию в короткие сроки продают купленную в центральном регионе квартиру и возвращаются на Север, на прежнее место жительства. Двадцать процентов используют новое жилье лишь в летнее время как дачу. И только 50-60 процентов участников программ действительно переселяют (Sheremey 2002). В то время как в ЯНАО случаи, связанные с «возвращением на Север», упоминались скорее как единичные примеры, исключение из общего правила. Несмотря на отсутствие официальной статистической информации подтверждающей или опровергающей это наблюдение, и тот факт, что наши выводы основаны на экспертных интервью и историях самих жителей, обратная миграция представляется нам важным ответом (response), который необходимо учитывать для успешной реализации политики переселения в том или ином регионе. Это тот сигнал, который общество посылает государству в ответ на административные решения.

Анализ административных мер, направленных на переселение избыточного населения из северных районов также показал, что внутри властной вертикали не существует единого понимания, каким образом должен развиваться Север. Каждый уровень (федеральный, региональный или местный) выделяет свой приоритет для развития северных областей и свое понимание, что такое Север. Такая неоднозначность оценок относительно северного развития, высказываемых российской политической элитой, подтверждает тезис о многогранности института государства и дополняет теорию антропологии государства (anthropology of the state) эмпирическим материалом. Другое теоретический аргумент, сделанный нашим исследованием, дополняет научную дискуссию о движущей силе миграций и отвечает на вопрос, является ли переселение следствием индивидуального выбора или структурного принуждения к смене места жительства (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999). Проекты административного переселения нацелены на рациональное регулирование численности и мобильности жителей, а так же процессы их расселения (Government resolution N700 from 10 July 1995), исходя из экономических и геополитических интересов страны. По мысли авторов программ, стимулирование миграции экономически неактивного и пожилого населения должно способствовать «обновлению» состава населения северных сообществ. В этом смысле, программы переселения являются механизмами социального проектирования (social engineering) северных сообществ, а миграция – вынужденным ответом населения на меняющиеся приоритеты государства. Процессы естественной, стихийной мобильности противопоставляются управляемому регулированию миграции, и роль государства в этом процессе, по мнению авторов программ переселения, является определяющей (Government resolution N700 from 10 July 1995).
Реальные же процессы показывают, что переселенцы не только активно принимают участие в формировании миграционных стратегий, но используют программы для извлечения большей выгоды для своих семей, обходя установленные законом предписания. Таким образом, миграция, если она не является принудительной, остается выбором переселенцев и их семей гораздо в большей степени, чем результатом структурных изменений. Переселенцы лично решают о степени их взаимодействия со структурами, определяющими миграционный режим, более того, они используют эти структуры, где это возможно, в своих личных интересах (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999: 96). Решение о переезде напрямую зависит от многих условий, которые могут выступать подталкивающими (push) или притягивающими (pull) факторами: социально-экономическая ситуация в северном регионе и регионе переселения, доступ к социальным программам и качественным медицинским услугам, место проживания детей и внуков, наличие или отсутствие социального капитала в регионе вселения, бюрократические сложности, связанные с участием в программах переселения.

В заключение, анализ реализации политики переселения предлагает некоторые общие рекомендации, которые могли бы быть полезными для разработки будущих проектов, направленных на регулирование процессов мобильности и развитие северной территории в целом. Для формирования не только экономически, но социально-культурно устойчивых сообществ, при планировании социально-ориентированных проектов государству необходимо руководствоваться подходами, выходящими за рамки расчетов. Сбалансированная и реалистичная государственная политика должна учитывать местную специфику и неэкономические факторы, влияющие на миграционное поведение, а также ответные сигналы, которые посылает государству общество. Минимальное участие в программном планировании региональных и муниципальных администраций, слабый механизм обратной связи и недостаточная кооперация между разными уровнями власти, курирующими переселение, создает разрыв между центром (отвечающим за планирование проектов) и северными регионами (осуществляющими реализацию переселения). Для преодоления структурной разобщенности между органами власти, важно обеспечить эффективную коммуникацию и доставку информации из регионов в центральные органы. Политика должна быть спланирована исходя из реальных нужд северян и их интересов, а также максимально отражать современные рыночные процессы. Подводя итог, необходимо отметить, что результативность политики переселения и достижение программных целей напрямую зависит от подхода, принятого государством в отношении будущего развития северных территорий, и от того насколько последовательно этот подход реализуется на практике. Поэтому, с нашей точки зрения, важно выработать единый сценарий развития Севера, учитывающий особенности регионов, в рамках которого будет осуществляться поиск и освоение человеческих и нематериальных ресурсов, а так же планирование социально-экономических изменений.
Annex II: List of experts interviewed

Murmansk region
1. Local Government Official
   Institution: Municipal administration of Apatiti
   Date of interview: 20 October 2008
   Place: Apatiti
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
2. Regional Government Official
   Institution: Regional administration of Murmansk oblast’
   Date of interview: 06 November 2008
   Place: Murmansk
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
3. Regional Government Official
   Institution: Regional administration of Murmansk oblast’
   Date of interview: 06 November 2008
   Place: Murmansk
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
4. Local Government Official
   Institution: Municipal administration of Kovdor
   Date of interview: 15 September 2007
   Place: Kovdor
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Alla Bolotova
   Yamalo-Nenets Autonomus Okrug
5. Local Government Official (a)
   Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
   Date of interview: 27 November 2008
   Place: Novy Urengoy
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
6. Local Government Official (b)
   Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
   Date of interview: 27 November 2008
   Place: Novy Urengoy
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
7. Local Government Official
   Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
   Date of interview: 06 December 2008
   Place: Novy Urengoy
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
8. Local Government Official (a)
   Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
   Date of interview: 07 December 2008
   Place: Novy Urengoy
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Elena Nuykina

9. Local Government Official (b)
   Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
   Date of interview: 07 December 2008
   Place: Novy Urengoy
   Method: Semi-structured interview
   Interviewer: Elena Nuykina

10. Regional Government Official (a)
    Institution: Regional administration of YNAO
    Date of interview: 12 December 2008
    Place: Salekhard
    Method: Semi-structured interview
    Interviewer: Elena Nuykina

11. Regional Government Official (b)
    Institution: Regional administration of YNAO
    Date of interview: 12 December 2008
    Place: Salekhard
    Method: Semi-structured interview
    Interviewer: Elena Nuykina

12. Regional Government Official
    Institution: Representative office of YNAO in Moscow
    Date of interview: 15 December 2008
    Place: Moscow city
    Method: Semi-structured interview
    Interviewer: Elena Nuykina

13. The World Bank expert
    Institution: The World Bank Unit in Moscow
    Date of interview: 16 December 2008
    Place: Moscow city
    Method: Semi-structured interview
    Interviewer: Elena Nuykina

14. The World Bank expert
    Institution: The World Bank project implementation Unit in Moscow
    Date of interview: 19 December 2008
    Place: Moscow city
    Method: Semi-structured interview
    Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
Resettlement from the Russian North: an analysis of state-induced relocation policy

Elena Nuykina

Edited and with a preface by Florian Stammler

“This study brings the importance of the Arctic down to the lived experience of industrial city-dwellers with state policies beyond abstract climate change models and offshore resource games. Nuykina’s work is valuable not only for its policy analysis, but also for its focus on the consequences of resettlement policies for residents and their responses. It is worth reading for all those interested in the study of population movement, Russian northern development and the anthropology of the state.”

Florian Stammler, coordinator, Anthropology Research Team, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland

“The northern regions of Russia are crucial for the country’s development and the right-sizing of the population in the north is an important element of northern development strategy. Elena Nuykina’s excellent study skillfully combines analysis of Russian government laws and policies of northern resettlement policies with on-the-ground research of the implementations and unintended consequences of those policies.”

Timothy Heleniak, Department of Geography, University of Maryland