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ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DURING THE EUROPEAN
DEBT CRISIS –
ARGUMENTATION ANALYSIS OF THE EDITORIALS OF THREE FINNISH NEWSPAPERS

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Table of contents

1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 The background and the reasoning for the chosen subject.....	1
1.2 Literature review.....	3
1.3 Research problem and questions.....	14
1.4 Newspapers' editorials as the material of the study.....	15
1.5 Methods.....	17
1.5.1 Argument analysis.....	17
1.5.2 Categorization of newspaper editorials.....	18
1.5.3 An example of argument analysis.....	20
1.6 Theoretical framework.....	23
2 Finland's demand for collateral.....	27
2.1 Lapin Kansa.....	27
2.2 Kaleva.....	30
2.3 Helsingin Sanomat.....	33
3 Unfit governments of Greece and Italy.....	39
3.1 Lapin Kansa.....	39
3.2 Kaleva.....	42
3.3 Helsingin Sanomat.....	45
4 How is the crisis going to end?.....	50
4.1 Lapin Kansa.....	50
4.2 Kaleva.....	53
4.3 Helsingin Sanomat.....	57
5 Conclusions.....	63
References.....	67

1. Introduction

1.1 The background and the reasoning for the chosen subject

In the autumn of 2011 Europe had one particular topic over others. This was the first time when serious questions were raised upon European Union's (EU) and Europe's common currency Euro's future, also the course of whole Europe was covered in the fog of uncertainty. For my opinion the most descriptive name for this chain of events is the *Europe's debt crisis*.

It could be said that the starting point for the discussion about Europe's debt crisis was when Greece's significant budget deficit came to daylight in January 2010. Greece's budget deficit was 12.7% which was over four times bigger than the earlier thought 3.7% deficit and this made it also four times bigger than allowed by EU rules. The consequence of this was that in April Greece's credit rating was cut so that it now belonged to so-called "junk" territory. In May the member countries of Euro and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed for a bailout package worth 110bn euros for Greece. (SK 2011 & BBC 2011.)

However, Euro continued its fall and the distrust spread and therefore also the debts of other Euro countries came under scrutiny. As a consequence the problems of Ireland were revealed and in November the EU and IMF agreed of 85bn euros bailout package to Ireland. The Irish Republic also committed to the toughest budget in the country's history to correct the situation soon as possible. Right after this, the speculation about Portugal's need of help begins. In December it was announced that ten of the Euro countries had debt covering more than 90% of their GDP. To compare, at that time Greece had 148% debt of GDP and Finland had 48%. (BBC 2011.)

In February 2011 eurozone's finance ministers agreed to establish a permanent bailout fund called the *European Stability Mechanism* which is worth 500bn euros and will commence in 2013. In April Portugal finally admits that it cannot survive with its finances by itself and asks help from the EU. In the following month the euro countries and the IMF agreed to give 78bn euro bailout package to Portugal. Also the next bailout package for Greece is agreed in July, worth 109bn euros. The aim is to resolve Greece's problems and to prevent other euro countries from falling to same kind of problems, but at the same time Portugal's credit rating lowers to junk. (SK 2011 & BBC 2011.)

The yields on government bonds from Spain and Italy rise quickly in August and therefore the European Central Bank buys government bonds from them to help to lower their borrowing costs and preventing the crisis from spreading to these two big economies. On September 20th Italy's debt rating is cut to A from A+ by financial service company Standard & Poor's. After eurozone's finance ministers decide to delay the next payment to Greece on October 4th, the European stock markets take a deep dive. Some faith is restored to authorities' willingness to help the banking sector, when Franco-Belgian bank Dexia receives a large bailout on October 10th. (BBC 2011.)

On October 21st Greece is approved its next payment worth 8bn euros, preventing the country from default. The next shocking news came from Greece's Prime Minister George Papandreou on October 31st, announcing that there will be a referendum about the financial help given to Greece. Few days later Papandreou informed the referendum to be cancelled due to pressure from other Eurozone countries as well as from his own party. Just three days later Papandreou left his post and November 11th the new Prime Minister Lucas Papademos was appointed. (The Guardian 2011.)

On 4th of November Italy allows IMF's inspectors to scrutinize its economical situation so that the IMF can be sure that the financial aid package worth of 57bn euros will be used according to plans. A week later Silvio Berlusconi finally resigns from prime minister's post, a day after Italy's Senate approved reforms which were demanded by the EU. (The New York Times 2011.)

On 9th of December, after an EU summit which had in advance major expectations, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that eurozone countries as well as others will sign an intergovernmental treaty which aims to create and execute new budgetary rules in order to solve the crisis. All 27 EU countries were urged to sign the treaty but Great Britain and Hungary refused to do so. (BBC 2011.)

I wanted to go deep into this interesting chain of events through the public debate and therefore I decided to study the ways how Finnish newspapers dealt with this significant phenomenon in their pages. It is interesting and relevant to study newspapers' stances to this phenomenon because newspapers, as media's representatives, are also significant political actors.

Newspapers can bring out their own political goals in their everyday activity which will make them political actors or at least their activity can have a major impact in political processes. Media, in this case the newspapers are seen to be providing and producing both political and social reality. (Seppälä 2007: 99.) So because it can be seen that media has political influence and it can be a part of creating the reality that passes on to the general public, it is important to study the opinions that newspapers have on the phenomenon called Europe's debt crisis.

1.2 Literature review

My aim was to find earlier research on Finnish newspapers' opinions about Finland's membership in the European Union. Although my research wants know more about the current situation, it was very hard to find researches which would have been done recently. Understandably that is the case because the discussion was in its highest level when Finland was about to join EU as well as to the Economics and Monetary Union (EMU). Even when this is the case, I believe that something can be taken from these earlier researches. At least they give some kind of pre-idea about the opinions and attitudes that certain newspapers have or had about EU.

The other problem with the earlier research, however very understandable as well, is that most of the researches have only taken the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (HS) as the object of their researches and all the other Finnish newspapers are left without notice. This is understandable because HS is by far the largest newspaper in Finland. Luckily I was able to find some researches that used also other newspapers as their material than just HS, although it would have been interesting to have even wider understanding about the other newspapers as well.

Next I will introduce the earlier research I was able to find. Four of them are pro graduation studies, made by Erkka Myötyri, Susanna Ahonen, Ville Jutila and Marika Harjumaa, and one of the researches is an article in a larger study, the article is written by Sirpa Puhakka and Seija Ridell. After the introduction of these researches I will conclude the results.

In the first pro gradu-study *EU-jäsenyys uhkana ja mahdollisuutena* (1999) writer Erkki Myötyri tries to find out how two daily newspapers, Helsingin Sanomat and Ilkka, concern Finland's membership in European Union from the beginning of the EU-membership negotiations in 1st of February 1993 until the referendum in 16th of October 1994.

The first objective of Myötyri's study was to examine the agendas of the two mentioned newspapers and also to find out the arguments used to form these agendas. The second objective of the study was to define these newspapers opinions about Finland's membership in EU. To complete these objectives, Myötyri compares the contents of the editorials. (Myötyri 1999: 5.)

The essential aspect in Myötyri's study is to see how the concept of EU constructs in general through the editorials and how these constructions differ between the newspapers. To do this Myötyri uses Pertti Hemánus' typology which allows to compare and examine the editorials by their goals. (Myötyri 1999: 5.)

Myötyri's study also tries to perceive strategies in textual level of how the newspapers seek to form audiences and how they build their relations to these audiences and therefore relation to the membership of EU. By doing this the Myötyri tries to make assumptions about what kind of people the newspapers see to be their audience and therefore to who the newspapers are writing their editorials to. (Myötyri 1999: 5.)

The methods used in the study are qualitative and quantitative *content separation* (?). Qualitative content separation aims to describe the editorials' arguments verbally and the method is commonly used when describing the contents of newspaper articles or some other form of public discussion. Quantitative content separation aims to describe the editorials different classes of content by percentage and therefore it also tries to see if there has been a change in those classes of content in some matter of time. (Myötyri 1999: 6.)

In the results of Myötyri's study, I'm most interested in how the newspapers did concern Finland's membership in EU. Myötyri found out that 77.1% of the editorials of newspaper Ilkka were negative towards EU and only 8.6% of the editorials positive, the rest were neutral (Myötyri 1999: 61). Whereas 40% of the editorials of HS were

positive towards EU and only 7.5% were negative. There was also a notable amount of neutral editorials, 52.5% (Myötyri 1999:64).

Myötyri's study's other aim was to find out the agendas that the newspapers had in the chosen editorials. The results were that the agendas were rather similar as they both had the same two most common arguments. These arguments were about agriculture and grocery industry and also about neutrality and independence. (Myötyri 1999: 66.)

As a conclusion Myötyri defines HS's stance as a positive and Ilkka's negative towards Finland's membership in EU. Myötyri also reflects these conclusions to the results of the referendum of should Finland join EU or not. And the conclusions actually reflect the results of the referendum as Helsinki area (the area where HS is made) was the most positive towards EU in whole Finland with 73.6% of yes votes. Whereas 55.6% of newspaper Ilkka's distribution area (electoral district of Vaasa) voted no for joining EU. Although there can be seen coherence in the newspapers' opinions about EU with the results of the referendum, Myötyri admits that there might not be causal relation between these two. However, he suggests that an assumption could be made based on the previous, that the newspapers made the frame of reference to the public discussion of what were the important matters when talking about joining the EU. Based on these matters people might have formed their own opinion of how they would vote. (Myötyri 1999: 76-77.)

In Susanna Ahonen's pro gradu-study *Argumentaatio Helsingin Sanomien Emu-pääkirjoituksissa* (1999) the writer tries to find out how much and what kind of arguments are used in the editorials of newspaper Helsingin Sanomat concerning Finland's joining to the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Ahonen uses 38 editorials of HS in her study and the first chosen editorial is also the one where HS first time made a statement about EMU in 18th of May 1997, and the last chosen editorial's date is 18th of April 1998 which is soon after the Finnish parliament voted for Finland's joining to the EMU. (Ahonen 1999: 42-43.)

The aim of Ahonen's study is to describe those means of argumentation that are used in the editorials about EMU in HS. In more detail she aims to find out whether the argumentation is versatile and conversational or if HS actually tries to convert its readers to support Finland's joining to the EMU without counter argumentation. To do

this Ahonen uses content separation as a method in her study. Ahonen has chose this method, as well as Myötyri did in his study, because of its clarity and punctuality and also because the method has been traditionally used when examining the contents of newspaper writings. Ahonen has created 12 classes of contents based on the Chaim Perelman's argumentation theory and to those arguments that are repeatedly found in the editorials. The writer also has a aspect of criticality in her analysis meaning that she also pays attention to how critical the editorials were towards the idea of Finland joining the EMU. (Ahonen 1999: 43-44.)

In the conclusions of her study, Ahonen points out that HS was trying to convince its readers for the importance of Finland's membership in EMU in the expense of criticality. Important notion in Ahonen's study was that HS couldn't know whether EMU was the best option for Finland because the EMU hadn't yet come to existence. Despite that HS was supporting Finland's membership very openly and even before most of the political elite had decided their opinion about the membership. According to Ahonen HS aimed to show to the society's elite that EMU is just a natural continuum to the Finland's membership in EU with its rather one-sided and EMU-adoring argumentation. (Ahonen 1999: 70.)

Ahonen points out that also criticism were found in the editorials, but claims that the criticism was there only so that it could be later proved false. The reason for this, Ahonen suggests, is the assumption that well educated people take the argument more serious when more aspects are brought to the discussion – even negative ones. The critical arguments used in the editorials were also very nonspecific and virtual. The used arguments also tried to convince its readers for the sensibility of Finland's membership in EMU. Therefore Ahonen concludes that HS was very biased in its opinions and therefore slipped away from its role as an independent newspaper. (Ahonen 1999: 74-75.)

In his pro gradu-study *Helsingin Sanomien EU-kirjoittelu Suomen EU-jäsenyysneuvottelujen alkaessa 1993 ja päättyessä 1994* (1995) writer Ville Jutila wants to find out what the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat gave to the Finnish EU-discussion and in what ways it tried to affect to its readers' opinions. As a material Jutila uses HS's articles concerning EU in two time periods. The first time period is between January and February 1993 when the negotiations about Finland's membership were beginning,

the other time period is between February and March 1994 when the negotiations were concluded (Jutila 1995: 28).

As a reference frame in his study Jutila uses two dimensional combination of the model of news operation guidance and the theoretical model of making news. The first dimension should be perceived as horizontal and it indicates the affects of different levels of news operation guidance to HS's writings about EU. For example, can the editing policy originating from the working environment be seen in the writings about EU. The second dimension, the vertical one, aims to separate the actions of journalistic working process in to small pieces. Therefore it is possible to see how the affects of the different levels of news operation guidance filter through the journalistic working process in to the final article obeying the theoretical model of making news. (Jutila 1995: 20.)

Using the previous reference frame Jutila defines the research problem with three parts. He wants to find out how the affects of the different levels of news operation guidance could be seen through HS's EU-articles' material acquisition channels, as well as through the used information sources and the acceptability of the articles' contents (Jutila 1995: 21-22). To put the previous in simplified form, Jutila wants to know how the origin of an article affects to the article's approach to Finland's membership in EU, and from which sources HS gets its EU-articles and most interestingly, whose opinions about EU Helsingin Sanomat is passing on (Jutila 1995: 26). As a method in his study, Jutila uses content separation, as well as Myötyri and Ahonen did (Jutila 1995: 27).

In the results of his study, Jutila defines HS's opinions about Finland's membership in EU to be positive thing in general. HS was most positive towards Finland's membership in its editorials and columns. The only negative writings appeared in the readers' columns. The most unbiased approach to the membership was found in the articles of the visiting writers such as experts in different matters. The sources of information were mostly Finland's political elite and government's officials. (Jutila 1995: 85.)

Jutila also defined that HS's own policy towards Finland's membership in EU was *cautiously* positive. Despite that the writings of the newspaper's own journalists' were almost three times more often positive than negative towards the membership (Jutila 1995:85). However, Jutila also points out that HS can't be accused of having clearly biased approach to Finland's EU membership since in total, when counting all of the

writings used in the study, there were two positive writings against one negative (Jutila 1995: 86).

The used sources of information also revealed that the picture of EU provided by HS actually reflected the dominant power structures of Finnish society and therefore the whole EU-discussion exposed to be a kind of a field of discussion for the political elite, officials and the leading men of the Finnish society (Jutila 1995: 89).

In her pro gradu-study *Kalevan, Lapin Kansan ja Pohjolan Sanomien suhtautuminen Euroopan Yhteisön jäsenyyteen* (1993) writer Marika Harjumaa tries to find out how three newspapers from Northern Finland: Kaleva, Lapin Kansa (LK) and Pohjolan Sanomat (PS) concern to the membership of Finland in the European Community (EC), which is later known as the the European Union. Harjumaa's study was written in the time when Finland's government made the decision to apply for the membership in the EC (Harjumaa 1993: 1-2), unlike the other studies represented here, which all focused to the later process when Finland actually made the final decision to join the EU.

Harjumaa's study is particularly in interesting for my point of view because it uses also other newspapers than Helsingin Sanomat as its material, and also because two of the newspapers used here are also the same ones that I'm using in my own study (LK and PS). Thus Harjumaa's study provides variation compared to other studies made from the same subject, which very often tend to use only the Finland's "main" newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, as their material.

As a research problem, Harjumaa aims to find out that do these earlier mentioned newspapers concern Finland's membership to be a positive, negative or a neutral thing. Additionally Harjumaa is also interested to investigate how much the newspapers see the membership concerning Northern Finland in particular. Harjumaa also gives a pre-hypothesis where she suggests that all the newspapers concern Finland's membership in EC to be a negative thing. (Harjumaa 1993: 3-4.)

For the study's material Harjumaa chose all the writings that she regarded to contain opinions about Finland's membership, excluding all the experts' writings. These texts' also included editorials. In total Harjumaa chose 463 texts, which divided in the following way: Kaleva 152, LS 119 and PS 192 writings. (Harjumaa 1993: 5.) As a

method also Harjumaa uses content separation (Harjumaa 1993: 6), which is rather popular method in these types of studies.

In the results of her study, Harjumaa points out that the newspapers didn't have homogenous stance about Finland's membership. About 50% of Kaleva's and LS's writings were negative towards Finland's membership and 35% of the writings were positive. PS's opinion was more negative with 71% of the writings being negative towards the membership and only 16% positive. Harjumaa then admits that her pre-hypothesis wasn't completely right or completely wrong. (Harjumaa 1993: 47-48.)

Especially when looking to the editorials of the newspapers, Harjumaa interprets that LS was mostly neutral towards the membership and Kaleva's stance was between neutral and positive. So when leaving everything else out than editorials, it can be seen that these newspapers weren't at all negative towards the membership in EC, although PS was more negative also in its editorials than Kaleva or LS. (Harjumaa 1993: 48-49.)

When looking to the study's second research objective, which was the interest to investigate how much the newspapers see the membership concerning Northern Finland in particular, Harjumaa found surprising that the newspapers didn't pay much attention to this regional perspective. Therefore Harjumaa believes that newspapers opinions weren't affected by the fact that they were from a certain part of Finland. (Harjumaa 1993: 48.)

As all of the previous studies I have introduced here examined the newspapers stances through writings which clearly included opinions, Sirpa Puhakka's and Seija Ridell's article *Politiikkaa ja politiikkaa uutisessa: hallitus, oppositio ja Helsingin Sanomat (1996)* investigates newspaper Helsingin Sanomat's stance through news. The article is part of a book called *Sopulisilppuri – Mediakritiikin näkökulmia (1996)*.

In their article Puhakka and Ridell tried to find out how HS produced news concerning one particular interpellation in Finland's parliament about the country's membership in EU. The discussion about this interpellation was held in the parliament between 13th and 14th of June 1994. The first aim of the article was to examine one event of the political reality, in this case the interpellation, as a political speech situation and as a part of the parliament decision making system. The second objective of the article was to find out how widely the different political actors that participated in the discussion got their

voices heard in HS's news and also to examine the way HS represented the opinions of these political actors. Puhakka and Ridell pay special attention to differences of how HS handled the speeches of government and the opposition. (Puhakka & Ridell 1996: 177-178.)

Puhakka's and Ridell's main idea behind the analysis is that journalists actually produce *discursive politics* while they represent and pass on the speeches of the political actors. Puhakka and Ridell use narratology-oriented tools as method in their article, because this kind of method makes it possible to separate the ways which journalists represent the discourses of the different societal actors in the news journalism's "discourse of the discourses". From narratology's point of view the essential things are the presentational strategies by which journalists produce interpretations of the political actor and his/her speeches and in this way actually practices the discursive politics. (Puhakka & Ridell 1996: 178-179.)

In the results of their article, Puhakka and Ridell stress the way HS lifted Prime Minister Esko Aho on a podium with his positive statements about Finland's membership in EU. This kind of podium wasn't offered to anyone who was critical about the membership. Paavo Lipponen, the leader of the biggest opposition party SDP, also got his voice heard in the news of HS, although this happened only when Lipponen had positive things to say about Finland's membership. (Puhakka & Ridell 1996: 196.) It's also noticeable that though the members of the opposition used their voice more than others (59% of the speeches held in the parliament), the speeches held by the members of government parties were more cited in the news of HS (Puhakka & Ridell 1996: 185).

As a conclusion, Puhakka and Ridell admit that different parties did have their voices out in the news of HS, but when examining how notable and what kind of roles in general were they given, Puhakka and Ridell notify that HS slipped away from their self-defined role as an independent newspaper. By supporting the EU-advocates HS guided its readers towards certain direction instead of leaving them the possibility to do comparisons and choices by themselves. (Puhakka & Ridell 1996: 197.)

Next two articles are from book called *Kansa euromyllyssä* (1996). The first article "*Teemmepä kumman päätöksen tahansa...*" *EU-keskustelun rakentuminen valtavirtamediassa 1992-1994* is written by Heikki Heikkilä and his aim is to examine

the discussion around Finland's EU-membership in time between 1st of January 1992 and 18th of October 1994. Heikkilä has chosen the writings of Helsingin Sanomat and STT (a Finnish news agency) as the material of his study. In the following I will concentrate mostly to the analysis concerning HS. (Heikkilä 1996: 65.)

Heikkilä aims to examine the discussion from two perspectives, the more limited perspective originates from the simple assumption that the discussion was basically about whether Finland should join EU or not. Heikkilä counts every discussion and news about EU in to this first perspective, because they created understandings and expectations about what EU is and what would be the consequences of Finland's actions. The other perspective examines the way political actors, journalism and citizens dealt with the *problematic* side of the EU discussion and what kind of expectations these actors had about the ways of discussion and decision making when talking about EU. (Heikkilä 1996: 65-66.)

The method Heikkilä uses in his article is based on a qualitative analysis which core lies in the assumption that sees the discussions about EU as *ways of giving meanings*. Heikkilä sees the texts that are found in the mainstream media as a separate or composed ways of giving meanings in which actors give meanings to matters that relate strictly to EU. On the other hand, Heikkilä also sees that the ways of giving meanings also produce understandings about who *we* are, who *they* are as well as who should be in charge of making the decisions. Heikkilä examined the separate ways of giving meanings in relation to the contexts that were created by the EU discussion and with this he sought to find out how the meanings, definitions and themes concerning EU formed during the process. He also tried to find out how the interruptions and continuities in the discussion relate to each other as well as to who the credit is given from creating those meanings in the journalistic texts. (Heikkilä 1996: 67.)

In the analysis Heikkilä finds out that HS aimed to support (especially in its editorials) the policy driven by the government by reasoning that it would be harmful to Finland if everyone wouldn't stay behind this solid policy (Heikkilä 1996: 72-73). HS named this policy as national unity and its purpose was to make the criticism towards EU seem as something that is threatening the national unity and therefore being unpatriotic behavior (Heikkilä 1996: 89). Heikkilä emphasises that the dictums in HS's editorial discourse prove that its positive stance towards Finland's EU membership maintained solid

through the membership process (Heikkilä 1996: 74). Also the HS's former editor-in-chief Simopekka Nortamo backed up Finland's membership in his writings through the process despite changing his arguments during the process (Heikkilä 1996: 81).

Heikkilä also found out that HS most frequently gave "voice" to three institutions in its texts. These institutions were the government, parties and EU. What is more noteworthy is the fact that HS let its own voice to be seen as often as the voice of these three other institutions. Heikkilä takes this as a sign of journalism's power to produce meanings. (Heikkilä 1996: 84.) HS also emphasised the status of the leading ministers and in comparison to STT it more often left out president's, other officials' and the leading opposition party SDP's opinions from its writings (Heikkilä 1996: 97).

Heikkilä summarises his research in the view that the both actors of media (HS and STT) took the EU discussion seriously and responsibly and therefore the themes, actors and perspectives in their writings were very much traditional, although the situation was very abnormal. This proves seek for security and safety from the Finnish media in this insecure situation of EU membership process. (Heikkilä 1996: 102.)

The second article from the book *Kamsa euromyllyssä* is written by Iina Hellsten (1996) and it concentrates to the metaphors used by the mainstream media in the Finnish EU discussion. Hellsten uses writings of Helsingin Sanomat and TV-programs of the Finnish broadcasting company YLE as a material of her article. These writings and TV-programs were published between the years 1992 and 1994. Once again I will primarily pay attention to the findings concerning HS.

In her article, Hellsten wants to make the dominant and established metaphors visible and therefore open up possibilities for alternative metaphors (Hellsten 1996: 178). In the analysis Hellsten moves from the most established metaphoric expressions to the most recent ones by using mainly qualitative and occasionally quantitative methods (Hellsten 1996: 187). Hellsten aims to research the meanings of the political metaphors when "we" and "them" collide and in this case it means the construction of the concepts *Finnishness* and *Europeaness*. Hellsten approaches EU journalism by examining what the metaphors stress and what they hide at the same time. By deconstructing the ideology of a metaphor opens up new possibilities to alternative ways of handling political processes. (Hellsten 1996: 179.)

Hellsten acknowledges that the role of journalism is essential when it comes to strengthening and spreading the established metaphors, because journalists pass on and shape the metaphors used by others and also create their own metaphors. In newspapers the metaphors are verbal and they are normally used in commentary texts such as editorials and columns and not so much in news. HS uses metaphors in two ways. In editorials and articles HS builds its policy in consistent matter through the chosen way of categorizing metaphors. In news the metaphors are used in unquestionable way and by borrowing the metaphor from the source of information. (Hellsten 1996: 180-181.)

Hellsten found out that EU membership appeared as an inevitable destination in both YLE's and HS's releases and this inevitability based on a metaphoric threat of Finland leaving out alone in the most remote corner of Europe if it wouldn't join the EU. YLE and HS also very commonly used the metaphor of getting in/ leaving out as *getting in* meaning something warm and cozy whereas *leaving out* of EU would mean loneliness and insecurity. (Hellsten 1996: 187-189.)

Other metaphor was the importance of Finland getting on the EU train and to the first class of it. The main argument behind this metaphor is the right kind of company that Finland wants to be seen with, because the industrialized European countries are totally different thing than the poorer countries in the east or south. By belonging to the right group Finland can secure its benefits and advance its economy. Hellsten also found out the critics of the EU membership build their criticism using exactly opposite arguments with the same metaphors. It is also notable that HS hardly gave any space to these critics. (Hellsten 1996: 203.)

The critics also used metaphors concerning religion and the threat of Russia, but both HS and YLE systematically played down these metaphors and tried to make them look ridiculous. Hellsten points out that these kind of metaphors were one of the few possibilities to do daring and different EU journalism, but the media decided to skip this change. (Hellsten 1996: 204-205.)

The results of the studies introduced here could be concluded as very consistent. Especially Helsingin Sanomat is seen in all of the researches as a supporter of EU. As reinforcement to this, HS was also a supporter of EMU which proves that although some years had passed since the discussion about Finland's membership in EU, HS was still a spokesman for the European integration.

None of the other newspapers dealt with such a positive manner as HS did towards EU. Their stance towards EU could be mainly described as neutral, although Lapin Kansa's and Kaleva's stance was described as cautiously positive whereas Pohjolan Sanomat and especially Ilkka concerned EU as a negative thing. Obviously the problem here is the small amount of the studies concerning these other newspapers and therefore it is not justifiable to do generalisations about the policies of these newspapers, except HS's of course. However this gives some direction and it is rather likely that some reserved opinions are to be expected towards EU when dealing with other newspapers than Helsingin Sanomat.

1.3 Research problem and questions

The research problem in this study is to find out what kind of opinions Finnish newspapers Lapin Kansa, Kaleva and Helsingin Sanomat have about the European Union. To be more specific, this means pursue to find out what are their attitudes towards EU in the light of Europe's debt crisis. These attitudes are examined through editorials of the mentioned newspapers.

To find answers to the research problem, I will use different themes which rise from the editorials. These themes form the structure for the analysis and also the result chapters of this study. These themes come from the issues that the editorials see most troubling in the whole process of Europe's debt crisis at a certain moment. I have defined these themes by finding out which were the most often repeated issues in the editorials. The first theme is the conversation about Finland's demand for collateral in the bailout packages paid to Greece. The second theme is Greece's and Italy's unstable situation before their governments changed and the last theme is the discussion of how the crisis will end, although, it was and still is unsure when the crisis might actually end.

These themes worried the newspapers the most during the examination period and all of the newspapers also moved on to the next theme at, more or less, the same time. I will ask the same questions from each editorial in each theme group and examine the answers through the theoretical framework I have chosen to this study. Every newspaper will get its own subchapter in each theme. This way I hope to be able to form an understanding of every newspapers' stance towards the EU.

The following questions will be asked from every editorial:

- What were the newspapers' opinions about Finland's actions?
- Who/what the newspapers held "guilty"?
- What actions should be done according to the newspapers?

1.4 Newspapers' editorials as the material of the study

I have chosen the editorials of three Finnish newspapers as a primary material of my study. These newspapers are Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Lapin Kansa (LK) and Kaleva. I was able to find 36 editorials from HS, 9 editorials from LK and 21 editorials from Kaleva. As I have already mentioned, I will be using themes for categorizing the analysis-chapters and for the first theme HS had 9 editorials and Kaleva 6, LK had 3 editorials in each theme. For the second theme HS had 11 and Kaleva 5 editorials, during the third theme HS published 16 and Kaleva 10 editorials. I have chosen these editorials, which all deal with Europe's debt crisis, in the time between 25th of August 2011 and the end of the same year. Therefore I will begin the examination of the editorials when the discussion about Finland's demand for collateral in Greece's bailout packages started and I will end the examination period for the end of the year 2011 for schedule reasons. During this time the discussion about Europe's debt crisis was on a very high level of intensity and in public media even the possible collapse of the EU and euro currency came up occasionally. The amount of the editorials proves that the chosen newspapers did use their possibility to take part in to the discussion concerning Europe's debt crisis.

In total, much more editorials could be found concerning Europe's debt crisis, starting from at least the beginning of the year 2010. Especially in HS's case, this subject was dealt with almost daily basis and because I wanted to use a certain method for the analysis within limited amount of time, some limiting had to be done to the amount of the editorials.

When thinking about editorials suitability as an indicator of newspaper's opinions, it can be said that it is the right place to look for them. Editorials are defined as a section

where the newspapers can bring out their own opinions and stances to different matters, according to the journalistic rule. What makes editorials so suitable to express opinions is the fact that a reader can easily recognize that she or he is reading about someone's opinions which aren't introduced as news in the first place. This is of course a very important point from reader's point of view. Editorials are also a section of newspaper which openly pursues to affect reader's opinions or actions and therefore aims to guide them to the desired direction, and the reader is also able to recognize this attempt of effecting to one's mind. (Raunio 2003: 31–32.)

I have chosen the three newspapers because they provide points of view from different parts of Finland and as a resident of Northern Finland I have focused on the northern newspapers without ignoring the biggest and mightiest newspaper in Finland. Lapin Kansa, based in Rovaniemi, is the northernmost newspaper in the world that comes out seven days a week. LK was founded in 1928 and originally it was a political newspaper speaking for the centre party called *Maalaisliitto* (Agrarian League), but in 1958 LK transformed to an independent newspaper when the party denied its right to be an official supporter of the party. (Alma Media 2008.) LK is the 12th biggest newspaper in Finland by the volume of 82 000 readers which is not very much but LK is also the main newspaper in Lapland which covers over 25% of Finland's surface area (Levikintarkistus Oy 2011).

Kaleva, based in Oulu, is the main newspaper of the Oulu region but it also deals with issues from Northern Finland and that makes it very popular newspaper in Lapland alongside Lapin Kansa. Kaleva has also a history as a political newspaper and it was a supporter of liberal party called *Kansallinen Edistyspuolue* (National Progressive Party) until the end of the party in 1953 and after this Kaleva became an independent newspaper. (Kaleva Oy 2011.) Kaleva defines itself as a spokesman for whole of Northern Finland (Kaleva Oy 2011) and in fact it is the biggest newspaper in Northern Finland and the 4th largest in Finland with 191 000 readers (Levikintarkistus Oy 2011).

Helsingin Sanomat, which is based in Helsinki, is the by far the largest newspaper in Finland and also the largest in Scandinavia with 945 000 readers (Levikintarkistus Oy 2011). HS was founded in 1889 and in the beginning it was a supporter of mainly liberal party called *Nuorsuomalainen puolue* (Young Finnish Party) and afterwards it became a

supporter of Kansallinen Edistyspuolue (National Progressive Party) until 1932 when HS became an independent newspaper (Sanoma Oyj 2011).

There has been lot of researches concerning HS and it has been used as a material or the subject of the research and therefore it is rather easy to justify the selection of HS to one of the newspapers in my study, although geographically and by size it differs from the two other newspapers. At any rate HS has a very special status in Finland (Puhakka & Ridell 1996: 177-178) and it has been said that it is unlikely that any other newspaper in the world has such a wide national coverage than HS (Suhonen 1994, 71). Therefore I believe that this kind of newspaper offers interesting base for comparing in contrast to the other two somewhat regional newspapers.

1.5 Methods

1.5.1 Argument analysis

As the method of my study I will be using Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila's version of argument analysis from the book called *Argumentti ja kritiikki* (1998). The goal of the method is to find out the claims by examining the reasoning of the claims and also by opening the possible background assumptions. Each editorial which is part of the study's material is processed to find one or more *main claims* and after this the target is to find the closest reasoning for the main claim. The main claim of an argument is a claim which has reasonings in the text but which doesn't work as a reasoning for other claims. If necessary, the closest background assumptions are also to be searched for the full understanding of the argument in question. (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Halonen 1998: 60.)

For the sake of clarity I will introduce the main concepts of argument analysis. First one is the *claim* which is the part of the sentence that the argument is trying to make convincing. *Reasoning* is the part of the sentence that provides the reasons why the claim should be accepted. Argument can exist only if it includes the claim and also the reasoning for the claim. Argument differs from explanation because argument's task is to *convince* whereas explanation's task is to *make issues understandable*. In addition to claims and reasonings argument also includes some *background assumptions* which

create connection with claim and its reasonings. This connection explains what are the reasons when the receiver accepts the claim in case she/he accepts the reasonings. Thus, argument answers to the question *why should the receiver accept the claim?* (Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998: 51-53, 55 and Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Halonen 1998: 63.)

In general, argumentation is about *persuasion* instead of (for example) coercion and this is done with such ways that appeal to the common sense and emotions of the receiver of the message and as a consequence it will produce actions that were hoped for by the creator of the message (Lehtonen 1998: 153). Persuasion also usually means activity that happens during long period of time and its audience is a large group of people or the so-called *general public* instead of individual persons (Lehtonen 1998: 159).

The credibility of an argument is based on the audience's values which are culturally and historically changing (Kantola, Moring & Väliverronen 1998: 49). Editorials are also very much about persuasion which is directed to the general public or at least to some large group of people and because persuasion constructs from different arguments, I consider argument analysis to be relevant method for looking opinions and claims of the chosen newspapers.

1.5.2 Categorization of newspaper editorials

I will also use Pertti Hemánus's categorization of editorials to help understanding the ways the editorials take a stance. First of all, Hemánus divides affecting with mass information to two main groups. The first group is *propaganda* which signifies for affecting with open means, the other group is *indoctrination* which means that pursue to affect to the audience is hidden and therefore not open to see. Newspaper editorials belong to the first group and are therefore propaganda because pursue to affect is open for everyone to see. (Hemánus 1972: 6.)

Hemánus forms two basic dimensions for the objective of an editorial. These dimensions are *making valuations* and *giving options*. Making valuations means applying different values to some problem and when the writer gives opinions based on her/his values, indirect conclusions can be made from writer's own values concerning

the phenomenon in question. (Hemánus 1972: 17–18, 43.) With these basic dimensions Hemánus divides typology of editorials to the following matrix (Hemánus 1972: 19):

		Degree of taking a stance	
		Values are not presented	Values are presented
Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned	Speculative editorial	Separating editorial
	No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial	Policy defining editorial

Table1. Degree of taking a stance.

A *speculative* editorial will not present values concerning the phenomenon in question. However, more than one optional point-of-view is mentioned and one characteristic of this type of editorials is the use of phrase *on-the-other-hand*. *Separating* editorial gives values concerning the phenomenon and it also mentions more than one optional point-of-view. In this case the writer aims to separate one particularly good option from the other options and to hand out it to the reader of the editorial. (Hemánus 1972: 19-24.)

Explanatory editorial doesn't make any valuations or give any optional point-of-views. This type of editorial is simply a kind of an explanation to the backgrounds of the phenomenon. *Policy defining* editorial will make valuations about issues but it doesn't give any optional point-of-views and this way the editorial gives the one and only option to the reader without any alternatives. (Hemánus 1972: 25–28.)

The most interesting types of editorials are the separating and policy defining editorials, because these are the types which intentionally try to affect reader's opinions, attitudes

and values and this is done by linguistic means of affecting. It is also notable that an average reader is unable to recognize major part of the ways which pursue to affect one's mind. (Hemánus 1972: 30–31.)

With argument analysis I aim to find the chosen newspapers' opinions and the ways they form these opinions. With Hemánus's categories I'm hoping to deepen the understanding of the ways the newspapers try to affect the readers. When combining the results of these two, I believe to have a diverse understanding of what kind of opinions the chosen newspapers have about EU.

1.5.3 An example of argument analysis

For the example analysis I will use HS's editorial from 8th of November 2011 named as *Italy has leaned on to one man for too long*. In order to find the main claim the text should be unpacked to parts by paragraphs. Since argumentation analysis tries to reduce the linguistic appearance to simple as possible and to examine the true content of the text, it's useful to eliminate all meaningless expressions which are not necessary from the text's message's point of view. Such expressions could be superfluous adjectives and all other expressions meant to make the text livelier. Here I will present the structure of the editorial *Italy has leaned on to one man for too long*:

1. Italy is the third biggest economy in the eurozone and Europe could not handle its collapse.
2. Pulling Italy farther away from problems would require restoring political confidence.
3. Silvio Berlusconi and the weak basis of Italian politics are preventing the political confidence to be restored.
4. Prime Minister Berlusconi claimed that his government is the best option for Italy until the end of the electoral term (2013).
5. Dominant opinion elsewhere in Europe is that if Berlusconi stays in power, it will be the worst option for Italy.
6. The interest rates of Italy's bonds are near to the level which forced Greece and Portugal to take international financial aid.
7. Italy's debts are over 100% of its GDP.
8. The fact that Italy's loans are mostly domestic will calm the situation.
9. Increase in the interest rates is alarming.

10. At Monday it was unsure whether Berlusconi's governmental coalition's unity will be enough to secure majority at the parliament.
11. Italy's government should make the decisions about reducing the debt and getting the economy to grow as it has promised.
12. The IMF's and EU's inspection squads will be arriving to Rome to supervise development of the reformations.
13. For this Berlusconi agreed unwillingly.

14. If Berlusconi loses his majority and agrees to resign, the most likely option is a specialist government or the current government coalition strengthened with small central parties run by a new Prime Minister.
15. Both solutions would offer a chance to get rid of economy's lack of confidence.

16. Elections could be ahead at next spring or year 2013.
17. The opposition led by the political left and central hesitates about quick elections.
18. One reason for this is that being in government would mean making unpopular decisions and the opposition doesn't have unanimous economic program.

19. Italy's decline as an expression of Berlusconi's weaknesses has continued for long time.
20. In the background affects the twisted development of Italy's political system.

21. Berlusconi rose to a political leader and to a prime minister for the first time in the 1990's when corruption scandals had broke the Christian Democrat party.
22. Berlusconi didn't have any real ideology but he handled populism.
23. Skillful use of populism has helped him to become the Prime Minister for 3 times.

24. Scattered left and central parties have not been able to offer credible programs or leaders.
25. Behind Berlusconi's power has been the Northern League which is supported by Northern Italy's tax revolt as well as anti-alienism.
26. Northern League's isn't concerned about whole Italy's well-being.

27. Berlusconi's long lasted popularity began to vanish because of the sex-reveals concerning him.
28. Recently also the Catholic Church's bishop conference and Italy's employer's federation have turned against Berlusconi.

29. Berlusconiism has drawn its success from personification but that is also the reason why it has wasted its energy to hide Berlusconi's moral and justice problems.
30. Reformations which administration and economy needed were left secondary.
31. Italy's international prestige weakened.

32. Due to the crisis Italy has a chance to admit that its system cannot be based on despising the legal state, buying political support and charming its audience with a TV-empire.
33. Italy does have responsible leaders if the emergency is admitted.

The editorial can be therefore divided into 33 parts. From these 33 parts can be found 9 parts which will bring up relevant claims from the editorial:

- Pulling Italy farther away from problems would require restoring political confidence, but Berlusconi and the weak basis of Italian politics are preventing the political confidence to be restored.
- Prime Minister Berlusconi claimed that his government is the best option for Italy until the end of the electoral term (2013) but the claim is incorrect because the dominant opinion elsewhere in Europe is that if Berlusconi stays in power, it will be the worst option for Italy.
- Increase in the interest rates is alarming because Italy's bonds' interest rates are near to the level which forced Greece and Portugal to take international financial aid and Italy's debts are over 100% of its GDP.
- Italy's government should make the decisions about reducing the debt and getting the economy to grow as it has promised but it has been uncertain whether Berlusconi's governmental coalition's unity will be enough to secure majority at the parliament.
- If Berlusconi loses his majority and agrees to resign, both plausible solutions would offer a chance to get rid of economy's lack of confidence.
- Italy's decline as an expression of Berlusconi's weaknesses has continued for long time because of the twisted development in Italy's political system.
- Behind Berlusconi's power has been the Northern League which isn't concerned about whole Italy's well-being.
- Italy's international prestige has weakened because the reformations which administration and economy needed were left secondary due to wasted energy used to hide Berlusconi's moral and justice problems.
- Due to the crisis Italy has a chance to admit its system's faults and then Italy will be able to use those responsible leaders that it has.

From these 9 parts it can be seen repeatedly that Berlusconi is either behind Italy's current problems or that he is the reason why things can't be improved. Therefore the editorial claims that Berlusconi is Italy's biggest problem and gives decent amount of reasons why it is so. Thus the main claim (C) and its closest reasonings (R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5) are as follows:

C: Italy would do better off without Silvio Berlusconi.

R1: Berlusconi's demission and other government solutions would offer a chance to get rid of Italy's economy's lack of confidence.

R2: Due to the crisis Italy has a chance to admit its political system's faults.

R3: Italy does have responsible leaders if the emergency is admitted.

R4: Dominant opinion elsewhere in Europe is that if Berlusconi stays in power, it will be the worst option for Italy.

R5: Italy's decline as an expression of Berlusconi's weaknesses has continued for long time.

The chosen editorial can be seen through Hemánus' categorization as a *separating editorial*. It presents values concerning the issue in question, as the editorial makes it clear that Italy would do better if Berlusconi would resign, and it also mentions more than one alternative point-of-views, when it uses examples of what might happen to Italy if Berlusconi wouldn't resign. Therefore this editorial can be categorized as one that clearly takes a stance and not to ones which simply explain or speculate about the situation.

The model of argumentation analysis as presented here will be used to all 66 editorials which I have chosen to be the material of this thesis. In the following chapters (2, 3, and 4) I will present the results of the argumentation analysis. Every newspaper receives its own subchapter. All the main claims and their reasoning of every editorial can be found from attachment 1.

1.6 Theoretical framework

As a theoretical framework in my study I will use Sami Moisio's definitions of three different kinds of geopolitical actors. The aim of Moisio's doctoral thesis *Geopoliittinen kamppailu Suomen EU-jäsenyydestä* (2003) is to clarify the paradigmatic traces of politics which were produced during the battle of the EU membership. These traces Moisio aims to clarify with the help of the perspectives provided by geopolitics and rhetorical research. (Moisio 2003: 25.)

Moisio wants also to provide a detailed and theory based empirical analysis on the political battle of Finland's EU membership (Moisio 2003: 8). The writer concentrates especially on creating a different way of interpreting those reasons that caused Finland to join the EU despite that the membership included politically significant obstacles (Moisio 2003: 42).

Moisio believes that because many of the powerful counter arguments towards the EU membership were displaced, in the background has to be some fundamental structures that derive from long-term historical continuum rather than from short-term evaluation of economical and political reasons. This is why Moisio seeks for the comprehensive

connections that relate to geopolitical space and which are behind the reasons why Finland joined the EU. (Moisio 2003: 42.)

Moisio shows that geopolitics is a struggle which inevitably connects with the alterations and conflicts of power relations and therefore geopolitics is, for example, about political rhetoric's that affiliate with state's external and internal operational environment. The essential aim of this rhetoric's is to seek shares of power. In a geopolitical struggle the opponents try to convince their audience and put their own geopolitical interpretation in a position where it becomes the societal truth and with these kinds of actions they pursue to win shares of power and carry out the state of affairs they desire. The discussion about Finland's EU membership included these kinds of features and the essential question was where Finland should be situated in a geopolitical map of the post-Cold War Europe. (Moisio 2003: 165.)

From the geopolitical struggle of Finland's EU membership Moisio finds three kinds of geopolitical groups of actors. The groups are called *the traditionalists*, *the prudence policy supporters* and *the westernizers*. Moisio's first group, the *traditionalists* were against Finland's membership and also thought that Finland should continue using same kind of (geo)politics as it did during the Cold War. They saw themselves as the successors of President Kekkonen's geopolitical visions. Moisio doesn't count all the opponents of Finland's EU membership to be traditionalists. Traditionalists were just those who admired the Kekkonen's school of foreign policy. Due to this, the traditionalist vision included taking Russia as a super power as well as a potential enemy to Finland and therefore Russia shouldn't be annoyed with talks about joining EU. (Moisio 2003: 189.)

Moisio highlight's four attributes which are typical for traditionalists' geopolitical vision. Firstly, traditionalists assumed that Russia's interests to Finland were permanent and therefore Finland should always recognize those interests before acting. Secondly, traditionalists didn't want to accept that Europe was assimilated to EU because if they would have accepted that they would have accepted also that Finland was outside Europe since after all they were the ones who argument against Finland's EU membership. Thirdly, traditionalists wanted that Finland could manage it relationship to Russia by itself so that Finland wouldn't end up in a situation where it would found itself threatening Russia's security interests against its own will. Finally, traditionalists

strongly emphasized that Russia is the public enemy to Finland and due to geographical constancy this problem wouldn't disappear and therefore it should have a strong emphasis in Finnish foreign policy. (Moisio 2003: 198-199.)

The second group of geopolitical actors, the *supporters of prudence policy* (I shall use the abbreviation *SPP* for the convenience), Moisio places between traditionalists and westernisers. The ideological origin of SPP is hard to locate because it includes features from the Cold War and post-Cold War ideologies. The actors who belonged to SPP were mainly those who didn't demand new foreign policy during the era of Kekkonen's presidency. Many of the leading politics belonged to SPP in the beginning of the EU membership discussion, including president Koivisto and three consecutive prime ministers. (Moisio 2003: 199.) In the beginning of the Finland's EU membership discussion the SPP were downplaying or even denying the willingness to integrate and at the same time they emphasized Finland's neutrality. The SPP were waiting for the geopolitical environment to change and this made them seem like very passive which then annoyed many of the supporters of Finland's membership. (Moisio 2003: 201.)

The SPP differed from the traditionalists with their critique of some paradigms that originated from the Cold War era (Moisio 2003: 202). As the SPP were originally obeying the *wait-and-see* policy, their stance transformed during the EU membership process to more positive towards the European integration and also their policy changed to *predict-and-act* way of thinking. As an example of this change, Finland made its own report of the required actions to join the EU and eventually applied to the membership of the EU before Russia gave its opinion about it. For the sake of clarity it has to be mentioned that the SPP never abandoned the wait-and-see policy when it came to Finland's defense policy. (Moisio 2003: 205.)

The last group, the *westernisers* were the ones whose aim was to drive Finland to west and therefore a member of the EU. In the beginning of the membership discussion the westernisers used economical arguments when talking about the benefits of the membership. However after Sweden's surprising membership application westernisers began to compare Finland to Sweden to make arguments stronger. Westernisers also emphasised the uniqueness of the EU membership application and its importance was even assimilated to Finland's declaration of independence from 1944. (Moisio 2003: 169.)

Moisio found five essential dimensions from westernisers' geopolitical ideology. Firstly, westernisers' rhetoric's were clearly anti-Russia as well as against Finland's Cold War foreign policy. Secondly, westernisers assimilated EU to Europe which would have meant that leaving out of EU is the same as leaving out of Europe. This is also the reason why the threat from the east as well as the need to transfer Finland to real Europe were emphasized in westernisers' rhetoric's. Third dimension was the understanding of history that Finland had 1000 years of history as a western nation and therefore the westernisers were steering Finland back to its origins in the form of EU. Fourthly, westernisers saw Russia's unclear situation as worrying but it also offered a chance to prepare for the possible chaos by joining the EU. Lastly, westernisers emphasised the relation between the threat of Russia, the old neutrality policy and the future of Finland's nation. The bright future of Finland required tearing away from these old ties. (Moisio 2003: 186.)

The current situation is in many ways different than it was during the EU membership discussion. Finland is now unquestionably part of Europe unlike in the beginning of the 1990's. However there have been discussions about Finland's geopolitical location also during the EU membership, especially the discussion about whether Finland should join NATO. My aim is to use Moisio's geopolitical actors as a tool to recognize what kind of actors the chosen newspapers are in the Europe's debt crisis discussion.

2 Finland's demand for collateral

2.1 Lapin Kansa

I will begin the examination by analyzing Lapin Kansa's editorials on Finland's demand for collateral in Greece's bailout packages. This theme includes three editorials from LK and their message is somewhat straight forward. The first editorial was published on 26th of August, the second almost a month later, 20th of September and the third editorial on 5th of October in 2011.

LK clearly thought that Finland's demand for collateral was unwished behavior that made solving the crisis even harder than it already was. LK's arguments were such that by demanding collateral Finland might even cause the bailout package to collapse and lead to a situation where Finland still has to give financial aid to Greece.

Finland is on the edge. If Finland stubbornly decides to keep its strict stance, it might collapse the whole bailout package. Then ahead is a debt arrangement, which also requires financial aid from IMF as well as from the euro members. Problems won't be solved this way. (LK 26.8.2011.) (All the quotes can be found in their original language from the attachment 2, translations are made by the writer of this thesis.)

In this situation LK concentrated its criticism mainly to Finland and its government, leaving the cause of the crisis, Greece, with less notice and accusations. LK lifted also one guilty actor above others. This actor was the other of the two big parties forming the Finnish government; the Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP) and especially its current personification, minister of finance Jutta Urpilainen. LK saw that the SDP couldn't withdraw from its demands for collateral since the party thought that it was one of the main reasons behind its good result in the spring's parliamentary elections. Therefore SDP and its government ally National Coalition Party (NCP) had to hold on to their demand even it were utterly unnecessary.

Demanding collateral for new bailout packages was a sacred election promise for the social democrats during last spring's parliamentary elections. (...) Therefore the task left to the minister of finance Jutta Urpilainen is to convince over and over again that collaterals must be received. In question here are big and serious issues, which alongside holding on stubbornly to domestic election promises seems as unnecessary grumbling. (LK 20.9.2011.)

LK also instructs Finnish government to end the discussion about demands for collateral as soon as possible in order to be able to concentrate on actually solving the crisis. LK

points out that time is running out and Finland has already wasted precious time by “sticking to secondary issues” (LK 20.9.2011).

As already mentioned, LK settles for mildly criticizing Greece and above all, Greece is mentioned only as a part of reasoning why it is such a hurry to deal with the debt crisis. The message is clearly pointed to Finnish government and although Greece hasn't done the required savings and reforms, it's the bigger problems such as slowing down of global economy and a possible new depression, which might occur if decisions can't be quickly made.

The third editorial by LK in the theme in question is written after decisions about the collaterals were made. LK sees that decision to demand collateral ended up being an expensive one for Finland. LK emphasizes that none of the other countries wanted the collaterals and that only possibility for Finland to gain advantage from the collateral is the case in which Greece is unable to repay their loans. In any other case Finland has to deal with several disadvantages such as paying its part at once and still receiving smaller interests than other countries.

According to Urpilainen Finland got good collaterals which can reduce tax payers' risks. How big benefits Finland will eventually receive, is a matter of debate, and only time will tell. (...) Situation is interesting because the President of the Euro Group Jean-Claude Juncker told that he had asked if other countries were willing to have the collaterals, but the answer was a clear no. In this light the collaterals don't seem particularly tempting. (LK 5.10.2011.)

However, LK also discreetly praises Finnish government for finally closing this matter and therefore ending the negative attention that Finland collected during the process. The solution offered way out from the dead end to the government parties while keeping their dignity and therefore making it possible to quietly forget the whole discussion.

Something unambiguously good is included in the conclusion. Now the constant topic can be gradually put aside from the political stages. There are more important things for minister of finance to deal with. (LK 5.10.2011.)

From now on LK instructs the Finnish government to concentrate on how Finland can avoid such problems which have encountered Greece. Especially getting into debt has to be stopped as soon as possible. LK also warns that the government has a long way ahead and some very difficult decisions to be made, since it means squeezing the savings from citizens.

All in all, LK doesn't seem to hesitate when criticizing Finnish government for endangering the process of saving Greece, euro and the EU. When looking LK's stances through Moision's theory it's notable that the newspaper doesn't criticize the helping of Greece in any way and acts therefore in unquestioning fashion towards the European integration, which can be seen natural to westernizers. LK is also clearly worried about Finland giving the wrong message to other European countries, by complicating the bailout package negotiations. According to Moision, westernizers see this sort sending of uncertain messages to be potentially harmful for Finland as an integral part of the European nations. (Moision 2003: 168.)

		Values are not presented	Values are presented
		Speculative editorial	Separating editorial 66,6%
Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned		
	No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial	Policy defining editorial 33,3%

Table 2. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 1, Lapin Kansa.

As can be seen from the table, LK clearly wanted to take a stance of what's right and what's wrong as well as what should be done. LK presented its own values in every editorial it published during this theme and this can be seen as an indicator of the issue's importance to LK. What also can be said is that LK preferred presenting its stance through different options from which it then indicated the correct one to its readers. It should be also noticed that the amount of LK's editorials in the first theme was rather low and therefore too much conclusions cannot be made.

2.2 Kaleva

During the debate over Finland's demand for collateral in Greece's bailout packages, Kaleva shared LK's opinion about Finland's demands, but also concentrated on a bigger variety of issues. This theme includes six editorials from Kaleva, the first one being published on 25th of August and the latest 21st of October.

Unlike LK, Kaleva dedicated only one editorial to purely criticize Finnish government about its demand for collateral. However, Kaleva argued that Finnish government has increased the risk of worsening the crisis which then could cause depression in Europe as well as shattering of the eurozone. Exports, which are crucial for Finnish economy, would also suffer greatly from these consequences. The main guilty for all the troubles is the Finnish Social Democratic Party and its promises during the Finnish parliamentary elections, which it refuses to let go.

If Greece's bailout package collapses because of Finland's stubbornness, Finland's actions will remain in history with new characterizations, as an example of irresponsibility, which because of short-term domestic political reasons prevented the making of sensible long-term decisions. (Kaleva 25.8.2011.)

Kaleva also demands that Finnish government must have the courage to abandon earlier thoughts if the situation requires it. When stating that the unwillingness to let go of the demands for collateral is an indication of weakness of the Finnish politicians, Kaleva refers once again especially to SDP.

In its editorial, published on 8th of September, Kaleva changes the theme of criticizing Finnish government to a pessimistic estimation about euro's future. Kaleva suggests that among other things, Finland's demand for collateral has weakened the will and belief in saving euro. However, Finland isn't the only one responsible for this and it seems that the will to save euro has weakened in general. Kaleva raises few examples responsible for this, such as Greece itself, the IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB) as well as Germany. Kaleva is also worried about populism directed towards criticizing European integration and which's effects can be seen trough whole of Europe, especially in Finland. By this Kaleva refers to the great result that national populist party *True Finns* achieved from Finland's parliamentary elections earlier in the spring.

There's no common vision and no common will. And soon there will neither be euro. (...) Euro and its future are as strong as are the national political forces behind it. These forces have been weakened by the wave of populism that has gone over Europe, and which's effects can be sensed especially in Finland at the very moment. (Kaleva 8.9.2011.)

Kaleva demands in the same editorial that politicians must have the ability to discuss openly as well as honestly in order to solve Europe's problems, since the collapse of euro would only mean the beginning of true problems. Kaleva gives an example this by wondering how hopeless it might be to define normal Finnish citizen's mortgage or wage in any other currency than euro.

In its next editorial (13.9.2011) Kaleva proceeds to tighten its demands, as it claims that Greece's debts must be restructured and that Greece must be temporary suspended from euro. Kaleva argues that no bailout package can save Greece anymore and its own actions are not clearly as effective as they should be, also the interest rates of Greece's loans have risen to record-breakingly figures. As Kaleva explicitly blames Greece for being responsible for the current situation, Kaleva also believes that Greece would have better possibilities for surviving from the crisis by taking back its own currency.

There's no time to linger anymore, because Greece threatens the future of whole euro currency. (...) The upper hand from the economical crisis can only be claimed, if there's readiness for actions which will ease the crisis. At this very moment these actions are debt restructuring for Greece as well as its separation from euro. (Kaleva 19.9.2011.)

Once the decisions about collaterals for Greece's bailout packages were made, Kaleva immediately made clear that terms for collaterals were bad. And what was even worse was that Finland accepted these terms, being the only country to do so. Kaleva listed that Finland has to pay its full share in the bailout package, 1.44 billion euros, at once and Finland is not entitled to receive profits in case the European Financial Stability Facility produces some, and on top of these, Finland will receive collaterals for only 20% of the funds given. Once again guilty for this mistake was Finnish government and especially the SDP with its election promises. Kaleva also reminds that the reason why other countries didn't accept the terms for collaterals was that they didn't have the domestic political necessity to do so and they actually realized how poor the conditions were.

The most desperate international operation by the Finnish government since past few years, getting collaterals for loans to Greece, has finished during the night

between Monday and Tuesday. This agony lasting several months was ended by German invention, (...) a model which Finnish minister of finance Jutta Urpilainen (SDP) freshly characterized as a good one. Terms for this agreement ruggedly tell that the view is groundless. (Kaleva 5.10.2011.)

However, Kaleva was pleased in the same way as LK was, that having the collateral discussion out of the daily agenda, it's possible to concentrate on how the crisis might actually be solved. Kaleva characterized that the discussion for collateral took excessive amounts of Finnish government's time and did considerable damage to Finland's good reputation among the EU nations. Kaleva ends the editorial with a warning that reminds about the dangers of domestic politics during continental crisis:

A lesson can be learned in Finland, of what kind of problems the inconsiderate and populist phrases during the election campaign can lead at worst. (Kaleva 5.10.2011.)

Kaleva's arguments can be clearly seen as defending the unity of the EU as well as the eurozone. As a typical argument for westernizers, also Kaleva emphasized that Finland can't afford to be outside eurozone for economical reasons and therefore it's highly reprehensible if Finland's demand for collateral causes to collapse the monetary union (Moisio 2003: 172). Also Greece receives critics as it is seen endangering the future of euro.

Kaleva's demand for quick actions in order to prevent eurozone from dispersing is also a typical argument for westernizers. In a decisive moment and in order to secure the right actions to be taken, westernizers remind of the dangers which might occur when decisions are hesitated (Moisio 2003: 177).

It can be additionally said that Kaleva, as well as LK, found enemies within Finland who endangered Europe's and euro's future. These enemies were Finnish government and especially SDP, whereas other major governmental party NCP was left for very little notice. Westernizers are seen to have a tendency to criticize fiercely those who were seen to compromise Finland's future as a part of the core of Europe. Kaleva also points out the *responsibility*, still characteristic to westernizers, which the government has and what then might happen to an average taxpayer if the currency was to change due to the collapse of the euro. (Moisio 2003: 179.)

From the theme of *Finland's demand for collateral* there was nothing to be found which would have referred Kaleva's behavior to be any other than what's characteristic

for westernizers. It unconditionally defended euro's importance and as decisively criticized everyone who it saw threatening the future of euro.

		Degree of taking a stance	
		Values are not presented	Values are presented
Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned	Speculative editorial	Separating editorial 50,0%
	No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial	Policy defining editorial 50,0%

Table 3. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 1, Kaleva.

In Kaleva's case can be seen its will to present the one and only option to its readers. Kaleva presented its own values in every editorial and as mentioned, significant number of *policy defining editorials* indicates that it had its own agenda that needed to be planted into its readers' minds. Therefore there's no doubt that Kaleva sought to influence to the current situation through its editorials. This means then that Finland's demand for collateral wasn't indifferent subject to Kaleva in any sense.

2.3 Helsingin Sanomat

Also HS was concerned about Finland's demand for collateral in Greece's bailout packages, but HS looked at the ongoing situation from other aspects as well. During the theme about Finland's demand for collateral, HS published nine editorials, the first one being published on 25th of August and the last one 5th of October.

HS, as well as LK and Kaleva, began the theme by criticizing Finnish government for its demand for collateral. HS argued that demanding collaterals in such a persistent and

selfish fashion wasn't justifiable in any sense. It meant setback and losing face in Europe for Finland. On top of this, Finnish government drove itself to a dead-end from where it was virtually impossible to turn back. From HS's point of view this was utterly unnecessary since it was only done in order to follow those election promises that SDP gave to diminish True Finns' popularity. Therefore also HS names SDP as a fundamentally guilty for this situation and actually reduces responsibility from the other major government party NCP by saying that they have no other choice but to conform to SDP's demands in order to avoid scattering of the government.

But once you are in the corner, reversing is difficult. The inner unity of the government is rickety and cracking. NCP, who are less enthusiastic about the collaterals, cannot just change their stance, because that would ruin the relationship with SDP and diminish Prime Minister Katainen's prestige. (HS, 25.8.2011.)

HS demands that SDP should take its promises back and retreat because that would be the only possibility to escape from the situation. However, HS doesn't really think that SDP would do so because it would mean at least some kind of humiliation to the party. HS admits that the demand for collateral isn't a huge problem itself, but its consequences might be. If Finland's demand were to be accepted, it might cause other countries to demand the same. Because of this being somewhat impossible to execute, it could cause heterogeneity between European countries in a situation where the unity of the community is already at stake. HS sees this sort of situation as a serious threat to euro and EU.

Next time HS grabs to Finland's reducing reputation in Europe is in its editorial published on 3rd of September. This time HS uses an example of where Finland would need its earlier good reputation which would allow Finland to gather sympathy among other EU nations. The example concerns the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) new regulation, which the EU has also accepted as its directive, where the sulfur percentage at the Baltic Sea must be lowered to a level which is lower than at other seas. This would mean significantly bigger costs to Finland due to the importance of export. Therefore, HS believes that due to Finland's demand for collateral, other EU nations are not going to support Finland's cause in this sulfur directive.

This policy will be remembered. There might be no point of talking about vengeance but when operating in the EU, it takes a lot of time to collect capital of trust and it can be wasted in a heartbeat. (HS 3.9.2011.)

HS also believes that Finland might have to suffer from its actions in future as well. HS reminds that Finland has been known as a compromising actor who isn't after its own good. HS characterizes Finland's principals in the EU to be an actor who gathers *goodwill* which then can be used to persuade others to support its cause. For HS's opinion, it probably is already too late to gather others to support Finland, since it would have been hard in the first place but now it is virtually impossible. HS also wants to raise the question of what actually is profitable and what's not.

If one accepts the calculation of costs by industry (...) one will end up to the conclusion that the value of the possible collaterals received from Greece is barely the amount which Finland can lose due to the IMO's unevenly balanced sulfur decision. (HS 3.9.2011.)

HS moves on to comment other aspects of the crisis while the decision about the collaterals is still unmade. In the editorial published on 9th of September, HS wants to draw attention to the means of how the crisis might be solved. Whereas Kaleva suggested around the same time that no bailout package can solve the crisis, HS states that the forced saving and financial aid did help one other country suffering from the crisis, Ireland. HS reminds that Ireland received help from the EU and the IMF and after these forced actions Ireland's economy has turned to grow again. HS directs this remainder especially to Finnish opposition whom have been stating that the course of these countries with problems cannot be changed by conducting forced savings and that these actions actually worsen the situation. In this way HS not only defines what might be the correct path in solving the crisis, but also gives its support to the government which stated in the words of the Prime Minister that in order to solve the crisis, countries must conduct these undoubtedly unpleasant but effective adaptation programs.

Katainen said at the parliament about the saving programs that only a taken medicine can help. Ireland has taken its medicines. (HS 9.9.2011.)

For the next two editorials, published on 13th and 21st of September, HS concentrates on demanding faster actions in the decision making at a level of whole Europe. For this issue, also Kaleva gave great effort whereas LK hurried only Finnish government in its decision making. HS urges European nations to quickly conduct those financial aid decisions made in June. The newspaper argues that albeit it is unclear whether the aid will help or not, the inability to conduct these decisions can cause a new panic which will have even more disastrous consequences.

HS also refers to Finland's demand for collateral, when it says that the whole responsibility isn't solely on Greece's shoulders but it's the ability to make decisions in all EU countries with Finland in its core. HS reminds about the panic that occurred with the American investment bank Lehman Brothers three years earlier when it suddenly announced its bankruptcy and that the same kind of uncontrollable panic could happen once again if decisions aren't made promptly. It's notable that HS uses precisely same arguments in both of these mentioned editorials which then means that it saw this cause important enough to repeat it.

Finally, when the decision about the collaterals was made, HS (5.10.2011) criticized the conditions of the collaterals as well as Finland's decision to accept them even though any of the other countries didn't. HS also uses the same kind of argumentation, about the reasons why conditions were so bad, as Kaleva and LK did. But what differs from Kaleva and LK, is that HS doesn't knock down the collaterals entirely.

In the Ministry of Finance they have calculated the amounts of the guarantees and collaterals, but the only comment about the price left to pay for Finland due to the collateral arrangements, is that it might be minor. If this is the case, the collateral arrangements won't cause direct harm to Finland. That would be the best remaining option. (HS 5.10.2011.)

Therefore it seems that the collaterals aren't and maybe never were the main concern for HS, at least not in the way how Kaleva and LK were precisely worried about taxpayers' moneys. Instead it seems that HS was all along worried especially about the consequences which Finland's unnecessary demands could cause to the decision making in the EU.

Solving the debate was without doubt politically good thing for everyone. Hopefully Finland won't drive itself alone in the corner for the second time. (HS 5.10.2011.)

What then most clearly arises from HS's editorials is the fear of something bad happening to Europe as a community. These threats can be found within Finland as well as from Europe in general and there's no point of waiting for help from outside of Europe. The biggest problem is the incapability to make decisions.

There are no major distinctions to be found in the ways the newspapers handled the theme of *Finland's demand for collateral*. Therefore also HS acted very much in a way that westernizer would act. Especially the fear of what might happen to Finland if the

European community was to collapse, suits particularly well to westernizers' argumentation (Moisio 2003: 168). As a purely geopolitical argument can be seen HS's fear that Finland would suffer as a remote European country because its possibilities for exporting were unevenly taken away due to the IMO's sulfur directive. This isolating rule that harms Finland's capability to function as an equal European country, and which was fault of the Finnish government's poor judgment, reminds for westernizers' argument that without being a genuine part of Europe, Finland was just a meaningless periphery (Moisio 2003: 176 & 182).

		Values are not presented	Values are presented
		Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned
No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial 11,1%		Policy defining editorial 22,2%

Table 4. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 1, Helsingin Sanomat.

The most popular type of editorials for HS, as well as for LK and Kaleva, was *separating editorial* which aims to influence to its readers' minds by separating the best option from number of alternatives. Although HS had its own opinion in most of cases, seems that it wasn't after all as determined as LK or Kaleva were in their editorials. HS also left some space for speculation and explaining the situation to its readers' which can be interpreted as being less stressed about what's going to happen and how the situation is going to develop, since HS would have had the same opportunity to consistently try to effect its readers' opinions if it would have been worried enough to think that things are going wrong. However, the theme in question here was important

also for HS which is proved by the proportion of $2/3$ of the editorials presenting the newspaper's own values.

3 Unfit governments of Greece and Italy

3.1 Lapin Kansa

After the conclusion of Finland's demands for collateral, the discussion swiftly moved on to next concern. Italy's problems had surfaced recently and since Italy were seen to have much bigger potential to cause problems to the EU and to the eurozone than Greece had, this topic could be seen also in the editorials. The main problem with Italy and Greece were their governments which couldn't reach the adequate unity to do the correct decisions to avoid worsening of the crisis. Therefore the discussion circulated around the theme of changing these unfit governments.

LK published three editorials during this theme in a time period that was less than two weeks, which can be seen rather frequent for a local newspaper such as LK to be writing about whole Europe's issues. The first editorial was published 29th of October and the last one 10th of November 2011.

In the first editorial LK reminds that even though the situation in Europe had taken steps to the right direction due to the successful EU summit, there were still many problems to be encountered. One of the main threats was Italy because it hadn't yet done any actions in order to improve its situation. LK however had a clear vision of what actions Italy should start doing before worsening of the situation in whole of Europe.

At this very moment dark clouds are hanging especially over Italy. In this boot-shaped country it has not yet been understood that the path to survive goes only through drastic economical reformations. If these actions aren't undertaken, Greece will have followers. (LK 29.10.2011.)

LK continued to list Europe's problems in its next editorial. This time the newspaper grabbed both, Greece and Italy, under its lens. LK doubts that even though Greece would get some stability because of a new government, it still might not be enough to keep up the pace in developing productivity with such countries as Germany and Finland. After the financial help would cease, Greece would dive back in to crisis taking the rest of the Europe with it once again. Therefore LK suggests that maybe Greece shouldn't be a part of eurozone at all. Thus, LK thinks that Greece needs a new government in any case but it also doubts that is it enough.

Italy gets its share of LK's criticism when the newspaper states that Italy's increasing and already massive debts create a threat to whole of Europe. LK agrees that it was a good decision from the EU and the IMF to begin monitoring closely Italy's actions for balancing its economy. For LK, Italy's situation is clearly out of its own hands and therefore outside control is desirable. LK also feels the same way about Italy's government as it did about Greece's government and that's why there's no confusion of what should be done to the current government of Italy.

It would be also necessary to change the leader of the country; Silvio Berlusconi whose credibility deteriorates day by day. (LK 5.11.2011.)

In the same editorial LK points out that also Finnish government could suffer from prolonging of the European economical crisis. LK doesn't believe that the government would fall because of the crisis but it thinks that the crisis will help the EU and euro critical party *True Finns* to succeed in the forthcoming presidential as well as municipal elections.

LK commits the last editorial of the theme (LK 10.11.2011) to illuminate the gloomy situation of the European economical crisis. Once again, responsible for the situation is the confusion hanging over the political situation of Greece and Italy. LK argues that the vagueness of the situation only makes the whole crisis worse. In Greece's situation the vagueness was still about to remain because even though the new government was to be formed, Greek citizens weren't accepting the savings since they complicated their lives and the one to blame was the previous government.

LK was particularly pessimistic about Italy's situation. Even though Italy's Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi had agreed to resign once the economical reformations were accepted, LK doubts that the situation would improve rapidly. The reason for this wasn't that LK believed that Berlusconi had done good job but that Italy's debts will create a great concern for the whole of Europe in any case.

Italy seems to be the next cloud in the bright euro sky despite the resignation (of Berlusconi). Italy's debt is almost astronomical and it won't be solved quickly, no matter who are in charge. (LK 10.11.2011.)

Therefore LK believes that also Finnish government's options have narrowed. Finland as well as other European countries can only choose the least bad option from worse options

because of the bad choices that certain countries have already made. Thus LK doesn't blame Finnish government; the situation just doesn't look particularly bright.

As a conclusion, LK seems to be extremely worried and rather pessimistic about Europe's future and even it demands that Greece and Italy need new governments, LK isn't sure whether it will be enough to solve Europe's financial crisis. LK makes a geopolitical argument when it suggests that maybe Greece shouldn't be a part of euro because its economy isn't as good as Northern European countries, for which it includes also Germany. Northern Europe and especially Scandinavia were seen as an ideal group for Finland by the traditionalists (Moisio 2003: 168) but LK's argument still seems to be more suitable for westernizers'. The difference derives from the vision that LK sees Finland as an elite member of European integration which couldn't be thought in the early 1990's. Therefore LK wants to defend Europe's unity, even though Europe apparently doesn't mean all the European countries, but just those good enough for it. This kind of argumentation about *first* or *second* class Europe is typical for westernizers (Moisio 2003: 171).

Compared to the first theme, it's notable that in this second theme LK doesn't criticize Finnish government and isn't any more worried about the message that Finland is sending to other countries. Instead, LK is more worried about how the problem countries are endangering the existence of the EU and euro. That's why it could be said that LK clearly moved on from the layout seen in the first theme, even though the main fear remains the same.

Degree of taking a stance

		Values are not presented	Values are presented
		Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned
No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial 66,6%		Policy defining editorial

Table 5. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 2, Lapin Kansa.

What can be seen from the table is that LK transferred to be more passive than in the first theme. In this second theme it took a real stance only in one of its editorials whilst simply settling for explaining the situation to its readers in the other two editorials. It seems that LK's pessimistic view of the situation associates with its passivity in a way that the newspaper simply explained to its reader's that there's not much to be done in order to solve the situation. This view is enforced by the fact that the only time LK clearly took a stance, it emphasized that actions taken might not be enough (LK 5.11.2011). Although there can be seen a difference between the first and the second theme, it should be also taken into account that the amount of editorials were low in both themes in LK's case.

3.2 Kaleva

Kaleva published five editorials during this second theme, the first one being published on 11th of October and the last one 11th of November 2011. What's notable here is that except the first editorial, the rest four editorials were published within nine days which tells that Kaleva was highly active during that time period.

The series of four densely published editorials was started by Greece's Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou's announcement that Greece will hold a referendum about the bailout packages coming from the EU and the IMF (Kaleva 3.11.2011). There was no doubt about who Kaleva held guilty for the setback in the European economical crisis. Kaleva argued that the situation had taken steps forward and things seemed a little brighter until Papandreou made the announcement about the referendum. Kaleva doomed this action as a political game which didn't suit in the current situation.

Kaleva also argued that the referendum should be cancelled since it would only postpone the inevitable and if the people of Greece would vote against the bailout packages, it would mean Greece's separation from the eurozone. This would then mean serious economical difficulties for Greece which could also take down indebted Italy and Spain and thus cause even wider problems for the whole of Europe.

Only few days later Papandreou announced that the referendum was cancelled. Kaleva was pleased about the announcement but made it clear who was in charge of the mess. (Kaleva 7.11.2011). Kaleva also reminded that Papandreou's decision annoyed whole Europe.

In front of international pressure Papandreou had to back off and cancel the referendum. The indecisiveness has demonstrated the incompetence of the government. (Kaleva 7.11.2011.)

Kaleva also pointed out that this was the last time-out that Greece had and so the only action left to do was to form a new wide-based government which could do the required actions. Once again Kaleva predicts that if Greece won't commit to the required reforms it most likely will cause Greece to be separated from the eurozone and this would be unpleasant for Greeks as well as for other Europeans. Kaleva reminds here that more than 80% of Greeks still wish Greece to remain as a member of the eurozone. Kaleva also strengthens the belief in saving Greece by stating that Greece can be saved although it requires savings and reforms which will be directed especially towards the people of Greece.

The next editorial Kaleva dedicated to Italy's situation (Kaleva 10.11.2011). Kaleva's message is rather clear; Italy has to survive without falling into crisis. Italy's problems were a true deterrence for Kaleva since it argued that Europe or the eurozone cannot help Italy if it falls on the hands of other European countries.

Eurozone cannot help Italy. Italy's debts would be enough to collapse whole Europe's financial markets. Keys to solution are held by Italians themselves. The government needs to get the planned reformation program through. (Kaleva 10.11.2011.)

This reformation program includes, among other things, raising retirement age and privatization of state property. Kaleva emphasizes that time is running out for these actions and predicts that EU has to take strict means in use, as it did with Greece, in order to save Italy, which seems to be mandatory in Kaleva's book. What's noticeable once again is that Kaleva tries to strengthen the belief in a better future by reasoning that Italy has all the possibilities to manage its debts since it's a competitive and innovative industrialized country which's public economy still keeps going. The problem, according to Kaleva, is the unwillingness to perform changes.

The last editorial of this current theme by Kaleva was published right after Greece had announced that it had formed a new government. Kaleva states that the new government is Greece's last chance to avoid bankruptcy. However, Kaleva is worried about the credibility of Greek politicians and therefore doubts the government's possibilities to do effective politics without any support from its citizens. This was to be a problem because of the upcoming parliamentary elections in which Kaleva fears the rising of extremist

political parties which could once again endanger solving of the crisis. Therefore Kaleva hopes that the new government could do all the hard work and get the reformations under way before the parliamentary elections. The new government could, however, face also internal problems on top of citizens' lack of confidence.

Signs are not praiseworthy. Parties Pasok and New Democracy, forming a coalition government for the first time, have been fighting so far like a cat and a dog. In Greece people are used to single party majority governments. This time the major parties have to try together, because the coalition government is Greece's last chance. (Kaleva 11.11.2011.)

Interestingly Kaleva acknowledges Greece's actions so far when it admits that Greece has already done lot by raising the retirement age and by reducing the amount of municipalities from over a thousand to three hundred. Kaleva contrasts these actions to Finland's similar intentions and states that in Finland the same process has taken ages compared to Greece. Therefore Kaleva's pursue to mediate can be seen once again, as it doesn't criticize Greece in the same way as LK did and it wants to believe that the situation can be solved both in Greece and in Italy. Obviously the fear of the eurozone collapsing due to the crisis is present in Kaleva's as well as in LK's editorials.

As it did in the first theme, Kaleva demands also in this second theme for rapid actions in order to avoid further dispersion within Europe which can be seen as typical argument for westernizers (Moisio 2003: 177). This kind of argumentation clearly differs from the *prudence policy supporters'* argumentation which emphasized the importance of waiting before acting (Moisio 2003: 200). The reason for Kaleva's way of acting evidently derives from the desire to keep eurozone and the EU united.

Degree of taking a stance

		Values are not presented	Values are presented
		Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned
No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial		Policy defining editorial

Table 6. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 2, Kaleva.

When viewed through a degree of taking a stance, Kaleva can be seen to taken totally different approach than LK did. Kaleva presents its own values and therefore takes a stance in every one of its editorials in this current theme. Kaleva clearly had the passion to make the effort in affecting the situation as much as it could and the method to do it was by presenting different options and pointing the correct one to its readers. It can seen as somewhat open way of affecting which then differs also from Kaleva's means to affect from the first theme where it had significant amount of *policy defining editorials* which give no other than the correct option. Once again, the theme of *unfit governments of Greece and Italy* didn't seem to be indifferent for Kaleva in any sense.

3.3 Helsingin Sanomat

HS published 11 editorials during the second theme very intensively, especially towards the end of the theme's time period. The first editorial was published on 7th of October and the last one on 11th of November. What's noticeable here is that HS's last four editorials in this theme were published in four consecutive days meaning that no other subject was dealt in its editorials during those four days. This intensive period appeared just before and right after the change of Greece's and Italy's governments.

In its editorial published on 12th of October, HS begins the theme by sharing instructions of how Europe can survive from the crisis. HS criticizes Europe's decision-makers in general as they have not been able to do decisions with adequate efficiency and speed. HS demands that the current *yes, but...*-policy has to end and Greece's debts need to be restructured as soon as possible. HS also reminds that bailout packages only postpone what's inevitable and therefore these drastic actions need to be executed.

Next HS concentrated on putting pressure to the upcoming EU summit by stating that the summit cannot fail because it will initiate such economical problems that will affect to Finland as well. However, HS is still rather moderate with its demands as it simply hopes that the summit won't be a failure.

At least the direction has to change. World doesn't need to be totally different on Monday of what it was on Sunday. But it still has to be different (...). (HS 20.10.2011.)

Once again HS reminds about the means which will help to achieve the change to better; Greece's debts need to be restructured and most of Greece's debts need to be forgotten. HS justifies its demands by stating that Greece isn't doing enough to correct the situation. Here it can be said that HS's as well as Kaleva's approach seems to be more careful than LK's since LK has been the only newspaper which has suggested Greece's unambiguous removal from euro (LK 5.11.2011). Also Kaleva suggested Greece's temporary dismissal from euro in the first theme but changed its approach afterwards similar to HS. Actually HS makes an explicit limitation about what can and cannot be done to Greece.

Since dismissal from euro is an option which is simply out of question in Greece as well as elsewhere, the only way to proceed is to guide Greece towards controlled debt restructuring and significant lowering of its debts. (HS 20.10.2011.)

After the EU summit HS praised its good results. HS stated that the decisions made at the summit were a step towards the right direction and HS even emphasized that every definition of policies made at the summit was significant and justifiable. Once again HS reminds about Greece's debt restructuring without which Greece cannot survive. Interesting point here is again the distinction between LK and HS, since LK commented the summit just as a new time-out for Europe, nothing more (LK 29.10.2011). HS also raises a new threat to Europe's survival battle by stating that all the correct decisions made at the summit will be wasted if Italy won't change its financial policy as well as its prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. HS points out that Greece is only a minor actor which is slowly moving to right direction but Italy is something that all of Europe should be scared of.

Next scandal rose right after the positive results of the EU summit when Greece's Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou announced that Greece will hold a referendum about EU's and IMF's bailout packages. HS published its editorial commenting the event after Papandreou had withdrawn the announcement about the referendum due to the pressure coming from EU's big members; Germany and France. Therefore HS isn't too worried about the referendum but dedicates the whole editorial telling how stupid act Papandreou did and while doing it also destroyed his own political credibility. HS was also pleased about the cooperation that Germany and France showed in a challenging moment.

After Greece's incident HS began properly criticizing Italy's Prime Minister Berlusconi. HS stated that Italy had all the possibilities to survive from its debts and the crisis. Italy is the third biggest economy in Europe but there is one man stopping Italy from to start recovering. HS thinks that after Berlusconi's removal also rest of Italy's political field could start healing which could then restore confidence to Italy's politics. Therefore HS sees Berlusconi as a kind of a lock that is holding Italy back and argues that it's a general opinion in whole of Europe that Berlusconi should resign. HS offers two possible solutions to the problem and it's rather clear that *the* problem is the current Prime Minister Berlusconi.

If Berlusconi loses his majority and agrees to resign, the most likely option is a government consisting of specialists or the current government led by a new Prime Minister (...). Both solutions would offer a chance to get rid of economy's lack of confidence. (HS 8.11.2011.)

Before finally announcing new governments of Greece and Italy, HS wished to point out how troublesome it had been to form a new government for Greece (HS 10.11.2011). HS described Greece's politicians as opportunistic and corrupted who simply don't have the desire to try to solve the crisis. This criticism derived from the tactical games that both of Greece's major government parties *Pasok* and *Nea dimokratia* tried to play in order to harm the other party and which significantly complicated forming the new government. HS's stance is clear; these are such acts that should be avoided by any means in such a serious situation.

A day later, after Greece had officially formed its new government, HS returned to considering Italy's situation. Silvio Berlusconi announced his resigning and HS was pleased. HS disagreed with markets' evaluation that Berlusconi's resignation wasn't enough to save Italy. HS argued that what Italy was missing all along was the will to deal with its debts, not the ability and once Berlusconi has been removed this will can rise again. To justify this argument, HS reminds once again that Italy is a large economy which has a stable banking system and very high degree of private savings.

HS admits that even after Berlusconi's resignation, Italy's problems still intertwine with its political system as it is inefficient after Berlusconi's period.

Berlusconi's party will continue to act under the supervision of its old patron and won't try to do genuine economical change. (...) And the opposition is dispersed. (HS 11. 11.2011.)

HS believes that the best solution in order to start healing Italy's economy would be a caretaker government consisting of specialists who would then act in cooperation with the IMF. With right-minded government, HS reminds, Italy would have much better possibilities to start solving the crisis than Greece has.

HS's editorials reflect its belief in solving the crisis while keeping the unity of the European integration. It trusts that new governments of Greece and Italy will turn to better which cannot be said of LK. Therefore the main difference between the newspapers in this second theme comes from their different approach, whereas their mission seems to be the same; solving the crisis and keeping Europe united. Although in HS's case this means keeping euro and EU members as they are and in LK's case forcing out some members if they seem to be endangering the unity.

Although HS somewhat clearly profiles as a westernizer, one geopolitical argument differs from westernizers' original agenda. It is the reference group that westernizers saw most natural to Finland; Western Europe. *Prudence policy supporters* instead saw the correct reference group for Finland being whole Europe and in HS's editorials it can be seen that HS takes it as an important value that whole Europe stays together, not just the Western Europe. (Moisio 2003: 168.) However, as I said HS still seems to act like a westernizer with its unquestionable defending of European integration, and therefore the change in the correct reference group most probably derives from the change in the ways of perceiving Europe in Finland from what it used to be during 1990's.

		Values are not presented	Values are presented
		Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned
No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial 9,1%		Policy defining editorial 9,1%

Table 7. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 2, Helsingin Sanomat.

As well as Kaleva did, also HS uses most of its editorials to define the correct way to handle the issue in question. HS also prefers to use the method of separating the right policy from not so good ones which seems to be popular method especially in Kaleva's and HS's editorials. As having decent amount of editorials, 11 in total, it can be safely said that HS preferred straight ways of influencing to its readers as only one editorial separates from this pattern.

4 How is the crisis going to end?

4.1 Lapin Kansa

During the period of the last theme LK published three editorials as it did also in the earlier themes. In the last theme the newspapers seemed to move towards speculation of how the crisis will end and what will it mean to Europe and Finland. Obviously the crisis has yet not ended when this thesis is being written during the spring of 2012 and it will probably still take some time to be solved. However, before the turn of the year, discussion around the European economical crisis calmed down and after the middle of December 2011 there wasn't much to be written about the crisis. Therefore the quiet situation around the crisis, especially after a very busy fall, might have given the feeling that the crisis will come closer to its end.

LK published its first editorial of the theme on 2nd of December, the second editorial on 9th of December and the last one just before the turn of the year, on 29th of December. In its first editorial of the theme and almost a month after the last editorial concerning the crisis, LK continued in the same manner by stating its concern about the hopelessness of the situation. LK gave an example of how the economical experts are already talking about the disintegration of the eurozone and as how the business world is also preparing for that kind of situation. The main thing causing this kind of situation is the conflict between the national interests and the collective interests of the joint Europe. Between these interests the European politicians are struggling which then causes the lack of commitment to solving the European economical crisis. LK doesn't name any country's politicians especially but emphasizes the lack of will in general. The newspaper also quotes the European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, who is also a Finn, Olli Rehn who said that there's no single trick that would solve the crisis. LK also brought up the most ultimate estimations about how the situation could escalate.

Now there have been presented also such estimations that the euro will be gone and, among other things, the Finnish (previous currency) mark will return. There are talks about a fierce recession which would greatly affect to whole of Europe and the whole world economics. (LK 2.12.2011.)

Therefore LK demands several collective actions from all the European countries, especially from the EU and euro members. LK names such actions to be a creation of adequate economical firewalls within Europe and continue to strengthen economical

governance. However, LK reminds once again that such actions are not going to be easy to execute because the whole situation is not just about saving Europe, but also about a battle between market powers and politicians and about which side will be the winner.

In its second editorial of the theme (LK 9.12.2011), LK continues to stress the importance of making decisions in a solidary spirit. And once again the real threat to solving the crisis is politicians pursue to further one's own country's benefits. In many ways LK's second editorial of the third theme is a copy of the first one, since also in this editorial LK reminds that solving the crisis cannot be done by a single action and what would be extremely important to do, are commonly agreed actions. One difference in justifying these actions is the argument that they will always be painful somewhere and therefore these actions should not be avoided just because of their difficulty. LK also reminds that the situation is getting worse and not much time is to be wasted or there could be some drastic consequences ahead.

In any case the EU leaders are at least their backs against the wall. The options are tightening economical supervision or in the worst case, the dissolution of the whole eurozone. (LK 9.12.2011.)

From these views with a relatively little hope, LK moves to consider Europe's and Finland's relationship in general during the crisis. After a pause from considering Europe's financial crisis that lasted almost three weeks, LK returns to consider Finnish people's attitudes towards the EU and euro currency by analyzing the results of a survey held by HS. LK states that it might have been even a little surprise that Finns have such a positive attitude towards the EU and euro despite the crisis, since 2/3 of Finns hope that Finland will continue to be a member of the EU as well as a member of the eurozone also in the future. LK is also pleased that Finns realize the fact that the whole European economical crisis is happening due to irresponsible economic politics of some countries, not because of euro itself. Therefore LK reminds that such stubborn politics as Finland's demand for collateral earlier in the fall, were unnecessary because these politics were done in the fear of the EU critical party *True Finns* although the people of Finland were behind European integration all along.

LK believes that the reason why there had been such a critical atmosphere towards the EU and euro in Finland was because the critics such as the *True Finns* used their voices louder than others. However the noisiness of the critics wasn't the whole truth and therefore LK hopes that Finland will return to collaborate when dealing with European

issues. LK even thinks that the loud EU critique had twisted the ongoing presidential election campaigns.

Opposing the euro doesn't seem to appeal to the bulk of people, at least as much as the presidential candidates might have believed. Voters seem to expect also something else from their president than waving fist at Brussels. (LK 29.12.2011.)

Although changing its tone to more positive one in the last editorial, LK had once again slightly pessimistic approach towards solving the crisis. Naturally this might be just a rhetorical device used in order to emphasize the severity of the situation. What's different from LK's editorials in the earlier themes is that it begins to demand rapid actions for solving the crisis by reminding that the time is running out, which then reminds of those means that HS and Kaleva have already been using and which have also been already recognized as westernizers' means to affect (Moisio 2003: 177).

Other change in LK's editorials was that it didn't suggest anymore dismissing any member countries from the eurozone like it did during the previous theme and actually hoped for mutual decision making between the countries. This doesn't mean that LK's objective to save the EU and euro currency would have changed, just the means to do it. What's noticeable here is that like in the earlier themes LK aimed at breaking the *status quo* by demanding drastic actions such as dismissing Greece from eurozone. This is also a typical action for westernizers (Moisio 2003: 170), but as we have seen, LK let go of this procedure in the last theme and settled for demanding improvements within current circumstances. Therefore LK could be seen to move towards more prudent approach towards the crisis.

		Values are not presented	Values are presented
Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned	Speculative editorial 33,3%	Separating editorial 33,3%
	No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial	Policy defining editorial 33,3%

Table 8. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 3, Lapin Kansa.

When looked through the types of the editorials LK wanted to present its own stance in two out of the three editorials. Once again not too precise conclusions should be done according to the table since the amount of editorials was rather small as it has been with other themes in LK's case. The main thing that can be said about LK's editorials when examined through the table is that it did use the possibility to declare its own view about what should be done in order to solve the crisis in most editorials, instead of just commenting what had already happened.

4.2 Kaleva

Kaleva published 10 editorials during the last theme, the first one being published on 16th of November and the last editorial on 31st of December. The truly intensive discussion about the crisis ended to the editorial which was published on 13th of December, since after that only one editorial concerning the crisis was published before the end of the year 2011.

After new governments of Greece and Italy the public discussion turned to eurobonds (also known as the European bonds or the Stability bonds) which means that the eurozone would take loans as a whole and then forward those loaned assets to individual countries. It was generally agreed that this sort of system would further also the economical integration within the EU and eurozone which would then mean narrowing single country's sovereignty. Also Kaleva grabbed to this issue for the first time in its editorial which was published on 25th of November. Kaleva is especially worried about what means could possible help Europe's situation and therefore drastic means should be considered, including the eurobonds. Kaleva argued that the crisis had worsened so much that it's uncertain whether the eurozone or euro as a currency in general will continue to exist and that's why it considered whether it's possible for eurozone to survive without tight economic-political coordination between the euro members.

Even though big risks are involved with the eurobonds, they (the risks) shouldn't prevent from investigating Commission's propositions in an unprejudiced manner. The Commission has the right to make initiatives in the EU and nobody can deny that now there's a need for severe actions in order to knock down the crisis and to convince the markets. (Kaleva 25.11.2011.)

Kaleva also suggests that Finland should take part to the eurobond discussion so that it can make the system as good as possible and also to be sure that its economy wouldn't suffer anymore because of other countries' loans which Finland has had to guarantee. Kaleva also blames one actor more than others for holding back the investigation of these unprejudiced propositions, and the actor is Germany. Kaleva continues to blame Germany for not wanting to increase the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in solving the crisis (Kaleva 26.11.2011). Kaleva suggested that the reason behind Germany's reluctance to talk about increasing economical responsibilities between countries or increasing ECB's role is due to historical reasons deriving from the hyperinflation during the Weimar Republic. Germany wanted and still wants the European monetary union and especially the ECB to be nonpolitical organizations. However, Kaleva doesn't share this view, although it doesn't either directly demand for increasing the role of the ECB or taking the eurobonds in use, it demands that all the means possible are taken into account, even such means as already mentioned.

Kaleva switched to more general discussion about the meanings of the EU and euro within Finland in its editorial published on 6th of December which is also Finland's Independence Day. Kaleva very clearly assimilates Finland's independence to being a member of the EU by stating that it's precisely because of the European integration that Finland is now more independent than ever before. Kaleva also dooms the actions of the *True Finns* party for glamorizing those times that preceded Finland's EU membership. Also the current government of Finland receives criticism because it hasn't reminded often enough about the roots and original purpose of the European integration and has therefore allowed the criticism to grow. After this rather sentimental preparation, Kaleva hands in its view of how the European integration should be taken further into the future.

From the crisis of the EU and especially of the euro members it shouldn't be too hard to make conclusions. The EU needs tighter, not slacker, mutual coordination. This sort of development could be demonized to (European) federation, if one wishes to. (Kaleva 6.12.2011.)

But Kaleva does not wish to call it as steps towards the European federation but rather as a natural development within the European society. This clear orientation of furthering the European integration which has emerged especially during this third theme can also be seen in Kaleva's next editorial which was published just before the next *fateful* EU summit (Kaleva 8.12.2011). Here Kaleva once again emphasizes those

consequences, e.g. collapsing of euro, which might happen if the summit fails. After making it clear how decisive the summit will be, Kaleva demands quick actions which will be hard but necessary. Kaleva doesn't indicate what are those exact acts which should be done but separates those acts which shouldn't be done. Kaleva emphasizes that the Treaties of the European Union shouldn't be opened in order to make improvements to the current situation because such an act would simply be too slow. Therefore Kaleva's tendency to hurry decisions can be seen once again.

After the EU summit Kaleva was somewhat disappointed to the results (Kaleva 11.12.2011). Kaleva argued that the EU is paralyzed and no-one actually controls the crisis and one of the reasons why the summit failed was because no-one dared to talk about actual solutions. Kaleva reminded that the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), which took most of the attention during the summit, will be a solution of the future but it won't help at the current situation. Kaleva is also worried about the dividing that happens inside the EU and which seems to follow recently appeared geopolitical borders.

The European Union is dividing, not only to two but three different and even conflicting groups. Deepest in the core are those countries which have taken good care of their economies, which belong to Northern Europe, in the second layer are those Southern European countries which have taken poor care of their economies and in the third (layer) are those countries which are not members of euro. (Kaleva 11.12.2011.)

One of the reasons why Kaleva pointed out also those countries which are not euro members is that Great Britain left out of the *European Fiscal Compact Treaty* which was agreed during the summit. Due to the disagreement of the different groups inside the EU, Kaleva demands rapid compression of the EU despite the fact that it's rather sensitive subject in many European countries, including Finland.

Two days later Kaleva took the Finnish government under its watch by stating that the government should unite and start dealing the crisis with a common policy. The main motivation behind this demand was that Kaleva felt that the dispute between the government's two main parties would slow down the decision making of the next big thing; the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Especially Kaleva judged government party SDP's policy of not agreeing to accept the suggested way of making decisions within the ESM by qualified majority. Kaleva stated that Finland shouldn't be the one who keeps holding back the European decision making.

In its last editorial of the theme, Kaleva cited HS's survey about Finnish people's opinions about the EU and euro in the same way as LK did (LK 29.12.2011). By this Kaleva wished to remind that Finland's place is in Europe as it is being a member of the EU and euro. Especially Kaleva emphasized people's will to keep the euro as their currency despite the crisis. Kaleva also indicated that even though the crisis might be on its way to a better tomorrow, it wasn't over yet and therefore the work for solving the crisis should be continued.

What clearly rises from Kaleva's editorials in the third theme is that it increased the pressure to make decisions in order to solve the European economical crisis. Kaleva's main way to do this was to demand quicker decisions which has already been recognized as westernizers' means to add pressure so that other views won't get too much attention (Moisio 2003: 177). This can be seen as a counter-attack towards the supposed traditionalists such as the *True Finns* party which the newspaper even mentions as having damaged the attitudes for solving the crisis.

Also one clear distinction from the means of solving the crisis rises from Kaleva's editorials in the third theme. This distinction is the ever-repeating demand for quick deepening of the integration within the EU and the eurozone. Kaleva doesn't hesitate to bring out its demand even when it admits that such a demand is rather controversial around Europe as well as in Finland. Kaleva even strengthened the importance of being part of the group that is willing to deepen the integration by presenting the geopolitical argument of the inner group of the European integration consisting of wealthy Northern European countries, the outer group of poor Southern European countries and the ones which are and wish to be outside of the core of the decision making. Here Kaleva made difference to the previous reality which commanded the European integration and made clear which group was right one for Finland in this new upcoming reality. This sort of argumentation through the correct reference groups and changing reality was also a prominent way of argumentation for the westernizers (Moisio 2003: 173).

		Degree of taking a stance	
		Values are not presented	Values are presented
Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned	Speculative editorial	Separating editorial 90,0%
	No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial 10,0%	Policy defining editorial

Table 9. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 3, Kaleva.

Without making any deeper analysis from the table, it can be seen that it correlates with the analysis made above. Kaleva had a mission which it made clear by giving statements in almost every one of its editorials. Kaleva's style of making statements through separating the correct option from the others continues as well and this can be seen as a will to explain the situation to its readers instead of only stating what should be done.

4.3 Helsingin Sanomat

HS published 16 editorials concerning the crisis during the third theme, which was the single largest amount of editorials by one newspaper in one theme. The first editorial was published on 16th of November and the last one on 23rd of December. HS published these editorials very consistently thorough the period and at some points even daily.

HS began the theme by demanding the ECB to take greater part in solving the crisis (HS 16.11.2011). HS justified its demand by stating that even though Greece and Italy had their new governments, it still might not be enough and that's why the ECB is needed to secure the loans of the problem countries. HS also said that Germany was the biggest

obstacle from allowing ECB to widen its mandate and continued by implying that it was because of Germany's resistance that many important steps during the crisis had been slowed down.

Few days later HS issued its editorial to Finnish government by demanding actions because of the growing economical distrust (HS 19.11.2011). However, HS emphasized that the distrust wasn't Finland's own fault but of those problem countries' which were dragging also the good countries into trouble. HS stated that because of the problems of the big countries such as Italy and Spain, the investors were starting to back off from the smaller markets such as Finland and that caused Finland problems which it has to deal with even though they weren't its own fault. HS reminded that even though the actions were going to be tough, it was now a good time to execute such actions because there were no other options.

HS began the discussion about the eurobonds by stating cautiously that it might be a good solution when solving the crisis. The main argument for HS was that the crisis had united EU member states more than anything else in the history of the EU and therefore the European integration had its new direction.

In this sort of background the eurobonds, with their requirements for (economical) discipline and the authority to monitor budgets, together with the changes which are to be made to the Treaties of the European Union would be steps towards a tightening union. It wouldn't be even nearly like the American federal state and nobody has the exact draft about the union of the future, but the direction stemming from practical decisions is clear. (HS 22.11.2011.)

Therefore HS saw that the EU has two choices; further integration or disintegration. HS also defends the possible federal development of the EU by separating it from USA's system which is seen as an undesirable progress. HS continued demanding ECB's greater involvement by arguing that the ECB was one of the few actors that still had maintained their credibility (HS 25.11.2011). Germany had held a government bond auction and failed to sell significant amount of the bonds, which hadn't happened ever before. HS interpreted this as a sign of lack of confidence towards Germany and even suggested that the ECB would start printing more money as a means of solving the crisis. HS ignored the dangers of inflation by stating that bigger danger was the ongoing chain of events which was leading towards the disintegration of the eurozone. HS also saw investors' and banks' selfish tendency to play safe as a problem because it prevented money from moving and therefore complicated solving the crisis.

HS continued to instruct Finnish government to begin preparing to the deepening integration within the eurozone by considering how Finland would like the affect to it since the new *Fiscal Compact* would most likely to be introduced eventually (HS 29.11.2011). This new Fiscal Compact would define how big deficits and debts a country taking part in the treaty could have, what are the penalties for breaking the rules and how economic policies are to be combined. HS took it for granted that the treaty would be accepted because it was driven by Germany and France and therefore also many other countries will take part in it and that was why Finland should not consider will it take part to the treaty, but how will it take part in it. HS saw it important that Finland will try to take care of its possibilities to affect to the European decision making so that the EU and especially the eurozone won't become the domain of just two countries. HS also considered eurobonds to be plausible despite Germany's resistance because after careful adjustments the eurobond system will be acceptable also for Germany and therefore also Finland should start consider what kind of system it wants it to be.

In its next editorial HS pleas for the ECB once again and reminds that time is running out (2.12.2011). As HS has done already during the past themes, it puts pressure to the decision making by stating that only the ECB can solve the crisis and this can be done by increasing ECB's possibilities to affect the crisis and therefore moving towards tighter economical integration. HS continued to put pressure towards increasing the economical integration in its next editorial which it named as *Towards stability or dispersion* (HS 7.12.2011). HS published this editorial few days before the highly important EU summit and its main goal was to put certain expectations to the summit. HS used its customary argumentation style by stating that without a clear change of direction the eurozone will break up in some way. However, HS was also encouraged by the recent atmosphere and therefore encouraged the summit to do unprejudiced decisions.

World's central banks' joint dollar funding operation stabilized the situation momentarily. Italy and Greece are in a better control than earlier and interest rates are decreasing. The decision makers have now an excellent chance to stabilize the situation. It's a moment to move forward. (HS 7.12.2011.)

At the morning of the EU summit HS expressed its concern about the decision made by the Finnish's parliament's Constitutional Law Committee (HS 9.12.2011), when it stated that Finland can't accept decisions to be made by qualified majority in the

European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Therefore HS feared that Finland could prevent the summit from making decisions. HS made it clear though, that it wasn't Finnish government's nor Finland's summit representatives' fault but Finnish parliaments'. Interestingly Kaleva blamed the government party SDP for the same thing but HS mentions only the Constitutional Law Committee. However, HS also reminds that Finland's earlier demand for collaterals could be behind Germany's and France's reluctance to avoid the possibility for all members to use *veto* in ESM's decision making.

HS answered to its own concerns at the next day when it stated that Finland was too strict with its demands and therefore harmed the summit's decision making (HS 10.12.2011), however, the summit wasn't apparently totally ruined because of Finland's demands albeit HS had used such intimidating argumentation in its previous editorial. HS concluded the summit by stating that the gap between the EU member states had widened because now some states agreed to move towards further integration and some, like Britain, didn't want to take part in it. HS was disappointed to the summit since it wasn't able to make any binding decisions and therefore HS hoped that next time also Finland will give up its demands because it's irrational to demand unification of economic policies and increasing of discipline but not to be ready to decrease the sovereign right to decide one's own economics.

In its next editorial HS assimilated the unwillingness to save the eurozone from the crisis to the growing sense of nationalism within Europe (HS 11.12.2011). HS stated that Finnish's parliament's Constitutional Law Committee's demand to protect Finland's sovereignty during the EU summit was an indication of the growing nationalism. HS argued that also Britain's yearn for the great days of isolation and Hungary's new defiant policy were symptoms of this. HS suggested that one reason behind the growing sense of nationalism was European leaders' incapability to admit their own mistakes; therefore it has been easier to cover these mistakes by appealing to the nation's own benefit. HS makes an emotive argument when it reminds about Finland's phases as an independent country.

It can be said that during the 1930's Finland was more independent in a certain way than ever during its independence; it hadn't many bonds back then. Therefore Finland had to do decisions about life and death alone in the winter of 1939 and to fight for its existence, alone. (HS 11.12.2011.)

HS also reminded about the time after World War II and Soviet Union's influence to Finland's politics. Thus, HS pled for everyone to realize that the most independent time that Finland has ever had, has been the time of being a member at the EU. HS's wished to make it clear that there was no point to dream about turning back, especially not in Finland since there would only wait the loneliness of the past and therefore the only way Finland could get its voice heard is to be a part of the European community. HS's argumentation reminds almost as if it would be a plea to unite the forces before the final battle.

HS argumentation is very similar to Kaleva's argumentation in the third theme. What can be seen is that stakes are high and therefore hesitation is not wanted. HS demands actions to be linear from different actors such as the Finnish government and the EU. The typical pressurizing argumentation for westernizers can also be found from HS's editorials in the third theme (Moisio 2003: 177) as well as the rather aggressive attack towards for the supporters of other views such as the *True Finns* party as well as other Finnish parties in the opposition although HS doesn't name these actors in the same way as Kaleva did.

HS also made a typical geopolitical argument for westernizers when it reminded that Finland was and has been a part of Europe and other interpretations would only do harm to Finland (Moisio 2003: 179). As an exactly same way of argumentation to westernizers' argumentation during the early 1990's can be seen HS's demand to forget discussion about Finland's diminishing independence because HS as well as the westernizers reminded that independence as such is not worth to aim for as much as being part of the core of decision making is, and that true independence can be gained only by being part of those institutions where the decisions are made (Moisio 2003:186-187).

		Degree of taking a stance	
		Values are not presented	Values are presented
Degree of giving options	Alternative point-of-views are mentioned	Speculative editorial 6,25%	Separating editorial 75,00%
	No mention of alternative point-of-views	Explanatory editorial	Policy defining editorial 18,75%

Table 10. Degree of taking a stance: Theme 3, Helsingin Sanomat.

HS published truly a significant amount of editorials during the last theme and therefore also the above table can be seen to give more reliable interpretations. Still the results are very similar to the previous themes and what's unquestionable is that HS wanted to make clear its opinion about the subject in question. As already mentioned, also HS switched to more aggressive argumentation during the last theme and that tendency can also be located when viewed through the *degree of taking a stance* table where only one editorial didn't include HS's own values.

5 Conclusions

In the previous chapters I have tried to find out how the three Finnish newspapers, which I have chosen to this thesis, handle the European economical crisis in their editorials. The European economical crisis or the European debt crisis has been a talking point at least since the beginning of 2011 and still, at May 2012, continues to be a topic in the news nearly daily and it still seems that the crisis continues to be in the headlines for the time being. Therefore I believe that a topic that has had such a big attention in the public media requires proper examination. Thus I have chosen three Finnish newspapers which present the main paper media in their regions, Helsingin Sanomat presenting basically the whole Finland and especially the capital region, Kaleva presenting the Oulu region and Lapin Kansa which presents the whole Lapland of Finland. By the means of argumentation analysis and with the help of Sami Moisio's theory about different geopolitical worldviews I have gone through total of 66 editorials. The different worldviews in Moisio's theory divide into *the westernizers*, *the prudence policy supporters* and to *the traditionalists* (Moisio 2003: 168). These views appeared during the discussion concerning Finland's EU membership during the first half of the 1990's. I believe that Moisio's theory has even nowadays something to give, especially when examining attitudes towards the European integration.

I examined the newspapers through three different themes in a chronological order, giving every newspaper their own subchapter. The first result was that every one of these three newspapers expressed views and attitudes towards the EU which could be interpreted as being typical to westernizers both in geopolitical terms as well as in general attitude. As presented in the subchapter 1.2 of this thesis, especially HS were expected to act in westernizers' manner. Also in Moisio's research HS appeared as a westernizer (Moisio 2003: 171). Also Kaleva and LK appeared in the earlier studies presented in the subchapter 1.2 as cautiously positive towards the European integration. Therefore it can be said that those earlier attitudes of the newspapers have only strengthened during these years of Finland being part of the EU and the eurozone. Although it is still somewhat interesting that these newspapers didn't present much critics towards the EU or the euro currency even in the times of the economical crisis in question. One point that should be taken in notice is that the argumentation around the European integration has naturally changed during the time of Finland's EU membership. In the early 1990's there was still discussion about whether Finland is a

part of Europe or not and what does the EU membership mean in terms of neutrality. Today the argumentation is therefore different because it is somewhat natural and everyday thing that Finland is a part of Europe and a member of the EU and the eurozone. Thus, the question is not about whether Finland belongs to Europe but what kind of a member of Europe Finland wants to be. Critical attitudes towards Finland's involvement within Europe as an answer to the previous question can be seen e.g. in *True Finns'* agenda.

Not much criticism towards the EU or euro could be found from the editorials and in fact very much the opposite could be found. Towards the end HS and Kaleva increased their demands for further integration within Europe and appeared therefore in the original westernizers' spirit (Moisio 2003: 168). LK differed from the other newspapers in this sense since it didn't demand further integration and that can be seen as one of the main differences between the newspapers. If it's hard to find any critical attitudes from the newspapers, then those possible differences could be found from the degree of how positive the attitudes were towards the European integration and it can be therefore said that LK's attitudes were less positive from HS's and Kaleva's in that sense.

LK's policy is thus more prudent when it comes to Europe's further integration, but does it make LK a *prudence policy supporter* in Moisio's terms? I would say yes, because prudence policy supporters are in Moisio's theory cautiously positive towards the European integration. It's obvious that LK is openly a supporter of the EU and euro and doesn't want that the European integration would take steps behind or that it would be in danger in any sense. What still makes LK a prudence policy supporter and not a westernizer is the change in the spirit of time. Today the EU and euro are very normal part of the everyday life and opinions which support Finland's separation e.g. from euro are even seen as a bit extremist views. Therefore it's not prudent to not to dare to speak about European integration's good sides because there's no need to hide the opinion that being a part of the EU is a good thing for Finland. What then might need more carefulness are the opinions about the future of the European integration and here the same old subjects such as Finland's independence rise to surface once again. The question about Finland's independence is truly an issue when it comes to the discussion about decreasing state's sovereignty by increasing supervision and ways of punishing an individual national economy. Modern westernizers, such as HS and Kaleva appear to be, are denying the meaning of losing a part of Finland's independence due to further

integration (Moisio 2003: 186). And perhaps therefore a modern prudence policy supporter, like LK, settles for defending the current situation with the *wait and see* behavior (Moisio 2003: 200). LK took stance most actively during the first theme and then became more passive towards the end which can be then seen as a sign that perhaps it didn't want to take part to the discussion of increasing the European integration in the same way as HS and Kaleva did.

When concluding the results of this thesis through the *degree of taking a stance* –table, the previously said can be confirmed. Almost 90% of the total of 36 editorials by HS included HS's own values and 95% of Kaleva's 21 editorials did the same, whereas 66% of LK's 9 editorials included values. Obviously also in LK's case the vast majority of the editorials presented values but still not nearly all of them as was the case with HS and Kaleva. Therefore it can be said that LK's more prudent approach is visible also in the categorization in question since it did not take stance as much as more aggressive HS and Kaleva did. Also the amount of editorials tells something about stances as well as the issues' importance to the newspapers. All of the newspapers were examined through the same period of time which was approximately four months and therefore it can be seen that LK published rather modest amount of editorials which was about two editorials per month on average, whereas Kaleva published five and HS nine editorials per month concerning the crisis. Either it was the subject's lack of importance or its complexity that influenced to the amount of editorials. Especially in LK's case as it is a regional newspaper it might not be appropriate to spend lot of editorials to concern rather distant issues, however this would also concern Kaleva but it still published more than twice the amount of editorials compared to LK.

Anyhow, HS and Kaleva were similar to each other in their opinions about further European integration, by the degree of presenting values in their editorials as well as in the amount of editorials, which then confirms their similar approach to Finland's positioning within Europe in the geopolitical and attitude levels. It was somewhat challenging to see LK's prudent approach during the analysis itself and only comparison to other newspapers revealed the possibility to do such an interpretation. Therefore Moisio's theory might not give such a straight results when only minor distinctions between approaches are in question. However, here's a good moment to give some criticism to my thesis as well, since I could have made it more interesting and contrastive by choosing e.g. *True Finns'* newspaper as a part of the analysis material.

Afterwards it's easy to say that by choosing HS, LK and the True Finns' newspaper *Perussuomalainen* as my thesis' material, I probably would have been able to present a modern example of all Moision's actors. I could have also used different theory in order to raise other differences between the newspapers to be seen. However, I felt and still feel that Moision's theory was a proper tool to interpret Finnish's newspapers' attitudes towards the European integration.

I wish still to bring out why it's meaningful to study opinions of such media actors as newspapers. When thinking about my thesis' meaning to political studies, it's crucial to emphasize the importance of *media studies* to political science. It's important that different media actors are taken into account when considering where and how politics are made. Media has an exceptional amount of opportunities to get its voice heard to large audience and that's why it can also have considerable influence to public opinion. Besides affecting to the public opinion, media can affect also to economy as well as to politics (Paloheimo & Wiberg 1997, 257). For this reason also my thesis is meaningful. It's important to gain more knowledge about how some of Finland's most prominent representatives of media use their ability to bring out their own views. With this sort of information it's possible to predict politics of these actors in question and additionally understand from what sort of historical basis politics of these actors derive.

My thesis is just a scratch to this remarkably wide topic of the European economical crisis and moreover it's just a review of a very short part of the crisis' timeline. The crisis is also a relatively new phenomenon and therefore not much research has been yet done. However, as a phenomenon which has already had a huge effect to the way the European integration will develop in future and not to mention, to millions of people's lives especially in such countries as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain, the European economical crisis will be examined in many ways and from several different aspects. That is also something that is worth doing, especially because the common European currency is a still relatively recent phenomenon and for the first time we are facing indications of how the system handles when problems occur. Therefore it's important to increase understanding so that it's possible to handle and maybe even prevent future crisis. Even the current crisis is still unsolved (in May 2012) and because of that I hope that different phases of the crisis are being examined through many aspects as possible.

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