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Beyond the Pejorative

Sphere of Influence in International Theory

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Abstract

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Sphere of Influence in International Theory

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This study undertakes to contest the concept of sphere of influence from a historical perspective with a focus on normative questions and international order. While the concept of sphere of influence is frequently used in political parlance, it has not been studied within the discipline of International Relations. What is more, the term “sphere of influence” is used in a pejorative sense to criticise Russian foreign policy. The research identifies the pejorative uses of the concept and then proceeds to discuss normative aspects of spheres of influence in international theory. In the process, sphere of influence is transformed from a map metaphor into a concept which encompasses issues of justice and international order.

The history of the concept of sphere of influence begins with identifying how it acquired its pejorative ring, that is, the concept became associated with the foreign policy of Russia. What follows are four chapters on the history and theory of spheres of influence. The first episode explores historical examples such as suzerainty and colonialism, as well as the emergence of a hierarchical international order. The second reveals the untapped pool of ideas related to international order, sovereignty, great powers, the balance of power and non-intervention in the English School theory. The pluralist and solidarist underpinnings of international society come alive as a framework for linking the concept of sphere of influence to conceptualisations of international order. Spheres of influence are situated at the equilibrium point of a pendulum which sweeps an arc from the sovereign nation-state at one end to humanity at the other.

The third chapter looks into theories on spheres of influence “between nation and humanity” which were developed in the turmoil of the world wars. The ideas of Friedrich Naumann, Carl Schmitt, E.H. Carr, James Burnham, Walter Lippmann and George Orwell focus more on bringing about peace than causing war and conflict. Finally, a chapter on the Cold War, drawing on the example of the Cuban Missile Crisis, explores the period in history which has made the strongest impact on the present understanding of sphere of influence. It becomes clear that even Cold War spheres of influence are a source of theory which we have ignored. Once the historical and theoretical roots of the concept have been unveiled, Russian ideas on international order and influence beyond state borders are analysed in order to problematise the Western canon dealing with “Russia’s sphere of influence”. The Russian idea of a sphere of influence is clouded by an indecision in choosing between the pluralist and solidarist international orders. The Russian authors’ unwavering defence of sovereignty and
simultaneous admiration of “the concert of great responsible powers” has resulted in an inability to openly propose a system of international governance with spheres of influence.

The unique contribution of this dissertation is to put forward normative considerations pertaining to spheres of influence instead of using the concept in a pejorative sense. The study connects the English School tradition, post-war international order, the Cold War and Russian thought with the concept of sphere of influence with the aim of initiating a debate which will enrich the discipline with a fresh outlook on an old but topical concept.
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Foreword and Acknowledgements

*Spheres of influence and understanding about them remain part of international politics and for better or worse will continue to be (Keal 1983, 225).*

The eternal challenge of humanity is to organise the political map of the world. It has never been possible to make the world one, and few have even wanted this. In the end, the division of people by borders of nation-states took place. However, the state is not a perpetual and stable unit of the international system, but one that has been challenged from the day it was introduced – by the states themselves with asserted hierarchies and great power management. Spheres of influence come into the picture here when we discuss states and the hierarchical international system. Sphere of influence is an idea which takes a stance on the very core question of International Relations\(^1\) (henceforth IR): How is the world divided politically?

This is a critical analysis and reassessment of the concept of sphere of influence with an interest in normative and theoretical questions arising from the past and the present. The concept is characterised by a conflict between the lack of theoretical interest in it in IR and, at the same time, the frequent use of it in political discourse\(^2\). Sphere of influence is a contested concept which has awaited theoretical reassessment from a historical perspective for too long. The problem with spheres of influence is that there is no debate, or general agreement or disagreement, on the meaning of the concept. It simply is in its simultaneous vagueness and familiarity. Indeed, the term is a very familiar one, frequently deployed, especially when describing Russian foreign policy. Its recurrent use in language testifies to its being part of our political imagination. This imagination is founded upon past experiences, namely, the spheres of influence of the Cold War. Regardless of whether we see the Cold War as a thing of the past, or as something still visible as a mentality of division

\(^1\) “International Relations” refers to the discipline, “international relations” to relations among international actors.

\(^2\) This is not to say that influence beyond borders has not been studied in theoretical terms within IR, but only that there is no interest in contesting the concept.
and difference, international relations have entered a new era. In this new era, we still find the concept of sphere of influence attesting to the need to contest the concept itself.

To my knowledge, the only study discussing spheres of influence is that written by Paul Keal in 1983. Thus, it is firmly rooted in the Cold War context. I believe it is about time to begin elaborating the theories on spheres of influence again and to become critical about the language we use to judge or approve of international influence. The concept of sphere of influence belongs to the jargon of International Relations and to political parlance. Because of the strong pejorative connotation of the concept, the choice to use or not to use it is political. A sphere of influence signifies some form of influence beyond state borders, but not just any. It means a particular form of influence, or as I prefer, a particular form of international order. Some states are described as having or striving for a sphere of influence, but not all. Since not all international influence is referred to as emanating from a sphere-of-influence policy, there must be a clearly delimited space which is occupied by a sphere of influence. There must also be a reason for viewing some foreign policies as pursuing a sphere of influence and denying others that connotation.

What then is it that makes a sphere of influence “special”; what separates it from other ideas on influence? It is the concept’s pejorative connotation, that is, the notion that it is a form of influence which implies contempt and disapproval. More specifically, it often means contempt for and disapproval of Russia’s foreign policy. Much as no theoretical work has been done on spheres of influence within the discipline for some 30 years, neither has the pejorative nature of the concept been discerned. This prompts the questions: Where do the pejorative uses of sphere of influence come from? Has the concept of sphere of influence always had pejorative associations? Is there any tradition of justifying spheres of influence in international theory? Moreover, I am interested in finding out how Russian scholars and politicians write about spheres of influence when responding to accusations from other states. These are the research questions that I will examine in the following pages.

Research must have its anchor in the realities of life; otherwise it is useless. There are four reasons why I consider a study on spheres of influence to be important and needed. First, as I have already stated, the concept deserves to be reassessed due to its persistence in political
language. Second, the history of spheres of influence is a contribution to the discipline of International Relations, with its concern for international theory. Sphere of influence as a concept should be contested: its uses should be critically examined and its meanings theoretically explored. Third, sphere of influence has meanings beyond its pejorative senses; I will present these in order to sever the seemingly unavoidable link between (the pejorative meaning of) sphere of influence and and Russia. The aim is not to relieve Russia of its responsibility in its foreign policies but to reflect on the value of using the notion of sphere of influence as a means to judge and categorise Russian foreign policy. In the spirit of Joseph Rotblat (2007), signatory to the Russell-Einstein Manifesto against nuclear weapons in 1955, I have tried to connect this research to the problems I have discovered in contemporary international relations. This explains the focus on the three interconnected themes of the concept of sphere of influence, its pejorative uses, and Russia.

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This book is the product of my life. Finland has a strong research community working on topics related to Russia and in Finnish society at large there is a natural interest in Russian politics. I became fascinated with the political language involving our eastern neighbour. The term “sphere of influence” has a strong foothold within that language. If nationality explains my involvement with Russian studies, the topic of sphere of influence comes from my education in IR at the University of Lapland, where geopolitics featured strongly in the curriculum at the time. It is there that I first heard of Carl Schmitt and became interested in the politics of territory.

I am greatly indebted to my two supervisors, University Lecturer Mika Luoma-aho, PhD, and Professor Pami Aalto for supporting me all the way through, guiding me and showing me the way forward. They were my mentors, not only supervisors. Mika Luoma-aho possesses a vision which permeates my thinking about international relations. I could always count on him to crystallise my arguments when I failed to do so. That kind of relationship between a mentor and disciple is indispensable. Pami Aalto spared no effort in advising me and I admire his great attention to detail. I can never repay that debt of gratitude, other than by writing the best dissertation I can.
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Last but not least, I would like to thank my family. My aunt Pirjo Järvelä encouraged me to study at university, although she warned me not to apply to the discipline of IR, because I might end up as a researcher. My mother raised me well, showed me a model of a courageous woman and underlined the meaning of education. My husband lived with me through all my struggles, and never lost faith in my capabilities. I also want to extend my sincerest gratitude to all my friends around the world. There is no joy in life without friends and without joy there is no research of meaning. I would like to thank Johanna Holopainen for advising me to pursue my dream. I am also grateful to my sisters-in-law, Sanna Hast and Mari Hast. I would also like to thank my mentor in life, Daisaku Ikeda, for continuous encouragement.

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I dedicate this book to my children, Ernesto and Oliver, who have thought me love and patience.

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Susanna Hast
1 Introduction

1.1 A Normative Concept

This study is a theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of influence from a historical perspective. However, it took some time for the topic to settle into its final form. In 2004, I decided to study “the Russian sphere of influence”. To my mind, establishing and consolidating a sphere of influence was a foreign policy tool of the Russian Federation. I was planning an empirical study on how Russia influences its neighbouring countries and how it is against NATO enlargement. In order to ascertain what Russia’s sphere-of-influence policy was, I only needed to find out how Russia blackmails and oppresses its neighbours and violates their rights by meddling in their internal affairs and limiting their foreign policy options. But it did not take me long to encounter the problem that there was no literature discussing, defining and contesting the concept of sphere of influence. To my mind, it was not possible to study the Russian sphere of influence before first determining what a sphere of influence meant. This redirected my research to a study of the concept itself.

I began to look for theories on spheres of influence, but as such theories did not really exist, I considered it useful to start collecting the theoretically and historically relevant ideas that could help in defining the concept. Then, I discovered the meaning of sphere of influence, not only as a foreign policy tool but as a complex of ideas on 1) international order and 2) acceptable and unacceptable influence. A focus on international order and the normative aspects of spheres of influence led me to the what is known as the English School of International Relations and its potential to explain spheres of influence. Furthermore, order and justice directed my interest towards a group of theorists, active from the First World War until the aftermath of the Second World War, who were concerned with the demise of the state and the dangers of a world state. In addition to my interest in history, I became concerned with the contemporary use of term “sphere of influence” in political language. I noticed that use and non-use of the term reflected an idea according to which the referent was too straightforward to require a theory, too old for anyone to be interested in it, or too common to pay attention to. Most
importantly, a sphere of influence was a pejorative notion. As a foreign policy tool it was morally unacceptable, representing injustice. This last observation, the concept’s pejorative connotation, greatly influenced the path that I would choose for writing a book about spheres of influence. The work had to be concerned with history; it had to be critical; and it had to prove that we need to be interested in the concept of sphere of influence.

I began to see the way in which the concept of sphere of influence was used as a form of discursive power. I began to make observations on the pejorative meaning given to the concept. Sphere of influence in its pejorative sense means not only disapproval of the practice but also avoiding a critical approach to the idea of sphere of influence and ultimately avoiding the use of the concept. Lack of interest in the idea of sphere of influence results in denying the concept its place in international theory, and ”non-use” of the concept renders it as pejorative in tone as much as its use does. The pejorative sense of sphere of influence does not come out of nowhere: it comes from the injustice that the expression carried with it, and especially the practical manifestations of this injustice, during the Cold War. With the concept of justice, I follow Hedley Bull’s (2002, 75–76) assertion that justice belongs to the class of moral ideas which treat human actions as right in themselves but when it comes to world politics justice is often associated with equality of rights and privileges. I will return to Bull’s views on justice in chapter 4.4.

Spheres of influence constitute an issue that goes to the very core of international ethics. They relate to another political concept which is also bounded by normative considerations: power. For William Connolly (1993, 97), the position of exerting power over others indicates a position of responsibility and a need for justification. A sphere of influence denotes a relationship of power, and as such it comes with responsibility and a need for justification even if those aspects are denied or hidden. Thus, there is something naturally normative about spheres of influence. By “normative”, I mean norms in the legal and moral sense: that which is considered right or wrong and just or unjust. Historically, a sphere of influence has carried with it ideas on acceptable and non-acceptable codes of conduct and it has always necessitated justification. In the present, the pejorative use of the concept is manifested in the
criticism of Russia’s foreign policy: establishing a sphere of influence as a Russian foreign policy tool signifies imperialism, oppression, pressure (military, economic or political) and a Cold War mentality, but not subsidies, support, protection, stability or peace. All this will be contested in the following pages by unravelling the normative history of sphere of influence. I wish to resuscitate that part of the concept which expresses the tension between acceptable and non-acceptable influence in international relations by exploring the normative scope of a sphere of influence in its totality. The failure to discuss the pejorative nature of the concept of sphere of influence and instead taking it as something evident and immutable is the reason why a theoretical and historical reassessment is topical.

As Robert Jackson (2000, 5) puts it, “Normative discourse in international relations, as in any other sphere of human relations, operates by reference to certain assumptions and expectations concerning justified and unjustified conduct”. Throughout his book The Global Covenant, Jackson (2000) argues that world politics is normative, with its own ethics constructed by political leaders. Spheres of influence belong to this normative order. There is no international law on spheres of influence, but the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention establish the limits of international influence, and also the idea of a sphere of influence. Today there is no room for justifying the existence of a sphere of influence. The only way to justify the establishment of a sphere of influence is to avoid any reference to it or to formulate new expressions. Curiously, when looking into the past ideas on spheres of influence, attempts to justify them have been at least as frequent as, if not more frequent than, condemnations of them. Chapter 5 testifies how spheres of influence find a justification as they are constructed in relation to the demise of state sovereignty and the fear of a world state.

I am proposing here that the injustice ascribed to the concept of sphere of influence is not carved in stone. Justifications of spheres of influence do exist in international political thought. On a more general level, justifications of injustices also exist. Jackson argues that the stability of international society and especially the unity of the great powers is far more important than humanitarian protection or minority rights, if one has to choose between the two values. He asserts, “War is the biggest
threat to human rights. War between the great powers is the biggest humanitarian threat of all. Nothing else comes close.” (Jackson 2000, 291.) This is the normative debate we try to avoid at present and this is exactly what I want to bring forth with regard to spheres of influence. I do this by presenting a history of the concept of sphere of influence in normative perspective.

1.2 “Sphere of influence” is What We Make of It

It is with the focus on justice and order that I began the journey to reassess the concept of sphere of influence in terms of its past and present. My approach to the history of the concept is constructivist, in the belief that a great proportion of political action consists of speech acts. I claim that spheres of influence are constructed in inter-subjective interaction. Spheres of influence do not live lives of their own separate from political actors and the discursive constructions of those actors. If Alexander Wendt (1992) says that anarchy is what states make of it, then I say a sphere of influence is what states make of it. A sphere of influence is not a permanent structure in the international system but is instead shaped and re-shaped in the processes of interaction and discourses among human beings across state borders.

According to R.B.J. Walker (1995, 6), “Theories of international relations are more interesting as aspects of contemporary world politics that need to be explained than as explanations of contemporary world politics. As such, they may be read as a characteristic discourse of the modern state and as a constitutive practise whose effects can be traced in the remotest interstices of everyday life.” Walker also writes that “theories of international relations express and affirm the necessary horizons of the modern political imagination” (ibid). The ideas, theories and conceptualisations of spheres of influence should not be seen as mere explanations of world politics, but as constitutive of the practices of international relations. References to a sphere of influence enable certain political imaginations while limiting others. The concept of sphere of influence needs to be explained before it can be used to explain anything itself.
Jackson (2000, 10) writes that world politics is to a great extent a realm of discourse and dialogue. Modern statecraft, along with the expansion of the society of states, has caused political dialogue to become global in scale (ibid). Spheres of influence are constructed in discourses, and within ones that have a rather prominent role in international relations. If developing a theory on spheres of influence has aroused little interest in researchers, the analysis of discourses on spheres of influence – the use of the term “sphere of influence” in speech – has prompted even less interest. Jackson (2000, 37) puts discourses in the centre of political activity by stating that the most significant part of international human relations is discourse and dialogue on what actions are acceptable, desirable, justified and so on:

*In politics, talk is not trivial; on the contrary, it is fundamental. Written or verbal discourse is the main vehicle of political activity. Without discourse there could be no politics in the ordinary meaning of the word. Without international discourse there could be no international relations.*

According to Connolly (1993, 3), “to share a language is to share a range of judgements and commitments embodied in it”. Connolly writes about the “terms of political discourse”, which refer to a certain vocabulary that sets frames for political reflection. More specifically, terms of political discourse refer to a set of criteria that must be met before an event or an act falls within the definition of a concept (ibid., 2). Moreover, with those criteria comes a judgement (ibid.). Connolly continues: “Since the discourse of politics helps to set the terms within which that politics proceeds, one who seeks to understand and to assess the structure of political life must deliberately probe the conventions governing these concepts” (ibid., 3). For Connolly, the language of politics channels political thought and action into certain directions and “[t]hose who simply use established concepts to get to the facts of political life, those who act unreflectively within the confines of established concepts, actually have the perceptions and modes of conduct available to them limited in subtle and undetected ways” (ibid., 1).

In the same spirit, Iver Neumann (2008a, 62) declares on the meaning of ”discourse”: “It [discourse] constrains what is thought of at all, what
is thought as possible, and what is thought as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a given situation.” The terms of political discourse are what confine the concept of sphere of influence to a certain established framework, which I assert must be contested. A sphere of influence is not a fact of political life that can go without being critically examined first and foremost as an idea. Sphere of influence, if it remains uncontested and unrevised, offers a limited perception of international politics and potentially reinforces established practices. Even if its referent were transparent, “sphere of influence” would not lead to a blissful liberty in the use of language. All concepts include some uncertainty: all concepts are used and understood differently depending on the language, culture, time or even on the individual in question. Likewise, no concept can be totally “purified” or made “perfect”. But to let concepts live their own life without stopping to enquire what they mean and how they are used limits not only thought but also action. The point of departure for this research is to view sphere of influence as an idea expressed in a speech act. Sphere of influence is a concept which encompasses ideas consisting of what Connolly refers to as “terms of political discourse”: the vocabulary of influence, criteria informing a judgement and the potential to channel political thought and action.

1.3 A Map Metaphor from the Cold War

By now the reader might be curious to see a definition of sphere of influence. We must begin somewhere in order to find the concept in the history of ideas and place it in the context of the contemporary political imagination. For scholars in political science, “sphere of influence” is a term used in international relations, but for those outside the field it does not even necessarily denote relations among states. For Finns, such as me, “sphere of influence” is well established in popular language. Anyone who follows the Finnish media on international topics will have heard about “Russia’s sphere of influence”. Indeed, the term finlandisation, which is still a part of Finnish political jargon, describes Finland when drawn into the “Soviet sphere of influence”. The Finnish language also has its own neat and catchy term for a sphere of influence: etupiiri. The
word *etupiiri* is emotionally charged, as it stirs the identity of Finns as a small independent nation which has so courageously resisted the pressure from its big neighbour. It is no wonder then that sphere of influence has such a strongly pejorative ring to it. This is not the case only in Finland; the emotion and hostility that the Cold War image of sphere of influence evokes is shared by most of the Western world.

I argue that the contemporary meaning of sphere of influence springs from the Cold War. Hence, the definitions from two analysts of the period, Edy Kaufman and Paul Keal, are a suitable beginning for contesting the concept, although its historical origins lie elsewhere:

\[ A \text{ 'sphere of influence' can be best described then, as geographic region characterised by the high penetration of one superpower to the exclusion of other powers and particularly of the rival superpower (Kaufman 1976, 11).} \]

\[ A \text{ sphere of influence is a determinate region within which a single external power exerts a predominant influence, which limits the independence or freedom of action of political entities within it (Keal 1983, 15).} \]

Kaufman’s definition emphasises the relationship between superpowers: there is penetration into a region which excludes other powers from that region. In his definition Keal deals more with the relationship between the influencing and influenced powers: the sovereignty of the influenced is restricted. We can draw two features ascribed to a sphere of influence from these two definitions: exclusion of other powers and limitation of the independence or sovereignty of the influenced. The great power rivalry and its repercussions for sovereignty are the underlying tenets of the present discourses as well, even though they are not expressed explicitly.

What then is popularly understood by “sphere of influence”? A google search on the term in October 2011 turned up a Wikipedia page which says ”In the field of international relations, a sphere of influence (SOI) is an area or region over which a state or organisation has significant cultural, economic, military or political influence”. Interestingly, states are not the only actors which can possess spheres of influence, since an organisation can also extend its influence over others. Moreover,
Wikipedia recognises spheres of influence both as formal and informal. In extreme cases, a sphere of influence can develop into a subsidiary of a state, that is, a satellite state or a colony. As an example, Wikipedia notes that Japan had an extensive sphere of influence during World War II, which could be drawn on a map as a large “bubble”. Wikipedia also refers to Cold War spheres of influence and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. If these arrangements reflect the history of “SOI” in Wikipedia, the present is represented as a competition for spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Caucasus. In November 2011, I went to view the Wikipedia definition again and to my great surprise the page had been modified on the 15 November to read: “In the field of international relations, a sphere of influence (SOI) is a spatial region or conceptual division over which a state or organisation has significant cultural, economic, military or political influence” (Wikipedia). What has changed in the definition is the inclusion of the element “a conceptual division”, which implies that a sphere of influence can also be an idea. But because “conceptual division” is not explained any further, its meaning remains unclear. I encourage the reader to go and find out if the definition has again changed to include a discussion of a sphere of influence as a concept and not only as a foreign policy practice.

The notion of a sphere of influence extends beyond international relations. According to Wikipedia, a shopping mall can have a sphere of influence in retail trade and the software company Microsoft has a large sphere of influence in the market of operating systems. (Wikipedia.) Even though one can find references to spheres of influence anywhere from sports to medical science, it is quite well established as a concept in IR. But it is not well established enough to have prompted a debate on its meaning. In comparison, the concept of security has attracted the attention of a large number of researchers indeed, resulting in a deluge of studies which redefine “security” such that it encompasses forms of threats other than merely military ones and subjects other than only states. This interest in developing the concept of security is in striking contrast with the disinterest the discipline has shown when it comes to redefining the concept of sphere of influence.

One possible reason for this lack of interest in conceptualising a sphere of influence and debating the uses of the term, after the Cold War is
that sphere of influence represents more of a metaphor than an analytical concept to scholars in IR\(^3\). I view sphere of influence, in its present use, as a metaphorical expression which takes the form of a figure of speech, just like Richard Little (2007, 21–23) views balance of power. Like balance of power, sphere of influence combines two conceptual domains (that of sphere and that of influence) to correspond to a new way to explain a phenomenon involving the power struggle between states. In addition to sphere of influence forming a metaphorical expression, the language explaining the functioning of a sphere-of-influence policy includes metaphors such as “satellite” and “puppet”, referring to the “influenced state”. Likewise, sphere of influence resembles the metaphorical expressions ”clash of civilizations” coined by Samuel Huntington (2007) and “heartland” by Halford Mackinder (1996). But even more so, the term sphere of influence can be likened to the term balance of power which expresses a set of scales where power is the target domain of the metaphor. With this logic, influence is the target domain of the metaphor of sphere of influence. Instead of a set of scales, the metaphor’s source is "sphere”. "Sphere” as the source of the metaphor indicates a map with circles drawn on it to represent the territories of one state under the influence of another.

Wikipedia calls the circles of spheres of influence “bubbles” and one can also find the metaphor ”orbit”. Thus circle/bubble/orbit is the source of the metaphor and influence is its target. The idea of a circle on a map brings to mind a specific type of international influence: a sphere of influence. The sphere denotes a territory, but also something beyond that territory, that is, influence beyond a state’s border. A state border is not the only border that is associated with sphere of influence; the metaphor may also include the borders of the sphere, circle, or bubble. This takes us to the significance of the metaphorical image: the sphere of a delineated territory on a map consisting of states. This sphere can be drawn; it is not abstract, which is why I have often been asked to name the countries within a sphere of influence of Russia. These spheres exist as something as evident as anything else drawn on a map, like a geographical or at least a political fact. They can be refuted in order to draw the circles differently, just like borders of states are sometimes re-drawn, but the

\(^3\) See Little (2007, 19–50) for a discussion on the meaning and significance of metaphors.
existence of these spheres is refuted as infrequently as the existence of states themselves. Borders also make “sphere of influence” a pejorative metaphor, as it expresses a violation of or disrespect for a line drawn on a map. Thus, I argue that borders imagined on a map, borders which extend those of nation-states, constitute the subject which the metaphor of sphere of influence describes. This is why the vision of a sphere of influence as a feature on a map over presently dominates over the need to conceptualise a sphere of influence in terms of international order.

A newspaper cartoon on the Monroe Doctrine from 1912 (Figure 1), presented in the Wikipedia article on sphere of influence, illustrates spheres of influence on a map using a bubble metaphor; the spheres are depicted as two separate bubbles, as if there were two separate worlds with separate lords. In the cartoon, the American sphere of influence reflects the application of the Monroe Doctrine.

Figure 1. Depiction of influence on a map.
As I have noted, I wish to contest the concept and the idea of sphere of influence through a historical and theoretical investigation. I argue that even though one should be critical of the uses of the concept of sphere of influence in shaming and condemning action, it does not mean that foreign policies should not be criticised. What I am after is reflection on the fact that the pursuit of a sphere of influence does not necessarily always explain Russia’s motives. I also suggest that the mindset of Cold War spheres of influence can help to maintain established practices of thinking, speaking and acting. As a metaphor, sphere of influence provides the map image and maintains the aspect of disapproval, but it does not explain what a sphere of influence is or why it exists. I would contend that sphere of influence as a metaphorical concept leads to oversimplification of foreign policies and motives. For example, in order to condemn injustice by reference to a sphere of influence, one should first address the relationship between justice and the concept of sphere of influence. The pejorative connotation of the concept is a hidden agenda, and I propose we embrace transparency when using the concept to shame states. It should also be acknowledged that historically sphere of influence is a normative concept which has not been interpreted solely in pejorative terms. I will establish this argument in the chapters to come.

1.4 Contemporary Concepts of Influence

One explanation for the lack of interest in conceptualising sphere of influence is that there are already plenty of other concepts describing international influence. But if other concepts described international relations better, would not researchers and commentators then use those and leave spheres of influence in the past? My argument is that contemporary concepts of influence beyond state borders do not replace sphere of influence, because the political language proves otherwise and because sphere of influence maintains its uniqueness due to its pejorative connotation. I will demonstrate this by introducing the concepts of regional security complex, empire lite, regionalism and soft power.

The regional security complex theory (RSCT) proposed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever helps to explain the post-Cold War order and
the relationship between globalising and regionalising trends (Buzan & Waever 2003, 3–4). The RSCT claims that security interdependencies have become increasingly regional since the end of bipolarity. Buzan and Waever argue that the end of bipolarity and the intrusion of the superpower rivalry into all regions resulted in local powers having more room to manoeuvre (ibid., 3). Now great powers have less incentive and desire to intervene in security affairs outside their own regions (ibid.). As Buzan and Waever (2003, 4) explain, “RSCT distinguishes between the system level interplay of the global powers, whose capabilities enable them to transcend distance, and the subsystem level interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region.” For spheres of influence, the question of justice (justification of influence) is more relevant than for a regional security complex, which is more concerned with security dependencies. The crucial question in the case of a sphere of influence is the relationship between the influencing state and the influenced state, which is not the focus of a regional security complex.

Buzan and Waever (2003, 55–56) identify different forms of security complexes by pointing to the centre of influence: 1) a standard RSC with a Westphalian, anarchic structure and no unipolar power at its centre, 2) a centred RSC led by a great or super power and 3) a region integrated by institutions. RSC is a useful umbrella concept, or theory, for security relations, including influence beyond borders. A sphere of influence could be compared to a “centred RSC”. Even so, an RSC does not replace the idea of sphere of influence, because the two are not identical. First of all, even though a sphere of influence is most often defined as a region (see for example Keal’s and Kaufman’s definitions), historically it is not always regionally bounded. If we look at the Cold War, the spheres of influence of the time do not adhere to the map metaphor of a bubble, because influence was spread all over the globe. If we go even further back, the concept of sphere of influence first emerges in the literature on colonialism, where it is also nothing like an RSC. In fact, a sphere of influence is such an old concept that comparing it to contemporary concepts such as an RSC does not contribute to the need to contest the concept itself. Moreover, if we look at political discourses, the concept of a regional security complex, unlike a sphere of influence, is nowhere to be
found. No other concept has replaced sphere of influence, RSC included. Sphere of influence is a familiar concept, easy to resort to, and has its purpose in the language we use.

“Empire lite” is another contemporary concept addressing influence beyond borders. For Richard Ignatieff (2003, 89), empire lite is the new American Empire:

True, there are no American colonies and American corporations do not need their governments to acquire territory by force in order to acquire markets. So the new empire is not like those of times past, built on colonies and conquest. It is an empire lite, hegemony without colonies, a global sphere of influence without the burden of direct administration and the risk of daily policing. It is an imperialism led by people who remember that their country secured its independence by revolt against an empire, and who have often thought of their country as the friend of anti-imperial struggles everywhere. It is an empire, in other words, without consciousness of itself as such. But that does not make it any less of an empire, that is, an attempt to permanently order the world of states and markets according to its national interests. (Emphasis added.)

It is interesting that Ignatieff brings out the concept of sphere of influence while still preferring to use the concept of empire. The pejorative Cold War image of a sphere of influence is probably behind this choice of vocabulary. This is not surprising since United States foreign policy makers and analysts have never been comfortable with the concept of sphere of influence. Empire lite represents an American policy and one which is not colonialism. It is imperial tutelage on nation-building, to be seen in such places as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo, for the sake of global hegemony and ensuring stability in regions essential to the security of the United States and its allies (ibid., 89–90).

Ignatieff brings up questions of justice relating to the interventionism in the case of empire lite. The notion of sphere of influence sits squarely in the midst of a debate on the justification of intervention by an empire lite or a great power, even though Ignatieff pays no attention to the concept. I argue that when we look for a theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of influence, we will also find a debate on the role of the
state. Thus, spheres of influence not only draw our attention to matters of justice but also highlight the fate of the state and the dangers of a world state. The uniqueness of a sphere of influence is that its normative nature allows us to connect the question of justice and international order. Thus, I find sphere of influence situated between the discourses on justice and order in a way that no other concept is – and the reason lies precisely in our present use of the concept in shaming another state’s practices. The shaming of another state relates to the increasing concerns for justice (interstate and human) in international relations. Within this context, references to spheres of influence serve the purpose of pointing out injustice. But as a discursive tool, shaming can work as a means for identity-building. Western states have a long history in othering “the East” – and Russia especially – for the sake of identity construction (see Harle 2000, Neumann 1999, Wolff 1994). Thus, shaming can be turned into a discursive tool of othering, and seeking political support from other states in a conflict with the Other. This adds another peculiarity, and an ignored one, to sphere of influence: as a concept that is emotionally loaded, historically burdened and epitomised by considerations of injustice, it has the power to mobilise resistance and fuel resentment.

What about the concept of regionalism, then? Does that not replace sphere of influence in the contemporary international situation? Regionalism, especially when conceived of as regional solidarism, comes remarkably close to a sphere of influence in content. The difference between the two lies in the pejorative connotation of the latter. Andrew Hurrell’s (2007) discussion on regional states-systems or regional international societies is a good case in point. Hurrell (2007, 137–140) presents a division of identity-based solidarist regions, regions as poles and regions centred on powerful states. Regarding the regions centred on powerful states Hurrell writes, ”Such a situation may arise because the regional state is so overwhelmingly dominant that it can enforce its will, or because it succeeds in creating consensual hegemony within a region – maybe by providing economic benefits, or by underpinning regional security, or by claiming to embody a particular view of the world or set of values”. Finally, Hurrell mentions sphere of influence:

_Despite these difficulties over the longer run, it is important to hold open the possibility of a world order made up of large 'region-states'._
which might have a variety of internal forms of political organization – including perhaps old-style spheres of influence, hegemonically centered institutionalism and unequal forms of federal union (ibid. 141, emphasis added).

Hurrell envisions a regionalism led by a powerful state which can take different forms. One form is a sphere of influence, which belongs to the past (”old-style”) but can still be incorporated in the new regionalism. I will discuss primacy, hegemony and domination later (chapter 3.2), arguing that the theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of influence has its roots in separating different forms of influence and solidarist tendencies. The point is that there is no reason to be shy in discussing the meanings of sphere of influence and searching for meaningful connections to other concepts, for as long as the term “sphere of influence” persists in the language of the discipline, IR needs to address the phenomenon. Regionalism (or an RSC) is one possible manifestation of a sphere of influence – although a sphere of influence is not always confined within regional boundaries – and within regionalism a sphere of influence can express a certain form of political organisation.

Clearly, the concept of sphere of influence has its place in general discussions on acceptable or justified influence, but the problem is that is not explicitly included in these debates. Felix Ciută (2006) argues that the debate over American hegemony revolves around the ideas of “the good state” or “responsible hegemon”. Ciută (2006, 183) writes, “However hidden, the definition of ‘the responsible state’ permeates all the debates about unipolarity, hegemony or imperialism, whether they are for, or against specific policies.” Is Russian hegemony debated in this framework? In a way, yes, but only in conjunction with the idea of ”irresponsible powers”, where Russia as a ”sphere-of-influence power” is the antithesis of the ”responsible power”. Ciută is right to argue that debates on the meaning of ’empire’ inevitably, but almost always only implicitly, fall back on a deeply normative understanding of the state, hegemony and empire (ibid., 187). We are on the right track here, acknowledging the normative aspects of hegemony or empire, but we are missing sphere of influence. Sphere of influence represents irresponsible conduct in the present uses of the concept, and bringing sphere of influence within the
debates on the nature of states, responsibility and "the good state" would not only inform international theory but make it possible to contest the concept and assess its uses critically.

I will introduce the idea of responsible great powers in the English School context in chapter 4.6, but in the contemporary debates on power the distinction between hard and soft power potentially captures something about spheres of influence. Joseph Nye (2004, x) developed the idea of soft power as the ability to get what you want by attraction rather than coercion and payments. Yee (ibid.) writes, "When you can get others admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction". Hard power, by contrast, indicates economic and military might (ibid., 5). The distinction between soft and hard power can be a distinction between more and less acceptable influence and in this respect relates to the pejorative nature ascribed to a sphere of influence. Nicu Popescu (2006) writes that the European Union has seen itself as a soft power but recently Russia has begun investing more in means of soft power in order to better justify and legitimise its influence in neighbouring states. This raises the question of whether hard power is what makes a sphere-of-influence policy and, if so, whether Russia is stepping out of its traditional sphere-of-influence policy if it is resorting to soft rather than hard means. As we will see in chapter 2.1.1, Popescu has not abandoned the image of Russian as a sphere of influence even if he sees that influence has become softer. The relevance of the distinction between soft and hard power lies in its capacity to distinguish influence which is more acceptable: Soft influence could be a contemporary approximation of a sphere of influence but without the pejorative connotation. Even so, we are still faced with the fact that not even the soft-hard distinction has replaced the concept of sphere of influence in political parlance.

Even though comparing sphere of influence to other contemporary concepts of influence is meaningful, I am more interested in the history of sphere of influence. In order to contest the concept, I believe the process must start from an inquiry into the past meanings and origins of the concept of sphere of influence. If we ignored the historicity of sphere of influence, we would end up burying a valuable body of knowledge. Empire lite and RSC (or regionalism, integration and so on) have their
place in the IR jargon, just like sphere of influence does. Yet, I explore other concepts, such as colonialism, intervention and Großraum, and I argue that the meaning of sphere of influence becomes obvious precisely when it is connected with related conceptions. In fact, an assessment of sphere of influence needs other concepts around it to connect the concept to international theory, away from metaphorical or emotional uses. But my view is historical, a voyage of discovery into the past meanings of sphere of influence. The terminology invented in IR after the Cold War is no longer suited to explaining the theory of international influence that I am about to present, because sphere of influence is a much older concept than regionalism, integration, empire lite or other more recent ideas. In fact, one should enquire why post-Cold War theoretical thinking on regional orders is not explicitly connected to the concept of sphere of influence, which has a long and significant history. Even if more recent conceptualisations of regional order and international influence have succeeded in explaining present developments better, it is sphere of influence that people talk about. Politicians do not speak of regional security complexes or of an empire lite, they speak about spheres of influence. The term “sphere of influence” permeates even popular discourses and entails a shared unspoken knowledge of its meaning. I argue that there are not many concepts depicting regional order which can claim such a status. The special nature of the concept of sphere of influence comes from its engaging normative questions as well as its long history and centrality in political parlance. Thus, this is a study on the history of the pejorative: What has made “sphere of influence” a pejorative term and how has influence beyond state borders been justified and justification debated? An assessment of the relationship between sphere of influence and other contemporary concepts is a topic for another study, which I would very much welcome, but this is a study on sphere of influence and its history.

The reason why I see sphere of influence as a concept that needs a theoretical elaboration is the potential it holds in addressing normative questions. Sphere of influence as an idea indicates that 1) there is a matter of justice in inter-state relations (justice is not confined to state borders) and 2) there is an exercise of influence which represents injustice. This is where I find the uniqueness of the idea of sphere of influence. Of
course, sphere of influence is not the only concept to capture injustice and influence: hegemony, imperialism, interventionism or “export of democracy” are all pejorative in tone, but even so sphere of influence has persisted. Why? I suggest because of the power of the metaphor: the image of a map with the centre extending its power beyond its borders. More concretely, it endures because the Cold War map has not left our memories. Sphere of influence has taken on the function of describing Russia’s continuing Cold War mentality or imperial legacy (see Lo 2002). No other concept has such a strong association with the unjust influence policies of the Cold War. Thus, regardless of the usefulness of other concepts in describing influence and justice, they have not superseded sphere of influence. But there is more than just the question of justice: 3) sphere of influence shines as a form of international order. It is no coincidence that during the turmoil of the world wars numerous fascinating ideas relating to spheres of influence were produced, Schmitt’s *Großraum* being perhaps the most captivating. Political theorists reacted to the need to find solutions to problems of international relations of their time. Accordingly, by combining these two aspect of justice and order, we can begin building a meaning for sphere of influence beyond its pejorative uses. Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke (2005, 389), from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, write that “words, rhetoric and concepts *do* matter”. Norms, both positive and negative, spread within the international community altering the way states act and interact (ibid.). The way we speak of spheres of influence matters.

### 1.5 Structure of the Book

The history of spheres of influence I am about to present is not meant to be clear-cut. The purpose of this study is to address the questions and concerns related to the concept of sphere of influence in the past and within the contemporary political imagination. In order to open up new paths for understanding spheres of influence in the present, I detail a tradition of thought about spheres of influence – a history of ideas. There is no explicit school of thought on spheres of influence, but there clearly is a continuity of ideas which are connected and reflect each other.
I have collected thoughts on spheres of influence together and I make the case for using them in order to inspire the normative and theoretical discussion, which currently ignores the concept.

The study is divided into distinct but overlapping episodes in the history of the concept of sphere of influence. Locating the concept begins by presenting examples from contemporary Western images of Russia’s sphere-of-influence policy and ends in examples of contemporary Russian visions of spheres of influence. In between these two locations of “the present”, we find sphere of influence constructed as a normative idea on international influence in four settings: 1) the English School account of the history of the system of states, 2) the English School theory on the institutions of the society of states, 3) conceptualisations of regional constellations springing from the context of the First and Second World War and 4) Cold War spheres of influence.

In the next chapter, I explore research papers discussing Russia’s foreign policy to identify the uses of the concept of sphere of influence. Next, I introduce ideas on genealogy which have inspired me to look at the interconnectedness of past and present understandings of sphere of influence and explain my choice of sources. After we know what the nature of the present understanding is, we can investigate how it came about. The first chapter on the English School investigates the origins of sphere of influence in relation to the history of the state-system. Suzerainty, the Congress of Europe, colonialism and the Monroe Doctrine are discussed. The second chapter on the English School discusses balance of power, sovereignty, intervention, justice, international law and influence as responsibility. Sphere of influence is fitted within the pluralist-solidarist debate on international order.

The third chapter is an episode extending from the First World War until the aftermath of the Second World War (1915–1950), during which theorists formulated responses to the crisis of the states-system. The solution these theorists offer to the problems caused by nationalism and the disintegration of the sovereign state was a system composed of regional constellations. Friedrich Naumann wrote about Mid-Europe, Carl Schmitt and E.H. Carr about Großraum, Walter Lippmann about Good Neighbor Policy, and James Burnham about super-states; George

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4 Most of the material is related to the Second World War. Only Friedrich Naumann’s writings were published during the First World War (1915).
Orwell envisioned the fictional Oceania and Eastasia. The fourth episode is located in the Cold War setting, which reinvented spheres of influence as a central foreign policy practice of the time. I will explore not only the conceptualisations of the period but also the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). I set out to prove that the Cold War spheres of influence should also be analysed by reinterpreting the dynamics of the international society of the time. The final episode connects the two ends of the string by coming back to the present understanding of sphere of influence. Reading Russian discourses uncovers the need to rethink not only the concept of sphere of influence but also our obsession with “Russia’s sphere of influence”. I say this because the analysis shows that not even the Russians themselves have a clear vision of international order, not to mention spheres of influence. An inability to spell out a coherent view of international order means an inability to address matters of injustice, to show flexibility regarding the principle of sovereignty and, finally, to discuss a system of spheres of influence. In the concluding chapter, I encourage students of IR to take an interest in the idea of sphere of influence and I put forward thoughts on the relationship between spheres of influence, order and justice.
2 A History of the Present

2.1 Where is the Russian Sphere of Influence?

The twenty-first-century discourses on spheres of influence are stories which represent and uphold spheres of influence as much as the actual practices of states. The notion of sphere of influence emerges as an explanation for Russia’s foreign policy motives in its relationship with the post-Soviet space. Finding a research paper (written by a non-Russian) which would either problematise the idea of sphere of influence or prove explicitly that Russia is not constructing a sphere of influence is hard, if not impossible. The use of the concept of sphere of influence in describing Russian foreign policy is frequent enough to raise concern over the lack of critical approaches to the concept. As there almost seems to be an unspoken agreement among European and American scholars that Russia is attempting to construct or maintain a sphere of influence, it becomes difficult to challenge this view. Sphere of influence is almost like a mantra, which when repeated often enough becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. Critical research should be able to challenge established knowledges; indeed this is the very purpose of my research. I do not argue that Russia is not seeking to establish influence beyond its borders, but suggest that the term ”sphere of influence” – in its current pejorative and vague use – might not serve as an accurate description of Russia’s foreign policy motives.

When the concept of sphere of influence is used in describing Russian foreign policy, it represents something evident, undisputed and unproblematic. Given that IR has forgotten to theorise sphere of influence, it is quite understandable that foreign policy researchers refer to the term without questioning its meaning. Moreover, it is not possible to define every single concept that one happens to use in a piece of research. As Jens Bartelson (1995, 43) states, “as soon as one decides to investigate something, one has to take other things for granted”. But debating a concept or an idea has tremendous influence on its use. Consider identity politics. The term carries a very different meaning depending on whether identity is understood as innate rather than as a social relation. Racism thrives on the idea of natural characteristics belonging to a particular
nation or people. This notion has been contested within the discipline by claiming that a national – or in fact any – identity is socially constructed and can change and be manipulated. If IR is rich in theorising on identity and other concepts, it certainly lacks theoretical conceptualisations of sphere of influence. The lack of theoretical debate leads to use of the concept without pondering its meaning and its effects. It is important to be conscious of the fact that using the concept of sphere of influence to describe Russian foreign policy evokes pejorative associations and images of the Cold War. When one looks at the Russian discourses (see chapter 7), the rich discourse on international order prove that there is so much more to the Russian idea of influence than what is currently meant by the concept of sphere of influence.

Next I will offer some examples of the uses and non-uses of the idea of sphere of influence⁵. On the material chosen consists of examples of the uses of sphere of influence in contemporary IR and deals with these in two sections. The first comprises an analysis in which Russia’s regional policy is termed a sphere-of-influence policy and the second demonstrates how there has been a lack of attention to the phenomenon of sphere of influence. Western analysts produce a view of spheres of influence that shows they are not conscious of the intellectual history underlying the concept. Moreover, Western scholars use the concept as a means to highlight the alienness of Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis that of the Western (namely, European) states.

2.1.1 Revealing the Pejorative

It is not particularly difficult to prove that there is an image of Russia trying to consolidate a sphere of influence within the post-Soviet space. There are certain events that are referred to as if they form the body of criteria for identifying a sphere-of-influence policy. These include energy blackmail, interference in elections, military presence and military intervention. Russian visions of regional integration are interpreted as a means to establish domination and control, and the influence of Russian culture and language and the protection of Russian minorities are also viewed as means to consolidate a sphere of influence. This influence is not

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⁵ Studies on Russia with English School perspectives are dealt with in chapter 7.
just any influence; it is a continuation of the Soviet era, an unwillingness to “let go”.

Russia is the country associated with the practice of pursuing a sphere of influence more than any other great power. Curiously, Russia appears to be the only great power that is a captive of its tradition of influence. The former imperialist states of Europe, even though they still have influence in the developing world, are viewed more as the peace-builders of Europe than as states with sphere-of-influence ambitions. More interestingly, although denouncing imperialism, the United States also has a long history of international influence, which has only become stronger and wider. Despite the history of the United States as a great power with extensive international influence, ever since the Monroe Doctrine (1823), in contemporary analysis the image of the United States is not stained with a policy of establishing a sphere of influence. Wilhelmsen and Flikke (2005, 387) explain how during the Bush administration, after September 11, the United States’ foreign policy was founded upon its status as the world’s sole remaining superpower promoting regime change in an anarchic international environment. They continue, “This also involves the calculus that while rallying support from the international community and international law, the USA will reserve for itself the right to act unilaterally on the basis of imminent danger or even the suspicion that some states may have long term ambitions of inflicting damage on the USA”. Then why is this not a sphere-of-influence policy? One explanation is that the United States operates on a global arena, thus, its foreign policy does not translate into pursuing a sphere of influence which is often envisioned as a clearly delineated region on a map. Another, even more convincing, explanation is the pejorative ring of the concept of sphere of influence. Even though the United States is often admonished for its enthusiasm for military solutions, its motives are seen as rooted in defending human rights and promoting democracy. When there is a need to express criticism of the United States’ policy, it is done by reference to such ideas as the empire (lite), hegemony, or the world police. Imagining both the United States and Russia as states longing for spheres of influence would mean equating the policies and interests of the two. In order to keep the two states in different categories,
and in order to use sphere of influence as a pejorative expression, only Russia is currently associated with the concept.

The United States and the Soviet Union were seen as the two superpowers with spheres of influence during the Cold War. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States rid itself of the bad reputation of having a sphere-of-influence policy, whereas Russia was stuck with it. But it was not enough that Russia had to carry the image of a Cold War lust for influence: its sphere-of-influence policy, especially in the media, is often associated with imperialism. I argue that not taking an interest in conceptualising sphere of influence evokes images of imperial power. The upshot of this neglect is not only that the idea of sphere of influence is not discussed as a concept in its own right, but that its pejorative associations penetrate our imagination; “imperial” rarely indicates anything good. Bobo Lo, a well-known expert on Russia, describes Russia’s foreign policy as a reflection of an “imperial syndrome” whereby Russia is both aware of its old empire and feels that the country has an imperial mission in the future (Lo 2002, 48–52). Lo adds that this does not mean a rebuilding of the Soviet Union, but a state of mind based on the attempt to increase influence (ibid., 52). The territory of the old empire is now seen as Russia’s sphere of influence. Calling a territory a sphere of interest gave Russia a ”moral right” to interference (ibid., 115). Lo continues that since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the idea of a sphere of influence has lived strong and that in the background one can find a wish to preserve what remains of the Cold War status quo (ibid., 114–115). In this respect, for Lo, the history of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union are visible in the current foreign policy thinking in Russia.

There is no denying that Russia is interested in international influence. But what kind of influence? For Lo it is a mixture of an imperial mission and Cold War spheres of influence. There are two shortcomings in Lo’s account: 1) knowing that Russia’s present ambitions have something to do with its past status and influence does not contribute to defining what Russia’s present idea of a sphere of influence is, and 2) the continuation of an “imperial mission” and a “Cold War sphere of influence” leaves no room for any other interpretation of Russia’s sphere of influence than a negative one. This is not to say that Lo wants to contribute to the pejorative meaning of sphere of influence. However, by not saying what
he means by the expression or, rather, by implying that it means imperial influence, he reinforces the image of influence in a pejorative sense, evoking the contempt and disapproval that are not openly discussed and argued for, but that come with the choice of expression.

The way Western analysts see it, Russia’s involvement in regime change in another state, unilateral action within foreign territory and protecting national interests are nothing other than consolidation of its sphere of influence. Wilhelmsen and Flikke (2005, 388) write, “Even though the structural position of today’s Russian Federation in international relations is not as strong as formerly that of the Soviet Union, Russian unilateral military action against terrorist bases in Georgian territory and Russia’s more assertive policies in Central Asia all reveal that Russia has not given up on preventing the geopolitical space of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from eroding, or on preserving the post-Soviet space as a sphere of influence.” If we think about the informative value of this sentence, we can say that the message is that Russia has preserved some influence in its neighbourhood. For Wilhelmsen and Flikke, Russia’s influence is based on military action, assertive policies and “holding on to a geopolitical space”. “Geopolitical” implies power deriving from territory, which is why the concept of sphere of influence is invoked to explain Russia’s actions and motivations. The problem with this kind of logic is that there is no set of criteria allowing one to determine that Russia’s unilateral action in Georgian territory and assertive policies in Central Asia signify a sphere-of-influence policy. There is no list of actions to determine whether some conduct belongs to the category “sphere-of-influence policy” or not. If there were such a list, then we should also have a list of actions that do not constitute such a policy but would be in the category “influence of some other kind”. We do not know if the authors would, as a rule, deem any unilateral military action (that is, intervention) to be part of a sphere-of-influence policy of, or perhaps only when such an action is disapproved of by the international community. Would they see Russian humanitarian intervention as “preserving the post-Soviet space as a sphere of influence”? Moreover, we do not know if Wilhelmsen and Flikke consider influence approved of by the influenced states to be a manifestation of a sphere-of-influence policy. Some post-Soviet states might in fact view their relationship with Russia
as beneficial, despite their being under some form of Russian influence. Does the consent of the influenced mean that the relationship between the influencing and the influenced states is integration, cooperation or alliance instead of a sphere of influence? In fact, one justification for establishing a sphere of influence is in that such a policy involves influence which respects the rights of the influenced states and benefits them as well. Later I present the suzerain treaty as an example of this (chapter 3.2), and I discuss Naumann’s and Lippmann’s ideas as representing a vision of mutually beneficial influence (chapter 5).

When students and researchers look for analyses of Russian foreign policy, especially on the Internet, they often come across policy reports by think-tanks. One such think-tank is the European Council on Foreign Relations (henceforth ECFR). One of the papers by the ECFR on Russia is “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations” by Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, from 2007. Another paper by the same institution is titled ”The Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood”, from 2009, written by Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson and dealing directly with spheres of influence. The ECFR reports present a sphere-of-influence policy as something uniquely Russian. Popescu and Wilson (2009, 29) write, “Moscow has been trying to establish a sphere of influence in its ‘near abroad’ since the break-up of the Soviet Union”. What enables the pejorative interpretation of Russia’s influence is the discourse on a more positive form of influence exercised by the European Union, creating a dichotomy of bad and good influence. Bad influence means “an activist Russia that aims to bring countries into its sphere of influence” and good influence means “an EU that wants to spread democracy, stability and the rule of law” (Popescu & Wilson 2009, 5). Leonard and Popescu (2007, 8) go a little bit deeper into the differences between the two types of influence:

*Whereas the EU stands for an idea of order based on consensus, interdependence and the rule of law, Russian foreign policy is motivated by a quest for power, independence and control. The EU’s main concern is to ensure that its neighbourhood is peaceful and*

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6 The paper is “an audit of the power that the Union wields over its most important neighbour, Russia” conducted by a team of researchers from all 27 EU member states (Leonard & Popescu 2007, i).
Russia wants to expand its sphere of influence and achieve control of economic interests and energy assets in neighbouring countries and the EU.

In this account, the influence of the European Union, aimed at bringing about a peaceful neighbourhood and conducted with respect for the rule of law, stands in sharp contradiction to Russia’s influence, which is based on economic interests and power ambitions (sphere of influence). Does this mean that the EU member states have no economic interests or need for additional energy assets elsewhere and that the EU is not moved by power? And that Russia has no interest in contributing to a peaceful neighbourhood, but acts on its power and economic ambitions? I argue that the influence of Russia and of the EU is a more complex issue. All countries have national interests and all international actors have interests. Russian politicians and researchers have made the argument for national interests an art form. For Russians, the right to pursue national interests is seen as countering the threat of being ignored by the international community and of being forced to accept rules dictated from the outside. For Russians the discourse on national interests is aimed against those who try to dismiss Russia’s voice or try to manage world affairs without the country. ”National interests” is a sort of realist voice in Russia’s foreign policy discourse and, as I will later show (see chapter 7), Russians do not share the utopian dream of a common humanity, but they certainly have an interest in a well-governed and peaceful neighbourhood. The question is how to bring this about and what a well-governed neighbourhood looks like. For Russia, “well-governed” means operating according to the same kind of managed democracy as their own, with democracy imported from abroad seen as a source of instability rather than of peace and prosperity. Second, economic interests motivate all countries and regional integration projects in the world, without exception. I believe the dichotomy of good and bad influence of this sort serves the purpose of an identity project by excluding the alien other. Following is another quotation on the difference between influence in a positive and in a pejorative sense:

*From their perspective, EU governments are not trying to build a sphere of influence in the neighbourhood; they are allowing neighbouring*
countries to fulfil their right to embrace universal values such as democracy and the rule of law. But that is not how things are perceived in Moscow, which sees its influence receding as the EU and NATO gradually encroach on the countries of the former Soviet Union [...] (Popescu & Wilson 2009, 47.)

Here, influence without the sphere, that is, without the pejorative element, means “allowing neighbouring countries to fulfil their right to embrace universal values such as democracy and rule of law”. The method is “allowing” and the content is “promotion of universal values”. In fact, quite rightly, Popescu and Wilson argue that this is not what Russia is doing. As I will later show, in chapter 7, Russian analysts are not eager to speak on behalf of universal values, because for them there is universal international law, but there are no universal values. For Russians, promotion of universal values is interpreted as a violation of the right to choose one’s own path of development. For Russians, it is influence in the pejorative sense, and even more so when the promoter is the United States or NATO. Thus, we can see that the pejorative meaning attached to sphere of influence is not only evident within the Western world, but sphere of influence is pejorative for Russia as well (see chapter 7).

If the ECFR reports have now established the difference between Russia’s and the EU’s influence, the next step is to present the Russian worldview in its full compass. This worldview is expressed in a sphere-of-influence policy that serves to dismiss international society with its common rules and institutions:

When ‘coloured revolutions’ swept through Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004, the Russian elite was plunged into deep depression about Russia’s declining influence in its ‘near abroad’. But the elite’s foreign policy failures toughened it for what it sees as a competitive struggle for influence in a hostile, Hobbesian world. (Leonard & Popescu 2007, 17.)

The claim that Russia is struggling in a hostile Hobbesian world is not only interesting but alarming. Describing the Russian worldview as Hobbesian is a strong statement, not backed by any empirical evidence, that invokes an expression we are expected to be familiar with. Bull (1966b, 37) explains
that the Hobbesian state of nature is a state of war: “Sovereign states, on this view, find themselves in a situation in which their behaviour in relation to one another, although it may be circumscribed by considerations of prudence, is not limited by rules or law or morality”. If one interprets a “Hobbesian world” as characterised by a war of all against all, this can hardly be the Russian worldview. The official Russian worldview, read from speeches and statements by the country’s representatives, is based on the idea of international order as multipolarity, where the great powers provide stability and security in concert. Moreover, Russia emphasises the role of the United Nations (henceforth UN) and international law as the founding pillars of international relations (see Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008). For Russia, international law thus means the upholding of international order, that is, the system of sovereign states, and not, for example, human rights. Moreover, what is said about international law relates to defending Russia’s right as an equal member of the great power club. Resort to international law is a mask for making sure the country is not left out of the decision making concerning important world affairs. Equality for Russia means equality among the great powers, not among all states. Even considering that the Russian view of international law is somewhat self-serving, it is obvious that Russia is anchored in the international community and its principles. This makes the claim of a Hobbesian worldview at best a partial truth of Russian foreign policy. Military juxtapositioning is still visible in Russian foreign policy, but does not the same hold true for the United States’ foreign policy, even though it is not called Hobbesian? For Leonard and Popescu, the terms “Hobbesian” and “sphere of influence” betoken the negative associations of Russian foreign policy, where the use of the two concepts can be misleading. The pejorative uses of sphere of influence signify imposing on Russia the image of unjust influence, whereas the EU’s influence, for example, represents an acceptable, softer means to impose a preferred regional order. The idea of Russia’s Hobbesian worldview is an extreme example of simplification, but it illustrates the kinds of criteria and judgements a particular conception can entail and how it can restrict our perceptions.
2.1.2 Blind Spots

As I have argued, contesting the concept of sphere of influence has been neglected. Yet, there is an exception: an article titled “Russia’s Spheres of Interests, not Influence” by a well-known Russian scholar and director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin (2009). Trenin implies that he is about to unravel the meaning of “sphere of influence” and “interests”: “Thus, a question arose: what is the difference, if any, between the sphere of interests proclaimed by the current Russian leadership, and the more traditional sphere of influence condemned by international public opinion?” (ibid., 4) and “More specifically, is the current usage of the spheres of ‘privileged interests’ instead of ‘spheres of influence’ significant or is it a mere window dressing?” (ibid., 5). Trenin nevertheless fails to provide the answers to these questions. What he does offer is an account of the historical development of Russia’s sphere of influence.

According to Trenin (2009, 6), the Soviet Union treated the countries of the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), as well as Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam, as belonging to its sphere of influence. Trenin (ibid.) describes how this was a question of territorial control: “Moscow’s political supremacy was underpinned by its ideological domination, and backed by military presence and bloc discipline, made credible by the periodic use of force. In economic terms, the Soviet sphere was a closed system built on the centralized allocation of resources”. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the sphere of influence dissolved and “[i]nstead of contest and rivalry, they [Russia] sought inclusion and integration. Instead of bickering over the spheres of influence, they aimed at joint global leadership alongside Europe and the United States.” (ibid., 7).

Disappointed with not being accepted as a partner in European security structures, and with NATO’s enlargement plans, the Russians declared that sphere of influence as a concept was alive and well in international politics. “It was only the masters and hegemons that had changed.” (Ibid., 8.) Trenin (2009, 10–11) describes the Russian foreign policy approach in 2003 as follows:

_ Moscow had to keep the CIS space from expanding politico-military alliances such as NATO. It had to be able to mediate and manage_
conflicts among its near neighbors. It had to exercise political leadership within the commonwealth and, no less important, keep it within the Russian cultural sphere. The plan was to make Moscow a mecca for ex-Soviet elites, much as London has been one for the former British empire, and Paris for the francophonie.

This is a very interesting historical account of how Russia’s approach to (a certain) sphere of influence developed. But what about the difference between influence and interest? Trenin (2009, 12–13) writes:

"The current policy of Russia’s spheres of interest dates back from the mindset of the mid-2000s. Compared to the Soviet Union’s, the Russian Federation’s sphere is not only much smaller, but also much “lighter” – “interests” after all are not as compelling as “influence.” In Russia, and throughout the former Soviet Union, ideology has been replaced by pervasive pragmatism. There is no hint of political control by Moscow either”. […] Unlike “influence” which tends to be both all-inclusive and exclusive, “interests” are more specific and identifiable. Rather than whole countries, they include these various politico-military, economic and financial, and cultural areas within them”.

According to Trenin, a sphere of interests is smaller in geographic terms and can consist of parts of states instead of whole states; it is “lighter” and more specific, without ideological and political control. I find it problematic to dissociate political and ideological aims from the pursuit of “pragmatic interests”. First, Trenin evokes the Cold War by connecting influence with ideology, ignoring the spheres of influence that existed before the Cold War. Second, one could say that ideological struggles still persist in the form of resisting “forceful imposition” by the West of its form of democracy (see more in chapter 7). Attempts to draw a distinction between ideology and pragmatism also raise the question whether a sphere of influence that is defended for the sake of a balance of power is ideological or pragmatic. Are regional integration projects ideological or pragmatic? Moreover, what does Trenin really mean by “ideology” and “pragmatism”? When it comes to the claim that there is no hint of political control by Moscow, many Western analysts would disagree; they point to the energy disputes with Belarus and Ukraine,
conflicts with Georgia, the bronze soldier dispute with Estonia in 2007 and other aspects of Russia’s recent activity in the post-Soviet space. Thus, establishing the idea of a sphere of interests without political control, as distinct from a sphere of influence with political control, would necessitate agreement on what constitutes “political control”. For Trenin, political control has a pejorative connotation, while interests are purified of all that makes influence unacceptable; but this does not explain the difference between influence and interests in practical terms. Here we come back to the question of what constitutes a sphere-of-influence policy, and we have not, in fact, got very far in separating interests and influence. What also remains unclear is whether influence can include interests and interests can include influence.

Replacing the word “influence” with “interest” also entails a risk of simply inventing a new term to justify influence by claiming that is fundamentally different, as if to avoid the moral judgment that influence carries with it. Rather than replace one term with another, it is necessary to go to the root of the referent, to look at the discourses on spheres of influence, meanings given to the concept and to reflect on the structures of the international system which underpin the practice. When we know what notions the old concept incorporates, we can begin to develop a new concept to describe Russia’s influence. I admire Trenin’s attempt to put the question of sphere of influence on the table; it was a necessary act in itself. Unfortunately, his analysis does not produce theoretical insights. It does not free Russia from the stigma of being a sphere-of-influence power as long as the concept is not questioned in greater detail.

We have now seen the pejorative use of the concept of sphere of influence and Trenin’s attempt to replace “influence” with “interest”. A third option is to forget about the concept and the term altogether. Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin is a book edited by Jakob Hedenskog et al. (2008). This collection of articles includes no discussion of spheres of influence. Neumann (2008b, 2008c) discusses Russia as a great power without any mention of spheres of influence or other possible forms of territorial influence. Ingmar Oldberg (2008, 2010), from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, also ignores spheres of influence. In an article titled “Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev”, Oldberg (2010) lists a wide range of great
power strategies of Russia – international organisations, organisation in the post-Soviet space, the political use of borders and territorial integrity, the political use of Russian minorities, military bases and activities, economic means and energy as a political lever – but not a policy of establishing or consolidating spheres of influence. Is it so that spheres of influence are not relevant anymore? If this is the case, it should be said out loud. The point is not that great power status necessitates territorial influence, but that one should notice if it does not. In the case of Russia, accused of attempts to control the post-Soviet states, it would be of utmost importance to underline that other strategies for maintaining great power status than territorial influence. Discussing spheres of influence allows us to take notice of other explanations and other forms of influence than negative ones. It allows us to discuss how influence affects sovereignty, what the relationship between the influencing and the influenced power is like, or how influence is related to attempts to maintain the pluralist international order. The problem is the indifference within IR towards the concept of sphere of influence, which leaves Russian foreign policy analysts without the necessary disciplinary debate that would give them tools for identifying different forms of influence and their normative aspects.

In the introduction, I identified the core problems of the concept of sphere of influence at present: The first is the lack of interest in the concept itself; the second is the range of pejorative associations which the concept has acquired. When the two problems are put together – lack of explanatory power and pejorative meaning – use of the concept can result in simplifications. Evoking the idea of a sphere of influence, without a robust conceptualisation to underpin it, reduces Russia’s interests and influence to lines on a map, and imputes to them negative designs; and ignores how spheres of influence are conceptualised in Russia, how spheres of influence relate to international order and how they are or can be justified (if they can). We need to debate the meaning of sphere of influence and to do so with reference to international theory. Sphere of influence is not just an expression of disapproval but a concept which tries to explain something about international relations. If we acknowledge these two factors – that sphere of influence is used pejoratively and that the purpose of the concept is also to explain, not only to condemn
something – we can approach it as a contested concept. Once we become
conscious of our own uses of the concept, we can begin to discern Russian
views on spheres of influence. And once we have become critical about
the concept of sphere of influence and its uses, we can become critical
about the policy of pursuing spheres of influence.

2.2 On Methodology

*It seems clear that diplomacy's present plight cannot be understood,
or even be described as such, unless some knowledge of its origins is
available. In practical terms, if we are to know what diplomacy is,
or where it might be heading, we must know how it came into being.*
(Der Derian 1987, 2.)

Ever since I decided to pursue a PhD, I have been studying spheres
of influence. I wanted to study Russia's sphere of influence but could
not find literature on the concept itself. So I changed my focus to the
concept of sphere of influence and kept Russia in the picture because
the two had become so strongly intertwined. Methodologically, I went
from writing “a theory on spheres of influence” to “a genealogy of sphere
of influence” and finally to something in-between the two. Genealogy
is an inspiration to me, because of its focus on the interconnectedness
of past and present and its critical approach to “regimes of truth”. I
do not aim for methodological purity, which is why this is not a study
using genealogical methodology. This study is the discovery of different,
competing or complementary truths that have not yet been discovered
and would remain undiscovered without an interest in the history
of the concept of sphere of influence. In simple terms, this study is a
theoretical reassessment of sphere of influence, but one which draws on
the genealogical approach of problematising that which is evident in the
present by looking into the past.

It would be fair to say that this research comes close to conceptual
history and includes elements of discourse analysis; yet, what has truly
inspired me methodologically is genealogy, even though I am not true
to genealogy either. Thus, I devote some space here to explaining what I
take from genealogy for the study of the concept of sphere of influence. Genealogy is a methodology of historical research which has been developed and used by such scholars as Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. Nietzsche’s “Genealogy of Morals” (2003) is based on the idea that concepts such as good, bad, evil, guilt and punishment, which are commonly and unquestioningly viewed as moral issues, have no such origin. For example, guilt originally meant owing a debt and punishment was a means to ensure that the debt would be repaid (Nietzsche 2003, v–vi). It is the genealogical approach of Nietzsche that revealed where these concepts came from and how they developed into what they are today. Foucault’s genealogy is concerned with the development of the prison system in *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (1979). Foucault (1979, 30–31) explains his motivation for a genealogical approach as follows:

*I would like to write a history of this prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present.*

Foucault wants to uncover the past of the prison system, not for the sake of knowing history, but for the sake of knowing the present. Foucault describes not only the birth of the prison but also the idea of prison as a contemporary form of the use of power. Foucault (1979, 23) states that the means of punishment should not be viewed as consequences of legislation or as products of structures of the society but as means of power. The same applies to spheres of influence. I try my best to look into the phenomenon without disillusionment resulting from my own prejudices, my own past. This has prompted me to take the step towards presenting ideas which try to justify spheres of influence, not only to undermine them. Contesting the concept of sphere of influence, an undertaking which I call for, means recognising that not only the policies of, but also the language on spheres of influence are a means of power. A sphere of influence belongs to the world of language as much as to the

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7 My use of genealogy is instrumental and I will not engage in debates over genealogy in this study.
world of deeds, and language is what I am interested in here. The term is endowed with power in language use: a state can be accused of pursuing a sphere-of-influence policy and a state can deny an interest in establishing a sphere of influence. The term “sphere of influence” is interpreted, used and misused in language, or omitted, as means of power.

Foucault’s genealogy is concerned with knowledge, and particularly with what he calls “subjugated knowledges”, which are the historical contents buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation. Subjugated knowledges for Foucault (1980, 81–82) also mean “a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges located down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity”. It is from the insurrection of these subjugated knowledges that the history of sphere of influence emerges. I consider the knowledges I am about to present as subjugated in relation to the idea of sphere of influence, and this is why bringing them forth is important: sphere of influence is not only a Cold War concept, and it can have connotations other than pejorative ones. The material, where sphere of influence is constructed as the middle way between nation and world state, represents for international theory the reinvention of spheres of influence as justified and desirable entities. I believe knowledge of that history could allow us to contest the present use of the concept of sphere of influence as a pejorative Cold War map metaphor.

Colin Gordon (1980, 233) summarises Foucault’s genealogical question as “what kind of political relevance can enquiries into our past have in making intelligible the ‘objective conditions’ of our social present, not only its visible crises and fissures but also the solidity of its unquestioned rationales?”. Gordon (1980, 242) writes, “If Foucault poses a philosophical challenge to history, it is not to question the reality of ‘the past’ but to interrogate the rationality of ‘the present’”. Very descriptively, he continues that Foucault’s genealogy “would mean a study of the specific effects of practices whose rationale is the installation of a regime of truth” (ibid.) Sphere of influence represents a sort of regime of truth. It excuses its user from exploring the rationale of the concept itself, and its explanatory power, as long as the concept is taken for a granted, that is, as a truth. In IR “contested concepts” (such as political, security,
identity) are the prevailing paradigm: They are more the rule than the exception. Why is sphere of influence not a contested concept then? The reason is not only the lack of analytical interest; the concept is left intact because it incorporates buried, subjugated knowledge. As long as it is an uncontested concept, it can be used as a regime of truth.

From genealogy I draw the critical approach to regimes of truth and set out to open up a way to debate the meanings and uses of the concept of sphere of influence. I defend the choice of my sources with the potential they hold in approaching spheres of influence as a part of international theory and in revealing the subjugated knowledges related to the concept of sphere of influence. I also opt to present history as episodes and examples in terms of the present. Because sphere of influence is at present used as a pejorative metaphor, one relying on a particular geopolitical interpretation, I wish to bring forth that knowledge about spheres of influence which to date has remained subjugated.

2.2.1 Episodes and Examples

*If genealogical history happens to be rewritten, it is because the present changes. If the present changes, it is partly because history is rewritten* (Bartelson 1995, 78).

A more recent study on the genealogy of sovereignty, by Jens Bartelson, is “a political history of the knowledges that makes sovereignty intelligible” (Bartelson 1995, 53). Drawing on Foucault’s focus on the interplay between past and present knowledges, Bartelson has constructed a more detailed model for genealogical research. Here I borrow Bartelson’s idea of studying the history of the present in terms of its past, presented as episodes. History is not explained as it actually happened; rather, genealogy tries to explain how the present became possible (Bartelson 1995, 7–8). Genealogy is *episodical*, showing “how the past exists only by virtue of being reconstructed from a present, and how this present itself is contingent upon that very past” (ibid., 75). A genealogy focuses on those episodes of history that are meaningful for understanding that which has been problematised in the present. To be episodical, genealogy is
exemplary: selected examples drawn from the past when grouped together form episodes (ibid., 7–8). In this case, the episodes form a body of knowledges missing from the present, and it is these hidden knowledges that are the cause of the pejorative meaning given to sphere of influence.

Compared to conventional history, genealogy does not try to describe a past event or age in its entirety but only those episodes which help to explain the present (ibid., 76). The purpose of the history of sphere of influence is neither to find the proper origin of the concept by going through archives nor to discover everything about it. I search for those visions which have led to the present understanding of the concept as well as those which are not currently attached to it. The latter are as significant as the former, because their being ignored or overlooked explains why the present understanding of the concept is pejorative and why, historically, sphere of influence is not a pejorative notion.

Bartelson (1995, 77) writes about the possible objections to genealogy’s view of history due to its fusion of past and present, the fluidity of its object of study and the fact that episodes and examples are not selected with a stable set of criteria or are not necessarily representative. Because I take genealogy as the starting point for my interest in the interplay of past and present understandings of sphere of influence, I must address this criticism. I read the past and the present within the limits of my capabilities, of course. The history of sphere of influence in this study thus focuses on Western and Russian discourses, in both of which the term and its referent are pejorative. I set out to answer the question, What are the historical roots of the concept’s pejorative associations and how can we explain them? Next, the episodes reflect the fact that sphere of influence as a concept emerged after the conceptualisation of state. I refer to ideas of sphere of influence before the system of states but in principle the system of states is the framework for the theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of influence. The approach is thus one where sphere of influence is studied not only in terms of the history of the concept but as a history of related ideas – Großraum, Mid-Europe, Good Neighbor Policy, super-state – and of the ideas which help to frame the concept’s pejorative connotations (sovereignty, intervention, international law). The impetus for embracing this approach lies not only in the pejorative uses of the term but also in the present need for a theoretical conceptualisation that
is broader in perspective than just a conceptual history. The choice of related concepts framing the idea of sphere of influence is not arbitrary. If we go through the literature on the concept of sphere of influence, we find it enveloped in these concepts.

When I propose that the ideas of the English School on the institutions of international society are relevant for understanding spheres of influence, this is not (only) because I personally think this is a justified assertion but because the only available study on the concept (Keal 1983) points in this direction. When I chose to include Schmitt’s idea of *Großraum*, it was not only because it addresses spheres of influence as aspects of international order, but because there is enough evidence to argue that he was writing exactly about spheres of influence. Thus, there clearly had to be a connection to the concept of sphere of influence, even though in some cases the concept is not evoked at all. It is left to the reader to challenge my choice of sources if need be. Three types of sources are ultimately brought to bear: 1) texts dealing directly on sphere of influence (focusing on Paul Keal, especially chapter 6 on the Cold War), 2) texts which refer to sphere of influence and which end up explaining sphere of influence through the history of the system of states and international institutions (those written by the English School, discussed in this chapter) and 3) past ideas on spheres of influence with different names (theorists in the period of the world wars, discussed in chapter 5). The Russian discourses form an episode like the others but there I take the liberty of analysing the texts with the knowledge acquired from the earlier episodes.

When I sought that which would enable a theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of influence, I became less interested in all possible, even relevant, historical origins and I began a journey towards the body of theory which could explain the concept of sphere of influence in the present. In the past, the concept not only took on many different meanings but also assumed different names. The purpose is not, however, to cover all possible related concepts, but only those which fulfil the criteria of answering the normative question regarding justice and which relate to international order. I believe that the full scope of sphere of influence would be hard to capture without reflections on international order and related concepts if its meaning is to be more than borders on a map. And
as long as its use is pejorative, there is reason to believe that the concept of sphere of influence is a political one. If it is a political concept, it is also a contested concept or, rather, should be. Attaching sphere of influence to selected concepts perhaps fixes its meaning to a certain framework but it should be noted that even Bartelson (1995, 88), who explicitly wrote a genealogy of sovereignty (whereas I am merely using genealogy as a stepping stone), had to resort to conceptual antecedents from the Renaissance, when sovereignty had not yet been articulated. Thus, even genealogy, despite its attempts, has difficulties in avoiding defining its object of study. I want to emphasise that my approach is not the only way to historically conceptualise sphere of influence. It is a theoretical conceptualisation which is conditioned by the present pejorative uses of the concept. A new, different present may later require a new history of the concept.

It is the present pejorative uses of the concept of sphere of influence which explains the choice of focusing on the themes of order and justice, because through this perspective we can begin to contest and conceptualise that which appears obvious in the present. I found the potential to theorise sphere of influence and address its pejorative uses in the literature of the English School (episodes one and two). The English School encompasses a historical perspective on international relations in addition to the normative theory for which it is famous, and this enabled me to discover both the historical origins of sphere of influence and discuss order and justice within the English School framework. Many of the English School texts were written during the Cold War but I discuss the Cold War as a separate episode focusing more on the specific circumstance of superpower rivalry. The English School history and theory in chapters 3 and 4 deal with the society of states, in which states form a community with common rules and institutions. The rules and institutions of international society relate to a sphere of influence not only as the framework through which we can understand the concept but most importantly as the normative framework for assessing it. System of states, hierarchy, great powers, intervention, international law, justice, sovereignty and balance power are the concepts that are of importance for sphere of influence here. They are closely interlinked and need to be discussed if one wants to discuss sphere of influence. I have tried to frame
sphere of influence in this way: The present is the starting point since it is where the need for a genealogy of sphere of influence comes from. The present directs my attention to that which is missing: a theoretical and normative discussion. At the theoretical level, the core question is the relationship between spheres of influence and sovereign states. The normative question is whether spheres of influence are unjust and whether a system can be given priority over its individual members, that is, whether it can override the conventional precedence of international order.

In addition to the episodes dealing with the English School, the relationship between spheres of influence, order and justice can be found in what I call “the world wars episode” (episode three). There I find a place for sphere of influence in international theory as a concept casting doubt on the viability of a world state and as a defence of plurality. The world wars signified yet another period in history which caused intellectuals in the West to reconsider what the international order should look like in the post-war world. Something old was crumbling and something new was about to be built. All ideas spring from their political and cultural contexts, but the period of the world wars in particular produced the most interesting and theoretically developed visions of spheres of influence. As an alternative to universalism, sphere of influence becomes not only a matter of international order, but a development path which is supported and defended; the concept loses its pejorative pall. Bartelson (2009) writes about the dilemma of the universal and the particular – the idea of a world community on the one hand, and the bounded community of a state, nation or people, on the other. A sphere of influence represents a bounded community, but one which settles in between the idea of a world community and of a nation-state. Contemporary IR has neglected the relevance of spheres of influence in the debates on the universal versus the particular. Despite its potential, the idea of a sphere of influence has not been theorised as a solution to the disintegration of the system of states and the problems of forming a world community. This potential is based on the history of international thought, which I will analyse in this study.

The fourth episode is a period in history known as the Cold War and includes a reading of an illustrative incident, the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The significance of this episode lies in the fact that as the dominating reference to envisioning the nature of spheres of influence it makes the concept the pejorative metaphor it presently is. What happened to sphere of influence during the Cold War was that the concept came to denote so powerfully the superpower rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union that its broader meaning and history were forgotten. Even though the extreme circumstances of bipolarity made sphere of influence look like a Cold War concept, it has had a much longer history. Ignoring the idea of sphere of influence in the history of international theory has reduced it to geostrategy: imagining spheres of influence as circles on a map without asking what “a satellite” is or what makes “a camp” and what “bloc discipline” means for international order (see also chapter 5.1). Even during the Cold War the theoretical interest in spheres of influence was minimal, being limited to occasional references by the English school, Paul Keal’s book from 1983 and Edy Kaufman’s remarks from 1976. After the Cold War, a new era of confusion emerged and the idea of sphere of influence was left unproblematised. During that era, the injustice of spheres of influence became so obvious that there was no reason to open up normative questions relating to the phenomenon. If there was a need to theorise on regional developments or international influence, other concepts would come to the rescue and sphere of influence could be left as a reminder of Cold War practices, and the continuation of Russian foreign policy. Political leaders and analysts in the West soon observed that the idea of sphere of influence was alive in the foreign policy of Russia, but they were not interested in addressing the import of the concept for discussing the new world order. But neither the idea of an international society nor its connection to spheres of influence was crushed under the Cold War’s unique bipolarity. The need to problematise the concept of sphere of influence did not disappear, nor has it disappeared in the present.

The fifth episode is what I call “the present”. It is present in two contexts: present for the discipline of International Relations and present for Russian scholars and politicians with an interest in international affairs. The first part of the episode I have already presented. As I have argued, writings in the West on spheres of influence are dominated by the presence of Russia. Since spheres of influence are associated with
Russian foreign policy, I decided that the Russian visions of spheres of influence must be explored. I think that if we really want to problematise the present, we first need to identify what and where exactly the practices or discourses we want to problematise are. This present thus becomes as much a matter of location as of time. The view on sphere of influence differs dramatically when observed from two different locations. One could say the Iron Curtain is still there when it comes to understanding spheres of influence. Thus, the final piece of the puzzle are the present Russian visions of spheres of influence; when this is in place, I believe we have the ingredients needed to analyse spheres of influence in the twenty-first century.

For Bartelson the aim of genealogy is to explain how present features that are deemed unproblematic, timeless and without history have been formed out of the past. This means bringing forward subjugated knowledges. When it comes to the concept of sphere of influence, the lack of historical and theoretical interest is so pervasive that nearly all sources represent essentially subjugated knowledge. These are marginalised texts even though in many other contexts they represent nothing less than “great texts”, as in the case of the thinking of the English School and Schmitt’s and Carr’s works. Thus, in its totality, the genealogy of sphere of influence is buried knowledge. First, it is not recognised that the idea of sphere of influence has an intellectual history: spheres of influence exist only as a foreign policy practice. There has been no attempt to look beyond the observed practice or the concept and connect the idea of sphere of influence to the institutions of international society. Somehow, spheres of influence have been seen to operate alongside the balance of power as normal conduct of the great powers, but without anyone exploring the relationship between the two concepts. Spheres of influence have not been examined in the texts that are concerned with the disintegration of the system of sovereign states. In fact, spheres of influence have not been examined in terms of any international theory whatsoever. Moreover, the historicity of the concept of sphere of influence is not fully appreciated. There is ignorance of history, which manifests itself in confining the concept to the Cold War era (or sometimes the colonial era). What is missing is the period of the world wars, the history of the United States’ influence, and the emergence of great power order. These represent the
subjugated knowledges and the Cold War is the source of the dominant knowledge. Accordingly, the purpose of the following historical inquiry is to reveal subjugated knowledges relating to the concept of sphere of influence, stretching the limits of our present knowledge further and deeper into history.
3 The Origins of Spheres of Influence

The English School of International Relations combines normative theory with an analysis of the international system and its history, making it a fruitful source for discovering the history of sphere of influence and material for a theoretical conceptualisation. While interest in the English School has been increasing within the discipline there has been no interest in searching for the concept of sphere of influence in the literature of the School. I found my way to the English School after the realisation that spheres of influence have something to do with the system of states, which came to me from reading on Schmitt’s *Großraum*. The question of justice is discussed by the English School in a way which creates potential to theorise on the normative aspects of spheres of influence. Moreover, Keal’s study on spheres of influence is not only strongly associated with English School theory but directly linked to the thinking of Bull, under whom Keal did his doctorate. Hidemi Suganami (2010, 16) includes Keal in a group of those people to whom “the founding figures had exerted a formative influence directly or indirectly”. To my knowledge, there is no other extensive study on spheres of influence than Keal’s, and his *Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance* (1983) represents the spirit and agenda of the English School. Thus, Keal’s theorising is my point of departure and it has led me to the normative theory of the English School.

Excluding Keal’s work, the uses of the concept of sphere of influence are mostly (but not wholly) limited to Bull’s scholarship. This does not necessarily make the English School any less relevant as a source of theorising on sphere of influence. The knowledge of the English School on the concept is subjugated as much to the writers themselves as it is to those who attempt to make sense of those writings. The neglect of the concept by the English School is already an important finding, because it attests to the mysterious simultaneity of familiarity and unfamiliarity with it. The realist accounts of anarchy and the system of states might appear as a more natural source of the history of sphere of influence, but in my opinion the English School addresses the present problematique of the concept’s pejorative meaning more comprehensively and enables the discovery of subjugated knowledge. Moreover, a focus on the English school does not exclude the realist schools of thought in IR; it
only excludes the idea of sphere of influence in a realist world without international society, that is, without the driving force of shared rules and norms, because the concept of sphere of influence is theoretically located within international institutions, not outside of them. A sphere of influence requires some understanding and agreement among states in order to operate. Here I prefer to present a certain vision of spheres of influence, one that discusses order and justice, but also one that includes the pejorative and the realist voices even though I am not analysing the entire spectrum of classical realist or neorealist literature. A theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of influence does not have to include everything, and in this study the delineation of sources has been done with a preference for the work of the English School.

In this chapter I will discuss the origins of the idea of sphere of influence within the framework of the system of states and international order. I take up suzerainty and colonialism, as related but also separate ideas on international influence. I also discuss the Congress of Vienna and the United States’ Monroe Doctrine, which represent historical landmarks in the development of the thinking on spheres of influence, both as discourses and as practices. But first some words on the English School itself are in order.

3.1 The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics

Excellent accounts and analyses have been written on the English School by Tim Dunne (1998), Brunello Vigezzi (2005), Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami (2006) and Barry Buzan (2004a). I content myself here with a short introduction to the School without the debates that the English School theory and methodology have increasingly aroused. As a school of thought, the English School emerged from the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. The first formal meeting of the Committee was held in January 1959 by a group of scholars who set out to investigate questions of international theory (Dunne 1998, xi). Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight were the organisers of the Committee, which would come to include Hedley Bull,
Adam Watson, R.J. Vincent and others. In total, the members, guests and contributors comprised some 50 people with varying backgrounds (Vigezzi 2005, vii). According to Dunne, during the “formative years” of the Committee (1959—962), *Diplomatic Investigations* (1966) was written, which elaborated the conception of *international society*. The period from 1964 onwards Dunne calls the second phase, which was characterised by growing interest in methodology and a comparative sociology of the historical states-system. No collaborative publication came out of these studies, but the phase did see two significant works, Wight’s *Systems of States* (1977) and Watson’s *Evolution of International Society* (1992). The culmination of the Committee’s work was a volume edited by Bull and Watson titled *The Expansion of International Society* in 1984. (Dunne 1998, xiii–xiv.)

The most important sources from the English School in establishing the connection between spheres of influence and international society are Bull’s *The Anarchical Society* (2002), published in 1977, and Wight’s *Power Politics* and *Systems of States*. I found elements of the concept of sphere of influence in Bull’s institutions of international society and in Wight’s ideas on the system of states and hierarchy. Watson’s account of the history of the states-system and Vincent’s work on intervention fine-tuned the theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of influence in the English School framework, while Paul Keal’s work provided the signpost for theorising on and historically contextualising the concept. I do not adhere to the work of the original members of the School but rather use material from people who reflect or have done research on the School. These include Buzan, Little and Jackson, who have contributed (along with many others) to the re-emergence of the English School as one of the most significant and intriguing traditions in IR.

The contribution of the English School to the idea of sphere of influence comes from the historical account of the emergence of not only the system of states but also, and in particular, the great power order. Within that history we can find the Congress of Vienna (1815), the United States’

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8 *Systems of States* was collected from Wight’s writings from the last years of his life and published as a book in 1977 (Wight 1977, 1).

9 *Power Politics* was first published as pamphlets by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1946 and in 1978 as a book after Wight had already passed away (Wight 1995, 7–9).
Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the practice of colonialism. In the next chapter I will illustrate the second important finding from the English School literature for conceptualising sphere of influence: the pluralist-solidarist debate, which emerged from a discussion on the institutions of international society. I argue that sphere of influence is a conception of a territorial order in between the system of states (pluralism) and the cosmopolitan world community (solidarism). As Dunne (1998, 142) writes, Bull developed the pluralist and solidarist wings of the English School by exploring the normative possibilities of the society of states. This normative reflection is what makes the English School so significant for conceptualising sphere of influence.

Vincent played with the pluralist-solidarist division within the field of human rights, trying to build a bridge between the two (Dunne 1998, xiv). Wight and Watson inserted hegemonic order as the central tendency of international society – lying between the extremes of sovereignty and empire – while also reflecting on the pluralist-solidarist debate. Regardless of Paul Keal’s work on sphere of influence and international order, the English School has not made spheres of influence part and parcel of the society of states. A sphere of influence is not an institution of international society to Bull (2002) and not even a derivative institution for Buzan (2004a). Even so, if we acknowledge that sphere of influence is not only a concept which works in isolation, as a tool of foreign policy, but that it is an idea which explains international order, we can use international society as a point of departure for discussing the normative aspects of establishing spheres of influence. Theory on international society breathes life into the idea of sphere of influence, giving it a dimension outside the pejorative uses of the term and its attachment to foreign policy. The pluralist-solidarist debate makes the concept of sphere of influence part of the theorisation on international order even if the English School itself has failed to realise this. A sphere of influence becomes transformed from a foreign policy tool into an idea about the nature and form of international order between nation and humanity.
3.2 From Suzerain to Sovereign, from Independence to Hegemony

The concept of sphere of influence appeared only after the emergence of the system of states. As such it describes relations among states and is a part of the international order of states. But it is possible to look beyond the system of states, and indeed we can find a model which bears a resemblance to the idea of sphere of influence: the suzerain system. Although I focus on the idea of sphere of influence as deeply rooted in the system of states, a wider historical perspective helps to locate sphere of influence in the framework of international order. This is where the work of Bull, Watson and Wight comes to my aid.

Common to Bull, Wight and Watson is an interest in suzerain systems and hegemony. Wight (1977, 23) explains that a system of states means that states claim for themselves independence of any political superior and recognise the validity of like claims to independence by all others. This has been formulated in the doctrine of legal equality of states (ibid.). But there is also something Wight (1997, 24) calls suzerainty, where one among a group of states "asserts unique claims which the others formally or tacitly accept". "This is the suzerain, the sole source of legitimate authority, conferring a status on the rest and exacting tribute or other marks of deference" (ibid.). In the international states-system, the fundamental political principle is to maintain a balance of power, but in a suzerain state-system the policy is *divide et impera* (ibid.). Bull (2002, 11) explains Wight’s suzerainty as a system of one state imposing supremacy over others; this is why it is a suzerain state system, not states system. Bull (ibid.) continues that Wight also differentiates primary and secondary states-systems, with the former composed of states but the latter of systems of states, often of suzerain-state systems. Bull writes that there is a difference between hegemony in an international system and in a suzerain-state system. In a suzerain-state system, hegemony is permanent and unchallengeable, while in a system of states hegemony can pass from one power to another and can be disputed (ibid., 10–11). This difference means that the only international system is a states-system, since under a suzerain system only one power can be sovereign.
In *The Expansion of International Society*, Bull and Watson (1985, 1–3) use the concept of suzerainty to explain the international system before the emergence of sovereign states. Bull and Watson state that the European expansion began in the late fifteenth century, and before that the world consisted of several regional international systems with distinctive rules and institutions based on the dominant regional culture. The most important systems were the Arab-Islamic system, the Indian subcontinent, the Mongol-Tartar dominion of the Eurasian steppes, and the Chinese system. These systems were hegemonial or imperial with a suzerain supreme ruler at the centre. The ruler “exercised direct authority over the Heartland; and around this empire extended a periphery of locally autonomous realms that acknowledged the suzerain’s overlordship and paid him tribute”. Within these systems there was no attempt to question the hegemonial nature of the system and thus the states in the periphery did not combine forces to overthrow the ruler. They assumed that there would always be someone who would lay down the rules and control the relations among the members of the system. Bull and Watson also point out that the regional international systems had limited relations with one another as compared to those within the system. (Ibid.)

For Wight (1977, 29), if there was any system of states operating in medieval society, it was the suzerain system. The suzerain existed even before medieval times. Wight (1977, 25) mentions the Hittite Empire in the Near East during the latter half of the second millennium B.C. which dominated over lesser powers. Michael Horton (2009) writes about “suzerainty treaties” by the Hittite Empire in which a lesser king (vassal) in need of help entered into a covenant with the great king (suzerain), or the great king rescued the lesser king from peril and thus considered it his right to annex the vassal’s lands by covenant to his empire (Horton 2009, 24–25). The treaties stipulated the duties of the vassals as paying taxes to the great king, abstaining from alliances with other kings and abstaining from complaints against theirs. The suzerain in return pledged to guard his vassal. Horton writes that there were no obligations for the suzerain, who acted in absolute freedom. (Ibid., 27–28). What separates these suzerain treaties from modern analogues is that the suzerain was like a loved and revered father (ibid., 25). The covenant was not merely a legal contract; it ”involved the deepest affections” (ibid.).
If we want to find the earliest sphere-of-influence agreements, the Hittite suzerain treaties could be examples. What is curious about a suzerain treaty, however, are the ideas of protection, acceptance, legitimacy and the respect for the great king – all features absent from our present understanding of spheres of influence. The present idea of sphere of influence recognises neither legitimacy of the influence involved nor goodwill on the part of the influencing power. But if we look at the origins of great power influence represented by the Hittite king, the relationship between the sovereign and the vassal is not necessarily one of injustice. Then why is a sphere of influence necessarily unjust? Could it be that the norm of state sovereignty is so powerful as to always disapprove of international influence? The answer is yes in the case of spheres of influence, but not all international influence is negative. The EU’s international influence is often viewed positively even though it also has its opponents. Those who argue for a need for humanitarian intervention, or accept it, do not engage in debates over violations of sovereignty. Influence in the form of developmental aid is sometimes criticised but more often it is seen as beneficial and necessary. This explains why it is difficult to associate the fatherly influence of the suzerain with spheres of influence. If we look at Keal’s (1983,15) definition, a sphere of influence “limits the independence and freedom of action”, thus violating sovereignty. This violation is what affirms the pejorative connotation of the concept of sphere of influence, and this mindset makes it difficult to imagine a positive normative agenda on the part of the influencing power.

In the current popular use of the term “sphere of influence”, especially in the media, the pejorative element is often expressed as imperial domination. “Imperial” does not automatically have a pejorative connotation, but when the imperial power is Russia, this is often the case. The term “imperial” evokes an image of a suzerain who deprives other states of their independence. The influencing power in the case of a sphere of influence is not Horton’s fatherly suzerain, but Bull’s and Watson’s Supreme Ruler. However, sphere of influence is not necessarily an idea which entails a loss of independence by the influenced states. Falling under another power’s sphere of influence might violate their sovereignty but more often independence and sovereignty (or at least an illusion of
them) are upheld within a sphere of influence (see Carr 2001, 213–217; Lippmann 1945, 77; Naumann 1917, 254–255; Schmitt 2003, 252). I argue that in international theory a sphere of influence rarely implies imperial authority. The suzerain and the vision of imperial authority reinforce the pejorative interpretation of spheres of influence and eclipse images of those spheres of influence that do not aim for total domination and absorption. Suzerainty, as an historical example, can work as a model of a sphere of influence, but we can find conceptualisations that are even better-suited to situating spheres of influence in the framework of hegemony and hierarchy.

Watson and Wight observe that the European system was a succession of hegemonies rather than a pure Westphalian system (Watson 2007, 11). Watson establishes an idea which diverges from his earlier strict separation of systems of independent states, suzerain systems and empires. He proposes a spectrum ranging from absolute independence to absolute empire, these two extremes being theoretical absolutes, not practical realisations. Between independence and empire lie hegemony and dominion. "Independent states in a system indicates [sic] political entities that retain the ultimate ability to take external decisions as well as domestic ones" (Ibid., 19). When a hegemon emerges, it is able to "lay down the law" on behalf of others concerning their relations, but leaves them domestically independent (Ibid., 20). For Wight, a suzerain's claims that he was entitled to decide on the rules and institutions of international society were backed up by legitimacy and an acknowledgement by others of the need for suzerainty – this legitimacy the hegemon lacks (ibid., 18). Dominion means imperial authority which can determine how other communities are governed but allows them to retain their identity and some control over their affairs (ibid., 21). For Watson Empire means direct administration of different communities from an imperial centre (Ibid.). Watson sees this model as a pendulum with a gravitational pull away from the extremes towards the centre. What Watson wants to illustrate with the pendulum is "the tension between the desire for order and the desire for independence" (ibid). The significance of the pendulum idea lies in its establishing hegemony and domination as the equilibrium point of the pendulum – not necessarily the ideal state of affairs, but somehow one more natural than the extremes of independence and
empire. If hegemony and dominion are where the international system tends to gravitate, this is the logical space also for spheres of influence, which will lie somewhere between the two. Before the states-system the pendulum did not exist, only the empire, that is, the suzerain system. With the introduction of states the independence end was born, creating the possibility of a pendulum movement. Within this pendulum a sphere of influence is not quite a suzerain system but definitely does not belong to the independence end either.

Bull explores this middle ground which Watson sees as the equilibrium position of the pendulum. According to Bull (2002, 196), great powers assert and are accorded the right to play a part in determining issues affecting the peace and security of the international system as a whole, thus bearing a managerial responsibility. Great powers unilaterally exploit their local preponderance: they agree on spheres of influence and joint action in a great power concert (ibid., 200). Bull identifies three forms of preponderance: dominance, hegemony and primacy. Dominance means habitual use of force by a great power against lesser states and disregard of universal norms such as sovereignty, equality and independence in relation to those states (ibid., 207). This is not quite imperial sovereignty but treating small states as second-class members of international society. As an example, Bull cites the United States’ policy of military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean from the late nineteenth century until the introduction of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour Policy in 1933 (ibid.). For Bull what lies at the opposite extreme to dominance is primacy.Primacy is achieved without use or threat of use of force and with no more than an ordinary degree of disregard for sovereignty, equality and independence (ibid., 208). Primacy manifests itself among states whose peoples display some signs of being a single political community. Bull cites the British Commonwealth, which was founded without coercion or systematic disregard for sovereignty. The position the United States holds in NATO is also a form of primacy. (Ibid.)

Between dominance and primacy lies hegemony. Hegemony involves occasional and reluctant resort to force and the threat of force (Bull 2002, 209). The great power does not disregard the principles of sovereignty, equality and independence but is ready to violate them if needed (ibid.). For Bull, hegemony describes the relationship between the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. This is an important example, because what Bull describes as Soviet or US hegemony is the same as what we call a sphere of influence. According to Bull (2002, 212), the Soviet Union recognised the sovereignty, equality and independence of the Eastern European states but also limited these rights through the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968, which treated any threat to a socialist country as a threat to the socialist community as a whole. Likewise, the relationship between the United States and Central America and the Caribbean (but not South America) is one of hegemony, where the United States resorts to force only in extreme cases (ibid.). Bull (2002, 212) concludes that even though the hegemony that the United States and the Soviet Union represented is regarded as unjust, it nevertheless produced a kind of order. Thus, Bull offers us a way to diversify the idea of sphere of influence beyond the confines of its pejorative connotation. Bull’s forms of preponderance are divided in rather vague terms in relation to violation of sovereignty and resort to use of force, but they do indicate a separation between more or less forceful and acceptable forms of influence. The three levels of preponderance do not settle the question of what constitutes a sphere of influence but they help to visualise spheres of influence which can take many forms and affect sovereignty differently.

If we do not fix sphere of influence to any of the three categories of preponderance but think of it as a fluid concept that can signify varying degrees of control and resort to use of force, we have the possibility to analyse influence within the entire spectrum of dominance, hegemony and primacy. The normative effect of this would be to conclude that a sphere of influence exemplifying primacy is more acceptable than one involving influence, which is closer to dominance because the rights of the influenced are more violated within dominance than primacy. Conceptualising different levels of influence as having different implications for sovereignty, independence and equality, leaves room to speculate whether a sphere of influence takes the form of one of the three or to which end of the spectrum it comes closest. In this manner, we can imagine influence without the dichotomy of good influence and bad influence. This would mean dissociating the concept of sphere of influence from any particular state (Russia) and also dissociating certain foreign policy practices (such as interfering in elections or raising energy
prices) from sphere-of-influence policies. Instead, influence would be identified and evaluated on the basis of its implications for sovereignty, independence, equality, use of force and other relevant normative indicators.

3.3 The Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe

I, therefore, think that we should recognize the world, not as a hierarchy of states or a suzerain system, but as an international society managed to some extent by a group of Great Powers. This pattern is somewhat similar to the nineteenth-century concert in Europe. (Watson 2002, 150.)

Spheres of influence in both the past and the present are viewed as the privileges of great powers. A sphere of influence is an extension of the ideas of hierarchy and inequality in the international system. For the normative reading of sphere of influence, this means taking into consideration possible justifications for great power management and the silent acceptance of inequality as the nature of the states-system. If the emergence of the system of states was the beginning of the present international order, then the emergence of “great power order” was the beginning of spheres of influence. The origins of that order can be traced back to the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Concert of Europe. The significance of these two historical events is not so much in their content, but in their recurrent appearance in texts dealing with spheres of influence, both in the past and in the present. The point is not to evaluate the real meaning of the historical events, but to reveal the discourses which have constructed them as meaningful.

I agree with Watson that the battle for and against hegemony is at the centre of the international society. Hegemony is thus also at the heart of sphere of influence. The European international society of sovereign states emerged out of the fight against the hegemony of the universal church (Watson 1985a, 13–16; also Jackson 2007, 6–8). Nevertheless, the principle of sovereignty did not kill hegemony. Reading from Bull and Watson (1985, 6–7), we note first that the European system consisted
of a number of empires, even with the emergence of state sovereignty. Second, the idea that states were equal in rights emerged in the middle of the eighteenth century only to experience a setback in the nineteenth when the Great Powers formed the Concert of Europe, claiming special responsibilities for maintaining order and special rights that the small powers did not possess (ibid.). Watson (1985a) explains that within the development of the European society of states two principles became crucial: all member states were to be regarded as juridically equal and their sovereignty was absolute. Regardless of this, the European system of states did not disregard the great differences of power among its members. In the nineteenth century, the tradition of balance of power experienced a transformation as the European states agreed that order should be maintained by the hegemony of the five great powers acting in concert. Other states remained juridically sovereign but were to be accorded only a secondary role. This was also the time of colonisation, when Britain, Russia and France began to impose their government on almost all of Asia and Africa. By the end of the nineteenth century, the management of international society had also been entrusted in part to the United States and Japan, thus taking it outside of Europe. (Ibid., 23–30) We can conclude here that for a system of states inequality and differences of power have existed side by side with the principle of sovereignty, which is in fact the context for spheres of influence.

In Systems of States, Wight (1977) discusses the emerging “great power system” and inequality in international relations. In his view, the grading of powers can be traced back to the beginning of the international system. However, it was in the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars, in 1815, that great-power status became regularly established in international politics. The Congress abandoned the old order of precedence among sovereigns, which was based on antiquity of title. This was changed when the American revolutions, the French Revolution, and Napoleon’s abolition of the Holy Roman Empire made empires, kingdoms and republics all equal in diplomatic rank. A doctrine of equality of states became accepted among international lawyers. As Wight points out, “[b]ut in terms of politics, as contrasted with those of diplomatic theory and international law, the Congress of Vienna replaced the old system based on tradition by a system based on power.” Wight goes on to note that
“[t]he modern European states-system, while formulating the principle of the equality of states, has modified it by establishing the class of great powers. Since 1907, if not since 1815, their responsibilities and privileges have been recognized in international law.“ (Watson 1977, 41–42.)

Carsten Holbraad (1970) devoted an entire book to the Concert of Europe. Holbraad’s (1970, 5) main interest, like my own, was not to analyse the practice itself but to study the contemporary ideas on the institution. He explains how the Concert of Europe emerged from the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars, ending with the First World War. The Concert was meant to be a congress with regular meetings but as such it broke down in 1822 due to disagreement among the allies. It continued to function as an informal institution of cooperation and consultation on European politics. After the Napoleonic Wars, Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain took charge of the negotiations in Vienna and signed the Quadruple Alliance in Paris on 20 November 1815, which contained a plan for the conduct of European politics. The original membership of the Concert was later increased by the acceptance of France and in the middle of the century by admission of the Ottoman Empire, Italy and Germany (in the place of Prussia) and it also included cooperation with the United States. (Ibid., 1–2.) Holbraad observes, “However, the Concert of Europe was more than a practice which developed into an institution. It was also an idea.” The Concert came to signify the idea of a loose association of great European powers consulting and cooperating with one another occasionally. (Ibid., 3–4.)

Holbraad studies the different meanings given to the Concert of Europe, and finds three main lines of thought: the Concert of Europe was envisioned as an instrument for preserving the dynasties of the boundaries of the Vienna Settlement; as a system maintaining a balance of power in Europe; and as a means for humanitarian reform or as the seed of international organisation (ibid., 8). This is where Holbraad’s account of the Concert becomes interesting for the idea of sphere of influence. It is not only that sphere of influence is an idea of great power management; it is an idea which evolves from great power cooperation and competition. Cooperation and competition are engraved also in the idea of a concert, which expresses a certain form of international order. Wight (1966a, 154) points out that “[t]he Concert of Europe
was in origin and essence a common agreement on the balance of power”, an observation reflecting the dual purpose of the great powers to maintain their own status and prevent others from gaining excessive power. Holbraad examines German and English visions of the Concert of Europe and discovers that for Germans the idea initially was that of European unity and cosmopolitanism but that it eventually turned into state individuality and anti-European nationalism. Holbraad (1970, 112–113) explains:

This drift of ideas reflected the course of history. The doctrines of monarchical solidarity in the defence of the existing order were fostered by the tranquillity in international relations which followed the wars against France and the Congress of Vienna. The revival of the theory of power balance was promoted by the return of alliance politics after the years of congress diplomacy. The spirit of national ambition and the philosophy of state egotism were encouraged by the deterioration in international relations, which started with the Crimean War and culminated in the First World War, and by the decline of the European system, which went hand in hand with the rise of world powers.

Where the Germans turned against the Concert of Europe with extreme nationalism, their British counterparts drifted towards internationalism, upholding the idea of a concert even to inspire the establishment of the League of Nations. According to Holbraad, the view that prevailed in Britain was the progressive one with two branches: one dominated by humanitarian notions and the other by organisational ideas. The humanitarian line of thought supported joint intervention in the aid of subject peoples based on the ideas of political freedom and national liberty. The organisational version viewed the Concert as a means to pacify international society and as the seed of its organisation. (Holbraad 1970; 117–118, 206.)

Thus, the Concert of Europe becomes multi-faceted. At its strongest, it expressed the dream of a cosmopolitan international society and at its weakest it became consumed by nationalism. As a cosmopolitan idea, the Concert could justify intervention, what we would today call humanitarian intervention. The Concert can also be seen as a step towards a world organisation which would express the inherent
inequality of the system as built upon the special role of the great powers. Where does sphere of influence emerge within the visions of a concert? Sphere of influence is lurking there between the cosmopolitan and the nationalist, offering solutions to the defects of both. As I proceed to discuss the pluralist-solidarist debate (chapter 4) and the ideas springing from the tragedies of the world wars (chapter 5), I will fully establish that the heritage of sphere of influence lies within these discourses. As for the cosmopolitan approaches, intervention is a central theme for the concept of sphere of influence, not only because it is seen as a means to further a sphere-of-influence policy, but also because it entails the normative problem of when it is acceptable to violate the principle of non-intervention. A world organisation represents, on the one hand, the institutionalisation of hierarchy and, on the other, the problem of power being concentrated in one location, in the hands of the one sovereign. For those visions of spheres of influence which emerged from the ruins of the Second World War, the threat of world government or world empire represents a universe against which a system of spheres of influence needs to be established. Thus, the fascinating history of sphere of influence has its roots deep in the idea of great power management and the Concert of Europe.

3.4 Agreements on Spheres of Influence and Colonial Influence

When first this phrase [sphere of influence] was employed in the language of diplomacy I do not know, but I doubt if a more momentous early use of it can be traced than that in the assurance given by Count Gortchakoff to Lord Clarendon in 1869, and often since repeated, that

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10 Andrew Hurrell (2006, 10) writes about institutionalised hierarchy as exemplified in bodies such as the United Nations Security Council and G8. Wight (1995, 43) also took up this theme of institutionalised hierarchy in Power Politics when he claimed that the status of great power first obtained legal recognition through the possession of a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations. Since great powers had greater interests, they had the right to decide on behalf of the smaller ones at the League. According to Wight, the League of Nations continued the system of the Concert of Europe, where the great powers acted as the directorate (ibid.).
Afghanistan lay ‘completely outside the sphere within which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence’. (Curzon 1907, 42.)

A central part of explaining the concept of sphere of influence is exploring its relationship to concepts which are related yet different. After the Cold War meaning of sphere of influence, the second most prominent use of the term is to denote the relationship between European powers and their colonies. The first historical idea after the suzerain system or suzerain treaty resembling a sphere of influence is that of an empire or imperialism. In its present use, and in other historical uses excluding colonialism, sphere of influence is nevertheless more informal and less comprehensive. In terms of Watson’s (2007) pendulum idea, an empire indicates direct influence while a sphere of influence belongs more to the equilibrium point of the pendulum (hegemony or dominion). Hardt and Negri (2001, xii) explain how European imperialism was an extension of sovereignty beyond the borders of the imperialist state. If we look at the Cold War “spheres of influence”, there was no complete loss of sovereignty and the group of theorists I will later introduce all essentially defended the independence of the influenced (Schmitt and Burnham the least) (see chapter 5). A sphere of influence rarely indicates absorption or conquest but rather an occasional violation of sovereignty or maintenance of at least some level of sovereignty even under domination. The imperialist associations of the concept reinforce its pejorative connotation and strip it of its potential to defend, if not sovereignty of the nation-state, at least a plurality of bounded communities. In the present, the empire analogy is problematic because of the ambiguity of the concepts of empire or imperialism. I have already presented empire lite as a name for the new American foreign policy. Hardt and Negri (2001) use “Empire” to denote a new global form of sovereignty, a kind of global covenant that knows no territorial or temporal boundaries. Hardt and Negri (2011, xii) in fact draw a clear line of demarcation between imperialism, founded on sovereign states, and Empire, which means the end of sovereign nation-states. The essence of the concept of sphere of influence is deeply rooted in a plurality of the international system, which is not the case for the Empire in the sense used by Hardt and Negri. To be more precise, the Empire of Hardt and Negri is not the equivalent of a sphere of influence, but rather of
the single sovereign, or "universe" In fact, it was to counterbalance a
world organisation in the form of an "Empire" that visions of spheres
of influence were developed during and after the two world wars (see
chapter 5).

Keal (1983) explores a whole group of concepts which needed to be
distinguished from the concept of sphere of influence. He argues that
separating sphere of influence from "sphere of interest" would be like
splitting hairs, but that the latter is more acceptable than the former.
Likewise "spheres of action", which were used in the scramble for
Africa; spheres of preponderance, which signify superiority of power
and influence; and "zones of influence" all mean the same as sphere of
influence. Keal also distinguishes a sphere of influence from a buffer zone,
which can comprise independent or neutral states. A buffer zones can
coincide with a sphere of influence but might include territories which
do not fall within a sphere of influence. By the same token, a sphere of
influence can comprise areas which are not buffer zones. Keal borrows
the definition of buffer zone from Wight. (Ibid., 19–27) Wight (1995,
160) explains buffer state as "a weak power between two or more stronger
ones, maintained or even created with the purpose of reducing conflict
between them". Wight continues that each stronger power has a vital
interest in preventing others from controlling the buffer. Great powers
seek to either keep the buffer neutral and independent or try to control
the region. Wight divides buffer zones into trimmers, which play the
great powers against each other; neutrals, which do not have any active
foreign policy; and "satellites", which are states whose foreign policy is
controlled by another power. If a small power agrees to a treaty to give
away its sovereignty, it becomes a protectorate. (Ibid.)

For Keal spheres of restraint are grey areas in which no one power is
predominant. "Frontiers" involve relations between the influencing states
(two great powers) but not relations between the influencing state and
the influenced state. Frontiers demarcate interests, but not necessarily
influence, of great powers. (Keal 1983, 28–33.) I find these distinctions
rather unclear in defining what a sphere of influence is for two reasons:
First, they lack the type of analysis I proposed in chapter 3.2, which
would see influence from the perspective of sovereignty and hegemony.
Second, Keal does not pay attention to the politics of language. In Keal's
time, sphere of influence was less of a curse word and more of a simple fact of international life; thus, unlike today, the political uses of concepts such as sphere of influence was not as relevant as an object of study as it is for me. What I would like to embark on next, instead of dwelling on the aforementioned concepts, is a closer look at colonial influence, because at some level colonial practice can be considered as the historical predecessor of sphere of influence; it refers to an essentially similar, yet not identical, policy.

M.F. Lindley (1926), a source referred to by Bull (2002, 212–213) and Keal (1983, 16–17) alike, establishes the relationship between colonialism and spheres of influence. For Lindley (1926, 207–208), a sphere of influence has four uses: 1) It can entail a promise to abstain from acquisition of sovereign rights within the sphere allotted to the other. In this case the agreement is between colonising powers over an unorganised area. 2) It can mean recognition of special interests within a territory, which is sometimes called sphere of interest. This is an agreement between colonising powers relating to the territory of a third state. 3) It can be an agreement regarding the territory of a third state made by agreement with that state. For example, a state can promise not to dispose of a part of its territory to any other than the interested power. 4) It can be “inappropriate areas which adjoin, or are economically, politically, or strategically important to, territory already in the possession of a State”. In this case there is no international agreement.

For not only Lindley but also Bull (2002, 212) the first sphere of influence agreements are represented by the colonising activity of the Crowns of Castile and Portugal in the fifteenth century. The basis of those agreements were papal bulls, about which Lindley (1926, 124) writes, “At the time of the great discoveries, the popes claimed the power to grant Christian monarchs the right to acquire territory in the possession of heathens and infidels”. Lindley continues that the modern era of spheres of influence began after the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), where it was formally recognised that a territory might be under the influence, distinct from protection or sovereignty, of a power. The term “sphere of influence” had been used ten years earlier in Anglo-Russian negotiations on Central Asia, but was not yet formally recognised then. (Ibid., 209–210.)
Lindley’s account is from the 1920s, when neither the Cold War spheres of influence nor the ideas on super-states and concentration of power were in sight. Colonial influence was the dominant form of international influence for the European powers, and at the time a sphere of influence could not carry any other meanings. It is fair to say that colonial influence is what gave birth to the concept of sphere of influence. Yet something also separates the present understanding of sphere of influence from its colonial past: a colonial relationship was actually an agreement between the colonising powers, and the relationship between the influencing and the influenced was not disputed. The influenced party was stripped of its rights – if it even had any rights to begin with. There was no need to debate inequality of power and the level of sovereignty accorded to the influenced, because the colonial powers were the only sovereign powers.

In 1907, Lord Curzon traced the history of the concept of sphere of influence by connecting it with the idea of protectorates. A sphere of influence represented an idea between the more developed form of influence, the protectorate, and the less developed sphere of interests (Curzon 1907, 43). Bull (2002, 215) had read Curzon and explained the scale as ranging from 1) spheres of interest, which tend to become 2) spheres of influence, then 3) protectorates and finally 4) annexation. If protectorates and annexation are the formal and more constraining forms of influence, then a sphere of interest is something even less formal or less compelling than a sphere of influence. This is the idea Trenin (2009) tried to express by distinguishing between spheres of influence and spheres of interest (see chapter 2.1.2). For Curzon (1907, 41), the concept of protectorate was more accurate in defining colonial influence than sphere of influence, which had become commonly used but which was less precise. What the concept of sphere of influence denotes is influence by one power to the exclusion of others but to a degree chosen by that power based on its needs and preferences. Moreover, the native government is left as it is and its sovereignty can even be reaffirmed, but political influence and commercial exploitation are seen as the rights of the interested power. Nevertheless, there are no express rules laid down on spheres of influence. (Ibid., 43.) For Curzon, as I read his work, “protectorate” is the appropriate term for a colonised status since a sphere of influence appears to be a more unofficial form of influence. A sphere
of influence also gives more freedom to the influenced, although Curzon does not explore in detail the difference between a protectorate and a sphere of influence in this respect.

Geddes W. Rutherford wrote an article in *The American Journal of International Law* in 1926 about spheres of influence as an aspect of semi-suzerainty in which he also explored the difference between a sphere of influence and a protectorate. Rutherford (1926, 317) writes that a protectorate requires or at least suggests recognition. “Spheres of influence, whether affected by unilateral or bilateral arrangements, are not considered as binding on Powers not parties to such arrangements” (ibid., 304), whereas protectorates are recognised by third parties (ibid., 318). Moreover, a sphere of influence does not imply responsibilities, unlike a protectorate does. Rutherford also explores negative and positive aspects of influence, but because he does not discuss the normativity of influence, there is really nothing in his work that defines positive and negative. In fact, control over foreign policy of the influenced state is both positive and negative for Rutherford and he only discusses the pervasiveness of that influence, not its justification. With a stance on normativity Rutherford could have discussed responsibility as positive influence, but he does not take a step in this direction either, because in his opinion responsibility is not an element relevant to spheres of influence. Although in many particulars Rutherford’s analysis of spheres of influence makes them sound essentially like colonial relations, he attempts to draw a line between a sphere of influence as a more informal type of influence and a protectorate as complete territorial control. This distinction is one between *political influence* and *direct authority* (ibid., 316). In fact, it goes to the very core of the concept of sphere of influence and it deserves more attention.

Kaufman (1976, 10–11) sought to separate spheres of influence from colonialism by introducing the term *sphere of direct influence*. Kaufman associates the concept of sphere of influence with the colonial period, but recognises several concepts which describe the formality of the colonial relationship. The more formal types of domination include colonies and protectorates, whereas spheres of influence are less subject to the controlling power. Kaufman explains how colonialism was *de jure* control of foreign territories but, at a later stage, when most geographic regions
were distributed and the doctrines of nation-state and self-determination became widespread, *de facto* spheres of influence were introduced. (Ibid.) For Keal (1983, 45), spheres of influence have been agreed upon on the basis of tacit understandings instead of formal agreements ever since non-European powers became influential in international politics and state sovereignty was established as a universal principle. Bull (2002, 213–214) is sceptical about the existence of even tacit agreements on spheres of influence. He urges us to separate the fact of a sphere of influence from the right to a sphere of influence. This means that even though a great power might recognise another's sphere of influence, it does not necessarily deem it legitimate. As an example, the European powers did not think that the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States gave it a right to exclude them from the hemisphere; rather, they saw it as an American policy that they should take into account. Bull continues that the line between an agreement on facts and on rights is not always clear-cut. In fact it would seem logical that there is no form of recognition at all that would give legitimacy to a sphere of influence. It would seem more likely that great powers are always reluctant to recognise even the fact of a sphere of influence. (Ibid.)

For Kaufman and Keal, colonial influence and spheres of influence indicate separate levels of formality or legitimacy of influence. Colonies could be established based on formal agreements, whereas spheres of influence imply tacit agreements. Keal (1983, 22–23) explains how the concept of sphere of influence was first used in connection with the partition of Africa, with the term implying territorial acquisition. When influence was exerted on states, diplomats avoided using of the term “sphere of influence”, because it was no longer about the acquisition of *territorium nullius*. For Keal the origin of spheres of influence was in the colonialist tradition, but they later lost the meaning of territorial acquisition and became political and economic influence in the affairs of another state. (Ibid.) Finding the historical roots of the concept of sphere of influence in colonialism is only the beginning. We need to find additional sources that have contributed to our present political conception of the phenomenon. One of the most powerful images of sphere of influence, depicted in the cartoon presented in Wikipedia, is the famous Monroe Doctrine (see chapter 1.3).
3.5 The Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine had its origin in President James Monroe’s annual address to the United States Congress on 2 December 1823. For many it is the embodiment of a sphere-of-influence doctrine: It represents the beginning of a division of the world into spheres of influence, even a new international order. The Monroe Doctrine is also seen as explaining the vagaries of United States foreign policy: Sometimes it adheres to the Doctrine, sometimes it repudiates it. The Doctrine also appears to have had some universal meaning and it had considerable bearing on to the principles of sovereignty and intervention. For these reasons, for the importance that the Monroe Doctrine is ascribed by those who theorise on spheres of influence, I have chosen to look in more detail at the discussion on the Doctrine.

In the Doctrine, President Monroe urges the European states to stay out of the Western Hemisphere. It is a declaration which forbade the European states to intervene on the American continent, where the United States was the sole guardian of hemispheric security. Explaining the background of the Doctrine, Watson (1985b, 137) writes that Washington and Jefferson argued that the Old and New Worlds were two separate spheres of political activity which should have as little to do with each other as possible. The Monroe administration feared Russia’s activities in Alaska and that the Holy Alliance would restore the Spanish Crown in the Americas (ibid.). The doctrine states: “[T]he American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European powers”, repudiating European colonialism. The Doctrine also denies the right to extend any influence in the Western Hemisphere by the European states: “We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety”. (Monroe 1823.)

Vincent (1974, 111–112) reads the Doctrine as a doctrine expounding both the right to intervention and the principle of non-intervention. The Monroe Doctrine embodied an isolationist principle, but if the United
States had to use force to prevent European influence it would depart from the principle of non-intervention. In Vincent’s estimation, the interventionist interpretation of the Doctrine came much later. After the Latin American colonies achieved their independence, the United States followed the principle of non-intervention and the isolationist mode. “It was not until the end of the century that new interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine coincided with the growth of American power and turned the policy of non-intervention into one of intervention, and the threat to the independence of the Latin American states then seemed to come as much from the United States as from across the Atlantic”. (Ibid., 119.) Theodore Roosevelt disregarded the principle of non-intervention and instead saw it as the right of the United States to intervene in the affairs of the hemisphere (Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 9; Spykman 1944, 62–63.) The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, articulated by President Theodore Roosevelt (1904), continued and strengthened the thrust of the Monroe Doctrine, introducing the idea of the right to intervention:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

Where the Monroe Doctrine denied the European states the right of interference in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Roosevelt Corollary justified the United States’ interference in those areas. In practice, the Corollary had little to do with relations between the Western Hemisphere and Europe but served to justify increased use of military force to restore internal stability to nations in the region. President William Howard Taft followed the foreign policy of intervention after Roosevelt and so did Woodrow Wilson after him. Vincent (1974, 121–122) writes that Wilson even took the principle of “protective imperialism” further in practice than its inventor, Roosevelt. When we bring in Vincent’s interpretation, the Monroe Doctrine begins to address its relationship to intervention.
This relationship boils down to the problem of legitimacy of intervention and intervention as a tool of sphere-of-influence policy. The original meaning of the Monroe Doctrine was non-interventionist. It meant only fending off the influence of other powers. As a declaration of a sphere of influence, it defended the rights of the influenced and was very restrained when it came to the United States’ own influence. Later, the Doctrine became a declaration justifying intervention, either betraying its original meaning or only extending it to include the establishment of influence in addition to counteracting that of other states. In this light, the Monroe Doctrine raised the normative question of justification.

Kaufman also explains the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine, intervention and sphere of influence. According to Kaufman (1976, 178), the Doctrine was seen as the first step in declaring a right of the United States to spheres of influence, but it would be the turn away from isolationism to interventionism or imperialism that marked the emergence of the practice of spheres of influence. For Kaufman, the meaning of the Doctrine for the United States’ influence in Latin America could not be overemphasised as it became a foreign policy principle that had been maintained for such a long period of time (ibid.). Indeed, the meaning of the Doctrine was not confined to the hemisphere but was recognised by the League of Nations Charter in Article 54 as regional “understanding” (Kaufman 1976, 179; also Keal 1983, 107–109).

The significance of the Doctrine for the present research lies in its exemplifying a “sphere-of-influence doctrine”. When we get to Schmitt’s work in chapter 5, the Monroe Doctrine is ascribed yet another meaning: a threat to the pluralist system of states (see Schmitt 2003, 281–283). For Carr (1965, 45) the Monroe Doctrine represents the space between nationalism and internationalism, not the threat of world domination Schmitt saw. When we study Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, analysed in detail by Walter Lippmann, the Monroe Doctrine is again reflected against the principle of non-intervention and acceptable forms of influence within the international system (see chapter 5). It is curious how spheres of influence are not very often connected at the present time with the Monroe Doctrine and United States foreign policy.

In 1916 The New York Times featured a long article on the Monroe Doctrine by Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick in which he suggested
extending the principles of the Doctrine to include the world, abolishing spheres of influence and laying the road for peace. “Spheres of Special Influence” for Chadwick meant the evil of imperialism. “Man’s inhumanity to man” could only be stopped under the Golden Rule, and that could happen by the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the entire world. “We want no imperialism; we want only justice in the world”, Chadwick wrote. (Chadwick 1916.) Even though Chadwick did not want to call the Monroe Doctrine a sphere-of-influence policy, and even though he specifically defines a sphere of influence as meaning a colonial policy, I believe that he is addressing exactly the point where colonialism is transmuted into sphere-of-influence policy. They become two different forms of influence. The difference between the two is the tacitness of spheres of influence compared to the explicitness of colonial influence but also the persistency of spheres of influence, and especially their role in political imagination, as a source of disputes among states. The idea of sphere of influence represents stability and instability alike; it is salvation as well as ruin. It brings states together but it also divides them. Sphere of influences thus becomes reflections of international theory – theory on international order, states and sovereignty. And the Monroe Doctrine emerges as a significant signpost which represents the advent of spheres of influence in international theorising.

3.6 Order and Spheres of Influence

As we approach international society and the normative aspects of spheres of influence in the next chapter, I would like to direct attention to the idea of international order. International order, to which I have already referred several times, links this chapter on history with the next one, which deals with international society. International order is the framework for an inquiry into the history of spheres of influence. We cannot understand spheres of influence without understanding international order, because international order is what makes spheres of influence facet of international theory. International order, and especially the pendulum movement within it, enables us to imagine where spheres of influence are situated within the political organisation of the world.
International order can be understood in many ways. A common understanding of the term “international order” is to depict global power relations as multipolar, bipolar and unipolar. In this case, order means the type of hegemony within the international system, that is, whether there is a single dominant power, or two or more. At the core of IR is the concept of “anarchical international order”, which means that there is no authority above the states. International order can also be used to denote a historical period, such as that of the Concert of Europe or the Cold War. In such a use, international order entails more information than just polarity or anarchy. The Cold War order, for example, is an order of bloc politics and ideological competition by nature. But for spheres of influence, and the English School theory, international order is something more. It signifies the political organisation of the world expressly as a system/society of states.

International order is important to Bull; he examines it in *The Anarchical Society* (2002), first published in 1977. Keal follows in his footsteps to theorise on sphere of influence and order. For both Bull and Keal, it is important to notice that order has a purpose. Order is not promoted for its own sake, but for some purpose laid down by international society (Keal 1983, 194–195). Bull (2002, 3–4) explains that order is something more than simply regular behaviour. Bull claims that states’ behaviour in war and crisis, even though it would seem organised and orderly, is not an expression of order in social life. Order in social life has certain goals and values to promote and thus cannot encompass merely any regular relations. (Ibid.)

Then what is the purpose of international order? According to Bull (2002, 16) international order is “the pattern or disposition of activity that sustains the primary, elementary or universal goals of the society of states, or international society”. This is important for the idea of sphere of influence: international order sustains the goals of the society of states, which means that that the components of that order are states. For Bull, the first goal is the preservation of the system and society of states as the prevailing form of universal political organisation. Bull refers to instances in history where this has been challenged by a dominant state trying to form a universal empire: the Habsburg Empire, Napoleon’s France, the Third Reich and, as Bull notes, “perhaps post-1945 America”.
Threats have also come from ‘supra-states’ such as the Papacy, the Holy Roman Empire and even the United Nations. (Ibid.) The second goal of international order for Bull is maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of states. The preservation of the system nevertheless comes first, encouraging and tolerating such practices as agreements establishing spheres of influence (ibid., 17).

The third goal of international order is peace, which, like sovereignty, is again subordinate to the preservation of the system itself but also subordinate to the preservation of sovereignty of independent states. Fourth, Bull lists the goals of “limitation of violence resulting in death or bodily harm, the keeping of promises and the stabilization of possession by rules of property” as those of international society. (Bull 2002, 17–18.) The emphasis Bull gives to the preservation of the system of states – over sovereignty and peace – as the main goal of international society becomes extremely relevant for spheres of influence when reflected against Schmitt’s (2003) fear of the universalisms of the Soviet Union and the United States and the need to preserve the pluralism of the system (see chapter 5). In Bull’s theory, spheres of influence represent a practice of limiting sovereignty which is acceptable as long as it does not threaten the international order of states. Bull does not discuss the possibility that sphere of influence could violate the principle of sovereignty in a way that would challenge the first goal of international order, although he discusses alternatives to states-systems. Schmitt, by contrast, sees spheres of influence, or Großräume as he called them, as representing a new international order, an alternative to the state. This will be discussed more in chapter 5.

Bull (2002, 102–104) also discusses the means by which international order is sustained. He argues that international order is maintained through the balance of power. For Bull the main function of the balance of power is to maintain the system of states against conquest and incorporation into a universal empire. Bull continues that the balance of power tends to operate in favour of great powers at the expense of small ones. He explains how the balance of power is necessary for the preservation of the system: “From a point of view of a weak state sacrificed to it, the balance of power must appear as brutal principle. But its function in the preservation of international order is not for this reason less central”.


The balance of power as a means to maintain the preferred order necessarily violates the rights of individual members of the society of states, just like spheres of influence do – all for the sake of the order. The normative web around sphere of influence is woven out of these elements: the justification of the primacy of the system of states, the justification of violations of sovereignty in the name of the balance of power, and other great power management tools. The historical development, as I have presented earlier, has been one from de jure sovereignty to de facto great power management. In the next chapter I will explore the elements making up international society, as well as its normative underpinnings, in more detail.

Keal discusses the relationship between order and spheres of influence in detail, and poses the question whether spheres of influence contribute to order. His (1983, 199) answer is that the contemporary international order relies on superpower relations and, more specifically, order rests on the pillar of mutual acquiescence with regard to spheres of influence. For Keal “[s]pheres of influence contribute to order between influencing powers, and hence to order in general, through tacit understanding which serves the goals of social coexistence, and by contributing to what influencing powers perceive as necessary to a balance of power” (ibid., 209–210). According to Keal, the defence of spheres of influence in general has been that they diminish the possibility of conflicts in the international system. Hierarchical relationships maintain order within a bloc and a sphere of influence removes the area from external challenges, thus contributing to order. Relations among the influenced states are kept in check by the influencing power, thus limiting conflicts. Keal describes how a relationship of dependence is also a synonym for a sphere of influence: ”Through aid, trade and investment and through the harmony of interest between the elites in both the influenced states and the influencing power, control has been established and can be maintained.” Thus, Keal reasons that as a form of dependence a sphere of influence can lead to disorder by unjust distribution of wealth, which will prompt revolutionary action for economic and social justice. This might have consequences for the international system, especially if armed conflict breaks out between the influencing and the influenced and if an outside power intervenes. (Keal 1983, 199–203.)
For Keal (1983, 204–207), spheres of influence contribute most importantly to stability of possessions, limitation of violence, and to the sanctity of contracts or stable expectations – all elements of the fourth goal of Bull’s international order. This is so because a sphere of influence is removed from the disputes between the influencing powers. Moreover, spheres of influence contribute to order between influencing powers and order in general through tacit agreements. (Ibid.). Keal also points out the relationship between a balance of power and spheres of influence: “So far the argument has been that spheres of influence contribute to order between influencing powers, and hence to order in general, through tacit understanding which serves the goals of social coexistence, and by contributing to what influencing powers perceive as necessary to a balance of power” (ibid., 209). The problem is, as Keal notes, that for spheres of influence to contribute to order static relations are required, a status quo, but social systems are constantly changing (ibid., 211).

For Keal (1983, 197–199), stability of possessions is safeguarded not only in sovereignty but also in spheres of influence. Thus, Keal does not contrast sovereignty and spheres of influence but sees both as contributing to the same goal of international order. As elements of international order spheres of influence remain squarely within the limits of the system of states, and for Keal there is no need to discuss spheres of influence as something distinct from that system. Where Bull claims that the most important goal of international order is preservation of the system, to which sovereignty was subordinate, Keal sets sovereignty with the principle of non-intervention as the most important goal. (Ibid.) This is because for Keal there is only one international order and that is the system of states. Bull, instead, discusses alternatives to the system of states, such as an order consisting of a universal empire. But if the system of states is turned into a universal empire, spheres of influence are no longer relevant. International order is relevant for spheres of influence, because it encompasses the question of how spheres of influence fit within international society and whether the system of states can accommodate violations of sovereignty. International order is not necessarily composed of states, and this Bull (2002) recognises as well. But as a concept sphere of influence was born namely out of the state-system and great power management. The fact that spheres of influence support the system of
states while violating its core principles is a fascinating theoretical aspect of the concept of sphere of influence which I will later explain within the framework of the pluralist-solidarist debate and also explore in the context of Russian discourses in chapter 7.

The relationship between order and spheres of influence is also worth looking at from the normative perspective, asking whether the maintenance of international order is a justification for a sphere-of-influence policy which violates sovereignty. We have already seen how for Keal spheres of influence can contribute to international order. Bull takes the essentially same position when justifying the special status of great powers. For Bull (2002, 199–200) the contribution of great powers to international order derives from the inequality of power within the states-system. If all were equal in power, it would be hard to see how international conflicts could ever be settled. Inequality of states simplifies the pattern of international relations. Bull explains how great powers contribute to international order when they manage relations with each other by preserving a balance of power, seeking to limit and avoid crises, conflict and war among themselves and imparting a central direction to the affairs of international society. (Ibid.) According to Bull, great powers manage relations with each other first and foremost by preserving the balance of power, which provides conditions under which the system of states can endure (ibid., 201). Because of the order which the inequality in power produces, other states accept the special rights and duties of great powers. Even though at times great powers deliberately manufacture crises, measures to avoid and control crises are an essential part of the ‘management of great power relations’, as Bull points out. (Ibid., 203–206.)

Bull (2002, 199) indicates that spheres of influence (those of the United States and the Soviet Union) prevent, keep within bounds, help to resolve and contain conflicts. Bull further explains how the United States and the Soviet Union refrained from unilateral intervention in one another’s sphere of influence. The two great powers behaved as if they recognised a rule prohibiting direct influence on each other’s spheres of influence. (Ibid., 202–204.) Bull also underlines that these are the roles that can, and sometimes do, promote international order but that great
powers also frequently act in ways that cause disorder by upsetting the general balance and causing conflict and wars (ibid., 201).

There are two conclusions to draw about the relationship between spheres of influence and international order:

1) The relationship between spheres of influence and order falls within an international system composed of sovereign states. Both Keal and Bull are able to incorporate spheres of influence within the system of sovereign states; there is no fundamental conflict between influence and sovereignty. The system of states does not crumble because of spheres of influence. Enough plurality and sovereignty remains to provide the foundation of the states-system. What is more, spheres of influence even support the states-system as a means of great power management that prevents the emergence of a universal empire. In chapter 7, we will see how Russian analysts struggle to incorporate within the system of sovereign states the inequality that great power management and spheres of influence require.

2) Spheres of influence in Bull’s and Keal’s conceptualisation can contribute to international order. We should not ignore or take for granted the relationship between spheres of influence and international order, which happens if spheres of influence are taken to signify only a self-serving foreign policy practice. Spheres of influence can still mean a power game, but this game affects international structures, which is why we should be interested in the effects of spheres of influence on the system, not only on its members. What we can conclude from Bull’s and Keal’s discussion is that there is some potential for good in great power management and spheres of influence. For Keal, spheres of influence contribute to international order by stabilising relations among great powers, but the injustice that a sphere of influence entails can also become a source of conflicts. Another hindrance to spheres of influence providing benefits for international order is that the stability and predictability which spheres of influence create are subject to constant change. As the distribution of power within the system changes, so do the spheres of influence. Bull, too, views spheres of influence, although based on inequality, as a practice which promotes order. Spheres of influence function as a part of great power management, which is a necessity for settling conflicts among states. These are important perspectives in questioning the pejorative associations of the concept of sphere of influence in the present.
4 International Society and the Normative Question

In order to unravel the normative aspects of spheres of influence, I will next look into the English School literature on international society. We now know that for Bull and Keal spheres of influence can contribute to international order, but there is more to be discovered by examining further the idea of international society. Bull’s list of the rules and institutions of that society frame the concept of sphere of influence: it can be conceptualised by exploring the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention and examining the institutions of great power management, balance of power and international law. But going through how the English School defines these concepts would not contribute to the theoretical conceptualisation of a sphere of influence unless I could establish a meaningful relationship between them and the concept of sphere of influence. As I looked at the present pejorative use of the term ”sphere of influence”, the normative dimension appeared to me to be the link which would reveal what we need to know about the English School approach to the phenomenon. Thus, the logic of this chapter is to discuss great powers, balance of power, sovereignty, non-intervention and international law from the perspective of justice.

4.1 The Rules and Institutions of International Society

According to Buzan (2004a, 161), the concept of institutions is central to the English School because it entails the substantive content of international society and underpins what English School writers mean by “international order”. The subject of the institutions of international society is quite complex within the English School literature (see Buzan 2004a). As this is not a study on the English School, I take the liberty to pass over much of the controversy that surrounds the subject and explore that which we need to know in order to ponder spheres of influence from a normative angle. The foundations of English School thinking

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11 For a discussion on international society see Little 2002, Buzan 2004a, Roberson 2002.
lie precisely where sphere of influence can be located: 1) international society as a community of states with rules and institutions and 2) the pendulum movement within this society between independence and empire or, in other words, between pluralism and solidarism.

I wrote earlier that for the English School international order is predicated on the system of states, but even more so on a society of states or international society. In a well-known quotation, Bull (2002, 13) explains that “[a] society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”. He continues, “An international society in this sense presupposes an international system, but an international system may exist that is not an international society”. This means that states may interact without common interests and values, forming a system but not a society. (Ibid.) The English School conception of international society resonates with the idea of a society of state-persons, which means that one can, to some extent, apply the “domestic analogy” (states as a society of individuals) to understand international relations. States want to construct a society in which they are able to peacefully manage relations among themselves; as part of the process they promote common values and abide by common rules. More and more states are also willing to agree on principles such as human rights, protection of which necessitates relinquishing some sovereign rights and according human justice a place alongside interstate justice.

R.J. Vincent (1990, 39) describes Bull’s international society as a “Grotian world” between the Hobbesian rejection of a society of states and the Kantian idea of a cosmopolitan society of individuals. Where the Hobbesian view of international relations is a state of war against all, the Kantian is based on transnational social bonds between individual human beings (Bull 2002, 23–24). The Grotian tradition stands between the realist and universalist traditions and emphasises that common rules and institutions limit conflicts among states. In other

12 See Little (2007, 140-148) on the discussions of the usefulness of separating system from society.

13 However, Bull (2002; 39, 49.) writes that the international system [in his time] included traits of all the three traditions: 1) war and struggle, 2) elements of transnational solidarity and conflict and 3) cooperation and regulated intercourse among states. For Bull one of these three elements can predominate in different times and places over others.
words, states are bound by the rules and institutions of the society that they are members of. Moreover, they are bound by rules of not only prudence and expediency but also law and morality. (Ibid., 25.) The Grotian conception of international society is also called solidarist, in contrast to a pluralist view, in which states are able to agree only on certain minimum purposes (Bull 1966a, 52). Although Bull (1966a, 68) argues in *Diplomatic Investigations* that the members in Grotius’ system of are not states but individuals, he writes in *The Anarchical Society* that the immediate members of international society are states rather than individual human beings (Bull 2002, 25). Bull’s international society takes the state as the principal member but infuses it with solidarism, which makes the system into a society.

Thus, for Bull, international society is characterised by states that are bound by common rules and institutions. Bull explains that rules may have the status of international law, of moral rules, of customs or of established practice; or they may be operational rules worked out without formal, or even verbal, agreement. For Bull, sovereignty and non-intervention are rules of coexistence. (Bull 2002, 64–67.) Bull (2002, 71) defines institutions as follows: “By an institution we do not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practises shaped towards the realisation of common goals”. Institutions are an expression of and means for collaboration among states. Thus, rules are agreed among states, even if only tacitly, whereas institutions emerge as practices or habits. Like rules, institutions enable collaboration among states; that is, they produce enough solidarity to make the system function as a society.

The international institutions, according to Bull (2002, 71), include *balance of power, international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system of great powers and war*. Bull (2002, 68) writes that states themselves are the principal institutions of international society in that they make the rules of coexistence (sovereignty and intervention) effective. This makes institutions mechanisms for the enforcement of rules. Wight (1995, 111) and Jackson (2000, 58) have slightly different versions of the institutions and Buzan (2004a) identifies primary and secondary institutions in different interstate societies. For the purposes of this study, it is not of great importance to debate the differences among
sets of rules and institutions and make lists of them but to recognise that the principles which determine relations among states also govern spheres of influence, and influence the possible justifications for them.

As I have written already, a sphere of influence is not listed as an institution or a rule within the English School theory. The concept appears occasionally but it is never explicitly situated within the international society of the English School, not even by Buzan. I find it very curious that the English School ignores the phenomenon in this way. Luckily for us, Keal did not ignore the concept and its role within the web of rules and institutions. When it comes to spheres of influence, Keal (1983, 2) writes about tacit understandings between great powers and “rules of the game” instead of laws or written agreements. In his estimation, tacit understandings of spheres of influence provide unwritten rules or guidelines for promoting common interests. These understandings may violate international law but they nevertheless contribute to international order. (Ibid., 3.) According to Keal, underlying tacit understandings about spheres of influence is the fact that accepting sovereignty as a universal principle made formal agreements on spheres of influence unacceptable in practice. Keal explains that great powers can no longer make explicit agreements such as they did during the European expansion. Formally, they deny having spheres of influence, but agreements are made that are unspoken or tacit. (Ibid.; 45, 207.) Keal thus differentiates the more formal agreements on expansion (colonialism) and the more informal agreements on spheres of influence.

What we have here is the argument by Bull that international society is built on certain rules and institutions and by Keal that spheres of influence are founded upon “unwritten rules or guidelines for promoting common interests”. The rules and institutions of the international society also offer a relevant framework for conceptualising sphere of influence as a special relationship between states. It would be difficult to imagine spheres of influence without the notion of sovereignty, great and small powers, intervention and the balancing game. It should be noted, though, that Bull’s rules and institutions are contested concepts in themselves and I will discuss and analyse these concepts as they are defined by the English School. Moreover, because the purpose of this study is not to analyse all possible aspects of the focal rules and institutions, I will
confine myself to trying to establish the normative relationship between those rules and institutions and spheres of influence. I believe that by focusing on the normative – the hidden knowledge which is lacking in the present – I will avoid the pitfall of making spheres of influence dependent on some specific definition of, for example, sovereignty. Exposing spheres of influence to a normative dialogue with the rules and institutions of international society avoids fixing concepts to a particular definition. We can and should still contest the concepts of balance of power and sovereignty even if we argue that they are the framework for understanding spheres of influence.

4.2 Classes of Power and the Balance of Power

As I have argued, the concept of sphere of influence in international theory owes much to the theory on the institutions of international society and the rules of coexistence, of which I have chosen to discuss the ones I consider most relevant. In this chapter I briefly return to the subject of great power management, but I also discuss the status of being a great power and its pejorative aspect. The balance of power is constructed as a great power management tool just like spheres of influence, making the two closely associated. That which Keal calls the *influencing state* is the great power. The *influenced state* belongs to the class of small or lesser powers. Edy Kaufman (1976, 27–28) writes on great power influence, “Furthermore, it was always a condition of acceptance as a world power, that one maintained a position of supremacy in one’s own region of the world, and this is a further inducement to the superpowers to subjugate their nearest subsystems”. For Kaufman, becoming a world power requires influence beyond state borders, and specifically influence in the nearest territories. A sphere of influence is thus what makes a power great, making the status of great power important for theorising spheres of influence.

The concept of a great power needs some additional scrutiny. First, a conceptual clarity about great powers and other powers needs to be achieved. Starting with great powers, Bull (2002, 194–195) writes that when speaking of great powers there are two features at play: there needs
to be two or more great powers comparable in status and a club with a rule of membership. Members of the great power club are all in the front rank in military capacity, with no one power being superior to others (ibid.). Bull does not, in the end, give a full account of the differences between different powers, which is why I consider it useful to examine Buzan’s reasoning. Buzan (2004b) has classified powers in terms of three categories: superpowers, great powers and regional powers. Superpowers exercise global political and military reach. Concerning great powers Buzan writes, “[W]hat distinguishes great powers from merely regional ones is that they are responded to by others on the basis of system-level calculations, as well as regional ones, about the present and near future distribution of power.” What makes great powers different from superpowers is that great powers need not be present in all parts of the world. For a great power it is enough to operate in regions other than its own. Regional powers, by contrast, have capabilities in their regions, but are not active on the global level. They are excluded from system-level calculations but they dominate security relations locally. (Buzan 2004b, 69–72, 76.)

In light of Buzan’s analysis, regional powers could also pursue spheres of influence, or at least they have some influence within their own region. During the world wars, a sphere of influence referred specifically to regional influence confined within the borders of what was a new territorial entity, but the influencing state was always a great power. During the Cold War, the superpowers, with their world-wide influence, were seen as being able to establish spheres of influence. Today Russia is described either as a great power or a power with great-power ambitions, a characterisation which links the idea of sphere of influence to the class of great powers more so than to that of regional powers. The idea of a concert of great powers, promoted by Russia, is also an idea of a club of great powers and not regional ones. The balance of power belongs also to the great power order as a mechanism of great power management. Thus an actor perceived as having a sphere of influence has been and still is a great power rather than a regional power. What we can also observe is a triangle of a sphere of influence, great power status and a balance of power, in which the three elements belong together and affect each other.
The class of small or minor powers is not dealt with by Bull or Buzan. For spheres of influence, the category of the influenced (small) powers is nevertheless significant. Small powers are the targets of influence and should thus also be separated as a distinct group. States in all three of Buzan's classes of power are “great” in relation to small powers and have the capacity to extend influence over smaller states. Perhaps the category of small powers could then be defined as those states which are under the influence of other, greater, powers. Small states are the objects of power politics, “puppets” and “satellites” to use the metaphors of influence. On the other hand, small powers can influence the balance of power by shifting allegiances. A small power can have a stronger economy than a greater power as measured by other indicators. Small powers can gain from their close relationship with a greater power, adding to their military strength, economic strength or prestige. Thus, small states are not necessarily insignificant actors. In fact, a sphere of influence does not necessarily involve total subjugation of the small influenced powers. On balance, the class of small powers is every bit as ambiguous as any other. More importantly, this ambiguity means that the relationship between the great and the small, as well as the direction of influence between them, is not that clear-cut either.

The classification of powers into super, great, regional and small in the context of spheres of influence adds to the concept’s pejorative meaning. The strict division into the great influencing power and the small influenced power creates an image of one-way influence and the guilt of the great versus the innocence of the small. A great deal of great power management is accepted among states, such as occasional military interventions or the institutionalised hierarchy of the United Nations Security Council. But when it comes to sphere of influence, a small power is perceived as the victim and the influencing power takes on a negative status. This is one way in which the concept of sphere of influence is used in a pejorative sense: it is seen as predicated on a dichotomy of the bad influencing power and the suffering influenced power. Breaking down this dichotomy would mean discussing the role of great powers as system-level players and the role of small states as influenced powers. In the end it means looking at the interests of the focal actors but at the same time situating spheres of influence within the international system, that is, as
an aspect of great power management and a means of balancing. If the roles given to the influencing and the influenced power in contemporary uses of the concept of sphere of influence are ascribed a pejorative meaning, the same semantic burden is laid upon the concept of balance of power. The pejorative associations of the concept of sphere of influence in the context of the balance of power emphasise the role of small states as objects of great power games. But by connecting spheres of influence and a balance of power with the same objective of preventing a single hegemon from emerging, the normative horizon widens and a sphere-of-influence policy denotes not only hunger for power and subjugation of a weaker party but also a defence of the plurality of international society. Discussing how much influence we can accept for the sake of the system, at the expense of the influenced, sets the stage for a normative debate between spheres of influence and a balance of power.

For Wight (1966a, 153), balance of power is used in a normative way to denote the principle that the balance ought to be evenly distributed. Balance of power is endowed with a normative element in that it is often seen as a power game which does not treat small states fairly, just like a sphere of influence. This makes it unjust. On the other hand, balance of power is associated with the positive function of maintaining international order and, more specifically, maintaining a plurality of states and thus preventing world domination by a single power. Butterfield (1966, 32) compares a balance of power to a Newtonian system of astronomy where “[a]ll the various bodies, the greater and the lesser powers, were poised against one another, each exercising a kind of gravitational pull on all the rest – and the pull of each would be proportionate to its mass, though its effect would be greatly reduced as it acted at a greater distance.” If we think about the pendulum idea, it is as if balance of power is situated within hegemony and domination. A balance of power requires a certain amount of hegemony, which makes international society drift away from independence, but it also prevents a system of empire taking over.

For Bull, there is a general balance of power in the international system, which means the absence of a preponderant power from the system as a whole. In a local or particular balance of power, a preponderant power is missing from one area or segment of a system. Local balances are subordinate to the general balance. (Bull 2002, 98–99.) Under this logic,
spheres of influence work on both levels: they maintain a general balance between great powers or superpowers, and at the local level, where spheres of influence are established, balance is replaced by preponderance. Thus, a sphere of influence eliminates a balance of power locally, but this does not lead to the collapse of the general balance. In fact, the distinction between general and local balances does not seem very significant for international order, because in the end it is only the general balance which maintains the system of states.

I have already introduced Little’s (2007, 34) balance of power as an image of a set of scales, but for spheres of influence the question is, What is the relationship between spheres of influence and a balance of power? Bull (2002, 98) implies that balance of power has something to do with spheres of influence. According to Bull, one strategy (in addition to military technology and industry) to augment a state’s strength is the exploitation of the existence of other states by absorbing, partitioning or allying with them. Wight (1966a, 149) also mentions alliances and affinities as means to achieve a balance. For Keal, spheres of influence contributed, at least in the influencing powers’ view, to the maintenance of a balance of power. Keal (1983, 209) writes, “So far the argument has been that spheres of influence contribute to order between influencing powers, and hence to order in general, through tacit understanding which serves the goals of social coexistence, and by contributing to what influencing powers perceive as necessary to a balance of power.”

In both world wars and the Cold War period, the idea of international influence was always more or less connected with the idea of a balance of power. When the term ”sphere of influence” was used to denote colonial relationships, the concern was not so much with international order, which is why Lindley (1926) and Lord Curzon (1907) did not discuss balance of power. The concept of sphere of influence is also rather lacking in the literature on balance of power. The likely reason for this is that balance of power, as a concept, is primarily concerned with the effects of an increase in a state’s power through war and conquest, and less with influence. Herbert Butterfield (1966), for example, discusses balance of power at length without mentioning spheres of influence. Russian analysts also keep the two concepts of spheres of influence and balance of power separate. A balance of power is readily advocated but spheres of
influence rarely are. The relationship between the two lies in the fact that both are constructed as methods to maintain the system of states and that spheres of influence can help to establish or maintain a balance of power.

The idea of a balance of power, unlike spheres of influence, recognises small states as both victims and actors in the balancing game. Bull (2002, 103–104) writes, “From the point of view of a weak state sacrificed to it, the balance of power must appear as a brutal principle. But its function in the preservation of international order is not for this reason less central”. For Bull the general balance of power is what matters and if small states must be sacrificed for international order, then so be it. In a contrasting perspective, Butterfield (1966, 142) explains how writers in the eighteenth century thought that a balance of power guaranteed the existence of small powers and actually gave them more room to manoeuvre in terms of foreign policy, as they were not mere satellites. A balance of power vindicated small states (ibid., 145). For Wight, in a system that rests on a balance of power, small states can sometimes hold the decisive power with regard to the balance (Wight 1966a, 161), which implies vindication rather than victimisation. In a sphere-of-influence system, small states are not vindicated in this way. Neither Keal nor Bull discusses the possibility of small powers being vindicated within a sphere of influence, or even having the power to play great powers against each other by choosing the sphere they want to belong to. Thus, with this logic, when a sphere of influence is used as a means to achieve a balance of power, it is always in full control of a great power and small states are kept on a tight leash. Small states are not able to shift their affinities but rather are at the mercy of the influencing states, meaning that small states have no power where a balance of power is concerned. Connecting spheres of influence and a balance of power reveals how for Keal and Bull a sphere of influence is not a source of vindication of small states – unlike a balance of power may be. What is interesting is the question of whether vindication of small states is how things ought to be, because following the logic of “spheres of influence contributing to order with stability of possessions” it would not seem like a good idea to give small states too much room to manoeuvre. Butterfield (1966, 145) explains that within the European balance of power, freedom has been promoted before peace, precisely because considerations of the balance of power
vindicated small states. In a way, this provides the answer to the question posed above: even if vindication of small states means conflict and war, a choice will be made in favour of a balance of power over a universal empire. There ought to be freedom, which means the vindication of small powers, because freedom means freedom from a universal empire.

A balance of power takes precedence not only over the rights of small powers but also over international law. According to Bull (2002, 103–104), the relationship between balance of power and international law is paradoxical. He writes that the existence of a balance of power is essential for the operation of international law, but maintaining a balance often involves violating that body of law. The reason why international law requires the functioning of a balance of power is that the basic rules of international law depend on reciprocity. In the case of a single preponderant power, that power would not need to obey the rules of the society of states and could act as it pleased instead. (Ibid.) Bull writes, “The requirements of order are treated as prior to those of law, as they are treated also as prior to the interests of small powers and the keeping of peace” (ibid., 105). This principle applies to the idea of sphere of influence, if, like a balance of power, establishing a sphere of influence is viewed as a preventive measure against the danger of a universal empire. In such a case, sphere of influence also necessarily overrides peace, the rights of the small, and law. Order, when maintained by a balance of power and spheres of influence, works to justify the breaking of even the basic rule of the system itself: sovereignty. I will discuss the relationship between international law and spheres of influence later. The section to follow presents the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.

4.3 Sovereignty and Non-intervention

I have argued that the history of spheres of influence is the history of the system of states. This makes sovereignty of utmost importance for spheres of influence. In his Genealogy of Sovereignty, Bartelson (1995, 22–24) argues that the idea of sovereignty is the essence of international political theory. Sovereignty explains the international system and defines the state. Bartelson asserts that “sovereignty is constituted as a
primitive presence from which all theorizing necessarily must depart, if it is to remain international political theorizing”. (Ibid.) Sovereignty is so powerful a presupposition to a student of international relations or anyone who wants to analyse international relations that it must belong to the very heart of the idea of sphere of influence. To quote Walker (1994, 62), “Spatially, the principle of state sovereignty fixes a clear demarcation between life inside and outside a centered political community”. Spheres of influence break the holiness of this demarcation by intruding upon the territory of another sovereign. Spheres of influence essentially involve violation or non-violation of sovereignty, yet this core consideration has drawn surprisingly little theoretical interest.

I treat sovereignty as the principal organising idea of the system of states and as an idea which determines much of the meaning of the concept of sphere of influence. Sovereignty is often divided into external and internal. Bull (2002, 8) defines internal sovereignty as supremacy over all other authorities within a given territory and population, and external sovereignty as independence of outside authorities. International theory is interested specifically in external sovereignty and the nature of the system as anarchical. For Wight, sovereignty is a claim to be politically and juridically independent of any superior. Legal equality of states means a claim of independence of any political superior while at the same time recognising the same claim by all others. Wight continues that these accepted principles have nevertheless not guaranteed equality in practice. (Wight 1977; 23, 42, 130, 135.)

The relevance of sovereignty for sphere of influence can be illustrated through the principle of non-intervention. The relevance of intervention is in the difficulty of defining sovereignty and that which constitutes a violation of sovereignty. Waltz (1979, 95–96) makes an interesting claim in arguing that sovereignty does not mean that states are able to do as they wish. Sovereignty does not mean freedom from the influence of other states: “Sovereign states may be hardpressed all around, constrained to act in ways they would like to avoid, and able to do hardly anything just as they would like to” (ibid., 96). Waltz (ibid.) continues, ”To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance form others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments
to them”. Because of the difficulties in defining the terms of sovereignty it is not easy to come to terms with the relationship between spheres of influence and sovereignty. Following Waltz’s logic, we could enquire if the establishment of a sphere of influence, in the end, even violates sovereignty. Is it just a relationship of dependency which does not clash with sovereignty? At the same time, the concept of sphere of influence appears to entail a claim that the influencing state violates the sovereignty of the influenced. The problem becomes one of choosing between the idea of a sphere of influence which does not conflict with sovereignty and a sphere of influence which clearly violates sovereign rights. This is where the concept of intervention becomes useful in trying to determine when or if a particular sphere of influence involves a violation of sovereignty. Intervention can constrain the internal and/or external choices of a state to such an extent that it constitutes as a violation of sovereignty in Waltz’s terms. Thus, we could conclude that at least interventionist approaches to establishing or maintaining a sphere of influence are in violation of sovereignty. The nature of intervention is still a matter of debate but at least the concept provides a topical and easily accessible means to discuss whether spheres of influence necessarily involve violations of sovereignty.

Keal (1983, 182) and Wight (1995, 194) refer to intervention as a means to assert a sphere of influence. According to Vincent (1974, 330–331), respect for the rule of non-intervention means that states recognise the existence and legitimacy of others. The rule of non-intervention is fundamental to the international order of states, because it establishes respect for sovereignty and it determines whether the nature of the system is Hobbesian-Grotian-Kantian or as pluralist-solidarist. Intervention belongs to the same category as spheres of influence, balance of power and great power management in that while they clearly represent inequality, they are also often accepted and seem to be integral parts of the functioning of the international system. For Wight (1966b, 111), intervention even rises above all other forms of conduct with the controversy it generates:

*Intervention perhaps gives rise to more controversy than any other international conduct. Violating the assumption of the equal independence of all members of the society of states, it is *prima facie* a hostile act. Yet it is so habitual and regular that it is impossible to*
Imagine international relations without it; and international law can only make a system out of it by losing touch with diplomatic facts.

Intervention is controversial not only as an act, but also as an idea. As Wight (1966b) puts it, intervention as a concept is fluid and imprecise. Bull (1984b, 1) states that intervention can be forcible or non-forcible, direct or non-direct, open or clandestine. For Stanley Hoffman (1984, 9), intervention can be explicitly coercive, such as economic coercion, and implicit, such as bribery and propaganda bombardment.¹⁴ According to Vincent (1974, 8), intervention is coercive interference accompanied by the use or threat of force. Bull (1984b, 1) describes intervention as interference in another state’s jurisdiction over its territory, citizens, and right to determine its internal affairs and external relations. Intervention, just like a sphere of influence, entails inequality in power. To quote Bull (ibid.):

_A basic condition of any policy that can be called interventionary in this sense is that the intervener should be superior in power to the object of the intervention: it is only because the former is relatively strong and the latter relatively weak that the question arises of a form of interference that is dictatorial or coercive._

Bull (1984a, 184) asserts that great inequalities of power make interventions possible. Nevertheless, the simple fact of inequality of power between states is not tantamount to interference; inequality is actually inherent in the system of states. Involvement in a state’s sphere of jurisdiction needs to be dictatorial or coercive in nature to be called illegal interference. (Ibid., 187–188.) Bull’s distinction between dictatorial and coercive intervention and “the mutual involvement of peoples in one another’s affairs” is of course a matter of interpretation and causes disagreements over those actions to be counted as intervention and those which cannot be. But the idea of coercive intervention versus non-coercive involvement offers a perspective from which one can reflect on sphere of influence. As the concept is pejorative in tone, references

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¹⁴ In the same volume Windsor (1984, 50) argues that economic coercion or propaganda do not constitute as intervention since they are a state’s normal foreign policy tools counting only military force as intervention.
to a sphere of influence would imply coercive involvement, but any consideration of the concept in a normative perspective would prompt a debate on whether the influence involved is coercive influence or non-coercive, or “non-forceful involvement”.

Bull (1984b, 1) continues that throughout modern history it is the great powers that have had the capability to intervene, meaning also that, by definition, a great power cannot be the object of an intervention, since then it would no longer deserve to be called a great power. It then follows that great power status and intervention go hand in hand, which is not far from saying that being a great power and having a sphere of influence are closely linked. Intervention, depending on whether it is justified or not, becomes a matter of great power responsibility or privilege. Whether an intervention is justified or not, the small state’s sovereignty is always violated, even when the people of the state stand to gain from it.

What makes the topic of intervention even more complex is the blurring of the distinction between acts of intervention and non-intervention. Wight (1995, 199) writes that non-intervention can be just as positive a policy as intervention: “Hence the truth of Talleyrand’s sardonic remark that ‘non-intervention is a term of political metaphysics signifying almost the same thing as intervention’”. Non-intervention can mean support for some cause (other than that achieved by intervention) or its purpose could be to prevent intervention. Hoffmann (1984, 8) puts forward the same claim, pointing out that even non-acts can constitute intervention, also referring to Talleyrand. As regards spheres of influence, non-intervention could signify the acceptance of another power’s sphere of influence. It could mean a failure to come to the rescue of a small power falling into the hands of the influencing power. In such a case, by analysing policies of intervention and non-intervention, we could determine how spheres of influence appear as great powers refrain from intervening in territories under the others’ influence. Russia’s ability to intervene in the territory of Georgia, and the reluctance of others to take any counter-actions could be interpreted as Russia consolidating and other powers acknowledging a Russian sphere of influence. Non-intervention could also mean resistance to acknowledging a sphere of influence, for example, in the case of Russia abstaining from participation in the intervention in Yugoslavia and thus
abstaining from taking part in causing Kosovo to fall under Western control.

The moral element of intervention is evident. Whereas the concept of sphere of influence does not appear in international law, this is not the case for intervention. International law is very clear about intervention: non-intervention is the rule, whereas intervention is an exception to that rule (see Bull 1984b, 2). The principle of non-intervention is necessary to the principle of sovereignty. As Vincent (1974, 14) puts it, “The principle of non-intervention identifies the right of states to sovereignty as a standard in international society and makes explicit the respect required for it in abstention from intervention”. The principle of sovereignty requires that intervention must always be somehow justified. Bull (1984b, 2–3) lists exceptions, recognised by international lawyers and moralists alike, when intervention can be justified. The invitation of an incumbent government, counter-intervention, self-defence and collectively authorised intervention can serve as such exceptions (ibid). In *The Anarchical Society*, Bull (2002, 138–139) observes that although international law forbids states to intervene in one another’s internal affairs, it is argued that sometimes considerations of the balance of power require intervention in order to establish a great power’s influence or to resist the influence of a great power. Also Wight (1995, 196) notes how international lawyers have given their blessing to intervention when it is meant to maintain a balance of power. There is also an exception to the rule of non-intervention inscribed in the United Nations Charter. Keal (1983, 183) explains that Article 51 permits an exception to the non-intervention rule where intervention can be accepted if it is for self-defence in the event of an armed attack.

According to Vincent (1974, 11–12), many international lawyers view the motive for intervention as determining the legality of the act. But this causes further confusion as to whether an instance of interference that is considered lawful can be called intervention anymore (ibid.). What is unlawful intervention and what is tolerable interference? Although intervention involves the threat or use of force, Wight (1995, 192) explains, even an offer of friendly assistance may be suspect as to its motives and be denounced as intervention. This was the case when the Soviet Union denounced the United States’ offer of Marshall Aid
to Europe in 1947. Watson (2002, 151) points to the fact that there is a large grey area of pressure and interference where interveners can operate while appealing to international peace and security. Great powers have the leverage to balance between intervention and non-intervention and there is constant dispute regarding the justifiability and illegality of interventions. The idea of a sphere of influence actually offers a solution to the uncertainty of intervention. The advantage Keal (1983, 197–203) sees in spheres of influence is that they contribute to stable possessions and thereby limit the possibility of conflicts. Thus, spheres of influence, under this logic, would serve to limit conflicts over interventions between great powers as they could freely intervene within their own sphere of influence and refrain from intervening in those of others. It would not, however, resolve the issue of spheres of influence potentially subjugating smaller states and violating the principle of sovereignty. For Vincent (1974, 8) it is important that intervention is defined as something that is not a permanent state of affairs. Intervention occurs but it also must cease at some point in order to qualify as intervention (ibid.). Interpreting Vincent, a permanent state of intervention could actually be understood as a sphere of influence. This idea is not articulated within the English School; it is something I am reading between the lines.

Acknowledging the idea of sphere of influence would then render intervention what might be called structural intervention. Bull (1984b, 5) refers to this term, but Philip Windsor (1984, 45) explains it in more detail:

*But at the same time a general assumption persists of a world so-dominated, indeed permeated, by sheer power that it becomes almost futile to discuss the question of intervention by the superpowers because it is like asking what contribution oxygen makes to our ability to breathe in the atmosphere.*

What Windsor (1984, 46) is talking about is “a fundamental and permanent form of intervention, even a kind of structural intervention affecting the activities of all kinds of other states in the world”. Windsor explains how the Brezhnev Doctrine was the Soviet version of structural intervention: “The Brezhnev Doctrine is similarly an appeal to an overriding moral or historical principle, claiming a higher legitimacy
than that of international law. [...] The Soviet Union, in other words, has created a higher order of legitimacy for intervention.” (Ibid., 54–55.) Windsor does not consider this to have been unique to the Soviet Union, as the United States also claimed a higher legitimacy than international law by its mission of defending other countries against a universalising foe (ibid., 57–58). Windsor concludes that whereas the Soviet Union was practicing structural intervention in Eastern Europe, the United States was doing the same in Latin America (ibid., 64).

Bull also comes close to theorising spheres of influence as involving acceptance of intervention. He elaborates on intervention within different world orders. In a world with central international authority, the rights of the authority to intervene might be unlimited. In a world of regional international organisations, there might be unlimited power to interfere within particular regions. Similarly, in an order ruled by a small number of great powers, intervention would be accepted within the dominated regions. (Bull 1984a, 185.) The two last options could be called spheres of influence, but Bull does not mention the concept in this connection. Bull continues that any one of the three options would mean a drastic alteration of the current system of sovereign states. Abandoning the rule of non-intervention would mean abandoning the right to sovereignty and independence. Bull argues that regardless of how the European Community or proletarian internationalism might develop, there was still an overwhelming consensus on sovereignty and its corollary principle of non-intervention. (Bull 1984a, 185–186.) Bull also suggests that abandoning the rule of non-intervention, that is, accepting intervention in general, would mean the end of the system of states as we know it. This is what Schmitt, Carr, and Burnham also foresaw (see chapter 5).

4.4 A Regional Solidarist Order

As we examine the relationship between sovereignty, intervention/non-intervention and spheres of influence further, we reach a point where we must broach the question of the nature of international society. This is the most important contribution of having studied the literature of the
English School, because it makes it possible to situate the concept of sphere of influence more securely at the equilibrium point of the pendulum of international society (see chapter 3.2). The pluralist-solidarist divide is, in fact, the cornerstone of the following episodes, which makes it even more fundamental to the theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of influence.

In explaining the pluralist-solidarist divide, I begin with Buzan's (2004a) insights. Pluralist international society is state-centric and assumes that international law is made by states (positive law). Pluralism is concerned with the preservation of political and cultural difference and distinctness. Solidarists are more concerned with the rights of individuals (natural law), cosmopolitan values and shared moral norms. Buzan ponders whether the two are necessarily opposite ideas of state primacy versus a cosmopolitan position or, rather, two ends of a spectrum. The spectrum option is possible if sovereignty is more of a social contract – something open to negotiation – than an essential condition. At the pluralist end of the spectrum, international society is thinner and collective enforcement of rules will be difficult. At the solidarist end, collective enforcement might be accepted in some areas. The pluralist-solidarist divide implicitly answers the question of intervention: in focusing on shared moral norms, solidarism is a more interventionist view of international society, according to Buzan. (Buzan 2004a, 46–47.) But the spectrum metaphor relieves intervention from turning solidarism and pluralism against each other. Buzan explains, “In this view, so long as one does not insist that individuals have rights apart from, and above, the state, there is no contradiction between development of human rights and sovereignty. If they wish, states can agree among themselves on extensive guarantees for human rights, and doing so is an exercise of their sovereignty, not a questioning of it.” (Ibid., 48–49.) For some, solidarism means stepping from an international (state-based) into a world (non-state-based) society, but Buzan does not consider it useful to assume that solidarism is tantamount to embracing a world society (ibid., 50–59). Keeping solidarism as a feature of international society allows Buzan (2004a, 59) to reason that

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15 See Buzan's (2004a, 159) figure depicting the pluralist-solidarist spectrum of interstate society.
In substantive terms, pluralism describes ‘thin’ international societies where the shared values are few, and the prime focus is on devising rules for coexistence within the frameworks of sovereignty and non-intervention. Solidarism is about ‘thick’ international societies in which a wider range of values is shared, and where the rules will be not only about coexistence, but also about the pursuit of joint gains and the management of collective problems of in a range of issue-areas.

Getting back to sovereignty and intervention, Buzan (2004a, 219) writes that “sovereignty means different things at the pluralist and solidarist ends of interstate society.” He (ibid.) continues:

In a pure Westphalian interstate society, virtually all intervention is both illegal and illegitimate (except against forces aiming to disrupt or overthrow interstate order). In a thick, solidarist international society such as that represented by the EU, the agreed unpacking of sovereignty, and the establishment of agreements about elements of justice, and the rights of individuals and non-state actors makes many more kinds of intervention both legal and legitimate.

In Buzan’s opinion, sovereignty and intervention can be reconciled within the same international society. Hoffmann understands the role of intervention in international society in a way which fits in with Buzan’s vision of a spectrum. Hoffman (1984, 11–12) explains that the question has never been one of international society choosing between intervention and non-intervention but rather of the forms and likelihood of intervention given the nature of the international system as decentralised units without a common superior. Even though for Hoffman intervention is a reality not necessarily because of solidarist tendencies in international society but because of anarchy, he nevertheless implies that sovereignty and intervention can coexist if sovereignty as a principle is understood as something flexible and leaves room for exceptions. Influence, like intervention, has always been a part of the states-system. The same applies to the relationship between spheres of influence and sovereignty: influence does not automatically mean violation of the principle of sovereignty. Spheres of influence and sovereignty can coexist.
when the influenced power accepts its position and when the influencing power offers something in return.

Depending on the interpretation of sovereignty, which is looser at the solidarist than at the pluralist end of the spectrum, intervention is more or less acceptable. In addition, the consideration of justice, such as protection of human rights, loosens up the concept of sovereignty to include the legitimacy of intervention. Is then a solidarist international society also more tolerant of spheres of influence if it is more tolerant of intervention? A sphere of influence could incorporate regional solidarism as a voluntary “unpacking of sovereignty” and great powers could agree on a certain acceptable level of regional hegemony. Solidarism could make interventions within a sphere of influence a matter of agreement. Solidarism could not, however, explain away the potential for injustice in the case of spheres of influence nor could it likely tolerate the divisions that spheres of influence would create and maintain. If the world is moving in a solidarist direction, it is necessary to look at spheres of influence in a context where sovereignty is not as rigid as it is in a pluralist international society. This opens a way to discuss the normative aspects of justice in the case of spheres of influence in a world where no state can thrive on its own.

Jackson’s *The Global Covenant* (2000) deals with the normative order of the system of states and provides some very interesting remarks on sovereignty and intervention. For Jackson (2000; 19, 23) the global covenant signifies “the underlying moral and legal standards by reference to which relations between independent states can be conducted and judged”, and its fundamental underlying ethos is pluralism. The international society is a *societas* rather than a *universitas* (ibid., 105). Jackson’s societas and *universitas* are other names for a pluralist and solidarist international order, respectively:

>The great political transformation symbolized by Westphalia can be captured conceptually as a reconstruction of European politics from that of *universitas*, based on the solidarist norms of Latin Christendom, to that of *societas*, based on the pluralist norms of state sovereignty, on political independence. (Ibid., 165.)

Jackson (2000, 127) argues that only in Europe or “the West” are there indications of an emergent *universitas*. The European *universitas* is
regional and not universal and elsewhere *societas* prevails (ibid., 127–128). The Peace of Westphalia was the symbol of the political transformation from the Christian order to the system of states (ibid., 164). In a very Schmittian tone,¹⁶ Jackson (2000, 168) appears to prefer *societas* over *universitas*, that is, freedom over hierarchy:

*The societas of sovereign states is the idea and institution that expresses the morality of difference, recognition, respect, regard, dialogue, interaction, exchange, and similar norms that postulate coexistence and reciprocity between independent political communities. The language of societas is the language of political freedom as opposed to that of universitas, which is the language of political hierarchy and religious or ideological orthodoxy based on a political community of some sort.*

It is clear that Jackson’s *universitas* has relevance for spheres of influence when he begins discussing the Cold War. During the Cold War, Eastern Europe, in its subordinate position to Moscow, formed a *universitas* where only the Soviet Union enjoyed the rights of sovereignty and non-intervention. This ran counter to the pluralist norms of international society. The League of Nations Covenant (Article 21) confirmed the validity of spheres of influence but after 1945 spheres of influence did not have such legitimacy. “The USSR operated in a fashion that could only be justified, if justified at all, by a concept of legitimate spheres of influence.” (Ibid., 255.) The United States, too, proclaimed this doctrine in its neighbourhood. By contrast, Gorbachev’s speech to the Council of Europe in 1989, an articulation of what was also known as the Sinatra Doctrine, was a declaration of a *societas* ending the Soviet hierarchy in Eastern Europe. It was an acknowledgement of the pluralist norm of international society and a repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Russia and Eastern Europe thus returned to the *societas* of sovereign states. (Ibid.; 168, 256.)

Jackson’s (2000, 169) own normative conclusion is that *societas* is the superior order: The pluralist doctrine of non-intervention is the core doctrine of the global covenant and “to date the modern *societas* of sovereign

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¹⁶ Schmitt was the proponent of *pluriverse* against *universe*, which would destroy political plurality in the international system. See more in chapter 5.3.
states has proved to be the only generally acceptable and workable basis of world politics”. Jackson thinks it is ironic that some scholars now oppose state sovereignty and long for political and ideological solidarity in world politics. They wish to reinstate an universitas of a gentler kind based on popular consent rather than military conquest or political revolution. But, as Jackson writes, universitas was originally a medieval political-religious idea involving ideological orthodoxy and political hierarchy – exactly what sovereign states were created to escape from. Jackson goes on provocatively: “It [longing for political and ideological solidarity in world politics] is also ironical in light of the successful world-wide revolt against imperialism in the twentieth century which justified the abolition of colonialism in the name of local political freedom: in the name of self-determination and state sovereignty.” (Ibid. 168–169). Russian analysts would agree with Jackson; they are not ready to accept an universitas, as I will show in chapter 7.

For Jackson, the sovereign state has constitutional immunity and a fundamental right to non-intervention, making the ethics of intervention a negative ethics. Jackson writes that “non-intervention is the prima-facie norm of a pluralistic international society” whereas intervention requires justification. Jackson introduces three main justifications for intervention: 1) international order: valid reasons for international peace and security or national security17, 2) consent: a request of the legal government of the target state, and 3) humanitarianism: protecting the people of the target state. Jackson considers the third justification to be controversial since it goes beyond the rules of the UN Charter. According to Jackson, humanitarian intervention has the potential to challenge the societas. In an universitas, humanitarian considerations would override sovereignty and the question would become whether there is a transformation under way to a global universitas where the rule of non-intervention would no longer be the guarantor of sovereignty. (Jackson 2000, 250–252.)

Humanitarian intervention relies on universal human rights, whereby it represents an element of universitas for Jackson.

The relationship between humanitarian intervention and spheres of influence is interesting, because the concept of humanitarian intervention is so recent that no references to it can be found in the history of spheres

17 “National security” was used as an argument by Russia to defend its intervention in South-Ossetia in August 2008 (see chapter 7.5.3).
of influence. If we look at international society from Jackson’s perspective (instead of Bull’s spectrum), humanitarian intervention represents a discourse against pluralist international society \(^{18}\) whereas spheres of influence, even with the potential and likely violations of sovereignty they entail, represent a defence of plurality. In Bull’s spectrum, humanitarian intervention does not automatically signal the emergence of an *universitas* and thus is easier to accommodate with spheres of influence in the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum. The main difference between humanitarian intervention and intervention within a sphere of influence is found in their legitimacy in discourses. A humanitarian cause can be accepted as a motive for intervention while ambitions of creating a sphere of influence cannot. Yet, establishing a sphere of influence and humanitarian intervention are not opposite or separate forms of conduct. A humanitarian cause could be invoked in order to avoid an intervention being associated with a sphere-of-influence policy – as if purifying the motives of the influencing state. Today, humanitarian reasons are the only possible justification for intervention, and if spheres of influence exist, intervention within one can only be defended on humanitarian grounds. If intervention is a central tool of sphere-of-influence policy, and a humanitarian cause can be used as an excuse, then any interventionist state – not only Russia – can be accused of trying to establish a sphere of influence. For many Russian analysts, humanitarian intervention is sphere-of-influence policy in disguise. Humanitarian intervention is a matter of interpretation, hence the disagreement between Russia and Western states on the intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the disagreement on the nature of Russian intervention in South Ossetia in 2008. In fact, many Russians avoid making the claim of humanitarian intervention, because of the supposedly political uses of the term. For many Russians, Western “humanitarian interventions” represent sphere-of-influence policy and for many Western commentators Russian intervention in the territory of Georgia was an expression of a sphere-of-influence policy. Thus, the relationship between humanitarian intervention and a sphere-

\(^{18}\) For example, humanitarian intervention as *the responsibility to protect* principle, embraced by the UN World Summit in 2005, transfers the responsibility to protect people from states which fail to do so to the international community (see Evans 2008). Responsibility to protect is more closely associated with the idea of *universitas* as a collective and solidarist means to govern international affairs.
of-influence policy is not only in how these actions represent solidarism but, and primarily, in how they are justified.

I would say that the establishment of spheres of influence and humanitarian intervention are more interconnected than separated by the discourse on their legitimacy. Likewise, the separation of sphere of influence and humanitarian intervention at the level of the pluralist-solidarist debate is artificial if we challenge the core meaning of solidarism. The problem with Jackson’s *universitas* is that we do not know who gets to decide on humanitarian intervention. Who holds the decisive power over the normative? In the case of Watson’s pendulum it is the Empire, but the more vague concepts of cosmopolitan, solidarist and world society leave the questions of agency unresolved. Is solidarism simply a thick international society or is it a cosmopolitan word society? Solidarism needs to be articulated also in a concrete political setting, because otherwise we do not know how to situate spheres of influence and humanitarian intervention.

This is where we find the weakness of the English School theory: an inability to specify where power lies and who the actors in a solidarist society are. Buzan (2004a, 47–48) writes that the pluralist side is easily identifiable as a system consisting of states but the solidarist side blurs the difference between international and world society because it ties together state and non-state actors. For Buzan, the problem is the impreciseness of the idea of world society. Even though world society occupies a central position in English School thinking, the concept is not systematically elaborated. (Ibid., 44.) Since Buzan discusses solidarism within the society of states, endowed with sovereignty and the right to intervention, he keeps solidarism within the limits of international society. It makes me wonder where pluralism really turns into solidarism.

I argue that humanitarian intervention fits into the cosmopolitan ethos of a solidarist society less than the English School conceptualisations would suggest. To my mind, humanitarian intervention does not jeopardise pluralism as such, but rather – and specifically – the plurality of sovereign states. An international society where humanitarian intervention is legitimate is a concert of great powers and/or multiple regional societates maintaining a certain level of pluralism. In this order, great powers would decide on humanitarian intervention. Even within the EU, which
represents a solidarist order for both Buzan and Jackson, greater powers have the final say. In terms of this logic, humanitarian intervention, like any intervention, sits well in solidarist international society, which does not abandon the system of states. In fact, the idea of regional solidarism makes it possible to imagine a solidarist international society (a plurality of regional units) that allows humanitarian intervention.

In an argument close to my reasoning regarding the conceptual confusion about solidarism, John Williams (2005, 19–38) asserts that contrary to the general English School view, a world society does not have to be cosmopolitan. Williams wants to challenge the idea that pluralism belongs to international society and solidarism to world society. He writes that a world society where political activity is principally focused on individuals (and where states are not the predominant actors) can maintain plurality in some form. In other words, diversity can be accommodated in such a society. Williams (2005, 33) continues, “Thus a partly de-territorialised pluralist *modus vivendi* offers a normative agenda for world society.” Again the English School is theorised in terms of the mysterious notion of solidarism – mysterious because it is so difficult to conceptualise. The argument that a world society of pluralism indicates “non-territorial forms of politics” (ibid., 35) still prompts the question of what exactly happens to territorially bound communities in a solidarist international society or in a solidarist or pluralist world society. The usefulness of the pluralist-solidarist debate is undermined if there is no clarity as to what kind of political organisation is envisioned. Emphasising the importance of regions, Buzan’s and Waever’s regional security complex – and even more so Hurrell’s regional solidarism – offers answers to the contemporary need to make sense of the pluralist-solidarist divide. But there is no attempt to situate spheres of influence in this debate, because the concept has not been situated at all in international theory. Perhaps the pluralist-solidarist debate does not even need spheres of influence, but a sphere of influence can be theorised by situating it within this debate. If we take into account Keal’s and, to a lesser extent, Bull’s interest in discussing spheres of influence as contributing to international order, it is reasonable to assume that this international order has something to do with pluralism and solidarism.

19 There are many more studies on regions which I will not present here (for example Weinert 2011).
At the end of the day, by reading the English School we do not find out who it is that would be in charge of a solidarist order or world society. Would it still be states, or a mix of state and non-state actors? Would it be a world organisation – or even a universal empire? The reason why this question is compelling is that the answer to it would make it possible to situate spheres of influence more firmly in the middle of Watson’s pendulum of international society, provided both ends were clearly defined. Sphere of influence emerges out of the English School literature as a pluralist concept, as part and parcel of the system of states, but it also expresses ideas of breaking state borders to form bigger units than states. What makes a sphere of influence diverge from the pluralist ethos of the state is the idea of a regional unit, the *Großraum* for Schmitt (2003) and Carr (2001), Mid-Europe for Naumann (1917) and the “Good Neighbor Policy” for Lippmann (1945). These regional units are constructed not only out of influence but also out of unity and necessity. This necessity is the prevention of major wars by unifying states to form bigger entities. Jackson, by discussing spheres of influence as an aspect of *universitas*, does make the move towards seeing spheres of influence as part of a solidarist order. Spheres of influence are then regional solidarist orders which allow the pluralist order to survive on the global level. This solidarism is not restricted to “one humanity” but can include several regional international societies within the international order. The idea of a regional solidarist order also takes the pejorative ring out of sphere of influence. However, given the inadequate definition of solidarism, it remains difficult to imagine what the relationship between spheres of influence and solidarism would be on a global scale: Would solidarism mean the end of great powers and their spheres of influence, or would great powers maintain their dominant position even in a solidarist international society?

4.5 International Law and Justice

This section focuses on English School theory on international law and justice in relation to spheres of influence. It is nothing new to say that influence in international relations is not distributed equally. Some
members of the society of states can better proclaim and defend their interests (Bull 2002, 53). When one looks at the justice or injustice of spheres of influence, the first thing is to ascertain what international law has to say on the subject. References to international law are also the source for finding arguments for and against spheres of influence. The relationship between spheres of influence and international law, in the present, rests on the assumption that international law does not recognise a right to a sphere of influence. Instead, international law sets limits on pursuing international influence; it does this through the principles of sovereignty and intervention, but also through rules on the use of violence.

Keal writes about international law and its relationship to spheres of influence. According to Keal, in 1945 the allied powers met in Yalta to agree on the principles of the government of former satellites and liberated countries. The powers subscribed to principles that would ensure their cooperation and allow democratic government in Eastern Europe in line with the Atlantic Charter. (Keal 1983, 87–88). Soon thereafter the United Nations Organisation Charter was drawn up in San Francisco. Keal considers the Charter important for spheres of influence because Article 2(1) lays down the principle of sovereign equality and Article 2(4) states, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". In this connection, Keal writes: “Spheres of Influence are not consistent with the principle of sovereign equality”. Influencing powers have used force against the integrity and independence of states and contravened the Charter. (Ibid., 90.) I will later show, in chapter 7, how the Russian analysts take international law and its historical documents so seriously as to make one wonder how they could ever argue for spheres of influence.

Bull (2002, 126) states that since self-help is a part of enforcing international law, the distribution of power dictates conformity to this law. But it would be too simplistic to claim that the international order is one where great powers take matters of law to their own hands, disregarding the rights of the small. What I have tried to convey through the presentation of the institutions of international society is that the
question of whether spheres of influence are inherently unjust is far from settled. As Keal (1983, 199–203) suggests, even development aid can be seen as influence which can cause conflicts. Intervention and non-intervention as principles which are connected to spheres of influence emerge from a jungle of arguments over legality and legitimacy. Then there is the matter of “stability of possessions” as contributing to the lessening or controlling of conflicts by the influencing powers (Keal 1983, 199–203) and finally the big question of spheres of influence as potentially contributing to international order. All these considerations suggest that we should look more deeply into the many different arguments on the justification of sphere-of-influence policies.

Bull argues that conformity to international law and violation of it are not separate forms of conduct. In his estimation, international law is obeyed by most states most of the time. Even when laws are violated it might still embody some elements of conformity, making the line between conformity and violation blurred. (Bull 2002, 131–132.) The same applies to justice. A great power could argue for establishing a sphere of influence (violation) against foreign aggression (conformity or upholding the right of another state to sovereignty). Is not a sphere of influence actually a perfect example of violation and conformity taking place at the same time? If the existence of a sphere of influence implies a relationship between two or more great powers, the sphere of influence is established not only to influence another state but to prevent another great power from influencing that same state. During the Cuban Missile Crisis (described in more detail in chapter 6), both parties, the United States and the Soviet Union, expressed their wish to protect the Cuban

20 Bull defines international law as “a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law”. Bull explains that there are rules which states and other agents see as binding one another which constitutes an international society. It is, nevertheless, a matter of controversy whether these rules have a status of law due to the lack of an enforcing and sanctioning world government. (Bull 2002, 124–125.) International law rests much upon self-help including the use and threat of force. Members of international society often take the enforcement of international law in their own hands which makes international law function as a part of balance of power. (Ibid., 126.) The other members of international society might disagree on which is the lawbreaking party to a conflict and which upholds the law (ibid., 127).
people from the other superpower’s tyranny. What a sphere of influence can be, reflecting on what Bull writes about international law, is a mixture of a violation of the principle of sovereignty and an attempt (even if a self-serving one) to protect the sovereignty of the influenced or to maintain the system of states as the preferred international order.

Another more or less accepted argument for a sphere of influence can be the maintenance of a balance of power. Bull (2002, 138) explains how an interest in a balance of power might clash with international law. Balance of power is a principle that maintains international order but the means of achieving a balance might involve acts of violating international law. In this case, we are not talking about justice and the rights of individual states, but of the overriding interest in maintaining a balance of power for the sake of the system of states. Bull in fact comments on this dilemma with regard to international law: “It is often argued, however, that considerations of the balance of power require intervention in the internal affairs of a state in order to establish a great power’s influence in it, or resist the influence of another great power, because of wider considerations of the distribution of power in international society at large”. (Bull 2002, 138.)

Regardless of system considerations and the reasons promoted by the influencing power, the perspective of the influenced state is what matters most when judging the act of influence. If the influenced state feels its rights are being violated then the argument about protection can hardly justify a sphere-of-influence policy. However, the fact that a state is claiming that its rights are being violated by a sphere-of-influence policy does not automatically mean that injustice has occurred, or even that any sphere-of-influence policy has been implemented. States can abuse the idea of spheres of influence to get support from other states in a dispute with a greater power. The relationship between the influencing and the influenced power becomes more complex when we do not automatically view the small states as victims of a sphere-of-influence policy. Then it is more a question of enmities, alliances and identities than of international law whether influence is accepted or not.

The contemporary discourse has taken a firm stand against spheres of influence expressly on the basis of justice, even more so than on the basis of law. Keal (1983, 204) makes a clear judgment about the relationship
between spheres of influence and justice: “The freedom and independence of influenced states is always impaired and no matter how much they contribute to order, spheres of influence are necessarily unjust”. For Keal, even though spheres of influence contribute to international order this comes at the price of justice (ibid., 209–210). He explains, “The injustices inherent in spheres of influence such as inequalities in the distribution of wealth, violation of the doctrine of sovereign equality of states, and the denial of equality of individuals might simply nourish seeds of disorder” (ibid., 212). Thus the unjust nature of spheres of influence is at the same time a source of disorder. To summarise Keal’s argument, spheres of influence might contribute as much to international order as to disorder, but in the end they are based on injustice.

Bull explores justice in world politics in *The Anarchical Society*. Firstly he discusses the meaning of justice as actions considered right in themselves and thus belonging to the class of moral ideas separate from law, prudence, interest or necessity. Justice is also often understood as equality in respect of rights and privileges. Bull explains that there is substantive justice, or recognition of rules about rights and duties; and formal justice, “the like application of these rules to like persons”. (Bull 2002, 75–76.) Bull (2002, 76) writes:

Demands for ‘justice’ in world politics are frequently demands for formal justice in this sense: that some legal rule, such as that requiring states not to interfere in one another’s domestic affairs, or some moral rule, such as that which confers on all nations the right of self-determination, or some operational rule or rule of the game, such as that which requires great powers to respect one another’s spheres of influence, should be applied fairly or equally as between one state and another.

Thus, there are two aspects to justice: 1) the contents or the rules stating what course of action is considered right and what is wrong and 2) the equal application of these rules. Curiously, Bull presents spheres of influence as manifestations of justice, but it is justice in the second meaning, formal justice, according to which great powers have equal rights to spheres of influence. What Bull does not say is whether a sphere of influence is considered just according to the first aspect, substantive
justice, that is, whether a sphere of influence is just in the first place. My principal concern is substantive justice, but I am interested in formal justice as well – albeit not as relations among great powers but as the equal application of rules among all the members of international society.

Bull’s point is that the current institutions of international society do not support justice in world politics, but rather international order is often at odds with justice. International society is at odds with *cosmopolitan justice, human justice* and often with *interstate or international justice*. Interstate justice is best served in international society as states may add moral imperatives to the rules of their coexistence, whereas justice for humankind (cosmopolitan) or individuals (human) does not fit in with the workings of international society as it is managed by the states. (Bull 2002, 87.) Cosmopolitan justice could be realised only in a cosmopolitan society. Bull writes, “But to pursue the idea of world justice in the context of the system and society of states is to enter into conflict with the devices through which order is at the present maintained”. The same applies to human justice: it is simply incompatible with the present international order, where human rights enjoy no precedence over the rights of the states. (Bull 2002, 85–86.) Concerning the justice of spheres of influence, Bull (2002, 89) makes the following statement:

*Great powers contribute to international order by maintaining local systems of hegemony within which order is imposed from above, and by collaborating to manage the global balance of power and, from time to time, to impose their joint will on others. But the great powers, when they perform these services to international order, do so at the price of systematic injustice to the rights of smaller states and nations, the injustice which has been felt by states which fall within the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe or the American hegemony in the Caribbean, injustice which is written in the terms of the United Nations Charter which prescribe a system of collective security that cannot be operated against great powers, the injustice from which small powers always suffer when great ones meet in concert to strike bargains at their expense. (Emphasis added.)*

Systematic injustice is like systemic intervention: it takes place so frequently as to effectuate a status quo and something that is quietly
accepted. Bull (2002, 221–222) also writes about justice when dealing with international order managed by the great powers. He notes that the great power order does not provide justice for all. Bull doubts whether there should or could be equal justice within the society of states at all. For him it appears that any international order must have its custodians and guardians. In fact, Bull proclaims that the great power order enjoys wide support but that great powers constantly need to secure and preserve this support. He explains that “the great powers cannot formalise or make explicit the full extent of their special position” since it would engender more antagonism than the international order could support. This is why the society of states is based on equality, rejecting hierarchical ordering. But international society does not require perfect justice, because all states value order over justice. Nevertheless, if great powers seem to be both undermining order and denying justice, the legitimacy of their position is eroded. (Ibid.)

What has all this to do with spheres of influence, other than Bull mentioning the concept in two instances? Bull (2002, 83) maintains that justice is realisable only in a context of order. If we understand the world as an international society with certain “rules of the game” – such as spheres of influence being a part of great power management – what are the possibilities for justice? For both Bull and Keal balances of power and spheres of influence violate justice in relation to small states while nevertheless maintaining international order. This order also prevents the world from turning into a cosmopolitan society, thus leaving us to settle for interstate justice. An order supporting spheres of influence fits in well with the idea of interstate justice, for it deals with relations among states and not among individuals. It is much harder to evaluate what spheres of influence would mean to human justice than to justice among states. Clearly, spheres of influence, in terms of Bull’s definitions of justice, would mean formal justice between the great powers. Nevertheless, reading Bull more carefully, spheres of influence do not, in the final analysis, leave much consideration for justice. Instead, Bull refers to “systematic injustice” in the case of spheres of influence. This translates into formal justice among great powers and systematic injustice against the small.

The present inquiry into the English School institutions reveals that the apparent normative aspects of spheres of influence not only spring
from the present pejorative use of the term in the context of Russian foreign policy research but also emerges from the theory articulated by the English School. This theory reveals that sovereignty is not the same for all states, that the international system is founded upon the inequality of states, and that sphere of influence is a manifestation of these two features of the system. Thus, the normative aspects of spheres of influence come from the inequality that they presumptively entail. The reason why inequality is inherent in a sphere of influence is that we do not have a theory, concept, idea or practice relating to the phenomenon which does not embody this inequality. Even Keal, who recognises some advantages of spheres of influence, cannot argue that spheres of influence do not violate equality in some way or the other. But what can be investigated is whether this inequality is always necessarily bad, and especially whether it is bad from the perspective of the entire society of states and not only from the perspective of its individual members. It can also be debated whether the relationship of inequality within a sphere of influence has only negative consequences for the influenced states or if those states can still benefit somehow from being within the sphere of influence. We cannot ignore so easily, however, that there is a certain power relation at work even when influence is accepted by the influenced states. Some form of hierarchy and inequality always comes when a sphere of influence is created.

4.6 Influence or Responsibility?

In chapter 3.4, which deals with agreements on spheres of influence, I explore different concepts that come close to the idea of sphere of influence. When it comes to justifying spheres of influence, terminology again takes on importance. This terminology, which draws a distinction between spheres of influence and spheres of responsibility, is completely ignored in the present discourses on spheres of influence. When Lindley writes of protectorates, he means “protection” given by the influencing power to the influenced at the price of the loss of some, but not all, elements of the protected state’s sovereignty. As he (1926, 181) explains:
The assumption by a comparatively powerful State of the duty of protecting a weaker State is an institution of considerable antiquity. In the earlier instances the weaker State might gain the advantage of protection without losing its sovereignty. In the later examples of the older type of protectorate, however, an essential feature of the arrangement has been that the protected State has handed over the conduct of its external affairs to the protecting Power, or accepted its dictation in regard to those affairs, and has thus parted with part of its sovereignty without, however, losing the whole of its independence.

Protection implies something “good” that can come out of spheres of influence against the totally negative view of spheres of influence as forms of domination. This raises the question whether spheres of influence are necessarily always manifestations of systematic injustice based on power politics. Should not those with greater power in fact have more responsibility for peace and stability?

Bull offers one answer by distinguishing positive and negative sphere-of-influence agreements. The European expansion was a negative sphere-of-influence agreement while the agreement on the occupation of Germany by the Soviet Union, United States, Britain and France was a positive agreement. In the case of Germany, there was a common task of occupying the territory of the defeated enemy and preventing the resurgence of the Nazis, among other things. It was a common endeavour for whose implementation each party took responsibility. (Bull 2002, 215.) Responsibility is the key word here. Bull (ibid.) makes reference to Lippmann’s idea of good neighbours and spheres of responsibility, described in *U.S. War Aims* (1944). Thus, there could potentially be positive spheres of influence based on responsibility that would be different from negative spheres of influence. Keal also mentions spheres of responsibility. As an example, he points to France claiming a sphere of influence in Morocco but with the idea that France would preserve order and assist with various reforms there (Keal 1983, 23–24).

Wight also refers to the idea of great power responsibility, claiming that great powers have great responsibilities. They need to protect smaller nations; they must seek to serve, not to rule. Great powers have a managerial role due to their preponderance. (Wight 1977, 139.) Wight
(1995, 43–44) notes, “For since great powers have wider interests and greater resources than small powers, the main duty of settling international affairs must fall upon them; and it was hoped that they would develop, as it has been said, from great powers into Great Responsibilities”.

For Jackson, in general the great powers have a special role in the society of states. He argues in The Global Covenant that great powers have a special responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world, because they can do both the greatest harm and greatest good in world politics (Jackson 2000; 139, 173). Moreover, great powers can expect other states to recognise their special rights. Minor powers are not able to contribute to peace and security the way the great powers can. World peace rests on the shoulders of the great. (Ibid., 140–142.) Bull (2002, 194–195) calls the special rights and responsibilities of great powers their managerial responsibility. For Jackson, this sort of inequality is quite natural and also desirable. But global security needs supporting institutions other than the class of great powers only: it requires a balance among the great powers and their concerted action. A balance of power works against the emergence of a world empire or government that would destroy the plurality of states. A concert means that great powers cooperate in the management of world affairs. The concrete manifestation of this order is the Security Council of the UN with its special responsibility for peace and order. (Ibid., 201–202)

The responsibility of great powers that Jackson, Wight, Bull and Keal discuss can be refuted, as Jackson (2000, 376) indicates, by saying that it is only a façade masking selfish interests and hegemonial ambitions and an excuse for exploitation and oppression. But if great powers had no responsibility for their actions and if they did not see the need for a normative discourse (justification) they would, as Jackson (2000, 377) puts it, only have desires and power:

*The strong would be free to exploit their power to the full. The weak would be obliged to surrender in silence to the hegemon or else face the consequences. Is that how members of international society, great and small, conduct themselves in their relations? I believe the evidence indicates otherwise.*
Holbraad (1979, 13) sums up the dual role of great powers within the states system as follows: “Thus, they may be seen as both as the potential wreckers and as the ‘great responsibles’ of the world”. Even if the great powers could produce positive influence they would also represent systematic injustice in their managerial role. Acting in concert, great powers might be able to maintain order by a balance of power, but there would be no one to monitor the justice of their actions. Even if the great powers were called “the great responsibles”, we would be left with the dilemma of injustice versus order. Then we would have to ask ourselves whether the negative aspects of great power management outweigh its positive influences on international order. If we put on the table the perspective that great power management and spheres of influence, both of which help to limit conflicts and maintain international order, and compare these to the inequality of such a system and the violation of rights of the influenced – the justice side of the phenomenon – which do we value more? Only then we can decide what kind of normative meaning we should give to the concept of sphere of influence. Surely we would have difficulties imagining a sphere of influence unequivocally as a practice of peace. But we could try to decide if a sphere of influence should be understood as a controversial practice, like intervention (sometimes necessary, most of the time against international law), or if it should be judged as the greatest evil of humankind, like war.

4.7 Conclusions on the English School

I have tapped the undiscovered pool of English School theory on the relationship between international society, its rules and institutions, and spheres of influence. What the English School account of international society has contributed here is 1) the location of spheres of influence between pluralist and solidarist orders and 2) the normative question of the justice of a sphere of influence. Spheres of influence belong at the equilibrium point of the pendulum or the middle of the spectrum, as do hegemony or domination. This is where balance of power can also be found, because a balance of power violates sovereignty within a strict pluralist society and yet it also supports the pluralist system by
preventing one single hegemon from emerging. If sovereignty can be understood as a social contract, intervention does not belong solely to the solidarist end of the spectrum, but rather states can agree on the use of intervention. Not even humanitarian intervention need be a fatal blow to pluralism. Thus, intervention also swings on the pendulum towards the centre. In the spectrum metaphor, sovereignty and intervention can coexist, and so can sovereignty and sphere of influence. The usefulness of applying Buzan’s idea of a spectrum lies in its freeing sovereignty from its Westphalian chains, thus liberating the concept of sphere of influence from its pejorative shroud. Even though the English School does not locate sphere of influence within solidarism (any more than within pluralism), Jackson’s regional societas indicates that unity and spheres of influence belong together. I will elaborate on the solidarist idea of sphere of influence in greater substance in the following chapter.

When it comes to the normative question, the problem is between maintaining international order at the expense of the small versus justice for all. According to the English School literature, small states can be vindicated in a struggle for a balance of power but not in a struggle for spheres of influence. In fact, the core question of justice is the right of small states to their independence. Great power influence as such is acceptable, or indeed even necessary, but a sphere of influence always comes down to the rights of the influenced. I have tried to show in this chapter that the matter of justice where spheres of influence are concerned is a complicated one. For example, conformity to international law, the source of the notions of international justice, as well as violations of international law, are relevant for contesting the concept of sphere of influence. When there is a struggle over influence, one great power can be accused of trying to violate sovereignty of the influenced while another can claim to be defending sovereignty against the aggression of the first. If we take the relationship of intervention to justice in the case of a sphere of influence, the need arises to discuss what kind of intervention is coercive and what is “the mutual involvement of peoples in one another’s affairs” if one wants to start making lists of what acts make up a sphere-of-influence-policy. For example, one might ask whether development aid can be a sphere-of-influence policy? Conceptually spheres of influence also place limitations on intervention (great powers do not intervene in each other’s spheres
of influence), giving room for a discussion of normative considerations. Finally, the idea of spheres of responsibility takes the normative question to an entirely new level by giving the practice of establishing spheres of influence legitimacy as such. In Bull’s terms that means spheres of influence become a matter of substantive justice, not only a matter of promoting international order or a balance of power. The next chapter takes the normative issues in this direction.
5 Between Nation and Humanity

Grand designs are important. They furnish analytical models for public discussion of important problems. They provide criteria by which to test the long-run consequences of various short-run alternatives. Most grand designs are, however, presented by their author as one best hope of avoiding a fresh descent into the maelstrom of global war. (Fox 1944, 159.)

During the aftermaths of the First and Second World War, many theorists put forward ideas, “grand designs”, on the organisation of the international system with a view to saving their own country from peril and securing peace in the future21. It is the purpose of this chapter to connect these grand designs to the history of spheres of influence. In theoretical terms, the grand designs place spheres of influence in the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum, contributing to a connection between the notions of spheres of influence and international order. Normatively, the designs represent the subjugated knowledge of spheres of influence without their pejorative associations.

The German writers Schmitt and Naumann are well known for envisioning this new world order from a German perspective, Schmitt (2003 [1950]) writing on Großräume and Naumann (1917) on Mid-Europe. Schmitt advocated political pluralism in the form of three Großräume – Germany being one of them – which would save the world from a universalist conquest. In the United States, the concern was the same: to ensure that country had the role of a great power and to avoid major war at the same time. Burnham’s (1947, 227) vision is a ”democratic world order” founded upon the American universalism, exactly that which Schmitt was afraid of. What Burnham criticised was a soft approach to world order that would allow the Soviet Union to continue its attempts at world domination; he felt that it was the communist threat that justified the United States’ role as the World Empire. Burnham’s world-view was circulated widely among the general public by the work of Orwell. But there was also a vision, very different

21 For Naumann, the context was World War I and for others World War II and its aftermath.
from Burnham’s and one that Burnham could not support, called the Good Neighbor Policy, which was declared by President F. Roosevelt and Lippmann. Roosevelt’s and Lippmann’s basic concern was what kind of influence would be the right one for a new regionalism.

The German intellectuals Naumann and Schmitt, the famous Carr, the less famous American analysts Burnham and Lippmann, and the novelist/journalist Orwell were all concerned with the fate of the system of states. Bull (1966b, 36) notes that “[t]he feeling of unease about the system of states is a deep-rooted one in Western thinking about international relations”. This unease was common to these theorists and prompted them to speculate about spheres of influence. Bull (ibid.) gives expression to the apprehension:

*Whether by a social contract among the nations or by conquest, whether gradually or at once, whether by a frontal assault on national sovereignty or a silent undermining of its foundations, the problem of international relations, if it is soluble at all, is taken to be in the last analysis the problem of bringing international relations to an end.*

The dominant storyline of the period of the world wars is that of the struggle between universalism and pluriversalism, Word Empire and the system of states. What the idea of sphere of influence represented, with all the different names given to the phenomenon, was a solution to the threat of universalism. It was a compromise in which super-states replaced the deteriorating nation-states and the nationalism that had led to war. This compromise would affect state sovereignty and would strengthen the system of great power management that had been created in the Congress of Vienna. Moreover, a system of super-states, if it were to function on the basis of a balance of power, would prevent not only the destruction of political plurality but also major wars. The dilemma of the pluriverse and universe is still as topical as it was a hundred years ago. There is even more pressure to come to terms with the tension between international society (that of states) and world society (that of individuals). Will territorially bounded communities continue to exist, and if they do, within states or some other units? Will globalisation and the increasing focus on human justice lead to a cosmopolitan world society of individuals or to a world society which can still uphold plurality? The subjugated knowledge of the
English School and the theorists concerned with the world wars bring the nature of international society into the limelight in connection with the concept of sphere of influence.

5.1 The Geopolitics of Spheres of Influence

The concept of sphere of influence is generally associated with the tradition of geopolitics\(^{22}\), which studies the relationship between territory and politics (see Ó Tuathail 1998, 1; 1996, 7). Classical geopolitics has had a rather bad reputation and in my opinion this has reinforced the pejorative associations of the concept of sphere of influence. Geopoliticians have been seen as motivated by political ambitions and the use of geopolitics as a tool for power (see Ó Tuathail 1996; 7, 68–69). A typical way of understanding geopolitics is found in the following words of Charles Clover (1999, 9): “Few modern ideologies are as whimsically all-encompassing, as romantically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and as likely to start a third world war as the theory of ‘geopolitics’”. Colin S. Gray explains how many of the critics of geopolitics, like Clover, have viewed geopolitics not so much as an analysis of the problem of international society but as part of the problem itself (Gray 2005, 18). Gray (2005, 27–28) continues:

*Geopolitics, like strategy, is an equal opportunity tool of analysis. Each suffers from guilt by association: with conflict, war, and suffering; with some dangerous sounding, even crazy, ideas; and in general with an approach to the world that focuses upon competition rather than cooperation. Some scholars would shoot the geopolitical messenger and condemn the geopolitical message that explains the dynamic spatial dimension to some persisting patterns of conflict in international relations. One might as well condemn medical research for its obsession with disease.*

Spheres of influence are easily associated with such classical geopolitical scholars as Halford Mackinder (Heartland), Nicholas Spykman (Rim-

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\(^{22}\)Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), a Swedish political scientist, was the first to use the term “geopolitics” and is known for describing the state as a living organism.
land), A.T. Mahan (Seapower), Friedrich Ratzel (organic state theory) and Karl Haushofer (Lebensraum). Ó Tuathail (1998, 5) calls the work of this group imperialist geopolitics. Brian W. Blouet (2005, 3) writes that Mackinder, Haushofer and Ratzel were all active in political life and tried to influence international relations. Haushofer’s Lebensraum (living space) in particular offers an idea of expansion in the most pejorative terms. Blouet explains how Haushofer wanted the expansion of Germany to include all German-speaking peoples and the creation of a “Greater Germany”. However, Gray (2005, 27) argues that Haushofer cannot be accused of being the evil genius behind Nazi expansion to achieve world domination. Spheres of influence are by definition – those definitions we have available – related to power and ultimately to conflicts and the exercise of power using violence, that is, exactly what geopolitics is “obsessed with”. The vision of the evilness of geopolitics, represented in particular by German geopolitics, and its association with the concept of sphere of influence has contributed to the concept’s pejorative meaning.

Spheres of influence as circles on a map owe much to Halford Mackinder’s (1861-1947) concept of the Heartland23. Schmitt (2003, 37) writes in the foreword to Nomos of the Earth that he is indebted to Mackinder. Burnham (1947, 103) also used Mackinder’s terms “World-Island” and “Heartland”. Likewise, Nicholas Spykman (1944) used Mackinder’s Heartland concept and developed his own: Rimland. Paul Coones (2005; 65, 80) argues that during the last decade there has been a growing interest in the concept of the Heartland in certain political and intellectual circles in Russia (‘Eurasianism”). Mackinder was a geographer and a political geographer, not so much a theorist. His Heartland is not really a sphere of influence, but the notion does reflect Mackinder’s fear of the emergence of a single world power and his defence of the system of states. What Mackinder (1996, 106) produces are terms which describe territories and their power relations, as the well-known dictum states:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.

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For Mackinder, the Soviet Union comprised much of the Heartland, and World-Island meant the joint continent of Europe, Asia and Africa. North and South America, Britain, Malaya, Japan and Australia are smaller islands, or “satellites”, on Mackinder’s map (ibid.; 198, 65, 67, 50). In the idea of the Heartland, a sphere of influence is reduced to a territorial metaphor, which urges us to content ourselves with a map of influences and power struggles instead of thinking about what spheres of influence mean for international society.

Spheres of influence are present as circles on a map in geopolitical literature, where they represent a balancing game and a facet of geostrategy. The geopolitical intention is to discover who will rule the world and how, not to discuss matters of sovereignty, intervention, justice and other themes which relate to the pejorative associations of the present idea of sphere of influence. Imperialist geopolitics represents spheres of influence as aspects of geostrategy, the association of geography and military elements with politics. Moreover, there is no comprehensive engagement with the idea or the concept of sphere of influence, because the imperialist dimension does not capture the originality of the phenomenon. Those geopolitical visions which have ended up in this book not only reinvent spheres of influence as a new form of territorial organisation but also explain their *raison d’être* in terms of international order. I do not want to eliminate the territorial element from spheres of influence, and the writings I have chosen articulate the spatiality of spheres of influence. But they also add something more: the idea of a society of states, and even the pluralist-solidarist debate. This means that even though the visions presented in my sources come with rather nationalist aims, they are combined with considerations of the institutions/rules of international society and normative questions.

If geopolitics does not offer enough tools for theorising spheres of influence, neither does the realist school of IR. My selection of sources in this chapter represents realist voices, particularly in the form of Carr and Burnham, but the realist school as such is not the source for the study of spheres of influence. For John Mearsheimer (2001, 14), the three most influential realists of the twentieth century are Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* (1993) deals with imperialism but not spheres of influence. Waltz’s system theory (1979) is
even less interested in the concept of sphere of influence. Waltz discusses the advantages of a bipolar great power order over a multipolar order. According to Waltz, and contrary to the general view, interdependence does not necessarily enhance possibilities for peace, because conflicts take place specifically among those actors which are in contact with each other. For Waltz, interdependence in a multipolar system means vulnerability and instability, whereas a bipolar system is more stable and less conflict-prone. Even though Waltz admits that wars of lesser scale have been fought within the bipolar system that prevailed during the Cold War, he does not explore the relationship between conflicts, bipolarity and spheres of influence. (Waltz 1979, 138–145, 182.) Mearsheimer’s *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001) mentions the idea of “regional hegemons” and their balancing game but does not discuss the relationship between the hegemon and its subordinates (see pp. 40–42, 140–142, 247–249).

After the Cold War, geostrategising in the spirit of reducing spheres of influence to a territorial notion was continued by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saul B. Cohen (1964, 1973, 2003, 2005). The worldview of Brzezinski is a very “Mackinderian” one with its emphasis on the leadership of Eurasia in the grand battle for influence. Brzezinski has promoted United States’ world leadership as the alternative to both anarchy and the rise of a rival power, that is, a new rise of Russia. Cohen (2003, 3–5) wrote about “world realms” in a book published in 1964 and continued to make the same statements even thirty years later. Cohen divides the world into different realms dominated by a central power. In explaining what a realm means, Cohen (ibid.) writes, “A national state (the meso-level) may dominate the geopolitical region within which it is located, and forge the framework of a geopolitical realm”. But just like Brzezinski, Cohen does not engage in conceptualising influence in terms of political theory. Samuel Huntington, even though he mentions spheres of influence only four times in his *Clash of Civilizations* (2007), elaborates a similar view. Huntington’s famous thesis is that future conflicts will evolve between civilisations instead of states. What Huntington proposes – in a claim relevant to the study of spheres of influence – is

24 Brzezinski is a Polish-American political scientist who also had a career the as United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981. He has a very critical view of Russia, and Russian scholars and politicians often quote these criticisms.
that civilisational blocs develop around "core states". Core states attract culturally similar countries to bandwagon with them (Huntington 2007, 3118). Huntington (2007, 3121–3132) writes:

A world in which core states play a leading or dominating role is a spheres-of-influence world. But it is also a world in which the exercise of influence by the core state is tempered and moderated by the common culture it shares with member states of its civilization. Cultural commonality legitimates the leadership and order-imposing role of the core state for both member states and for the external powers and institutions.

Huntington emphasises cultural affinity, which we can see in Naumann’s work discussed in the following chapter, but this does not make Huntington’s sphere of influence acceptable in any way for the majority of people who view spheres of influence pejoratively. This negative view is based on the “clash” – the inevitability of conflict – and, in addition, the injustice that are seen as part and parcel of spheres of influence. The clash of civilizations is an idea which has gained wide acknowledgement, but it does not offer tools for a theoretical conceptualisation of spheres of influence interested in discussing justice and international order.

The present understanding of spheres of influence leans towards the Mackinderian tradition of pointing out territorial struggles for power, making a “sphere of influence” a catchword or a metaphor rather than a contested concept. The following conceptualisations of sphere of influence, which bind international order to a normative agenda, promote the aim of contesting the concept and exploring the hidden knowledge of the present.

5.2 Friedrich Naumann and Mid-Europe

If one enquires of a student of International Relations what the origins of the concept of sphere of influence are, right after the work of Mackinder the answer would likely refer to German geopolitical thinking, but not necessarily to the work of Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919). Naumann’s work Central Europe (1917) (German original Mitteleuropa 1915) is not
only a contextualisation of the idea of sphere of influence in terms of the fate of the German state, but also a theoretical piece leading the way for a wider discussion on international order and the disintegration of the system of states. Naumann’s Mid-Europe (in German Mitteleuropa) is interesting in the sense that it comes close to advocating regional integration but maintains the power relation of the influencing and the influenced states which in both the past and the present is at the heart of a sphere of influence. Mid-Europe is not a project which brings states together on an equal basis – which is why Naumann can also be seen as broaching the relevant normative questions – but the way that Naumann defends his vision of regional solidarism makes Mid-Europe a rather different entity from a sphere of influence as it was understood during the Cold War.

In Central Europe (1917), Naumann elaborates his wish to create a Central European Union, or Mid-Europe. For Naumann (1917, 179), ”the United States of the World” was far distant, but he took the view that groups of humanity were emerging and that Mid-Europe would be one of them. Naumann proclaimed that there was a growing unity of nations which belong to neither the Anglo-French Western alliance nor the Russian Empire but to the Central Powers of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Mid-Europe extends “from the North and Baltic Seas to the Alps, the Adriatic Sea and the southern edge of the Danubian plain”. (Naumann 1917, 1–3.) This Mid-Europe would be the new German-led Great State.

For Naumann, the three old Great States – the American, the Russian and the English – were intrinsically international. “International” was originally a religious notion, through Christianity. It then became a philosophical one as, according to Naumann, almost all great philosophers were cosmopolitan, but was soon taken over by nationalism (ibid., 185–186). Finally, English commerce adopted the idea and it spread to the rest of the world through the concept of free trade. For Naumann “international” was not enough. Exchange did not guarantee peace, not as long as the old military and administrative state lived on. (Ibid., 187.) Naumann states, “The basis of all human order and organisation, all law

Naumann was not the only German promoting the idea of Mid-Europe. See Heffernan (2000) for the broader German discussion on Mid-Europe, and also on Ratzel’s Lebensraum, the idea of living space for Germany and the theory of the organic state.
and coercion is the State”. He viewed the state as a living organism that cannot make the leap towards humanity from its national and territorial basis. (Ibid., 188.) Nevertheless, “the central points” (the Great States) were on the rise, counteracting the power of the state.

The context for Naumann’s (1917, 4) vision of Mid-Europe, just like the visions of other like-minded theorists, was the end of the old international order:

All the allies in the Great War feel without argument that neither now nor in the future can small or even moderate-sized Powers play any large part in the world. Our conceptions of size have entirely changed. Only very big States have any significance on their own account, all the smaller ones must live by utilising the quarrels of the great, or must obtain leave if they wish to do anything unusual. Sovereignty, that is freedom to make decisions of wide historical importance, is now concentrated at a very few places on the globe.

Small states had become dependent on great powers; large-scale industry and super-national organisation had seized politics. For Naumann Germany was too small, as were Austria and Hungary, to survive a world war. He concluded, “Hence to-day the Central European Union is no chance but a necessity”. (Naumann 1917, 4–5.) It was not with Russia that Germany should unite; rather, if it were to maintain an individual course Germany would require a union with Austria-Hungary (ibid., 60–61). Mid-Europe was to be the fourth power among the other three great organisms, that is, Great Britain, America and Russia. Naumann describes how of the three Great States which had already emerged at the time that the Russian Great State was built on coercion while the American on free will, with England standing between the two. (Ibid., 180, 182.)

For Naumann unification was a political necessity; not unifying would mean political suicide (ibid., 15, 23, 25). States which could not keep up in the race would fall into third- or fourth-rank sovereignty (ibid., 189). He claimed that unless Mid-Europe emerged as a separate centre of power it would fall into being “a satellite nation” (notice the metaphor here). In Naumann’s view, satellites (Planet Nations) have a life of their own but no longer follow their own laws. Satellites only add strength to the guiding
group to which they belong. Neutrals, instead, do not belong to any “sun” but rather can be swept away into a satellite relationship with the Great Sovereignties. Naumann explains that a proper mixture of enforced unity and freedom draws the satellites in close to the centre of power. He describes how Russia ruled with fear but also with the magnetic power of the Russian spirit. (Ibid., 180–183.) The English, instead, request as long as possible, and only after that do they command. The American Great State represented the third way – “the most non-military great human organism that has ever existed”. Naumann observed that these Great States were not mere administrative districts but entities intermediate between nation and humanity with a specific essence that held the union together. (Ibid., 184–185.)

Naumann’s ideas were very clearly written for the political elite of Germany and for those states which Naumann dreamed would become Mid-Europe. He knew that there was strong opposition to his vision in Germany, not least in Austria and Hungary (ibid., 15, 19). Naumann tried to explain that Austria-Hungary without allies would be even more lost than Germany without allies (ibid., 23). He wanted Germans to let go of nationalism for the sake of Mid-Europe (ibid., 11–12.). Mid-Europe would be built upon the German language, but Germans would have to display tolerance and flexibility with regard to neighbouring languages (ibid., 108).

Naumann (1917, 108) described in detail what the Central Europe Union would be like. First of all, Germany would be the leader, the nucleus, of the new Union. Mid-Europe was to become a historical and political entity, not only an economical union (ibid., 35). Naumann exclaimed, “You must think of these stretches of country as a unity, as a brotherhood of many members, as a defensive alliance, as a single economic district!” (ibid., 3–4.) Naumann thought that it was not enough to build the Union on economic considerations alone, which is why he speaks of a common soul and common historical consciousness. Referring to the history of medieval Central Europe with Germany at its centre, Naumann calls forth the old unity “longing to return after its long sleep”. (Ibid., 44). Here Naumann’s Mid-Europe reminds one of an entity governed by a suzerain as the beloved and revered father (in chapter 3.2).
But Naumann did not remain at such an abstract level; instead, he offered a list of suggestions for the future union in which he proposed harmonisation of laws, a joint committee for foreign affairs and a joint collector of taxes (ibid., 30–31). In many ways the union would be an economic and not only a military one. This economic partnership was to be implemented willingly and not by force (ibid., 177). For Naumann, the economic Mid-Europe would battle for success amidst other unions. He declares, “It will not only be Central Europe that will emerge from the war with schemes for equipment and defence, but all the other States as well” (ibid., 179). Naumann claims that smaller nations cannot be the leaders of economic world-groups. They can only choose between isolation and adhesion and isolation would not very much longer be a choice. The small states needed to decide which union they would or could join. (Ibid., 194) According to Naumann, people did not understand the greatness of the older world-group economic areas. Germany could no longer keep up with them alone. (Ibid., 211.)

Sovereignty would be an obvious concern in the new Mid-Europe, which is why Naumann addressed the issue. For Naumann, the creation of Mid-Europe would mean centralisation of certain political activities, but without sacrificing sovereignty. Mid-Europe was not an entity that would destroy sovereignty: “No State becoming a partner in the new super-State will consent to sacrifice thereby its political dignity, its own sovereignty which it has won with difficulty and defended with its blood.” The dignity of the state must not be touched, Naumann proclaimed. For Naumann, Mid-Europe was not a new state, but a union of existing states, with sovereignty remaining the organising principle. (Naumann 1917, 254–255.) According to Naumann’s vision no state could be forced to join the union and emphasised the traits and rights of the satellites even though Germany was the central power. Although Naumann proposed the harmonisation of many laws in the political and economic union, he wanted the joining states to retain their political independence (ibid., 272). At the same time, the union had to have its military dimension, which naturally created political limitations but also offered a safeguard through the joint army (ibid., 281).

Naumann’s Mid-Europe was an ambitious imperialist project, as he reveals when examining the economic considerations in resisting the
power of the other great states. First, Central Europe would need further regional accessions to become greater than the existing dimensions of Germany and Austria-Hungary (ibid., 272). He added that Mid-Europe would need its share in overseas colonial possessions (ibid., 198), going on to predict, “Our Central European home population would be the centre of life of an economic body which stretched out its grasp into other quarters of the globe” (ibid., 203). This was thus not simply a regional union of states, but a union that leaned on the idea of overseas possessions as a necessity for economic success.

Naumann’s German-led Mid-Europe clearly has something to do with a sphere of influence. Both are “between nation and humanity”; they may be seen as a solution to the demise of the nation. If we look at Naumann’s vision, excluding its imperialist ambitions, it is quite far from the pejoratively tinged concept of sphere of influence that we embrace today. Mid-Europe sounds much more acceptable because it is justified, not by power political games but by the survival of cultural uniqueness, freedom in plurality and independence over Eastern domination. In addition to embodying a survival story, Mid-Europe is not an empire which will strip its constituent parts of their identity and sovereignty.

Naumann took pains to justify the Central European sphere of influence and maintained the use of cultural affinity in organising the ”Central European Union”. Membership needed to be voluntary, based on the brotherhood of nations, bearing in mind the absolute necessity of this development. Naumann did not scare his readers with the threat of a world hegemon, but rather warned about the demise of Central Europe as an independent centre of power. He wanted at least an illusion of sovereignty to prevail over the idea of total merger into one unit. He was nevertheless in favour of colonial expansion in order to keep up with the other great unions. But, most importantly, Naumann reflected Mid-Europe against the emerging international order at the time, where small states were becoming satellites of the great ones. This approach of his has important theoretical value for the present discourses on spheres of influence, which take no interest in the more broader questions of international order. In their connecting spheres of influence with international order and considering the possibility of the end of the Westphalian system of states and the emergence of a system of unions
of states, thinkers such as Naumann and Schmitt are necessary literature for understanding spheres of influence. The world today is caught in the crossfire of regional integration projects and still-strong nationalistic sentiments. Somehow, the world is between nationalism and humanism, just as Naumann felt it was almost a hundred years ago. This chapter is thus constructed on the idea that a sphere of influence lies between nation and humanity. This is also where Carl Schmitt situates his articulation of a sphere of influence.

5.3 Carl Schmitt, *Nomos and Großraum*

When writing about spheres of influence, one cannot avoid discussing the work of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985). As controversial as Schmitt is with connections to the Nazi regime (because he was involved in the party during the years 1933-1936), his theory of spheres of influence has wider implications than just the future of Germany after the war. Even though Schmitt wrote about the *Großraum* (literally, “large space”; figuratively, large spatial sphere) in a specific context, his vision of international order has relevance even today, not least when theorising sphere of influence.

Schmitt’s *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus publicum Europaeum* (2003) was first published in German in 1950 (*Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum*). Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (2007, 1–2) call it the masterpiece of his intellectual production, a work that should be acknowledged as a classic of International Relations. The translator’s introduction to *The Nomos of the Earth* describes Schmitt’s idea of *nomos* as “a community of political entities united by common rules”. It continues, “It is the spatial, political, and juridical system considered to be mutually binding in the conduct of international affairs – a system that has obtained over time and has become a matter of tradition and custom”. (Ulmen 2003, 10.) At the core, Schmitt is talking about the same international order, the same basic idea of a society of states, as the English School, with the state as the “decisive entity” of the political. This is why Alessandro Colombo (2007, 22–25) calls Schmitt’s theory “realist institutionalism”, where the realist game of power politics is understood as an institution and international
anarchy is placed in a societal and juridical web. But what is important for the history of spheres of influence is the point when Schmitt begins theorising on the collapse of the institutions of the society of states. It was in describing the danger of modern states being at the verge of extinction from the political map of the world that Schmitt developed his vision of spheres of influence.

Schmitt’s concept of *nomos* is the background for understanding his idea of how states should have been organised in post-War Europe. For Schmitt *nomos* means “the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible – the initial measure and division of pastureland, i.e., land-appropriation as well as the concrete order contained in it and following from it”. Schmitt further explains that *nomos* is not only the measure of dividing and situating a land but includes the political, social and religious order that follows from it. (Schmitt 2003, 70.) Nomos is not something fixed, for new manifestations of world-historical events will always give rise to a new *nomos* (ibid., 78–79.) However, Schmitt argues, not every land-appropriation constitutes a new *nomos* even though a *nomos* always includes a land-based order and orientation. A change needs to occur in international law in order for seizure of land to create a ”new nomos”, that is, “a new spatial order of international law”. (Ibid., 80–83).

The reason why sphere of influence as a concept is situated specifically in classical geopolitics can be found in Schmitt’s definition of *nomos*: it is a social order that is made spatially visible. Perhaps this is also the reason why spatiality, the geopolitical dimension, of spheres of influence is emphasised over other dimensions. It is emphasised quite rightfully: the spatial element is at the core of spheres of influence as long as international relations is concerned with states and their borders. “Sphere” is the spatial element and when states begin to arrange themselves into unions, blocs, super-states, centres of power – whatever one wishes to call them – we witness a spatial order based on spheres of influence. A sphere of influence also tends to imply territorial proximity of the influenced states to the core, which is why influence in distant territories is not viewed as a sphere-of-influence policy as readily as relations between the core and its surrounding states. Kaufman’s (1976, 11) “direct sphere of influence” not only means that the influence is *de facto* instead of *de jure* but also that
the states have a geographical proximity. Spatiality is why it is logical to assume that if Russia has a sphere of influence somewhere, it is within the post-Soviet space. But Schmitt’s *nomos* is more than just spatial; it is also political and juridical, and this is where it becomes a conceptualisation of spheres of influence based on visions of international order and society of states.

*Nomos* becomes important for Schmitt when he compares the pre-global order – medieval Europe’s unity of international law, *respublica Christiana*, supported by an empire and the papacy – to state-centred international law, the first global order of international law. This new age was founded on a spatial order of balance and it meant secularisation with the elimination of the holy empire and the imperial house of the Middle Ages. (Schmitt, 2003; 56–66, 127.) This was the epoch of *jus publicum Europaeum*, international law among sovereign territorial states, which prevailed from the sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth century. It was an order determined by Europe for the rest of the earth. (Ibid., 126–127.) Schmitt called the new *nomos* a marvellous product of human reason because it ended the religious wars of the Middle Ages and rationalised and humanised war. Schmitt writes that it was a European achievement that wars could be limited to involve sovereign states. (Ibid., 141–142, 151.)

This function of “bracketing war” is what makes states so important to Schmitt. For him it is the system of states that has made it possible to limit wars. By contrast, the end of sovereign states, and the emergence of a world hegemon, would mean that once the political (the ability to separate friend from enemy) was gone, a door would be opened to global interventionism.

Schmitt describes the territorial changes within a spatial order of the *jus publicum Europaeum* and illustrates the role of great powers. First, “the procedures for territorial changes in European international law were developed by the Great Powers at the major peace conferences in the 18th and 19th centuries”. Schmitt claims there are different principles at work whose purpose is to maintain the present order and its established members. One of the principles is “delimitation of spheres of influence” and “affirmation and recognition of great spheres of special interest”. (Ibid., 185–186.) Great powers are the strongest members of the spatial

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26 See Odysseos & Petito (2007) for discussions on Schmitt’s ideas of “humanised war”.
order, and thus they march at the forefront of development. This primary status also requires recognition from others, which makes it in fact the highest form of recognition in international law. The practice of recognition, according to Schmitt, has had an important effect on the spatial structure of the order of international law. Great powers could participate in European conferences and negotiations and could acquire colonies. Schmitt elaborates this point, saying, “Recognition as a Great Power became and remained a legal institution of international law, as important as recognition of a new state or government.” In his view, since great powers were the leaders of the spatial order, they were in a position to recognise major territorial changes. (Ibid., 190–192.) This is an indication of how seriously Schmitt took the institution of great power management.

The spatial order of Europe was based on political balance; it was the foundation of international law. Schmitt writes, “The pervasive commonality of the spatial order is more important than everything usually associated with sovereignty and non-intervention”. Just like Bull then, Schmitt took the view that order took precedence over sovereignty. He was also openly in favour of a balance of power as the ordering principle, noting “the great practical superiority of the concept of balance, because therein lies its capacity to achieve a bracketing of war”. Moreover, just as Keal saw what good spheres of influence could produce, Schmitt saw the war-limiting effect of balancing. (Ibid., 188–189.) The English School vision of order and great powers and Schmitt’s vision of nomos and its leaders are very much alike and testify to the importance of taking this shared view of the system of states seriously when reflecting on the present images of international order and spheres of influence.

Finally, after his extensive explanation of the previous nomos of the earth, Schmitt addresses the topic of the future nomos, which in his view began with the collapse of the Eurocentric spatial order. The flag of the Congo Society, a new state on the African soil, was recognised by the United States on April 22, 1884. Yet, it was not really decolonisation that worried Schmitt but the growing power of the United States. Moreover he was concerned by what he saw as the decline of jus publicum Europaeum into a universal world law lacking distinctions. European international law was being transformed into universal international law; European order
was becoming part of the spacelessness of general universalism. Schmitt notes that at the same time as a new spatial order (of universalism) from America was challenging the traditional European order, there was also a new process of “several different spheres (Großräume) of international law” that appeared on the scene. (Schmitt 2003, 227–231.) More specifically, Schmitt identified what he saw as the threat of universalism as coming from the West and hoped that a new regional organisation of the global political map would be the solution. Schmitt was very concerned about the fact that Europe had lost its central position and did not even seem to have noticed it. What the Europeans had overlooked was that the recognition of new (non-European) states in international law had destroyed the system of states and was replaced by a collection of states randomly joined together by factual relations. This collection of states was not joined together by a spiritual or spatial consciousness, unlike states had been before. (Ibid., 233–234.) As Schmitt states, “With this rejection of international law, Europe stumbled into a world war that dethroned the old world from the center of the earth and destroyed the bracketing of war it had created” (ibid., 239). Put into English School terms, Schmitt thought that international society was turning into an international system.

Schmitt was not fond of the idea of World Government, or a solidarist international society with common morals. It was not only that Schmitt disliked the idea of a single sovereign; he had an aversion to any system of international society where spatial distinctions would disappear, whether dictated by the United States or a World Government. According to Schmitt, at the end of the First World War, the League of Nations was formed to oversee the re-division of European soil. As the League’s headquarters were situated in Geneva, Schmitt called the choice for universalism the “Geneva dogma”. (Schmitt 2003; 241, 244.) As Schmitt (2003, 243–244) saw it,

_The development of the planet finally had reached a clear dilemma between universalism and pluriversalism, monopoly and polypoly. The question was whether the planet was mature enough for a global monopoly of a single power or whether pluralism of coexisting Großräume), spheres of interest, and cultural spheres would determine the new international law of the earth._
The League advocated universalism instead of pluriversalism, a position which Schmitt was not happy about. At the same time, the League failed to create a universal world order, since the Soviet Union and the United States were absent. (Ibid., 245.) Schmitt thought that the alternative of a plurality of *Großräume* was not discussed at the time of the League of Nations. What was at stake was a balanced spatial order against a centrally ruled world – pluralism against universalism, polypoly against monopoly. (Ibid., 247). A World Government was not what Schmitt wanted. Schmitt envisioned something else to counter the threat that universalism posed to the political, the system of states. That something was a sphere of influence: “*Großräume* spheres of interest, and cultural spheres” (ibid., 243–244).

It was not only the Europeans themselves who were to blame for their plight at the time. When Schmitt wrote about universalism and became enthusiastic about the idea of a new pluralism, he would end up discussing the power of the United States. And indeed Schmitt put much of the blame on the United States for destroying political plurality. The United States was making its own rules of the game. As early as 1823, *The Monroe Doctrine* had shielded the Western Hemisphere from further land appropriation by the European powers. (Ibid., 238.) The United States had not signed the Versailles Treaty and had not joined the League of Nations. It did not participate in the International Court of Justice in Hague. Although the United States was officially absent from these forums, it was effectively present and involved in European affairs. (Ibid., 251.) It controlled the foreign policies of states within the Western Hemisphere even though they were considered “sovereign”. They were in fact within the spatial and political sphere of influence of the Monroe Doctrine. Schmitt (2003, 252) explains the relationship as follows:

\[T\]he controlled state's territory is absorbed into the spatial sphere of the controlling state and its special interests, i.e., into its spatial sovereignty. The external, emptied space of the controlled state's territorial sovereignty remains inviolate, but the material content of this sovereignty is changed by the guarantees of the controlling power's economic *Großräume*).

Schmitt’s *Großraum* is something where the shell, or outer layer, of sovereignty is maintained but the content of it is sacrificed. What this
content was Schmitt (ibid.) describes with reference to the United States’ influence and right to intervention:

The controlling state had the right to protect independence or private property, the maintenance of order and security, and the preservation of the legitimacy or legality of a government. Simultaneously, on other grounds, it was free, at its own discretion, to interfere in the affairs of the controlled state. Its right of intervention was secured by footholds, naval bases, refuelling stations, military and administrative outposts, and other forms of cooperation, both internal and external.

Thus, Schmitt has a list here, probably not an exhaustive one, of what kinds of acts are performed within a sphere of influence. The spatial sovereignty of the controlling state is extended to include other states within its sphere of influence, but formally sovereignty remains in the hands of the controlled state. This was the case with the Monroe Doctrine; this is the case with a Großraum; and this is also the basis for depicting spheres of influence in the present. Schmitt (2003, 252) continues to lament the exercising of the Monroe Doctrine by claiming that “it destroyed the order and orientation that had obtained in the previous form of sovereign territory”. For Schmitt there is a great difference between states whose freedom is limited due to interventions and states with the power to make their own sovereign decisions. The states within the spatial order of the Western Hemisphere, that is, the Caribbean and Central American states, belonged to the United States’ sphere of spatial sovereignty. (Ibid., 252–253.)

Thus, the true challenge to the old nomos came from the United States and its proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine on December 2, 1823. The wording “Western Hemisphere” was now intimately connected with the Doctrine, as it became a Großraum in the sense of international law. (Schmitt 2003, 281–283). In the beginning, the Doctrine meant a defensive line of isolation directed against the powers of the Old Europe, but drawing such a line also gave the United States the freedom to undertake its own land appropriations in the hemisphere. This isolation, according to Schmitt, created a new spatial order by separating a sphere of guaranteed peace and freedom from a sphere of despotism and corruption. The line drawn by the United States between Old and New
Europe was seen as a moral one. (Ibid., 286–290). In the next chapter, where I discuss Cold War practices, this aspect of spheres of influence will become even more evident. If we step beyond seeing spheres of influence as a structural matter of hierarchy, inequality and a struggle for a balance of power, we find a discourse of justification, of “us and them”, of freedom and tyranny. If there was a moral line between the Old and the New World, it was also territorial and historical. The Western Hemisphere was a territory with its own historical tradition (ibid., 286). I argued before that the idea of sphere of influence subsumes a spatial or territorial dimension. I would now assert that it also includes the idea of some moral, historical or cultural closeness. This makes a sphere of influence look like a regional arrangement something that encompasses a delimited territory of states that are somehow related – or at least related in the opinion of the central power.

Going back to the Monroe Doctrine, Schmitt (2003, 292–293) writes that it did not take too long for the United States to transform a foreign policy of isolation into imperialism. It was this imperialism, not the isolationism that the Monroe Doctrine represented at first, which caused Schmitt to take a very critical stance towards the United States’ ambitions. The United States was faced with a choice between isolation and intervention – a choice between a transition to the plurality of coexisting Großräume or a global claim to world power, and with it, global civil war. (Ibid., 296.) The threat of this interventionist policy was that it transformed the concept of war from one of interstate conflict to one of intrastate struggle, that is, into a civil war (ibid., 299). What the Monroe Doctrine ultimately represented was a new spatial order – global universalism lacking any spatial sense – replacing the old one. Political control and domination were based on intervention, which destroyed the nomos of sovereign territory. (Ibid., 252–253.) Not only the Western Hemisphere was the target; eventually the United States made the claim for global interventionism and refused to recognise territorial changes that it considered illegal anywhere. Schmitt (2003, 307) writes, “The praxis of jus publicum Europaeum had sought to encompass conflicts within the framework of a system of equilibrium. Now, they were universalised in the name of world unity.”

According to Schmitt, the Eurocentric nomos met its destruction in World War One and a division of the world into East and West became
reality. Schmitt listed three alternatives for the future order. The first was that one of the great powers would emerge victorious and the dualism of East and West would be replaced by a complete unity of the world. “The victor would be the world’s sole sovereign. He would appropriate the whole earth – land, sea, and air – and would divide and manage it in accord with his plans and ideas.” For Schmitt this was the most undesirable alternative. The second option was an attempt to restore the balance of power of the previous nomos. The third was a balance maintained by several independent Großräume which needed to be homogenous internally but differentiated externally. (Ibid., 353–355.) Schmitt already saw the Western Hemisphere as one, and Eastern Europe as the second, new territorial Großraum (ibid., 305). Ulmen (2003, 19) writes that Schmitt saw Germany as being too small to be a world power but too big to disappear from history. Thus Germany could not survive the destruction of the state-system on its own. According to Luoma-aho (2007, 36), the Soviet Union, as well as the British and Japanese empires, also had their respective Großräume in Schmitt’s eyes. A German-led Großraum in Central and Eastern Europe would balance the two universalistic powers of the United States and the Soviet Union. Only in this way would the political pluriverse be maintained as the prevailing international order. (Freund 1995; Luoma-aho 2000; 2007, 41.)

Schmitt explained the dissolution of jus publicum Europaeum through international law. The international law that Schmitt idealised was the spatial international law seen in Europe, not least because its great achievement was the bracketing of war. Even though Schmitt declared that the challenger of jus publicum Europaeum was the United States, which had its own spatial international law, that is, one which allowed universalist-humanitarian interventions, Schmitt also blamed the Europeans for mistaking the universalising of international law for a victory of European international law. In fact, Europe itself made jus publicum Europaeum global through land appropriations. (Ibid., 133–135.) Schmitt could not stand universal international law. He considered it the end of European international law because it was universal law that lacked all distinctions; it embodied a general universality and meant the destruction of the traditional global order. Thus, Schmitt began to see the development of an international law specific to Großräume as desirable.
He was afraid of the United States’ *Großraum* not because it created this kind of spatial international law – after all spatial differentiation was what Schmitt sought – but because it could turn into a universalist monster. As I understand it, the globalisation of European international law was not the focal problem until Europe’s domination over that law was jeopardised.

The question remains, What is the form of international law, if any, that lies between the separate spatial international laws? Will anarchy still prevail between *Großräume*, and will there be international societies instead of a single international society? Does Schmitt’s system of *Großräume* mean suzerain-state systems? These questions Schmitt leaves quite open when he focuses on exploring the universalist threat. One interpretation of Schmitt’s dilemma of the universal is the Russian approach, which I explore in chapter 7. The Russian vision is to choose universal international law but decline to accept universal values. Power is concentrated and spatially based, but relations among and within the spatial units follow general, universal international law. This guarantees peace among the great powers. Values, however, are particular and spatial – and should not be universalised. Universalisation of values would mean imposition of values by force, thus creating a universe. Schmitt’s concern was international law, but the Russian analysts try to separate values from law in order to come to terms with the separation of the particular and the universal.

The relevance for present-day spheres of influence is that Schmitt’s sphere of influence is a formal agreement. For Schmitt (2003, 252) the right to intervention was based on agreements and treaties, making it possible to claim that the action taken was no longer intervention. When Schmitt writes about *Großräume* as separate spheres of international law, he cannot be talking about informality and tacitness. In this respect, one could argue that Schmitt’s idea is a legal system resembling more colonialism and suzerain-systems and less the sphere of influence which Keal wrote on. Looking at history from the perspective of the present, the tacitness of influence is not necessarily a distinctive feature of a sphere of influence. The present understanding embodies the pejorative associations, but it also embodies a sphere of influence which is imperialist. Even the Cold War sphere of influence, though tacit, was well established.
and included treaties, such as the Warsaw Pact. The ideological divide was also concrete and evident. If we think about Russia, it is accused of trying to establish its sphere of influence by formal means - integration. Because of the pejorative associations of “sphere of influence”, the integration project of the European Union in all its legality is not described as a sphere of influence.

Schmitt’s universalist fear is very topical when we look at the Russian discourse which is obsessed, as I will argue in chapter 7, with the United States’ unipolarity. I am inclined to say that it is the idea of international order which makes Schmitt so interesting for any analysis of spheres of influence. He did not explain the idea of *Großraum* nearly as carefully as he did the idea of a *nomos* of the earth. It is Schmitt’s conceptualisation of international order and the moral stance that particular is good while universal is evil that accounts for his succeeding in giving the concept of sphere of influence a place in the history of international theory.

Whereas Naumann’s vision of Great States seems to be situated more in the spatial order of states, with his defence of sovereignty and national sentiments, Schmitt’s *Großraum* takes the idea of spheres of influence a step further by legitimising them and creating a new spatial order of international law. This new spatial order of *Großräume* means a loosening of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty but does not mean the creation of a solidarist international society. Instead of solidarism, Schmitt clings to the pluralist system in the new form it takes. Schmitt’s rather complex system of thought about international law, the notions of universe and pluriverse, and, similarly, the English School’s notion of solidarist and pluralist international orders are helpful in understanding why Russian writers agonise over the questions of what kind of international law should be promoted, who can decide on it and how it should be applied in specific spatial cases.

**5.4 James Burnham and E.H. Carr**

The story of spheres of influence is also a story about the people behind the concept. It is also a story of the interconnectedness of these people and their ideas. James Burnham (1905-1987), an American political theorist,
was an inspiration to George Orwell, whose work I will introduce later. E.H. Carr (1892–1982), the well-known British historian, journalist, diplomat and theorist on International Relations, had a connection to the English School. The English School was born out of the emergence of IR as an academic discipline in Britain. In that process, Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* had a great impact on the development of international theory. Carr not only refuted universalism with his “utopian realism” but he also broadened the study of IR from its narrow focus on law and organisation. (Dunne 1998, xii.) Dunne (1998, 13) even begins the story of the English School by first introducing Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, which Dunne describes as the dissident work of the English School. Carr was not a member of the British Committee, and not everyone is willing to identify him with the English School (see Linklater and Suganami 2006, 15.) In fact, Bull (1969, 638) himself criticised Carr for not dealing with international society: the common values, interests, rules and institutions of states. For Dunne, Carr’s relationship to the School is a semi-detached one; what keeps Carr a distance away from the School is his belief in the intrusion of power into all spheres of ethics and politics. At the same time, Bull and Vincent attach great importance to his work. (Dunne 1998, 36.)

Naumann’s Central Europe was cited by both Carr and Schmitt (Luoma-aho 2007, 45). The world-vision of Schmitt, Carr and Burnham rested on the same basic idea of a transformation of the system of states. In fact, Luoma-aho (2007, 36) identifies Schmitt’s writings as an academic landmark that anticipated the emergence of theoretical writings during the 1940s on post-war international order. In this sense, the English School’s work on international order can be seen as a continuation of what Schmitt initiated. These links in thinking do not necessarily signify a linear line of development, but rather form a path that can be followed and that makes sense for the present understanding of spheres of influence. Indeed, this interconnectedness is one additional criterion for choosing these sources. I have already dealt with Schmitt but what is common to Carr and Burnham is that, unlike Schmitt, they are not generally associated with ideas on spheres of influence. Carr is

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27 Luoma-aho (2007) deals with the common ideas of all three in his article “Geopolitics and *Gross*politics. From Carl Schmitt to EH Carr and James Burnham”. 
known for his critique of idealism and Burnham is relatively unknown.\textsuperscript{28} We are talking about buried knowledge. In the case of Carr, in particular, the knowledge on sphere of influence has been buried under his other significant ideas rather than buried with the man itself. The conclusion I drew concerning the English School was the same: the general disinterest in sphere of influence as a concept has led to the dismissal of the School as a relevant source for theorising spheres of influence.

5.4.1 Nationalism versus Internationalism

Schmitt’s \textit{Nomos of the Earth}, envisioning a new international order, was published in 1950. Carr’s \textit{The Twenty Years Crisis} was published in 1939, reflecting on the result of the First World War, and \textit{Nationalism and After} in 1945, outlining visions for international order after the Second World War. Both Schmitt and Carr expressed the currents of the time and each scholar’s vision of international order resembles the other’s. In \textit{Nationalism and After} (1965) Carr even uses the term \textit{Großraum}\textsuperscript{29}. Luoma-aho (2007, 44) suggests that Carr’s conception of the political is adopted from Schmitt, even though Carr does not refer to Schmitt directly. The idea was nevertheless the same: politics took place between states in the context of violence. In a very Schmittian vein, Carr also promoted the pluriverse of states. (Ibid.) As Carr (1965, 49) saw it, within a national community the concentration of authority in a single organ would result in totalitarianism and the same applies to the international system, which is why a multiplicity of authority is required. In essence, Carr relied on the same idea of the duality of pluriverse and universe as Schmitt did – or, as Carr termed them, nationalism and internationalism – and the need to find a middle ground between them.

Just like Schmitt and the English School, Carr recalls the history of international order: a state-system emerging from medieval Christendom. Carr divides the modern history of international relations into three distinct periods with different conceptions of nation. The first period

\textsuperscript{28} See Roger Kimball’s (2002) excellent introduction to the thought of James Burnham.

\textsuperscript{29} The word Großraum was not Schmitt’s invention but he conceptualised it for his own theoretical purposes (Luoma-aho 2007, 39).
started with the dissolution of the medieval order and ended with the Congress of Vienna. During that period, international relations were between princes and kings, and a nation was identified with the person of the sovereign. (Carr 1965, 1–6.) The second period began with the Napoleonic Wars and ended in 1914. For Carr, this was a period which was successful in balancing between internationalism and nationalism. The asserting of claims to statehood by nations lived side by side with the creation of a single world economy, whereby the period was a compromise between politics and economy. Carr’s own nationalism caused him to admire the English supremacy in the world economy, which explains his enthusiasm for the post-Vienna order. But British supremacy ended in the First World War and the nineteenth-century economic system was ruined. (Ibid., 6–17.) The third period followed with “catastrophic growth of nationalism and the bankruptcy of internationalism” (ibid., 17). Nationalism became catastrophic because of a new environment which included the increase in the number of nations (ibid., 18). Carr writes, “Down to that time the influence of nationalism had been to diminish the number of sovereign and independent political units in Europe”. The conditions of the period, the military and economic developments, favoured the concentration of power, but instead dispersal of authority was taking place all over the globe. (Ibid., 24.) The change compared to the previous order was that independence and statehood were assigned no more by might (by virtue of power) but by right (ibid., 40–41). Carr did not view the equality of nations as proclaimed in the Charter of United Nations as being possible in the way that equality of individuals is. States are simply too disparate in size. (Ibid., 42–43.) Like Schmitt, Carr did not advocate a “supreme world directorate” that would follow the bankruptcy of nationalism or requests for the emancipation of the individual to equal a “sentimental empty universalism”. According to Carr, the world was not united enough for a universal authority. (Ibid., 44.)

These are the observations Carr made about the history of the system of states. What is noteworthy for discussing spheres of influence is the dualism of nationalism and internationalism and Carr’s interest in the location of power in international relations. What Carr would have liked to have seen was a power structure that we could call great
power management. Carr (1965, 34–37) made a prediction concerning
the possible fourth period after the Second World War. Even though
nationalism was still strong, the main forces of the world – the United
Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union – were not built on
nationalism in the old sense. According to Carr the world might well
have been facing the end of “the ideology of the small nation as the
ultimate political and economic unit”. (Ibid.) What Carr thought that he
saw was a “clearly marked trend towards integration and the formation
of even larger political and economic units”, which started in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. Quoting Naumann, Carr refers to the
concentration of sovereignty. (Carr 2001, 211.) In The Twenty Years’
Crisis (2001), Carr repeats the remark he made in Nationalism and After
(1965): it was a dangerous fiasco when nationalism and disintegration
were resumed in 1918; instead of political and economic disintegration,
the post-war order would have required larger units. Making a reference
to Naumann’s Mid-Europe Carr (2001, 212) notes that the process of
centration continued:

The United States strengthened their hold over the American
continents. Great Britain created a ‘sterling bloc’ and laid the
foundations of a closed economic system. Germany reconstituted
Mittel-Europa and pressed forward into the Balkans. Soviet Russia
developed its vast territories into a compact unit of industrial and
agricultural production. Japan attempted the creation of a new unit of
‘Eastern Asia’ under Japanese domination. Such was the trend towards
the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of
six or seven highly organised units, round which lesser satellite units
revolved without any appreciable independent motion of their own.

Thus Carr saw a change in the post-war order. There was no return to
the pre-1914 world, nor would sovereignty remain static. For Carr,
political power was territorially based but even this was not permanent.
Territorial power had not always been centred on sovereign states and
it was uncertain whether it would be in the future either. For Carr any
other form of organising international relations than territorial units
seemed revolutionary and thus it was more likely that territorial units
would change form instead. (Carr 2001, 210–211). Carr’s focal question was, “Will the nation survive as the unit of power?” (Ibid., 209).

Carr predicts that in the future sovereignty will be more blurred and indistinct than at present. Sovereignty had marked the distinctiveness of the authority claimed by the state after the medieval system. But “when distinctions began to be made between political, legal and economic sovereignty or between internal and external sovereignty, it was clear that the label had ceased to perform its proper function as a distinguishing mark for a single category of phenomena”. (Ibid., 212.) Thus, Carr questions the whole idea of state sovereignty as the organising principle of international order, since its original meaning did not fit the conditions at the time. For Carr we had already lost sovereignty as a principle, and in the reality of international affairs sovereignty was also becoming obsolete. Based on Carr’s observation, basing the idea of sphere of influence on assumptions about sovereignty is problematic if sovereignty no longer adequately describes the “present conditions”, or if it ever did. If there never was sovereignty other than in principle, then “violations of sovereignty” poorly describe what spheres of influence are about.

Carr states that in the future units of power will likely not take much account of formal sovereignty. He does not see why there should not be units consisting of formally sovereign states as long as the effective authority is exercised from a single centre. Nevertheless, these units would not be recognised by international law. (Carr 2001, 213.) What Carr means is the *informal* concentration of power, not a system of *Großräume* that would replace the system of states in the eyes of international law. Moreover, Carr suggests that international order cannot be based on naked power alone. There needs to be consent, whether it be forced or not, on the order. At the minimum, the order needs to be viewed as better than any alternative. The ones creating conditions for the consent required are of course the ascendant powers. (Ibid., 216–217.) To sum up, for Carr the concentration of power is informal and does not require a change of international law, but does necessitate consent among the great powers.

Even though for Carr (1965, 52) the future order would not be built on international law, he uses Schmitt’s terminology:
If these predictions are realized, the world will have to accommodate itself to the emergence of a few great multinational units in which power will be mainly concentrated. Culturally, these units may best be called civilizations: there are distinctively British, American, Russian and Chinese civilizations, none of which stops short at national boundaries in the old sense. Economically the term Großraum invented by German geo-politicians seems the most appropriate. The Soviet Union is pre-eminently a Großraum; the American continents are the potential Großraum of the United States, though the term is less convenient as applied to the British Commonwealth of Nations or the sterling area which are oceanic rather than continental agglomerations.

Compared to Schmitt’s analysis, there had to be a British and not a German Großraum between the two other great powers (Carr 1965, 53). Carr did not want Britain to end up as subordinate to the United States or the Soviet Union but to lead a Western European Großraum (ibid., 71, 73). Moreover, Carr makes it clear he does not promote “a division of the world into a small number of multinational units exercising effective control over vast territories and practising in competition and conflict with one another new imperialism which would be simply the old nationalism writ large and would almost certainly pave the way for more titanic and devastating wars”. Carr admires the nineteenth-century order of only few great powers and wishes that would be the model for the future. (Ibid., 53.) According to Carr, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century order allowed great powers exclusively to decide on matters of war and peace, with small states agreeing to this practice. In turn, small nations could opt for neutrality and remain outside of wars. In Carr’s view, the option of total neutrality was no longer available. Collective security did not work either, as small states could not make any contribution to it. These factors caused Carr to doubt the viability of small nations as independent entities. (Ibid. 54–55.)

In Carr’s view, the only way for a small nation to maintain independence and contribute to international security was “by willingly merging some of its attributes into the common pool”. This would also solve the problem caused by the principle of national self-determination,
a product of the nineteenth century that has caused impractically small units of power. (Carr 1965, 56.) Carr considers it natural for human beings to form groups of varying size and purpose. The multi-national units of power would not have to kill national feeling and culture; instead they could offer overlapping and interlocking loyalties. (Ibid., 59.) The new political units should not be based on national exclusiveness but on shared ideals and aspirations, just as Naumann envisioned. Carr wanted to avoid the multi-national units manifesting nationalism at a larger scale. The concentration of power should advance tolerance of the national and not the opposite. (Ibid., 66.) Carr is constructing an image of two different ways to concentrate power: One represents a nationalistic-imperialistic project ending up in more wars and the other advances tolerance and shared values. Carr does not explain the difference between the two types of influence well enough, but conclusions can nevertheless be drawn. First, nationalism is the core issue. It has the potential to ruin the beautiful idea of Großräume, just like it ruined the system of states. Second, Carr expresses the idea that there is a good Großraum and a bad Großraum, meaning that a sphere of influence has the potential to benefit all the members of international society, not least because of the order it produces.

Carr had a vision of a union of the great and the small which would not mean the formation of empires but a union of states with at least some level of independence. Interestingly, at the same time Carr (1965, 58–60) proposed a world security organisation, supported by the three great powers for the management of some collective forces and strategic bases. Carr was not very consistent or clear in his vision of this organisation and its relation to the system of Großräume. The logic of trying to solve the dilemma of war and nationalism by organising the system of states into a system of Großräume is noteworthy for contesting the concept of sphere of influence with its present pejorative connotations. Even though Carr’s solution sounds like a triumph of the inequality of states, he is not as “realist” as it may first seem. Matters of justice are not alien to Carr. He declared, quite radically, that the primary function of international order is not to maintain the status quo or rights of nations, but to improve the life conditions of ordinary people (ibid., 61). Carr does not seems to take the state at face value, but rather places individuals before it.
Even if a sphere of influence on a theoretical level is mainly concerned with relations among states, the pejorative associations of the concept, especially the images of the Cold War, nevertheless encompass the human factor. Then the question becomes, How does a sphere of influence affect the people inhabiting the territories influenced? I believe that this is the one question that should be put more squarely at the focus when discussing spheres of influence.

Carr could also make us consider whether his emphasis on social justice over nationalism could be applied to the logic of spheres of influence. Is a sphere of influence in fact a progressive idea (like it is for Carr) instead of a regressive one? Could it not be seen as progressive and at times justified if we place the human being front and centre instead of clinging to the principle of state sovereignty and the nation-state? After all, protecting people is the cause that promoters of humanitarian intervention would appeal to in order to justify violations of sovereignty, the use of force and violence in general. Carr (1965, 69) insists that small or medium-sized nation-states lack the resources to provide well-being for their people. He puts forward proposals on common action, conventions, a General Staff and trade agreements as the measures needed to create the British *Großraum* – proposals which bring to mind the present practice of integration and not forceful domination (ibid., 72). Are the peoples of the small states better off if they can let go of their state’s sovereignty and accept a merger into bigger entities? Or is Carr just as utopian as the those whom he accuses of being so, dreaming of prosperous and humanistic spheres of influence?

Carr’s concern was war and peaceful change as he tried to make sense of a world free of the problems caused by nationalism and internationalism alike. He offers the solution of larger units to war-causing nationalism and its counterpart, utopian internationalism. The solution cannot be a fantasy for Carr; it needs to be based on the realities of life. And in reality regionalism was more practical than universalism: ”The history of League of Nations, beginning with the insertion in the Covenant of the original Monroe Doctrine reservation, bears witness to the persistence of attempts to escape from a theoretical and ineffective universalism into a practical and workable regionalism” (Carr 1965, 45). Internationalism for Carr meant universal dominion. He thought that world peace, based on the
“harmony of interests” that internationalism proclaimed, was certainly desirable but its problem was that it could be used to mask hegemonic political interests. Carr notes, “[P]leas for international solidarity and world union come from those dominant nations which may hope to exercise control over a unified world”. Moreover, those states which desire a position in the dominant group usually invoke nationalism against the internationalism of the dominant powers. The core problem of utopianism was that in the end, in a concrete political situation, selfish national interest would win out over any sense of common good. (Carr 2001, 78–81). This is why, in his view, the emerging order that was challenging the system of nation-states had to be based on pluralism. This meant a compromise “between the past confusion of a vast number of nations, great and small, jostling one another on a footing of formal independence and equality, and the well-knit world authority which may or may not be attainable in the future” (Carr 1965, 52).

Carr insists that power is and will be the determining factor in world affairs. Thus, “[t]he new international order can be built only on a unit of power sufficiently coherent and sufficiently strong to maintain its ascendancy without being itself compelled to take sides in the rivalries of lesser units. Whatever moral issues may be involved, there is an issue of power which cannot be expressed in terms of morality.” (Carr 2001, 216.) Carr is a realist, sceptical about utopian dreams, which is why his stand is so strong. The realist paradigm has obviously left its mark also on the present understanding of spheres of influence. This is why the possibilities of the concept have not been explored outside the realist worldview of power politics. Carr is important for the concept of sphere of influence for situating it in the framework of problems with nationalism and internationalism, and especially by bringing forth how spheres of influence could solve the problems of nationalism. Carr’s sphere of influence cannot be built on nationalism and he argues that larger political units can improve the living conditions of citizens. What is more, Carr pointed out the blurring of sovereignty and the difficulty of discussing sovereignty which was never truly realised. Again, if we relax the idea of sovereignty, spheres of influence are not always and necessarily a violation of sovereign rights; that is, a sphere of influence does not inevitably deserve a pejorative interpretation.
5.4.2 The Inevitability of Power Politics

Burnham considered that a new form of world organisation was emerging that challenged the system of nation-state at the centre. For Burnham, this meant the end of the system of states as the contemporaries knew it. Mika Luoma-aho (2007, 49) describes how Burnham was losing his faith in the old international system: “Though the world political was not one but many, it had become, in an age of world-wide movements and atomic weapons, simply too dangerous a place for a balance of power. This is pluriversalism with a vengeance.” Burnham can be described as an influential person in formulating American foreign policy. His books were widely read; he served as an intelligence officer for the government; and he was one of the founding editors of the eminent journal The National Review (Luoma-aho 2007, 51). According to Roger Kimball (2002), Burnham was a fervent critic of communism but also of totalitarianism at large. For Burnham, communism was an expansionist ideology, ultimately aimed at world domination.

Two of Burnham’s books are of interest to the history of spheres of influence: The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World from 1941 and Struggle for the World from 1947. In The Managerial Revolution, Burnham (1941, 172) explains how under the political system of capitalism the world has consisted of a large number of large nations, with each nation claiming sovereignty for itself. In his view, this system was nevertheless being radically altered by the emergence of the managerial society. “One after another of the sovereign capitalist nations are being either wiped out altogether or stripped of the attributes of sovereignty” (Ibid.) For Burnham the existence of a large number of sovereign nations was incompatible with contemporary social and economic needs (ibid., 173). What Burnham meant is that the development of the global economy did not support the system of sovereign states in the form in which it had been constructed in the past. This political system was already dead, Burnham declares. Burnham envisions a single world state as the possible replacement for the system of states, which has reached its final days. In the utopia of a world state, conflicts could be eliminated and production could be organised in the most effective way. Finally, Burnham does not believe that a world state is possible, because of all the practical problems in establishing it and the
inevitable disintegrative forces which would emerge. For Burnham there is no unity of humankind upon which a world state could be built which is why it remains a utopia. (Ibid., 173–175).

Instead of the emergence of a world state Burnham envisions that “a comparatively small number of great nations, or ‘super-states’, will divide the world among them”. For Burnham, unlike Schmitt and others, sovereignty will be reserved only for the super-states. Burnham writes, “Some of the many nations which are eliminated in fact may be preserved in form; they may be kept as administrative subdivisions, but they will be stripped of sovereignty”. (Ibid., 175.) Backward people may try to win independence but, lacking in technological resources for modern warfare, they will ultimately gravitate towards one of the great camps. (Ibid., 180–181.). He (1941, 181) goes on to observe,

Everywhere men will have to line up with one or the other of the super-states of tomorrow. There will not be room for smaller sovereign nations; nor will the less advanced peoples be able to stand up against the might of the metropolitan areas. Of course, polite fictions of independence may be preserved for propaganda purposes; but it is the reality and not the name of sovereignty about which we are talking.

For Burnham, in *The Managerial Revolution*, the super-state is a sphere of influence close to a federation. In the definitions of a sphere of influence by Keal (1983, 15) and Kaufman (1976, 11), spheres of influence entail a violation of the sovereignty of the influenced state, but not its complete denial. Nor does Bull (2002) make any reference to the absolute abandoning of sovereignty when discussing spheres of influence in various parts of *The Anarchical Society*. Naumann (1917) was careful about dismissing the sovereignty of the states of Mid-Europe. Schmitt (2003, 252) distinguishes external sovereignty, which remains intact, and the material content of sovereignty, which is affected by the controlling power. Carr does not claim that sovereignty is totally lost either. The fate of sovereignty is certainly the cornerstone in discussing the change of the state-system and spheres of influence. In the present use of the concept as well, sphere of influence means less the absorption of and more an attempt to dominate other states. Whether a sphere of influence entails a violation of sovereignty or its complete loss, sovereignty is a central
question to the concept of sphere of influence. David Armstrong (1999, 559) writes that despite the changes in international relations over the last 50 years this central fact remains: “A sovereign state cannot formally be subject to any external jurisdiction except by its own consent” and international law remains the law of states. Thus, for a sphere of influence to have any legitimacy in the present it needs to be a voluntary union of states, a union where there is no longer a violation of sovereignty. Likewise, in a forceful unification, which leaves no room to speculate about the sovereignty of the subjects, the new territorial unit is no longer a sphere of influence in its historical sense. On balance, if we dismiss concerns over the loss of sovereignty when considering spheres of influence of, we lose that which has for a long time defined the concept.

Burnham (1941, 176) was certain that the new system would be implemented through war, which is an interesting remark considering that other writers (not least Lippmann, whose work is analysed in the next chapter) did not consider war the way forward. Quite the contrary, in the context of ongoing war, the purpose was to find a solution for organising the world after the major wars, and certainly not by means of a new war. Burnham was an American with national concerns: “Such political predictions as I have herein outlined are very much resented in the United States. Our official doctrine still continues in the Wilsonian tradition: international law and morality; rights of small nations; nonrecognition of territories acquired by force” (ibid., 182). Indeed, there was an opposing discourse regarding power politics in the United States, one that I will discuss in the next chapter, which Burnham was reacting to. For Burnham (1941, 262–263) expansionist foreign policy was a necessity for survival, not a matter of choice. For the United States this meant “modified hemispheric defence”, drawing a ring around all of northern America and northern South America. Burnham was no doubt overtly expansionist in his thoughts, giving no consideration to the justice of the small. The United States needed to “make a bid for maximum world power as against the super-states to be based on the other two central areas”. (Ibid.) In this sense, Burnham’s imperialist approach to unification differs from the softer models of the rest of the proponents of spheres of influence.
As the title *The Struggle for the World* (1947) suggests, after the *Managerial Revolution* Burnham focused specifically on the challenge of the Soviet Union trying to take over the world. Burnham begins the book by declaring “The Third World War began in April 1944”. For Burnham (1947, 11) this was not a hangover from the Second World War but a phase in its own right, even though no grand battle had yet broken out. As we know today, no third world war ever broke out and the name “Cold War” came to signify the post-war era. The United States was intimately involved in world affairs around the globe, which for Burnham was an irreversible development. But Burnham was dissatisfied with the “immaturity” of the United States in world affairs and wanted to offer advice in creating a more successful policy to counter the Soviet threat. Burnham, like other theorists of the time, struggled to make sense of not only the new role of the state he himself represented, but also the changing international order. Burnham (1947, 23) ponders the meaning of the concept “one world” again in *The Struggle for the World*: “The world is one because all men share a common humanity, whether that humanity is interpreted in naturalistic, metaphysical or religious terms. What bearing, then, does the oneness of the world, so understood, have upon the cold historical problems of world politics in our time?” Burnham answers that it has almost no bearing at all since although connected by certain technology and economic production, “[p]olitically, and, most deeply of all, culturally, the world is many”. Men have always been divided fighting and killing each other. (Ibid.) Burnham’s harsh realism is based on his view of politics as unavoidably connected with power. This means that peace cannot be the objective of a nation if it wishes to survive. Politics is, in the end, about the will to fight and defend the interests and institutions which the nation is founded upon. (Ibid., 147–148.) Even if at an abstract level men might be one humanity, in concrete situations they are driven by diverging interests and clashing objectives (ibid., 24). Thus, in terms of world politics, Burnham saw division as inevitable, making him a pluralist in the Schmittian sense.

Burnham’s approach to universalism is dual. On the one hand, he is suspicious of the claim that a world government, even when exercising supreme world sovereignty, could put an end to war. Like Schmitt, Burnham noted that civil wars and rebellion would emerge within
a united world. On the other hand, Burnham was so overtly worried about the annihilating power of nuclear weapons that he began to think a world government made sense as an organ with a monopoly over atomic weapons. Burnham became more intrigued than Schmitt by the idea of universalism, turning his back on his initially pluralist approach: “However, if there was, or came to be a World Government, it would in fact provide the most rational structure within which to meet the problems of modern world policy, economy and technology. And it would give the complete answer to the greatest of all immediate issues: the issue of control of atomic weapons.” (Burnham 1947, 49.) Burnham did not believe, based on the historical experiences, that a world government could be created voluntarily; it had to be effected by conquest instead (ibid., 52). Shifting his attention to the idea of a world empire, established by force, Burnham notes that what Arnold Toynbee called ‘Universal Empires’ have indeed appeared in history. For Burnham, the battle for a universal empire was being fought between the two super-states of the United States and the Soviet Union. (Ibid., 55–57)

Burnham insists, in line with Schmitt, Naumann and Carr, that the reality of international order is that the time of a world consisting of a large number of independent and sovereign nations is over. “Smaller nations are no longer seriously independent factors in world politics”, Burnham writes. The United Nations is the last nail in the coffin, as seen in the inequality of small and big states regarding seats and veto rules in the Security Council. (Ibid., 58.) Burnham (1947, 155) explains further:

We cannot make all nations equal by calling them equal, or writing their equality into the provisions of the Charter. They simply are not equal, and that settles the question. The so-called ‘revolts of small nations’ at various international gatherings during the past few years are deceptions. The net effect is never anything but an expression of the alignments of small nations in relation to the great powers. All the fuss over the veto power in the United Nations is energy wasted. Whatever the Charter said, the Soviet Union and the United States would always have a de facto veto power, because either of them is alone immeasurably stronger than the United Nations. What an absurdity to think for a moment that Ecuador is equal to the United States, or Sweden equal to the Soviet Union! And what a preposterous absurdity
to imagine that the crisis of world politics could ever be solved with the help of such juridical nonsense!

For Burnham, justice is proportionate – a justice which takes into consideration the capacities and needs of persons and groups according to Bull’s (2002, 77) definition. In Burnham’s case it is capacity that matters. Just like Bull (2002, 21), he does not even see why states should have equal justice for all states. William T.R. Fox also writes how the analogy between equality of men and states should not be carried too far. States cannot be equal in the same sense. Moreover, for Fox equality does not guarantee a more “democratic” order if a state like Uruguay can obstruct effective action by an international organisation as easily as a state like the United States can. (Fox 1944, 144–148.)

Burnham argues that any attempt to formulate international law that would establish plurality will not work since it is against the reality that dictates world politics, that is, power politics. Burnham refers to his own conclusion in *The Managerial Revolution* that it is not a world state that would emerge but competing super-states. This was before the introduction of atomic weapons and the fact that only two super-states emerged from the ashes of the Second World War, making balancing trickier than it would be in a system of three or four super-states. The atomic bomb, most importantly, made Burnham inclined to put his faith in a world state. (Burnham 1947, 58.) “Who controls the atom, controls the world”, Burnham (1947, 59) declared. It is clear that Burnham was also conscious of the fact that if there were an attempt at world domination, it would have to be the United States that would make that attempt because “the ultimate goal of communist, and therefore of Soviet, policy is the conquest of the world” (ibid., 97). The Soviet Union was attempting to control the Eurasian continent – the Heartland in Mackinder’s language – and attempting to weaken all nations not under Soviet control (ibid., 103).

Burnham drew a picture of circles of influence, “concentric rings around an inner circle”, over which the Soviet Union would attempt to establish control. Burnham’s rings illustrate the global domination pattern with circles of *absorption* (the Baltic States, East Poland, Mongolia, etc.), *domination* (Finland, Germany, the Balkans, the Middle East,
etc.), *orienting influence* (Latin America, France, Central and Southern China, etc.) and finally *infiltration and demoralisation* (the United States and England). The Soviet sphere of influence would ultimately be the entire world with more influence closer to the core. (Burnham 1947, 104–105.) Burnham insisted the Soviet strategy was to draw the states of the circles closer inwards so that those within domination would be absorbed and those on the edge of domination would be drawn into the sphere of domination (ibid., 106–107). Within the circle of orienting influence, the aim would be to promote pro-Soviet foreign policy or at least minimise anti-Soviet policy either through pressure or through concessions and conciliation (ibid., 109). Yet, Burnham did not see the Soviet Union as really able to take over the world, so long as the United States remained the rival centre of power (ibid., 111). Burnham’s drawing represents an attempt to demonstrate the magnitude of the Soviet plans which the United States needed to resist in order to hold on to and spread its own influence.

Burnham’s drawing is Schmitt’s greatest fear becoming a reality: the two imperialistic powers lacking a third balancing force and thus beginning to struggle for the world. The new World Empire would be a state, world-dominating politically if not world-wide in scope literally. Burnham writes that he does not advocate totalitarianism but intervening only when necessary to maintain the integrity of the Empire. Although it could be loose in other fields, the Empire had to have an absolute monopoly over atomic weapons. A more voluntary union of states in the form of a world government could emerge out of the World Empire. (Burnham 1947, 60–62.) Within the Empire, sovereignty would evidently be restricted. Burnham is trying to convince the reader that this restriction does not have to mean loss of concrete liberties and may even mean their considerable development. (Ibid., 119–220.) Instead of tyranny, the United States would rule by conciliation and concession, accepting others as partners (ibid. 222). For Burnham, in the world system, the choice is always between a balance of diverse powers and a monopoly of power (ibid., 217). A system that would be based on the universalism of the United States would not be based on a balance of power. Nevertheless, a balance of power would remain the method of preventing “any totalitarian crystallization of power” at other levels.
of social power, except the military, which would be controlled by the United States. Powers within the federation would continue to interact. (Ibid., 222.) Thus, where Burnham differs from other theorists is that as he witnessed the weakening possibilities for three or more super-states, he began to believe that there could be a single super-state, one sovereign state with a sphere of influence encompassing the entire globe. But here Burnham was willing to accord some rights to other states and the absolute monopoly over the Bomb was the only thing he insisted upon firmly.

According to Burnham (1947, 184−186), in order to resist the Soviet attempts to become the sole empire, the United States adhered to the ideas that peace was not an object of foreign policy and that equality of nations and the non-intervention principle needed to be discarded in taking on political leadership of the world. In advocating a World Empire, Burnham's political outlook for the United States certainly takes steps far from the idea of great power management through spheres of influence. Somehow Burnham wants to believe in spheres of influence, but fears the Soviet Union and the Atomic Bomb too much to believe that the bipolar or any multipolar system could endure. Adhering to spheres of influence would be the defensive strategy, but Burnham (1947, 187−188) takes the view that the ultimate goal is an offensive policy. A defensive policy would not be enough, because it would not solve the problem of the communist aim of world conquest. The world needed an alternative, a non-communist world federation, which only the United States could force into being. (Ibid.) This should take place by the United States maintaining its imperial relation towards the Americas. Burnham insisted that a union, not an alliance, had to be formed between the United States and Great Britain, along with its dominions. In this union, Britain would initially have been the junior partner due to the imbalance in material might. Under the union a European Federation had to be built. Burnham claimed that as Europe was too weak to form its own centre of power between the United States and the Soviet Union its only option was to merge with one or the other. (Ibid., 195−199). In Asia, states would be kept in line with the United States policy with the incentive of material benefits and resisting communist infiltration (ibid., 202). Burnham (1947, 226−227) writes:
It will be useful to give a name to the supreme policy which I have formulated. It is neither ‘imperial’ nor ‘American’ in any sense that would be ordinarily communicated by these words. The partial leadership which it allots to the United States follows not from any nationalist bias but from the nature and possibilities of exiting world power relationships. Because this policy is the only answer to the communist plan for a universal totalitarianism, because it is the only chance for preserving the measure of liberty that is possible for us in our Time of Troubles, and because it proposes the sole route now open towards a free world society, I shall henceforth refer to it as the policy of democratic world order.

Burnham was a prophet of sorts for the post-war foreign policy of the United States (see also Luoma-aho 2007, 53), making his writings all the more relevant for analysing the present understandings of spheres of influence. The attempt to establish a democratic world order by the United States is much feared in Russia and closely related to Russian ideas on spheres of influence, as the forthcoming analysis will demonstrate. A democratic world order represents an aggressive world-dominating sphere of influence which Russia is trying to prevent from materialising.

Burnham does not use the concept of sphere of influence, nor would one find many other American scholars theorising on the “United States’ sphere of influence”. For American scholars and intellectuals, spheres of influence represent a self-serving foreign policy practice which they fiercely oppose; that is, the concept is a pejorative one. Much effort has been put into inventing names such as a democratic world order or Good Neighbor Policy in order to create an image of something other than the traditional (imperialistic) sphere-of-influence policy. Although Burnham at first advocated the idea of super-states, he became convinced that in the age of atomic weapons and the Soviet threat, a world empire ruled by the United States was the only way to maintain some level of liberty within the international system. Instead of accepting a great power order that would be based on a balance of power through the establishment of spheres of influence, Burnham placed his trust in no other state than his own for the management of world affairs. Next, I will introduce the Good Neighbor Policy, another phrase denoting international influence
that attempted to draw attention away from the concepts of balance of power and sphere of influence.

5.5 Walter Lippmann and the Good Neighbor Policy

Schmitt and Naumann proposed a new global political order for rescuing Germany from being absorbed by other great states and for the sake of pluralism. Schmitt and Naumann had their American counterparts who were interested in regional arrangements and developing a scheme for great power relations and relations among the big and the small. Burnham's vision of a democratic world order, as he called it, was founded upon the American universalism that Schmitt was afraid of. What Burnham criticised was taking a soft approach towards world order that would allow the Soviet Union to continue its attempt at world domination. It was the communist threat that justified the United States' role as the ruler of the world empire. But there was also a vision, very different from that of Burnham's and one that Burnham could not endorse, called the "Good Neighbor Policy", which was supported by President F. Roosevelt and Lippmann. Roosevelt's and Lippmann's basic concern was the question of what kind of influence would be the right one for the new regionalism.

In a meeting with Winston Churchill in 1941, Franklin Roosevelt put forward a proposal whereby the United States and Great Britain would together police world affairs until an international organisation could be formed. This police force was later expanded to include Russia and China. Roosevelt's post-war plan included proposals that great powers would act as guarantors of peace, that colonial empires would be disbanded and that other states would be disarmed. (Kimball 1991, 85.) Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali (1998, 9) write that Franklin Roosevelt rejected the policy of Theodore Roosevelt from 1904 which asserted that the United States could intervene in the domestic affairs of the countries of Western Hemisphere. The new policy from 1933 onward would be that of non-intervention with the name "Good Neighbor Policy". Lippmann took the concept of Good Neighbor Policy and formulated the idea of the United States having a sphere of responsibility within the Western Hemisphere.
Although we are concerned with “subjugated knowledges”, Lippmann’s significance for the history of the concept of sphere of influence is evident when we embark on connecting Lippmann with spheres of influence. I found my way to his work through the English School and Keal. Lippmann (1889-1974) was a journalist and writer and worked as an advisor to Woodrow Wilson. He received the Pulitzer Prize in 1958 and 1962 for his newspaper column “Today and Tomorrow.” One curious fact about Lippmann is that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was an eager reader of his columns. Fursenko and Naftali (2006, 487) write that Khrushchev appreciated Lippmann’s realism and his insight into international relations. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 26 or 27 October 1962, Khrushchev was given the column Lippmann wrote in *The New York Herald Tribune* on 25 October. Lippmann proposed in the column that the superpowers should dismantle both the Soviet base in Cuba and the US base in Turkey. This idea possibly influenced Khrushchev (1962d) and prompted him to propose in a letter in 27 October the removal of missiles in Turkey. Fursenko and Naftali (2006, 488) even put forward the question whether President Kennedy might have delivered his message through Lippmann, since he knew Khrushchev’s enthusiasm for reading Lippmann’s columns.

The reason why I consider this connection to Khrushchev significant is that, first of all, it indicates that political analysts such as Lippmann can be influential in transmitting ideas to the political level. It was not only Schmitt, Naumann and Lippmann, firmly rooted in politics, who wanted to influence the foreign policies of their respective countries; the British Committee had a similar interest as well, with its agenda of being involved in the development of international affairs. Second, the fact that Khrushchev read Lippmann’s columns means that the ideas travel across borders, and even the Iron Curtain. Likewise, we can see when reading Russian discourses (chapter 7) how painstakingly international theory has been studied in Russia. Russian discourses on spheres of influence are passionate cries, but cries founded upon theorising on the society of states. It is no secret that IR in Russia has developed from Western research and concepts (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 2004, 8) but, interestingly, Russian analysts have also been able to move from the Cold War mindset into envisioning a future on the basis of international theory.
For Lippmann, like his contemporaries, the world wars formed the context for thinking about international order. Lippmann (1945, 131) felt that a new world order could emerge from the ruins of the war, and with it a long peace. Lippmann pondered the war events in Europe in Some Notes on War and Peace in 1940. He lamented the balance-of-power system in Europe and the lack of an authority to bind together the European nations (ibid., 38–44). Lippmann saw Europe as an entity in itself which would not flourish as a diversity of nation-states, but as a union, which required a centre of order: “If this is correct, then the great question of the war is whether there will be established a new and durable center of civilized union and authority, capable of repulsing attack, large enough and strong enough to exhaust the aggressors, and able in the end to admit and absorb into its unity the civilized peoples of the western world” (ibid., 45–46).

In Europe, small states had put their independence in the hands of the system of the balance of power, whereas in the New World relations among the great and the small were founded upon the Good Neighbour Policy (Lippmann 1945, 81). Relying on a balance of power was the mistake Europe had made. Instead, in the New World, a more successful policy had been developed. Lippmann thought that this model, successfully implemented in the Western Hemisphere, could form the basis of a new international order. A clearly spelled-out policy was needed that would tie nations together into unions of “good neighbors”. Bull called the idea of good neighbours represented by Roosevelt and Lippmann “spheres of responsibility”. Bull (2002, 215–216) writes that what Lippmann spelled out in U.S. War Aims (1945) was an idea that the post-war international order should be based on a division of three or four spheres of responsibility where each great power or combination of them would secure peace. Lippmann (1945, 87–88) in fact proposed that the world order would be “composed of the great regional constellations of states which are the homelands, not of one nation alone but of the historic civilized communities”. Lippmann argued that international order could no longer be established on the basis of collective agreements among individual national states; rather these had to be concluded among groups of national states (ibid., 64–65).
For Lippmann (1945, 65), this organisation of the world meant the strategical systems of the Atlantic Community (the United States, Western Europe and Latin America), the Russian Orbit, China and later some constellation(s) in the Hindu and Moslem worlds. Lippmann was also prepared to counter voices against United States’ dominance over Europe from people who would rather have seen a European federation. But Lippmann did not see Europe as a single geographic and strategic entity that could form a political union. The main reason for this was that Germany would inevitably be its nucleus. (Ibid., 124–127.) Lippmann argued that war as it was known at the time was being fought precisely to prevent this from taking place. For Lippmann, European unification could be implemented only by preventing German domination, and this could be done within the framework of the Atlantic Community. (Ibid., 127–128.)

Fundamentally, Lippmann was as nationalistic in his visions for international order as any other theorist presented here (see Lippmann 1945; 53–57, 208–210). The purpose of introducing the Good Neighbor Policy was primarily to secure the Western Hemisphere as a distinct region free from interference from the outside. Referring to the Monroe Doctrine, Lippmann (1945, 49) declared, “Within the region of the world which fronts upon the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United States is the enemy of all conquerors and the partisan of national freedom”. Lippmann called out for a common foreign policy since “[a] house divided against itself cannot stand” (ibid., 73). For Lippmann, the Good Neighbor Policy was a substitute for an empire (ibid., 85). The common foreign policy Lippmann called for did not mean political federation or a formal treaty of alliance, but rather a network of agreements and understandings. Lippmann explained, “The Atlantic nations remain separate sovereign states but they form a living community”. (Ibid., 77.) According to Lippmann, the Atlantic Community would follow the spirit of the Atlantic Charter30 (ibid., 79). The regional systems should be based on the Good Neighbor Policy of non-aggression, co-operation and good will and not on a policy of neutrality that depended on balancing between great powers (ibid., 82–83). Lippmann (1945, 83–84) made

30 Keal (1983, 65–66) writes how the allies (United States, Britain and the Soviet Union) concluded a joint declaration of the Atlantic Charter for a post-war order that asserted principles which conflicted with ideas on spheres of influence.
sure his proposal would be appreciated also by the small states, portraying
the Good Neighbour Policy as a two-way game:

*The Good Neighbor relationship is one in which small states and a
great one in the same area of strategic security become allies in peace
and in war. The great state provides protection – which the technology
of modern war being what it is – no small state can provide itself. The
small state reciprocates: it provides strategic facilities needed for the
common defence, and it uses its own sovereign powers to protect its
great neighbor against infiltration, intrigue, and espionage. Insofar
as the small state makes this critical contribution to the security of
the neighbourhood, its independence is of vital interest to its great
neighbor.* (Emphasis added.)

A great power provides protection for its small neighbours as
compensation for the contribution they make to ensuring the security
of the region. The independence of the neighbour is “of vital interest” to
the great power and that will guarantee the protection of the neighbour
states. As this protection comes with a price, Lippmann emphasised
that small states can only assure their rights by general acceptance of the
duties of the Good Neighbor Policy. Lippmann writes, “We must not,
as many do, identify the rights of small nations with their right to have
an ‘independent’ foreign policy, that is to say one which manipulates the
balance of power among great states.” For him small states were too small
compared to big states to pursue anything other than the Good Neighbor
Policy. (Lippmann 1945, 84.) There was simply an ever-growing disparity
between the greatest states and others (ibid., 137–138). For Lippmann
the relationship between the great and the small did not involve injustice;
rather, it was a win-win relationship in which the great offered protection
for the price of commitment by the small to certain duties. Moreover,
the small states were not innocent actors, but like any other states can
play the games of power politics when given the chance. This was the
most just system Lippmann could envision for the smooth working of
the international order and the prevention of war. It is fair to say we
have now strongly established the idea of reciprocity within a sphere of
influence, which began with the suzerain and has ended with Lippmann’s
vision. Because Lippmann’s views embody subjugated knowledge of spheres of influence, they deserve detailed analysis.

Like Schmitt, Naumann and Carr, Lippmann dismisses the idea of a universal society in the form of a world government charged with policing humankind. As Americans had successfully implemented regional policies through the Monroe Doctrine, the Pan-American Union and the Good Neighbor Policy, Lippmann (1945, 190) asked why they should promote a universalist doctrine. First of all, no state would give away its legislative and executive power to such a world government (ibid., 183). Moreover, any comprehensive world organisation can only reinforce national measures of security, not replace them (ibid., 160). According to Lippmann, diplomatic relations dealing with security and prevention of war should be left to national states, acting within regional groups (ibid., 167). Here, he holds on to plurality in world politics as much as Schmitt does.

Lippmann did not believe that separate states could form a world organisation but he did think that if single sovereign states combined in their neighbourhoods, and neighbourhoods combined into larger communities, then these constellations could participate in a universal society. Lippmann’s thinking here is along the lines of Carr’s, arguing for the incapabilities of the nation-state in guaranteeing peace. If we compare this thinking to Schmitt’s and Naumann’s, we see that the German scholars did not call the capabilities of the state itself into question unlike Lippmann (and Carr) did; quite the contrary, they felt that the international order had taken a turn in an irreversible direction. For Naumann and Schmitt this new world order was one where no small states, or states at all, could survive. If we look into the present, which is still a conflict-ridden age, the same challenges of nationalism and disparity of power remain in international relations. Europe has indeed found a way to unity (although it has not eliminated nationalistic sentiments), but for most parts of the world Naumann’s dream remains unattained. I believe his ideas are valid for the present and they offer an interesting perspective on spheres of influence, not least because of Lippmann’s emphasis on peace.

In Lippmann’s (1945, 138) view, the world order that was forming around regional actors was crucial for world peace. He notes, “The
regional grouping of states in combined strategical systems is, therefore, indispensable to the general security of great and small nations alike, and to the stabilization of the relations among states.” Peace would be determined on the basis of great powers’ willingness to rest within their “orbits”:

> Under the regional principle I am advocating, it would be held to be an over act of aggression for any state to reach out beyond its own strategical orbit for an alliance with a state in another orbit. Within the same strategical neighbourhood alliances are good: neighbours must and should combine for their common security. But alliances are bad if they disrupt the solidarity of a neighbourhood; they are entangling and interventionist if they bring an alien power into the midst of a neighborhood. (Ibid., 136–137.)

The problem remains, as Keal (1983, 211) notes, that spheres of influence are not stable. If they are not stable, there is not much prospect for peace. Lippmann, unlike Burnham, would allow spheres of influence for all the great powers, which would then act in a concert. Just like Burnham, Lippmann was nevertheless concerned about whether Russia was willing to keep within its orbit and whether any concert with Russia would guarantee peace. Lippmann still believed that a concert would be the foundation of a new order. (Lippmann 1945, 91.) And “concert” meant first and foremost the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union (ibid., 132). For Lippmann, a direct war between the two was as impossible as a war between an elephant and a whale – if only the two countries refrained from reaching out for allies within the orbit of the other. Moreover, neither should try to incorporate Japan or Germany within its orbit. (Ibid., 134–135.) Furthermore, Lippmann considered it possible to solve the emerging ideological disparity between Western democracy and Russian totalitarianism by meeting the Russians as allies and proposing to them that they commit themselves to democratic freedom (ibid., 150–151). To put the matter in Cold War terms, both superpowers would have their own spheres of influence which would lead to stability and avoid major war. For Lippmann this meant stabilisation of relations among states, both great and small (ibid., 138).
It was not only Lippmann’s concern for peace in general and the rights of small nations in particular that makes him an advocate of the idea of sphere of responsibility. For Bull (2002, 215), the difference between a negative sphere of influence and a positive sphere of influence (or responsibility) is that the negative influence takes the form of expansion while the positive is agreed upon and somehow accepted by the small states. Lippmann tries to make the case that his Good Neighbor Policy is something more acceptable, responsible and based on collaboration than what is traditionally understood in the case of spheres of influence. Lippmann (1945, 87) writes, “Objections present themselves at once to the views expounded in this book: they are that the world will be divided up into spheres of influence each dominated by a great power, that within these spheres the smaller and the weaker states will come under the influence of the great power, and that the huge constellations of states may become rivals and enemies.” Lippmann explained that the regional groupings had already been formed and that that development should not be prevented. Any hope for stabilising international relations rested on the perfection of these regional groupings. (Ibid., 187–188). Disputes, when they emerge, should be settled within the neighbourhood in question without the interference of any outside actors. Lippmann feared a chain reaction of other regional issues being drawn into a purely regional dispute if several great powers became involved. Failed attempts at global settlement of regional disputes could result in global war. Licence given to universal intervention means it would be used. (Ibid., 188–189.) The Good Neighbor Policy was the remedy to shifting alliances caused by power politics. Lippmann’s regionalism tried to prevent these shifting alliances so that each state would recognise that it belonged to only one larger strategic zone of security. (Ibid., 190.) This would not guarantee that no wars would emerge between the regions, but stabilising the alliances would remove the most provoking forms of interference and intervention, which are a cause of great wars (ibid., 191). Here one sees Lippmann the pluralist talking: ”In this view of things the horrid antithesis of nationalism and internationalism subsides” (Ibid., 193).

Going back to Roosevelt’s original idea of good neighbours, Kimball (1991) explains how there was confusion within the United States about the two approaches to coercion (sphere of influence) and leadership
Kimball writes that “[i]n the immediate, practical sense, the Monroe Doctrine in the era of World War II was a sphere of influence conception that gave the United States self-assigned special “responsibilities” in the Western Hemisphere”. Kimball sees the Good Neighbor Policy, in the end, as having been a reformulation of the Monroe Doctrine based on hegemony and not an equal partnership. (Kimball 1991, 123.) In the Good Neighbor Policy there remained a dilemma of how to exert influence without the use of power (ibid., 125). Kimball asks, “But how are the regional ‘policemen’ to avoid the Orwellian temptation, even necessity of creating a sphere of influence in their region? How is such a region different from a Pax Britannica, a Russian Empire, or a Monroe Doctrine?” (ibid., 96). For Carr (2001, 215), the Good Neighbor Policy was by no means separated from power: “The ‘good neighbour’ policy of the United States in Latin America is not the antithesis, but the continuation of ‘Yankee imperialism’; for it is only the strongest who can both maintain their supremacy and remain ‘good neighbours’”. Keal (1983, 24) also identified the problem of who would “police the policemen” in proposal put forward by President Roosevelt after World War Two for an international order of four policemen. Wight (1995, 42–43) as well warned of the double standards of great powers, which would justify their actions as enforcing peace and security while at the same time monopolising the right to create international conflict. For Burnham, the Good Neighbor Policy was simply a propagandist name and by no means a policy that would guarantee the sovereignty of a great power’s neighbours. Burnham (1941, 263) strongly argued that the Good Neighbor Policy meant “the de facto elimination of independent sovereignty in all nations and colonies of the area except the United States, and thus the creation of a single interrelated territory so far as de facto political sovereignty goes”.

A critical look at Lippmann’s vision of the great regional constellations shows that it clearly has less aggression embedded in it than Burnham’s world-view, but it cannot be seen as a serious alternative to the proposals put forward by Naumann, Schmitt or Carr. There is an emphasis on protecting the small states and maintaining world peace, but that is not unique to Lippmann’s proposal. Rather, the Good Neighbor Policy is an attempt to justify, in more acceptable words than Großraum or super-state, the emerging order of great power management. Yet, Lippmann
was more optimistic and specific in describing the relationship between the great powers as one which would be based on collaboration and acceptance of the limits of influence. He was not as afraid of the Soviet power as Burnham was but rather believed that democracy, which Russia should also be persuaded to embrace, could be the prevailing ideology in international relations.

5.6 George Orwell and the Totalitarian Super-states

George Orwell\textsuperscript{31} (1903-1950), was a well-known English novelist\textsuperscript{32}. In addition to novels such as \textit{Animal Farm} and \textit{Nineteen Eighty-Four}, he left behind a body of diary entries, essays and newspaper journalism. Orwell died at the age of 46 of tuberculosis, leaving us to wonder what all he could have written during the years of the Cold War if he had not passed away. Even though Orwell did not live to witness the emergence of the international system that he himself foresaw, his input into the history of spheres of influence is significant.

It comes as no surprise to anyone who has read Orwell’s works that his novels were politically motivated. Orwell himself was passionate about political developments to such an extent that he volunteered to fight in the Spanish Civil War in 1937. Paul Anderson (2006, 28) describes Orwell’s political orientation as an engagement with the “dissident anti-Stalinist revolutionary socialist left that was obsessed with the degeneration of the Bolshevik revolution”. Furthermore, Anderson (2006, 32) writes that Orwell wanted to see democratic socialism as the prevailing form of political organisation and saw this threatened by Stalin’s carving out a sphere of influence. It was the future of the state, post-war Europe, democracy and the common people that Orwell passionately debated. He could not avoid the topic, for spheres of influence loomed on both sides of his home country.

Orwell (2009, 8–10.) in his own words, wanted to make political writing into an art. Orwell wrote from his sense of justice, mixing propaganda with prose style. Orwell fused political purpose with artistic purpose in a powerful way, making his voice far more widely heard

\textsuperscript{31} Orwell’s real name was Eric Arthur Blair.

\textsuperscript{32} See Newsinger (1999) on Orwell’s life and political thought.
among people than any political scientist or commentator. Even though Orwell’s work is not focused on spheres of influence, the powerful images of the super-states in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* must have made an impression on readers, thus contributing to our understanding of the concept. Two years after making these statements on his purpose in writing, in 1948, Orwell finished *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (2000). In this piece of fiction we find the antithesis to the spheres of influence which would save political plurality, prevent war and create a new functioning international order. This was the totalitarian sphere of influence, which Burnham saw as a possibility if the democratic world order failed to develop. It is Orwell who describes a world based on spheres of influence in its most oppressing and cruel form. Orwell focuses on the totalitarian system that Winston Smith witnessed in London. In the novel, one can also see and, perhaps even more, sense the international system that is the context for Mr Smith’s experiences. Orwell’s fictional world consists of three super-states – Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia – which are constantly at war with each other. One is always allied with the other, with the third party being the enemy. Russia, which has absorbed Europe, forms Eurasia, and United States, which has absorbed the British Empire, forms Oceania. Eastasia consist of China, Japan and fluctuating parts of Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet. Orwell (2000, 859) calls these super-states separate universes where “almost any perversion of thought can safely be practised”. The borders are not stable but “the balance of power always remains roughly even, and the territory which forms the heartland of each super-state always remains inviolate”. Fighting occurs in some distant disputed areas and there is never any attempt to invade enemy territory. (Ibid., 854–855.) It sounds like the super-state system promotes stability and, in fact, some sort of peace for the masses.

For Naumann the acceptance of citizens and their loyalty to the great state was crucial and likewise Lippmann envisioned international influence as responsible foreign policy, not something that would lead to totalitarianism. What makes Orwell’s fiction the antithesis of, say, Lippmann’s sphere of responsibility is the crucial difference of motive. Where Lippmann’s sphere of influence is designed to prevent war, Orwell’s fictional world-system is in place to maintain war. In *Nineteen

33 See “Chapter III: War is Peace” in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (2000), where Orwell explores the system of super-states.
*Eighty-Four*, war is the means to control people by fear and hatred, and thus it is needed for the sake of the order. Peace is not desired in a system which is based on total control of the people. Particularly illustrative of this mindset is the motto of “the Party” of Oceania: “War is Peace”. Wars are not meant to be won but instead they maintain a balance of power and prevent conquest by any world empire. In fact, war between the super-states is peace in much the same sense as the peace which the non-prosaic visionaries hoped super-states would create:

> War, however, is no longer the desperate, annihilating struggle it was in the early decades of the twentieth century. It is a warfare of limited aims between combatants who are unable to destroy one another, have no material cause for fighting and are not divided by any genuine ideological difference. (Orwell 2000, 854.)

This world is actually not so different from Schmitt’s and the others’ international order, except for the emphasis on the perverse effects of totalitarianism. The existence of super-states, even in a constant state of war, limits conflicts and maintains international order.

The relevance of Orwell’s novel lies in the gloomy image of spheres of influence it conveys. I have argued that we need to transform this pejorative orientation into a normative debate and for this reason I have sought to bring forth arguments for spheres of influence. But we also need arguments against spheres of influence and Orwell provides one: a sphere of influence with injustice, repression and violence. Orwell’s construction of a system of super-states works as a warning story of great power order gone badly awry.

Less well-known than *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are Orwell’s columns. During the period 1943–1947, Orwell wrote a weekly column to the *Tribune* (with a gap of 21 months while he worked as a war correspondent to the *Observer*) (Anderson 2006, 2). These columns included Orwell’s insights into the logic of spheres influence. Orwell’s inspiration for portraying the world of super-states came from Burnham’s *The Managerial Revolution* (see Newsinger 1999, 106–107). Orwell (1946) summarises in an essay on Burnham’s thinking the essence of *The Managerial Revolution*:

> “The new ‘managerial’ societies will not consist of a patchwork of small, independent states, but of great super-states grouped round the main
industrial centres in Europe, Asia, and America. These super-states will fight among themselves for possession of the remaining unclaimed portions of the earth, but will probably be unable to conquer one another completely”.

Even though Orwell in many ways refutes Burnham’s predictions on the new world order, he endorsed the prediction on the weakening of the small and the increasing power of the great. The threat of “the totalitarian super-states world order” was not fictional, but very concrete for Orwell. Orwell wrote in *The Tribune* on 2 February and 19 October 1945 that the world was indeed splitting up into two or three super-states, or great empires, just as Burnham predicted. In “As I Please 7”, written in 1944, Orwell argued, again referring to Burnham that Britain was decadent and bound to be rapidly conquered by Germany. After the conquest of Britain would come the attack on the USSR and Russia’s ‘military weakness’ would cause her to ‘fall apart to east and west’. Orwell writes, ”You are then left with three great super-states, Germany, Japan and the USA, which divide the world between them, make ceaseless war upon one another, and keep the working class in permanent subjection”. (Orwell 2006a, 85.)

In his columns Orwell describes international order in the same manner as in his novel, saying that states will be at permanent war with each other but the war will not be very intensive or bloody. He sees these super-states as cut off from each other, self-sufficient and in no need of trading with each other. They are ruled by a self-elected oligarchy. (Orwell 2006b, 240; 2006c, 249.) Orwell writes, “If these two or three super-states do establish themselves, not only will each of them be too big to be conquered, but they will be under no necessity to trade with one another, and in a position to prevent all contact between their nationals. Already, for a dozen years or so, large areas of the earth have been cut off from one another, although technically at peace.” (Orwell 2006b, 240.)

Orwell foresaw what was to come after the war: the Iron Curtain. Two super-states embraced the world order of preventing interconnectedness as much as possible. Interestingly, this was not the prospect that other visionaries of spheres of influence or great power management portrayed. Quite the opposite: at the core of spheres of influence lay the ideal of great powers managing international relations in concert. The super-states were
indeed expected to keep away from each other’s spheres of influence but not to isolate themselves economically or culturally. *International society* would prevail in a system of spheres of influence as much as in a system of nation-states. According to Orwell’s prophecy, something fundamental would happen to international society; it was as if it would split in two and lose its global character. There would only remain two suzerain powers. If we think about international order, this kind of development would be an even more drastic new *nomos* than that which Schmitt described. The scary truth which lies within Orwell’s fantasy is that the world witnessed the emergence of two separate, antagonistic super-states, of which one exhibited totalitarian features after the Second World War and has not yet fully recovered from it.

Although Orwell sides with Burnham in predicting the division of world into super-states, he criticises “that school of thought” for its contempt for the common person and ignorance of the strength of democracy – its power of criticism (Orwell, 2006a, 85). For Orwell, the sphere of influence of a super-state presupposed a totalitarian system. He does not see super-states as capable of offering respect for the common person, or of upholding truth, and thus upholding democracy. Orwell is explicit about the impossibility of incorporating international influence of the super-state with democratic government. Super-states simply cannot be democratically governed, and thus they cannot pursue any good. This view is what still persists. Perhaps this is one of the reasons, coupled with our bad memories of the Cold War, why we are so afraid of spheres of influence in the present. Orwell himself believed in the possibility of the all-mighty super-states and their totalitarian nature. Orwell’s account is an image of Cold War spheres of influence as comprised of super-states or great empires which are totalitarian by nature, possess the atom bomb, are self-contained and are maintaining “peace that is not peace” (Orwell 2006c, 249).

**5.7 The Shared Concern**

According to Luoma-aho (2007, 52), "Schmitt was quite possibly the first theorist of international law and international relations to articulate
what exactly happened when President Monroe gave his seventh annual address to the United States Congress, and what had really begun almost a decade before in the Congress of Vienna: the dismantling of the Peace of Westphalia”. Perhaps Schmitt was the first, but he certainly was not the only one. The common concern for the majority of these thinkers was the need to solve the problem of nationalism as the cause of major wars. If this was not an openly stated goal, the idea of breaking national boundaries – willingly or by force – and connecting peoples was. Only Burnham’s realist account was motivated by power politics to the extent that he ultimately favoured universalism and was ready to see it achieved even if it meant war.

All the theorists presented here were interested in international order, not only the fate of their own state. Essentially all shared Schmitt’s concern for universalism, even Burnham – until the point when he became more afraid of the atomic weapon. Lippmann and Carr put more emphasis on prevention of major wars than their German counterparts, but Schmitt and Naumann both sought a peaceful world. For Lippmann and Naumann alike non-forceful unification was a necessity, whereas Burnham accepted war as the means to achieving a world consisting of super-states. Schmitt was more occupied with the concept of *nomos*, and was not specific regarding the details of the actual unification. Carr’s concern was also war and order: he declared the end of small states and dreamt of a British *Großraum*. Some were more concerned with matters of peace than others, but all attempted to paint a picture of some sort of super-states which would be the actors in the future international order. The predictions, or fears, came true in the form of the super-states of United States and the Soviet Union, although not in the way the scholars had perhaps hoped. In fact, Schmitt’s and Naumann’s fear was actualised: Germany lost the war and its position as a great power. Carr’s England did not succeed in becoming a pole of power either. Burnham’s World Empire did not materialise until the 1990s and even then it was not the sole guardian of the atomic weapon.

The theorists of the period of the world wars all relied on the idea of a balance of power. On the one hand, the balancing system is seen as the core problem and, on the other, as the ultimate solution. Schmitt based his ideal world on the idea of a balance of power: balance meant pluralism
and “no balance” universalism. For Schmitt, the necessity of spheres of influence as the basis of the new system of balance lay in the fact that the system was becoming that of two balancers with universalist ambitions. Either of them could gain too much power, turning the world into a single empire unless a third force was found. Initiated by the Monroe Doctrine, the development was towards *Großräume*, or balance through spheres of influence. There could be no balance of power within the past system of states. Carr found balance in regionalism, which he situated between the bankruptcy of nationalism and empty internationalism. Burnham was in principle in favour of a balance of power. He, too, was afraid of universalism, although it was only the universalism of the Soviet Union that he warned against. Burnham claimed that instead of trying to form a system based on a balance of power that relied on several spheres of influence, it would be safer for all nations, for the sake of their “freedom”, to opt for United States’ universalism. A balance of power needed to be sacrificed if the nations of the world wanted to preserve even some amount of freedom.

Roosevelt and Lippmann were concerned that small states could abuse balance-of-power politics. In a sense, they saw a balance of power as working just like Butterfield (1966, 142–145) described when he argued that it gave room to manoeuvre for small states. Lippmann set the idea of balance of power against that of a Good Neighbour Policy. The former resulted in war, while the latter in order. For Lippmann, a balance of power, as it let the small states “run around free”, was the source of disorder and war; by putting small states on a leash with the Good Neighbour Policy, war could be avoided. Thus for Lippmann the argument goes that the system of “responsible spheres of influence” was an alternative to a balance of power. In the end, Lippmann is simply proposing a balance-of-power system based on his idea of good neighbours and not a system that lacks a mechanism for maintaining a balance of power.

In Orwell’s fantasy-world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, a constant state of war enforced by a totalitarian government was a means to achieve a balance of power among the super-states. Orwell’s warning is powerful in all its extremity, because it is based on the perspective of an individual. It lacks the nationalistic perspective of wanting to make one’s own state the model super-state. It is a story of how my super-state, along with
others, is corrupt and rotten. The system is rotten from the inside and the international order is based on the perverse equating of war with peace. Orwell lacks a general perspective on sovereignty, the role of small states, the development of international order, and so on. Yet, by the same token, he is not confined to the map metaphor, but focuses instead on the nature of the influencing state. The significance of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* derives from the fact that its popularity is something quite different when compared to any theory of international politics. *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was made into a movie and references to Orwell’s imaginary world in popular culture are frequent (see Wikipedia on George Orwell). Even if extreme totalitarianism is the prominent theme of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the super-state system is the context for the emergence of “doublethink” and “Big Brother”. Thus, Orwell’s writings, and especially his prose, may have a greater influence on people (including state leaders and academics) than the less well-known theorisations on sphere of influence, which is the reason I saw the need to explore Orwell’s ideas. Clearly, Orwell’s sphere of influence represents cruelty and injustice at their utmost, complying with and reinforcing the pejorative associations of the concept today.

Another common line of thought – sometimes overt, sometimes more hidden – is that the *normality* or *necessity* of power is what justifies spheres of influence. It is not an abnormality that an inequality of power emerges if it is seen as a part of the social life and functioning of international relations. In fact, spheres of influence prevent tyranny and the disappearance of the political – pluralism – from the international arena by dividing power according to the principle of balance of power in a new form. The nation-states in Europe failed to achieve a balance of power among themselves against each other; war eventually prevailed. Nationalism urged states to take up arms. Thus, something bigger than the nation-state was needed as the seat of power, although such bigger entities also ran the risk of ending up either as world tyrannies or engaged in major wars with each other. But as the nation-state system was in crisis, and the world was already moving in the direction of a world empire or world government, spheres of influence, super-states or *Großräume* offered a solution in between the two other options. Power seemed to be the basis of all the international systems in sight since humanity was too divided for a solidarist society to emerge on its own. Even Lippmann,
who wanted to cut power out of the equation, could not fully escape the fact that even in the Good Neighbor Policy sovereignty would not be the same for all.

Burnham’s and Lippmann’s approaches conflict with regard to their approaches to responsibility and power politics. According to Wight (1995, 29), in common usage “power politics” does not mean merely the relations between independent powers. It is a translation of the German *Machtpolitik*, which means “the politics of force”. It denotes “the conduct of international relations by force or the threat of force, without consideration of right or justice”. (Ibid.) Burnham saw power politics as an unyielding element of international relations, emphasising offensive over defensive foreign policy, whereas Lippmann, at least rhetorically, saw great powers as *great responsible*. Whether Burnham liked it or not, the idea of responsibility was very much used (or abused) by the United States in defending its foreign policies, and whether Lippmann liked it or not, the United States also failed to abandon power politics altogether.

The world wars offer important insights as regards the justice and injustice of spheres of influence. In general, for the theorists presented here, justice was not a top priority and inequality of power was a fact of political life. Justice in the super-state was not a choice as such; it was more a question of convincing the influenced states that they needed to unite under the power of the centre in order to survive. Thus, justice was instrumental, and not a value. Bull and Keal discussed the justice of spheres of influence in the context of the system of states, not challenging the premises of that system, whereas Naumann, Schmitt, Carr, Burnham, Lippmann and Orwell proceeded from the view that there could be no system of states based on sovereign equality anymore. Even so, the rights of influenced states were a concern, because super-states could not be built by force. Thus, Naumann, Carr and Lippmann expressed sympathy for influenced states and wrote of the importance of small states’ acceptance of being dominated.

But, as small states still existed, as the system was only on the verge of destruction, the proponents of a new system needed to justify the systematic injustice that would emerge with it. For Naumann, Schmitt and Carr, unification was a necessity. Schmitt’s focus was on the universalist threat and Carr’s on the problems of both nationalism and
internationalism. Naumann, like Schmitt, was worried about the future of the German state, and Carr was concerned about the future of Britain. For Burnham, it was the communist threat of world domination that justified American hegemony. For Lippmann, it was the good-natured approach that made spheres of influence look like they would benefit all parties involved. Orwell, by contrast, could not find justification for the super-states which came with totalitarianism, and resulted in “brain death” for the human beings who were subjects of the system. Burnham and Lippmann had no need to discuss the matter at all, since for them the United States was a democracy. For Burnham, even as the world hegemon, the United States would still be democratic; and for Lippmann, non-democratic states simply needed to be converted. Orwell was concerned for the fate of the common people inhabiting the super-states. Naumann and Carr alike expressed sympathy for the people. Naumann insisted on voluntary unification and saw Mid-Europe as a brotherhood of nations. Carr, with all his realism, thought that the foundation of international order lay in improving the living-condition of people. I think that when it comes to the normative dimension of spheres of influence, it is precisely the human perspective that we are lacking. I will return to this topic in the concluding chapter.

One could argue that it is not necessarily spheres of influence that the selected theorists are talking about, but if we look at Schmitt’s account, he does bring up the concept. The idea of a sphere of influence was available knowledge and all of the thinkers discussed here must have been aware of it. Envisioning super-states with a strong emphasis on power politics evokes the pejorative associations of spheres of influence rather than a more acceptable form of influence or integration. Naumann’s Mid-Europe comes closest to the concepts of regionalism and integration, but is unique in imagining a new international order, that is, a system-level change which restructures the world political map. Perhaps this was not the original colonialist idea of a sphere of influence, but if a sphere of influence can be traced all the way back to the suzerain system, there we find spheres of influence determining global power relations and territorial borders.

Although Burnham writes of super-states, his circles of influence are nothing but the map metaphor that often describes spheres of influence.
Although Lippmann envisions a Good Neighbor Policy, his outright resistance to spheres of influence is evidence of conscious consideration on his part of the meaning of the concept. The reasons why sphere of influence is not a concept used by these theorists are manifold. One explanation can be its association with colonial practices and the need to find new terminology. Lippmann’s case is clear: he wants to defend influence with a term which has no negative overtones, and this can very well be the reason why Schmitt and others avoid the concept as well. But this does not mean that they were not writing about spheres of influence. I argue that the grand designs during the period of the world wars, based as they were on the connection that is built between influence, international order and justice, strongly relate to the idea of sphere of influence. Geostrategy does not reach these far corners of ambit of the concept; and Empire lite, regionalism and integration do not have the history and centrality that the concept has within the vocabulary of the discipline. I am opening up the criteria – or the terms of discourse, as Connolly would put it – for an appraisal which can incorporate the normative dimension and questions of order into what at present remains an uncontested concept; what I envision is a sphere of influence conceived as situated between nation and humanity.

For a history of spheres of influence, the period of the world wars offers an untapped pool of ideas. Whereas the Cold War practices, such as those seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis, are presently connected with the concept of sphere of influence, the discussion on the concentration of sovereignty and the possible benefits and drawbacks of creating super-states are not. Schmitt’s ideas are perhaps the best known, but no serious thought is given to his or others’ visions on spheres of influence. At present, the international system is in a state of confusion about the principle of state sovereignty, unification of states, inequality and balance of power, giving all the more reason to look into the past, where confusion and uncertainty resulted in theories on spheres of influence.
6 The Burden of the Cold War

There is one episode in history which dominates the present understanding of spheres of influence in IR, Russian foreign policy research, the media and everyday language. Whereas colonial influence or the Concert of Europe is sometimes remembered, and the theories on super-states and Großräume prompted by the events the of world war era go virtually unacknowledged, the Cold War is seen as the true era of spheres of influence. We remember the division, the superpowers and their blocs, the ideological battle, and the Cuban Missile Crisis; and we remember how Russia lost its sphere of influence and the United States could freely pursue its universalist ambitions. The purpose of this chapter is not to tell the story of Cold War spheres of influence in its entirety or even comprehensively. I wish to raise questions on the interpretations of spheres of influence in the Cold War, to awaken an interest in examining how the Cold War can illuminate the concept of sphere of influence and to further problematise the present uses of the concept by bringing to light subjugated knowledge from the era. There is a temporal overlap with other episodes (in particular the English School), but the chapter examines the Cold War setting and superpower relations in more detail. The purpose of this chapter is twofold:

1) To gain insights into the Cold War theorisation on sphere of influence. I will focus on the work of Keal, Kaufman and Vincent (as well as Bull, but to a lesser extent), which represents the analytical discourse of the time. One could read any Cold War texts and discover something of the history of spheres of influence there, but because my concern is in conceptualising the phenomenon, I found it more useful to look into sources which explicitly theorise spheres of influence. Keal and Kaufman offer perspectives on order and justice, which satisfies the need to problematise that which is evident in the present, that is, the current pejorative associations of the concept.

2) In order to reflect on actual Cold War practices, instead of just the few theoretical sources, I choose to take a closer look at the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example. Again Keal and Kaufman provide much of the material, because of their theoretical focus, but I have taken an interest in the speeches of state leaders and these will be explored as well.
In its simplicity, the Cold War understanding of a sphere of influence is that of a foreign policy practice of controlling smaller states for the sake of position, prestige and balance of power. It is influence for the sake of influence: any increase in the quality and quantity of influence is that much influence taken away from the rival power. Spheres of influence were interpreted through “imperialist geopolitics” and a realist worldview. Spheres of influence meant not only an ideological divide but also military superiority or inferiority and resources for prosperity. Looking more closely at the Cold War reveals that fundamentally, despite the cold, realist power calculations, spheres of influence were an aspect of international order: the threat of universalism should balancing fail, great power management, questions of sovereignty and intervention, tacit understandings, stability of possessions, and even consideration of justice. We lack theoretical studies on Cold War spheres of influence which would take an interest in the idea of sphere of influence, just like we lack interest in the relationship between spheres of influence and international institutions in the present. The Cold War made spheres of influence visible; the world became the battlefield of spheres of influence with the result that the Cold War manifestations of influence ended up overshadowing the earlier history of spheres of influence. Hence, the concept of sphere of influence came to be understood in the meaning ascribed to it during the Cold War.

Then what is wrong associating the concept of sphere of influence with the Cold War? First, it is problematic to use the concept without contesting it, as I have argued throughout the study. Second, it is problematic to rely on an understanding of spheres of influence that is based on the history of the Cold War, without first contesting the interpretations of this history. What do we really know about the Cold War spheres of influence with our lack of knowledge and interest in the conceptualisations of the phenomenon? Third, the problem of exporting Cold War images into the present, like that one would face in exporting “world war images”, is that the world is being transformed all the time. States change; their relations change; new states appear; and some old states disappear. Even if the institutions of the society of states stand rather firm, they, too, are under pressure whenever a new order emerges. Thus we should constantly renew our knowledge of what constitutes a
sphere of influence, as long as people continue to use the concept and it captures something essential about territorial influence. We are better equipped to do this when we study our history, in this case the history of the Cold War, the most powerful history of spheres of influence in our minds. Thus, the Cold War is full of potential. Because of the superpower practices of influence and because of the theory of Cold War spheres of influence (although minimal in number), we can bring the Cold War itself under the looking glass.

6.1 Theoretical Framework of the Cold War

The Cold War era offers as yet unexplored theoretical insights for conceptualising and contextualising spheres of influence. For one thing, the English School literature is situated in the Cold War context: Vincent’s (1974) book on interventions offers a perspective on the era which I will explore here. I also refer to Bull several times. However, Keal’s book *Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance*, from 1983, and Kaufman’s *The Superpowers and their Spheres of Influence: The United States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, from 1976, deal specifically with the spheres of influence of the two superpowers. I have already presented Keal’s and Kaufman’s definitions of sphere of influence (chapter 1.1), as well as many other of their ideas, and here I will go into the consolidation and the formality of Cold War spheres of influence. The work of Keal and Kaufman is again important subjugated knowledge, because their theorisations are unknown and their insights can help us conceptualise the Cold War spheres of influence in particular.

6.1.1 Consolidating Spheres of Influence

Keal describes the post-war mentality when spheres of influence crept into international practices. Keal (1983, 65) explains how the Atlantic Charter, which was approved in 1941 by the allies: the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, was a joint declaration of a post-war order. It asserted principles which conflicted with ideas on spheres of influence, denying a right to aggrandisement or territorial changes against the wishes
of the people concerned and giving sovereign rights and self-government to those who had been deprived of them (ibid., 66). Contrary to the spirit of these initial wishes, spheres of influence nevertheless became a legacy of the war (ibid). Keal explains exactly how spheres of influences were formed after the war. First, they were determined by occupation of specific regions. Where the Soviets were present, the Western powers stayed away and vice versa. The Soviet Union stayed out of the affairs of Italy and Greece, and the United States and Britain out of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary (Keal 1983, 84–86). This is how spheres of influence worked as the “exclusion of other powers”, to cite Keal’s definition.

The interesting question is how exactly spheres of influence were consolidated during the Cold War. When we read Keal’s analysis of the Soviet Union consolidating its sphere of influence, it is not hard to guess where the pejorative associations of the concept come from. Keal points out that in 1939 the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact with a secret protocol dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. That was the beginning of the Soviet establishment of spheres of influence, Keal (1983, 80) notes. For Keal, Stalin’s hegemony over Central East Europe was ”not compatible with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and was bound to bring the United States and the Soviet Union into conflict” (Ibid., 83–84). The focal concerns here are the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Nazis and Stalin’s hegemony, both very unpleasant memories for Europeans. What makes these memories important is that these are the very same memories that haunt Russia. I will show in chapter 7 how Russian analysts try to explain away this very same legacy (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Stalin’s policies) of the country’s sphere of influence.

Keal writes that the United States opposed a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe but through its actions and inactions in fact allowed it (Keal 1983, 93; also Davis 1974, 170). In fear of its rival’s further expansion, the United States did not want to recognise the Soviet sphere of influence but it did nothing in practice to oppose it (Keal 1983; 94, 96). But as the Soviet influence became more and more overt towards the end of 1945, the United States started to act according to the principle of balance of power (ibid, 97–98). On 12 March 1947, President Truman asked Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey to resist Soviet pressure.
This became known as the Truman Doctrine (see also Vincent 1974, 188–193). Keal (1983, 99) writes:

*Most of the states in eastern Europe already had a communist government and ‘way of life’ and the region had been privately acknowledged by United States officials as a Soviet sphere of influence. In effect the speech drew a line between these states and those where Soviet influence was not established. It was a formal declaration that the United States would resist any extension of the Soviet sphere of influence beyond its existing limits. As such it marked a resignation on America’s part that eastern Europe was a Soviet sphere of influence.*

Other steps taking the United States closer to consolidating its respective sphere of influence was the recommendation for a collective defence in Northern America and Western Europe, strengthening regional order in Latin America and treating Soviet influence in Eastern Europe as irreversible (Keal 1983, 101–102). Behind the Marshall Aid Plan (1947) was an idea that economic support to Western Europe would diminish the conditions for Communism to spread, in other words, it was an attempt to prevent Soviet influence spreading westwards (ibid, 101–102). This was, of course, against Soviet interests. Keal (1983, 107) observes, “The Marshall Plan provoked the Soviet Union to further consolidation and the extent of Soviet influence was made clear by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Finland, all of which would have preferred to have participated in the plan, declining to do so”. In addition to preventing Czechoslovakia and Poland from joining, the Soviet Union consolidated its sphere of influence through a pro-communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 (ibid., 104–105). Keal is explaining the practice of how the superpowers took control of the territories of the globe, dividing them, excluding each other, at times challenging one another and at others accepting one another’s influence, and accepting this as the post-war international order. The idea of inaction as an acknowledgement of a sphere of influence is interesting and I have already referred to it earlier in the context of intervention. This means that Cold War spheres of influences were established as a mixture of extending influence, finding the territorial limits of that influence, and abstaining from interference, intervention and other involvement.
For Keal and Kaufman, the Cold War represents a consolidation of spheres of influence, making them a normal practice of international relations. Kaufman (1976, 195) describes the “decisive presence” of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in Latin America as a normal state of affairs. He (1976, 28) observes, “All the countries located in the two spheres of influence have suffered from penetration by the superpowers to varying degrees. In some cases, the intervention has been permanent with annexation being the final solution.” In the same vein, Keal (1983, 104) states, “Thus, the lines were drawn: what had been going on since before the end of the war was now explicit and open”. The openness and normality of the two spheres of influence is the reason why we associate spheres of influence with the Cold War. To invoke the term “sphere of influence” in the present is to evoke not the Großraum, Mid-Europe, super-state, Good Neighbor Policy or the Great Responsibilities, but the ideological hegemonic ambitions of the Soviet Union and, to a much lesser extent, the United States.

### 6.1.2 Interventionist Policies

When we look at Keal’s, Kaufman’s and Vincent’s accounts of Cold War superpower relations, we find not only spheres of influence but also intervention, the Monroe Doctrine, universalism and the Good Neighbor Policy. In fact, this is the legacy of the post-war international order and theorisations which offered visions of a new world order. All the way from Naumann to Keal and the English School, from 1915 towards the end of the Cold War the same themes surround the idea of sphere of influence. Thus, the clarity that related notions bring to the concept of sphere of influence are not only the legacy of the period of the world wars, but also of the Cold War.

When Keal explains how spheres of influence became the normal state of affairs, in the case of the United States he refers to the Good Neighbor Policy and the Monroe Doctrine. According to Keal (1983, 67), the United States’ vision of post-war order was that of universalism: World affairs would not be governed by spheres of influence and a balance of power but by international cooperation and organisation. Keal explains that Roosevelt was opposed to colonialism and power politics,
and supported the self-determination of peoples (ibid). He thought that the security of the United States depended on the security of the entire international society. This was at least the declared policy; the motivations were not as unselfish (ibid). Keal observes, “In short, it was thought that the interests of peace would best be served by a universal system based on an integrated world economy and on the United Nations rather than by the traditional state crafts of spheres of influence and balance of power” (ibid., 69).

According to Keal (1983, 69), the United States also argued that spheres of influence belonged to power politics which was not the way to a lasting peace.34 To quote Keal (1983, 70), “In place of power politics there would be collective security under the control of a universal organization”. According to Keal, Roosevelt saw great power “policemen” acting as good neighbours (rather than “influencing powers”) in the interests of world community with the explicit approval of other great powers (ibid., 71). Thus, officially, the United States opposed spheres of influence and promoted universal order, even though there were some dissident officials who favoured spheres of influence (ibid.). Kaufman (1976, 181), too, examined the Good Neighbour Policy, and remarked how the Monroe Doctrine became more acceptable in Latin America due to Roosevelt’s approach:

*It is important to note that the greatest progress towards the acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine on a continental basis was made during F.D. Roosevelt’s ’good neighbour’ policy, committing Washington to refrain from military intervention in the Southern Republics. During the years 1933-65 no direct military intervention took place in the region.*

Even though Kaufman writes that the United States refrained from military intervention, Keal’s insight is that, in the end, Roosevelt’s vision of world order was not too different from one with spheres of influence and great powers that were responsible for world order. The role of

34 Lynn Davis (1974; 141, 143) wrote that throughout the war the United States was against spheres of influence, the tradition that had caused the outbreak of the war in the first place. For the United States in order to achieve peace, a collective security organisation needed to be formed. Davis notes that the American officials never saw the Monroe Doctrine or United States’ relations to Latin American states as analogous to Soviet or British influence in Europe, which they so feared.
weaker states in this system of collective security was very much like the one within a sphere of influence (Keal 1983, 70). What Keal implies is that a sphere of influence can have different names but in the end it involves the same conduct. In other words, if a foreign policy practice falls within the definition of a sphere of influence, then regardless of the name given to it, it is still a sphere-of-influence policy. The terms used to describe a particular form of conduct may then signify a difference between accepted and disapproved of policy. Thus, for Roosevelt the term “policemen” signified an acceptable policy, whereas “spheres of influence” were disapproved of. What we are broaching here is the question of how to make influence acceptable. The Good Neighbor Policy is not necessarily a policy designed to thwart spheres of influence, but one establishing a sphere of influence by disapproving of intervention, thus “selling” the position of being influenced more easily.

Vincent confirms the same story and we have heard this story before: The Monroe Doctrine was a discursive tool and an instrument for defending both non-interventionist and interventionist foreign policy. But this time Vincent also touches upon the legitimacy of influence implemented by invoking the non-intervention principle. According to Vincent, the American approach to Latin America until 1918 was interventionist but at the Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires in 1936 a protocol of non-intervention was signed. Vincent (1974, 113) writes:

> What was remarkable was that the United States should bind herself by treaty to the observation of an apparently absolute rule of nonintervention, allowing none of the exceptions with which she had increasingly indulged herself. By signing and ratifying such a protocol, it seemed that the United States had finally succumbed to the Latin American doctrine of nonintervention.

Before 1936 the United States had resisted the Latin American call for the adoption of the principle of non-intervention in their mutual relations, but here “Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour policy had extended to the international legal relations of the American States” (Vincent 1974, 115). This was influence without intervention, making influence more acceptable, and in Vincent’s estimation transposing non-intervention
from a principle to a term in a treaty was quite remarkable (ibid, 193). But this tendency of American foreign policy was short-lived. Vincent (ibid) explains how already before the Second World War hemispheric solidarity was becoming the foundation of relations between the United States and Latin America. Especially after Communism entered the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine became accepted as the hemispheric principle (ibid). Where the original Monroe Doctrine opposed the old European order extending to the Western Hemisphere, the Cold War transformed the Doctrine into one opposing Communism, at the same time broadening the idea of extrahemispheric intervention and counter-intervention against it (ibid., 208). Vincent (1974, 193) also interprets the Truman Doctrine as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine (the exclusion of the old European order) into a worldwide doctrine of counter-intervention. This meant the extension of influence from the regional to the global level. Here Vincent is pointing to the transformation of the United States’ policy from non-intervention to a sphere-of-influence policy firmly founded upon interventionism. Vincent thus establishes the connection between Cold War spheres of influence and the policy of intervention.

If we look more closely at the United States’ interventionist policy, we find a new doctrine which explains what sphere of influence means. Both Keal (1983, 141–143) and Kaufman (1976, 29–30) mention the Johnson Doctrine as one instance of the United States establishing its sphere of influence in Latin America. The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1965 after internal power struggles in that country which the United States saw as a threat to the inter-American system and peace in the hemisphere. President Johnson claimed there were outside agents, that is, communists, trying to seize control and that prompted the United States to announce its position, which became known as the Johnson Doctrine. The United States first argued that the intervention was conducted in order to protect Americans living in the Dominican Republic, but the justification was soon extended to include responsibility for law and order in the country, preventing the spread of international communism and, finally, protection of the hemisphere. The Johnson Doctrine limited the freedom of the Dominican Republic in conducting a revolution and choosing its form of government. (Keal
1973, 141–142; also Vincent 1974, 201–214.) But if intervention became characteristic of the United States’ influence, both regionally and globally, how could it be justified? We can try to answer that question from the Soviet perspective.

The case for justifying intervention is found from Windsor’s (1984, 54–55) notion of structural intervention. Reading from Vincent (1974, 146–147), the Soviet Union’s internationalism was a form of structural intervention in which the nation-state was downplayed to the extent where intervention was considered an internal conflict. Vincent observes that after the Russian Revolution there was no room for the norm of non-intervention, because Russia had substituted class for nation and imperialist war for civil war (ibid.). Reading from Vincent and put in the language of the Cold War, this meant that Russia had formed its sphere of influence, a realm where intervention was normal and acceptable. The establishment of the Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919, and its strengthening in 1920 made respect for national self-determination all the more insignificant for Soviet Russia (bid., 152–154). Conversely, in Soviet relations with Asia national freedom was declared as a means to counteract imperialist oppression (ibid.). Vincent (1974, 155) writes, “It is possible to establish this dualism as a theme of Soviet foreign policy between the two wars containing a revolutionary motif which led to interference with the affairs of other states and a motif of accommodation which proclaimed noninterference at the formal diplomatic level.” Here we see the unease over the principle of non-intervention which Russia has yet to overcome: simultaneous upholding and violating of the principle of non-intervention. I will explore this in more detail in chapter 7. According to Vincent (1974, 184–185) non-intervention as a legal principle was defended by the Soviet Union but it was superseded by interests derived from socialist internationalism. Moreover, adherence to the principle of non-intervention did not prevent the Soviet Union offering support for national liberation movements due to the Soviet idea of sovereignty, which recognised the right to self-determination of each nation irrespective of its statehood or lack of it (ibid.).

For Vincent, it was the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, as outlined by S. Kovalev in a Pravda article in September
26, 1968\textsuperscript{35}, which established the policy of structural intervention. Vincent (1974, 177–178) describes the Soviet Union’s discursive strategy of turning the matter of sovereignty upside down: by interfering in Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union in fact claimed to uphold the country’s sovereignty against internal and external counterrevolution, and had by no means violated it. The Soviet Union’s actions were thus protective and defensive (ibid.).

Thus far we have established the narrative of consolidating spheres of influence. The United States turned its back on non-intervention and the Soviet Union had established its interventionist sphere of influence policy already in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. If adherence to the non-intervention principle of the United States made the Monroe Doctrine and sphere of influence more acceptable, what happened when non-intervention was abandoned? The answer on the part of the Soviet Union was to establish intervention as the state of affairs - structural and permanent intervention, which, as the argument went, was no longer intervention. For the United States, legalising influence through treaties offered a means to consolidate intervention as a part of its sphere-of-influence policy. But we can go even further in discussing the normative aspect of acceptance.

6.1.3 \textit{De Facto or de Jure} Influence?

Keal devoted pages to explaining how spheres of influence were agreed upon. His conclusion was that the interventions (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic and Cuba) during the Cold War, and the inaction of the rival superpower against these interventions, testify to the tacit understanding of spheres of influence (Keal 1983, 154). Tacit understanding “stems from perceived common interests and it is achieved through unilateral acts or the conspicuous absence of certain acts together with the response or lack of response to those acts” (ibid., 151). Keal (1983, 114) further explains that post-war spheres of influence were unilaterally consolidated but that at the same time they required implicit, by no means open, acquiescence from the other party.

\textsuperscript{35} Brezhnev restated the "doctrine" in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party on November 13, 1968.
For Bull (2002, 216) as well, spheres-of-influence understandings were not formal or drafted in a treaty but based on reciprocal declarations of policy or “behaviour of the parties which is as if in conformity with a rule, even though that rule is not agreed, not enunciated nor even fully understood”. In addition, Bull (2002, 217) claims there was no “free hand” given to the other superpower, but rather the United States and the Soviet Union had an interest in and maintained contact with the other’s sphere of influence. According to Bull, as the agreements were tacit, their alteration did not take place through negotiation but through competition and struggle (Ibid., 218).

Kaufman points out how there is \textit{de facto} recognition of the superiority of one’s rival in the respective sphere of influence; condemnation is only verbal. He notes how world peace was more important than the goal of liberating the oppressed countries from their ideological opponent, referring to what Keal wrote extensively on regarding the “conflict limiting effect of spheres of influence”. Kaufman also indicates that there was an understanding if not a mutual agreement on spheres of influence. Kaufman (1976, 21–24) calls this legitimacy by omission, tacit acceptance or indirect compliance with superpowers’ right to protect their spheres of influence. He describes the “decisive presence” of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in Latin America as a normal state of affairs (ibid., 195). \textit{De facto} influence and tacitness are not, however, the whole story. I have already pointed to the ideas of the normality of spheres of influence, structural intervention, acceptance, and treaties on non-intervention, all of which indicate the prospect of formalising and legitimising spheres of influence.

When writing about colonialism, I introduced Kaufman’s idea of \textit{de facto} and \textit{de jure} spheres of influence, of which Kaufman wanted to call the former a sphere of direct influence. Kaufman’s (1976, 10–11) aim was to argue that a sphere of influence was a product of the Cold War and was characterised by informality and geographical proximity.\footnote{Although Kaufman (1976, 181) makes the remark that in the case of the United States its sphere of influence has a longer history, he nevertheless writes that spheres of influence developed specifically after the Second World War (ibid., 11).}

This was also one reason why I have distinguished colonialism from a sphere-of-influence policy. Kaufman went on to put forward the idea of separating \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} also in the Cold War period. Thus, there
was also influence which is more formally agreed upon. Tacit agreement was no longer the only possibility. Keal makes the interesting remark that the Soviet Union had *de facto* predominance in Eastern Europe while the United States managed to create predominance by a *juridical framework* in Latin America. Keal (1983, 114) writes, “The nature of the influence it exerted was not of the same kind as the Soviet Union exerted in eastern Europe, and the United States was able to establish its predominance, to some extent, through a formal institutional framework.” Another difference, according to Keal, was that the United States had a presence in Europe that would have enabled it to challenge the Soviet Union’s influence but the Soviet Union had no means to oppose the United States’ actions in Latin America (ibid.). Kaufman’s (1976, 179) views on the Monroe Doctrine follow a similar reasoning:

*In addition to the unilateral declaration, the *de facto* fulfilment and the *de jure* universal acceptance of the doctrine, the US also sought the legitimisation of the principle through its acceptance by the countries of Latin America. In spite of intensive criticism of the unilateral use of the doctrine, and the amendments and additional clauses, the Fourth Pan-American Conference meeting in Buenos Aires, in 1910, recognised the doctrine as ‘a factor of international peace in the continent’.*

Kaufman’s argument is that *de jure* influence is more legitimate, more acceptable from the point of view of the influenced states. Like Kaufman and Vincent, Keal (1983, 107) argues that the United States invoked the Monroe Doctrine and made it acceptable as a hemispheric principle of continental solidarity in Latin America. The Inter-American Conferences of Foreign Ministers in Havana in 1940, in Rio de Janeiro in 1942, and later Inter-American Conferences made declarations in keeping with the Monroe Doctrine’s spirit of keeping non-American powers out of the continent (ibid., 108). Moreover, Article 52 of the United Nations Charter encourages regional arrangements for settling disputes (ibid., 109). In 1947, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed, which placed responsibility for the defence of the region upon all members of the inter-American system; and in 1948, the Organization of American States (henceforth OAS) was formed (ibid.) (See also Vincent
1974, 195–196.) The Soviet Union had its juridical framework of the Warsaw Pact after 1955, which was also an organisation for protection against outside attack. Perhaps Keal does not take the Pact into consideration, since it came at a later period, when spheres of influence were already established.

Kaufman explores the differences between the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s influence. According to Kaufman (1976, 34), inequality is manifested in different terms for the two superpowers: The Soviet Union dominates its satellites in the political field and the United States in the economic, social and educational sectors (ibid., 36). Moreover, there are fewer limitations on political and ideological freedom in Latin America than in Eastern Europe. Many Latin American countries enjoy freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and political pluralism (ibid.). The Soviet Union allowed diplomatic or other relations with capitalist countries, whereas the United States did not allow diplomatic relations with communist states (ibid., 38–39). The Soviet Union, nevertheless, had tighter political control overall (ibid.).

All in all, the *de jure* side of Cold War spheres of influence implied a certain acceptance of the influence, not only by the other influencing power but also by the influenced states. It even implied a legal framework, a treaty or an organisation. Regardless of this acceptance, Keal and Kaufman still speak of spheres of influence, which means that for them a sphere of influence *de jure* is not by definition different from a sphere of influence which is imposed against the will of the influenced states. In present usage, a sphere of influence is always involuntary. The reason is discursive: How could we otherwise speak of a sphere of influence in a pejorative manner if it were not a tool of oppressive power politics? Reading Keal and Kaufman, a general image is beginning to emerge of Soviet influence being strongly negative and the United States’ influence being more legitimate. Legitimacy is a very important perspective when analysing spheres of influence because *de jure* influence allows us to relax the exclusively pejorative understanding of the concept to include in it the notion of a sphere of influence which is not implemented against the will of the influenced and by force. This discussion of *de facto* and *de jure* influence has not lost its relevance and could contribute to a discussion.
of the means of influence (of Russia, the United States, European Union, China and other great powers) in the post-Cold War era.

What we can also conclude from the Cold War consolidation of spheres of influence by intervention, legal mechanisms and softer approaches is that the attempts to understand spheres of influence during the Cold War relied extensively on foreign policy doctrines. By evoking the different sphere-of-influence doctrines – the “Monroe”, “Truman”, “Johnson”, and “Brezhnev” Doctrines – Keal, Kaufman and Vincent were able to make sense of spheres of influence by relating them to significant historical signposts and the people behind them. These doctrines are not the truth about spheres of influence, but they are the milestones we need to remember in order to remember what a sphere of influence meant. We need to remember them also because of their influence in the present. Evoking the Brezhnev Doctrine to criticise Russian foreign policy is a powerful discursive tool because of the associations with Cold War spheres of influence and interventionism it embodies. The policy and context behind the Brezhnev Doctrine, when approached analytically instead of emotionally, can be seen as incorporating historical knowledge that can be used for the conceptualisation of sphere of influence, for example, in explicating the idea of justification and structural intervention.

6.1.4 Subjugated Knowledges and Legacies

Both Keal and Kaufman acknowledge the good and the bad sides of spheres of influence. For Keal (1983, 156), tacit understandings were based on the common interest of avoiding a nuclear war. This function of limiting conflicts is related to the relationship between spheres of influence and international order that Keal wrote about extensively (ibid., 157). Kaufman observes that spheres of influence have decreased intraregional conflicts. Where Keal is concerned over conflicts between the superpowers and a nuclear war, Kaufman (1976, 196) writes that tight control has diminished conflicts among the members of a subsystem. When there have been conflicts, they have arisen as a consequence of an attempted emancipation from a controlling superpower (ibid.). The Cold War order rested on a balance of power, but Bull (2002, 109–111) thought that it did not rest on “general collaboration or concert among
the great powers concerned”. The Cold War balance was not the same as
the nineteenth-century European balance-of-power system, which was
based on rough equality of the five members, a common culture and a
common objective of balance (ibid.). Keal and Kaufman, the latter less
directly, indicated that a tacit understanding of spheres of influence, and
thus also a balance of power, among the two superpowers existed that was
based on the avoidance of a nuclear war.

The order the Cold War maintained was not something we can be
particularly proud of. Even if we were to agree that some wars were avoided
or some stability was maintained by Cold War spheres of influence, we
could not justify the practice in the present. The power of the Cold War
image is that it is a true example, from a very near past, of how spheres
of influence divided people and how an ideological divide, military
competition and antagonism almost led to a nuclear war. Accordingly, it
is fair to say that we should remember the Cold War spheres of influence.
We certainly do not want to repeat those mistakes. If we have forgotten
the order-producing mechanisms in spheres of influence, the reason is
straightforward: it was not a particularly good order. It was not even a
particularly successful pluralist order, because ”the pluralism of two” did
not really represent freedom, even though it did prevent the emergence
of a world empire.

Clearly, the Cold War spheres of influence represented injustice. This
is where I make my own normative statement; Keal and Kaufman were of
the same opinion. Keal (1983, 212) recognised that spheres of influence
were inherently unjust. Kaufman was perhaps even more concerned for
the sufferings of the influenced states. Kaufman (1976, 11) describes
a sphere of influence as a ‘prison’ condition for the countries of the
controlled region. Even Cuba, which Kaufman describes as a deviant
case, an exception to the inescapable prisoner status, suffered from the
limitations imposed by a superpower (ibid., 197–198). The Soviet Union
could not “free” Cuba from the United States’ sphere of influence (ibid).
In Kaufman’s view, the aim for a superpower in its sphere of influence is
to keep the controlled countries in a position of dependency (ibid., 31).
He writes that superpowers undermine and try to replace governments
that have failed to maintain the values of the bloc (ibid., 82). “Satellite
states” also renounce their interests in their external affairs for the benefit
of the superpower (ibid., 83). Kaufman also declares that the people of the dominated regions feel that their misfortunes are caused by the exploitative relationship to the superpower (ibid., 83–84). Today, in the discourses on spheres of influence, the prisoners of political and economic influence are the post-Soviet states; thus, the notion of imprisonment is one association that the concept of sphere of influence has carried along with it over the years.

Going back to subjugated knowledges, in addition to (the illusion of) stability and order, there is the question of formalness and legitimacy of influence – expressed in the distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* influence – as the subjugated knowledge of the Cold War. It is hidden because presently only *de facto* influence is seen as influence constituting a sphere of influence. Nevertheless, Russia makes an exception. In the present discourses, if Russia’s influence is *de jure* it means a sphere of influence of the (self-serving) suzerain or imperialist power, not a legitimate form of influence – even if an influenced state accepts its position. In the case of Russia, attempts to establish influence via a treaty or an organisation are deemed instances of a sphere-of-influence policy. At the same time, in the present discourse no legal means of bringing states together, except when applied by Russia, deserves to be referred to as a sphere of influence. In general, there is no room to discuss spheres of influence as being legitimate. Keal and Kaufman discuss the legitimacy of influence with reference to its formality, but the present age does not separate influence as much by its level of formality as it does by classifying the states that exert their influence. This is why it does not make much difference how Russia exerts its influence, the fact that it does so is adequate for the condemnation of that influence.

Thus, it is not only that *de jure* and *de facto* influence can be distinguished but there is also a question about the legitimacy of influence when it is related to a specific state. Keal and Kaufman try to suggest that a sphere of influence can be something different for different actors. The United States and the Soviet Union did not have the same type of legitimacy for their influence; yet, Kaufman and Keal used the concept of sphere of influence for both. Because they both had a definition in mind (exclusion of the other power, violation of sovereignty and mostly tacit agreement) they could refer to both the Soviet Union’s and the United States’ conduct
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using the same term name regardless of the differences. At the same time,
the United States’ influence emerges as more acceptable, because it is
founded upon treaties; it is more “de jure”.
Acceptable or not, for Kaufman and Keal, it is not the name of the state
which determines whether its policy may be deemed one of establishing
a sphere of influence; it is the policy itself, which is defined in relation to
the prevailing international order. Thus, in this case, “sphere of influence”
is not a pejorative expression and there is no need for Keal and Kaufman
to describe the United States’ influence in some other terms (such as
the Good Neighbor Policy). My ultimate point here is that that Russia,
like any other state, is a member of international society and exerts its
influence within the context of the world which its decision-makers see
around them. Even though Russia is the successor of the Soviet Union,
and even if we conclude that the Soviet Union engaged in an unjust
practice in maintaining a sphere of influence, this is not a case for guilt
by association. Indeed, it was Mikhail Gorbachev, the last head of state
of the Soviet Union, who ended the “festival” of spheres of influence by
abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine and who demanded disarmament,
the withdrawal of the country’s military presence in Eastern Europe and
strengthening of global institutions like the United Nations. Gorbachev’s
approach meant a clear break with previous policies. I believe we need a
fresh look at Russia’s policy of influence, a perspective that does not cling
to the country’s Cold War image. This means discussing the legitimacy
and the nature of spheres of influence in general and in the case of Russia
in particular.

6.2 The Cuban Missile Crisis
We are still missing some elements from the Cold War story: the collision
of and competition for spheres of influence, and the nuclear factor. These
elements I want to discuss by exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
This is not the only collision of the superpowers. We could very well
discuss the Vietnam War (1955–75), the Berlin Blockade (1948–49), the
Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–89) or some other battle over spheres
of influence. But the Cuban Missile Crisis represents “crossing the line”,


embarking on influence in the territory of the other superpower, and thus challenging the stability of international order as established by spheres of influence. More importantly, the missile crisis centres around nuclear weapons and encourages an examination of the meaning of the nuclear factor where spheres of influence are concerned.

The number of sources which I draw on here is rather limited because my aim is not to explain the Cuban crisis in its entirety. The sources represent a set of examples through which we can raise questions about Cold War spheres of influence, and I am not attempting to discover everything there is to know about the event that took place in 1962. When it comes to discussing the concept of sphere of influence and Cuba, Paul Keal is really the only available source. There is a need to take the concept of sphere of influence up a theoretical level and explore the crisis from this perspective. When it comes to finding out what happened in the missile crisis, I rely on Aleksandr Fursenko’s and Timothy Naftali’s “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (1998) and Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (2006). For example, Graham Allison’s and Philip Zelikov’s Essence of Decision (1999) does not add anything significant to Fursenko’s and Naftali’s account. A few other works are used as supplementary sources. In One Hell of a Gamble, Fursenko and Naftali share the story of the Cuban Missile Crisis using the archives with secret documents which have been opened since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In order to demonstrate the political discourse that Keal and Fursenko and Naftali refer to, I will present some speeches by President J.F. Kennedy and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Again Keal’s and Fursenko and Naftali’s books function as a primary source as much as Kennedy and Khrushchev in the quest for the Cold War meanings of spheres of influence.

The Cold War was a time of constant threat of a nuclear war. This gave a special meaning to the balance of power and great power management. The possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union created a unique concentration of power where maintaining the status quo became a matter of life and death for all of humanity. The basic line of thought is that the world came close to a nuclear war because of the collision of spheres of influence. On a theoretical level, we are dealing with the ideas of stability of possessions and limiting conflicts.
Burnham changed his mind on universalism as he became increasingly afraid of the atomic bomb. He thought that competition between great powers was too dangerous given their nuclear capabilities. Even though in the present we sometimes forget that the Bomb still exists – not only as a symbol (a material representation) of power, but also as an actual weapon of mass destruction – the fact is that nuclear deterrence makes struggles for spheres of influence extremely dangerous. This is one thing we should have learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, but unfortunately there is as little discussion on the meaning of nuclear weapons for spheres of influence as there is conceptual discussion on spheres of influence in the first place.

In January 1959, Fidel Castro, along with his brother Raúl, Ernesto “Che” Guevara and others from the July 26 movement, overthrew the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. This was the beginning of a socialist Cuba which would seek the company of the Soviet Union. Castro considered the Americans imperialists and was irritated by the naval base in Guantánamo on Cuban soil, which reminded him of Theodore Roosevelt’s “big stick” diplomacy. (See Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 5–7.) According to Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 9), since 1933 the foreign policy of the United States had been founded upon the principle of non-intervention and since 1948, with the founding of the OAS, Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour Policy had been the basis of inter-American relations. But Fidel Castro was well aware that the time of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy was over. The United States once again opted for an interventionist foreign policy by participating in the overthrow of the regime of Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz’s in 1954. In 1954, the OAS signed the Caracas Resolution, which included a commitment by the members for joint action in case of any communist infiltration (ibid.). This was the background to Cuba’s resistance to American influence.

According to Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 55), when Castro took over Cuba, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union knew what course he intended to pursue. The Soviet Union was cautious in supporting Cuba, because it was uncertain of the country’s ambitions. In Cuba, the communists were not in complete control of the government (ibid.). Guevara and Castro’s brother Raúl were members of the communist party but Castro was not a Marxist; he was a “Fidelista” (ibid.). In the
end, Castro made his choice and pledged his allegiance to communist ideology; and finally, the situation in 1960 was that Cuba was sliding into the socialist camp and the United States “seemed prepared to accept this violation of its sphere of influence” (ibid.).

After January 1961, Cuba and the United States had no diplomatic relations and very little mutual trade (Fursenko and Naftali 1998, 83). The Kennedy administration could not just sit and watch Cuba turn into a communist Soviet outpost thus a plan was developed for a military invasion using Cuban exiles in order to overthrow Castro, which was implemented in April 15. One curious aspect of the plan and its execution was that, according to Naftali and Fursenko, Kennedy was concerned about the worsening of the international reputation of the United States and for this reason wanted to avoid offering air support. The United States did not want to be seen by the world as an interventionist aggressor. Due to this cautiousness, the operation, known as “the Bay of Pigs Invasion”, completely failed. (Ibid., 77–100.) What can be concluded is that international institutions worked to limit states’ actions even during the Cold War: sovereignty and the non-intervention principle had not lost all meaning. The United States and the Soviet Union could not act as they pleased, especially because they had to consider each other’s reactions. The Soviet Union was cautious in supporting Cuba, for the sake of good relations with its opponent, and the United States feared for its reputation in the case of full-blown military intervention. If we compare the time of the missile crisis and the world today, some things have not changed. The ideological orientation of another state, be it close by or far away, is still a concern, even to the extent that a superpower is ready to intervene. Even the argument has not changed: intervention is resorted to for the sake of the people. It is still a means to put an end to dictatorship or tyranny, or to protect human rights. Intervention is now resorted to also by Russia, not only the United States and its allies, as exemplified in the August 2008 conflict in Georgia. Cuba was a manifestation of this same paradigm – intervention to save a people from an oppressive ideology, albeit in a very different international order.

For the United States, a communist outpost in the Caribbean was not acceptable; the reason was not only the Soviet threat, but also the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine. Keal (1983, 113) explains, “After Guatemala
it was Castro’s government in Cuba that became the focus of United States anxiety about the infiltration of international communism into the hemisphere. By the time Kennedy became President, the United States regarded Cuba as a Soviet satellite and as a transgression of the Monroe Doctrine that could not be tolerated.” (ibid.). The point Keal is making is that considerations of the peace and security of the United States overrode any of the independence of Latin American countries to decide on their internal matters. The threat was of course that those states would also fall under Soviet influence. The Cuban association with the Soviet Union was a threat to the balance of power in the region (ibid., 132). Moreover, Keal (1983, 113–114) writes, the United States had the right to determine what the threats to peace in the hemisphere were and what was considered an acceptable form of government in each of the American states. If we link this to the more general context of international order, the United States would seem to be following the principles laid down as early as in the 1815 Congress of Vienna about great powers’ rights to decide on matters of international security. In this perspective, we are not addressing something peculiar to spheres of influence or to the Cold War superpower rivalry but merely an old tradition of great power management. The idea of a sphere of influence needs to be understood as something that emerged with great powers and lives with great powers. Sphere of influence is a concept situated between the universe and the pluriverse and which is intimately connected to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. On the theoretical level, any conceptualisation of a sphere of influence must rely on the notion of international society, and as a practical policy the pursuit of spheres of influence always emerges as a part of international order. A sphere of influence belonged to the framework of international society, both as an idea and a foreign policy tool, even during the Cold War.

For the United States, the dilemma was to justify intervention and make it look like something other than a sphere-of-influence policy, which had such a negative ring to it for Americans. On 20 April 1961, President John F. Kennedy gave an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors explaining the United States’ “Bay of Pigs” invasion in Cuba. Kennedy (1961) explained how intervention was against the American tradition and international obligations, but at the same time...
stated: “Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction - if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration - then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation!”. Thus, exactly as Keal explained, if it was a question of the country’s security, the United States’ considered that it had the right to act, even abroad. Moreover, inaction could be even worse than intervention if it led to accepting communist penetration. This is the logic whereby a small state’s sovereign rights can be violated for the sake of the greater good. Because of international order – the extreme division of the world into two camps – inequality had become the foundation of international relations. It was the right of a great power to decide what was acceptable in its “neighbourhood” and what was not – and for the United States communism was not.

Kennedy (1961) made it clear that there was no room for the Soviet Union to deplore the United States’ actions in light of its own actions on the “bloody streets of Budapest”. Kennedy (ibid.) observed, “It is not the first time that Communist tanks have rolled over gallant men and women fighting to redeem the independence of their homeland. Nor is it by any means the final episode in the eternal struggle of liberty against tyranny, anywhere on the face of the globe, including Cuba itself.”. Kennedy explained at length how serious a threat communism was to the freedom of nations. Soviet tyranny was threatening to spread to other nations of the Western Hemisphere unless it was stopped. Kennedy wrote how this spreading threat of Communism turned support and help for the people into a reign of terror where discontent was repressed and self-determination disappeared (ibid.). When reading these justifications for taking action, the idea of the inherent injustice of a sphere of influence becomes blurred. It becomes a matter of perspective: justice in whose opinion? In a concrete political situation, justice is not abstract; it is defined by those involved. The Cold War struggles for freedom against tyranny are perfect examples of spheres of influence representing either an alleged deprivation or declared bestowal of freedom.

According to Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 12), the day Khrushchev decided to send Warsaw Pact weapons to Cuba, in late September 1959,
was the day when Khrushchev decided to take the risk of a military clash with the United States by pursuing interests in Latin America. Fursenko and Naftali explain, in the logic of spheres of influence, that “[f]or the most part, Stalin had left Latin America to the United States. It was America’s backyard, too far away for a man who had never traveled outside his own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. But under Khrushchev the Soviet Union looked for allies among the young nationalist leaders of what became known as the Third World.” (ibid.).

Ultimately, the Soviet support extended beyond conventional weapons. Fearing that the Cubans could side with China, and receiving a report indicating that the CIA was recommending preventive war against the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, for the first time, on 9 July 1960, spoke of extending the nuclear umbrella over Cuba (ibid., 50–52.) Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 171) write:

*The Soviet Union had never stationed ballistic missiles outside of its borders. But Khrushchev had broken rules before. Stalin had never seriously considered making inroads to Latin America. The idea of a missile gambit, which began in Khrushchev’s mind as a work of inspiration, even whimsy, stayed with him.*

Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 180) quote Khrushchev’s statement at a meeting of the Defence Council where he insisted that nuclear missiles would not only protect Cuba but would equalise the balance of power. The missiles would eliminate the strategic imbalance, the military inferiority (ibid., 187). Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 183) write, “But a concern for Cuban security alone cannot explain why the Soviets took the risk of sending their most expensive and dangerous weapons seven thousand miles to an island republic”. Other reasons motivated Khrushchev: Kennedy’s decision to resume nuclear testing in April 1962, the lack of progress in the negotiations over Berlin and the American activity in Southeast Asia all posed a challenge to the Soviet Union (ibid.). The Soviets wanted to do more than just save Castro; their reasons for crossing the line were the balance of power, the nuclear balance and projecting power into the Western Hemisphere (ibid., 180–188).37

37 Fursenko and Naftali (2006; 469, 471) write that the missiles were placed in Cuba as a political threat, a restraint on the United States regarding Cuba, with no aim
When the Soviet Union finally reached out of its comfort zone, and approached the borders of its competitor, the move was not motivated only (if at all) by its interest in Cuba as such. Khrushchev did not involve Castro in the negotiations with Kennedy at any point (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, 490; Holbraad 1979, 69). In the terminology of postcolonial research, this was a case of marginalising Cuba (and later also marginalising the Cuban interpretation of the history of the crisis) (see Laffey & Weldes 2008). If the Soviet Union was uncertain about supporting Cuba in the first place, it was even more uncertain about providing military support lest something that was a minor relationship turn into a conflict between the superpowers (Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 23). The Soviet foreign policy bureaucrats were against fulfilling the request made by Cuba to provide them with Polish weapons. Fursenko and Naftali claim that it was Khrushchev who saw the revolution in Cuba as being too important to deny it assistance (ibid., 24). Khrushchev also believed that for the United States general détente was an important enough reason to ignore Cuba in order to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union (ibid., 44-45). What comes to light here is the significance of international society, even during the Cold War. Institutions and rules were at work, and both the United States and the Soviet Union restricted their actions because of them. And because of the restrictions created by the desire to act as a member of this society sphere-of-influence policies reflected not only national interests but also interests of maintaining peace and order in general.

Keal concludes that the threat to the security and ideology of the hemisphere came not from Cuba’s internal developments but from Soviet intrusion. He (1983, 153–154) explains:

*Although Cuba no longer had government under United States influence, it was strategically located within a region that was a United States sphere of influence. What was important was not that it had a communist government having links with the Soviet Union, but rather the extent of what the United States would allow the Soviet Union to do in and from Cuba. The Soviet Union was not to take advantage of Cuba either to improve its nuclear and strategic balance of unleashing a war. Taubman (2005, 535) also asserts that the missiles were meant to frighten and not to be fired.*
According to Keal (1983, 1234) the conflict involved a dispute between two influencing powers over the limits of spheres of influence. The interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, by contrast, were a matter of the influencing power acting against the influenced (ibid.). Two observations follow: 1) We really have a collision here, exactly that which should challenge Keal’s idea about spheres of influence producing order and stability, and an event which was, nevertheless, limited by the existence of international society. 2) If we look at the history of spheres of influence, the great power competition for survival is always there. If sovereignty is fluid, intervention a contested idea and justice a matter of interpretation, then great power rivalry is the one thing we can establish with reasonable certainty as a defining feature of spheres of influence when we look at the history constructed to date. Noteworthy for the present pejorative understanding of spheres of influence is that if there needs to be another great power against which a sphere of influence is constructed, this can hardly be a purely imaginary adversary. If Russia is trying to establish a sphere of influence, against whom is it being created? Where is the other great power with a sphere of influence? And why would Russia see the United States, the EU, China or some other entity as the other influencing power? Or is it just Russian paranoia after all?

What followed the Soviet support for Cuba and the United States’ “Bay of Pigs” invasion was the missile crisis. The Soviet Union delivered 36 R12 missiles to Cuba by the end of September 1962, and the first shipment of nuclear warheads reached the island on 4October. On 15 October, the United States’ U2 flights spotted some of the missiles. (Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 216–222). President Kennedy was reluctant to answer the Soviet threat with military action; he wanted to try diplomatic means. But the problem was that the more time the diplomatic solution took, the less likely military success became. If the Soviet Union was able to make the missiles operational, the United States would embark on a suicidal mission trying to destroy them. (Ibid., 226.) The tension was great and “spheres of influence” were bringing the world to the brink of war – instead of contributing to peace and stability. Despite the initial
constraints by international society, this was “stability of possessions” failing in the most tragic sense. Avoiding a military solution as the first option, the United States answered with a naval “quarantine” preventing additional offensive weapons reaching Cuba (see Fursenko and Naftali 1998, 235).

President Kennedy (1962) gave a speech on 22 October on the crisis. In the speech he stated that the purpose of the missile bases had to be to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. Kennedy (1962) referred to international agreements by stating that:

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base--by the presence of these large, long range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction--constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. […] The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements--and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

For Kennedy, United States interests in Cuba were legitimate and the country’s sphere of influence could be justified on the basis of international law. In fact, Kennedy’s assertion of regional arrangements is like Schmitt’s idea of spheres (Großräume) of international law. Kennedy was not saying that there were tacit agreements about spheres of influence. He was saying that the Western Hemisphere constituted a legitimate Großraum which was under attack. There is also a voice similar to Naumann’s in Kennedy’s claim for a regional international law. Kennedy insisted that Cuba was well known for its special and historical relationship to the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere. In the light of the legality of the United States’ sphere of influence, and the special relationship of the Cuban and American peoples, the Soviet Union had pulled a stunt constituting a “deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo” (Kennedy 1962). In addition, Kennedy (1962) accused the Soviet Union of attempts at world domination and assured that the
Unites States was ready to take action if the safety and freedom of peoples the United States was committed to were threatened.

In letters to President Kennedy 23 and 24 October, 1962, Khrushchev (1962a, 1962b), just like Kennedy, invoked international law:

*I must say frankly, that the measures indicated in your statement constitute a serious threat to peace and to the security of nations. The United States has openly taken the path of grossly violating the United Nations Charter, the path of violating international norms of freedom of navigation on the high seas, the path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against the Soviet Union.*

*You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law.*

Both superpowers claimed to be on a mission to protect freedom and peace; that is, they were on the side of the law. Bull (2002, 211) writes that in fact both the Soviet Union and the United States have mainly appealed to peace and security, and not ideology, doctrinal rectitude or human justice, in justifying their interventions. This, for Bull, meant that they valued international order over norms of justice (ibid., 212). I agree that international order and peace were the main concerns for the two great powers after the conflict unfolded in full, but, also the language of justification was strong and even showed a humanitarian dimension. Again, I draw the conclusion that justification mattered because of concerns for international society. Khrushchev (1962c) wrote to Kennedy on the 26th offering to remove the missiles if the United States would promise not to invade Cuba. He also wrote that the Soviet military aid to Cuba was solely for “reasons of humanitarianism”, to support its revolution against outside attack, and not as a means to interfere in Cuba’s internal affairs. It is hard to imagine how humanitarian reasons were at the heart of Soviet foreign policy here, but it is easy to understand that positions were defended with appeals to such a noble cause.

Khrushchev proposed to Kennedy on 26 October that if the United States would end the naval blockade and refrain from invasion in Cuba

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38 A slightly different transcription of the letter is found on the United States State Department web page (see Khrushchev 1962b for the source).
the Soviet Union would destroy its armaments in Cuba (Keal 1983, 137–138). The next day (27 October) Khrushchev (1962d) wrote again to Kennedy, before receiving any reply to this previous letter, and presented additional demands for the settlement of the crisis. The letter stated that the United States had surrounded the Soviet Union with missiles located in Britain, Italy and Turkey and claimed that this was an unfair situation. Khrushchev proposed that the Soviet Union would remove its missiles from Cuba if the United States would remove its missiles from Turkey. Moreover, Khrushchev (ibid.) wrote to Kennedy:

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidences in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey’s other neighboring states. (Khrushchev 1962d.)

Khrushchev demanded that the United States make a similar commitment regarding Cuba. On the part of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s statement was a promise not to include Turkey in the Soviet sphere of influence, “sphere of influence” as we understand it today: not to violate its borders or sovereignty, not to interfere in its internal affairs or invade the country. The United States accepted the offer to refrain from invading Cuba but the agreement on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be concluded later under a secret protocol (Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 278–287).

Ultimately, the United States got its way, without a military invasion. Khrushchev did not want a war and eventually the Soviet Union returned the missiles to where they came from (see Fursenko and Naftali 1998, 277). To quote Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 260), “He could not go to war in the Caribbean with any hope of prevailing. He had tried to achieve some measure of parity with the United States to defend Soviet interests in that region; but clearly he had failed.” Keal (1983, 141) writes that by withdrawing the Soviet Union accepted that Cuba was in the sphere of
influence of the United States. The crisis was settled on 28 October with the promise from the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles, but there were still difficult negotiations ahead on how to implement the agreement (Fursenko & Naftali 2006, 493; Taubman 2005, 577). Nevertheless, I will end my account of the incident here and look at the contribution of the missile crisis to our present understanding of spheres of influence.

6.3 A Re-Reading of the Cold War

The Cuban Missile Crisis is an ample example of how the struggle for spheres of influence encompassed ideology, “contamination”, fighting tyranny or imperialism, and defending the freedom of the people. Sphere of influence is not an idea which belongs exclusively to the Cold War, but there definitely are traits which make Cold War spheres of influence special. At the same time, the concept of sphere of influence relates to ideas on international order, that is, to international theory expounded by the English School, especially because that theory was born in the midst of the Cold War itself. Keal saw the missile crisis not as a matter of Cuba’s conversion to Communism as such but as the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. International order was also at stake, and war between the superpowers was the risk worth taking in a conflict over Cuba.

Even though the spheres of influence in the Cold War were based on tacit agreements, Kennedy argued for the legality of an American Großer Raum. Khrushchev did not spare words in appealing to international law. This, coupled with hesitation about turning a minor matter into a superpower conflict, and the need to justify influence prompts me to state that concerns for international order affected the decisions on questions of influence. It was Bull’s international society at work. The missile crisis was also an example of the dangers of spheres of influence; it almost ended in a nuclear war. Because of the instability of spheres of influence and the balance of power, a struggle between two influencing powers took place and spheres of influence failed to provide for stability of the powers’ possessions. Yet, spheres of influence, although almost leading to nuclear war, did not, in the end, fail to provide for international order.
during the Cold War. The Third World War never materialised and spheres of influence maintained the bipolar order. In fact, what I am able to read from the Cuban Missile Crisis is that somehow the nuclear threat overrode the powers’ considerations regarding their spheres of influence. Reading from Keal, and Fursenko and Naftali, international order – and maintaining it by nuclear parity – was a major motive for both parties. The Soviet Union gave up; it could not achieve nuclear parity and it could not extend its military influence to the Caribbean. The Soviet Union was ready to back off, because, in the end, luckily, peace was more important.

The role of small powers comes into the limelight in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the case of Cuba, sovereignty was defended and violated at the same time. Intervention was resorted to. Yet the small power was no victim. Although Cuba was ignored in the negotiations, marginalised as an object of superpower rivalry, it was able to choose its side in the beginning and play “the big game”. Castro wanted to join the Soviet bloc; he wanted the Bomb. The people were less enthusiastic, but of course it was not for them to decide. Moreover, if Cuba agreed to the Soviet influence, was the relationship anymore that of being part of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, or was it an alliance? This is the general question of where we draw the line between a sphere of influence, an alliance, integration, and so on, when it comes to the consent of the influenced state.

The role of small powers includes influencing balances of power. The Cold War balance of power is generally viewed as something Wight (1966a, 152) calls a “simple balance”, that is, “selective concentration upon the greatest Powers”. But Wight argues there has never actually been, in Western international society, a simple balance. There have always been lesser powers around or between the dominant powers (ibid.). A simple balance is only possible in an international system of established, stable Großräume. As long as small states exist as independent powers, no matter how small they are, as the Cuban case testifies, balance is achieved by controlling the moves of the small powers. This destroys the dream of perfectly working great power management and it destroys the idea of perfect hierarchy. The Cuban Missile Crisis proves that not even the Cold War was built upon a simple balance; even “tacit agreements on spheres of influence” could not create a simple balance. Maybe this is the reason
why Burnham did not believe in great powers anymore, but put his trust in the Universal Empire. Maybe this is why Lippmann did not trust the balance of power, but believed that there must be a way to divide the world along lines of responsibility, willingly and in good spirit.

If we re-read the Cold War, one inevitable question is whether spheres of influence provided for international order in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Did the tacit agreement on spheres of influence cause the crisis or prevent its escalation, or both? This is a discussion on the conflict- and war-preventing mechanism of spheres of influence, a discussion completely absent from IR today. In the present understanding of the concept, sphere of influence is the source of conflicts, not a check on violence and war. I have yet to encounter a statement from a non-Russian affirming that Russia’s sphere of influence contributes to stability and helps to limit conflicts. In this light, the Cuban missile crisis is an example of how due to the struggle for spheres of influence and the balance of power the superpowers came close to starting a nuclear war. Because of spheres of influence, the United States took great pains to plan a military invasion and overthrow Castro. Because of spheres of influence, Khrushchev delivered nuclear armaments for the first time outside Soviet soil. One could even put the blame on spheres of influence for Cuba’s turn towards Communism and the loss of many lives in Castro’s purges. It all makes sense: spheres of influence can lead to this. In any human endeavour, power has the potential to lead to death and destruction. But power has another side too, and the historical discourses on spheres of influence reveal that they may be vehicles for exercising “responsibility” or using power for the sake of order.

If we turn the matter the other way around, we could say that respect for spheres of influence eventually prevented the escalation of the conflict. Keal (1983, 205) writes that the role of spheres of influence as a means to limit violence became obvious in the case of Cuba. Spheres of influence created a restraint on great powers interfering in each other’s spheres of influence. In fact, respect for those spheres of influence prevented a nuclear war (ibid). This claim can be refuted, of course, and I would say that it was rather the fear of a nuclear war that prevented a nuclear war. But what Keal means is that considering the antagonistic system, the existence of the fatal bomb, and the tension in international relations, the
spheres of influence created some rules whereby the superpowers knew their limits. Spheres of influence created order in chaos and helped to prevent a major war. Stalin had respected the rules drawn, and Khrushchev tried to cross the line, but eventually the system held together. What is more, spheres of influence helped to maintain the pluralist system against a single sovereign, although, as I argued before, this particular pluralist system was not a strong one in defending freedom. Cold War pluralism did not give states the possibility to do things their way. Keal (1983, 199–200) also argues that not only did the system of spheres of influence maintain peace between the superpowers but hierarchical relationships maintained order within the blocs and the spheres of influence removed the influenced areas from external challenges. In addition, the influencing state managed relations among the influenced, preventing conflict inside the bloc (ibid).

All this is not to idealise the Cold War or to say that Cold War spheres of influence were not that bad after all. I was only 8 years old when the Berlin Wall fell, and I could not possibly understand how people lived and felt during those years. Superpower politics affected millions of people, and Orwell foresaw that spheres of influence entail totalitarianism, violence, war, suppression and manipulation of people. But this should not mean that the concept of sphere of influence has no history, that it is fixed within its Cold War uses. If a sphere of influence expresses a relationship between the influencing and the influenced; and if it affects international order and its rules and institutions; then it is necessary to take a historically and theoretically broader view on spheres of influence than the Cold War alone can offer.

The Cold War, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, constitutes much of our understanding of spheres of influence. Just like the Monroe Doctrine it is a beacon signalling spheres of influence at work: it is a memory which makes sphere of influence understandable. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a manifestation of, a concrete reference to what a sphere of influence is and, more specifically, what spheres of influence meant for the relations among the influencing powers. The usefulness of the Cold War memory is that it reminds us of the dangers of antagonism and division in the society of states in the age of nuclear weapons. We forget this too easily. But the question remains whether in the end the
issue in the Cuban Missile Crisis was spheres of influence rather than nuclear parity. Were spheres of influence reduced to a balance of power in a manner that prevents us talking anymore about a struggle for spheres of influence? Did the nuclear factor alter the sphere-of-influence logic in a fundamental manner? Was the fear of mutual suicide so overwhelming that it overruled considerations of spheres of influence and made even Khrushchev accept defeat and humiliation by retreating from Cuba? According to Lippmann (1963), nuclear deterrence does not prevent a nuclear war. I agree with Lippmann in that as long as there are nuclear weapons, the possibility of a nuclear war really exists. Lippmann (1963) commented on the missile crisis as follows:

Had the missiles been put in place, they would have changed seriously the balance of nuclear power in the world. The United States deployed its whole military power, nuclear and conventional, against such an alteration of the status quo. It would do the same, and for the same kind of reason, if the Soviet Union moved its military force against Berlin or against any other point which is critically important to the maintenance of the status quo in the balance of strategic power.

How much could little Cuba weigh on the scale where the other weight was nuclear war? If Kennedy and Khrushchev understood that nuclear war would become a reality if the missiles were kept in Cuba, they could not have cared for any trivial matters relating to spheres of influence. Khrushchev gave up the dream of nuclear parity; he gave up a balance of power, all for the sake of avoiding war. What drove the Soviet premier to give up the confrontational sphere-of-influence logic must have been the fear of destroying the entire planet, or at least the human race. It is even uncertain whether Khrushchev was after a communist bridgehead in the Caribbean or if he was planning all along to advance military parity, or even superiority. Even if the conflict began as a competition over spheres of influence, it ended up in a negotiation on nuclear weapons. Even American missiles in Turkey entered the bargain. What was agreed on Cuba, where it all began, was not much: a promise from the United States not to intervene. The United States was left with communist Cuba and with Castro. The Soviet Union was left with humiliation. What the nuclear age brought as an extra for the logic of spheres of influence was
that, in addition to, or even instead of, fear of the spread of an alien ideology, spread of power of the Other, or losing the balance of power, great powers now had to take into consideration the dangerous military scenario that their game of influence could be opposed with the nuclear weapon. The missile crisis thus illustrates that even during the Cuban Missile Crisis there was no overt manifestation of spheres of influence, not even if we rely on the definitions of Keal and Kaufman, and agree on the meaning of the concept.

I began this research by being critical of the transmission of Cold War thinking on spheres of influence into the present. I was also critical of how the Cold War forms a unitary yet uninformative picture of spheres of influence and dominates the image of Russia’s sphere-of-influence policy. Later I came to realise that that problem was not so much conceiving of spheres of influence in Cold War terms but the fact that even Cold War spheres of influence have not been studied. And how could they have been, when spheres of influence had not been theorised? With the knowledge we have today, with archives more and more open, the idea of spheres of influence, the assumed practice of spheres of influence during the Cold War, could very well be a fruitful source for theorising spheres of influence. I believe the Cold War offers more than a burden of pejorative associations on the concept of sphere of influence: it contributes to a theoretical tradition in that it is a part of the history of spheres of influence, the most explicit and familiar phase, but not the only one in that history. Even if rooted in pejorative associations, the Cold War knowledge offers material for the normative discussion we need and lack. Failing to read the Cold War policy of spheres of influence means we will not be able to take a critical view of the contemporary manifestations of spheres of influence.
7 Russia, Order, Law and Influence

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the Russian political and academic elite write about spheres of influence, international order and justice. What makes the Russian discourses of utmost importance is that in the present spheres of influence are located, mapped, in the “Russian neighbourhood”, that is, the post-Soviet space. In order to shake the foundations of the pejorative understanding of the concept, I had to ascertain whether there really was an idea of sphere of influence alive in the current Russian thinking and what conception of international order the Russian analysts want to present to the outside world. Like the previous chapters, this chapter represents an episode that draws on examples,. My purpose here is to problematise the present understanding of “Russia’s sphere of influence” by introducing Russian ideas on influence and international order. What we will discover is that the Russians also use the term “sphere of influence” in a pejorative sense and they find it difficult to articulate that, at the end of the day, influence is what Russia seeks.

7.1 The Sources of Russian Discourses

The following reading of spheres of influence operates on the same two perspectives of international order and justification of influence as the previous chapters. The term “sphere of influence” is mentioned infrequently in the sources, but the idea of influence beyond the country’s borders is firmly rooted in Russian thought. The focus of Russian ideas on spheres of influence is twofold, representing: 1) a defence against the accusations that Russia has pursued and continues to pursue an ill-intentioned sphere-of-influence policy and 2) an offensive against the sphere-of-influence policies of others. Accordingly, I needed to find texts that were directed to international audiences and that represent a forum for articulating the defensive and offensive approaches. The material is in English and naturally some meaning may have been lost when the texts were translated. On the other hand, the intention of the authors is not my focus as much as the visions that can be discovered in the material,
in other words, the effects of the discourses. Identifying the speech acts that convey ideas on spheres of influence is the methodological basis of the analysis, even though I do not adhere to discourse analysis as such.

I also wanted to find sources which would operate on the same level of language as the other parts of the history of the concept of sphere of influence, that is, writings which would express not only political interests but also theoretical thinking. These two criteria were well met by two journals representing the Russian voices of academia, think-tanks and politicians alike: *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* and *Russia in Global Affairs*. I chose to use the issues from 2006 until 2010, which provide enough material for finding “present” Russian ideas at the time of writing this book. The articles represent rather coherent visions, indicating that the journals set the boundaries for the views expressed by excluding the most radical ideas, but also that the passing of years from 2006 to 2010 has not made a great difference. A majority of the contributors are in high government, ministry or academic positions. I have not chosen the texts by author, only by topic. If some authors are quoted more frequently than others, such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, it is not because of their position but because of the amount of relevant published material written by them. My interest is not in personalities of the authors, but in the views that are expressed by them as representatives of the Russian political and academic elite. In the end, the number of Russian discussants rose to 66 persons, and in order to keep the scope of the material manageable, I reduced the sources to those which both quantitatively and qualitatively offered most for the analysis. When I generalise, I write “Russian writers”, “analysts” or just “Russians”. When I write “Russians” or “Russian” it does not refer to Russian people in general but only to the sources used in the analysis. The “Russian” ideas which emerge from the material,

39 *Russia in Global Affairs* is co-founded by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and the newspaper *Izvestia*. It has both Russian and English versions online. *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* is the English translation of the Russian-language journal *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA). The contributors are diplomats and independent analysts, and the articles often include roundtable discussions.

40 I have mentioned the affiliation of the authors in the footnotes as they were reported by the journal at the time of publication.
thus, represent the opinions of the Russian analysts chosen, but at the same time they become the visions of sphere of influence presented to the outside world.

The timeframe, the period from 2006 to 2010, encompasses a vast body of material dealing with enough political events to offer a varied source of ideas on sphere of influence. I call this period “the present”, although by the time this manuscript is published many significant political events will have taken place in the world, and even the year 2010 will be long past. My idea of the present should not be taken literally but rather as a synonym for “topical”, or “relevant for the twenty-first century” and, what is more, relevant for a history that should be written from that point onward. All in all, the discourses that cover five years of international events are quite harmonious in content and the only clear change that occurs with the passing of time is that the closer we get to the year 2010, the less talk about spheres of influence there is. The language becomes more sterile. Moreover, there is less discussion of controversial matters. The tone softens, and rather than expressing opinions the authors relate what they see as facts. I do not think this means a moderation of opinions but merely that the style of writing has become more academic and scientific and less political in these particular journals.

The years 2006–2010 witnessed then-President Vladimir Putin’s (Prime Minister from May 2008 to May 2012) famous Munich speech (2007), the election of new presidents in Russia (2008) and the United States (2009), Kosovo’s declaration of independence (2008), a war in South Ossetia (2008), the financial crisis (since 2008) and a “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations (2010); all of these events affected the topics addressed in the journals. The Munich speech was interpreted in Russia as a cry for monumental change in international society, but in the West it was seen as an aggressive geopolitical manifesto declaring a new Cold War. The next attempt to promote the Russian idea of international order was the proposal for a new security architecture for Europe, put forward in June 2008 in a speech in Berlin by then-President Dmitri Medvedev. The proposed treaty was published more than a year later, on 29 November 2009, on the Kremlin’s website (Kremlin.ru Archive). The intervention in Yugoslavia (1999), the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by many Western states and the conflict in Georgia (2008) created an impetus for
Russian analysts to discuss matters of intervention, international law and justice related to ideas on territorial influence. The financial crisis and, to a lesser extent, the “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations caused spheres of influence to fade into the background, and instead of promoting ideas, the journals provided more in the way of descriptive information. In addition to reacting to major events, the Russian writers addressed what they call falsification of history. In the case of the discourses on spheres of influence, history is indeed a source to draw images from (for Russians, just like for anyone), but Russians have accused their neighbour states of politically motivated interpretations of the history of world wars and the Cold War.

What is peculiar to the Russian discourse is that the writers cannot argue for their vision of international order without trampling on the very principles they wish to promote. This applies to sovereignty, international law, justice, non-intervention, and ultimately questions of influence. For the Russian authors, sovereign equality and great power management are not contradictory notions; intervention and non-intervention are upheld when it suits Russia’s interests and sense of justice; universe and pluriverse, solidarist and pluralist international society go hand in hand according to Russia’s needs; justice in principle and justice in practice do not need to match; and spheres of influence are sometimes good and at other times bad. This indecisiveness or contradictoriness can cause confusion in Russia’s relations to its partners in the West. It could also explain why many think that there is a stark contrast between Russian foreign policy discourses and actions. This is not to say that Western foreign policies are coherent and understandable to all, least of all to Russians. In fact, one of the most prominent Russian discourses is to accuse the United States of double standards in foreign policy, that is, defending international law and violating it whenever it suits American interests.

As regards the use of the emotionally and pejoratively loaded term “sphere of influence”, its use in shaming the other is not necessarily helpful in improving mutual relations. I believe that there is something to learn from analysing Russian visions of spheres of influence, especially if we depart from a broader set of tools of analysis by including ideas on order, great powers, sovereignty and intervention. At the minimum, it becomes clear that at the level of discourses no idea of Russia’s sphere of influence
is articulated. There is no shared understanding of "Russia’s sphere of influence" to be detected. The Russian idea of influence, as I read it from the material, resembles “regional solidarism” or a Good Neighbor Policy, as I will later argue, but it is not articulate aloud. Instead of a Russian vision of a sphere of influence, we find discourses justifying the country’s own efforts to exert influence and refuting others’ policies of doing the same. I believe the lack of coherence in articulating a Russian vision of influence and international order is reflected in Russian foreign policy. Even if it is not possible to draw direct conclusions on Russian foreign policy from the following analysis of discourses, it should be remembered that language is inextricably linked with and thus has an impact on the conduct of world affairs.

My intention is not to defend any actions by Russia or the Soviet Union. It is a sensitive issue to begin opening up paths of unorthodox reasoning about Russia’s influence. As a Finn who has learned the history of her country, I know how this subject stirs national sentiments. History has a strong grip on us, which makes it all the more important to look it in the eye. I have not allowed my own understanding of the rights and wrongs of the past to affect my analysis of Russian discourses and I hope the reader can follow my purpose in explicating the Russian argumentation, which is not to justify Russia’s foreign policy choices, but to cultivate some understanding of them.

7.2 International Society and Research on Russia

In the following analysis I proceed mostly with the English School conception of international society and its institutions. For this reason it is relevant to take a look at how the English School’s ideas have been utilised before in the analysis of Russian discourses and state behaviour. Of course, the concept of sphere of influence is absent, because the English School notions of sphere of influence have not been analysed before, let alone used to examine Russian foreign policy or discourses. Nevertheless, there is an interest in studying Russia in terms of international society and I will introduce some of the salient works here. Alexander Astrov has edited a book which deals with the Russian-Georgian conflict in
2008 from the perspective of the English School theory, namely, its idea of great power management. This is the most interesting research on Russia I have read, because it comes so close to opening paths for a discussion sphere of influence. The book in its entirety is an example of the lack of interest in spheres of influence, which is especially curious when we have a multitude of articles dealing with the conflict in South Ossetia. Even Astrov (2011b, 17) makes a clear statement about a sphere of influence being a manifestation of great power management. He laments the fact that great power management is the least theorised topic within the English School when it is actually “one of the defining practises of international society” (ibid., 2). Astrov even sees Russia as blatantly asserting its sphere of influence yet fails to extend the theoretical discussion to encompass spheres of influence (ibid., 3). The elements are all there: the idea of great power management, the English School, and even Carl Schmitt (Astrov 2011b and Prozorov 2011), but spheres of influence remain hidden. Sergei Prozorov (2011, 33) raises an important issue: the paradox of Russian claims to hegemony and the affirmation of the territorial integrity of the post-Soviet states prior to August 2008. The same paradoxes in argumentation about international order, along with spheres of influence, will be explored in my analysis of Russian discourses. Irina Papkova (2011, 56) has read about spheres of influence in Bull’s work but she uses the concept as something evident and descriptive rather than theoretical. While Papkova argues that Bull’s *The Anarchical Society* provides tools for understanding Russian-American relations in the context of the Georgian conflict, she does not count a sphere-of-influence policy among those tools (ibid., 58). Pami Aalto (2011) takes up the role of small states in great power management, also neglected in the English School literature. Elsewhere Aalto (2007) discusses Russia’s convergence with European and EU international society and what he sees as pluralist and solidarist tendencies in Russia’s view of international society. But also Aalto leaves questions of spheres of influence aside.

Other examples exist where the work of the English School is meritoriously utilised to explain Russian foreign policy, but without mention of the concept of sphere of influence. Neumann takes a historical approach to analysing Russia’s relationship to international society and argues that Russia has chose to remain in the outer tier of international
society because of its memories of emerging from a suzerain system (Neumann 2011, 483–484). Neumann does not accept Watson’s view on the expansion of international society according to which the European order spreads from the centre to the periphery without any residue. This is why Neumann writes about entry into international society as a relational process. (Ibid., 469–470.) Neumann’s conclusions bear resemblance to mine. He emphasises memories which inform present actions consciously or unconsciously. The memory which informed Russia’s entry into international society was its belonging to a suzerain system dominated by Mongol policy, emerging as its self-proclaimed successor and resisting becoming part of a new suzerain system, the Holy Roman Empire. (Ibid., 463–464) This analysis has interesting bearing on the present study. Neumann writes about expectations of certain behaviour in encounters with other people (ibid., 470–471, 484). If the Russians are still influenced by their memory of suzerainty, this means that their behaviour does not always match the expectations of those states which are in the centre of international society. If Russia’s memory of suzerainty explains its role in international society, this can mean that sphere of influence has a longer history, one extending all the way back to the suzerain systems. Perhaps it is sphere of influence as the successor idea of suzerainty which causes Russia to remain in the outer tier of international society. On the other hand, Russia is now perhaps the strongest and loudest proponent of international society, and sees other states as slipping away from the order which international institutions are designed to maintain. Thus, Russia sees itself as being in the centre of this order even if Neumann argues that Russia is anywhere but in the centre.

Neumann (2011, 484) notes, “The question of in what degree Russia’s contemporary standing within international society is still marked by the differing narrative sociabilities that marked Russia’s entry into it, must await further investigation”. I hope to offer some perspectives on this matter by pointing at the Russian interpretations of history: the refusal to accept a view of Russia as an imperialist aggressor, the need to remind the world of Russia’s role as a historically rightful member of the great power club responsible for international order, Russia’s visions of (spheres of) influence and of its relations to its neighbouring states, Russian ideas on hegemony and cosmopolitan values and its insistence on honouring the
institutions and rules of international society. All these discourses address Russia’s standing within the international society and prove the country’s continuing resistance to accepting rules of international society as dictated by Western states. In my analysis, Russian authors are producing an image of Russia not as a state which entered international society, but as one which, although operating from the outskirts of that society, is the only remaining defender of it. This defence is not particularly convincing, because Russia has difficulties, like other great powers, in obeying rules in practice and even discursively supporting all the rules they uphold. Why this difficulty? – Possibly because of the country’s memory of suzerainty, reflected today in its conception of what a sphere of influence is.

The discussion on Russia, Europe or the EU, and international society is also taken up by Richard Sakwa (2011). He asserts that Russia does not want to destroy the existing international order but rather is calling for a central role in this order and equal application of moral declarations by other powers. Russia promotes a thin international society (great power order) but is not ready for a thick version. As Sakwa puts it, Russia is not ready for “English School solidarism”. (Sakwa 2011, 199.) Russia has taken the role of norm-enforcer, demanding that the leading powers abide by the rules of international society (ibid., 202). Thus, as Sakwa notes, ”There remains a powerful normative current in Russia’s engagement with international society” (ibid., 203). Sakwa continues that Russia’s concern is to ensure that cultural differences are incorporated in the normative arena of international society. In other words, norms need to be mediated by Russia’s own history and culture. (Ibid., 205.) My analysis will prove these insights correct; but I will, in addition, explore in more detail the Russian discourses that express Russia leaning towards thin and thick international society alike. I discuss the problem of the universal and particular in Russia’s approach to the normative, that is, the universality of law and the particularity of values. I will furthermore illustrate how the Russian thinking on international society obscures the idea of ”Russia’s sphere of influence” with a focus on defending sovereignty and great power management over the threat of universalism.

S. Neil MacFarlane (2003) discusses the Russian view of justice and order in an analysis which offers some important insights. First, the Russian view of justice is egoistic rather than solidarist. This means
that justice is *justice for Russia* in light of Russia’s sense of exclusion and unequal treatment. This egoistic approach to justice does not mean that institutions do not matter to Russia. Quite the contrary, participation in these institutions offers recognition, status and a means to restrain other powers. (MacFarlane 2003, 178–179.) MacFarlane explores how Russia has applied this egoistic interpretation of justice historically: both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods represent an assertion of rights of the sovereign great power and disrespect for neighbouring, weaker states’ sovereignty (ibid., 188–201). MacFarlane implies that within the UN, a platform with a strong solidarist agenda, the Soviet Union/Russia has promoted its sovereign rights and great power interest rather than justice (ibid., 190). I read this as the ability to promote pluralist interests within a solidarist forum, picking the best of both pluralism and solidarism and blurring the boundary between the two. I will later argue, bringing international society into the centre of the idea of sphere of influence, that the Russian balancing between pluralism and solidarism is not only the central issue for Russian views on international order but the central issue for Russian views on spheres of influence as well.

I begin the chapter by first introducing Russian visions of order and institutions: chaos in world politics, great power management, balance of power, intervention in Kosovo and South Ossetia, and, finally, the proposal for a European Security Treaty. Next I introduce visions of influence: “historical politics”, justification and depolitisation of influence, the United States’ universalist threat, and the Russian *Großraum*, between the pluriverse and the universe. Finally, I sum up the discourses and offer an explanation for the peculiarities I find in Russian thinking.

### 7.3 Order and Institutions

#### 7.3.1 Chaos and International Law

Many Russian analysts see international order heading towards a *chaos*. Sergei Karaganov, Timofei Bordachev, Eduard Kuzmin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (since 2004)\(^{41}\) are the ones who most explicitly

\(^{41}\) Karaganov is Dean of the Faculty of World Economics and International Affairs of the State University–Higher School of Economics, Chairman of the Presidium of the
warn about the emerging chaos. For these analysts, chaos in world politics is a result of a Western failure to consolidate the old international institutions after the Cold War and to integrate Russia into international society as a fully fledged member. The West caused instability and tension, and ultimately ruined the global covenant.

According to Karaganov (2008), the West won the Cold War but failed to build a peaceful world. Finally, “[t]he system of governance over international relations and security, established over the previous 50 years, was gradually disintegrating” (ibid). The view of the West operating against the lofty international order, missing the chance to build a fair and democratic international order, is the context for Russia’s need to insist on the role of international institutions in opposing those who disrespect them. But as if it were not enough for the West, intoxicated by a sense of victory, to undermine global security structures with claims of world hegemony, it has also made direct attempts to contain Russia (Lavrov 2007b). Containment is a Cold War metaphor for building dividing lines, isolating, ignoring and slandering Russia. According to Karaganov, in the “spirit” of containment, Russia is seen as a neo-imperialist power “stigmatised for expansionism” (Karaganov 2007). This is where the need to defend Russia’s foreign policy springs from: the view of old divisions lives on. In this antagonistic world around Russia, the United States and NATO serve as the embodiments of the universalist project and disrespect for the most fundamental rules of the society of states – sovereignty and non-intervention. Bordachev (2010b) applies Carr’s ideas to explain how after the Cold War the Western countries took Carr’s maxim “Politics are in one sense always power politics” literally. The “the right of the stronger” was applied when NATO used force against Yugoslavia in 1999 and in Iraq in 2003; but military means are no longer efficient in pursuing political objectives and the irrational use of force has exterminated the order based on a monopoly of power of the status quo powers (ibid).

Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) and Chairman of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. Bordachev is the Deputy-Dean of the School of International Affairs and World Economy and the Director of Studies in the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. Kuzmin is Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and professor at the International Law Department of the Moscow State Academy of Law.
The world is not a threatening place for Russia only because of NATO expansion or even the United States’ universalism. Bordachev’s concern for great power order fading away by itself, dissolving in the fundamental irrationality of the use of force, indicates a new challenge to international order. It is the erosion of international institutions which worries the Russians in particular. This erosion is not only the result of Western negligence or the universalist approach of the United States, but something that potentially comes with the pluriverse, or multipolar order, which the Russians hold so dear. Bordachev and Lukyanov (2008) write:

*A number of participants in international relations view a multipolar world as a blessing, as they link many evils of the past few years to attempts by a single power to establish global domination. However, they ignore the fact that multipolarity arising amid a dilapidation of global institutions does not mean a reverting to stable multilateral formats. There are grounds to expect an escalating confrontation of “everyone against everyone” and the cropping up of fly-by-night alliances for solutions to specific problems.*

This is chaos, a multipolar order where international institutions are not functioning. The problem is governability in a multipolar world. The chaos theme was voiced most clearly in a report by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) published in 2007 (SVOP 2007). Lavrov reacted to the report, writing “I cannot agree with the opinion that a real alternative to a ‘unipolar world’ is ‘chaotization’ of international relations due to a ‘vacuum’ of governability and security” (Lavrov 2007a). According to Lavrov, multipolarity does not automatically increase the likelihood of confrontation, because ”things have always been this way, and there is nothing fatal about it” (ibid). What Lavrov offers as a global covenant is informal leadership amongst the world’s leading states in addition to the authority of international institutions (UN) (ibid). Lavrov means that great power management, agreed on some tacit basis, is needed. Thus the solution to the emergence of new power centres is the formation of a concert among them, so that instead of confronting one another they would rule together.

Not everyone is as optimistic as Lavrov about the functioning of a multipolar order. Bordachev (2010a) explains how the balance of power,
which has prevented hegemony and which was behind the establishment of international institutions, is now being replaced by chaos. For Bordachev (2010b), chaos means that the system of coordinates – the world order which is manifested in unipolar, bipolar or multipolar form – is eroding. The balance of power is eroding as an institution, because the fear of mutual destruction is no longer effective in managing relations between states. This was a bond that kept the international system together. The international system is losing its power to lay down rules for individual states and security interdependencies are weakening. States, even small ones, are beginning to behave more independently, Bordachev insists. (Ibid.) Kuzmin is another author who takes the view that the present lack of balance results in chaos: “The absence of such ‘balance’, or a sort of a ‘checks and balances’ system in world affairs is a strong temptation for dominant states to use international instability for selfish ends, which inevitably ends up in arbitrariness and anarchy, disregard for conventional norms and principles of international law” (Kuzmin 2007, 79). International Law, in addition to great power management, is the sword used in the battle against chaos: ”Russia tends to build up its impact on the global processes for the sake of a fair and democratic world order based on collective decisionmaking at the global and regional levels, the rule of international law, and equal and partner relationships with all states.” (Kuzmin 2010, 160).

The ideal global governance system is fair, equal and democratic, but most importantly it is built on respect for international law. Respect for international law means respect for sovereignty and the non-intervention principle and, in practice, also restrictions on the use of force. The Russian writers absolutely oppose the use of force. Lavrov (2009, 3) does not even approve of economic sanctions and other means of pressure against “difficult” states. Lavrov also writes that the conflict prevention and resolution methods inherited from the Cold War are ineffective. Lavrov puts his hope in strengthening the norms of international law and adherence to them. Ultimately, “[t]he choice in favor of law-based methods of international cooperation should subsequently bring about a situation where any forceful action – be it the use of force or threat of force – will be ruled out completely” (Lavrov 2010b, 2–3). Lavrov is proud of his country, which in his view is advancing in this direction (ibid., 5). For Lavrov, Russia is not looking into the past; Russia is not
a country succumbing to use of force and geopolitical games. This is a strong message against spheres of influence and their forceful imposition.

Judging by Russia’s behaviour, for example in the case of the intervention in South Ossetia, admiration for international law appears like mere rhetoric. Indeed, there is no conflict for Russians when it comes to Russia’s foreign policy and obeying of international law. In fact, as Russia promotes its national interests and aspires to be or become a great power, it needs international law. International law serves Russia’s interests and identity as a great power. Invoking international law is a means to defend the multipolar order and refute the power ambitions of any state trying to take over the world. In this capacity, it is a weapon against disorder. For Russia, international law includes hierarchy; after all, both hierarchy and international law are inscribed in the United Nations’ structures. International law is something that works as a regulative system among the great and for the protection of the small.

The cry for order is an assertion of the system of states as the ultimate goal of international order, a position faithful to the tenets of the English School. It is also an ode to the balance of power – the old and respected method of maintaining international order. In the view of the Russian authors there is no other way. The system of states is so deeply ingrained in Russian thought that even Karaganov (2010b) declares that “[t]he role of nation states and regional blocs is reviving – to the detriment of the agencies and institutions of multi-party supranational governance”. Thus, even though the Russians warn about the dangers of (American) universalism, they do not envision it as ever fully materialising. As chaos gives room for violation of sovereignty by the strongest, it constitutes a threat to international society as such. Chaos means a lack of stable and predictable relations among states. There is no power and no group of powers to lay down the rules and see that they are abided by. It is an anarchical system which lacks the element of great power order. Succumbing to chaos would mean not only that Russia would not be one of the guardians of international order, but that there would be no security structure, no global governance at all. It would be the end of polarity. When we continue with the analysis of Russian discourses, it becomes evident that chaos is not an abstract threat that just emerges out of nowhere. The source of the threat is specific: the United States and its unilateral use of force around the world. Some writers think that
the United States universalist project has failed, some see it as still more or less functioning; but everyone agrees that there is no attempt by the Western states to rebuild the international order – to rebuild a system of states governed by great powers. The trend towards remilitarisation, containment policy, unilateralism; and disrespect for sovereignty and non-intervention principles are the reasons why the multipolar dream is not becoming a reality and why chaos threatens to prevail instead.

This is how the Russian writers see the world. The Russian worldview, imbued with the power of history, results in a fervent defence of international institutions, criticism of those powers which disrespect the good old international order, and idealisation of Russia’s foreign policy as lawful and just. In the midst of these discourses we find ideas on spheres of influence.

7.3.2 The Great Responsibilities and Cooperative Balance

We need multilateral diplomacy for a more equitable, democratic system of relations. The same framework should involve mechanisms of collective leadership by leading states, those states that have a special responsibility for the situation in the world. And such leadership must be a truly representative in geographic terms and in terms of different civilizations. This is the foundation of the modern democratic architecture of international relations. (Medvedev 2008, 5; emphasis added.)

The Russian solution to the erosion of global governance is great power management – not just any management, but responsible management. The discussants on great power management include Medvedev, Lavrov, Putin, Alexander Orlov, Yevgeni Primakov, Sergei Lavrov, Modest Kolerov\(^{42}\), and Segei Karaganov\(^{43}\).

\(^{42}\) ECFR report from 2009 describes Kolerov: “Modest Kolerov is Chair of the Free Russia Union of Nongovernment Organizations. Originally a journalist, he was in charge of the Kremlin’s unofficial “neighbourhood policy” from 2005 to 2007, and has helped set up many Russophile NGOs in neighbouring states.” (Krastev et al. 2009).

\(^{43}\) Orlov is the Director of the Institute of International Studies, MGIMO. Primakov is former Foreign Minister (1996–1998) and Prime Minister (1998–1999), Member of
Great power management is at the heart of the Russian vision of international order: it is what saves the world from chaos. Great powers and influence belong together which makes the discourse on the special role of great powers in maintaining peace and order an important one for understanding visions of influence. Since the existence of great powers also signifies inequality, it can only with difficulty incorporate the Russian enthusiasm for equality and sovereignty. Adding the element of responsibility becomes a means to relieve great power management of the structural injustice it entails. But the Russian analysts are not particularly convincing in their accommodation of equality and great power management. First of all, insistence on sovereignty does not seem compatible with the great power order. The reason is not only that great powers limit the independence of the smaller members of the society of states, but that they also need to restrain themselves (see Watson 1997). Would Russia be willing to set limits on its own power? The answer is “yes” if one looks only at the Russian discourse on international law. Russia should abide by it like any other state, and this would limit its freedom of action. The answer is “no” if one looks at the violation of the non-intervention rule by Russia in August 2008. However, there is no discussion on how Russia should restrain itself, only of how other great powers should obey international law.

A second difficulty comes with the democracy and equality of great power management which Medvedev is calling for. In the above quotation from Medvedev, the inherent contradiction between equal and unequal is clear. “Democratic”, “equitable” and “truly representative” represent relations among the leading states, not among all states. Moreover, for Russian analysts the UN Security Council is the highest international decision-making authority, imparting a very hierarchical image to the Russian notion of equality and democracy. The Russian ideas on hierarchy can be read as if the leadership of ”the Great” is needed to provide for at least some form of democracy. Or, as Bull (2002, the Russian Academy of Sciences, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, and a member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. Kolerov is the head of the President’s Department for Inter-Regional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries.

44 See also statements made together with China on the fair and democratic world order (Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness 2001, Joint Statement 2005).
observed, if all were equal in power, it would be hard to see how international conflicts could ever be settled. Or, quoting Jackson (2000, 291), “War between the great powers is the biggest humanitarian threat of all”. However, democracy is a concept that hardly describes the representativeness of great power order. In fact, it is curious that Russians would want to use the concept of democracy in the first place, considering their dislike for the imposition of democracy on other states, including their own. As a form of government, democracy describes the great power management order poorly when the dominant states are not elected by vote. Great powers establish themselves by power, be it soft or hard, but necessarily by power, size and prestige. The underlying idea of great power order is that states are not equal in size and power, and thus not equal players in global decision-making structures. Although the domestic analogy is hardly the best to describe the anarchical system of international relations, or the global covenant, I would like to evoke an image of the biggest, strongest and richest individuals claiming the right to be the great responsibles. In addition, they could be in that position also by virtue of their glorious past or their fight against injustice (in their own opinion). One could hardly call this democracy or equality. Democracy only applies to the relations among the great powers, not to international society in general.

If we continue to ponder the question of equality, we are afforded some insights in Orlov’s (2010) explanation of the development of the decision-making structure of the UN. In his view, when the UN was being established, the United States wanted to grant more powers to the General Assembly, the plan being to use its supporters in Latin America to vote as the US ordered. “Nevertheless, in the distant year 1945, it was only thanks to the USSR’s firm position that an optimal balance of powers between the Security Council and the UN General Assembly was found. As a result, the only correct and therefore durable and long-term system of cooperation evolved between the main UN agencies, as enshrined in the UN Charter.” (Orlov 2010, 133). There are interesting arguments here: The first is that regarding the potential of the General Assembly, manipulated by the United States, to turn from a democratic body into a tool for the United States. Thus, initially, because of bloc discipline it would have been very dangerous to establish true democracy...
in the form having the General Assembly be the decision-making body of the UN. Luckily, the Soviet Union saved the day, and insisted on the power that was ultimately given to the Security Council. Here we see democracy becoming more complicated since the political fact is that, at the end of the day, states differ in size and power. In this light, for Orlov, the General Assembly turns into a power tool and signifies less democracy than a system that includes the Security Council, where great powers have votes of equal significance. This “not so equal and democratic system” is constructed, without a sign of unease, as the marvellous product of the great power order. For Orlov, the Security Council represents an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, and this was backed up during the Cold War by the “huge moral and political authority” of the leading states (ibid., 134).

Orlov (2010, 136) tries to defend the inequality within the UN by claiming that there is no alternative system in sight. Order is the primary goal and if it comes at the price of some inequality, then so be it. Orlov (2010, 136) emphasises the “responsibility role” of the great powers, if only they take this privilege seriously by following international law:

> It is another matter that permanent members of the Security Council themselves, in their actions, should give no cause for new attacks on their unique, hard-won prerogatives, secured by the generation of victors in World War II and that to date remain a precious instrument in their hands for the maintenance of peace and security. The permanent members of the Security Council that other countries look to for guidance are called upon to serve as a model of behavior on the international arena, faithfully and painstakingly following the UN Charter and other norms and principles of international law. And they definitely must exclude actions involving the use of military force or the use of other forms of coercion without approval from the UN Security Council.

I find it interesting that the Russians can incorporate inequality and equality with so little effort, because it tells us something about the Russian image of international institutions in general and spheres of influence in particular. I argue that the awkwardness which plagues the idea of sphere of influence results from two simultaneous and contradictory lines of
reasoning: On the one hand, Russian analysts insist on equality; on the other, their vision of the world ultimately draws on the inequality which was legitimised in Vienna 1815 and institutionalised in the UN Security Council. In other words, they perceive the society of states in traditional Westphalian terms but end up supporting the great power system and, without noticing it, the inequality in entails.

If we take a closer look into what great power management means for the Russian analysts, we find discourses on 1) balance of power and 2) bloc politics. Primakov (2006) argues that the Russian idea of multipolarity does not mean “coalition-type military and political alliances between different world poles” but a departure from confrontation and competition and a move towards interdependence. For Lavrov (2006), the concert of great powers and a balance of power are two opposite things:

These changes have resulted in the development of conditions for the formation of a global “orchestra” of the leading powers. This orchestra would be able to consolidate the collective principles in global politics and put an end to the practice of creating various kinds of balances of forces in the world. I am sure that collective leadership of this kind would be welcomed by an overwhelming majority of states.

The Russian writers favour a balance of power as a source of stability and prevention of hegemony. But there are two types of balance: competitive and cooperative. Little calls the two types of balance “associational” and “adversarial”. Adversarial balance means the manipulation of the distribution of power by the great powers in their own favour in an anarchical international order (Little 2007, 11–12). In associational balance, the metaphor of scales applies, but the image of balancing is closely associated with the other institutions of Bull’s international society: diplomacy, great power management and international law (but not war). It is a balance of power in international society which is closer to the solidarist end of Buzan’s spectrum.

Even if we see (cooperative) balance of power belonging to a thick international society of coexistence through shared rules, such a (competitive) balance entails power politics, conflicts, war and the pluralist order as well. Competitive balance would be the one where
spheres of influence are a method of balancing\textsuperscript{45}. When Lavrov speaks of “balance of forces” he means competitive balance – balance in a pejorative sense. Lavrov’s “concert” is also an idea of balance, but one that promotes cooperation. At the level of language, just as “responsibility” sounds better than “influence”, “orchestra” sounds better than “balance”. With the idea of concert Lavrov wants to add the element of “society” to the “system”, that is, the balance of power which appeared after 1815, the concert of great powers. The great responsibles are not meant to fight for power and position; they are meant to cooperate and rule together. The element of balance is there, however, because imbalance would mean that the great powers were not equal or, what is worse, one of them would be superior. Thus, the Russian analysts cannot do without the idea of balance even in a system of responsible great powers; and if they cannot be rid of balance, they cannot dispose of the negative images of balance and its implications for small states. A balance of power is a method of equality only for the great. Moreover, imagining a cooperative balance does not take away its conflictual aspect. When a balance of power ”vindicates”, that is, empowers, small powers to play the balancing game, great powers might enter into conflict over influence. In fact, this is what the Russians call “the Great Game”. Lippmann (1945, 82–83) warned of the dangers of the neutrality of states because it enabled balancing between the great. The Good Neighbor Policy solved the problem of balancing, for under it the small states would choose their sides and stay put. Even if, in an ideal world, states could achieve a balance of power harmoniously, ruling the world together in a great power club without disagreements and conflicts, this type of cooperative balancing is not expressed explicitly by the Russian analysts. Distinguishing working in concert, or cooperative balance, from conflictual balance, would make it possible to argue for a more acceptable form of balance of power, and the influence which possibly comes with it. Not many would read the Russian idea of a balance of power as a cooperative model; rather, they would see it as a conflictual notion imbued with a lust for influence.

The controversy does not end with the problems of equality, democracy and balance, but extends to the division between leaders and followers.

\textsuperscript{45} Hans J. Morgethau (1993, 197) argues that alliances are historically the most important manifestations of balance of power.
While the analysts promote a special role for leading states, they are disillusioned with bloc politics. Medvedev (2008, 2–3) writes:

*I am convinced that with the end of Cold War the underlying reasons for most of bloc politics and bloc discipline simply disappeared. We simply do not need to return to that paternalistic system whereby some states decide for all the others. The behavior of states in the international arena is now much more varied and independent.*

Even though Medvedev is convinced that bloc politics have come to an end, many see them as still continuing (Furman 2006, Karaganov 2010a, Dvorkin 2007, Kortunov 2010, 53). Kolerov (2006) also dislikes bloc politics to the extent that he encourages Georgia to build its sovereignty on the basis of national sentiment instead of alignment with either Russia or the United States. As lofty as the renouncement of bloc politics is, it is not in line with the idea of great power management. The roles of leaders and followers come with the idea of grouping. Naturally, some states choose to follow one leader, while others choose another. The follower-states will gravitate towards the leader which appears most appealing to them. But this is not the system Russia wants, perhaps out of recognition of the fact that its followers are not that numerous. The Russian writers are against military blocs such as NATO, but on the other hand Russia is involved in and highly praises other sorts of groupings (CIS, BRIC, SCO, CSTO46), which, they claim, are not against anyone and do not aim for world leadership.

This is bloc politics in the pejorative sense of the term. How would the Russians solve the problem of inevitable groupings within a great power order? There is as little real discussion on the topic of “equality for all vs. equality among the great” as there is on the problem of the quite inevitable grouping of states in the face of a leadership system. But reading between the lines, I would suggest that the Russian idea of bloc politics is a Cold War memory of gross violations of sovereignty, forced alliances and an ideological divide. But Russians are not against integration. In 2011 then-Prime Minister Putin suggested a “Eurasian Union” as the future

46 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Brazil Russia, India, China (BRIC); Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)
integration project for the post-Soviet space. If this is not bloc politics then what is it? If “bloc politics” is a pejorative term, hailing from the Cold War period together with “sphere of influence”, then integration could very well be the idea of a regional solidarist order. Integration represents a less forcible and more subtle way to enter the solidarist order, or at least the middle of the spectrum, such that sovereignty remains the foundation of international order. Within integration there is no need to discuss violation of sovereignty because it is voluntary. Putin (2011) writes, “A state must only join on its sovereign decision based on its long-term national interests”. Then great power management would allow for integration where there is at least formal sovereignty and where external sovereignty would remain strong (as it is in the European Union). It begins to sound like the possibility in Buzan’s spectrum: sovereignty as a social contract. Another reason for accepting integration, in addition to its being voluntary, is that it connects whereas bloc politics divide. To quote Putin (2011) again, “[w]e do not intend to cut ourselves off, nor do we plan to stand in opposition to anyone”. In Putin’s vision, integration projects would overlap somewhat, or at least cooperate intensively with one another, which would provide some solution to the problem of divisions that comes with concentration of power.

Karaganov is not quite so optimistic about the prospect of the great responsible, the reason being that the facts of international political life entail the elements of division and confrontation. In the following quote from Karaganov (2007) one can see the chaos discourse casting a shadow of doubt on the idea of great responsible:

*The very idea of establishing a community of powerful and responsible states that could lead the struggle against new threats to world order is quite reasonable. But in the new epoch of an all-against-all competition, such an idea is not only highly unlikely, but also simply harmful, as it may sow the seeds of a new ideological divide and systemic confrontation.*

Karaganov recognises the danger that a leadership system has of developing into confrontation and divisions, but does not put the blame so much on the inherent interconnectedness of styles of leadership and bloc politics as on the ”new epoch of all-against-all competition”. Curiously, one year
later, in 2008, Karaganov appears to have acquired some confidence in the community of the powerful and responsible after all when he explains the Russian proposal for a European Security system that would consist of "14 to 20 of the most powerful responsible and states capable of assuming responsibility for global governance". Karaganov (2008) now proposes joint elaboration and coordination of policies instead of attempts to establish hegemony by one or an all-against-all struggle. The discursive strategy of Russian analysts is to organise the idea of great responsibles as a dichotomy of the "Concert of the Great" versus competitive balancing or some chaotic, uncontrollable anarchy. Later, I will show how the great responsibles are also fighting a battle against the single sovereign or the world empire. For the Russians, if one really wants to make a case for this type of global covenant, there can be no discussion of a relationship of equality between the great and the less great, or the possibility of divisions into (hostile) groups.

7.3.3 Intervention in Kosovo and South Ossetia

Those conducting intervention will definitely describe it as humanitarian. Those opposed to it will call it aggression. (Valeyev 2009, 93.)

For Keal (1983, 182) and Wight (1995, 194), intervention is an instrument used in a sphere-of-influence policy. The role of the Monroe Doctrine in the history of the concept of sphere of influence also testifies to the intimate relationship between spheres of influence and intervention. Indeed, Vincent discussed the Monroe Doctrine as a doctrine of non-intervention which turned into an interventionist policy. The Russian discourse on intervention revolves around two topics: Kosovo and South Ossetia. Criticising the intervention in Kosovo is a means to criticise the United States and NATO for disrespecting international law. Defending the Russian intervention in the territory of Georgia is necessary not only because of the Kosovo case, but also because of the accusations against Russia regarding the illegitimacy of its intervention in Georgia and its sphere-of-influence motives. Professor Alexander Buzgalin and researcher
Andrei Kolganov (2008) write about the reaction of the international mass media and world community to Russia’s intervention: ”The recent outbreak of violence in the Caucasus has given rise to a version of these developments in which a huge and aggressive authoritarian Russia, loaded with nuclear bombs and missiles, attacked a small, defenceless and democratic Georgia.” Russia faced harsh criticism of and very little understanding for its intervention. The discussions on Kosovo and South Ossetia probably prompted the most discussion and sparked the most contributions. Here I will bring up only the most relevant arguments related to sphere of influence; curiously, the opinions of the academic elite are well represented here. In addition to Buzgalin and Kolganov, Professor Yevgeni Lyakhov, Associate Professor Aleksei Moiseev, Professor Vladimir Kotlyar and Professor Stanislav Chernichenko offer their views on intervention.

Russian analysts imagine international law as something perfected by great power management. They do not recognise Bull’s (2002, 132) claim that conformity to international law is not separate from its violation. This is why they cannot relax even for a moment in their concern for formal justice: equal application of rules. If they did, it would be possible to justify not only intervention in some cases, but also the inequality which comes with influence, spheres of influence. Upholding the non-intervention principle means recognising the existence and legitimacy of others’ sovereignty (Vincent 1974, 30–31). This is what the Russians maintain adamantly, and this is why they cannot justify their intervention, even as ‘humanitarian’.

For Russia, defending the intervention in South Ossetia is a matter of explicating the complex relationship between the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Given their aversion for invoking humanitarian reasons for an intervention, the analysts find it difficult to defend the incident in South Ossetia. Moreover justifications put forward in case of South Ossetia are intertwined with statements condemning the intervention in and independence of Kosovo. The problem with intervention is that it has pejorative overtones for the Russians. Kosovo in particular signifies a reprehensible sphere-of-influence logic for the Russian experts. Lyakhov (2010, 195) writes, “Today, the recognition or non-recognition of a state is to a very considerable degree linked to the
division of the world into blocs, and has become a method of involving it into a bloc’s sphere of influence, and this applies both to Kosovo and other unrecognized states”. The case of Kosovo represents a violation of international law, sovereignty, the non-intervention principle, and territorial integrity; and it represents brutal use of force. Intervention in Kosovo was a violation of the pluralist international order that Russia wants to defend (see Moiseev 2008, 139). Moiseev (2008, 140) writes, “In the logic of Kosovo’s partners, in the context of international law, force leads to the abandonment of the principle of legal equality of big and small States and the establishment of an order where some are recognized to have more rights than others, which, therefore, results in the breach of the principle of sovereign equality of States”. For Russians, the intervention in Kosovo is an example of the inequality of the great and the small, yet they have endorsed this very same inequality in the form of great power management and undermining sovereignty by their own intervention in the territory of Georgia.

In the case of Kosovo, Russia chose to defend international law through non-action: not interfering in Kosovo and not recognising Kosovo’s declaration of independence. But then Russia conducted its own military intervention in South Ossetia in August 2008 and with it a dilemma of justification emerged. The universality of international law means the universality of the non-intervention principle and sovereignty. Russians, who so much opposed the armed intervention in Yugoslavia, had to explain how the intervention in South Ossetia was justified. They had to struggle with the dilemma of upholding the principle of non-intervention and finding legal grounds for their country’s own intervention. They had to refute any claims that they were motivated by considerations of power politics, that is, ambitions related to the establishment of a sphere of influence.

Then how do the Russian analysts justify the intervention? First of all, they do not argue that its purpose was to ensure a balance of power, because that would mean a balance in the pejorative sense – a competitive balance – and Russians only believe in a cooperative balance. “Balance of power” is most often understood as referring to the competitive form, making it a negative term in Russians’ eyes, not one that can easily be used to justify a foreign policy. Since maintaining a balance of power in
the region was not a justification, Russians found ways to defend their intervention based on international law. The usual argument is that it was self-defence in keeping with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows members of the United Nations to resort to self-defence in the case of an armed attack against them. Georgia’s attack on Russian peacekeepers was interpreted as such an armed attack against Russia. Another tempting argument is to embrace putative humanitarian reasons. Indeed, the intervention in South Ossetia forced the Russians to discuss the meaning of the term “humanitarian intervention” and the possibilities to use it as an argument of justification (see, for example Roundtable discussion 2009). Humanitarian intervention does not really qualify as a justification for the Russian analysts, because there is too much suspicion regarding the term. Humanitarian intervention is problematic not only because of its complicated relationship to international law but also because it is seen as an excuse for furthering geopolitical goals. For Professor Vladimir Kotlyar, Yugoslavia is one such example, and he ultimately argues that the Russian military acted on the basis of the right to self-defence in South Ossetia and did not conduct a humanitarian intervention (Kotlyar 2009, 87). Professor Stanislav Chernichenko (2009, 85) takes the view that Russians should not speak about humanitarian intervention at all not be used at all, because it “is an attempt to lend a certain measure of legitimacy to a term that has a purely negative connotation”. Instead, Kotlyar (2009, 87) sees “humanitarian intervention” not as a term with a negative connotation, but as one which attempts to “lend support on the emotional level to unlawful intervention”. In addition to the term “humanitarian intervention” being associated with the alleged geopolitical motives of Western interventions, the problem for Russia is that accepting humanitarian intervention in principle means accepting the interventions of all other states. And that would not do for the Russians who insist on compliance with the principles of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty.

Most of the discussants defend Russia’s intervention in South-Ossetia, but there is one exception. Buzgalin and Kolganov (2008) criticise Russia, although they blame the United States for initiating the war. In their view, Russia is not wholly innocent and they suggest that by protecting the South Ossetians Russia could “finally satisfy some people’s nostalgia
for the Soviet Union”. Buzgalin and Kolganov continue: “The Russian authorities, who had long wanted to portray themselves as at least having some kind of empire and who had planned to do that precisely in the Caucasus region, could not but take advantage of the situation.” Buzgalin and Kolganov defend the rights of nations to enter into alliances voluntarily without pressure, and strongly condemn imperial ambitions by any state. The Russian people have accepted the imperial geopolitics of their state in the past and in the present, leading to a situation where the world does not believe in Russia’s good will. (Buzgalin & Kolganov 2008.) The credibility of Russia as a responsible great power suffered a blow with the intervention, as Buzgalin and Kolganov (2008) write:

To begin with, the inconsistency of the Russian authorities – who sometimes oppose the sovereignty of “small peoples” and sometimes advocate it, depending on tactical considerations – has backfired, and very painfully, on themselves and, indirectly, on all Russians. This happened at the precise time that the Russian authorities did something really useful; that is, when they defended thousands of people in South Ossetia. The world does not believe the Russian government, and this is bad. But still worse, it does not believe Russian citizens, many of whom personally helped the South Ossetians and some of them even gave their lives for that cause.

Even though it is “unique”, this statement is significant in opposing the dominant discourse and in exposing Russia’s own double standards and inconsistency in defending the rights of the small.

Even if we believe the majority of Russian writers, and find justification for the intervention in Georgian territory, we would still be left with the fact that intervention is always a violation of the sovereign rights of the state intervened in. If intervention were considered legitimate by all the parties involved, it would no longer be intervention. Any form of intervention, humanitarian or other, involves the broader question of the value of international order and the right to sovereignty. This is the core problem of the anarchical international order: the goal of maintaining that order as a system of states is uneasy with the goal of protection of human rights and humanitarian intervention. For Buzan (2004a, 48–49) this uneasiness can be resolved by agreeing on sovereignty as a
social contract instead of an essential condition, thus tolerating a level of solidarism within the system of states; but the Russian approach to international society is less flexible. Bull’s (2002) solution would be to say that some level of violation is needed for upholding international law, and in such a situation even a balance of power is a justified reason for intervention. But this is not a possibility for the Russians either, because it would mean an open statement about the injustice of international society and again allow the United States to continue its interventionist policies.

Intervention is also intertwined with great power management, and this is something Russians fail to notice. Bull (1984a, 184) states that great inequalities of power make interventions possible. Intervention is embedded not only in the notion of sphere of influence but in great power management as well. Russia proved this in August 2008 by taking unilateral military action against another state. Intervention then becomes a privilege or even a responsibility of the great powers, and small states’ rights are violated. Since intervention has pejorative associations for Russians, they should address how their idea of great power management solves the problem of rebel-states or violations of human rights, both of which might require intervention. Even an intervention sanctioned by the Security Council is an intervention. If the Russians connected great power management with spheres of influence, they could argue that spheres of influence provide for stability of possessions and thus reduce the need for interventions. But as I will later show, Russians do not take this step towards endorsing spheres of influence.

7.3.4 The European Security Treaty

I have now discussed Russian ideas on great power management, the balance of power, and the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention. Before introducing the discourses on influence, I want to examine the proposal for a European Security Treaty put forward by President Medvedev in June 2008. The historical point of reference for the proposal is the Helsinki Conferences of 1975. The Security Treaty and the Helsinki Final Act both articulate a conception of international order which does not tolerate spheres of influence. The Helsinki Act is evoked
because for the Russian analysts it attests to Russia’s role as a great power that participated in the creation of the international order. This the order which the analysts so admire and which they see as nearly demolished by the Western states. The Treaty represents a reintroduction of the Helsinki principles and is an affirmation of undivided security instead of spheres of influence. The main discussants on the Security Treaty are Medvedev, Lavrov, Sergei Kortunov, Igor Panarin and Andrei Zagorsky.

The Helsinki Final Act is a document in which sovereignty and non-intervention are affirmed as the organising principles of the society of states. According to Ambassador Mikhail Maiorov (2008, 102), it represents international law which has been undermined by the Western countries ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated. In Kortunov’s (2010, 54) view, NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 and the United States’ involvement in the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan destroyed the world order based on international law; and the use of force came to prevail over reason and humanism (see also Alekseev 2008, 134). In addition to the importance attached to the Helsinki Act, the Russians consider the agreement of the Yalta Conference (1945) as an affirmation of post-war international institutions and moreover as a reminder of the country’s great power status. Like the Helsinki Act, the Yalta Agreement was to serve as the model for a new nomos in Europe, one not founded upon use of force. Panarin (2010, 218–219) describes the connection as follows:

_Yalta and its spirit need to be rebooted within the framework of the Treaty on European Security. The balance of powers should be enforced and, as our president correctly proposes, the obligations of the European countries and the U.S. on non-application of force must be legally enforced. This is precisely why the Yalta Conference and the spirit of its agreements can be instrumental in creating a new system of European security._

According to Kortunov (2010, 54), the principles of the proposed treaty are “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its members,

47 Kortunov is the head of World Politics Chair at the Department of World Economy and World Politics, State University-Higher School of Economics. Panarin is a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Zagorsky is a leading research associate at the Institute of International Studies, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations (henceforth MGIMO).
non-interference in the domestic affairs and, as a matter of course, the principle of undivided security which means that none would be allowed to ensure its security at the expense of others”. The Security Treaty represents the international law of a new nomos – but it is not new at all. The Treaty is founded upon the idea of the sanctity of the post-war system of states. Any new international order would rely on the traditional institutions of international society but without the elements of confrontation, militarisation and nationalism. In essence, the Treaty would be an affirmation of the Helsinki Act. It would re-establish order based on international law, restrict the use of force and end the division of Europe. The use of force is the core question for the Russian analysts because it ultimately involves setting limits on interventions.

The Russian writers are on the defensive when it comes to explaining the Security Treaty, because the proposal was greeted with suspicion abroad. Lavrov (2010a) writes that the Treaty is not meant to destroy NATO or weaken the European Union, unlike some claim. After the Cold War, to Russia’s disappointment, European security remained divided and the OSCE did not take on the challenge of creating a common European security architecture. Lavrov (2010a) states, “This opportunity was missed, however, as the choice was made in favor of the policy of NATO enlargement, which in practice meant not only the preservation of the lines dividing Europe into zones with different levels of security, but also the movement of these lines to the East“. The Russian view is that security is defined and force used, not according to any agreed rules, but in a contradictory manner. For Lavrov (2010a) this is expressed in taking opposite approaches to the intervention in Kosovo and South Ossetia. But then Lavrov (2010a) really goes to the core of the matter when he writes:

*The European Security Treaty initiative is aimed at building a truly open and democratic system of region-wide collective security and cooperation, which would ensure the unity of the Euro-Atlantic area – from Vancouver to Vladivostok – and would help overcome the inertia of bloc approaches. It is strange to hear people say that our initiative is an attempt to return to the 19th-century policies of “spheres of influence.” On the contrary, the Treaty offers a real opportunity to rebuild Euro-Atlantic politics on a collective basis and will help redeem*
the time lost after the end of the Cold War. It provides a universal answer to all imaginable and unimaginable security deficiencies in the region. So far, no one has undertaken to convince us that this is not so.

For Lavrov the focus of the Treaty is not spheres of influence. On the contrary, its purpose is to finally end the old divisions. Lavrov is trying to eliminate the image of a pejorative sphere-of-influence policy from being associated with the Security Treaty.

Even though the Treaty establishes regional democracy, that is, it incorporates Russia as a full-fledged partner, it has universal meaning for Lavrov. The old international institutions are universal; they are the best model of international society. Perhaps Lavrov is thinking that establishing great power order by re-affirming the weakened principles of international law in Europe would translate into a universal model. Medvedev (2008, 4) writes that the legacy of the essential principles of interstate relations, embodied in the Helsinki Accord and treaties between the Soviet Union and NATO, should be examined. According to Medvedev, “If these principles retain their universal importance, we have to honestly examine why they have ceased to be universally applied” (ibid.). The Russian idea of universal is very Euro-centric, which comes from the importance attached to the role of Europe in creating the rules and institutions of international society – that is the Helsinki and Yalta Conferences. While constantly emphasising the rising importance of such states as Brazil, India, and China, Russian writers completely ignore their role in great power management. I wonder if the purpose of the Security Treaty is to create regional international law or if the Russian analysts wish that “universal” (international law) could still be defined by the Euro-Atlantic great powers.

If Lavrov denies that the Security Treaty is designed to create a great power order based on spheres of influence, Zagorsky (2009,111) asks:

*Do we want to create “zones of responsibility” in the Russia-U.S.-EU “triangle”? Do we want to create a mechanism that would make it possible, on the one hand, to avoid the worsening of relations in the “triangle” in the event of conflict situations arising in a particular “zone of responsibility,” and on the other, to harmonize our positions on*
those issues that do not fall into any particular “zone of responsibility”? Do we mean something like a “new Yalta”?

The Security Treaty has the same fundamental problem as the vision of the great responsibles: implementing great power management, with its inevitable forming of groups or coalitions. Because of this, it is quite understandable that outside Russia the Treaty raises suspicions of a sphere-of-influence mentality. Again, we witness the Russians’ confusion about their preferred international order. The noble idea is a great power concert but one which is not based on dividing lines. But if the international system is hierarchical, based on several different centres of power – the Russian view, where does this leave the lesser powers? If we look at the world today, alignments of some sort are evident. Since its independence, Finland has been struggling to balance between East and West, wanting to join the European family and keeping its distance from Russia. The same applies to many post-Soviet states, which have aspired to membership in not only the European Union but also NATO. Thus, states tend to lean towards centres of power and cooperate more with some than others, sometimes more institutionally and at other times on an ad-hoc basis. No treaty made by the great powers will force other states to change their loyalties, which are often influenced by national identity and historical experiences. The idea of sphere of responsibility to which Zagorsky refers attempts to solve the dilemma posed by the pejorative associations of the notion of sphere of influence. It is an idea different from sphere of influence; it is something more benevolent, but at the same time it is dangerously close to the idea of sphere of influence. Proposing spheres of responsibility would be too close to accepting, in principle, the fact that sovereignty is not the same for all. This is why Zagorski enquires but does not answer.

The Security Treaty is backed up by a declaration of the importance of Russia as an independent centre of power (Kortunov 2010, 55; Lavrov 2008). In this respect, the new treaty brings to mind an old security architecture, one which was developed in 1815. There is no security treaty, no security architecture, without the system of great powers, without a hierarchical international order. Thus, what the Treaty expresses in terms of spheres of influence is the sanctity of old international institutions,
especially the idea of great power management. Sovereignty and non-intervention are among the lofty principles of the society of states, but they fall by the wayside under a great power order. The attempt to establish a common security space in Europe is admirable as such, but the discourse on equality, democracy, and fairness does not fully fit in with the Russian idea of international order. There is such a fine line between the idea of spheres of influence and spheres of responsibility that unless the distinctions between the two types of spheres are fully discussed, it is impossible to expect anyone to understand what kind of great power order the Russians seek.

7.4 Just and Unjust Influence

Thus far the Russian discourses on order and law have been presented as expressing the dilemma of upholding sovereignty and great power management simultaneously. “Balance of power” has a pejorative ring for the Russian analysts when it suggests the conflictual side of balancing, but as a cooperative model it is something to strive for. The Russians experts have a distaste for bloc politics but integration is valued. They do not discuss how to avoid blocs when dividing lines emerge in a great power order. The authors feel the need to defend Russian intervention, because it conflicts with their unwavering support for the non-intervention principle and because they seek to distance themselves to a certain extent from sphere-of-influence policies. Finally, the drafting of the European Security Treaty indicates that Russians value Westphalian institutions above all, and these institutions do not incorporate spheres of influence. In the sections to follow, we get even closer to the Russian vision of international order, which consists of 1) sphere of influence as a pejorative concept; 2) support for ”responsible influence” and regional integration; and 3) the universalist threat of the United States, which conditions all other discourses. First, Russia’s past policies of influence are purified of their pejorative associations. Next, the present Russian influence is depoliticised and portrayed as normal. And because the element of territorial influence of a great power never left the Russian imagination, a Großraum emerges, albeit a hidden and secret one. I use
the pluralist-solidarist divide to situate the Russian vision of influence between the two extremes. A sphere-of-influence policy is shown to signify United States interventionism and the export of democracy, whereas Russia’s influence is deemed to be only natural.

7.4.1 Falsification of History and the Small Powers

*Historical politics is highly pragmatic, one may even say cynical. It exploits the ambiguous pages of history to deal with the burning issues of domestic and foreign policies.* (Dyukov 2010, 165.)

The need to justify Russia’s influence extends quite far back into history. Of course, Russians do not want to be associated with the oppressing state which was playing sphere-of-influence games at the expense of others; rather, people should remember how Russia saved Europe from the Nazis and defeated Napoleon. Other states should remember that Russia is one of those states which established international order after both Napoleon and Hitler fell (see Fomenko 2010, 146.) Russian analysts defend the Yalta Conference, because for many it represents the upholding of traditional institutions of international society and Russia’s role as a great power deciding on those institutions. Mikhail Narinsky (2010, 211), who is the Head of the Chair of MGIMO, argues that contrary to the popular view in the Western world, the focus in Yalta was not on the victors dividing Europe into spheres of influence: “If all the documents of the Yalta Conference are carefully read and the discussions held in Yalta analyzed, it becomes obvious that nothing was said there about dividing Europe up into spheres of influence. The Declaration on Liberated Europe in fact declared noble, democratic principles that would allow the people to create democratic institutions of their own choice, hold free and unfettered elections, and so on. “ This is an attempt to cleanse Russian history of the negative image associated with spheres of influence. Contrary to Narinsky’s view, Professor Aleksandr Dugin, well known for his strong geopolitical views, argues that Yalta established zones of influence, but even so he admires Yalta for bringing about a functioning international order (Dugin 2010, 212–215).
But even more than it alludes to admiration of Yalta, the term "historical politics" refers to the role of small powers as interpreters of history to Russia's detriment and as playing power-games in the present. In 2010, *International Affairs* featured several articles on the Second World War and historical politics, and if intervention caused academic discussants to participate, historical politics attracted more governmental representation (such as Ambassadors Maiorov and Stegni). According to Russian authors, their state has become a victim of "falsification of history", whose purpose is to portray Russia as an inherently aggressive and expansionist power, as part of the identity project of some newly independent states (Stegni 2008, 2). This matter became so serious that in May 2009 Medvedev issued a decree establishing the "Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests" (Dyukov 2010, 173). From the Russian perspective, the falsification of history is anti-Russian propaganda and aimed at dividing Russia from Europe and damaging the country's international image (Yakovenko 2010, 225; Maiorov 2008, 102–103). What is more, Maiorov (2008, 97) explains, the falsification of history is meant to discredit the post-war order and blame Russia for all the tragedies of the past century.

Historical memories are important. In this case the historical memory is one involving sphere-of-influence politics; something Russia does not want to be associated with. The analysts do not want Russia to be remembered for its totalitarian past but rather for its fight against totalitarianism and expansionism in Europe. This positive image will wither away if a reading of history prevails where Russia is accused of playing imperialist or sphere-of-influence games during the period when it supposedly defended freedom in Europe. Discourses on historical politics represent a Russian outcry against drawing parallels between the Soviet policy of establishing a sphere of influence and Russia today. There is an attempt to purify the image of Russia's history where spheres of influence and the pejorative interpretations of the concept are concerned. The reason why discourses on spheres of influence in a pejorative sense are important to Russian analysts is that there is a concern that historical images of the "evil Soviet oppressor" are being used in the present to
isolate Russia from Europe by portraying it as a country which only wishes to extend its influence over others.

Russian analysts implicitly warn of the power of the small to disturb the stability and balance of forces maintained by the great powers. Karaganov (2010a) writes, “The tiny neighboring states like Georgia or the Baltic countries would be pointing to “huge Russian supremacy” over them and demanding counter-measures. As a result, the already observed trend of European politics towards re-militarization will receive a powerful boost.” Karaganov is arguing that the disproportionate power of the small is causing re-militarisation in Europe. Militarisation here means NATO enlargement, the (already abandoned) plan of building a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, failure of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFET), from which Russia withdrew, and United States military campaigns, to mention a few. In the same vein, Eduard Solovyev (2010) from the Russian Academy of Sciences expresses how the post-Soviet states are using geopolitical competition to their own advantage. These states balance between their nation-building project, which is based on a clear friend (US) - enemy (Russia) demarcation, their fear of “balkanization” by the United States, and a neighbour (Russia) which does not care so much about their democracy (or lack thereof) while it can offer them military assistance (Solovyev 2010, 99–100). Thus, from the Russian perspective, the post-Soviet states are not only victims, and they have interests in cooperating with both “influencing powers”.

The potential of the small states to disturb the relations among the great is the reason why a hierarchy of power is needed. Or this would be the argument if it were voiced explicitly. Russia wants the Westphalian order, where great powers have a status preventing the reckless behaviour of small states. The falsification of history is one means for the small states to play the great against each other by containing Russia, excluding it from Europe, and invoking fear of it. I have argued that the class of small powers is important for theorising sphere of influence, because it is only by addressing small powers that we can see their role in the game of spheres of influence. The Russian fear of the falsification of history testifies to this.
The reason why I want to bring Russian historical politics to light is to demonstrate the power of historical interpretation. As much as the Russians wish the Cold War was a thing of the past, they cannot help finding the world dragging the legacy of old spheres of influence with it. Dmitry Furman (2006) asserts, “The Russia-West struggle in the CIS is a struggle between two irreconcilable systems, as was the struggle between the worlds of Capitalism and Communism”. For Karaganov (2010a), the Cold War is still on, Europe is still split, and this legacy almost caused a replay of the Cold War in autumn 2008. Russians fear the re-emergence of Cold War bloc politics, especially “containment”, and feel that some states are trying to slander Russia by malicious accusations and history politics. Russia has not yet found its way to the West: it has remained outside European integration and NATO, and its cooperation with the United States has not been very productive. In this light, to think that spheres of influence do not matter anymore, or that the Cold War is a thing of the past, is to close one’s eyes to the fact that history has no end. We carry history with us. Some histories we want to remember and some we would prefer to forget. In the case of Russia, the history of spheres of influence is the present of spheres of influence. Both Russian and Western analysts hold on to images of spheres of influence in the Cold War context, importing the meaning of the concept and shaming one another with it while viewing their own states as being free of the past.

7.4.2 It Is Only Natural

Every country has a natural desire to see friendly regimes in neighboring countries (Lukin 2008).

Meddling in the internal affairs of another state, for example, by trying to influence elections, would be interpreted as a sphere-of-influence policy in the present – at least if it were Russia perpetrating such an act. Even Russians are suspicious of such interference, whatever the motives. Furman offers a new perspective on the matter that even Paul Keal missed.

48 Furman is leading researcher at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Although Furman does not mention the concept of sphere of influence, he still writes about influencing the nature of regimes in neighbouring states. For Furman (2006) this is a matter of survival, because all states want to be surrounded by regimes which are similar to their own. For Russia, being surrounded by managed democracies protects the managed democracy of Russia itself. Furman is not shy about admitting that Russia was “gathering the lands together” after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He laments the fact that because there can be no open goal of promoting managed democracy, there can be no well-thought-out strategy for promoting that goal either. (Ibid.). I will come back to this lack of an open “sphere-of-influence strategy” later.

There is an important lesson in Furman’s thinking: the interest in influencing regimes is not a Russian sin. The reason why we view it as a sin is that we think Russia is imposing the wrong type of regime. It is easy to judge the influence of a country which is not built on pure Western democracy and respect for human rights. The influence of a country which is not the same but the other simply cannot be supported. The West, instead, promotes democracy, which we view as the best model of government. As the West represents that which is good and pure, its influence is not only accepted but preferred. But what Furman points out is that, in the end, we are still talking about influence which serves our national interests and stability, from our perspective. The question then is who gets to judge what influence is right and what is wrong. In this sense, influence is not anything peculiar or extraordinary; it is part of international politics for better or for worse. But a sphere of influence is peculiar, because of its unspoken negative function.

Russian discussions on influence take up its pejorative aspects as much as the Western ones do. The Russian writers face the same dilemma of distinguishing good and bad influence as analysts in the West. Russian influence needs to be justified as acceptable, pragmatic and beneficial, while the influence of the United States, and sometimes Europe, is just the opposite. It is not difficult to detect a general Russian discourse which attempts to justify Russian influence, but what is lacking in that discourse is discussion of how the country’s influence relates to the idea of a sphere of influence. Despite the large variety of Russian analysts, a single discourse can be detected and those who criticise Russia’s influence or refer to it as
a sphere-of-influence policy are few\textsuperscript{49}. The Russian analysts who express ideas on Russia’s influence are many, and here I have collected thoughts from Lavrov, Karaganov, Solovyev and Putin, among others\textsuperscript{50}.

Reading from the Russian discourses, sphere of influence as a concept is used in a pejorative sense, whereas influence (without the sphere) is free from disapproval (see Roundtable discussion 2010, 107–108). Influence, unless it is defined specifically as military or ideological, is something abstract. It has the potential to be neutral or even good, whereas “sphere” implies a bad, or at least suspicious form of influence. Thus one finds “influence” used much more often than “sphere of influence”, especially when it comes to describing Russia’s influence. For example, Viktor Kremeniuk (2008, 47), Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences, writes about “Russia’s influence” while the United States has a “sphere of influence”. Solovyev is concerned about the lack of soft power as a means of influence. For Solovyev (2010), soft power constitutes acceptable influence, and he openly promotes Russian influence in the post-Soviet space via soft means, which include economic cooperation, promoting Russian language and culture, and diplomacy geared to “winning the struggle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the once brotherly nations”. Using soft power means that Russia’s influence will not be interpreted as some form of “imperial revenge”. (Solovyev 2010.)

Lavrov (2009, 14) writes that there can be no return to the former “spheres of influence” and continues:

\begin{quote}
Yet this does not give anyone the right to deny, let alone undermine, the natural mutual gravitation of nations toward each other generated by historical and other objective factors and based on mutual interests.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{49} Lukyanov and Bordachev (2008) use the term “zone of influence” with reference to Russia and “zone of responsibility” for NATO although NATO’s influence-policy is strongly criticised. For Professor Lev Klepatsky (2008, 140–141) both Russia and the EU have a sphere of influence. Yevgeni Satanovsky (2008, 6) also makes reference to Russia’s sphere of influence. These are not discussed or explained, but rather just “thrown in” as within contemporary Western literature.

\textsuperscript{50} Others include Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the State Duma International Affairs Committee; Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov; assistant professor Andrei Suzdaltsev from the State University-Higher School of Economics; Sergey Chernychev, who is an associate professor at the International Trade Department of the Russian Academy of Foreign Trade; and the Director of the Department for Economic Cooperation with the CIS at the Russian Ministry for Economic Development.
Speaking of our closest neighbors, Russia wants them to be friendly, stable, and dynamically developing states. This approach is consistent with the plans of these states and cannot contradict anyone’s interests.

Thus, even though the Cold War spheres of influence are not celebrated, the gravitation of nations towards others and an interest in a peaceful neighbourhood is only natural and should not offend anyone’s interests. There is an assumption within IR that great power and influence go hand in hand. This is also the conclusion the English School came to. Discourses on great powers are inseparable from discourses on influence for this very reason. Where one finds a great power, one finds influence. If this connection appears evident, it is altogether a different matter to say that great powers necessarily have or aspire to establish “spheres of influence”. The reason for this is that adding “sphere” is a statement in its own right: influence loses its innocence and becomes enveloped in pejorative associations. What then is the difference between exerting influence and establishing a sphere of influence? A sphere of influence in its present use implies territorial control which can even lead to annexation. “Sphere” is the geopolitical element of influence; and this is the legacy that geostrategy and geopolitics have left us with. I believe that use of the term “influence” without “sphere” is an attempt to eliminate the geopolitical elements from international influence. Separation of influence from sphere of influence also implies an attempt to cleanse “influence” of its pejorative associations. It is part of “neutralising speech” in which influence is natural, normal and nothing to cause alarmism (see below). Influence is a normal part of international relations, but spheres of influence involve geostrategy, a great game or an ideological struggle.

Just as a distinction emerges between influence with or without a sphere, one appears between influence and interests. Russian writers favour the word “interest”, and it works to neutralise the meaning of influence just like leaving “sphere” out of “sphere of influence” does. Interests are also defended against bloc politics or the universalist threat (Lavrov 2007a). Several variations can be found: Russia’s strategic/privileged/special/vital and legitimate interests (see Bordachev 2008; Minaev 2010; Markenodov 2007; Markenodov 2008; Nikolaev 2009,
Karaganov (2010b) posits an opposition between Russia’s security interests and the United States’ influence or domination:

*The real irritant of Russian-U.S. relations is America’s unwillingness to acknowledge Russia’s right to a zone of its own security interests. It nearly resulted in direct confrontation in August 2008, when Georgia attacked South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers, and Moscow gave a tough response, aiming at the logic of NATO’s endless expansion. This occurred amidst the constant expansion of the U.S. zone of not so much security interests as of influence – if not domination – in the military-political field, the most sensitive to Russia.*

Kosachev (2007) argues that Russia has no sphere of influence: No one is now compelled to join new structures and the economic dependence card is not played in order to consolidate what might be construed as a sphere of influence. Russia has not even insisted that the rights of its Russian-speaking minorities in post-Soviet states be ensured – a subject where the West’s democratic concern always stops (ibid). Abdulatipov (2008, 157) continues depoliticising Russia’s influence by arguing that Russia is not playing any games in Central Asia or seeking a monopoly in the region. He writes that Russia “works taking into account its own interests and the interests of its strategic partners” (ibid.). He concludes, saying “I should also stress that, despite some opinions, we do not treat our partners in Central Asia as ‘younger brothers’” (ibid.). Thus, instead of influence Russia has interests, and instead of “younger brothers” it has strategic partners. The Russian analysts do not deny that Russia has interests in the post-Soviet space, but they perceive a need to explain the motives for pursuing those interests and make explicit the soft power means of their influence. In Putin’s (2006, 4) words the aim is to develop a “common humanitarian space”. Putin (ibid.) explains the purity of Russia’s motives: “Our responses are therefore based on the genuine aspirations of the peoples living in the CIS, and these aspirations are for cooperation and good-neighborly relations on an equal basis and for integration that brings greater practical benefits and impact”. Underlying the “normality discourse” is the need to justify Russian foreign policy. Lavrov (2008) insists on the normality of Russian’s foreign policy and wishes that this could be understood abroad:
Unfortunately, the Cold War experience has distorted the consciousness of several generations of people, above all political elites, making them think that any global policy must be ideologized. And now, when Russia is guided in international affairs by understandable, pragmatic interests, void of any ideological motives whatsoever, not everyone is able to adequately take it. Some people say we have some “grievances,” “hidden agendas,” “neo-imperial aspirations” and all that stuff.

The argument is geared not so much to proving that Russia’s influence is good, but that it is normal. Whenever the analysts explain Russia’s relations to the post-Soviet states in response to what is a hail of accusations from the West, they defend Russia’s policy as something logical, rightful and a normal way to handle inter-state relations. One such “normal” type of influence is leadership. For Suzdaltsev (2010), leadership is mandatory in any integration process and in the post-Soviet space Russia is the only state which can shoulder this responsibility. Chernyshev (2010) continues on the same theme, insisting that instead of imperial ambitions Russia wants leadership, and the members of the CIS are beginning to see that. The post-Soviet space is logically a foreign policy priority for Russia, since the economies are closely interlinked and problems are common to the region (ibid). According to Lavrov (2007a), Russia is building non-politicised relations in the CIS space with the aim of stabilising the region. For Lavrov, non-political in this context means that Russia is not playing any power games in its economic relations with its neighbours.

All this begins to sound like the Good Neighbor Policy, but with the exception that there is no talk of wider geopolitical significance, not to mention explicit statements that some forms of spheres of responsibility are preferred. For Lippmann, the Good Neighbor Policy was a matter of international order and bringing peace on earth. It was a model of organising the system of states into regional units. But this idea has already made its debut, especially in Europe; Russians do not have to ”invent it”. Instead, they are on the defensive, trying to argue how they are in fact pursuing a Good Neighbor Policy of their own. The Russian analysts try to dissociate the country’s foreign policy from negative influence, and the notion of interest serves this purpose. In fact, by denouncing the United States’ foreign policy and, albeit less often, the EU’s as well
while portraying Russia as the only defender of international law, Russia emerges as the only power with pragmatic and depoliticised motives. This is not a sphere-of-influence policy any more than the Good Neighbor Policy was for Lippmann. At this point it is useful to remember the concern that arose in the case of the Good Neighbor Policy: Is replacing one word with another an indication of a change of policy, or merely a way to justify a long-standing tendency? Is the emphasis on interest, pragmatism and normality mere rhetoric?

What we can learn from reading Russian discourses on the country’s influence and relations with its neighbour states is that deep down the idea of sphere of influence is alive and well. One cannot escape the logic by sidestepping the term and concept. The notion of sphere of influence comes to the fore, for example, in the dispute over the motives of Russia’s new pricing policy for gas for some post-Soviet states (mainly Ukraine and Belarus). While the Western world accuses Russia of “sphere-of-influence politics” the Russians say they are promoting equality, sovereignty, fairness and normal relations – everything but consolidating a sphere of influence (see Arbatov 2007, Karaganov 2006, Lavrov 2007a, 2007b; Medvedev 2008; Putin 2006, 2007b). The Russian perspective is that those who accuse Russia of geopolitical games are themselves guilty of upsetting the stability of the region with their grand strategies (see Medvedev 2008, Putin 2006). It is not difficult to notice that although Russian writers do not invoke the concept of sphere of influence in this context, we can recognise the discursive game of accusations. The idea of sphere of influence has considerable power in pointing out the (geo) political (that is, selfish and unjust) motives behind the Other’s actions.

Balance of power is a topic avoided when justifying Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space. Because balance of power is an idea of concert for the Russian analysts, it cannot be evoked to justify a policy of influence; otherwise it would become to signify competition. The Russian analysts cannot argue that Russia wants to be involved in the post-Soviet space in order to achieve a balance of power with the United States, because this indicates the competitive balance which has a negative connotation and it comes too close to the idea of establishing spheres of influence. The geopolitical aspect of influence has been eliminated from the discourses: there is no geostrategy to follow or a “Great Game” taking place on Russia’s
part. Influence has not been eliminated, however, and the argument that Russia’s foreign policy constitutes “normal relations” justifies the right to pursue one’s interests. Balance of power will come to shine as salvation against the universalist threat but, just like for Lippmann, that balance has no value when it comes to justifying influence beyond state borders.

It is not peculiar for Russia to want unity with the post-Soviet states in the hope of achieving integration, economic cooperation and protection for Russian minorities. This is what any country would wish for territories that once belonged to it. When I say that the authors do not promote “spheres of influence”, this is not to say that Russia wants to relinquish its influence in the region. If the post-Soviet space were insignificant to Russia, the writers would not steadfastly resist NATO enlargement or United States’ influence. The concept of sphere of influence indicates hard power and the Great Game, a relic from the Cold War which for the Russians better describes the democratisation and world police actions of the United States.

7.4.3 Influence of the Single Sovereign

*Unipolarity, quite simply, is an encroachment on God’s prerogatives (Lavrov 2007b).*

If the Russian writers have not read Schmitt, they are definitely embracing his spirit. Schmitt (2003, 296) wrote, “[T]he Western Hemisphere had found itself facing an enormous alternative between a plurality of *Großräumen* and a global claim to world power, pluralism and monism, polypoly and monopoly”. Vladimir Pechatnov (2006), from MGIMO, writes, “Today, when the United States is going through a new period of ‘imperial temptation’ – this time as the ‘only superpower’ – it is faced with the same dilemma: find a modus vivendi with other emerging power houses, sharing with them its rights and responsibilities, or strive to preserve its global hegemony at any cost”. The United States’ interventions, export of democracy and export of universal values represent for the Russian analysts that which is “the new sphere-of-influence policy”. It is an extension to Cold War spheres of influence. When the Soviet Union
collapsed, the United States continued where it had left off: spreading its own ideology around the world.

Between the two journals the quantity of material on the United States’ “export of democracy” and interventionism is overwhelming and deals with cases varying from Kosovo to the Middle East and the post-Soviet space. Governmental representatives such as Putin, Lavrov and Kosachev are pouring energy into discussing United States’ hegemony. Again, it is no news to discover the Russian resistance to unipolarity, or criticism of the United States’ foreign policy. The argument goes that exporting democracy around the world is undemocratic to begin with and represents interference in the internal affairs of another state (for example, Chernichenko 2009, 149; Kosachev 2007). I argue that we need to connect the Russian concern for unipolarity with the concept of sphere of influence, especially if we wishes to claim that sphere-of-influence policy is an integral part of Russian foreign policy.

Russia has a long tradition of being high up in the hierarchy of states, where it had an interest in influencing and the capacity to influence the institutions of the system. The Russian concern for the international system is very much dependent on political reality, that is, the role and power of the United States. If Russian influence is portrayed as normal and just, then the influence exerted by the United States is presented as its antithesis. It is the influence of the single sovereign. This is reflected in President Putin’s (2007b, 56) Munich Speech in 2007:

However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision-making. It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.

The political reality for Russia is the threat of the one master who destroys sovereignty from within. We can interpret this resistance of hegemony as the defence of the pluriverse over the universe. Even when many of the

51 Also Orlov, Yekaterina Kuznetsova, an International Affairs observer, and Valdimir Batyuk, the Head of the Center for Regional Aspects of the U.S. Military Policy at the Russian Academy of Sciences, are concerned about universalism as global democratisation.
analysts believe that the time of unipolarity is over, or it never even fully materialised, Lavrov’s harsh words express the seriousness with which Russian writers approach the topic. They are talking about a state playing God. This god is not particularly benevolent or fair, and the idea itself of a god-state presages the end of history, the end of everything particular and different, the end of sovereign states.

For Orlov, the universe is a reality: the world is a product of total domination by one superpower, the sovereign. Orlov evokes the memory of “gunboat diplomacy”, which was used against those who were slow to grasp American values (Orlov 2008, 67; also Satanovsky 2008, 7). The descriptions of the United States are harsh and melodramatic. For Oleg Ziborov (2007 15), from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States is a *tyrannosaurus rex* which intimidates and destroys its enemies. For Leonid Ivashov52 (2007) and Igor Maksimychev53 (2007, 58–59), the United States is an evil empire: one either becomes its servant or faces destruction. Referring to the US plans for an anti-missile system in Eastern Europe, Maksimychev (2007, 59) writes: “The United States is setting up an absolute anti-air defense system to rule out the slightest possibility of retribution. This will make it the master of the world."

For Lavrov (2008), who argues for the “pluriverse of cultural and civilisational diversity,” the ultimate threat is universal interventionism and a transition toward the construction of a global empire:

> As regards the content of the new stage in humankind’s development, there are two basic approaches to it among countries. The first one holds that the world must gradually become a Greater West through the adoption of Western values. It is a kind of “the end of history.” The other approach – advocated by Russia – holds that competition is becoming truly global and acquiring a civilizational dimension; that is, the subject of competition now includes values and development models.

Kuznetsova (2006, 68) writes in the same spirit:

52 Ivashov is the President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems.
53 Maksimychev is a Chief Research Fellow at the Institute of Europe, RAS.
Universalist projects are fraught with danger, especially if proposed by a strong state. Force, as a rule, cancels out all other arguments not based on force. At the same time, any universalist project has a limit to its own universality because there are no values for the sake of which people would agree to give up their individuality. Humanity, alas, is not disposed to embrace universal values. At the same time, the presence of force gives rise to the temptation to use it for imposing or establishing “universal” values all over the world.

For Kuznetsova, universalism means two things: universal values and their imposition by use of force, which are both totally unacceptable. Together, these two form the universalist threat, in which people lose their individuality. This resistance to universal rules for humanity is tantamount to saying “no” to the solidarist international society.

There is an obsession with the United States which affects Russian ideas about the international system. All the efforts to defend international law, equality, sovereignty and non-intervention, and great power management and to resist the idea of universalism are conditioned by the threat of the United States. The dilemma in the case of international law is that when Russia defends universal international law it defends its right to be one of those who define that law and who force that law upon rebels. If Russia is not empowered to decide on the application of universal international law, that is, when it is not accepted among the Great Responsibilities, it cannot support it. For Russian analysts, international law is universal when it is not being imposed and interpreted by a single sovereign. But when a single sovereign begins dictating the law, it turns into universalism. This is when “universal” becomes negative; it comes to signify imposing values by force. This makes the idea of equality in international relations to mean equality between the United States and Russia. Sovereignty and non-intervention alike are principles which are, ultimately, defended fiercely as a response to the power of the United States.

When it comes to universalism, the core question, obscured by the anxiety over the United States, is values. Values are often presented by the Russian analysts in a negative light, implying an ideology or something forced upon others. Universal values, in more concrete terms, represent the import of democracy and Western models of development. “Law” is
the opposite of values, the opposite of ideology. Law is universal but values are particular. Law also means freedom in the sense that international law (as respect for sovereignty and non-intervention) guarantees the right to choose one’s own values. The separation of values and law is a bit artificial, because laws must have some values behind them; otherwise laws would be hard to formulate. Sovereignty and non-intervention are in fact values that express that which is preferred, right and, ultimately, also universal. The dichotomy of law and values again springs from the political reality which the Russian analysts face with the United States’ superiority and global activeness. Values are interpreted as the weapon of the single sovereign, not as the foundation of laws. In an approach that pits values against law, “universal international law” is expressed as a fortress against the United States’ tyranny of values. But the universalist threat of the United States is not just some abstract idea of a tyrannosaurus rex constructing a global empire. For Putin (2008, 13–14) it means a very concrete dismissal of sovereignty:

Today’s world is not becoming any simpler. On the contrary, it is becoming ever more complicated and tougher. We have seen how the lofty slogans of freedom and an open society are sometimes used to destroy the sovereignty of a country or an entire region.

From the Russian perspective, the United States’ universalism is a continuation of the Cold War policy of ideological influence. Vladimir Batyuk (2010, 96) explains, “We have witnessed an amazing metamorphosis: the Russian Federation has become a conservative country, a zealot of a stable and immutable international law while the United States can be described as “the main revolutionary force of our time” to use a Soviet formula.” He continues, “This is signally important: for the last few years, Moscow and Washington were gradually being sucked into an ideological confrontation similar to that of the Cold War period. While in the past it was our country which hoisted the flag of the ‘world revolution’, after 1991 the United States is marching under the slogan of global democratization American style.” (Ibid.) Kosachev (2007) explains why Russia does not go along with “democratisation American style”: 
Moscow’s refusal to participate in the collective harassment of the “last dictators,” and in other passionate “crusades for freedom,” is explained not by the absence of democratic views. Rather, Russia is guided by sober realism and its own bitter experience of imposing the “only true teaching” on others.

It has already become clear that Russian experts portray the foreign policy of Russia as the opposite of that pursued by the United States. The argument goes as follows: the United States is stuck in the Cold War; Russia is the country which respects international law, promotes fairness and equality, puts its faith in the UN and has proposed a Euro-Atlantic security structure based on common security. Moreover, Russia does not resort to the use of force and is aware of the responsibility that comes with an active role in international affairs (Lavrov 2008, 2). But how does all this relate to spheres of influence? First of all, reading from the Russian analysts, if there is a sphere-of-influence policy it is the American export of democracy and forceful imposition of Western values. The reference to Cold War-style influence is a reference to spheres of influence. Second, the capacity and willingness of the Russian analysts to articulate Russian-style influence is conditioned by their perceptions of the United States. The universalist threat is spelled out clearly but the response to it is not the Großraum, because, just like for Burnham, the world is simply too dangerous a place to propose that influence per se is acceptable. Instead, the Russian analysts invoke the supremacy of the principle of sovereignty. Next, I discuss the Russian vision of international order in the pluralist-solidarist logic conditioned by the unipolar threat.

7.4.4 The Middle Way

Buzan (2004a, 46–47) suggested that pluralism and solidarism should not be seen as the two extremes of positive law (state-centric) and natural law (rights of individuals, cosmopolitan values and shared moral norms) but together as a spectrum where international society is thinner at the pluralist than at the solidarist end. The pluralist end has more difficulties with collective enforcement of rules, and the solidarist end is more interventionist. For Buzan (2004a, 49), in a spectrum of pluralism
and solidarism there are “ends” but these are not opposing positions, but rather represent degrees of difference. We can include a sphere of influence, Großraum or Good Neighbor Policy between the two ends of the spectrum whereby a sphere of influence can be seen as incorporating both pluralist and solidarist ideas. Thus, it situates between the two ends. In this way the pluralist-solidarist divide offers a framework for theorising on Russian visions of spheres of influence within the international society.

Russian experts do not uphold either of the two extremes of pluriverse or universe. From the Russian perspective, the extreme pluriversalist approach of a system of states with minimal elements of a society is not preferred. Instead of a system, the Russians want a society of states, which implies enforcement of international law and limitations on hegemonic tendencies. On the other end of the spectrum lies the universe of a single sovereign, which is tantamount to a cosmopolitan world society. Solidarism, in the form of common values and humanitarian interventions, is the platform on which the single sovereign operates. Between the two ends of the spectrum is the system of Großräumel super-states/Good Neighbor Policy. But because Russian analysts do not openly promote this middle way, their ideal system is sooner situated somewhere between a system of Großräume and the pluriverse. The characteristic feature of this system is that it is not quite a system of spheres of influence, because of the unease Russians feel about the idea of withering sovereignty and explicit inequality. What makes it a regional solidarist order is that even with the pluralist agenda the Russian analysts see opportunities for historical, cultural, political and economic unity within the post-Soviet region. In the form of integration, this solidarist order could materialise, but the analysts are not really making a strong case for integration either.

However, the authors accept Russia’s territorial influence and try to convince others of its normality. There is no sign of the country wanting to relinquish its influence in the post-Soviet states. The dream lurking behind the Russian discourses is a Großraum in the style of the Good Neighbor Policy, even if the Russians are afraid to say so. The leaders of Russia see their country as a peacemaker in the region, mediating, bringing stability, fighting drug trafficking, and so on, but this still does not translate into an explicit vision of a Good Neighbor Policy.
The reason why the Russians cannot verbalise their idea of a sphere of influence is that it represents systematic injustice (see Bull 2002, 89) and is too close to the idea of bloc politics. Russia has chosen to uphold international law, which does not allow spheres of influence, because of the preoccupation with the United States, its universalist threat and interventionist policies. Even though the Russian analysts would take advantage of all the normative aspects of sphere of influence (like contributing to order and peace), the injustice that inheres in spheres of influence cannot be articulated aloud, for this question would have to be answered if the Russians began speaking in favour of establishing a sphere of influence. Another reason for depoliticising influence is that there is a great deal of resistance against Russia’s foreign policy. Arguments legitimising spheres of influence, or whatever the name one chooses for territorial influence, are of little use if the influenced states do not accept their position. Naumann paid great attention to this, and that is why he wanted to make sure that above all influence would be acceptable for the influenced states. Moreover, with the erratic progress with regard to democracy and human rights in Russia, there is also a danger of any Good Neighbor Policy coming closer to the Orwellian version of a superstate than that of responsibility. This is what the Western analysts in fact propose when they use the concept of sphere of influence as a pejorative notion to describe Russian foreign policy.

If the Russian authors fear the extreme form of solidarism – the single sovereign – and do not openly promote spheres of influence, their vision of international order is not quite the pluriverse of equal nation-states either. This is because great powers are seen as the “great responsibles”. In Watson’s (2007, 20) pendulum, great power status makes the pendulum swing towards hegemony (a hegemon is able to “lay down the law” on behalf of others where their relations are concerned, but leaves them domestically independent.) If we imagine pluralism and solidarism as a spectrum with a thinner and a thicker international society at each end, the Russian vision falls on the thinner side. There is a longing for an international society bound together by universal international law. Even though Russia has not been eager to go along with collective enforcement and interventions, it did support the United States after the terrorist attacks in 2001. Yet, besides the country’s rallying for international
law, there is not much solidarism to brag about in the Russian vision of international society, especially when common values are so strongly criticised. What makes the Russian discourse take yet another step toward pluralism is the fact that the Russian “quasi-pluriverse” is founded wholly on the principle of sovereignty. Lukyanov and Bordachev (2008) argue that not even globalisation will ever wipe out sovereignty completely, and Gennady Gatilov (2009, 54) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs writes, “Despite the allegations about ’the erosion of state sovereignty’ in global politics, nation-states should preserve and even strengthen their position as basic elements that make up the complex mosaic of international life”. In addition, Buzan (2004a, 47) makes an observation that goes directly to the core of the Russian thinking: ”Pluralism stresses the instrumental side of international society as a functional counterweight to the threat of excessive disorder, whether that order comes from the absence of states (a Hobbesian anarchy), or from excesses of conflict between states, whether driven by simple concerns about survival, or by rival universalist ideological visions”. The ”chaos discourse” centres precisely around the functionality of pluralism.

The principle of sovereignty poses a dilemma that haunts the Russian analysts: Even though many Russian analysts uphold the principle of sovereignty as the guiding light in the darkness of international politics, the realities of the changing world force them to incorporate solidarist ideas to their thinking. A good example is Kuzmin (2010, 158), who begins with the argument that states should relinquish some of their sovereign rights to the world community in order to tackle global concerns, such as environmental and economic problems. Moreover, Kuzmin (ibid.) writes: ”The consistently intensified universal nature of social processes and the ever increasing impact (or even pressure) of universal problems on international relations have brought us to the limits beyond which the world order should be transformed into an integral structure based on shared values and common interests.” But then Kuzmin goes on to make a declaration at the end of his article which wipes away these traits of universalism. In fact, he (2010, 159) sees universalism, in the form of a world government, as completely impossible:

The present inefficiency of global governance and its inadequacy are too obvious to be denied. The Western development model (and American
unipolarity as its part) imposed on the world looks like a flagrant violation of the unifying nature of the United Nations Organization as devised by the “founding fathers.” We should move away from the highly ideological international relations of the Cold War era and avoid ideas of the world government as noble and romantic on the surface but far-fetched and essentially Utopian. Instead it is advisable to strive for a self-regulating world order based on tolerance and pluralism without betraying the tested principles of sovereign equality of all states, mutual benefit and international law. In the West, too, the ideas of world government are doubted as unpractical and unviable (M. Virally, C.W. Jenks, R. Falke and others).

Thus, Kuzmin is first looking in the solidarist direction by proposing some unravelling of sovereignty and shared values. But when solidarism manifests itself as a world government or Western superiority, Kuzmin turns his back on it and begins to argue for a pluralist international society. What makes solidarism so unpleasant for the Russian experts is not necessarily that it requires a loosening of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, but rather that in a solidarist society (ruled by a world government or single sovereign), there is no great power concert which could agree on the limitations to sovereignty. The Yalta and Helsinki Conferences were examples of great power management, even though they affirmed a pluralist rather than a solidarist international society. At present, according to Russians, we are witnessing violations of international law and hegemonic tendencies, which is not a basis upon which solidarism can be founded.

Another problem with solidarism is that it should allow doing it “my way”. Lavrov (2009, 10) resists universalism by stating that conditions are ripening for the coexistence of various models of social-economic and social development and value systems. In fact, Lavrov (2007b) admires the Westphalian system for placing value differences beyond the scope of interstate relations. In other words, value differences should not come to define relations among states, as happened during the Cold War. It gets all the more complicated when Russians demand the right to choose their path of development, pursue national interests (regardless of others) and resist the imposition of democracy on other states. This approach is
hardly possible in the light of the system of shared values which Kuzmin calls for. For the Russian analysts, a solidarist international society does not mean universal values which lead to accepting humanitarian intervention. It does not mean the end of states and sovereignty. But some solidarist underpinnings can be found, given how much energy the authors invest in defending “society” in the international system. The importance of common rules and institutions for Russians, even if those institutions derive from the pluralist system, is pivotal to the vision of one world that is fair and even democratic.

The controversy related to the institutions of international society boils down to the political reality in which theory becomes fused with the world that Russia is surrounded by. It comes down to the perceived role of the United States. In theory, universal values are good, and international law is good. But when universal norms, such as democracy, are imposed by United States, they become bad. They destroy plurality. Intervention is justified when Russia so decides but it is a selfish plot when it is orchestrated by the United States. This dilemma of the universal and the particular reminds me of Burnham’s dilemma: longing in principle for a pluralist order but due to the political facts (the Atomic Bomb and the Soviet threat) leaning in the end towards the dream of a World Empire of the United States in order to secure at least some form of democracy and plurality. I am also inclined to argue that if only the Russians were not so obsessed with the universalist threat and the defence of sovereignty, they could openly propose great power management with spheres of responsibility as the suitable international order. But since the Russian experts cannot let go of their discourses on sovereignty and international law, they cannot make a case for an international order of Großräume which would uphold tolerance and plurality against the negative sides of the solidarist order, and at the same time admit that such a system would run a high risk of violating the rights of the influenced.

7.5 Conclusion: Perfectly Ruled, Perfectly Free

The most compelling concern for the Russian analysts is the erosion of international society. This erosion is taking place for two reasons:
First, because the chaos of multipolarity and the reckless use of force have emerged due to the lack of concert among the great. Second, because the United States is attempting to establish a world order with a single sovereign, which, if it materialised, would mean the end of universal international law and justice, and imposition of a single value-system. The Russian solution is the re-establishment of the old international institutions: international law, great power management, and the (cooperative) balance of power; and the rules of coexistence: sovereignty and non-intervention. But there is such uncertainty in the post-Cold War order and in Russia’s place in it that the authors end up undecided, unable to formulate an idea of international order which could incorporate both the superiority of sovereignty and the necessity of great power management. I argue that the contradictory views of order stem from issues related to the source of normative decisions.

According to Carr, personification of the state made possible the creation of international law on the basis of natural law. He even claims that it is impossible to discuss international relations without the fiction of a state as a person with rights and obligations. (Carr 2011, 136–137). We can also explain international society as theorised by the English School as an imagined society of state-persons. Thus we can use the domestic analogy to explain the normative dimension of the Russian view of international order and spheres of influence. I have already hinted at this by speculating on the impossibility of democracy in great power management (chapter 7.3.2). If we think about states as individuals, we can use the ideas of Arthur Allen Leff (1935-1981) on the United States Constitution and the morality of individuals. In fact, Allen Leff (1979, 1229) expresses perceptively what the Russian discourse on the society of states really means:

I want to believe – and so do you – in a complete, transcendent, and immanent set of propositions about right and wrong, find able rules that authoritatively and unambiguously direct us how to live righteously. I also want to believe – and so do you – in no such thing, but rather that we are wholly free, not only to choose for ourselves what we ought to do, but to decide for ourselves, individually and as a species, what we ought to be. What we want, Heaven help us, is
simultaneously to be perfectly ruled and perfectly free, that is, at the same time to discover the right and the good and to create it.

The Russian analysts presented in this research want the world of states to be both perfectly ruled and perfectly free. This means that international relations are to be strictly based on international law, which must be applied equally to all the members of the society of states. At the same time, perfect freedom gives Russia the right to decide on the normative and pass judgement on others. Where there is law, there is also a lawmaker. Law does not come from nowhere. Russian analysts not only claim the historical role of their state as a law-maker (by the right of the victor) but also claim to possess the ultimate truth about that law. There is no room for others’ normative assertions, a position that renders Russian multipolarity hypocrisy. For the Russians, great powers are the source of law but Russia is the one country that correctly interprets this law. At the same time, the analysts do not want the world to have the single sovereign, or in Allen Leff’s (1979, 1240) terms “the unjudged judge, the unruled legislator”; it is an arbitrary idea. Prozorov (2011) argues that Russia is not a norm-maker but rather a norm-keeper, meaning that it accepts the Western norms of international relations (most importantly sovereignty, non-intervention and territorial integrity) and attempted to defend them – until the war in Georgia, where Russia took the liberty to go against the norm of non-intervention it so strongly upheld. Here we can see the wish to be perfectly ruled and perfectly free in conflict, going against the norm that Russia so fervently defends. But I argue that Russian analysts see Russia not only as a norm-keeper but also as a norm-maker: in Vienna in 1815, Yalta in 1945, Helsinki in 1975 and in its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. What is more, the Russians see their country in a third capacity as a norm “interpreter”. A Norm interpreter is an actor who passes judgement on others’ behaviour based on its understanding of right and wrong, lawful and unlawful.

“Perfectly ruled and free” also has bearing on spheres of influence. For Russian analysts, wanting to be perfectly ruled means speaking out forthrightly for sovereignty and non-intervention; but wanting to be perfectly free means that Russia should have the right to act in keeping with its own morality. If we look at the Russian idea of the role of small
states as being simultaneously free and ruled, the analysts are defending the rights of the small to equal sovereignty yet without wanting to empower them to influence world affairs or relations among the great powers. Spheres of influence are located within this dichotomy: a sphere of influence is unjust because small states deserve to be free, but great power rule is justified because small states need to be controlled when they cause disharmony. Influence and interests are just as long as they can be depoliticised. The need to be perfectly ruled by the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention also leads to the inability to propose a Good Neighbor Policy or Großraum, that is, a hierarchical great power order with spheres of influence.

As I have argued, the concept of sphere of influence has pejorative associations, attached to the nature of the United States’ policies of influence, for the Russian analysts whom I have discussed. While the American style of influence deserves to be called a sphere-of-influence policy, Russian influence is seen as free from selfish political motivations. Ideas on sovereignty explain the pejorative notions in the Russian idea of sphere of influence. Sovereignty is holy, and so is the non-intervention principle – in principle. But the Russian experts avoid discussing the relationship between actual power and sovereignty. The logic is that Russia should be a great power because it has been great historically, is presently and can be in the future. It is stronger than some other states and always has been. Russia is a historical great power and victor of the last major war. It did not even lose the Cold War, because it triumphed over totalitarianism and ended the division of Europe. Accordingly, it should have a rightful place among the great powers. With this argumentation, how could sovereignty possibly be the same for all the members of the system of states? If there is a class of great powers, it automatically follows that other classes are lower and this in turn has practical implications. It is already a practical implication to decide on something in the Security Council, for example, on an intervention that relates to a state not empowered to take part in the decision. The uncompromising defence of Westphalian sovereignty is simply not compatible with the insistence on the role of great powers. The two are not incompatible as such: a hierarchy of power is as old as sovereignty itself. Carr was perhaps right in stating that sovereignty was dead as soon as it was invented.
so many “buts” to incorporate that it becomes by definition something which cannot be absolute. But the Russian writers do not explain how great power management necessitates a measure of inequality. Instead, they vociferously advocate equality, which only comes to mean equality between great powers. When the Russians claim great powers should be the great responsibles, they are saying that sovereignty is not the same for all. It is not a revolutionary discovery to find that there is a tension between the admiration of sovereignty, on the one hand, and hierarchy, on the other; but the insight here is that this can explain the difficulties in articulating the Good Neighbor Policy.

The Russian view of international order is somewhere between the pluralist society of states, deeply rooted in sovereignty, and the Großraum, deeply rooted in great power management. For the Russians, international order should remain the same as it has been since the Congress of Vienna. Great power management is important because it contributes to order in the anarchical system. For Russia, a concert of great powers is the best available – no, the only available – option to avoid chaos. For the Russians, if the great powers are numerous and representative enough, this constitutes a fair, just and democratic international order. If great power order is a dream come true for the Russian writers, then why not argue at the same time for the Good Neighbor Policy, or outright spheres of influence, which would settle the problem of geopolitical games and changing affinities? The Good Neighbor Policy could be defended as protection of the small: it could be a win-win situation. Or it could be argued that great powers – the great responsibles – mediate conflicts, limit conflicts and stabilise international relations. It would only mean letting go of, or loosening, pluralist ethics and establishing small powers as second-class citizens in the international system – not only in practice but also in principle. I have argued that what at least partly explains the Russian authors’ the difficulty of formulating a coherent idea of international order – and a vision of influence – is that the political reality obstructs theoretical thinking. The idea of national interests overrides broader considerations of international order. This is not a unique situation as such: all states struggle to accommodate national interests with the interests of the society of states. What is unique in the case of Russia is how the fear of universalism culminates in a feeling of
inferiority compared to the United States in such a way that the authors formulate the idea of international order on that basis.

I believe that with the support of the pluralist-solidarist debate we can understand the Russian view of the world better. What is crucial is to theorise the middle range of the spectrum, because that is where the Russian idea of territorial influence can be found. For me the middle of the spectrum looks like an unarticulated idea of Good Neighbor Policy or a Großraum, depending on how much consideration is given to defending the rights of the influenced (Good Neighbor Policy) and concerns for pluralism against the universalist thereat (Großraum). The Russian analysts are at odds with the nomos of the earth because it is changing in the wrong direction – into a dissolution not of sovereignty but of great power management. Thinking back to those theorists who witnessed the withering of their beloved sovereignty, they could not uphold it anymore, but they had to invent new ideas to save at least something of the greatness of the old world. The Russian proposal for a new nomos is the European Security Treaty, even though it does not extend beyond the Euro-Atlantic space. But this is not enough for Russia’s Western partners, who interpret Russia’s agenda in negative terms. It is not only the Western analysts and decision makers who should open their eyes to the idea of sphere of influence; Russians, too, could benefit from spelling out international order not in terms of the duality of the pluriverse and the universe, but in terms of the regional solidarism which lies in the middle.
8 Conclusions

8.1 Framing Sphere of Influence

I have argued that sphere of influence is an important concept in international relations because of its continuous use in political language. Yet, it has not sparked theoretical discussion since the Cold War. Sphere of influence has become a concept to use when judging the foreign policy of Russia, a concept in which one finds inscribed the map metaphor of territorial influence spilling over state borders. The historical meaning of the concept of sphere of influence is drawn from the memory of the Cold War, which imbues the concept with pejorative associations. There is a silent agreement on this pejorative pall, which means that IR has settled the normative question without even beginning to discuss it. Because sphere of influence is used in a pejorative rather than an analytical sense, I have run into difficulties in trying to find relevant theoretical conceptualisations to support my own study of "Russia's sphere of influence". As I could not find conceptualisations and debates on the phenomenon, I had to initiate some myself. I have tried to challenge a notion of sphere of influence which is taken as self-evident by contesting and conceptualising the concept though historical sources. I began from problematising the pejorative uses of the concept, and concluded with studying Russian discourses on influence. In my search for the origins and meanings of the concept of sphere of influence, I have identified the dimensions of order and justice as the framework for the inquiry.

The relationship between spheres of influence, order and justice explains where the pejorative associations of the concept have originated. A sphere of influence either contributes to international order or it does not, but no conceptualisation of it can not avoid questions of international order. This means that if we wish to use the tem "sphere of influence" we should not only reflect on what actions constitute a sphere-of-influence policy, but also address the nature of the international system: a sphere of influence, when viewed historically, defends plurality against solidarist or universalist tendencies. When spheres of influence do not involve an open regional solidarist agenda; as they did for Naumann, Schmitt, Carr and Lippmann; they relate to international order by tacit
understandings, stability of possessions, limiting conflicts, sovereignty, great power management and non-intervention/intervention. Even if a sphere of influence is not necessarily confined to a particular region it most often expresses a regional solution to the demise of the system of states and to the dangers of a world state. Thus, to the initial "Do spheres of influence contribute to order?", a second question can be added: "What kind of order do spheres of influence contribute to?"

Justice, the second element that is relevant for our present understanding of spheres of influence, refers here to justice between states. When an analysis of spheres of influence addresses interstate justice, the context is the sovereign equality of states and in particular relations between the great and the small. When it is claimed that a sphere of influence can contribute to international order, or that political unification is a necessity, the argument is that the order-producing effect of a sphere of influence takes priority over the rights of the influenced states. Spheres of influence have not been seen as having bearing on human justice because there is practically no discussion on the relationship between spheres of influence and the individuals living within them. Indeed, the interconnectedness of intervention and spheres of influence is discussed in terms of the violations against the states that are the objects of intervention, not the human beings affected by it. The focus on sovereignty strengthens the link between spheres of influence and international order as a system of states. On the other hand, the history of spheres of influence also points to a system where sovereign states did not yet exist, the suzerain system, but even more to an international order where the state ceases to function as the principal international actor. This in turn directs our focus to the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum of international society, where spheres of influence could be called regional solidarist projects, *Großräume* or super-states.

The table below summarises the visions on spheres of influence, order, justice and the nature of the system in the selected historical and conceptual episodes. The entries reflect the answers to the following questions:

1) Do spheres of influence contribute to international order among the society of states?
2) Do spheres of influence violate interstate *justice*, that is, do they necessarily violate state sovereignty?

3) Do spheres of influence operate within the limits of the *system* of states?

Table 1. Relationship between spheres of influence, order, justice, and the system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Present studies</th>
<th>The English School</th>
<th>Theories bridging nation and humanity</th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th>Russian discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does not promote order</td>
<td>Promotes order or instability</td>
<td>Promotes order</td>
<td>Promotes order or instability</td>
<td>Does not promote order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Present studies</th>
<th>The English School</th>
<th>Theories bridging nation and humanity</th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th>Russian discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violation of sovereignty</td>
<td>Violation of sovereignty</td>
<td>Justice for the small</td>
<td>Violation of sovereignty</td>
<td>Violation of sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Present studies</th>
<th>The English School</th>
<th>Theories bridging nation and humanity</th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th>Russian discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System of states</td>
<td>System of states</td>
<td>Regional solidarism within the system of states</td>
<td>New nomos</td>
<td>Regional solidarism within the system of states</td>
<td>System of states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have chosen the elements of order, justice and system as the theoretical anchors for the reassessment of the concept of sphere of influence. They represent elements which bind spheres of influence to international theory and the pejorative uses of the concept. Order connects justice and the system, for it expresses the potential of spheres of influence to resolve or worsen problems within the society of states. Arguments that spheres of influence can contribute to order and represent regional solidarism act as justifications for the violation of sovereignty which spheres of influence tend to result in. When it comes to international order, at present a sphere of influence is not envisioned either as just or as contributing to international order; rather, it is considered a Cold War relic that represents power games of the system of states. But when we
look into the past, a sphere of influence is conceived of as an arrangement which can promote international order, and even one that can create a new order to replace the system of equal sovereign states. When it comes to justice, it seems that violations of sovereignty are part and parcel of spheres of influence, and only the theorists reflecting on the world wars tried to defend and support sovereignty as much as was possible within the new *nomos*. Looking at the above table, these theorists can be seen as promoting the most radical view of spheres of influence. If we ignore Burnham and Orwell, we get the least pejorative visions of spheres of influence. Next, I present the three factors of order, justice and system in more detail.

### 8.1.1 International Order

Within the English School, Bull and Keal discussed the contribution spheres of influence could to make to international order. In *The Anarchical Society* (2002) Bull establishes his idea on great power management which is maintained by a balance of power. The spheres of influence of the United States and the Soviet Union are a part of that balancing game and contribute to international order (Bull 2002, 199–204). Keal makes an even stronger case for spheres of influence with a potential to promote stability of possessions and containment of conflicts, and thereby the potential to contribute to international order. The problem with order for Keal (1983, 211) is its instability. If spheres of influence contribute to the stability of international order, it is only very temporary, and as long as spheres of influence are composed essentially of relations among the influencing powers, competition between them entails the prospect for conflict over spheres of influence.

The present understanding of spheres of influence from a pejorative perspective means that there is no discussion on their possible contribution to order. Great power management, humanitarian intervention and the principle of a "responsibility to protect" are examples of ideas of international influence without pejorative senses; in other words, they can be both defended and opposed. Thus, other forms of influence, ones more justified, can be seen as contributing to international order. We lack studies which would examine the order-producing mechanism of spheres
of influence during the Cold War. The same applies to Russian discourses: spheres of influence are most often discussed in pejorative terms and refer to dis-order rather than order. Russian influence, on the other hand, is order-producing. The Russian discourses on international order resonate with the dilemma of the particular and the universal captured by the historical conceptualisations and visions of spheres of influence. Russian writers defend the state and object to universalising tendencies and hegemony, but because they admire great power management and speak in favour of regional influence as something natural, they end up in the middle of the spectrum – as if secretly envisioning a Good Neighbor Policy or a Großraum.

If we look at Keal’s and Kaufmann’s accounts, Cold War spheres of influence are seen as contributing to some kind of order, but the Cuban Missile Crisis and its interpretations demonstrate that this order is rather problematic. Keal recognised that instability was a weakness of the order produced by spheres of influence. Spheres of influence were part of the international order that prevented a third world war and maintained bipolarity, but it is altogether another thing to argue that that order was a good one. It was an order which could also have led to a nuclear war. It was an order which was based on hatred, fear, division and competition. For the theorists situated in the context of the two world wars, spheres of influence were the salvation of plurality and thus they embodied the promotion of order. Only Orwell imagined the system of super-states as a rather frightening order. Burnham concluded that nuclear weapons made it necessary to abandon the otherwise functioning idea of super-states, sacrifice plurality and embrace the hegemony of the United States. Instead, Naumann, Schmitt, Carr and Lippmann all envisioned how a sphere of influence, or whatever they liked to call it, would become the middle way of international political organisation, contributing to a new nomos.

8.1.2 Justice in Spheres of Influence

Within the English School, we find discussion not only on the inherent injustice of spheres of influence but also on intervention and great power management. In the English School conception a sphere-of-influence
policy clearly entailed a violation of sovereignty. Nevertheless, even though a sphere of influence is unjust for the influenced state, it can promote order and thus is not completely condemned by Bull and Keal. Moreover, the English School affinity for great power management and discussing the occasional justification of intervention indicates that some sympathy is found for spheres of influence. Still, the only way to justify a sphere of influence is to argue that it contributes to international order, as Keal does. This means that spheres of influence bring regional order but, more importantly, that management of them becomes an ordering principle in the relations of the influencing powers. The inherent injustice of spheres of influence becomes manifest if influence is exerted without the consent of the states subjected to that influence, and this problem of injustice troubled Keal.

Injustice also troubled Naumann and Lippmann, who both tried to elaborate a sphere of influence policy which would turn injustice into a mutually beneficial relationship of protection. They also began their reasoning with the system-level consideration of how to manage international relations in an age of conflict and war, that is, how to create a viable international order. Spheres of influence, Schmitt’s and Carr’s Großräume, Burnham’s super-states (later the single super-state), Naumann’s Mid-Europe and Lippmann’s Good Neighbor Policy were the answers. Creating units larger than nation-states was in fact a necessity, since the time of sovereignty was clearly over. Spheres of influence would create rules and boundaries regarding international influence, establish a new balance of power, and reduce the number of international actors, making the management of international relations simpler in the process. Justice is the issue where the theories relating to the period of the world wars diverge most from those in all the other episodes, because it is the only area where we can find an attempt to overcome the inevitable injustice of influence. Three justifications are presented: the benefits for the influenced (Lippmann and Naumann), pluralism against universalism (Schmitt, Carr, Lippmann, Burnham) and, ultimately, world peace. It was only within the context of the world wars that spheres of influence emerged as regional constellations of the willing. If there was unwillingness, those resisting needed to be converted for the sake of preventing another great war.
The Cold War spheres of influence are deemed unjust by Kaufman and Keal, but these scholars also draw attention to the legitimacy of the spheres of influence at that time as more formal arrangements of influence, which is an important point. To read from the Cold War episode, spheres of influence can be built in a manner in which the influenced state accepts its position and is even ready to commit this acceptance to paper. Formality, nevertheless, does not make a sphere of influence necessarily just if the influenced state is forced into a union with the influencing state. But legitimising influence through such an agreement could be viewed as justified as part of the process of normalising spheres of influence as a de facto practice of the time. The question arises: What does legitimacy do for the idea of a sphere of influence and does the establishment of a sphere of influence then turn into integration? The Cold War period offers an interesting possibility to study how much justice a sphere of influence can actually incorporate. Was there consideration of justice or were the small states simply relegated to the role of puppets of the superpowers? Keal (1983, 212) and Kaufman (1976, 11) were of the opinion that there was not much, if any, room for justice.

In the present pejorative understanding of the concept, spheres of influence are evidently unjust but this they are for Russian scholars as well. Taking “sphere” out of the expression “sphere of influence” tends to mitigate some of the pejorative connotations. Influence as such is not pejorative, only “a sphere of influence”. This is why the EU’s influence can be just for Western observers and Russian influence for Russian writers. The Russian idea comprises a strong defence of sovereignty while celebrating the great power order, making the defence of justice reflect the age-old dilemma of equality in principle and inequality in practice. The Russian elite of the twenty-first century believe in the same great power management as the theorists situated in the world wars’ period and the English School, but are afraid to discuss the injustice that their vision of international order entails. Many Russian writers believe in a balance of power, although, like Lippmann, some see it also as a problem. The Concert of Europe proved to some that a balance of power can contribute to peace and order. Yet, the Russian authors, like their Western counterparts, do not seek justification for spheres of influence.

54 This is not to say that Russia is the only country to face this dilemma; it concerns all the states which promote great power management.
since there are as few examples of successful spheres of influence periods in history as there are defenders of the policy. The colonial period, the Cold War, and post-Cold War “Russian sphere of influence” all look to us like the embodiment of injustice in international relations.

8.1.3 System of States or a New Nomos?

Finally we get to the relationship between spheres of influence and the nature of international order as a system of states. The world-war-era theorists again make an exception by positing spheres of influence as an aspect of a new nomos. Yet, even if there is an explicit idea of new order and its constituent regional units, it still hangs on to the idea of sovereignty. This is not because sovereignty as such would be upheld as it was before – the theorists did, in fact, declare the end of sovereignty – but because of the need to explain that regional solidarity would still enable its units to hold on to the power to decide over their internal affairs. In order to sell the idea to those affected, sovereignty was promoted as the means to avoid an image of (Burnham’s and Orwell’s) super-state. With the question of sovereignty as the focal point, Schmitt and others positioned their visions of spheres of influence between nation and humanity. Just as I believe that the English School conceptions of spheres of influence should be placed in the middle of the pendulum of international society, so, too, should Großräume, the Good Neighbor Policy and the super-states, but with the recognition that the international society is composed not of sovereign states but of regional constellations. The state has run its course and something new is taking its place. Because this kind of "regional solidarity" is constructed as a force against the state and the world state, it constructs an idea of a new nomos. The explicitness of the argument for a new nomos is important, because that argument becomes the justification for spheres of influence. A sphere of influence becomes a necessity; it becomes a means to achieve peace.

In the contemporary literature, a sphere of influence is seen as a foreign policy tool strictly confined to the policies of states and not an entity, a regional constellation in its own right. A sphere of influence is not an instance of integration or regionalism; it is not a progressive, but a regressive and conservative idea of influence. For the English School,
spheres of influence are part of the society of states. Even though spheres of influence are not the centre of attention, they clearly emerge in the context of international institutions. Spheres of influence are fixed within the system of states and can be found within the debate on pluralist and solidarist societies. Jackson’s concept of regional solidarism becomes an apt description of what a sphere of influence looks like from the English School perspective. Likewise, in Keal’s and Kaufmann’s analysis of the Cold War, spheres of influence represent regional solidarism which emerges as a bipolar order within a system of states. Thus, they do not discuss the demise of the state itself, unlike Schmitt and others. The Russian perspective is the most state-centred, making discussions on spheres of influence firmly rooted in the Russian desire to preserve the society of states.

In addition to debating spheres of influence from the normative perspective, looking at their inherent injustice and justifications, theorising international order adds substance to the concept of sphere of influence. The two episodes I have detailed in this thesis, English School theory and “between nation and humanity”, reveal that spheres of influence can be located in a debate on the nature of international order. This means that spheres of influence can be the answer to the weaknesses of the other two options for an international order: the system of states and the world state. This less pejorative view of spheres of influence is implied in the theorisation on Mid-Europe, \textit{Großraum} and Good Neighbor Policy. I wanted to take the idea even further, by identifying spheres of influence as falling in the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum. The reason why the idea of a sphere of influence sits so well within the pluralist-solidarist/universalist debate is that it contributes to the criticism of the world state and world society of individuals. If we want to situate the concept of sphere of influence both theoretically and historically within the discipline of IR, it is exactly here that it can be found. This is where I step out of the genealogical caution in defining, seeking the correct origin and setting the limits of the object of inquiry, because I argue that the present pejorative associations of the concept of sphere of influence can be traced to the dichotomy of pluralism and solidarism. These traces have gone unnoticed until this research. This makes sphere of influence, not necessarily “an old-style concept”, conservative or even pejorative, but
a progressive idea in the attempt to imagine a new pluralist order after the system of states. The concept combines that which is seen as good and valuable in pluralism and solidarism alike. To be sure, spheres of influence might not solve the tension between pluralism and solidarism; they might well represent an unimaginable international order, but they can still address the contemporary challenges of international order. Stepping out of the fixed meaning of sphere of influence does not mean the acceptance of unjust practices; it means reflecting on a sphere of influence as an idea which encompasses theorisation on international order and justice among states.

8.2 Future Research Agenda

In this research, the concept of sphere of influence has been reviewed and revised based on its normative history in international theory, but this should be considered only a beginning. The study, which has drawn upon examples of history and contemporary challenges, is not meant to uncover everything there is to know about spheres of influence. I have opened up paths towards the English School, ideas on regional constellations, the Cold War and contemporary studies, and the current thinking in Russia. Next I will express my thoughts on the concept of sphere of influence in international theory and put forward those questions which I feel merit further investigation.

The English School is clearly a source in which the topic of spheres of influence was not sufficiently explored. I wonder whether, had the English School theorists taken spheres of influence seriously, we might now have students interested in studying spheres of influence. If the English School had paid attention to Schmitt, Naumann, Lippmann and Carr (or some others) as theorists of spheres of influence, that is, if they had been interested in the history of sphere of influence, there could now be studies on spheres of influence, just like there are on every other topic the English School ever took up. Keal’s (1983) book on spheres of influence is an interesting case, because it has not been noticed within the discipline and especially not within the English School. Keal is the missing link between the English School and spheres of influence. His
study draws on English School concepts and he comes close to writing a conceptual history of spheres of influence. Keal writes about colonialism, the Monroe Doctrine and the Good Neighbor Policy, for example, connecting spheres of influence to other episodes of history than only the Cold War. However, even Keal’s account is not enough: First, it is focused on tacit understandings in international order and not on the history of the concept of sphere of influence; second, it needs updating in the post-Cold War situation; third, it neither pays attention to the uses of the concept in political parlance nor situates the concept within IR theory. In a word, the English School missed sphere of influence: the concept and phenomenon were never framed within the institutions of international society. However, the subject of spheres of influence is not wholly lacking in the English School theory if one looks carefully enough. If the English School overlooked its opportunity to scrutinise spheres of influence, we have overlooked the English School’s omission in neglecting spheres of influence.

The need to theorise the concept of sphere of influence becomes evident when discussing the relationship between spheres of influence and sovereignty, because violations of sovereignty take central stage when attempting to define the concept. Sovereignty is also important for the present understanding of spheres of influence, because when seen violated, it reinforces the pejorative associations of the particular conception of influence involved. Suzerain or imperialist influence are the pejorative manifestations of a violation of sovereignty. But considerations of sovereignty are also important for conceptualising sphere of influence, because sovereignty is such a central concept of IR; by affecting sovereignty, sphere of influence becomes a central concept as well. Since modernity, sovereignty and the international have been seen as interdependent (see Bartelson 1995, 189–190). There can be no sovereignty without the international system and no international system without sovereignty. Thus the state has taken centre stage in international political theory. A sphere of influence breaks this canon by foreshadowing an international system that is not formed out of sovereign states but some sort of “great-states”. Could spheres of influence really become the basis of a new international order, a new international law? Or does sovereignty nevertheless persist within a sphere of influence to
an extent where it could accommodate the inequality which a sphere of influence entails? Does a sphere of influence only take away the content of sovereignty and leave it formally intact, as Schmitt envisioned? One could turn the attention away from sovereignty by focusing on the consent of the influenced. So, rather than discussing whether a sphere of influence violates sovereignty, we could discuss whether the consent of the influenced determines the appropriate term: Where the influenced state resists its position, this qualifies as a sphere of influence; where the influenced state happily agrees to its position of being influenced, the relationship is one of alliance or integration. Here, the pejorative connotations follow the concept of sphere of influence, but the notion of influence would assume different levels of legitimacy.

Watson sees international society as a concert of hegemonial powers where peripheral states are becoming increasingly willing to accept the donors’ terms for the aid they need. State independence is becoming limited and nation-states everywhere may come to exercise less than total sovereignty. (Watson 2007, 65–66.) This trend toward collective hegemony began with the Concert of Europe in the form of not so much a right as an obligation to intervene in other states. Watson asserts that after the collapse of the Soviet Union a concert has formed again. (Ibid., 66–67.) But this new concert is less concerned with maintaining the system of separate states than it is with peace and prosperity (Ibid., 79). Watson (ibid., 82) identifies ideas which belong to the hegemony-suzerainty area of the pendulum (see chapter 3.2), for example, management of the international system, the privileges and responsibilities of great powers and rich nations, the Concert of Europe, intervention, standards of civilization, human rights and women’s rights, donor and recipient states, strings being attached to aid, derogations of sovereignty, and limits to independence. This is actually quite illustrative of the picture that emerges out of the history of sphere of influence, from the Congress of Vienna all the way to the war in South Ossetia. We see a movement towards a solidarist international society, but one which retains the special role of great powers and their influence over other states. We see sovereignty and non-intervention fading, giving room to the solidarist claims to human rights, but we see neither equality of states nor a world government emerging. We see the same pendulum gravitating
towards great power management, just as it has been for the past two centuries. If we believe Watson and his pendulum theory we need to start taking the idea of sphere of influence more seriously, for it suggests that a sphere of influence is a fact of contemporary world politics, not merely a metaphor, a discourse or a pejorative term used as a means of shaming nations. IR is guilty of not theorising sphere of influence in the context of international order and justice, and hopefully the present research is a step towards correcting this state of affairs.

An analysis of the Cold War theorisations on spheres of influence and the Cuban Missile Crisis proves that there is still much to learn when it comes to understanding the phenomenon of spheres of influence. There is also much potential to theorise on spheres of influence with reference to the unique setting of the Cold War, as the research and open archives that are available today offer better opportunities to study spheres of influence in that era. For example, we can ask if the Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of spheres of influence contributing to international order or rather to disorder: Was the crisis caused by competition over spheres of influence (causing disorder), or was it caused by a struggle for nuclear parity or some other form of conflict in which respect for spheres of influence prevented the escalation of the crisis (maintaining order)? The Cold War image of spheres of influence becomes more complex when that episode is examined. One question is the relationship between institutionalisation and legitimisation of influence. Keal and Kaufman deemed the Cold War spheres of influence unjust but they recognised different forms of influence, with *de jure* influence representing an act of legitimisation. The Cold War idea of sphere of influence was not pervaded by pejorative connotations to the extent it is today, which made it possible to see a sphere of influence as a formal arrangement that an influenced state can accept. In addition to questions of order and legitimacy, there is room to speculate on how much bipolarity depended on the division of spheres of influence and how much on the nuclear parity. Moreover, one could study if Cold War spheres of influence maintained order inside the blocs and restrained or prevented conflicts. Answering these questions would require empirical studies geared to conceptualising spheres of influence in the Cold War context.

Cold War history is important also for understanding our present discourses on Russia. When arguing that Russia is trying to establish a
sphere of influence, Cold War style, it should be noted that at least at the level of speeches there is clearly a dislike among the Russians of Cold War spheres of influence. The Russian analysts presented in this research are not particularly sympathetic to the idea of sphere of influence even though they do embrace great power management. Can we still claim that sphere of influence is the concept that explains how the Russians see the drama of great power politics unfolding? And if so, what kind of sphere of influence is involved – one following the spirit of Schmitt’s *Großraum*, Lippmann’s Good Neighbor Policy, a new Soviet Union, or perhaps the super-state that Orwell was so afraid of? Rather than making claims about Russia’s sphere of influence, it would be more interesting to ask what kind of sphere of influence the country has and how it is being justified.

The dilemma in the Russian discourses is how to defend hegemony and freedom at the same time. If we look at the Good Neighbor Policy or the idea of Mid-Europe, for example, both contain hegemony with freedom. It is not denied that one state is more powerful than the other, but influence is accompanied by mutual benefit and assistance. The present Russian discourses on international order do not reveal any attempt to formulate an idea which could encompass both the special rights and needs of the great powers and the right to equal sovereignty and freedom for the influenced states at the same time. The Russians have no concept, theory or argument which would explain how the principle of non-intervention can tolerate Russia’s intervention, but not those of other states. As I have suggested, it would be useful for Russians to develop a vision of international order which would not be shy about articulating the Good Neighbor Policy which Russia appears to be pursuing. It would mean connecting the idea of great power management to the idealisation of sovereignty and proving that the two are not incompatible. The next step would be to connect the compatibility of great power management and sovereignty with the dream of a cooperative balance of power and to explain what the solution is to bloc politics, which a balance of power often leads to. Then, finally, what would be required is self-reflection on how the fear of the United States affects Russian discourses on international order and influence. I would really like to see Russian scholars and politicians elaborate on these questions.
One way to make sense of spheres of influence and the Russian discourses alike is to cease thinking about spheres of influence in terms of absolute dichotomies. If the Russian discourses on international order seem incoherent, it is because the authors seem to have difficulties in envisioning the solidarist and pluralist orders as points on a spectrum and not as mutually exclusive choices. Watson offered the pendulum idea and Buzan the spectrum for breaking the pattern of thinking about solidarism and pluralism as opposite choices. If we take Watson's spectrum of primacy and domination as the two ways to consolidate a sphere of influence, we could see the movement between the two ends such that primacy represents less of a violation of the rights of the influenced and domination involves more of a trampling of those rights. Then we would not have bad and good influence but violations of the rights of the influenced on a different scale. Moreover, if we attach to this “spectrum of violation” the consent of the influenced, we have another variable. More consent would make influence closer to primacy and less would take us towards domination. We would then have two variables to determine whether a sphere of influence constitutes primacy or domination: violation of (sovereign) rights and consent of the influenced. Taking Buzan’s spectrum idea, if sovereignty is a social contract, if we cast doubt on the usefulness of the nation-state in principle, and if we imagine concentration of power working together with limitations on sovereignty, we can find the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum. The reason why we need to make sense of the middle of the spectrum is that it can help us make sense of Russian visions of order and influence. This way we can also discuss spheres of influence from the normative perspective. The Russian discourses appear to me to be a perfect example of the need to study Buzan’s spectrum idea in greater depth and challenge the idea of international order as being constructed upon a dichotomy of the pluriverse and the universe.

8.3 Beyond the Pejorative

The normative problem is the heart and soul of the concept of sphere of influence. Then why is it that, in the present, we lack a discussion
on the justice/injustice of spheres of influence? It is because we have
ignored the history of spheres of influence and left unexamined the place
the concept holds in IR. The Cold War mindset has left the concept of
sphere of influence unchallenged; IR has failed to acknowledge that it is a
contested concept. Especially because the concept of sphere of influence
is so strongly normative, it must be contested. Connolly (1993, 2) writes,
“For to adopt without revision the concepts prevailing in a polity is to
accept terms of discourse loaded in favor of established practises”. If one
accepts the concept of sphere of influence without revision, one ends
up constructing a certain image of Russian foreign policy. In fact, in
order to condemn the practice of establishing or consolidating spheres
of influence, one must begin by contesting the very concept. Contesting
the concept of sphere of influence means problematising its present
distinctive features that have rendered it an immutable and emotional
metaphor of injustice. As a conclusion to this study I will devote the last
words to elaborating the more positive views on spheres of influence. My
purpose is to stimulate discussion on the normative aspects of spheres
of influence by bringing to light that part of the intellectual history of
sphere of influence which has so far remained hidden and unarticulated.

Sphere of influence is not in essence a pejorative notion; it has been
forged into one in the fires of the Cold War. Yet, sphere of influence
is fundamentally a normative notion, because it has always needed
justification. Colonial influence experienced its normative rise and fall,
but this never happened to spheres of influence. Spheres of influence
emerged as a type of political influence which embodied questions of
inequality of power and violation of sovereignty and it has remained just
that. What makes the concept of sphere of influence so topical is not
only its popularity in political language, but its relationship to questions
of law, order and justice within the system of states and outside of it.
But when I look at the history of the concept of sphere of influence that
I have attempted to unravel, the most relevant origins of the concept
lie in the period when the globe was devastated by the two world wars.
In this context the idea of influence beyond state borders, of regional
constellations, is one which attempts to envision international order in
order to rescue the world from war caused by nationalism. The origin of
the concept, which I believe I have succeeded in ascertaining, was not in
justifying oppression, violence and power. The impetus for establishing and consolidating spheres of influence is indeed war, but preventing war, that is, managing relations among the great states and preventing major war between them. Even the English School, especially through Bull and Keal, is concerned with imagining the contribution that spheres of influence and great power management can make to international order. Those who theorised on the “compassionate sphere of influence” often did it from the perspective of their own nationalistic sentiments, but even still they considered the world at large, because they knew that a new international order based on spheres of influence could not be forged by force. The project would have to work on a global basis and people would have to benefit from it. The power relation is expressed as responsibility with the argument that this is the only way forward in the process of transforming the international system. But like any idea, when interpreted and put into practice it can suffer in the process and become transformed into something that is the complete antithesis of its initial intention. The Cold War destroyed the ideals of those who theorised on the creation of spheres of influence as an order for world peace. I believe none of them would have wished to see the bloc politics of the Cold War unfolding. The Cold War caused spheres of influence to lose that perhaps small, but still evident, element of compassion.

International Relations has been moving away from the state-centric perspective in recent years to study not only non-state actors on the international scene but also the effects that international theory has on individuals. For example, the concepts of human security and women’s security have been established by moving beyond the traditional security concept dominated by the state. Sphere of influence, as I have stated, is an idea about the system of states but, as a theory, it must be viewed also as an attempt to organise international life such that people could live together. This is the eternal dilemma of humankind – how to live together in diversity. Both pluralism and solidarism are answers which international theorists have offered to us. But the history of spheres of influence has somewhat neglected the human perspective. The consideration of justice proceeds at the level of states and thus remains an abstraction. One way to approach justice in the case of spheres of influence, and as something more than a relationship between states, is to ask questions about the
nature of the influencing state’s regime. This is even more relevant when the dissatisfaction with Russian foreign policy relates to dissatisfaction with the progress of democracy in the country. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union were recognised as having a sphere of influence, regardless of the differences between their regimes. The capitalists and the communists alike were capable of consolidating spheres of influence. Even though spheres of influence were implemented by different means and meant different things in practice, the same name was given to both superpowers’ policies of influence. In sharp contrast, Lippmann thought that the United States would rule its neighbourhood in good will and Burnham as well assumed that the United States expressed the supreme ideology and type of regime. But what kind of democracy can sphere-of-influence policies represent? The closer we get to a notion of democracy in spheres of influence and the benefits they entail for the states influenced, the further we get from the pejorative associations of the concept, and the closer we step towards ideas on regionalism and integration. Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is written from the perspective of the individual, demonstrating what life could be like in a totalitarian super-state, but we are left to wonder what is offered at the other pole – that with better-justified spheres of influence. Even if spheres of influence have been discussed historically more than anything as a matter of interstate justice, one should ultimately judge the justice and legitimation of spheres of influence at the level of the individuals affected. Naumann, Lippmann and Orwell got closest to capturing this perspective, even though none of them theorised how the super-state would, for better or worse, provide for the good life.

Something Carr wrote left an impression on me – something which seemed insignificant at first but which conflicted with the pejorative image of the concept of sphere of influence. Carr (1965, 69) wrote that small or medium-sized nation-states lack the resources to provide well-being for their people. This was his justification for constructing a *Großraum*. I wonder if it would be possible to transform the questions of interstate justice relating to spheres of influence, that is, the sovereignty dilemma and inequality of states, into a discussion on how spheres of influence affect the people living within them. Does a sphere of influence connect or divide people? How about the security and well-being of the
influenced *people* rather than of the influenced state? Sovereignty is a value for a state, not necessarily for its inhabitants. Bringing in human justice to complete the normative discussion on spheres of influence means writing a new history of the phenomenon. This research began by exploring what has been a pejorative yet uncontested concept but it should end with the words of Carl Schmitt (2003, 39):

*The earth has been promised to the peacemakers. The idea of a new nomos of the earth belongs only to them.*
References


