CHARLES AMO-AGYEMANG

UNDERSTANDING NEOLIBERALISM AS GOVERNMENTALITY

A Case Study of The IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Regime in Ghana

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Abstract

In this thesis, I critically interrogate power relations that underlie practices, techniques and rationalities of contemporary forms of governance represented by the governing strategy of structural adjustment framework devised by the Bretton Woods institutions— especially the IMF and the World Bank. Far from being a technique of coercion and domination, the thesis demonstrates that structural adjustment framework represents a differing modality of global power that attempts to discursively legitimise external interventions through the imposition of neoliberal economic agenda. I show that structural adjustment policies are carefully constructed neoliberal rationalities of governing through which donors seek to transform the government of Ghana into a self-disciplined neoliberal subject that must behave in an appropriately competitive fashion that is congruent with the ethos of market rationality. I draw on Michel Foucault's nuanced conceptualisation of governmentality, a form of productive and relational power working through individuals' subjectivities particularly as it coexists with the disciplinary rationale of power, and extend it to the relation between the IMF and the World Bank and the government of Ghana. I analyse how these interactions are embedded within a discursive formation and concrete *practices* which establish certain views of 'a problem' and mobilise particular authoritative actors, techniques and forms of truth as solutions. I also explore how over the decades the IMF and the World Bank through the modalities of conditionality associated with structural adjustment have sought to govern, remake and regulate the economic, political and social institutions of recipient States. In closing, and by way of illustration, I also examine 'non-compliance' as one possibility into what Foucault has termed 'counter-conduct' through which subjects undermine and challenge governmental forms of power. This being said, within the structural adjustment discourse, there remains, I would be inclined to argue, repressive and dominant forms of power. This thesis, contributes to the contemporary scholarship on governmentality to deepen and re-evaluate the distinctiveness of power relations in the example of the IMF and the World Bank adjustment programmes in Ghana.

Keywords: Africa, Foucault, governmentality, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Ghana, structural adjustment programmes, discourse, neoliberalism, good governance, subjectivity, power-knowledge, biopower, biopolitics, descipline, counter-conduct, resistance.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

ACBF	Africa Capacity Building Foundation
AFC	Alliance for Change
BWIs	Bretton Woods institutions
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
CEM	Country Economic Memorandum
CEPA	Centre for Policy Analysis
CFAA	Country Financial Accountability Assessment
CGA	Corporate Governance Assessments
CPAR	Country Procurement Assessment Review
CPP	Convention peoples party
CSA	Civil Servants Association
CSA	Civil Servants Association
CSO	Civil society organization
CWSP	Community Water and Sanitation Projects
DPR	Development Policy Review
EEF	Extended Fund Facility
ERP	Economic Recovery Programmes
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ESR	Education Sector Reviews,
ESW	Economic and sector work
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FSA	Financial Sector Assessments
GACC	Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition
GDN	Global Development Network
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
ICA	Investment Climate Assessments
IDEG	Institute for Democratic Governance
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
IFIs	International financial institutions
IGR	Institutional and Governance Reviews

IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDA	municipal districts and agencies
MPS	Mont Perinen Society
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPM	New Public Management
NPMRP	New Public Management Reform Programme
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PNDC	Provision National Defence Council
PSIA	Poverty and Social Impact Assessment
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SAPRI	Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TUC	Trade Union Congress
TWN	Third World Network Africa
VAT	Value Added Tax
WB	World Bank

For my family

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Amo-Agyemang, Charles

Map of Ghana


Burkina Faso
Bolagatanga
Upper East
Benin
Upper West
Wa
Tamale
Northern
Togo
Côte d'Ivoire
Brong Ahafo
Sunyani
Volta
Ashanti
Kumasi
Eastern
Koforidua
Western
Greater Accra
Accra
Central
Gulf of Guinea
Cape Coast
Takoradi
0 25 50 100 150 200 km

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Structural Adjustment Project in Global Governance: Overview

In the early 1980s, African countries like their counterparts in other developing parts of the world found itself grappling with economic tragedy manifested in the form of increasing budget deficits, deteriorating balance of payments, hefty external debt burden, high inflation, worsening terms of trade as a result of a fall in demand for commodities (Paczynska, 2006; Toussaint & Millet, 2010; Makube, 2007; Oakley, 2006; Fourie, 2006; OPEC, 2007; Kaplinsky, 2007; Nwagbara, 2004). While internal factors played a part in creating Africans over-indebtedness and precarious balance-of-payments crisis, well suffice it to say that Africa's debt crisis has been severely exacerbated by exogenous conditions and major developments within the wider global political economy; and therefore provided an important basis for the surge of neoliberal agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s. The debt crisis of Africa came to a head following the demise of the Bretton Woods system of trade and exchange and the two oil price hikes by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973-74 and 1978-79 (Harrison, 2010, p.88; Sörensen, 2009). The oil price hike of 1979 particularly worsened the situation. During this period, many African governments had irresponsibly over-borrowed to fund domestic projects on the back of the commodity price boom of the 1970s in the erroneous belief that high prices and export earnings would be sustained. The oil crisis which provoked a bout of general global economic slowdown, combined with substantial increase in real interest rates during most of the 1970s in the global financial markets hit the non-oil exporting countries in the global south, especially hard (Harrison, 2010, p.88). Though many countries recovered, many did not. Low levels of savings and income and the attendant shortage of investment capital, led many African countries to rely heavily on official development assistance (ODA) and foreign borrowing to close widening resource and investment gap. The rising external control over capital flows between Africa and the rest of the world immensely contributed to the debt overhang in most Africa States paving the way for the promotion of painful neoliberal economic reforms. The deteriorating lending terms and the seductive granting of credit subject to International Monetary Funds' conditionality on loans indubitably played a significant role in the unsustainable level of debt of the post-colonial African states.

These poverty-stricken countries that appeared not to have any alternative route or any room for policy manoeuvre (Adebayo, 2002) out of their deepening economic crisis were compelled to turn to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), on

the condition of implementing radical policy reforms. The international donor community led by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the two foremost proponents of neoliberal orthodoxy (Harvey, 2005, p.15; Stiglitz, 2002) in their passionate intensity and acting with the religious zeal of a latter day saint to solve the African crisis, imposed structural adjustment policies (SAPs) on these countries in exchange for badly needed financial resources to improve their economies (Mainsah & Ikezi, 2004; McGregor, 2005).

Armed with neoliberal development discourse heralded as the only panacea and moniker for development problems with the collapse of socialist regimes, African governments since the 1980s and 1990s respectively, were preoccupied in implementing standard policy prescriptions earnestly linked to the Fund and its sister Bretton wood institution, the World Bank (Mkandawire & Olukoshi, 1995; Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999) :which to all intents and purposes were perceived as economic wisdom or common sense and key to economic growth.

In order for countries to offset their balance of payment disequilibria they have to adopt one-size-fits-all macroeconomic policy prescriptions (Akapori, 2006). These wide-ranging "good" macroeconomics policies comprised measures such as cutting government budgets and subsidies; privatising public operations; raising interest rates; opening national economies to foreign imports, corporations and capital; and trade liberalisation (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007; Ismi, 2004; Keen, 2005; Hartzell, Hoddie & Bauer, 2010). These policy reform conditions commonly came to be institutionalised as structural adjustment programmes. Needless to say, structural adjustment policies or economic reform packages are austerity measures advocated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to heavily indebted governments as conditionality to achieve much-coveted economic recovery and growth (Duncan & Howell, 1992, p.5). That structural adjustment conventionally became a short hand reference for austerity measures adopted by recipient governments usually the result of a co-operation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Gibbon et al., 1996; Haines, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; Ismi, 2004; Sachs, 2005; Todaro & Smith, 2009).

Policy reform conditions associated with structural adjustment whereby loans from the World Bank and the IMF and even private finance became effectively conditional on the agreement by the recipient governments to implement comprehensive economic policy reforms came to animate a form of subtle external state intervention, which significantly and necessarily provided a logic that defines and legitimises what it means to govern, to what ends and through what technologies and practices (Duffield, 2007; Taylor, 2006).

On similar grounds, the radical neoliberal restructuring of the State was most clearly demonstrated in the conditionalities contained in macroeconomic reforms of national policies. From this viewpoint, I argue that structural adjustment framework can be conceived in the modern liberal polity as representing an economic constitution pursued by International Financial Institutions—that is, of being among the foremost economic agenda of the International Financial Institutions, and can there-

fore be elucidated by its insertion within a wider field of economic liberalism as an attempt by these institutions to shape the economic policy of Africa and the rest of the global South through the rationalities and discipline of the market. Seen as key element in the re-formation of the economic and social landscape in these countries (Stiglitz, 2002), World Bank and the IMF extensive intervention through policy conditionality is significant in redefining and reconceptualising the role of the nation-state's 'complex of men and things' (Foucault, 1991); transferring social, political and economic responsibility to private hands and economically rationalised self-governing individuals. For Stein:

> Since 1980, the most ubiquitous and consequential set of policies influencing the developing world has been a series of economic reforms sponsored by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilateral and bilateral donors. From their inception, these policy packages, known collectively as structural adjustment, were imposed as conditions for receiving loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (2008, p.56)

Enmeshed in the regime of conditionality this study contends, is the wielding of economic power most appropriately considered by some to represent the disciplining of African countries; the need and inevitability to monitor, influence and shape the economic and development processes, and provide incentives for compliance with the policies that are part of its programmes without the use of power in the form of coercion or domination. As will become apparent, toward the end of this thesis, I address the question of compliance with the International Monetary Fund conditionality generally, taking a point of departure, however, I analyse noncompliance as a latent critical metric for counter-conduct by explicitly taking into account what causes an adjusting government to risk a rupture in its structural adjustment programme, and thus its relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions.

Adjustment-inspired reforms wrought by the Fund and the World Bank across board, massively sought to institutionalise economic and political reforms as conditions in return for receiving development financing. For instance, one of the key components of neoliberal development discourse and argument effectively entailed a process aimed at dismantling and delegitimising the authoritarian; the logic of neopatrimonialism and/or rent seeking African policy elites (Mkandawire, 2013; Olukoshi 2005, p.19-4). In other words, the concern was primarily driven by the fact that the postcolonial African State has allegedly been a "cold monster", "vampire", "predatory" and therefore had not been propitious for development whilst the magic of the market forces would ensure better development (Akobeng, 2015; Olutayo & Omobowale, 2007; Nooruddin & Simmons, 2006). In this agenda, the Bank and the Fund pontifically claim that the developmentalist and *dirigisme* postcolonial African economy has distorted the market and the development policy thinking in Africa (Hendrix, 2010; Mawuko-Yevugah, 2013; Oakley, 2008). As this line of argument goes, the Fund and the Bank flatly refused to recognise the then fashionable devel-

opmentalist and exponentially paternalistic responsibility the State assumed in the postcolonial political economy (Ekanade, 2014). Consequently, in the early 1980s, structural adjustment discourses came to rationalise and cohere policy practices, seeking to regulate and control the development policy making process of the postcolonial Africa with its heavy emphasis on rolling back the State from economic activity (Mawuko-Yevugah, 2013).

The point that needs highlighting is that the overriding focus of the whole structural adjustment process was it simplistic and superstitious belief that ultimately the "invisible hand" of the market would sanitise Africa's poor economic performance (Dornbusch, 2002; Easterly, 2002; Bhagwati, 2004; Williamson, 2003). This formation of the adjustment model was in more respects than one, framed around the mainstream neoliberal development line of reasoning that minimum State would provide appropriate freer environment for both internal and external market forces to thrive. In this vein, Green argues that structural adjustment reforms were based on the simplistic assumption that the global economic integration through unbridled free trade and participation in the liberalised global markets is the commonsensical path to sustainable development, and to the extent that the benefits of growth will in the long term inure to the be benefit of both the rich and the poor (Green, 1995).

The depressing reality is that contra prevailing dogma fervently invoked by the proponents of neoliberal orthodoxy notably the Fund and the World Bank, and neoconservative theorists, the radical and progressive African political economists have ferociously and persuasively pointed out that after decades of promoting and implementing adjustment packages, the evidence on the ground does not support the optimism and the euphoria that greeted the approach (Stiglitz, 2002; Ismi, 2004; Bello, 1999; Susan, 1990). A key criticism against the Washington Consensus policies represented by the orthodox structural adjustment discourse remains that they have been characterised by slow growth, enduring poverty, lower income, growing inequality, monumental and growing debt situation in most of the countries that obediently followed this developmental model (Stiglitz, 2002a; Ismi, 2004). For instance, Adebayo Adedeji (1989, p.4) argues that the conceptual underpinning of neoliberal argument has been a stunning fiasco in Africa:

> (SAPs) sustained economic growth has not materialized, the rate of investment rather than improve has tended to decrease, budget and balance of payments deficits have tended to widen after some temporary relief and debt service obligations have become unbearable.

To be fair, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in response to these criticisms have grudgingly conceded that their own blueprint was wrongheaded (Blanchard & Lieigh, 2013). In 1989, for example, the Bank conceded that: "There are countless examples of badly chosen and poorly designed public investments, including some in which the World Bank has participated. A 1987 evaluation revealed that half of the completed rural development projects financed by the World

Bank in Africa had failed. A cement plant serving Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo was closed in 1984 after only 4 years in operation. A state-run shoe factory in Tanzania, the Morongo Shoe Factory, has been operating at no more than 25 per cent capacity and has remained open only thanks to a large government subsidy" (p.27).

At its most bizarre, the Bank (2001) has half-heartedly admits that the initial assumption that these programmes would enable economies to resume growth in approximately 5–7 years was unrealistic and that it grossly underestimated the intensity and the deep-rooted nature of the structural dislocation and imbalances of African economies which in a sense, markedly makes it a victim of its own naïve faith in free-market liberalism. As a way of staving off and deflecting attention from the ineffectiveness of its own programmes, the World Bank and the Fund claim that reforms failed because of time constraints, slippages, reversals and lack of commitment on the part of the deficit countries (Heidhues & Obare, 2011).

Largely in response to the severe criticisms (and rebuttals) from observers who were concerned about more than two decades of misguided structural maladjustment policies or question the rationale of the neoliberal 'Washington consensus' in solving the mounting socio-economic malaise for the people in those countries (Harrison, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002), the World Bank and the IMF begun to frame aid policies around 'institutional and technical quick fixes' (Sörensen, 2012). And this finds expression and crucially marks the movement from what Graham Harrison (2004) calls the construction of 'governance states'. Thus, rather than the state-retrenching logic embedded in the nomothetic pretensions of neoliberal structural adjustment prescriptions, the Bretton Woods institutions stressed that the interventionist role of the post-colonial African state must be acknowledged as vital in directing and fostering development. These new measures focus on capacity-building state institutions and intervening to construct 'civil' society that can implement and oversee neoliberal reforms to mitigate the social effects on the poorest population (Ibid). This turn to 'governance states', is indicative of the ambition of World Bank to promote regulatory and liberal project' beyond 'the West' (Harrison, 2004). In these frameworks, "intervention is not exercised solely through conditionality and adjustment, but to a significant degree through closer involvement in state institutions and the employment of incentive finance" (p.77). For Harrison therefore, the Bank's institutional reforms agenda serves a supplement to enhance the implementation and effectiveness of its global development governance and neoliberal agenda through 'transformation narrative'.

But, more interestingly, concurrent with the global governance agenda was a "new development architecture" (Soederberg, 2004) clearly reflected in the dramatic turn to poverty alleviation discourses decidedly marked by the introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 1999. This major turning point was hailed to represent a radical rupture from the ineffective conditionality structural adjustment espoused by the infamous 'Washington Consensus' to a system which strongly emphasises the importance of social expenditure and an opportunity for recipient countries to 'own' their development strategies (Harrison, 2010, p.42; Sörensen,

2012). It bears adding here that part of this so-called fundamental policy shift in the discourse of development policy and practice also take on an added urgency and, even more importantly, engender what has been labelled as the post-Washington consensus with its acceptance of the importance of the State (Ruckert, 2006; Joseph, 2010a). These orientations towards the discourse of development policy and practice, and the wider 'new architecture of aid', as part of its conditions to receiving loans, expect the recipient countries to produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), not only to reinvigorate growth economic but to address the issues of poverty as crucial factors for the success of development and need to be addressed simultaneously ((Sörensen, 2012). In this manner, PRSPs sought to redress the increasingly evident failures of the structural adjustment programme. The rhetoric of poverty reducing interventions and strategies and specifically, the PRSP framework with its emphasis on inclusive with popular "participation" and greater country "ownership" of policies - as well as the promotion of the ideals of good governance, was to enhance donor power in the formulation and implementation of client countries policy processes. Indeed, the conceptual discourses of poverty reduction under the rubric of recent aid architecture and international development relationships, needs to be understood, Jens Stilhoff Sörensen (2010, 2012) has argued persuasively, as an attempt to further institutionalise and re-enforce the dominance of the neoliberal economic ideas and practice and the demands for a post-Washington consensus ideology (good governance) within the Bank and the Fund (Sörensen, 2010, 2012, my emphasis). The cluster of mechanisms being promoted by the World Bank and other Western donors, I would argue, represent a new form of social control and governing technology to steer countries in Africa and the rest of the global south at a distance while relying on mechanisms of self-censorship and self-policing.

Even though structural adjustments are primarily neoliberal market-led reform policies and its purported results, intended and unintended, I argue that it is a political one in several respects. It entails reconfiguring the role of the state and political institutions; it privileges private entrepreneur and it involves contestations and resistance instead of a restricted domain of depoliticisation. The current study does not make a foray into the substantive content of structural adjustment; whether its implementation in Ghana in particular, and Africa, in general was justified or not, neither does it seek to know whether structural adjustment is having negative effects or positive effect on economic growth rate, or poverty reduction. It does not debate the pros and cons of structural adjustment project, but, it does draw predominantly on Foucault's governmentality perspective in an attempt to gain crucial insights into the epistemological positions, intersecting assemblages of power relations, and the corresponding subjectivities that are enabled and reproduced within the broader neoliberal economic reforms in the case of Ghana. Such are the subjects of this inquiry which I set out to address in my study.

1.2 Context of the Study

With the term "governmentality", Foucault did not only refer to the fact that the state becomes increasingly a governmental state, but also that this 'governmentalisation' is particularly sensitive and responsive to changing historical rationalities of power. In this respect, governmentality exemplifies a particular *rationality* (Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008, p.56) within the broader neoliberal context. The foregoing gives that the phenomenon of structural adjustment policies I would argue is a particular governmental logic. It is my contention that this provides instructive diagnostic tool and begs for a more thorough analysis in scrutinising how and why structural adjustment policies become a domain to be reflected upon from the perspective of a governmental rationality and how and why it becomes regarded as a biopolitical problematisation of governing contemporary state as adapted by discourse of global governance. This is important since structural adjustment plans became a domain for policy prescription, an object of governmental reflection and an instrument to achieve the stated goals of a specific policy prescription.

The ascendency of neoliberal economic policies through the IMF and the Bank structural adjustment programmes provide a context of this thesis by using the contemporary development trajectory of Ghana as an empirical frame for understanding neoliberal regime and global power relations. While standard critique of the deleterious and destructive effects of structural adjustment discourse has been one of the most debated topics of our times, in this study, I develop and attempt to analyse how structural adjustment programmes can be understood as a particular logic of Foucauldian governmentality. It is to such a perspective that this thesis is tuned, in order to advance a critical volley against the insidious nature of neoliberalism. At the risk of sounding overly pedantic the description of structural adjustment programmes are not repeated here. It is critically important to emphasise here that critique into structural adjustment has figured prominently and produced an enormous flow of literature (Bello, 1999; Cornia; Ismi, 2004; Jolly & Stewart, 1987; Mawuko-Yevugah, 2013; Stiglitz, 2002; Susan, 1990).

The key point which is worth keeping in mind is the fact that there have been a robust critical literature and sustained criticisms of adjustment packages in Africa. African elite, over the years have articulated and championed counterhegemonic alternative development framework to dismiss the prevalent neoliberal agenda in Africa. Grudgingly defended by the Fund and the Bank, and heavily criticised by those who dismiss the market superiority approach inherent in the policy, orthodox adjustment policy packages have been, and rightfully so set the agenda of debate over the development dilemma in Africa. This said, the dominant themes in International Relations in the study of structural adjustment in Ghana in particular, and Africa, in general, have tended to cluster around its conventional material effects and rationalist reductionist strains of thought (Carmody, 1998; Cheru, 1995; Konadu-Agyemang, 1998; Simsa'a, 1998; Riddell, 1992; Mlambo, 1993; Sahn et al., 1997) without linking it to the substantial part of the story: the dominant shifting concerns to what renders

them both thinkable and intelligible, the intricacies and the historically altering governmental rationalities implicated in them. My argument is that while analyses that easily take its cue from a critique of the orthodox political economic model of adjustment programmes can significantly contribute to the contradictions and ruptures of the bloodthirsty character of neoliberal hegemonic project (Gibbon, 1996; Harvey, 1996),I feel that such analyses tend to reinforce the ascendancy and authority of the so-called Washington consensus development paradigm on which such programmes are predicated: and, as such have largely constrained our potential to imagine political alternatives.

This is the more reason why I maintain an intellectual unwillingness to replicate the same beaten paths - the mainstream/objectivist problem-solving analyses of Africanist scholarship - or, at best the far too simplistic stereotypes found in the self-referential networks often imbued with, if not tinged with Afro-pessimism that cynically critique the material expression of structural adjustment. I make the case that such claims, in short, are simplistic and hugely problematic as it fails to gain neither shape nor widespread acceptance in the implementation of neoliberal reforms, with all its difficulties. In this sense, this thesis proposes an alternative reading emphasising the need to squarely place the adjustment project itself at the centre, where the purpose appropriately becomes to give coherence to what is criticised. I hold that adjustment programmes acquire concrete forms and *visibility* in the configuration of power relations at the international inter-state level, which to a very large extent is actually imbricated in the wider structures and policies that make Ghana, and, for that matter, any African country, possible. Said another way, the neoliberal development paradigm (for want of a better qualifier) biopolitics, gains dominance precisely in the *silences* which it imposes, justifies and defends in its ruthless quest to make the projects and expectations of the 'Other' only discursively and materially valid within the confines of the so-called "Washington Consensus" development paradigm. Thus, what is novel in this work, in the main, is that placing my argument from the vantage point of Michel Foucault's governmentality perspective as a perspective and an explanatory concept, I seek to critically interrogate the neoliberal structural adjustment policy. This interrogation arises out of an interest in power and its expression within structural adjustment policy.

1.3 Rationale for the Case of Ghana

Ghana is the case study of this thesis. There are a number of justifiable reasons why Ghana represents a particularly unique case study for examining the neoliberal governmentality of structural adjustment reforms: first; Ghana was a country widely adulated and acclaimed as the "star pupil", a "good adjuster" and the most obedient follower of neoliberal policies in Africa throughout the 1980s by the IMF and the World Bank (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999, p.58, 82, 83; IMF & World Bank, 1990; 1995); second, Ghana was mirrored as the gold standard and convenient illustration

of the fruitful outcome of neoclassical economic policies in generating growth; third, Ghana's acclaimed success was commonly presented as a reflection of a renewed optimism and triumphalism within the expanded applicability of market-led development in Africa. World Bank's Ghana representative Seung Hong Choi, commenting on Ghana's story success noted: "if (the miracle) can happen in Ghana, it can happen in any African country" (quoted in James Brooke, 1989, p.1); fourth, Ghana's case may not represent the entire Africa region but it will provide lines of inquiry and analytical tools that may or may not be indicative of the power dynamics imbricated in structural adjustment framework in other settings, and, finally, focusing on Ghana is in great part compelling and noteworthy, because despite the fact that Ghana was one of the first African countries to adopt a comprehensive Bretton Woods institutions reform programmes and one that has remarkably sustained adjustment longest, no comprehensive study has as yet adequately analysed how it resonates in many ways with distinctive features of neoliberal governmentality.

1.4 Ghana and the Neoliberal Restructuring Reforms

The government of Ghana in 1983 embarked upon a process of radically restructuring her economy. This neoliberal restructuring agenda has been sponsored and guided by International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This study is concerned with these neoliberal development governances during 1983 through 2000. At independence in 1957, President Kwame Nkrumah-led Convention People's Party government with a Marxist-Leninist philosophical makeup chose scientific socialism defined as the new ideology for Africa development. In economic terms, this grand effort towards socialism effectively translated into the introduction of a planned economy; ambitious expansionary nationalisation of companies and industrialisation programmes (Hutchful, 1987, p.2–9). Consequently, in the decade following independence the Ghanaian economy relatively showed a lot of promise which quickly made her a "model", a "gate way" and a "springboard" for Africa development (Herbst, 1993, p. 27, my emphasis). But sadly however, the mood of optimism dissipated as economic decay begun to loom large during the 1970s, slumped in the 1980s and subsequently became dire in the 1990s. The vicious circle of economic decline in Ghana between the seventies and eighties reflected profoundly in negative GDP figures, a precarious balance of payments position, worsening debt burden, rampant inflation and precipitous fall in the price of cocoa (Toye, 1991, p.153-4; Loxley, 1991, p.5-8; Kraus, 1991, p.120-4).

The general view attributable to this messy state by the International Financial institutions is that Ghana has not been tidy and prudent with her economic policies after independence mainly because of the interventionist policies and vacuous development agenda she experimented under the guise of socialism (Hutchful, 2002). A particular illustration of this accorded with the long-standing features of patronage, brazen corruption, neopatrimonialism, prebendalism, clientellism, and other uprogressive aspects of postcolonial African political economy such as 'bad' economic pol-

icies, and 'bad' governance (Nathan Andrews, 2010; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). However, in 1981, the military junta under the leadership of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings not surprisingly contended that the economic malaise could be attributed to the local "comprador bourgeois" and "neo-colonialism".

Imperatively, it was against the backdrop of this gloomy and hopelessly chaotic economic situation that characterised the move that led Ghanaian government not just voluntarily, but eagerly deepened and relentlessly extended the use of a neoliberal rationality of governance to respond to the 1970's and 1980's economic plight. Indeed, it was within this climate that the then self-styled Marxist revolutionary, Rawlings-led Provisional National Defense Council government (PNDC) confronted by the new orthodoxy of neoliberal government abandoned its radical populism (Ahiakpor, 1985; Matthew, 1991, p.235-63) and earnestly begun to initiate contacts and negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, leading to the implementation of stringent loan conditions and Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) in 1983. The central animating element implicit in the Ghanaian neoliberalising agenda was the notion that Economic Recovery Programme would help combat and revitalise the troubled economic conditions; redressing the crippling external debt overhang facing the country, and improving social delivery (Mawuko-Yevugah, 2010). As in other countries of Africa in the 1980s, so, too, in the Ghanaian context, "misguided" government interventions in the market was identified as the problem, and neoliberal approaches and practices seen as the only panacea.

Introduction of Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), Ghana's version of the structural adjustment programmes indelibly constituted a radical policy shift from the aggressive socialist socio-economic transformation to market-led development model that had been laid at the attainment of independence. The main argument is that structural adjustment discourse as introduced in Ghana rapidly emerged in the old fetishism of the worst excesses of economic protectionism: which became a guiding policy narrative for even rigorous and comprehensive market-led reform policies in the form of neoliberal conditionality restructuring and rationalisation of the public sector through rapid privatisation, divestiture; drastic reductions of government spending; removing of subsidies to domestic industries; removing tariffs; general deregulation of the economy; radical market liberalisation; and devaluation of the exchange rate to encourage exports and reduce imports (Heywood, 2011, p.371; Williamson, 1993) dominating the continent's development discourse (Mensah, 2006; Mkandawire, 1995).

In this way, fundamental to the changes enacted in Ghana was simply to delink and disengage the state from an active role in the economy and to be under the sway of market-friendly forces to ensure efficient and healthy economic development. Simply put, through widespread privatisation, divestiture, deregulation, liberalisation and personalisation, neoliberal governmentality purposefully aimed at transforming, restructuring and reformulating recipients of burgeoning welfare benefits into economically competitive enterprising subjects, who should be self-disciplined to become responsiblised and socialised citizen rationalised and undergirded by a new

governmental reason (the extension of economic rationalism into politics). This in a sense was evidenced in Ghana where neoliberalism's bureaucratic remodelling and reorientation of state formed an inescapable dimension of specific policies and programmes in governing every aspect of life (Ward & England, 2007; Mudge, 2008). Since the 1980s up until today, neoliberal structural adjustment ideas and precepts have ridden roughshod over any solution to the Ghanaian economic malaise particularly among the political elites. As Storey richly put it 'the new orthodoxy' of neoliberalism although constructed by outside powers, is being 'perpetuated and internalised by local elites (Storey, 1997, p.18).

Predictably, prominent within the government of Jerry John Rawlings thinking on how to pursue its policy ambitions in the direction for sustainable development is its accommodation and acceptance of the orthodox political economic model of neoliberal reforms and restructuring under auspices of International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In tandem with this thinking, PNDC government just like other African countries in 1983 launched the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) under the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF. In particular, between August 1983 and November 2000, PNDC regime enthusiastically embraced reform policies closely tied to restoring and repairing Ghana's international economic standing in the 1980s.

The reform policies were drafted in two major phases, each geared toward responding to and addressing a particular problem identified in the economy (Mawuko-Yevugah, 2013). The first phase of the recovery programme dubbed the stabilisation phase, lasted between 1983 and 1986. This aspect of the recovery was aimed at halting the economic decline, especially in the industrial and export commodity production sector. It entailed macroeconomic stabilisation measures which included but not limited to: fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies; liberalisation of prices; and restructuring of the public and financial sectors. The second phase of between 1987 and 1989 was the structural adjustment and development phase which mainly focused on liberalisation (Boafo-Arthur, 1999).

The key elements of the strategy for implementing the ERP have been: (a) a realignment of relative prices to encourage productive activities and exports through strengthening of economic incentives; (b) a progressive shift away from direct controls and intervention towards greater reliance on market forces; (c) the early restoration of monetary and fiscal discipline; (d) the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure; and (e) the undertaking of structural and institutional reforms to enhance the efficiency of the economy and encourage the expansion of private savings and investment (IMF, 1991).

Notably, panoply of targets, regimes, regulation, monitoring, external inspection and policy dialogue were co-opted and mobilised, forming the very micro-politics of governance. However, the point is that from the perspective of governmentality, the use of this arrangement of techniques of indirect controls and market-based policy instruments became an economic totem, an article of faith for the PNDC government. From the apparatus of the state, every corner of the economy, from health to housing and social welfare, and from every nook and cranny, have been inundated

with such regimes, monitoring, and regulation; overwhelmingly consolidated and reinforced within the orthodoxy of state reason. On this point, it is the reliance placed in these disciplinary rationalities, strategies, technologies, and techniques to manage conduct which is perhaps most vividly exemplified in neoliberalism's broader rationality of power. And this is precisely what this thesis sets out to do through critical interrogation of neoliberal development paradigm and its implications for governance in the Ghanaian context.

1.5 Framework for Analysis

The study selectively draws on Michel Foucault's notions of governmentality as a starting point to critically interrogate the contemporary configurations of power relations between Bretton Woods institutions and the government of Ghana represented by the governing strategy of structural adjustment framework. More specifically, governmentality literature offers a better critical conceptual schema to analyse International Monetary Fund and the World Bank structural adjustment policy within the context of Ghana. This configuration proper to power structures and dynamics is best captured by the term neoliberal governmentality. Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) seminal lectures on the history of governmentality delivered at the Collège de France between January and April of the 1977-78 academic years have influenced a generation of the highly credentialed scholars. In contrast to the standard political economy critique that tends to view neoliberalism as a set of policies, such as privatisation of state enterprises, trade liberalisation, unregulated direct foreign investment and the reductions in state spending and regulation of virtually every kind (Williamson, 2003), the task here is to analyse neoliberalism as a form of governmentality and how this idea in our understanding neatly dovetails with what Michel Foucault called the "microphysical" rationalities to the analysis of power through to macrophysical rationalities "and strategic codification through the governmentalised state" (Jessop, 2006, p. 2). That is to say, complex array of apparatuses of knowledge production, liberal techniques and competing discourses and practices are co-opted with the aim of governing human subjects and collectivities.

Foucault's governmentality neologism has spawned significant *array* of studies. Of chief concern here are the twin notable intersecting ways along which most governmentality tradition resides and works. It is with such points in mind that Gordon developed two distinctions to be had in Foucault's own writings and lectures on governmentality (Gordon, 1991). Perhaps more broadly, Foucault analysis of governmentality refers to "the conduct of conduct", or self-government and of the government of others working through their autonomy rather than through coercion (Foucault, 2008) flagrantly reminiscent of the rise of characteristically neoliberal forms of government in the second half of the twentieth century (Lemke, 2012). Given this , governmentality as patented by Foucault can refer to strategies, techniques, methods, mechanisms and technologies deliberately employed, on the one hand, to gov-

ern subjects either directly or indirectly by structuring the field of possibilities, and on the other, the configuration of subjectivity itself under the action of government. This meaning of governmentality is all the more eloquently addressed in Michel Foucault's "technologies of power". Thus Foucault's engagement with the problematics of government can be analysed "from the perspective of a genealogy of technologies of power...according to its objectives, the strategies that govern it and the program of political action it proposes" (Foucault, 2007a, p. 36).

There is a second, more specific and nuanced level of meaning of governmentality that expounds on the art of government (Foucault often used these two terms interchangeably). Here government functions as specific kind of political power or technology of power, one that Foucault commonly highlighted and contrasted with sovereign power. Whereas sovereign power evokes the image of a single source of authority, law and right within a given domain (Rose, 2008, p.2), the discourse on the art of government, Foucault contends, signals a departure from the sovereign to the target of government itself: the population. It could certainly be argued that underwriting Foucault's juxtaposition is the incremental manner in which "thanks to the perception of the specific problems of the population, and thanks to the isolation of the level of reality that we call the economy, that it is possible to think, reflect, and calculate the problem of government outside the juridical framework of sovereignty" (2007a, p. 104).

To fully understand this, it is crucial that we note, as Foucault does from the outset that governmentality refers to the historical variants of technology/neoliberal logic of governing in the seventeenth century under the impetus of the *Polizeiwissenschaft*, and is then reproduced within the context of liberal vision of government in the eighteenth century. That is governmentality as a technology/neoliberal mentality of governing manifested, for instance, in the "discoveries" of political economy and the population. Foucault explains:

> The constitution of a knowledge (savoir) of government is absolutely inseparable from the constitution of a knowledge of all the processes revolving around population in the wider sense of what we now call "the economy"...the constitution of political economy was made possible when population emerged as a new subject...a new science called "political economy" and at the same time, a characteristic form of governmental intervention, that is, intervention in the field of the economy and population, will be brought into being by reference to this continuous and multiple network of relationships between the population, the territory, and wealth. In short...the transition in the eighteenth century from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated by techniques of government revolves around population, and consequently around the birth of political economy. (2007a, p. 106)

These points are not to be taken lightly inasmuch as they disclose for Foucault how government and governmentality are not sterile static categories and irreducible entity —which need not be seen as mutually exlusive but rather their meanings remarkably shift, overlap and actualised in terms of the kind of problems—political and analytical—to which they were put. Governmentality Foucault notes in this respect is conducive to the productive aspects of power that illuminate the ways through which practices and actions are shaped and constituted in conjunction with the transformation of political rationalities (Foucault, 2008; Walters, 2012, p.13–14).

According to this logic, governmentality analytics is meant to open up a flexible and a unifying framework for the analyses of the way in which the world is ordered, conceived and governed and, secondly, a specific horizon of thought well suited to interrogatively envisioning discussions on neoliberal governmentality. In the course of his lecture of 1st February 1979, Foucault proposes governmentality as a *grid* that resonates with the political rationalities that mark the advent of a distinctly modern form of governmental mode of thought—mentality. This proposal hinges on an understanding that Foucault's notion of governmentality... is valid for the analysis of ways of conducting the conduct of mad people, patients, and children (and is equally valid) when we are dealing with phenomena of a completely different scale, such as an economic policy...or the management of a whole social body" (2008, p.186).

To be sure, governmentality is neither synonymous with liberalism or neoliberalism; on the contrary, it is conceptualised in this study as specific forms of governmentality. Principally, it can be asserted that it is precisely such logic of reasoning that prompts consideration for the study of neoliberalism that leaves open the possibility of non-liberal and non-Western forms of governmentality (Jeffreys, 2009; Ferguson, 2010; Collier, 2011; Ailio, 2011; Death, 2013). Thus understood, the term governmentality will be used in this study both as a technology of governmental knowledge production and as apparatuses of neoliberal political rationality (Foucault, 1997, p. 319; Rose et al., 2006, p. 85; Walters, 2012, p.5–6). Following Gordon's reflection (1991, p.2), it is reasonably straightforward to understand governmentality framework in general as "a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practiced". In all of the above instances, that is, following the governmentality tradition that I similarly wish to locate neoliberalism, the philosophy that underpins and informs the economic model represented by the structural adjustment policies devised by International Monetary Fund and World Bank as a specific type of neoliberal governmentality. The governmentality approach is a promising tool in understanding how structural adjustment policies have been constructed, made visible, thinkable and addressed (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992; Miller & Rose, 2008). This is the key focus of this study.

1.6 Research Aims and Objectives

This thesis more broadly aims to contribute towards a more nuanced understanding of the comprehensive ways hegemonic neoliberal regime is shaping our contemporary global politics and to imagine alternative approaches for transformation and social change. Specifically it attempts to critically address, clears up and provide a productive analysis on the multiple and overlapping ways that neoliberal governmental rationalities and practices seek to order social and political life (Foucault, 1991a) through the mantra of structural adjustment in the context of Ghana. Finally, locating my research within the broad theoretical framework of critical IR scholarship with special interest in governmentality perspective, this research attempts to offer a critical appraisal of this theoretical body with the aim of contributing towards it continues appeal.

1.7 Research Questions and the Statement of the Problem

The policies and practices as well as the evolution and the implementation of structural adjustment policies in Ghana in particular, and Africa in general, raise two interrelated questions that my research sets out to explore.

The questions posed by this research were twofold:

> (1) To what extent can Foucauldian governmentality perspective be applied to International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment programmes in Ghana? and
>
> (2) What does a framework of governmentality help us to understand about the political effects of structural adjustment and the construction of development?

In addressing the first question the thesis aims to contribute to the theoretical debates in International Relations (IR) critical scholarship particularly in view of the recent interest in Foucault's concept of "governmentality" perspective that clearly bypass bifurcated conceptual categories of inside *vs*. outside, domestic *vs*. international and micro *vs*. macro—viewed as broad church categories that are in and of themselves inextricably connected and shift in tandem with governmental rationalities and political technologies or art of government—liberalism or neoliberalism through empirical research. I am not in the first place interested in developing a grand theory; instead, one of my chief aims is to gain crucial insights into the conceptual and operational underpinnings of the banal, most mundane practices, the taken-for-granted "reality", and humble acts that are implicated in the production, reproduction and circulation of power in the structural adjustment framework (Larner & Williams, 2004, p.4; Vrasti, p. 12).

While research studies on neoliberal governmentality has traditionally inundated the IR discipline, there have been very few analyses or any consideration given to

the context commonly thought of as "non-Western" as well as "non-liberal" (Sigley & Jefferey, 2006), much less of those that focus on how "new forms of government that are indicated by the increasing significance of international, supranational and transnational organisations" like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Lemke, 2007, p.12). With the significant exception of few early works (Debrix, 2010; Dillon, 1995), most of the current Foucauldian-inspired works (Dauphinee & Masters, 2007; DeLarrinaga & Doucet, 2008; Dillon, 2007; Dillon & Neal, 2008; Dillon & Reid, 2001, 2009; Jabri, 2006; Pin-Fat, Edkins & Shapiro, 2004; Reid, 2004, 2006; Salter, 2003), are mainly geared at clarifying the concepts of biopolitics namely, issues of race, population, migration and reproduction (Rabinow & Rose, 2004). It is not until recently that some Foucauldian scholars have shown interest to employ a governmentality analytics in their research within the domain of international, supranational and transnational organisations (Larner & Walters; Perry & Maurer, 2003; Walters & Haahr, 2005).

More significantly, even the little work being done from a Foucauldian governmentality perspective and specifically with those dealing with issues of international or transnational nature is surprisingly however taking place outside of the realm of International Relations (Crampton & Elden, 2007; Inda, 2005; Li, 2007; Ong, 2006; Collier & Ong, 2005; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Peck, 2004; Rose-Redwood, 2006; Sparke, 2006). Similarly, governmentality approaches so far, had done *little* in contributing substantially to the substantive understanding of Foucault's insights within the wider biopolitical projects of institutions of global governance (O'Brien; Goetz et al., 1998) in this case, the World Bank and the IMF commonly seen as being simply "over" and "above" national states (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002).

In fact, the gap this study humbly proposes to bridge is to investigate how the IMF and the Bank economic structural adjustment model in Ghana can be used in framing the Foucauldian readings of neoliberal governmentality as a starting point for further analysis as Foucault acknowledges the economic rationalisations and impulses of neoliberalism as calculations of global regime of power that selectively grants privileges to those whose conduct conforms to governmental injunctions:responsibility, autonomy and resourcefulness expected from a good entrepreneurial neoliberal subject rather than as a policy framework or an ideology (Weidner, 2009; Vrasti, 2012). In other words, while neoliberal government is a set of power relations that subsumes the entire social life to the logic of market rationality, (Kiersey, 2009, p.363; Vrasti, 2012) it also makes the market into the standard of truth against which all social life should be assessed (Foucault, 2008, p.246). This, I suggest, is congruent with the entrepreneurial logic of structural adjustment policies in African countries to produce adaptable and competent subjects who enthusiastically live up to the dictums of neoliberal market.

Particularly many contemporary empirical treatments of governmentality analytic, insurance, security, accounting, crime, health, or international affairs (e.g., the European Union, international organisations, global civil society), despite its been a question at the very top in the discourses of international development have been deeply

unsatisfying; and by large, tended to focus on an analysis on how governmental rationalities and practices worked, and less so, on how they are met with resistance (Vrasti, 2012, p.7). It is for this reason that the present study in trying to avoid and replicate this trap, considers the forms of agency and subjectivity, particularly in terms of the ways in which power is exercised, legitimised and rationalised through practices of "freedom" and the 'conduct of conduct' in relation to the structural adjustment initiatives. In stark contrast to the prevalent assumptions that problematically present the governed as mere passive, docile and enthusiastic recipients ready to conform to the regulatory edicts imposed by Western, liberal model (Merlingen, 2006, p.190) I feel that it is critical to point to how neoliberalism might inspire resistance by looking at the constraining forces that cause "the governmentalisation of populations to fail" (2009, p.427) or "revert back to something more basic" —what Foucault has identified as "disciplinary power" (Joseph, 2010a, p.225).

Another key question explored in this study is the degree to which the structural adjustment constructs global economic and development governance. Recourse to the Foucauldian concepts in particular, discourse, knowledge-power and subjectivity, and its extended case study in Ghana remain imperative in an attempt to answer this question. Part of why I have chosen to direct my attention to the Bank and the Fund through the prism of Foucauldian perspective is to question or problematise the epistemological foundations of governmental rationalities and technologies of structural adjustment framework and its accompanying policy instrument in the context of development-good governance matrix. In contrast to the commonplace and simplistic renderings of politics of development as political-economic reality or an ideological rhetoric that merely impoverishes the periphery, here Foucauldian concepts provide a more concretised account and the means in which discursive politics of development framing contribute to our understandings of how some things are rendered visible and others invisible (Abrahamsen, 2000, p. 138; Ferguson, 1994, p.20).

The discourse of development governs global politics in certain ways through techniques and sites such as structural adjustment plans, and this thesis is geared at examining how, and with what effects, this is achieved and resisted. It is hoped that utilising the intricacies of discourse to the study of structural adjustment plans will enhance our understanding of how power is embedded in the way we think of, speak about and relate to others— the inseparability of power-knowledge couplet and subject-object relations that reside within the structural adjustment framework. Thus, my research aims at unpacking and exposing the Orwellian designs and disruptions conceptualised and defined through structural adjustment which will serve as opportunities to recover alternatives.

1.8 Research Methodology

A Foucauldian approach does not limit the use of other methodologies and critical devices. Foucault is clear: discourse "is so complex a reality that we not only can but should approach it at different levels and with different methods" (Foucault, 1974, p. xiv). I share this opinion, and hence methodologically I am motivated by a desire to evoke the historical and contextual analysis on the existing secondary literature on the structural adjustment regime in Ghana in particular and Africa in general as a dominant prismatic lens through which to elucidate neoliberal discursive formations as packaged through the of liberal frameworks of 'good governance' agenda (Chandler, 2010; Springer, 2012b). Through the analysis of 'good governance' agenda I show the ways Bretton Woods institutions relied upon certain objects of knowledge and expertise, interventionist forms of power and production of subjectivation that legitimise specific and core assumptions of global economic and development governance; and how it shapes and gives direction to new political spaces within the context of Ghana. The analysis of 'good governance' is based on a number of key discursive statements as epitomised in the 1989 World Bank report entitled *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,* the 1999 *Governance and Development* publication, 1997 *The State in a Changing World* and 2002 *Building Institutions for Markets* reports. These policy texts were purposefully selected because of its canonical and prominent status as well as the coherence of their visions to act as primary producers of neoliberal discourse in the Ghanaian context. These empirical data have become increasingly central in establishing the neoliberal logic of the World Bank and the IMF. And accordingly in order to deconstruct discourses inherent in the politics of adjustment, I draw on Bretton Woods institutions statements on structural adjustment to show how it functioned as a key technique to "govern at a distance" (Barry et al., 1996; Larner, 2000) in which the scope, forms and identities of governmental action — conceived as "the conduct of conduct"—were determined (Foucault, 2000, p.201–222): and the ways in which the discourse of development was defined, shaped, maintained and reproduced in global governance (Abrahamsen, 2004).

By supplementing (and complementing) my case study with a range of official and unofficial policy documents, relevant reviews for analysis which include documents drawn from both official Bretton Woods institutions as well as non-Bretton Woods institutions, we can construct an epistemology around the structural adjustment framework as a regulatory mechanism and/or a new disciplinary framework. Even though a Foucauldian discourse inevitably has its biases, imperfections and shortcomings, however it offers a much wanted insight, sophisticated analytical perspective and most promising methodological avenue that cast a critical and sustained sense of rigour on structural adjustment experience. And it also has much to contribute to our understanding of the effects of the politics of development and its affinity with 'good governance' discourse within the global political economy (Connolly, 1993, p.221; Shapiro, 1981).

1.9 Synopsis of the Study

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The two chapter sets out to explain three Foucauldian concepts in particular: discourse, power-knowledge and subjectivity. Here I delineate the epistemological matrix on which this thesis is based. Using Foucault's critical purchase on discursive formation of ideas and practices, I show how politics of development establishes forms of knowledge, techniques and technologies of power that are productive of a specifically neoliberal form of subjectivity— nation-state. In particular, I demonstrate how both the discursive formations and non-discursive consequences of politics of development are put into play through the power-knowledge nexus; highlighting how it asserts particular understandings within which subjectivities are produced and how such critical perspectives are extended in the light of the neoliberal structural adjustment project proselytised and rationalised by International Monetary Fund and the World Bank within the milieu of Ghana.

In my exposition in the third chapter, I address the main intellectual challenges posed by neoliberalism by looking at the political and economic thoughts of Frederick Albert Hayek and Milton Friedman. I further suggest that one of the ways we can approach the contemporary neoliberal challenge is to survey the ideas of the intellectual arch fathers of neoliberalism by re-reading and re-interpreting the intellectual works of most prominently F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman. As well, this section is woven around my own description, interpretation and critique of the political and economic thoughts of both Hayek and Friedman. Ultimately, I conclude that by considering the subtleties and the complexities of some specific ideas of their works, the so-called elusiveness of neoliberalism can be somewhat rendered understandable, knowable and simplified.

As a way of developing an alternative account for studying neoliberalism, in the fourth chapter, I turn to Foucault's reading of neoliberalism published as *The Birth of Biopolitics*. In it, I find that Foucault's uncannily prescient analysis offers a clear distinction between the governmental rationality of liberalism and neoliberalism. In the ensuing discussion, I walk the reader through the remarkable steps Foucault made in offering a more sophisticated reading of neoliberalism. I then suggest that relying on Foucauldian-inspired thoughts on governmentality through and through, provide an ideal lens to understand the discursive politics of neoliberalism. Paradoxically however, there is also a lively dispute particularly animated by quasi-Marxist epigones as to whether or not Foucault's unflinching position towards what he enthusiastically characterised as neoliberalism could wholly be applied to the uniquely changing conditions that confront us in our historical present. While I remain sympathetic to these provocations, I acknowledge this is an issue I cannot conclusively settle here — that certainly would be another project in its own right.

As a way of unpacking neoliberalism, the main concepts used in this thesis, chapter five explores why neoliberalism despite it perceived dominance has proven to be so elusive in often highly popular accounts. In fact, differences in terms of its incoherence and contradictions illustrate the many disagreements in voluminous scholarship

on neoliberalism. I argue that the reason why neoliberalism appears to be elusive is that we have largely been heedless of its discursive qualities.

Chapter six is motivated by a Foucauldian discourse analytic to examine key discourses, power-knowledge dynamics and production of subjectivities as packaged in the neoliberal 'good governance' development paradigm devised by Bretton woods officials. This chapter contends that neoliberal subject formation in Ghana was validated precisely through the proliferation of legitimising discursive formations like 'good governance' as consent for neoliberal development paradigm. In consistent with Foucault's model of the discursive formation, my intent is to focus on the conditions that constrain and make 'good governance' discourses possible, and instead of searching for meaning, I look for "external conditions of existence". One of the main goals of Chapter six is to give an indication of how narratives of resistance are imbued within neoliberal discourses. This is crucial if we are to counter problematic notions and obfuscations of neoliberalism as inevitable or monolithic imperative and begin to have a radical (re)appraisal of neoliberal logic and its fundamental rationale and how it becomes operable on the ground in Ghana and beyond.

In the seventh chapter, I direct attention towards the examination of the techniques of "disciplining" power enacted by disciplinary technologies of structural adjustment framework. For my purposes, I employ the notion of power as inherent function of relationship a key concept developed by Michel Foucault. In the following, I prefer to evoke the concept of power as productive in which considerable freedom, possibility and autonomy is exercised by the subject in the practice of his/her own individual subjectivity. And, in being so, my discussion will draw on the ways in which the circumscription of state regulatory authority in domestic policy space within the orthodox structural adjustment framework transformed subjects into objects, i.e., the re-appropriation of Ghana as a locus to be managed, administered and reformed. In closing, and by way of illustration, I offer 'non-compliance' as one possibility into what Foucault terms "counter-conducts" or the tactical reversals within the context of neoliberal governmentality.

Finally in Chapter Eight I reflexively conclude by summarising my findings and provide a general conclusion that clearly emerged as significant next steps in this vein of research. It also discusses the contribution of the research. I hypothesised that neoliberalism at its core is a kind of politics that achieves its goals discursively (Springer, 2012b) by rearticulating our social world and how we ought to be governed. In short, a neoliberal governmentality par excellence which I will attempt to answer in the body of the thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

Discourse, Power-Knowledge, Subjectivity

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to explain three interconnected Foucauldian concepts in particular: discourse, power-knowledge and subjectivity to carefully and reflectively delineate the methodological orientation for this thesis. Foucault's analytical purchase on discourse is crucial in discerning both discursive and non-discursive consequences of politics of development. It also holds possibility in exposing and destabilising the constructions of power-knowledge relations and certain regimes of "truth" that condition the ways in which we can think about ourselves as reinforcing and embodying certain subject positions; and the ways that such critical perspectives could be extended in the light of the neoliberal structural adjustment project devised by the twin Washington-based institutions within the milieu of Ghana.

Obviously, this decision is, of course, not altogether arbitrary at all. The overarching objective is to suggest that the focus on the intricacies of discourse, power-knowledge and subjectivity are well suited to offer a luminous interpretation of what politics of development and discursive legitimation of neoliberal structural adjustment actually do in an attempt to understand how they pertain to contemporary relations of power and government. Contra doctrinaire and simplistic interpretation of development as a monolithic imperative or an ideological mystification that merely entrenches existing power relations, Michel Foucault's conceptual apparatuses provide a more concretised account that shine significant light on discursive formations in respect of the dynamics of visible and the hidden, permeated through the use of almost unchallenged and the marginalised ideas which gain wider acceptance in institutions pertaining to the discourse of development.

It is not enough to all too frequently blame structural adjustment programmes devastating resonant failings to solve development problems arguing that it is more productive and fruitful, however, to also ask what is solely served or wholly produced by their failings, and how they structure global governance in certain ways (Foucault, 1975, p.272; Abrahamsen, 2000, p. 138; Ferguson, 1994, p.20) beyond simply describing it. Therefore, I argue that Foucault's work is, in this respect, a compulsory reference insofar as it exposes, unpacks and deconstructs the intricate linguistic utterances and discursive understanding of development which overwhelmingly give coherence and legitimacy to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank's penetrations within the context of Ghana and beyond not as natural. But this chapter asserts that it should instead be seen as intimately bound up with the production and

re-production of global power relations formed out of contextually specific material circumstances for their possibilities and justification.

To concretise these remarks, I first dissect Foucault's understanding of discourse to discern how politics of development frames our understandings of issues or set of problems in a particular way. By taking a radical rethinking in mapping out the intersections between politics of development and its corresponding discursive formations and *practices* as a starting point, this chapter seeks to vigorously problematise, contest and tear down the assumed inevitability and all-encompassing version of neoliberal theology to render "the familiar strange" (Foucault, 1980). I then set out to examine the way politics of development as discourses and practices effectively function to legitimise and instil certain forms of superior economic knowledge, entrench forms of power regimes coagulate under subjectivation (Springer, 2012b).

2.2 Discourse Analysis à la Foucault

Michel Foucault's theoretical and empirical corpus on discourse has received incredible expansion and become a source of inspiration to authors in the broad field of development thinking in the past two decades (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Cornwall & Eade, 2010; Cooper & Packard, 1997; Crunch, 1995; Eriksson Baaz, 2005; Ferguson, 1994; Grillo & Stirrat, 1997; Groves & Hinton, 2005; Moore & Schmitz, 1995; Mosse & Lewis, 2005; Rahnema, 1997; Ziai, 2015). In articulating the significance of discourse, Michel Foucault (1972) who is among the foremost seminal thinkers of discourse analysis, was centrally concerned in cultivating a cutting edge approach for understanding how the bigger social world is *represented* and how this primarily tend to influence the perceptions and preferences about the way people understand themselves as self-evident reality. That is, a reality which perpetuates the constructedness of others as subjects is tightly aligned with discourse due to its formative power. Discourses Foucault famously described are "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 1970, p.54).

Discourse, knowledge and power are all intrinsically linked and mutually imbricated domains. As Foucault (1981, p.52-53) writes, "discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and by which there is a struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized". It must be acknowledged that in Foucault's *oeuvre*, the definition of discourse is unclear, notoriously elastic and not easy to pin down: "sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements" (Foucault, 1972, p. 90). It was not until page 131 in *Archaeology of Knowledge* that he gave tentative definitions of the concept— "we shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation". Whereas the general misunderstanding of definition of Foucault's discourse is beyond the scope of this thesis, in my view, though, its utility certainly is of central concern to this thesis.

With that being said, I utilise Foucault's notion that discourse—more correctly discursive formations —explicitly constitutes "the general domain of all statements" (*"enounces"*) or "an individualisable group of statements" (1972, p.90) —in this case, the Fund and the Bank's statements that have been discursively produced (Hall, 2003, p.72; Sribas, 2014). The "statement", *pace* Deleuze (1988, p.15) is extracted in Foucault's theorisation from the simple techniques of exactly what can (not)be said and what can be thought and enunciated at a particular time and place (Pitsoe & Letseka, 2013, p.24) established as "truth"(how what is said gains authority).

Development discourses as Arturo Escobar correctly points out "results in concrete practices of thinking and acting through which the Third World is produced" (Escobar, 1995, p. 216). Put this way, Foucault strikingly aims at no less (but no more) than describing the statement, in an entirely different sense. It is not merely as language -in-use, sets of thoughts or sayings *per se* (Young, 2001) but as a "function" (Foucault, 1972, p. 98) in Pêcheux's (1975) *sense* of the term that install regimes of truth (knowledge). This underscores the fact that Foucault's depiction of "statement" as "function" that can be theorised as a bundle of interconnected discursive practices and forms of knowledge that may overlap and coincide as they change historically to define a particular relations of power; triggering what Judith Butler expressed as process of interpellation (Althusser, 1971; Butler, 1990) whereby one can "recognize and isolate an act of formulation" (Foucault, 1972, p.93).

The "statement", a principal theme that runs through Foucault's analytics of discourse and discursive practices, again need somehow to be thought of and grasped as a "special mode of existence" (1972, p.100) which, by implication, "enables rules or forms to become manifest" (p.99). Thus in his attempt to navigate and make sense of the tactics related to the construction of psychiatric "truth" inscribed in power-knowledge specific to the discourse of natural history, Foucault repeatedly and systematically looks,

> to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, to analyse the conditions in which this function operates, to cover the different domains that this function presupposes and the way in which those domains are articulated. (1972, p.86-87)

The very fact of this focus, Foucault himself has often claimed, is on how discourse evidently constitutes its objects rather than merely representing it. In the Foucauldian formulation, what needs to be analysed and hence understood, is to specify how for example psychiatry practices and institutional apparatuses find a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object —and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, observable, measurable, classifiable and describable" (Foucault, 1972, p.46). As Hall (2001) conveys, "discourse "rules in" certain ways of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write, or conduct oneself "and "rules out" limits and restricts other ways of talking, or conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about

it" (p.72). The primary argument being made here by Foucault is not to ask for how a group of statements (discourses) and practices function not to define "objects, fully formed and armed" (Foucault, 1972, p.47) but to call into question "what it means for them to have appeared, when and where they did and not others"(Foucault, 1989b, p.109). The interest is obviously to study how "things said" could be in the true— accepted as an accredited form of knowledge.

Thus conceived, Gilles Deleuze (1988, p. 8) in recounting Foucault's interest in statements even suggests that "statement has a "discursive object" which does not derive in any sense from a particular state of things, but stems from the statement itself". Interestingly and instructively, drawing freely from him if statements are "the words, phrases and propositions which revolve round different focal points of power... set in play by a particular problem" (p.17); then similarly for this study, what is of deepest importance is to locate 'statements' that enable/disable as things said within the discourses used to describe problematic structural adjustment model that function with constitutive effects to speak into existence of heavily indebted poor countries as a recognisable (Butler, 1993) object of discourse (Foucault, 1972, p.50) .

In essence, this should thoroughly alert us to the fact that in considering structural adjustment packages which characterised African states elites as deviant objects who need tutelage (Escobar, 1995,p.30) in order to be delivered or redeemed "from the undignified condition called underdevelopment" (Esteva, 1992, p.7), reciprocally, it is these discourses we need to analysis in order to open up the problematic of ways of thinking through the system by which these particular truth-objects are formed and the specific enunciative modalities (Foucault, 1972, p.205) or types of statements and practices that embody such as subject position and subjectivity.

Finally, Foucault discusses subject-*positions* defined by the enunciative function played within discursive practices which make possible the objectification and subjectivation of human beings. This clearly suggests and echoes what Foucault portrayed (in the broadest sense possible as the construction of the ideal form of man as subject and object of knowledge): "Man appears in his ambitious position as an object of knowledge and a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator (...) " (Foucault, 1973, p. 312). The value of Foucault's explications resides to a large extent in its analysis of objectification as the chief means and a positive foundation that dictates a definitive technique of visibility (Deleuze, 1992; Ewald, 1992): a method, says Scheurich (1997, p. 107) capable of illuminating how a "group is seen or known as a problem".

This interpretation and its extension to the sphere of Ghana , I will illustrate, tacitly assumes that once conceived as an object of a particular sort, individuals - the nation-states, can be transmitted, diffused and dispersed into disciplinary spaces within that "grid of social regularity" (p.98). From this, individuals — the nation-states, could become subject to particular discourses, practices and rationalities, and thence exhibit a nexus of regularities that result in what Butler most appropriately (1997b, p.358-359) describes as, the "on-going" subjugation: which significantly come across

as the very operation of interpellation, that continually repeated action of discourse by which subjects are formed in subjugation".

It may be said that narrativisation of objectification aligns with the idea that individuals not only come to occupy spaces in the elaborate "social hierarchy but through their continual subjugation, ordinarily come to know themselves and accept their world" (Graham, 2011, p.672). Therefore, one could suggest, following Foucault that statements are articulations that may possibly be said (and done) that look at particular ways of being, acting, seeing and thinking actively constituted as an object of expertise or knowledge. This line of thinking typifies and mirrors the discursive neoliberal logic which I contend has become all-pervasive way of life and altogether invisible that other ways of being, of saying, and of doing politics are increasingly becoming (or already have become completely) lost?

Consider, for instance, the case of Arturo's *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*: the systems of discourse and representation of "reality" associated with the advent of "development" as "a domain of thought and action" in the immediate post-1945 period has not only significantly created an efficient principal mechanism for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over the Third World", the organisation of the third world into a social Darwinistic model of progress has made it possible for the successful deployment of "a regime of government over the Third World, the one half of a starkly bifurcated architecture—the abstract oppositions between "developed" and "underdeveloped", "modern" and "traditional", "rich" and "poor" (Escobar, 1995, p.9-10; Tan , 2011, my emphasis)

In the considered view of Escobar (1995), the process of "development" as constituting a part of the "anthropology of modernity", a complex historical conjunction (Naz, 2006, p.68) is characterised by what Badie (2000, p.77) tells us is "the logic of universalization". There are three issues that need to be rationally unpicked here. To begin with, a distinct and distinctive regularity of statements, which is neither linguistically or logically correct both in general form and dispersion, come to represent a discursive formation itself; a "family of statements" (Deleuze, 1988, p.11). This, in turn, forms the surface of a discourse or a certain "positivity" (Lemke, 1997) which points towards the constituting field of power-knowledge that characterise a particular discursive social relations (Foucault, 1972, p.48). Secondly, once a demarcation of a field of an object of scrutiny has been validated through the discursive practices of a particular regime of knowledge, that object becomes attached increasingly to that domain; and, thirdly, the discourse that constitutes the object also to a degree, constitutes a complex mix of knowledges and practices that will inevitably come to function as an instrument of power through which that object is disciplined (Foucault, 1972).

The portrait I have painted so far has focused selectively on how discursive practices are much more textualistic (Spivak, 1993, p.56). However textual studies clearly form an infinitesimal part of what constitutes discursive practices. Textual productions, classically conceived, exist as an interlinking ensemble of social practices generating in the process what is controlled, selected, organised, redistributed and excluded to form discourse (McNay, 1992, p.27). To the extent that discourse consists of a densely com-

plexity of converging, enwrapping and diverging practices, researchers writing from a disciplinary background of development have included spatial and temporal contextual realm in their understanding of discourse.

Breaking free of a model that tend to conventionalise textual forms, it is the central premise of this endeavour not only to include textual materials in my analysis but hope to do justice to the networks of heterogeneous material elements as a "archaeology of knowledge" (Foucault, 1972). This approach of course has significant correspondence with neoliberalism as discourse for the central reasons of both "structure" and "agency"; "thus adequately capturing the discursive production of neoliberalism" (Springer, 2012b, p.135). This is important mainly because, materialities (state formation through policy and programmes that is both constituted by and constitutive of the subjectivation) characterised structural adjustment model in this instance, for the re-invention of Ghana as a local arena for external intervention: "their power, in effect, derives from their capacity to translate ideas into material form" (Best, 2014, p.13). More importantly too, Following Foucault (1984, p.252) who declared that "space is fundamental in any exercise of power..." it is my submission that these material conditions or accounts offer a nuanced appreciation of manipulating and defining a hierarchy of power relations within the discursive field of international development.

By portraying discourse as a regularity of practices which shape what can be thought and said, it is my contention that Foucault's work on discourse can productively be read as inherently connecting materiality and the discursivity. It is exactly in this sense that discourse cannot be constructed, established, consolidated and validated in isolation of material drivers (Cotoi, 2011). What is perfectly certain is that discourses are not simply free-floating signifiers or insular. It rather revolves itself entirely around the power of material conditions and social effects in which they have been used. It is this *effect* in Foucault's language that presents an extremely efficient mode of power that enormously paints an acute picture of how discourses always function which in this instance again were institutionally framed by the orthodoxies of structural adjustment model. It evokes and considerably has an important consequence for revealing the implications of discursive practices as an instrument of power: discursive practices ...take shape in technical ensembles, in institutions, in behavioural schemes, in types of transmission and dissemination, in pedagogical forms that both impose and maintain them (Foucault, 1984, p.12).

Potentially more problematic though is that at any one time, there will be a multiplicity and *dis*continuous set of discourses which bear directly on the potential ruptures and struggles with each other; always changing, absorbing, and transforming other discourses (Young, 2001, p.402). It is this framing discontinuity of discourses or episteme (the knowledge system of a particular time), I take to be the key element which will turn out to be absolutely crucial in opening possibility of counter hegemonic discourses and spaces for the hope of resistance.

Once again it can be argued that because Foucault understands discourse to be embedded in social systems with its attendant description of discursive formations and their discontinuities, discourse, I think, should not be conceptualised as mono-

lithic or hegemonic totality (Cohen & Arato, 1994, p.291-292; Pieterse, 2000, p.175-191); or overly restrictive, dominating and finally "mostly oppressive" (Dryzek, 2006, p.39) but has a constitutive and determinative role in producing partial and situated reality.

On another related tangent, Foucault has been accused by feminists and Marxists for being extravagantly vague and or neglecting the exact influence that material objects expressed in discourses, say economy has on the formation of discourses (Sawyer, 2002, p. 441). Suffice to point out that as far as this imprecision is concerned, Hall (1988, p.51) and Dean (1994, p.17) go as far as to suggest that Foucault's predilection of "primary relations" in his archaeological work is a clear enough indication that he uncompromisingly saw awesome non-discursive practices as a necessary precondition for discursive transformation to take place. In fact this blatant misunderstanding of Foucault's archaeological method has also been corroborated by Rabinow (1991, p.10) pointing out that Foucault is consistently materialist in asking how discourse functions, and that practices are just as much discursive as language.

Michel Foucault is worth quoting at length here:

> ...in discourses something is formed, according to clearly definable rules: that this something exists, submits, changes, disappears, according to equally definable rules; in short, that alongside everything a society can produce (alongside: that is to say, in a determinate relationship with) there is the formation and transformation of "things said". It is the history of these "things said" that I have undertaken to write. (Foucault, 1991a, p.63)

Recognising the multiplicity and materiality framework, it is worth keeping in mind that in the field of development policy, discourses coexist and compete with tightly-knit and disparate webs of discourses that interweave with competing discourses which coalesce, take hold and clash: thereby producing incongruent meanings which weave into different strands over time and hence open to tropological displacement (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). This multiplicity is what Foucault, would simply call the "tactical polyvalence of discourses" (Foucault, 1997, p.100-102). This obviously does not mean either that neoliberal discourse as a dominant paradigm has stayed unchallenged or "the potential for subaltern discourses to unsettle the orthodoxy remains" (Springer, 2012b, p.143).

Jeniffer Milliken sort of agrees. He, too, argues that "the open-endedness and instability of discourses means that they are liable to slip and slide into new relationships via resistances that their articulation and operationalisation may engender" (Milliken, 1999, p.242). This, then, is the substance of the matter. Consequently, "it is this relationship among discourses; these intra-discursive, inter-discursive and extra-discursive dependencies or webs that we should try to analyse" (Foucault, 1989f, p.163, my emphasis). It is also, I submit, precisely this friction, perturbations and disturbances that create the whole field of power and the positions that ultimately construct subject positions within discourse. In this context, discourse is not a place into which

the subjectivity irrupts (Foucault, 1991c, p.58); it is quintessentially a place where power-knowledge produces them. Perhaps it might be more interesting to examine how Foucault negotiates with these philosophical concerns which form the substance of my subsequent sections: precisely because for Foucault, the questions of subjection and power and power-knowledge form the cornerstone for any understanding of discourse. As should be sufficiently clear by now, Foucauldian discourse is an ensemble of social practices and conditions through which a situated or historically specific reality is made intelligible. Discourses shape the world and simultaneously structure power relations in certain ways. They have a situated character as it were and subsequently produce partial, incomplete and situated knowledges which are arbitrarily fixed, uncertain, and potentially open to contestation and negotiation (McNay, 1994, p.74-76). Predictably perhaps, in understanding and resolving the tensions within these negotiations the task at hand not least will be an engagement with power, a concern I turn my attention towards now.

2.3 Enter Power-Knowledge Nexus

2.3.1 Bringing Power Back In

Although I will provide a fuller discussion of power and its relation to knowledge I am looking at in this chapter, before this however, I think it is worth spending a moment highlighting Foucault's analytic that describes the functioning of power — the other half of the power-knowledge nexus in its positivity and in its contextual specificities (Ewald, 1978; Walters, 2012). If we accept Foucault's contention that "it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power" (Foucault, 1980b, p.52), then one cannot help but also recognise the effects of power linked to knowledge. Let me first make clear how I am using the concept here: given that the question of power is one that has been discussed at length in the last chapter; I am not going to reflect anew on it here. What I want to do here instead is to undertake some necessary conceptual clarification of sovereignty, biopower and discipline for comprehending how objects-subjects or domains are reinscribed within a particular power-knowledge formation.

Foucault in interrogating power beyond historicisation and functionalism insisted upon different rationalities or modalities of power immanent in discourse (power-knowledge) that have been developed from the eighteenth century up to now. Foucault characterises the various technologies of power to challenge, classify prevailing governmental forms of power, and to indicate trajectories towards other, to newly emerging governmentality: Sovereign power, biopower and disciplinary power of which the relationship among them is one of "historical transformation but which of course is not necessarily entirely linear (Foucault, 1975, p.209): although these rationalities face each other in the second half of the eighteenth century, "in the end it was the third that was adopted": discipline (p.131). This does not at once imply that discipline saturates and dominates all relationships of power; it does merely imply

as Foucault himself notices that diverse technologies of power are reassembled and heterogeneously overlap, intersect, or even contradict in the contemporary societies (Fiaccadori, 2015).

He begins by distinguishing what he calls sovereign or juridical model of power, which as he argues is a historical situation in which earliest form of power was held by monarchs over their subjects. He is a "material and physical presence, "and the origin of a "force that he himself deploys or transmits to some few others" (Foucault, 1975, p. 208): sovereignty had the sword and the law as its primary instrument. The "juridico-discursive" (Foucault, 1976,p.82) liberal technologies of power to repeat the Foucauldian mantra was used by monarchs which denotes a configuration of awesome power over life and death, and in fact the state and its entire people (Foucault, 1990). Thus, the capacity to decide on life and death is essentially the 'right to take life or let live' (Foucault, 1976, p.136). Foucault's conceptualisation of sovereign forms of power is understood as power exercised over individuals and the population through *prohibitions* and increasingly state apparatuses which are grounded on the regimes of truth and the functioning of discursive practices involved. But opposed to all justificatory narratives of juridico-discursive rationale of liberal technologies of power in line with Lemke, is the installation of the "notion of freedom of a (sovereign) subject on the one hand and the instance of political sovereignty on the other" (Lemke, 2010). This is key as it aims at non-juridical understanding of concept of power that is not expressed in terms of its origin in the institutions of the state.

On the other hand , the concept of biopower, or "domain of life over which power has taken control" (Membe, 1993) developed by Foucault in both *The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, and Society Must be Defended* emerged as a relatively new and distinct form of power in the course of the seventeenth century in Europe as a form of pastoral techniques of governing (Foucault, 1982, p.215) through procedures to conduct the conduct of individuals to conform to preordained acts (Golder, 2007, p.95; Miller & Rose, 2008, p.16): pastoral power is thus an individualising power which infiltrates, sustains and produces one's conduct.

Biopower profoundly entails power over people's body and as power to foster a positive influence on life. Biopower says Foucault, is intensely related to technologies that endeavours to administer and continued optimisation of the human body: "shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns" (Foucault, 1990, p. 137)—which is in dramatic contrast to the traditional juridical model of power that involved the ritualistic marking of the body through terror and torture, which was exactly what Foucault set out to move away from (Fiaccadori, 2015). In a sense therefore, the species life of populations is intensively administered and shaped to bring them in line within a prescribed and defined norm (Reid, 2006). At the anatomo-political, bodily level, biopower has been involved with collecting demographical statistical values in order to vigorously pathologise elements of the population on a whole range of issues such as subjectivity, illness, gender and other measures in regulating modern societies (Foucault, 1978, p. 140-141; 1995, p. 25; 2003, p.249). It seems then, that biopower, as I understand it predominantly produces a kind of

power-knowledge and truths which are used to institute mechanisms which consist of individuation and subjectivation through discipline and surveillance (Dillion & Reid, 2001).

In other words regulatory mechanism that primarily operates at the level of the collectivised body of a population functions as a foil or a hinge which gave ultimate realisation to biopolitical regimes of power aimed at regulating and management of the life of a new political subject, the population (Mills, 2013, p.85) or the species through global governmental programmes and its practices (Reid, 2010, 2006). Biopolitics as a fundamental trajectory of power emerged in the eighteenth century with the task to "rationalise specific problems presented to governmental practices by the phenomenon characteristic of a group of human beings constituted as a population: health insurance, sanitation, birth rate, economic prosperity, longevity, fertility, sex education, race (Foucault, 1997a, p.73). Biopolitical tactics as we know "takes species life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation of a novel and emerging set of discursive formations of power-knowledge" (Dillion & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, p.257). As with the biopower, here too biopolitical framing of government of life if we follow Foucault (1990) foster and to a great extent deploy forms of power-knowledge and political rationality to produce discourses which are used to devise techniques to objectify, subjugate and control the biological in a specific form (Dillion & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, p.257). Foucault thus claims that human beings have been subjected to these "truths" through the "normalisation of life processes" and coercion (Foucault, 1978, p.144; 2003, p.24); which is to say that biopolitical technologies and biopower complementarity (Collier, 2009, p.85) serve "instruments of the state institutions or techniques of power" both of which essentially constitute an integral part of the disciplinary normalising logic of power (p.82-87).

Foucault finally turns his attention to what he calls disciplinary technology—*"an anatomo-politics of the human body"* (Foucault, 1976, p.139), whereupon claiming a distinctive epochal shift in terms of the dominant and prevalent mode of power. Thus what Foucault suggests is "the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their spread throughout the whole social body, the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society" (Foucault, 1975 , p.209).

Disciplinary rationale of power that mainly, although not exclusively, manifested itself in the transformations of the penal systems in the late eighteenth century Foucault repeatedly stresses, produced a form of subjection that enabled bodies to perform their tasks in modern society (Reid, 2006). Foucault claims that discipline as the rise of a new form of power prescribes certain practices, norms and compels individuals to take up their role in society emerged when the figure of the king was not a symbolic identifiable centre of power. Briefly put: "the right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of society" (Foucault, 1976, p.90).

Indeed, Foucault (1980c) points to the fact that in parallel with the decisive rearticulation and reconfiguration of biopower which was primarily concerned with the

regulation of the individual and the population; disciplinary rationale of power operates from the epistemological discovery of Man as object of knowledge: Man can be watched, measured, ordered, and controlled (Foucault, 1976, p.136). The importance of this point can hardly be overstated. As Foucault notes: this power was "instituted so that it reaches into the grain of individuals ...and inserts itself into their action and attitudes, their discourses and everyday lives" (p.39). This is about the mundane encounters within the locus of the everyday-life, to loosely appropriate a phenomenological concept - that the deeply problematic world of structural adjustment is dangerously ingrained into the non-problematic experiences of everyday reality: in Lefebvre's (1984, p.24) terms — it is the quotidian that on the contrary it is taken literally for granted, rarely questioned and even cursorily addressed.

Crucially, the tight grip on human body through the normalising logic of surveillance, hierarchical observation, examination, monitoring, standardising and uniformising (Foucault, 1995, my emphasis) in *my* view is only one among many processes of thorough individualisation in disciplinary technologies of power. In fact one could claim therefore that reforms wrought by structural adjustment also substantially comprise of standardising and uniformising elements which are innocuously and subtly used to collect data which is translated into expert knowledge upon which adjusting countries are represented in the global marketplace (Best, 2007); which was precisely the concern of the state elites in Ghana. Through these governance strategies countries quite simply are sufficiently rendered *visible* phenomena to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for an extensive state intervention.

Producing regimes of *visibility* in this way, to a greater extent facilitates the construction of multiple representations about these countries which occurred invisibly, anonymously and out of the realm of the general public and yet pervade the entire social fabric (Debrix & Barder, 2012, p.100). The essential point to note, for Foucault is that the task is to directly regulate the body (Joseph, 2013), i.e., the state elites internally so that they control their actions and conform to the strictures of the international economy to make them governable —all of which create the frame of normalisation process: "a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life" (Foucault, 1978, p.144).

Let me illustrate this with the intriguing case of Ghana to get a better glimpse and more adequate sense of how donor adjustment model, among other examples, is more expressive techniques and technologies of interventionist global government. What I want to point out is that orthodox adjustment, as instruments of a will to power of as usual an inherently nihilistic and narcissistic neoliberal practices and discourses is intimately tied to the attempts at framing the normalisation and the stabilisation process within which the government of Ghana in a sense, voluntarily submitted itself to the power of Bretton Woods institutions without being aware of it: neoliberal structural adjustment legitimates itself through emancipatory discursive formations by increasingly insinuating into people's quotidian life or even tries to reshape and refashion that life.

What Foucault's analysis of discipline rationale boils down to is that power does not simply repress. As he puts it: "in fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (1975, p.194). Thus what Foucault has focus so particularly on and sensitive to was the question of "how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as subject" (Foucault, 2003,p.28)

Using Jeremy Bentham's panoptical systems of disciplinary surveillance (1995), Foucault provides an insightful contemplation on how panopticism was an important technique through which disciplinary forms of power is able to function within social practices such as a prison setting and its significant contribution to power relations in the nineteenth century (Foucault, 1995, p.195-228; 2008b, p.73-79). He showed how for instance, the panopticon as a machine was designed purposely to make it visible and legible for the prison supervisors to control and surveil the inmates conduct (Monk et al., 2008). By keeping a record of each inmate observed they gathered knowledge which are used to develop further mechanisms for "correcting" individuals. Strictly speaking therefore, when Foucault asserts that "discipline makes "individuals" (Foucault, 1975, p. 170), he alludes to the individualising effect of power-knowledge nexus.

Constant gaze through non-juridical logic of surveillance and observation Foucault maintains, incite states of compliance and to uncompromisingly produce "docile bodies" (Foucault, 1995, p.135-69) in which power is exercised over them (Angus & Winslade, 2015). The subject of observation by contrast, disciplines him-or herself to conform to the norms (Dean, 1999; Morgan, 2005). In short, the disciplinary gaze is a normalising gaze (Foucault, 1995, p.183) "which is continually (re)produced by the "omnipresence of the mechanisms of discipline underpinning society" (Springer, 2012b, p.941). Here, I argue through Foucault that much like the focus on the panoptical qualities of the development of penal discipline, the concern here, I think, is the economic surveillance of what Gill (1995) calls "disciplinary neoliberalism" which becomes abundantly clear in the case of Ghana.

Looking back at panopticism (Foucault, 1990) it becomes apparent how the subject is subjected to relations of power as she or he is individualised, categorised, classified, hierarchised, normalised, surveilled, and provoked to self-surveillance. The thesis is that discourses as a product of an articulatory practice are used to construct people as subjects through disciplinary power which operates invisibly to control their conduct as prisoners. In this sense, the goal is to become aware of the rules as 'truth-claims' and internalise them for fear of the repercussions of non-conformity.

In this section, I have examined the interrelationships among different competing rationalities of government: sovereign, biopower and discipline based on the fields of visibility they reveal, the regimes of knowledge they construct, techniques and technologies they legitimise and the forms of subjectivity and identity they produce (Dean, 1999, p.20). It is the two main correlates of Foucauldian model of biopower, i.e. disciplinary (or anatomo-political), and regulatory (or biopolitical) forms of

power with reference to the process of normalisation as opposed to biopower that will be the central analytical and explanatory utility in the coming chapters.

But as indicated elsewhere, this does not mean that all other forms of power have simply been displaced. Not at all, merely that disciplinary and biopolitical rationale are compatible strategies of power to the extent that objectification of discipline can for instance, intimately be connected with the subjectification of biopolitics. Or, to put it precisely, both strategies function more and more as normalising techniques as firmly embedded within discourses (Agrawal, 2005). That being the case, my discussion will draw on the ways in which the circumscription of state regulatory authority in local social contexts within the orthodox structural adjustment transform subjects into objects, i.e. the re-appropriation of Ghana as a locus to be managed, administered and reformed in particular ways.

2.4 Power and its Relation to Knowledge

Through Benthamite panopticon, Foucault explicitly constructs a systematic analysis of power as a set of discourses and practices which functioned as a spatial diagram of *visibility* and intelligibility to influence conduct for a specific rationale and strategy (Foucault, 1995, p.195-228; 2008b, p.73-79). Foucault's critical focus on the explanatory potential of Bentham's panopticon enables the telling of highly intrinsic and irreversible relationship between power and knowledge on one's action. Thus Foucault wants us to recognise how power relations can be grasped exclusively in terms of its target for knowledge which ostensibly manifests itself in the constitution of human subjectivity (Sarasin, 2009). Foucault (1990) lucidly expresses this point in the following passage: "every power relationship is imbued through and through with calculation, there is no power relationship that is exercised without a series of aims or objectives" (p.95). That is to say any exercise of power leads to a complex network of power-knowledge relations and when knowledge is deeply connected and firmly nested to power it assumes certain truths (Hall, 2003). One obvious expression of this claim is that rather than studying knowledge and power separately, it is the "nexus of knowledge power" (Foucault, 1997e, p.53) that greatly needs to be described in order to effectively grasp the acceptability of the knowledge power system.

Consider the following passage: "power and knowledge directly imply one another, meaning that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (Foucault, 1995, p.27). Now, the crux of the issue —for Foucault as for Nieztche before him—is that power-knowledge first and foremost primarily influences the discourses that people take in and are shaped by (Nieztche, 2011). Foucault's radical analysis on the question of power and knowledge in turn, has consequences for what he calls "regimes of truth" and also raises the question of the critical role of discourse and discursive practice and its ramifications for the status of human subjects in contemporary societies (Foucault, 1977). Encapsulating this

position, Foucault notes that 'truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it" ; and a such "truth is already power" (Foucault, 2000, p.132-133). It is in this sense that, Foucault's conception of discourse as I have argued previously is expressive of the essential link between the role of power relations and the historical production of knowledge-truth we live by: "there is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms" (Foucault, 1969, p.201).

It should be clear then that power operates to both produce and establish which discourses are regarded as universal or transcendental truths on which all else decisively depends (Foucault, 1970) by rejecting other truths (perceived or designated as false), so to speak. And thus clearly the analysis of discourse in Foucault's formulation, "does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they were "really" saying ... it is a description of things said, precisely as they were said" (Foucault, 2002, p.123). To illustrate this, we can consider the discursively constructed regimes of truths around adjusting countries. Through relations of power, Bretton Woods Institutions impart their products of "knowledge" that masquerade as the "truth" upon adjusting countries usually by discourses of neoliberalism: and worse yet, they have uncritically come to be understood and perceived as "common sense", "natural" and rarely questioned. What this also hints at is that knowledge that is embedded in discursive practice is not only seen as a reflection of an allegedly universal truths, but it also have consequences on how it becomes an instrument of domination and exercise of power: that is ways of making sense of the world which Foucault denotes as "power knowledge discourse" (Ebrahim, 2003, p.11-12; Rossi, 2004, p.1-2). Thus, for instance, Foucault says,

> The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside power or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and function would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirit, the child of a protracted solicitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraints. And it induces general effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (1984a)

This quotation poignantly sums up Foucault's point that "truths" are discursively produced effects situated in a specific, historically rooted power-knowledge network which conditions the rules for practices and discourses by which humans can be constituted as subjects (Foucault, 1995, p.194). This is perhaps another way of saying that

there is acknowledgment of power when discursive truths, practices and of course disciplinary techniques regulate discourse and the conduct of human beings (Hall, 2003). This way of thinking goes some way to problematise and reverse the long-held Baconian aphorism that "knowledge is power" (Gordon, 1980, p. 233-234).

And indeed such a reversal, I claim provides helpful insights to see power as immanent in knowledge rather than two interrelated hazy notions. In fact, in its most general form, formations of power-knowledge such as politics of development as Foucault would argue, is a fact of discourse.

Arguably it is for similar reasons I contend that it is perfectly plausible and reasonable to analyse the flows of power within to seriously complicate and to consider as the starting points of our inquiries why and how certain "regime(s) of truth" has become widely acceptable and being perpetually institutionalised to the point where it is seen as "common sense". Such a reflection in my estimation, enables us *not* just to question and reject why historically situated technologies, strategies, the discursive production of truths and tactics of power have gradually become codified and reinforced in some institutions (most important is perhaps the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund): but so germane and critically important to opening alternative political imaginaries (Dillon & Reid, 2009) to the possibility of change.

It is here, within the matrix of power-knowledge that Foucauldian approach to politics of development comes to the forefront; and which yet again has many resonances to my argument. First of all, therefore, it presents a distinctly revealing outline to the problems and the explicit problematisation of a "fictitious construct" (underdevelopment) (Escobar, 1995) as not pre-given and unproblematic scientifically neutral transcendental "Truth": but have always been discursively constructed which falls well within the logic of power relations that have (de)legitimised a particular topic as an object of investigation. The second, related point is that primarily because underdevelopment and poverty do not simplistically exist as Platonic forms, but, rather commonly understood to be underpinned by their historically and discursively constructed structures of meaning; then their constitution as objects of scientific enquiry can be understood only in the materialised intersections of the prevailing balance of forces at the time of their formation (Naz, 2006, my emphasis). In thinking about development state of affairs most overtly via the dynamics of discourse and power as articulated by Escobar (1995) from my perspective throws doubt and opens various fields for exploring the possibility for more fundamental truths or thinking otherwise, since these forms of development knowledge are always produced by and through particular power relationships (Smith et al., 1996, p.16).

But again this *is* a most crucial observation and, to the extent that it allows us to "stand detached from (development), bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyse the theoretical and practical context with which it has been associated" (Foucault, 1986, p. 3). In fact, if development knowledge essentially emerged as a social construction that is contextualised historically and discursively (Omar, 2012, p.46) then it does even foreclose and particularly shift focus from "what is" to how subjects and forms

of knowledge are always constructed within this discourse as so-called developed and underdeveloped.

Power and its relation to knowledge as far as I can see, make evident, identify, recognise and unavoidably expose the political and strategic nature of discourse embedded in power relations by virtue of their presumed status of "truth" as solutions. The task requires us to deny and denaturalise the concreteness of discourse, power, knowledge and truth about certain objects and importantly in this context repose the pertinent question once posed starkly by Michel Foucault (1980, p.115), thus: "*for what* and" *for whom* do certain policies, practices and discourses serve? And in doing so serves as a filter for saying all that can be said and be critiqued. In this respect, Ferguson's (1994) refreshing study, *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* alludes to how World Bank's development discourse constructs Lesotho as a "Less-Developed Country" ("LDC") where World Bank is able to create a "structure of knowledge" (p. xiv) around the object (Lesotho-as-LDC) by organising interventions on the basis of this structure. By epitomising Lesotho as having an aboriginal economy and agricultural society, it becomes taken for granted that Lesotho is an LDC and that it needs the kind of intervention (knowledge) that the Bank offers. The main line of argument being advanced here is that that development programmes as Ferguson skilfully reveals, pretends to rely on the fallacy that its intentions are mostly motivated by technical and scientific research, for that matter, inherently devoid of any political considerations and essentialist representations (Della Faille, 2011).

In arguing this, I am referring precisely to how Foucault's instructive understanding of discourse as power-knowledge corroborates and sufficiently accounts for how knowledge primarily constituted as discourse about Ghana, I should say, could have been produced with a particular *truth-effects* (the established economic truism and good governance agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions): a certain vision of economic reality that was used to design belligerent policy initiatives portrayed as a sole purveyor of all manner of political-economic transformations. And as a matter of fact, in this, is Foucault assertion that all truth claims are merely fabricated fictions and unattainable. More than ever, he concludes:

> No! I amnot looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by another people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions—and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper— and pessimistic activism. (Foucault, 1984, p.343)

And since "everything is dangerous ... the ethical political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger" (p.256). The point Foucault makes is that we should consistently be careful about the consequences of the façade of invincibility of truth; the precarious nature of knowledge claims and be critical about the effects of all discourses and ways in which they shape, and frame or rearticulate what is possible to think, say or do.

In all regard, this aptly signifies that discourses of the neoliberal governing projects instituted by the Fund and the Bank this thesis makes clear, were not inherently bad or good; and in being so I think it seems fair to say that, the outcomes of development programmes that come attendant to neoliberal structural adjustment are not bad, or not altogether bad. Surely I do concede that they often arguably bring changes of a kind that people supposedly want and so in Foucauldian fashion, I resist the attempt to grandly critique nor cynically dismiss or unveil the objective "truth" behind structural adjustment packages. To put the matter otherwise, "I don't try to universalise what I say; conversely, what I don't say isn't meant to be thereby disqualified as being of no importance" (Foucault, 2003c, p.246). In other words, my intention is to develop a biopolitical perspective on structural adjustment in an attempt to make helpful contribution to what Foucault (2003, p.7) magisterially calls the "insurrection of subjugated knowledges". By subjugated knowledges Foucault meant two things. On the one hand, as either "historical contents that have been buried or masked in functionalist coherences or formal systematizations" and, on the other, "as a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges and as insufficiently elaborated knowledges" (2003, p.7). The empirical analysis of this thesis explores the historical presuppositions of a episteme of system of thought (Olssen, 2004) contents, structures and conditions, and the formation of discourse in a particular period that have largely remained severed and masked under powerful political economic systems in our contemporary context (neoliberalism). In untying, unmasking and exposing these historically specific contents, structures and conditions, this thesis makes a crucial contribution to the insurrection of subjugated knowledges therefore. Alternatively, by employing Foucault's "toolbox" to develop a biopolitical perspective on structural adjustment, and thereby elaborating and expanding further on his empirically informed theoretical concepts, this thesis endervours to provide cutting insight into the insurrection of subjugated knowledges.

In fine: it is more productive to suggest that the analysis of Foucault's conceptual architecture of the power-knowledge complexes offer the possibility of problematising certain discourses (good governance) and disciplinary practices (structural adjustment) instituted by international Monetary Fund and the World Bank to influence policy direction in Ghana. Foucault's theorisation of how the common matrix of power and knowledge contributes to subject production, I gather, is obviously crucial for an analysis of structural adjustment and the struggle over the knowledges caught up in and tightly bound up by "truths" of neoliberal discursive formations.

Bringing a Foucauldian perspective on the internality of power and knowledge, I inquire: how does discursive formation like "good" governance and its effects, evoke

certain views of "a problem" to which various programmes, interventions and practices attempt to give an answer; authorises and empowers certain experts, mobilises techniques and systems of "truth" as solutions (Frazier, 1997). More than overly simplistic and familiar account that ideally portray development in terms of ideological cleavages deployed to mystify and obscure the exploitation of particular classes, I think it is more accurate to recast and recalibrate the ways the discursive politics of development framing enable us to ask for instance, how Ghana was demarcated as a particular problem space and the ways in which her situation should be improved during the adjustment period.

The analysis of power-knowledge through discursive formations called archaeology I would argue also lurks within the emergence of the genealogy of the subject. This is true of course, and enormously important for the analysis of how power and knowledge give rise to a certain type of neoliberal subject taking into account both discursive and non-discursive practices. A consideration of the aspect of how these discourses cross fertilised and co-constitutively (re)define particular subject *positions and* subjectivities forms the basis of the next section.

2.5 Understanding Subjectivities

Foucault throughout his intellectual life remained implacably hostile to the practice of "systematizing and universalizing political and scientific theory which turned subjects into objects" (Maddigan, 1992, p.266). "Subject" as, in Foucault's words, is "being subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault, 1982, p.212). Theoretically clarifying — and reconceptualising, of course— his usage on the human subject, Foucault's analysis can be said to reveal an additional sense of a pluralised world of multiple subjects. He was centrally motivated by the desire to theorise forms of subjectivity because "man was a fictional construct produced in those regimes of truth that claim to describe them" (Walkerdine, 1997, p.61)—and thus a product of historical developments shaped by discursive knowledges, power relations, institutionalised practices (Danaher et al., 2000, p.123) which are irrevocably linked to social relations.

Resolutely opposed as Foucault was to the embodied subjectivities as historically contingent - he was not indeed naïve and negligent of the ontological possibility of a naturally autonomous and productive human subject; only this way one can explicitly grasp what a human individual is: "to become individual one must become subject" (Foucault, 2007, p.231). And yet, he completely rejects and disavows any a priori or suprahistorical perspective of the subject as presented in existentialism or phenomenology (Foucault, 1997a, p.290) suggesting instead to read and think power precisely in terms of its productivity. This is all the more so as in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality,* Foucault (Foucault, 1979, p.70) tells us that subjection is largely attributable to a product of social practices effected by discursive formations (disciplinary knowledges). Foucault in his work documented the centrality of the practices

and techniques used for the production of truth and how eventually "a truth willing subjects" is constituted (Foucault, 1985).

Again, in his distinctive and mind-blowing essay called "The Subject and Power", Foucault explains that his "objective... has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (Foucault, 1982, p. 777). In this essay, Foucault offers an acute picture of how subjects were perceived and enacted in particular ways. Yet again, in *The Subject and Power*, Foucault (1982, p.208) explores three modes of objectification that have historically been the enabling moment in transforming human beings into objectified subjects. This, that is to say points to the objectifying effects of the so called scientific inquiry arguing that it is this objectification that forms the power-knowledge constellation, before moving on later to the objectification of man in what he refers to as dividing practices and the attendant dangers inherent in them. The final mode of objectification is neatly illustrated through an analysis of sexuality on how human beings turn themselves into subjects which has a constitutive effect in either shaping new identities, actions or creating a new awareness (Oksala, 2007).

This description provides a case in point with respect to the challenges of political elites in Ghana which I maintain could definitely be linked to the way they have been transformed as political subjects and how this transformation limits the number of alternatives available for them to act as policy makers. Here we can look to the influence of Foucault's work which played pivotal role in how human and social sciences have defined and shaped the way man is understood for a long time: in other words, demonstrating a broader interest in how people's political subjectivity, including the political subject of the nation-states was shaped thanks to disciplinary power often through social institutions such as prisons and defined norms which made people think in given ways. In *History of Madness*, what Foucault sees, is one's subjectivity can be shaped through categories and labels such as illness and madness (Foucault, 1994a). This, essentially, I claim was as true for the adjusting countries as for the *History of Madness.* Supplementing Foucault's argument on *History of Madness* (for example, Ghanaian state) was discursively constructed as weak, predatory, neo-patrimonial, crony, personalistic, prebendal, kleptocratic, rentier (Olukoshi, 1998); this owes, I will suggest, by particular discourses within particular regimes of truth.

This at any rate separates them from the so-called Western leaders and possibly shapes the way they are perceived by others and how they think about themselves. Yet this insight is played down as Foucault in his work on *Technologies of the Self,* sheds a grander light on the continued importance of how people can also invariably choose to be subjects, wherein they take the initiative to have what he calls "relation with oneself" by working through techniques of the self to transform, negotiate, fashion their own identity and relate to themselves as subjects (Foucault, 1994a, p.88). This understanding reinforces and provides a fascinating view of the sheer transformative and the productive power of neoliberal discursive practices (structural adjustment thinking) which precisely lies in its regulation of life and thenceforth creates subjects through a focus on subjectivities without recourse to domination and control: "neo-

liberal subjectivation works on individuals who are rendered as subjects and subjected to relations of power through discourse" (Springer, 2012b, p.139).

In large part working through responsible, self-governing subjects, I want to argue, most prominently justifies the presence and practices of the structural adjustment which ipso facto is a product of a sooner example of advanced liberal governmentality. Evidently, by offering an attentive reading on power working through freedom and the processes of subjectification this involves, Foucault's insights as post-Marxist and neo-Foucauldian theorists are eager to explain vehemently resists and does away with the common impression interpreting it purely in terms of - for instance all powerful global institutions suppressing say less powerful African states - but rather shows how practices of government intersect and overlap in the constitution of global power relations. As long as this is so, I think, Foucault's approach to the analysis of constitution of subjects — or subject formations —within discourses faithfully then, provide the possibility, an escape route and the means of identifying how suitable neoliberal subjects are produced and constructed.

2.6 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have engaged with the Foucauldian concept of discourse to interrogate the political effects of the discourse of development and the politics of structural adjustment. I have explained how an understanding of governmentality contributes to how sovereign, disciplinary, and regulatory forms of power work to regulate the conduct of conduct through self-knowing, autonomous and reasonable subjects (Springer, 2012b) acting according to the calculating logic of discursive politics of neoliberalism. By following Foucault in seeing power as deeply imbricated and contained within, each other in the production of knowledge with subjectivity and its discursive nature, it has moved away from the fetishisation of development as an unproblematic instrumental concept simply obscured to entrench existing power relationships. Rather I would propose politics of development must be read as discourse which establishes specific regimes of visibility, authorises particular regimes of knowledge, institutionalises a range of practices and techniques, and produces certain subjects and legitimate actors (Frazier, 1997).

I have shown how the influence of power-knowledge is evident in the constructed discourses and regimes of truth that have historically and to date played a significant role in repeatedly producing forms of subjectivities or identities (Dean, 1999, p.23). But here there arises two interesting issues in particular. One is that it expressly imparts the view that these alleged truths appear to form the basis for the Bretton woods Institutions extensive policy interventions which subjugate the state and the work of political elites in this study. Another is that in Foucault's reading, the influence of power-knowledge allows these institutions to de-fang, control, entrap and discipline the State elites so that they wilfully conform to these truths. As was argued, a Foucauldian reading of this study in every instance suggests that many challenges

encountered by state elites in Ghana emerge because they have to strike a delicate balance between indigenous forms of knowledge, the hegemon imperatives of scientific and economic forms of knowledge. As we witnessed with Foucault, each of these discourses is strictly speaking predicated on different truths about the seductive overtones and "common sense" rhetoric of development and what is important.

State elites in Ghana in particular and Africa in general keep stumbling over and are gravely faced with competing imperatives that define appropriate conduct often in different ways, apparently. We might conclude that these challenges emerge very largely because these truths are generally (or at least) premised on experiences within "advanced" or Western contexts imposed upon the African (Ghana) as best practice. It is on this strength that the possible assumptions, knowledge, discourses, truths, disciplinary practices and norms rationalised through practices of freedom about neoliberal development paradigm in Ghana are being contested and challenged.

As Foucault reminds us, we need to escape the dilemma of being either for or against. One can, after all, be face-to-face, and upright (*debout et en face*). Working with a government doesn't imply either subjection or a blanket acceptance. One can work with and be intransigent at the same time" (Foucault, 2000, p.455–456). And it is precisely this stance of standing face-to-face which is always informed by critical engagement and incessant questioning: "to do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy" (Abrahamsen, 2000, p.138).Consequently this study seeks to recognise, politicise and question the forms of rules established by development discourse within which the nomos of structural adjustment becomes internalised and realised. This is manifestly part of the broader ethical agenda of discourse analysis itself which ultimately "seeks to make visible the political consequences of adopting one representation of social reality rather than another" (Ibid).

CHAPTER THREE

The Neoliberal Challenge: A Critical Re-reading of the Political Economy of A. F. Hayek and Milton Friedman, and of the Intellectual History of Neoliberalism

"In order to get close to what a writer is all about, you have to get close to the words they actually use and be shown how to read these words". Simon Critchley.

3.1 Introduction

The overarching objective of this chapter is to critically explore the seeming tensions between twentieth century and contemporary neoliberal political theories on one hand, and the political and economic theories of among others Friedrich. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, on the other. This chapter contains the description and my own interpretation of the political and economic thoughts of both Hayek and Friedman, as well as some circumspect criticisms of their thoughts. In the ensuing discussion, I suggest that *one* of the ways we can approach the contemporary neoliberal challenge is to survey the ideas of the intellectual arch fathers of neoliberalism by re-reading and re-interpreting the intellectual works of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman. It is my contention that one of the virtues in focusing on the subtleties and the complexities of some specific ideas of their works they claim to *represent* is that it illuminates and offers a unique insight into the historical excavation of neoliberalism much more broadly and hopefully give answers to political and economic problems of our times. In turn, this thesis does not also claim that the intellectual positions fiercely defended by Hayek and Friedman only *constitute* "neoliberal-ness" so to speak or will lead us to nirvana, for if anything at all, the intellectual history of neoliberalism has several roots if not many branches, of which Hayek and Friedman may be just *two* possible representatives and therefore their explorations admittedly, is not a *fait accompli* as there are blind-spots. I emphasise that "every reading or re-reading of any literary or philosophical text is always something of a singular experience", which of course, is clearly no easy task and could sometimes be problematic and tricky, albeit with a caveat (Trent, 2010, p.164, emphasis mine).

Without claiming to offer an *accurate* overview of their works, I take consolation from Foucault's admonition that, "there is no single true, accurate, or right way to read a text and that we might do well to concern ourselves least of all with an author's intentions as a guarantee of that singular truth" (Trent, 2010,p.163). And that is exactly what I intend to do in this chapter. Moreover, the reality is that I am not thor-

oughly convinced that these early fascinating, compelling and thoughtful explorations by Hayek and Friedman have left much indelible imprint on the forms of economic government of the late 20th and early 21st century. This is not to say that they are not purposeful and authoritative, yet they may not be quite as significant for a *history of the present.* However, the argument of this thesis is that their ideas have a high purchase in serving as a starting point in "arresting" the so-called incongruity and challenge of neoliberalism and to further expose the blurring lines that seemingly exist within the neoliberal intellectual project, and *rethink* the political positions that neoliberalism initially sought to reject. These discussions of two of the most celebrated political theorists of the twentieth century will certainly serve as a background for the fourth chapter of this thesis.

3.2 Neoliberalism: Historical and Intellectual Context

The purpose of this section is to analyse and explore the intellectual and historical context within which neoliberalism evolved in the 1930s and 1940s. Precisely because of the *different* ways with which neoliberalism has been defined it is barely difficult to pinpoint its intellectual and historical origins (Turner, 2008). However, it has its intellectual and historical roots which can squarely be located within an "ideological movement that met at Mont Pelerin in Switzerland to expose the dangers they felt were inherent in collectivism and to create an international forum for the rebirth of liberalism" (Turner, 2008, p.1). Or more accurately, neoliberalism emerged in the years immediately before World War Two (Denord, 2009; Cros, 1950), which includes intellectuals such as the Austrian economist and political theorist Friedrich August von Hayek, who had received world- wide acclaim for himself three years earlier with the publication of his polemical book, *The Road to Serfdom* (Harvey, 2005, Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; Clarke, 2005; Munck, 2005; Palley, 2005; Campbell & Pederson; 2001; Dean ,1999; Chalfin, 2010). At best, while Hayek and his like-minded Pelerians less explicitly used the term neoliberalism, they doubtlessly inexorably "took the political ideals of individual liberty and freedom as sacrosanct" and gospel (Harvey, 2007, p.24, emphasis mine). In this connection, as I have hinted elsewhere, I review the works of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman among the intellectuals who formed the nucleus of Mont Pelerin Society, two prominent political theorists whose names have come to be commonly associated with neoliberalism in recent times. More especially, Hayek who has been described variously as the "pathfinder and intellectual architect of neoliberalism"—is perhaps the most central theorist of the neoliberal tradition of political thought" (Fogh Rasmussen, 1993, p.49-57).

My principal reason for zeroing in on Hayek and Friedman is not that the works of other members are *less* important or that they are to be disregarded but, rather, to make a case that reviewing the works of all the neoliberals who formed the nucleus of Mont Pelerin Society would certainly amount to an intellectual autobiography. In part, I analyse the political thoughts of these two political theorists fundamentally

because their entire corpus of scholarly work was geared towards vigorous defense of the *ideals* of free-market extremism which include but not limited to liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, commodification, marketisation, flexibilisation, financialisation and delimited role of government which have decidedly and overwhelmingly become pivotal for global economic governance and North-South relations since the late 1970s and early 1980s (Abrahamsen , 2004).

The strategic formulation of neoliberalism emanated from the core principles underlying the formation of Mont Pelerin Society found around the Australian philosopher-economist Frederick August von Hayek in 1947 (Steger & Roy, 2010; Harvey, 2005). In the opening statement of Mont Pelerin Society in outlining its aims, it gave a grim spectacle of the prevailing circumstances which confront them at the time:

> The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth's surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary groups are progressively undermined by the extension of arbitrary power . . . The group believes that these developments have been fostered by the growth of a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law. It holds further that they have been fostered by the decline of belief in private property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved. (Turner, 2008, p.2)

In many instances, the society delivered a scathing critique on economic planning and socialism which in their view, obliquely *constitute* a danger to the survival of free market liberalism and therefore ought to be screwed back (Harvey, 2005; Steger & Roy, 2010; Turner, 2008). The primary aim of the society was to revive classical political economy in order to protect personal freedom, private property and free market against the burgeoning influence of totalitarianism and welfare-capitalism.

Thus it notes,

> The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth's surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own.

That is to say, the formation of The Mont Pèlerin Society by Hayek in 1947 successfully galvanised the intellectual community at the time and served as a fulcrum in shaping what Mirowski & Plehwe (2009) have commented as the "neoliberal thought collective":

> Effective endeavors to elaborate the general principles of a liberal order are practicable only among a group of people who are in agreement on fundamentals, and among whom basic conceptions are not questioned at every step. . . . What we need are people who have faced the arguments from the other side, who have struggled with them and fought themselves through to a position from which they can both critically meet the objections against it and justify their own views . . . this should be regarded as a private meeting and all that is said here in discussion as "off the record." . . . it must remain a closed society, not open to all and sundry. (1967, p.149, 151, 153, 158)

This quotation accomplishes four essential facts: (1) It gives a general description of what constitutes the core objective of the society, (2) It provides Hayek's philosophical take on the new liberal agenda he and his acolytes are able to reconstruct and its inherent excesses (3) It provides a backdrop to the fierce debate that raged on that the state should not in any way create an "artificial order" which has the potential to eclipse the spontaneous order of market economy (4) How these intellectuals should show solidarity among themselves, persevere in their intellectual inquiries and worked tirelessly to see the world become a better place for the habitation of mankind through unfettered market.

More importantly, the society had firm belief about the neoliberal ideals of *minimal* government, *unfettered* markets, and strong private property rights (Mont Pèlerin Society, no date; Plehwe, 2009) but was however ambivalent about the surge of totalitarianism and economic planning in the embryonic democratic welfare states:

> The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth's surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own. The group holds that these developments have been fostered by the growth of a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law. It holds further that they have been fostered by a decline of belief in private property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated

> with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved. (Mont Pèlerin Society, no date)

Most palpably manifest in Hayek's opening address to the members of the society was his identification of three ailments namely, socialism, excessive rationalism and nationalism as *central* enemies that effectively afflict the society that he envisages he and his cohorts will be able to recreate. In one sense, therefore, Hayek saw the state as an enemy which can potentially foreshadow the "spontaneous order" of the market economy. And perhaps ultimately, to construct a society based around the collective ideal of social order which would ultimately *ensure* human fulfilment, happiness and condition that would be more morally lovely (Sheamur, 1996) which significantly sharply contrasts with other libertarian suspects such as Karl Popper and Robert Zodick who favour a more "egalitarian" and "organised" liberalism.

> The basic conviction which has guided me in my efforts is that, if the ideals which I believe unite us, and for which, in spite of so much abuse of the term, there is still no better name than liberal, are to have any chance of revival, a great intellectual task must be performed. This task involves both purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become attached to it in the course of time and also facing up to some real problems which an oversimplified liberalism has shirked or which have become apparent only since it has turned into a somewhat stationary and rigid creed. (Hayek, 1967, p.149)

> It is, I think, important that we fully realize that the popular liberal creed, on the Continent and in America more than in England, contained many elements which on the one hand often led its adherents directly into the folds of socialism or nationalism, and on the other hand antagonized many who shared the basic values of individual freedom but were repelled by the aggressive rationalism which would recognize no values except those whose utility (for an ultimate purpose never disclosed) could be demonstrated by individual reason, and which presumed that science was competent to tell us not only what is but also what ought to be. Personally I believe that this false rationalism, which gained influence in the French Revolution and which during the past hundred years has exercised its influence mainly through the twin movements of Positivism and Hegelianism, is an expression of an intellectual hubris which is the opposite of that intellectual humility which is the essence of the true liberalism that regards with reverence those spontaneous social forces through which the individual creates things greater than he knows .(Hayek, 1967, p.154-155)

3.3 Fredrick Albert Hayek — A Case of his Economic and Political Philosophy

In this section, I analyse and critically engage in more detail the continuing *relevance* and distinctive perspectives of Hayek's political economy *vis-a-vi* the contemporary times. In part, his brand of fiery intellectualism in various ways inevitably becomes pivotal to our understanding of the contemporary market operation or "market Order" as (Hayek affectionately calls it) and therefore it becomes imperative to pursue as far as possible the Hayekian approach to classical liberalism which in my view is well worth further exploration. In particular, I discuss Hayek's works — notably his *Road to Selfdom, Constitution of Liberty* and parts of his *Law, Legislation and Liberty* in the 1940s which were his major works at the time, which clearly relates, in interesting ways to his political, economic and social ideas. Descended from the Austrian nobility, Hayek was born in 1899 in Vienna the heart of Austrian-Hungarian Empire and one of the leading intellectual capitals in Europe. Friedrich August von Hayek was generally considered arguably as the most prominent, most fearless, accomplished, influential, prolific thinker and classical liberal political economist of the twentieth century (Plehwe & Mirowski, 2009 emphasis added). As Gordon (1981, p.471), rightly notes, Hayek's "writings on these matters (the relation of economics to political philosophy) are unequalled in profundity, historical scholarship, and current relevance".Quite regrettably, "until recently, F. A. Hayek was very much an intellectual outcast". To this very day, Hayek's economics is almost completely unknown to his fellow-economists, and Hayek the economist remains a lone ranger even though his intellectual fecundity has been acclaimed as unapparalled"(p.472).

F.A. Hayek was one thinker who spent a life's time trying to show how socialism and economic planning is a chronic danger to solving economic problems and that it is *unworkable*. Hayek strongly believed that the surest way to reverse the stranglehold of collectivism in the politics and economies of the West was to frontally launch an "intellectual assault" against it (Turner, 2008, p.48, 63-64, 75). The apparent decline of socialism somehow someway confirmed his worst fears that socialism was ultimately doomed to failure. To a remarkable degree, Hayek's personal and professional fortunes and the intellectual battles in which he found himself are also the story of the 20th century. Hayek was a prodigious writer who was the author of 25 books and hundreds of scholarly articles in which he articulated an elaborate and an inspiring vision of a free society unencumbered by government. To be sure, Hayek wrote profusely covering a large swath of topics of enormous interest to the society. Hayek's seminal book, *The Road to Selfdom* written towards the end of the Second World War is an insightfully interesting, provocative and at once polemical. His illuminating insights doubtlessly continue to shape how we think about the economic and social problems of our time.

Substantially, in his works such as *The Constitution of* Liberty (Hayek, 1960) *or Law, Legislation and Liberty* (Hayek, 1973; 1976, p.19), Hayek, vehemently opposed planned economy and advocated a smaller government and more unfettered markets.

It is therefore quite only natural to re-read his political theory as a clemency for a *transfer* of political power from the state to individuals, corporations, and the market economy which can aptly be described under the rubric of neoliberalism. To this end, A. F. Hayek's political and economy can be viewed as particularly radical form of neoliberalism centred on a belief in the minimal state — or almost everything in between (Røe Isaksen, 2008; Nilsen & Smedshaug, 2011; Astrup & Nilsen, 2011). Hayek places a lot of premium on economic freedom. He argues that economic freedom should be considered as the political and moral force that "shaped all others aspect of a free and open society" (Steger & Roy, 2010, p.15). He further argues that "economic freedom will not only lead to increase in economic growth and advancement of science and technology but also indispensably to the "undersigned and unforeseen by-product of political freedom" (Kohl & Farthing, 2006, p.16). He says:

> ...if we are to avoid such a development we must be able to offer a new liberal program, which appeals to the imagination. We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage. (Hayek, 1949b, cited in Plehwe & Walpen, 2006, p. 33)

For Hayek, individuals" freedom is indispensable for the development of the entire society. But what is even more significant to observe here is that Hayek considers as fundamentally anti-liberal and an affront any attempt on the part of not even under the so- called democratic society to *redistribute* public wealth and resources tightly held within the ambit of the ideal social justice and cohesion. And he rejected out rightly as irrelevant the *ideal* of redistribution of wealth. To Hayek, central planning is irreconcilable with democratic principles — Hayek has grave misgivings about central planning. For him, planning leads to an imposition of priorities on the people. And this account unsurprisingly became the centrepiece and most interesting themes in Hayek's explanation of totalitarianism in *The Road to Serfdom;* Hayek is by no means clear-cut and unflappable in his views in what he says on this theme:

> Especially in contrast to socialism it may be said that liberalism is concerned with commutative justice and not with what is called distributive or now more frequently "social justice" (Hayek, 1978, p.139). The ideal of distributive justice has frequently attracted liberal thinkers, and has become probably one of the main factors which led so many of them from liberalism to socialism. The reason why it must be rejected by consistent liberals is the double one that there exist no recognized or discoverable general principles of distributive justice, and that, even if such principles could be agreed upon, they could not be put into effect in a society whose productivity rests on the individuals being free to use their own knowledge and abilities for their own purposes. (Hayek, 1978, p.140)

Hayek was an implacable and ardent opponent of state interventionism in any form and saw it as a disturbing echoes in his time; he had a good deal of sympathy for free market competition and a lot of discomfort for overreaching government. Broadly speaking, Hayek's line of argument is that state interventionism is counterproductive and has catastrophic consequences for individual personality since the state lacks the capacity to maintain impartiality.

> If the state is precisely to foresee the incidence of its actions, it means that it can leave those affected no choice ... In a world where everything was precisely foreseen, the state could hardly do anything and remain impartial ... The state ceases to be a piece of utilitarian machinery intended to help individuals in the fullest development of their individual personality and becomes a "moral" institution —where "moral" is not used in contrast to immoral, but describes an institution which imposes on its members its views on all moral questions, whether these views be moral or highly immoral. In this sense the Nazi or any other collectivist state is "moral", while the liberal state is not. (Hayek, 1944, p.57)

Hayek comments that economic freedom in central planning is nothing short of collectivism instead of individualism. For seen in this light, Hayek contends, Socialist systems tend to neglect concepts of economic and political freedom: "As soon as the state takes upon itself the task of planning the whole economic life, the problem of the due station of the different individuals and groups must indeed inevitably become the central political problem" (p.80). It must be borne in mind that it is within this context that Hayek made a broad argument against socialism. Thus, he resolutely argues that socialism is the *root* cause of totalitarianism. He writes: "socialism was the very root of totalitarianism and that every ideal of distributive justice was nothing other than "the road to serfdom", (Hayek, 1947, chapt 7, 8, 10 & 11). The rationale behind Hayek's critique against totalitarianism in his *Road to Selfdom* was to ensure free market competition, and the complete elimination of public economic planning. Further, he was concerned about the danger of an unholy alliance between economic planning and social democracy which in his view could result in a totalitarian state.

> The basic conviction which has guided me in my efforts is that, if the ideals which I believe unite us, and for which, in spite of so much abuse of the term, there is still no better name than liberal, are to have any chance of revival, a great intellectual task must be performed. This task involves both purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become attached to it in the course of time and also facing up to some real problems which an over-simplified liberalism has shirked or which have become apparent only since it has turned into a somewhat stationary and rigid creed. (Hayek, 1967, p.149)

> It is, I think, important that we fully realize that the popular liberal creed, on the Continent and in America more than in England, contained many elements which on the one hand often led its adherents directly into the folds of socialism or nationalism, and on the other hand antagonized many who shared the basic values of individual freedom but were repelled by the aggressive rationalism which would recognize no values except those whose utility (for an ultimate purpose never disclosed) could be demonstrated by individual reason, and which presumed that science was competent to tell us not only what is but also what ought to be. Personally I believe that this false rationalism, which gained influence in the French Revolution and which during the past hundred years has exercised its influence mainly through the twin movements of Positivism and Hegelianism, is an expression of an intellectual hubris which is the opposite of that intellectual humility which is the essence of the true liberalism that regards with reverence those spontaneous social forces through which the individual creates things greater than he knows .(Hayek, 1967, p.154-155)

Sprinking from this again lays Hayek's conviction that the best institutions that we can choose have ineliminable imperfections. It is again a theme which runs throughout and which Hayek repeatedly and tirelessly returns in many places in his writings. In my view, this is Hayek's most profound and influential contribution to political thought. However, this important contribution seriously runs into trouble. Here is the rub. Hayek message in *Road to Selfdom* has little or no relevance in historical reality as "Political Science has already revealed that totalitarianism in and of itself is one phenomenon and authoritarianism another. Economic control by itself would at most lead to authoritarianism, but not to totalitarianism, the cause of which is not economic but inherently political" (Yamanaka, 2009). The truth of the matter is that Hayek's target of criticism was directed typically towards the German and the Soviet totalitarian regimes and to a lesser extent those of the welfare states in the 20th century (Yamanaka, 2009, p.3).

Happily however, as S. Tormey's (1995 as cited in Yamanaka) critique of Hayek clearly indicates this assertion by Hayek is definitively historically inaccurate to say the least. For, according to Torney, Nazi Germany never at any point in their annals of history operated a wholesale socialist planning system (Torney, 1995, p.21-24 as cited in Yamanaka) and that "Nazis presided over a *considerable* capitalist economy in which most of the productive apparatus was privately owned" (Yamanaka, 2009, p. 4). Significantly, the Soviet Union was neck deep in the so called infamous reign of terror long before they embarked on central planning (Yamanaka, 2009) and therefore the dictatorial tendencies of the Soviet state, had less to do with any economic measures introduced by the Bolsheviks in any way (Tormey, 1995, p.25-27).

Finally and most importantly, as Torney insightfully points out, Hayek's assumption that economic planning necessarily leads to totalitarianism to put it mildly is badly mistaken for in my interpretation, Hayek dismally failed to qualitatively distinguished totalitarianism from authoritarianism. At the same time, it would seem to me

that Hayek's thesis that economic planning leads to totalitarianism would have been greatly enhanced if it had been contextually grounded and the concept unpacked in more detail rather than the blanket and omnibus manner with which he presented it unless of course the term totalitarianism was used loosely to cover almost anything and everything bad from that which is not. I do not mean to extol the virtues of totalitarianism. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The point, however, is that it is simply not adequate to say that socialism *inevitably* leads to totalitarianism.

Hayek claims that many of the problems associated with free market economy are invariably the price one has to pay to have a market economy in the first place. As unjust and unfair as Poverty and inequality might seem, they are inevitable in a market economy. According to Hayek, free market liberalism *offers* the best and most efficient way of allocating scarce resources. In essence, the benefits that accrue from deregulation are thought to far outweigh any conceivable drawbacks it can engender precisely because the drawbacks of such policies explicitly *pale* into insignificance than the benefits of state's intervention which will only make things worse, and therefore one must unquestionably accept the unfortunate and deleterious effects of unregulated market willy-nilly (Hayek, 1978, p.57-68) otherwise, our choices for mixed economy will eventually send us to the road of destruction. In other words, free market is God-like and virtuous, it can do no wrong. And even if it does, there will always be good tidings of great joy out of its *apparent* evil. This is illustrative in his magnum opus called *Law, Legislation and Liberty*:

> There exists no third principle for the organization of the economics process which can be rationally chosen to achieve any desirable ends, in addition to either a functioning market in which nobody can conclusively determine how well-off particular groups or individuals will be, or a central direction where a group organized for power determines it. The two principles are irreconcilable, since any combination prevents the achievement of the aims of either. And while we can never reach what the socialists imagine, the general licence to politicians to grant special benefits to those whose support they need still must destroy that self-forming order of the market which serves the general good, and replace it by a forcibly imposed order determined by some arbitrary human wills. We face an inescapable choice between to irreconcilable principles, and however far we may always remain from fully realizing either, there can be no stable compromise. Whichever principle we make the foundation of our proceedings; it will drive us on, no doubt always to something imperfect, but more and more closely resembling one of the two extremes.

Two things must be emphasised here. Firstly, from the perspective of Hayek, we must either choose between an entirely unfettered market economy on one hand, and a planned economy, on the other and there is *no* alternative. The point of this is that unfettered market has no hand, the only hand it has is the hand of avoidable exploitation, unmitigated suffering and hardship. But perhaps the most troubling of it all

which is intimately related to the first one is that Hayek offers no "third way" as far as the organisation of the economic process is concerned only his kind of "imperial edict" (unregulated market) must be accepted hook, line and sinker; his kind of proposals must be taken as Catechism which makes Hayek decidedly dogmatic.

In part, it seems to me that the Hayekian case for neoliberal creed was not merely on policy justification as it were but rather more grounded on policy recommendations. However, it does appear that in his attempt to justify his neoliberal policy recommendations, Hayek seems to oscillate between consequentialist and deontological views (Lundstrum, 1993). Or, more to the point, it is not clear how Hayek differentiates between deontological and consequentialist views with respect to the economy. Here, the argument for minimalist state (which is mine not Hayek's) as far as his consequentialist view is concerned is that rolling back the frontiers of the state, namely deregulation, privatisation and tax cuts among others will have *favourable* consequences for the overall economic situation and deontological, because such a move will ultimately make the society more morally lovely and satisfying, irrespective of the consequences. Hayek firmly sees smaller government and a fewer fetters on the market as an end in itself rather than a means to an end which is incessantly ironic and contradictory. One at times gets quaint and queasy as to whether Hayek was writing as a moral philosopher or an economist.

Another theme underpinning Hayek's neoliberal configuration is the notion of a "spontaneous order" of social life which according to Hayek's understanding is far better than any artificially created order as far as the individual liberty is concerned.

> A proactive welfare state will inevitably, no matter how benevolent its intentions are, stifle economic growth and put an unjustifiable limit on individual liberty, all in the name of an ideal of social justice which according to Hayek is little more than a mirage (cf. especially Hayek, 1944/ 2001, 1973, 1976)

Crucial to the neoliberals' market order is the spontaneous order (Turner, 2008). A spontaneous order, for Hayek, "is the result of human action, but not human design" (p.16). Indeed, in Hayek's account, the market order is *beneficial* because it "increases" 'and even makes' as clear and great as possible the prospects and chance of everyone selected at random" (Hayek, 1976, p.79). Hayek here highlights the following:

> The most important spontaneous order for neo-liberals is the market order. Hayek defined the market order as a "catallaxy" rather than an economy. His concept of catallaxy is the modern counterpart to Smith's "invisible hand". A catallaxy is a collection of interacting economies, all operating within a framework of abstract rules. Unlike an economy, a catallaxy has no specific unitary hierarchy of ends; it has evolved without any conscious design, from the voluntary transactions of individuals. By referring to the market order in this way, Hayek did not base the market on the old naïve assumptions of perfect competition and general equilibrium associated with the classical economists. Rather,

> he perceived the market as an evolving discovery mechanism, complete with uncertainty and shocks. (Turner, 2008, p.122)

It is more striking, and perhaps ironic that despite his charismatic defense of the market order, he also has his own pessimisms against the infinite wisdom of the so-called market order particularly his fear for ordinary people who he thought quite rightly would find it extremely difficult if not impossible to cope with the strict and sometimes even "merciless and immense ruthlessness of market competitions without the fear of horrible totalitarianism" (Yamanaka, 2009). It is in "recognising the state as an important feature of real markets that he allocated it a catalogue of important tasks in maintaining, correcting and supplementing market deficiencies" (Turner, 2008, p.125) which perhaps possibly springs from his nostalgic flight for humanitarian sympathy with socialism which is a complete turning point in Hayekian approach to free market liberalism (Sheamur, 1996).

> There is no reason why in a society which has reached the general level of wealth which ours has attained the first kind of security (he had earlier mentioned "security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all") should not be guaranteed to all without endangering general freedom. There are difficult questions about the precise standard which should thus be assured; there is particularly the important question whether those who thus rely on the community should indefinitely enjoy all the same liberties as the rest. An incautious handling of these problems might well cause serious and perhaps dangerous political problems; but there can be no doubt that some minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient to preserve health and the capacity for work, can be assured to everybody.
>
> Nor is there any reason why the state should not assist the individuals in providing for those common hazards of life against which, because of their uncertainty, few individuals can make adequate provision. Where, as in the case of sickness and accident, neither the desire to avoid such calamities nor the efforts to overcome their consequences are as a rule weakened by the provision of assistance-where, in short, we deal with genuinely insurable risks-the case for the state's helping to organize a comprehensive system of social insurance is very strong . (Hayek, 1944/ 1976, p.120-21)

My sense is that even the kind of role Hayek allocates to the state is profoundly *qualified* and —halfhearted because at the next moment, Hayek asserts that "I had not wholly freed myself from all the current interventionist superstitions, and in consequence still made various concessions which I now think unwarranted" (1944; 1976, p.21) which is flagrantly-self-refuting. Clearly, the only consistency about Hayek is his inconsistency which sets his political philosophy greatly in confusion rather than compromise. Moreover, the role Hayek gives to the state is even more political than economic and I think that Hayek was completely wrong-ended in looking to politi-

cal solutions to economic problems. On the other hand, one could also argue that Hayek's argument for certain forms of governmental intervention is a stark reminder of the fact that as a young man, he had *receptive* ideas for Fabian socialism which according to him was the very motive he became an economist (Yamanaka, 2009). His Inaugural Address at the LSE in 1933 succinctly captures it all, The Trend of Economic Thinking", Hayek said:

> It is probably true that economic analysis has never been the product of detached intellectual curiosity about the why of social phenomena, but of an intense urge to reconstruct a world which gives rise to profound dissatisfaction. This is as true of the phylogenesis of economics as of the ontogenesis of probably every economist (Hayek, 1991, p.19).

He equally quoted Pigou:

> It is not wonder, but the social enthusiasm which revolts from the sordidness of mean streets and the joylessness of withered lives that is the beginning of economic science .(Arthur, 1932, p.22)

In some ways, Hayek's change of heart and soul for certain forms of government intervention with market order despite his initial virulent warning of "market or servitude" in selfdom seems to me personally as suggestive of the fact that he himself is after all, no *admirer* of the market economy he religiously offers legitimate argument in defense. Little wonder then Lundström asserts that Hayek's "instrumentalist view of human conceptions sometimes "enables him to defend ideas which he himself does not wholly accept" (Lundström, 1993, p.224). My argument is that this Hayekian case for the possibility of potential government intervention is hugely compatible and in sync with individual freedom and rationality at least to secure *equity* in society as any attempt to prevent government in interfering in market order can potentially cause unimaginable pain to the poor.

To conclude on Hayek. What is socialism? Communism? Social democracy? Democratic socialism? Mixed economy? Planned economy? Totalitarianism? Hayek's explication does not make clear distinctions about these crucially important questions, the debates that were triggered, and the way the conceptual understanding of these constructs shaped the 1940s and 1950s. My contention is that Hayek could have avoided the definitional conundrums of these constructs and probably freed his unsuspecting readers from any philosophical and theoretical fix if he had added some *dialectic legitimacy* to his arguments. Let me make my objections as clear as possible. My larger point is that Socialism is not completely deceased and buried or *passe*.' Socialism must have gone through many surmountable challenges, but its defining spirit is that it has always picked and dusted itself up anytime it has "fallen". And that is a historical fact that cannot necessarily be controverted if not disputed. Now it appears that Socialism is very much alive and *integral* to some of the greatest, powerful and more successful

economies in the world (Laidler, 2007). Most notably, new form of thinking have sought to grasp the practice of social democracy or democratic socialism in the Scandinavian or Nordic countries: it considers the economic frameworks of these countries – especially in understanding the effects of socialism on political, economic and social life the growth of these countries and this enable us to rethink the welfarist *ethos* practiced by these Scandinavian or Nordic economies.

More interestingly, it engages in how welfarism is reflected in new approaches in understanding Human Development Index (DHI) particularly focusing on explaining how most Scandinavian economies, if not all, have almost always made it to the upper echelon of this list since its inception in 1990. Again, how do Nordic countries count among the happiest countries on the planet, within the wider framework of mixed/planned economy approaches, as opposed to the so-called free market economies or capitalist like Africa? Of importance, for me, is how the shift towards socialism has contributed to this interesting phenomenon? I emphasise again that the framework of thought which underpins socialism and welfarism have led to the spread of socialist and communist political parties globally (Hattersley & Hickson, 2013) and to suggest that neither socialism nor communism is dead. We do also know that socialism and communism have become part and parcel of the changing framework of discussion of governance in relation to several polities with mixed/planned economies such as Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Chile, etc. (Ibid). Indeed the changing nature and dynamics of mixed/planned economic practices of Brazil, for instance, have facilitated the development of its sound economic and industrial growth. Why have Caribbean/Latin American countries deployed system of mixed/planned economy, social democracy, or socialism in terms of *shifting* their political economies in relation to market and market rationality? And yet Hayek makes this infamous argument that it is *highly* unthinkable and unreasonable for a mixed economy to have a dalliance with distributive justice.

Indeed, "if theoretical and philosophical analysis provide the sole possible benchmark against which to assess a program, then only one conclusion is possible about Austrian, analysis': it is deficient"(Cadwell, 1997, p.1856-1890). Peck (2008, p.5-6), in his assessment of *The Road to Serfdom,* movingly writes, "the book may have been a best-seller, but it was practically an act of self-immolation for Hayek — the economist." If Hayek he had had a crystal ball to look into maybe, just maybe, he would have seen how reticent and *resilient* socialism is and how for instance socialism might be a lesser evil than what replaced it. Personally, Hayek was too dogmatic and fanatical. He would have received much wider appeal if he had been intellectually agnostic, pragmatic and realistic. However, in fairness to Hayek, he was a skilful and thorough organiser as he was able to develop a distinctive "knowledge-based" critique of socialism and economic planning (Caldwell, 1997) which was on the ascendancy (Plehwe, 2009, p.16). The strategic formation of Mont Pelerin society, a cohesive society which was his midwife unarguably *proportionately* responded to socialism which eventually greatly helped in his meteoric rise to prominence culminating in the neoliberal

thought collective" and ultimately helped to push back the tide of Keynesianism and economic planning.

3.4 Milton Friedman's Neoliberal Political Economy

Milton Friedman, the Pulitzer Prize winning economist profound contribution in popularising neoliberalism as a dominant global blueprint is priceless and well documented. His vast intellectual resources according to Laidler (2007, p.1) "is rivalled only by John Maynard Keynes as the most influential political economists of the 20th Century". This statement is attested to by Lawrence Summers" (2006) when he asserts that, "we are now all Friedmanites". While Hayek might have certainly had a pre-eminent *influence* in Friedman's thinking and writings, Friedman adds to Hayek's contributions in a number of distinctive ways. While Hayek is widely seen as a pioneer of neoliberalism, Friedman has been credited as the strategist and *mastermind* of neoliberalism, not least through his role as political advisor to for instance the Pinochet regime in Chile (Klein, 2007). In his bestselling book *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962), which represents his foremost contribution to political economy, Friedman like Hayek makes fierce defence for pro-market and minimalist government view of the world (Friedman, 1962). This contribution is perhaps the most enduring and influential aspect of his legacy. According to Harvey (2005, p.8-20), Friedman was a champion of *unregulated* market, personal *freedom* and had a close affinity with the neoliberal group of economists known as "Chicago boys". Friedman in my candid opinion was less sophisticated than Hayek but his book Capitalism and Freedom, a rendition of Hayek's *Road to Selfdom*, received a wider reception among Americans far more than Hayek or any public intellectual could have imagined (Van Horn & Murkowski, 2009; Malnes, 1998, p.312-313).

Friedman in his *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962 /1982), argues among other things that a free market economic liberalism is organically *part* of freedom. At its simplest, "...freedom in economic arrangement is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself"' (Friedman, 1962, p.8.) First, Friedman made a broad argument in support of free market economic policies which for him is vitally important for a *free* society. He contends that, "economic freedom" is necessarily part and parcel of freedom". He further argues that market is an essential *ingredient* in the spread of democracy, prosperity and above all personal freedom (Callahan & Wassuna, 2006, p.10-11). Underlying the assumptions of Friedman core belief is that individual's freedom and choice is *optimally* attained in free market but not in a planned economy (Edwards, 2002, p.39-40, 76-78; Hamilton, 2003, p.64; Harvey, 2005, p.7).

According to Friedmaniac logic, you are *either* for free market liberalism or you are against freedom. As Friedman puts it, "underlying most arguments against the free market is a lack of belief in freedom (Friedman, 1962, p.15). This was of special concern to Freidman because of his view of the advantages of market for ensuring *free-*

dom, and in his opinion market is a far better mechanism for ensuring proportional representation than democratic processes. And in re-echoing Adams smith, intimates that, "the market allows the voluntary exchange of goods between individuals without coercion". "Exchange can therefore bring about co-ordination without coercion" (Friedman, 1963, p.13) .Consequently, "no exchange will take place unless both parties do benefit from it: Cooperation is thereby achieved without coercion" (Friedman, 1962, p.13).

> So long as effective freedom of exchange is maintained, the central feature of the market organization of economic activity is that it presents one person from interfering with another in respect of most of his activities" (Friedman, 1963, p.14). The market thus "gives people what they want instead of what a particular group thinks they ought to want" (Friedman, 1962, p.15).

He continues:

> The great advantage of the market... is that it permits wide diversity. It is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were, for the color of the tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what color the majority wants and then, if he is in the minority, submit. It is this feature of the market that we refer to when we say that he market provides economic freedom". (p.26)

All these emphatically mean that his preference for free market is not rooted on how *sound* it is but rather free market and freedom are *directly* correlated therefore anybody who profess to truly uphold the tenets of a free society must of necessity *subscribe* to a free market economic policy (Laidler, 2007). For only this, in his view, enables one to be a true believer in the *values* of freedom. But the major problem of Friedman's proclivity and impulse for the values of freedom is that it clearly amounts to an *imposition* of his moral values and tastes on everybody (Guerra-Pujol, 2012, p.29). Furthermore, according to Friedman "there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions" (Friedman, 1962, p.13). "One is central direction involving the use of coercion— the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals - the technique of the market place" (Ibid). For Friedman, economic freedom is an indispensible condition for political freedom. "There is an intimate connection between economics and politics, that only certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible, and that, in particular, a society which is socialist cannot also be democratic, in the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom" (p.8). Friedman (1962) argues that the claim that socialist society can ensure freedom is untenable as no one, so far, had been seen to talk in favour of socialism and freedom at the same time:

> By contrast, it is clear how a free market capitalist society fosters freedom ... One may believe, as I do, that communism would destroy all of our freedoms, one may be opposed to it as firmly and as strongly as possible, and yet, at the same time, also believe that in a free society it is intolerable for a man to be prevented from making voluntary arrangements with others that are mutually attractive because he believes in or is trying to promote communism. (1962, p.19-20)

But on a closer scrutiny, these formulations by Friedman are not entirely true and are in fact starkly *inconsistent* with his own devious personal involvement in Chilean economy where despotism, repression and unrestricted free markets were all *inextricably* linked. The free market absolutism and monetarist ideas which were implemented under his watch during the military junta of Dictator General Augusto Pinochet in the 1970s as Chile became the laboratory of neoliberal economics experiment did not by any stretch of the imagination bring about personal freedom in any shape or form. Rather, regrettably, the military junta under General Pinochet was severely criticised and blamed for murdering and torturing thousands of free citizens which left an indelible stains on the reputations of classical economic liberalism. As well, it is worth noting that under General Pinochet, rather than economic freedom forging personal freedom at least according to the thinking of Friedman, freedom was sacrificed on the *crucifix* of repression. And this of course invariably means that economic freedom should be treated *merely* as means but not as ends. In other words, economic freedom should be treated solely as instrumental but not as values in and of itself. And this clear-cut distinction between political freedom and economic freedom escapes Friedman. One would have thought that the unsavoury events following the neoliberal virus which perilously infected Chilean people would have helped Friedman to rehearse his understanding of the marriage of *dysfunction* between economic freedom and political freedom/liberty as the two ends do not meet. Perhaps, they will meet in infinity. However, quite unsurprisingly, he countered it by redefining freedom which to my mind was an exercise in futility. To put it directly, it smacks of pure damage control which muddied the already murkier waters as he misdiagnosed the whole issue.

Be this as it may, Freidman shared two indispensable features with Hayek. Throughout his writings, Friedman strongly championed the idea that the scope of government should be minimised as "governmental intervention in the economy serves as a restraint of freedom" (Guerra-Pujol, 2012, p.14) whilst the role of the market should be maximised. That is to say, firstly, "the scope of government must be limited, and secondly, government powers must be dispersed" (Friedman, 1962, p.2). In articulating his profound disgust for extensive government powers (Friedman, 2002, p.34-36), echoes:

> Even the relatively limited government of the United States ought to be rolled back and reduced in size, in order to secure the establishment of a "free society", and government programs from agricultural subsidies, via regulation of

> the financial industry, to national parks and toll roads, ought to be completely abolished.

But Friedman like Hayek also nevertheless recognises the critical role the government can play to ensure efficient market. According to Friedman, government is crucial first in determining the "rules of the game" and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on. But "the characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to require or enforce substantial conformity — the typical issue must be decided by a yes or no" (p.28).

> There are clearly some matters with respect to which effective proportional representation is impossible. I cannot get the amount of national defense I want and you, a different amount. With respect to such indivisible matters we can discuss, and argue, and vote. But having decided we must conform. It is precisely the existence of indivisible matters- protection of the individual and the nation from coercion is clearly the most basic-that prevents exclusive reliance on individual action through the market. If we are to use some of our resources for such indivisible items, we must employ political channels to reconcile differences. (p.30)

> A government which maintained law and order, defined property rights, served as a means whereby we could modify property rights and other rules of the economic game, adjudicated disputes about the interpretation of the rules, enforced contracts promoted competition, provided a monetary framework, engaged in activities to counter technical monopolies and to overcome neighbourhood effects widely regarded as sufficiently important to justify government intervention, and which supplemented private charity and the private family in protecting the irresponsible, whether madman or child —such a government would clearly have important functions to perform. The consistent liberal is not an anarchist. (Friedman, 1962, 2002, p.34)

It is important to point out yet again that both Hayek and Friedman view the role of state in their own time as too overreaching and overly involved in issues which ought to remain exclusively in the hands of "free citizens" living in a "free society" and yet paradoxically however do not also recommend the complete disengagement and delinking of the state from governmental activities. To these duos, what the state should rather concern itself with is to ensure effective and efficient promulgation and enforcement of laws which are essential for the proper functioning of market.

They warned that beyond this the state should not venture or attempt wittingly or unwittingly to redistribute wealth as this would *ipso facto* constitutes a virulent threat to liberty, rule of law and democracy at least in the not too distant future (Hayek /1944, 2001, p.59-90; Friedman , 1962/ 2002, p.7-36). The thinking behind these explications by Hayek and Friedman is the view that it is *unattractive and or*

improper for any political system to encumber the state with a lot of tasks. Instead, it is more attractive, aesthetic or may be romantic for the state to be assigned a relatively small and clearly demarcated role. Anything short of this particularly when the state attempts to implement economic planning is a clear indication of the state's slippery slope towards totalitarianism. Hayek sums up this shared position in *The Road to Serfdom*:

> It is the price of democracy that the possibilities of conscious control are restricted to the fields where true agreement exists, and that in some fields things must be left to chance. But in a society which for its functioning depends on central planning, this control cannot be made dependent on a majority being able to agree; it will often be necessary that the will of a small minority be imposed upon the people, because this minority will be the largest group able to agree among themselves on the question at issue. Democratic government has worked successfully where, and as long as, the functions of the government were, by a widely accepted creed, restricted to fields where agreement among a majority could be achieved by free discussion; and it is the great merit of the liberal creed that it reduced the range of subjects on which agreement was necessary to one on which it was likely to exist in a society of free men. It is now often said that democracy will not tolerate "capitalism". If "capitalism" means here a competitive system based on the free disposal over private property, it is far more important to realise that only within this system is democracy possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably destroy itself. (Hayek, 1944/ 2001, p. 73)

Both Hayek and Friedman throughout their works, incessantly recommend a rolling back of the frontiers of the state. As Friedman (1962/2002, p.34-36) writes, even the relatively limited government of the United States ought to be rolled back and reduced in size, in order to secure the establishment of a "free society", and government programs from agricultural subsidies, via regulation of the financial industry, to national parks and toll roads, ought to be completely abolished. At the same time, the state has a legitimate role to play when it comes to the fulfilment of handful of rather central tasks:

> A government which maintained law and order, defined property rights, served as a means whereby we could modify property rights and other rules of the economic game, adjudicated disputes about the interpretation of the rules, enforced contracts, promoted competition, provided a monetary framework, engaged in activities to counter technical monopolies and to overcome neighbourhood effects widely regarded as sufficiently important to justify government intervention, and which supplemented private charity and the private family in protecting the irresponsible, whether madman or child — such a

> government would clearly have important functions to perform. The consistent liberal is not an anarchist. (Friedman, 1962/ 2002, p.34)

Taken overall, "economic policy everywhere has moved significantly in Friedman and Hayek's preferred *direction* since the early 1960s" (Laidler, 2007, p.7) which has irrefutably helped to "reshape modern capitalism"(Wall Street Journal, 2006, p.1) "partly in response to events no doubt, but also under their profound influence. In academia, neoliberal dogmatic doctrine became a dominant discourse which gained a lot of credence and subsequently became a substantial political-economy theory cum- governmental strategy following the Nobel Prize in economics award that was given to Hayek in 1974 and Friedman in 1976 respectively for their work on neoliberalism. If their role in the development of their own discipline alone was enough to make them economists of the first order of importance, therefore, this broader impact surely confirms Friedman and Hayek's status as two of the twentieth century's greatest political economists. Perhaps only Maynard Keynes stands as a serious rival" (laidler, 2007, p.7).

3.5 Conclusions of this chapter

I have critically and thoroughly appraised the views of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman which are remarkably exemplary and add texture in explaining the registered diversity and plurality of the discursive market politics of neoliberalism. It presents us with a rich repertoire of the various neoliberal articulations. What came forward from their analysis is that they discursively articulate novel political rationalities that were staunchly anti-statist that derived its legitimacy of government from the market. Their impassioned appeal for neoliberalism finds expression in the market as the epitome of individual freedom which will ultimately truly guarantee among other things a common decency for humanity. In other words, both Hayek and Friedman primarily take freedom as the ultimate appeal of the market coupled with their growing disenchantment with overbearing state.

Finally, I present some preliminary and more pertinent questions about social democracy, democratic socialism, communism, socialism, authoritarianism, central planning, mixed economy and totalitarianism especially Hayek's unfortunate one-sidedness, penchant, warped and fallacious conception in equating central planning to totalitarianism as well as its broader implications for our recent times which I found logically untidy and yet Hayek's explication in many respects, incredulously failed to clearly distinguish. It remains therefore dismissive of those who tend to naively equate central planning with totalitarianism without giving us any decisive and convincing argument. It seems to me that such facile presumptions obliquely disguise the degree with which the mere absence of central planning is by no means enough to guarantee personal liberty for every Tom, Dick and Harry. And this is what incredibly continues to boggle my mind. That being said, both Hayek and Friedman's political theory and

ideas provide us with challenging and complex readings of neoliberalism. One might perhaps say, therefore, that their works technically and commonsensically require a close re-reading if one is to notice the many nuances of the neoliberal challenge in order to describe some recent trends in our contemporary economic and political thoughts. Put very simply, we may with a certain measure of justice describe Hayek and Friedman's economic and political theories as the most central neoliberal political tradition which has gained currency globally (Blomgren, 1997), so it seems to me at least if one primarily looks at the way their ideas have influenced and still continue to influence policy making in many countries and international organisations (Judt, 2005/ 2010; Harvey, 2005). To avoid been "accused" of offering simply a convenient re-reading of their works, in the next chapter, I present Michel Foucault's genealogy of neoliberalism which I claim provides a more theoretically matured understanding coupled with no-stones-left-unturned analysis of the "history of the present".

CHAPTER FOUR

Foucault, Governmentality and Neoliberal Reason

4.1 Introduction

To resolve or, at least, ameliorate the utter conceptual and seeming theoretical impasse that lies at the heart of neoliberalism, it is vitally important to think in a historically specific way. And to think in a historically specific way, we need to take a substantial theoretical step. And this substantial theoretical step this chapter claims involves a genealogical interrogation of neoliberalism. As I will attempt to show, I chart Foucault's account of neoliberalism published as *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008) which consists of a series of lectures given in 1978 /79 academic year in which Foucault has deservedly received world-wide acclaim and celebrated for delivering an uncannily prescient and a more richer understanding of neoliberalism (Tribe, 2009). As this thesis seeks to unambiguously clarify, I will argue that Michel Foucault's account provides versatile theoretical insights and perspicuously explores the intellectual origins of the modern view of neoliberalism and gives us a much more rigorous understanding of how we have come to this moment (Foucault, 1993, p.10).

I hold the view that Foucault's account gives a kaleidoscopic mirror picture of the world right now (Vrasti, 2013, p.12, my emphasis) even though I contend it still remains an open and a matter of dispute if indeed Foucault's unflinching position towards what he gleefully characterised as neoliberalism could *wholly* be applied to our modern day versions of it (Behrent, 2009) which I cannot conclusively settle here. But still, I do suggest though, that his articulations have been influential and have analytical and explanatory purchase regarding the provocative question of the way our contemporary global politics is and can tell us something illuminating about the operation of politics in the so called societies outside Western liberal democracies. I demonstrate that relying on Foucauldian - inspired thoughts on neoliberal governmentality not least provides a comprehensive, promising and productive theoretical cocktail for a robust understanding in analysing the markedly changing *rationalities* that governs us today with respect to their origins and context (Oskala, 2013, p.53) which I dare say will plainly and concretely help in pinning down the so-called *amorphous* nature of neoliberalism. This chapter proceeds as follows: First I broach the concept of governmentality by making the case for how this neologism contributes to our understanding of the debate on the nature of dominant power relations in contemporary societies. I show how this concept could be understood as analytical framework to rethink power relations, subject and object formation, more generally. Second I exhaustively explore the perspectives offered by neoliberal governmental-

ity by tracing the historical genealogy of neoliberal reasoning in order to unpack and disentangle how Foucault profoundly contrasts German liberalism and its cold-hearted cousin of American neoliberalism to illustrate more contestable modalities of its recent mutations which sum up the biopolitics of today—before briefly exploring more recent critiques that have been directed at neoliberal governmentality studies. I conclude by briefly sketching how I intend to extend governmentality to the relationship between supranational institutions and the Government of Ghana in the area of economic reforms to demonstrate how deployment of a new technology of power working through recipient countries greater autonomy and the ethos of self-regulation have been supported by the implementation of the structural adjustment programmes.

4.2 Foucault's Governmentality: Power as the Art of Government

> *"It is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my research" (Foucault, 2001, p.1042)*

In this section I explain the concept of governmentality and how the introduction of this neologism by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in his 1978 and 1979 series lectures (security, territory, population) at the Collège de France have rightly been recognised for its nuanced and sophisticated contribution; its increasing relevance in understanding the rationalities, technologies as well as the techniques of contemporary power relations discourses in social and political thought (Dean, 2010). Foucault's understanding of the notion of governmentality is broad (2007, p.108) and thus there may be different applications for the concept. It is beyond the scope and ambition of this thesis to examine every aspect of Foucault's concept of governmentality. For the sake of brevity and clarity, my own interest however, is to employ governmentality as historically specific forms of political power, and to develop the claim that it helps situate the supranational institutions — the Bank and the Fund within the general philosophy of contemporary configurations of power relations, and as an intersection between various contestable modalities, on the other, for example (Appadurai, 1996; Ong, 2006; Sharma & Gupta, 2006). I will simply show in this study how liberal technologies, rationalities and discursive structures are used to steer the 'the conduct of conduct' of receipient governments and states and how these technologies and rationalities in turn reproduce very specific subject positions and codes of conduct (Foucault, 1988; Dean, 1999; Miller & Rose, 2008, p.33).

Since the early 1990s, Foucault's insightful seminar on governmentality from the late 1970s in particular, (Burchell et al., 1991; Dean ,1991; 1994; 1999; Barry et al., 1996; Rose, 1996c; 1999a; 1999b; Lemke, 1997) have sparked "exponential increase in the number of publications that have taken governmentality as their central methodological starting point"(van Baar, 2011, p.27). And yet paradoxically, "this recent boom, has not necessarily and inevitably contributed to an increase of clear articula-

tions of the concept and its analytical scope and methodological ambitions" (Ibid) which undoubtedly stretches back to Foucault's own work which was characterised and plagued with apparent shifts of focus, ambiguities, confusion and attention in terms of it central parameters (Ibid).

However, what is more gratifying is that in the early 1980s when he begun to elaborate on technologies of self and the practices of freedom, he developed a further explanation of the conceptual scope of governmentality that many Foucauldian scholars have relatively neglected in spite of the fact that it constitutes an integral part of governing technologies which deserves immediate correction (Foucault, 1997d, 1997b, 2005a, 2010). Thus is it, in other words, that in contrast to Foucault's two other modes of power—those of sovereignty and discipline which rule through law and imposition, producing mere docile bodies to be corrected and disciplined— governmentality rules through and produces subjects as free and responsible agent in social interactions (Foucault, 1991, p.102, my emphasis). Against this, governmentality seeks to regulate and steer the behaviour or conduct of individuals in order to achieve certain goals (Boyce & Davids, 2004; Dean, 2010), yet doing so through ideas of responsible and consenting subjectivities. Based on the liberal problematisation of (interventionist) power, governmentality works as a self-limiting form of power, which is ever conscious of the counter-productive effects of imposition, and therefore ever in pursuit of the "involvement", "co-ownership" and "willingness" of those it seeks to rule" (Helle, 2012, p.6).

The notion of governmentality enabled Foucault to clearly distinguish between power seen as strategic games by which the conduct of others can be affected in relations of domination (Foucault, 1997a, p.299). More substantively, in the late discussion of his governmentality lectures between 1977 and 1979 at the *Collège de France*, Foucault refined, reconsidered and redirected his own theory of power by recognising that governmental techniques and logics of strategies can be mobilised to maintain as well as contest dominant power relations, and to govern both selves and others at different governmental scales" (van Baar, 2011, my emphasis). And this has unfortunately been misread by the trove of works that have referred or employed governmentality. As will become clear in this thesis, the proclivity on the part of some Foucauldian scholars who have somewhat engaged in caricatured reading of this particular variant of the concept has led to an ambivalent, yet persistent impression in some inquiries into governmentality to misleadingly conceive Foucault's neologism as one form of power that is mainly domination and subjugation without sufficiently offering a view of how this form of domination could be contested, resisted and the many avenues or possibilities of counter-conduct available (Death, 2011; Odysseos, 2011; van Baar, 2011). I argue that such jaundiced view of Foucault's conceptualisation of power can and should be vehemently denounced and resisted for Foucault steadily distinguished between several forms of power "later in his theoretical life"(Lemke, 2010,p. 6). As Foucault himself tells us thus. He notes: "It seems to me that we must distinguish between power relations understood as strategic games between liberties (...) and the states of domination that people ordinarily call "power".

And, between the two, between games of power and "techniques of domination" as sketched out in the *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977) you have technologies of government" (Foucault, 1997, p.299). Given this, it would be possible to approach and analyse Foucault's methodology of studying the manifestations of power and the dynamic interplay of power relations— as oppose to simply studying the effects of *powerful institutions* which is immensely helpful in mapping out topologically (Collier, 2009) the transition and means though which this power is incited or rather, in the means through which discipline is exercised over the objects of power (Foucault, 1994; 340-345; 1991, p.261-266).

Power ultimately in Foucauldian scheme is essentially *immanent* to the object it regulates, it is productive rather than hierarchical to be possessed by individuals, institutions or states apparatuses when they exercise control over another individual, institution or state (Foucault, 1994, p.340-343). Conceptualising power in this way highlights how African debtor states in this study are also imbued with considerable autonomy and agency to influence the activities of the Bank and Fund and vice versa. Foucauldian analytics of power conventionally conceived rests upon the understanding of power as the sum of power relations: "Power exists only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into action" (Ibid, p.340). In being so, the activity of governing is "to structure the possible fields of action of others" (Foucault, 2000e, p. 341). It follows from this that the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the action of others includes the conditions of relative freedom: "power is exercised only over free subjects, and only in so far as they are "free". Indeed to the extent that the individual has a degree of freedom, "power relationships will often be unstable and reversible, subject to resistance or evasion" (Hindess, 1996, p.97).

Reversibility in this context, for Foucault, indicates how "individual or collective subjects are saliently faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct; several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available" (Foucault, 2000e, p.341-42). Focusing in particular on the technologies of SAPs architecture that were used to steer the conduct of Africa debtor states, we need to understand the dynamics between the parties to the architecture and their relationship to each other and different and overlapping discipline to which they are subjected.

This study in stark contrast to the tiresome understanding of power in IR (Kangas, 2014, p.2) suggests that these power relations are far from a one-sided relationship between an allegedly passive, powerless, docile and a suppressed Africa debtor state object and an allegedly all-powerful supranational institutions subject International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for example. Let me put the point another way: power relations are much more heterogeneous, diverse and underpinned by the element of relative freedom, rather than merely abiding and docile conduct accounted for on the simple ontology of domination or repression. The central argument I wish to make here is that while the technologies of policy conditionality in the case of SAPs for example, was to produce distinct forms of rationalities, technical apparatuses, discursive structures and subjectification, they were nevertheless overwhelmingly tempered with tactical reversals, defiance and counter-conducts which will undeniably

confound post-Marxist critique or even Foucauldian inspired studies— or so it seems. Recall that in Foucault's post-1979 work, he intimately linked technologies of power to what he terms "technologies of the self" (Foucault, 1982). Generally less known is that Foucault's own work as I have underlined elsewhere, subsequently steadily moved away from an emphasis on the "subjectivation" and forms of "subjectification" towards an overwhelming emphasis "on how selves were fashioned and then lived in ways which were both heteronomously and autonomously determined" (Danica & Pearce, 2001, p. 125, my emphasis) :which in turn suffices in transforming selves in situations of relative freedom thereby significantly reconceptualising and recontextualising the relation between techniques of self and forms of domination/ subjugation.

The exercise of power as Foucault described, is "a management of possibilities" (Foucault, 1994, p.341) and in understanding the operations of power, it obliges us to understand how these possibilities saturate all fields and administered over the object of the power relations: either inciting, inducing or seducing the object to be disciplined or making things easier or more difficult for it, releasing or contriving, making probable or less and "in the extreme" constraining or forbidding absolutely (Ibid). Indeed as Foucault in his characteristic fashion reasons, it is the exercise of such power and how it is applied over the process of economic production and reproduction is the crux of what constitutes the mode of action called "government" (p.341). It is in this context that it makes sense to ask why and how the process of governmentality as Foucault asserts is characterised by an ensemble of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculation and strategies (Foucault, 1991, p.99-101) "that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power" and "the development of a whole complex of knowledges" to manage the objects of this power (p.219-220).

Read as such, we can say Foucault's paradigm gives us a concrete entry in problematising the critical historical conditions, trajectories and shifts that gave rise to the principles that underlie the SAPs architecture (Foucault, 2008) and to precisely situate them within the intersection of the SAPs as a mechanism of neoliberalism on one hand, and power relations as the interplay between various contestable and contested modalities of governmentality, on the other (Foucault, 2000a). In this way, we will be able to usefully unmask and expose the dynamics of power inherent in this regulatory framework and for instance, excavate the objectifying narratives of its underlying disciplinary norms and critically assess their wider impact on the construction of other regulatory (or biopolitical) forms of power. This is what Scheurich (1997, p.94-118) eloquently calls, "policy archaeology" — the deconstruction of a priori assumptions about a problematic that contributes to policy research and the "powerful "grids" or networks of regularities" that determine the problematising of key concepts within policy studies.

Finally, but not less important, if power according to Foucault functions in terms of the "conduct of conduct" (Dean, 2010, p.26) but not a zero-sum game, (Kangas, 2014, p.2; Sending & Neumann, 2006); then Foucault's analytics of governmentality I believe, enable us to clearly problematise how contemporary configuration of power is clearly exercised, nurtured and ordered through various clearly defined regulatory

instruments at the global level to regulate, shape and control territories (Foucault, 2008; Walters, 2012, p.13-14) : including how the SAPs framework clearly came to represent a differing modality of global power and a technique of governance that was used to influence the conduct of African debtor states (Foucault, 2000a, 2000c). Along these lines, l particularly want to consider how the SAPs framework clearly constitutes what Michel Foucault astutely terms the *technologies of the self* (Foucault, 1994, p.220-221; 1991, p.261-263). Or, better still, disciplinary supervision of societies — in this case, aid-receipent States.

4.3 Liberal and Neoliberal Governmentalities

As we may recall, Foucault in his genealogy of governmentality first introduced the notion of governmentality as a way to analyse the nature of contemporary configuration of political power. It was in the course of this lecture that Foucault made it absolutely clear that in our modern age political power is significantly exercised in the form of government. However Foucault argues that, there was a paradigmatic shift in the 18th century where one critically observes the emergence and the ascendancy of a liberal governmentality in which a naturalised market is presented as a limit to government (Flew, 2012b). In Foucault's analysis, at the heart of liberal problematisation is the notion of "frugal government" by which the question of "the too much and too little" develops into the central criterion around which the art of government will revolve" (Foucault, 2008, p.28-30; Gudmand-Høyer & Lopdrup Hjorth, 2009, p.110): through encouraging the autonomous existence and self-regulating freedoms of populations" (Dillion & Reid, 2001, p.47). I should note that, Foucault does not analyse the liberal regime as all- embracing ideology (Larner, 2006) rather, he sees it as a critique of other forms of government rationality and as a "principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government"(Foucault, 2008, p.338), which is strongly mediated by political economy (Fougner, 2012). What Foucault's account boils down to is the biopolitical and liberal art of governing which emerged for the first time in the eighteenth century: and includes forms of government whose basic forms "we can still recognize in its contemporary modifications" (Foucault, 2007b, p.354).

To get to grips of these modifications, I focus on Foucault's incisive account as it can be found in his lectures in *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008). Foucault's 1978/79 lectures on *The Birth of Biopolitics* employs two historical case studies of the origins of neoliberal reason : post-war West German "Ordoliberalism" of the Freiburg school (Lemke, 1997, p.3; Sven-Olov, 2013) to the more super radical American neoliberalism of the Chicago school or the "Anarcho-liberalism" (Sven-Olov, 2013; Kiersey, 2011; Flew, 2012b). All in all, it seems that Foucault's attempt was to distinguish these schools of thought from liberalism as a *political rationality* (Biebricher, 2014, p.4) in order to identify the essential redefinition of the relation between the state and the market.

Based largely on an explication of various biopolitical aspects that can be gleaned from Foucault's interpretations, in the next section, I examine "Ordoliberals" thought which Foucault considered (Hans-Martin, 2013) "more important theoretically than the others (the Austrian and American variants) for the problem of governmentality (Hans-Martin, 2013; Ptak, 2009): to get a satisfactory account of neoliberalism as a distinctively "novel problematisation of rule (Dillion & Reid, 2009, p.25) which firmly relies on a role of the market.

4.3.1 Post-War German "Ordoliberalism"

> *The German model which is being defused, debated, and forms part of our actuality, structuring it and carving out its real shape, is the model of possible neo-liberal governmentality (Foucault, 2008, p. 192).*

Foucault's focus on "Ordoliberal" thinkers I think might have emanated from the fact that the "governmental style that marks the specific form of German neoliberalism is something that we are "immersed in"—the contemporary neo-liberalism which actually involves us" (Foucault, 2008, p.192). Foucault underlines that "Ordoliberalism" is, "real neoliberalism both in practice and theory; indeed, the most clearly stated liberal governmentality. A governmentality that regulates the behavior of subjects between each other: the behavior of the governed among themselves, as well as their behavior towards the government" (Goldschmidt & Rauchenschwandtner, 2007, p.2). Foucault's overriding concern was to establish how "Ordoliberals" tradition is an original contribution to the biopolitical practices of art of liberal government which sought to make neoliberalism hegemonic in Germany at a time when the rest of Europe was strongly committed to the Keynesian rigidity (Peters, 2007). To accomplish this diagnostic task, he gives a scrupulous account of how "Ordoliberalism" as a variety of neoliberalism can be distinguished from liberalism as a political rationality (Senellart, 2008; Peters, 2008; Goldschmidt & Rauchenschwandtner, 2007; Gudmand-Høyer and Hjorth, 2009, p.116).

Relying in particular on the "Ordoliberals" "reinterpretations of the market and their role within a particular historico-political context, i.e. post-war Germany as a political rationality" (Biebricher, 2014, p.4), Foucault illustrates how the German neoliberals had been extremely concerned with the haunted question of how to *construct* a new state on the basis of a "space of economic freedom" (Foucault, 2008, p.87& 116; Sven-Olov, 2013): which as Foucault claims, is the distinctive feature of liberal political rationality which breaks from the "hegemony of "reason of state", and its dictum of maximum government intervention (Foucault, 1979, p.77). This does obviously mean that Foucault presents the German neoliberals project as an attempt to reconstruct and reconfigure the uncanny relation between market and the state. And thus readily shows "the point at which in Kantian sense governing was always governing "too much" and the participation of the governed come to be understood as the most technically efficient "system of governmental economy" (p.176).

In its minimalism, part of the narrative of "Ordoliberalism" agenda Foucault contends, is that the market is in *principle* the best way of organising the economy and to some very large extent all sphere of social life. In reality, however, it requires a strong state being there, "fundamentally, to serve the market as establishing the best-possible conditions for it to prosper" (Foucault, 2010, p.240; Ptak, 2009; Sven-Olov, 2013). What characterises this thought is that free economy can *only* be realised and make possible by means of a *strong* state authority: and decisive political engineering the explicit aim of which is to define their approach as a distinctive contribution to neoliberal reasoning (Bonefeld, 2015).

To substantiate how "Ordoliberalism" typifies neoliberal notion of government, Foucault to an extent makes strong reference in his lectures by developing a genealogical analysis of theories which fleetingly referred to the speech by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (Flew, 2012b; Peters, 2007). Perhaps because of the fundamental role he played in shaping neoliberal thinking in the twentieth century as far as social market economic policies in Germany is concerned. In Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's address to the Scientific Council in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War which comprises typically of the top apparachicks of "Ordoliberals" he usefully notices: "We must free the economy from state controls ... only a state that establishes both the freedom and responsibility of the citizens can legitimately speak in the name of the people" (cited in Foucault, 2008, p.80-81).

In a broad sense, Foucault reads Erhard as claiming a new legitimacy for the state as he inverts the liberal idea of the relation between the economy and the state. However, Erhard's message seems to convey an idea which is logically inconsistent with the maxim at the heart of "Ordoliberals" notion about the economy. In particular, but not exclusively, his proposition is contradictory namely that the state should unequivocally and without exception desist from intervening in the rationality and the logic of market which is quintessentially liberal idea. And yet Foucault reads Erhard as claiming something much more radical. Nonetheless, the second leg of his quotation is quite interesting. In the second leg of the quote, Erhard apparently seems to argue from a diametrically opposite direction of the liberal idea about the economy. There he proposes an intricate and interwoven relationship between the state and market through which the state can derive its legitimacy albeit in the service of the economy (Peck, 2010).

Properly understood, here, Erhard seeks to reformulate and reimagine the state as the pivot of the market and crucially being the guarantor of individual freedom especially against the background of post-war Germany: where the state was strangely absent, weak, pliable and had virtually lost all its legitimate powers. Therefore, the Erhardian logic was to reconstruct and reimagine a governmental logic which is decidedly contrary to the liberal idea of government at least in its standard understanding: the one in which the market legitimises the state and the individual liberty as a key concern of governmental rationality and political economy as opposed to the one which in fact undermines it, for example. If, rightly or wrongly, we take Foucault seriously then we have to understand Erhard's proposal not as an example of a liberal

governmentality but rather as neoliberal art of government in which the existence of the state is made legitimate by the market.

According to Foucault, the entire point of neoliberal governmentality concept has been to show how the market and the state are mutually exclusive and that the rationality of government is defined *a la* the market. More than that, as could be recalled from the example of Erhard, in neoliberal logic, market hierarchically assumes a more predominant role. However, in classical liberal conception, market is free-wheeling and eminently autonomous but hierarchically subservient to government. Similarly, while liberalism relied on an objective and naturalised view of the market, neoliberalism instead tightly holds on to a *constructivist* view. As can be illustrated through the Erhard's example, government gains legitimacy when it *constructs* and institutes market conditions which enshrine individuals' freedom.

This constructivist view is for instance reflected within "Ordoliberals" concept of "Ordnungspolitik and Ordnung", or market regulation—regulations that intervene in the market, but do so by respecting the conditions of the market upon which economies or economic systems are based' (Peters, 2007, p.173). Here the emphasis will be on a grand attempt to create and enhance the conditions of the market within which metaphorically the "invisible hand" that Adam Smith had described can be expected to do its work" (Vanberg, 2004, p.8). Following Lemke (2001, p.196), it therefore seems safe to say that in Foucault's analysis of neoliberalism, the most important feature underlying neoliberal government has been —and still is—its anti-naturalistic and constructivist view of the market in which the market is no longer just a quasi-natural phenomenon but rather serves as a constructivist vision for government.

For Foucault to concretely sharpen the central thrust of the market constructivism for this governmentality, he outlined a number of examples from "Ordoliberals" thought to structure his analysis. For instance, in thinking through the implications of the shift in liberal thought, he shows how with the German neoliberalism, the meaning of the market has shifted from "exchange" to "competition" (Adaman & Mandra, 2014). In stark opposition to the governmentality of classical liberalism which has a principle of the market as a site of exchange, German neoliberals view the market fundamentally as a site of competition. It is with respect to classical liberals view of the market in terms of equitable exchange which made them view exchange and competition as something that would flourish with or without government intervention. "Ordoliberals" contention is that liberal govermentality principle of non-intervention in the market (*laissez-faire*) could only amount to "naïve naturalism" about the economy. Neoliberalism as a matter of fact is no, "Laissez-faire", it is rather a "cultivation of the market", a "culture of entrepreneurship" (Gertenbach, 2010, p.15). More to the point, liberal politics of *laissez faire* Foucault mentions is the defining feature for understanding the naturalistic view of the market.

Contra classical liberalism, German neoliberals will argue that competition is not purely a natural phenomenon because market for them does not have any natural inner logic at all. It is for this reason among other things that they rather positively see the state intervention as crucial in *designing* active policies to prevent the

distortion of competition and creation of monopolies (Streit & Wohlgemuth, 2000, p.230, my emphasis). According to Foucault, German neoliberals innovatively devise and advocate active policies which will stimulate "markets order" in order to become more competitive and protect them from harmful monopolistic tendencies (Medema, 2009, p. 22-5). What is especially salient in this understanding of market order is that it attests to and amplifies what Foucault referred to as "conformable actions". If for the classical liberals, monopoly is a natural ally of competitive market, "Ordoliberals" defiant response would be resoundingly: "Not true, the natural order, what is understood by the natural order, what the classical economists or, at any rate, those of the eighteenth century understood by a natural order, is nothing other than the effect of a particular legal order" (Foucault, 2008, p.162).

Not only does the German "Ordoliberals" strongly believe that "competition is a necessity", they also belief that without it "man (is) not a "human being" (Eucken, 1948, p.3). What is visible and clear in this characterisation is Foucault's own argument that it is in this concept of a "competitive order" that a whole new architecture of governmentality tissue is framed. Foucault maintains that the market and competition "can only appear ... if it is produced by an active governmentality ... One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market" (Foucault, 2008, p.121). "Ordoliberals" endorse the logic of competition as socially beneficial model (Mandra, 2014) which strongly resonates and manifests itself within the constructivist view of the market. The point here is obviously that this is a clear shift from the rhetoric of competition as naturalistic, depoliticised and predetermined given representations to a view of competition as, "an historical objective of governmental art "to be actively pursued by the state (Foucault, 2008, p.120). "Ordoliberals" have no qualms whatsoever with state's intervention insofar as it is not to constrain the market, but in society to ensure *order* that support competition.

This is the logic which underpins "Ordoliberals" perspective that puts unquestioned belief in the ability of the state involvement to effectively assuage the fragility of the market processes. At bottom, they envisage as Foucault points out, a "permanent and multiform interventionism", properly understood as the "historical and social condition of possibility for a market economy" (p.160). One of the core axioms of "Ordoliberals" thought "was to establish "order" as a set of legal rules for a society of essentially self-reliant decision makers whose actions are controlled and coordinated by market competition" (p.231). With this as their objective, they distance themselves from the naturalistic fallacy of the market. The crux of the matter lays in the neoliberals' viewpoint of government as strictly speaking no longer one of laissez faire market fundamentalism and retreat of the state. But needless to say, market competition is seen as the object of active policies and state intervention. It is in consistent with this that German neoliberals adamantly reject and shrugged off laissez-faire theology for been counterproductive: because it ominously tends to undercut the whole fabric of society to the detriment of the market, if left unrestricted. This argument is confirmed and repeatedly reinforced by Foucault: that they cannot be subsumed under the rubric of the notorious laissez-faire market fundamentalism which they

view as deeply flawed, erroneous and dangerous. "Foucault traces how rather, they propose the market as a "principle of formalization" with its own internal logic, whose positive effects are produced only when this logic is strictly adhered to and respected (Foucault, 2007, p. 118-21).

In his examination of these issues, Foucault indicates that in the judgement of neoliberals, market is not only just about the principle for economic policy, but significantly for social policy or *Gesellschaftspolitik*. This underlying assumption is predicated as it is upon "Ordoliberals" model that the state is even entitled to intervene deeply into the private sphere of individuals insofar as they are economically sound and not perilous. After all, social policy is not by any stretch of the imagination intended to disrupt or distort market processes as it is arguably in the welfare states. The intention broadly speaking is to serve as a corrective intervention and efforts of the state which must be made to work in conformity with the market. In other words, in more respects than one, German neoliberals' social policy was to cushion citizens against severe sociological pathologies of capitalism (Rüstow, 2005, p.365) by cultivating opportunism that pervades the entire the social strata.

The above critical examination by Foucault of the "social policy" conundrum proposed by German neoliberals in my view should be read as an analysis of biopolitics *extraordinaire* given the fact that neoliberal proposals imply interventions with important consequences for governing everything *but* the economy: including the population, its conditions of life and social surroundings" (Gudmand-Høyer & Hjorth, 2009, p.118). This, in essence is what German neoliberals call *Vitalpolitik* (politics of life): "a politics to secure the vitality of workers as self-responsible entrepreneurs of labour power" (Behrent, 2009). As should be sufficiently clear by now, Foucault's "account marks out some important shifts that distinguish German neoliberalism from the preceding classical form especially when it comes to the principle of laissez-faire and the extension of the associated biopolitics" (Foucault, 2008; Gudmand Høyer & Hjorth, 2009, p.117).

But perhaps to fully appreciate the political implications of this novel neoliberal governmentality and to ascertain why it was so attractive and appealing, it may be highly instructive to peruse Foucault's reconstruction of the acute political context within which it emerged and flourished. Foucault rightly argues that experientially as well as historically speaking, the specific problems faced by "Ordoliberals" economists with the excessive state power of Nazism: the political turmoil and economic crises, as well as the different "material" they have to contend with namely, intellectual, institutional and cultural, have important ramifications in reversing the discursive thread with which their problematisation took (Biebricher, 2011). This point is absolutely critical, given that out of the space of problematisation posed by the Post-war German "Ordoliberals" (Weidner, 2013), they were faced with the herculean task of building a new state completely different in its understanding and approach of the market from that of classical liberal conceptualisation (Biebricher, 2015). Indeed what is at stake here and this expressly finds highlights in Foucault's argument as well, is the way and manner "Ordoliberals" economists view the National Socialist regime. Con-

comitantly what concerns the "Ordoliberals" predominantly as Foucault understands it was that state intervention in the form of protectionism, state aid, central planning, and hegemonic Keynesian developmentalism undermine both the economy and the state (Akbulu et al., 2015f). At the time of writing, such an assessment turns out to be most difficult to justify as this phenomenon was not peculiar to the Nazi era *per se.* Indeed it was a cancer that was notoriously noticeable in its different variants in the development of European societies in the 19th century. As I read it, there was a general outrage as to how to rethink and refashion the role of the state and this was effectively among other things that "Ordoliberals" sought to carry out by provoking and heating up a new debate about the issue. My argument here is that not only is Foucault's approach at least implicitly or explicitly simplistic and blatantly one way analysis, but rather, important aspects of the Nazi regime are ignored or neglected in a panicked attempt to confirm a predetermined position. This is in part because conspicuously disregarded in Foucault's account was the fact that at least retrospectively speaking, "Ordoliberals" tradition problem with National Socialism also stemmed apparently from "personal experience and not only in the theoretical reconstruction, and this was in fact very critical in the development of the Freiburg School" (Goldschmitt & Rauchenschwandtner, 2007, p.9).

Perhaps even more controversially, what pressingly worried "Ordoliberals" as far as Nazism was concerned, was not necessarily about the interventionist heresies of the state in the economy, but as they argue, it chiefly sets the stage to sacrifice freedom on the altar of market which is at the heart of government. They posited the phenomenon of Nazism as Foucault reveals, as representing an "anti-liberal invariant" (Foucault, 2008, p.111). This confirms that Foucault thus agrees with "Ordoliberals" that there is chaos when the state appropriates the economy and prevents it from operating freely. It is perfectly reasonable to infer from this that like Foucault, "Ordoliberals" present economic practices of Nazism as a harbinger of anti-liberalism. Presenting Nazism as a veritable sauce of anti-liberalism does surely, imply that as soon as one succumbs to any form of state intervention, one unwittingly slips toward totalitarianism. And of course this impressive and attractive example is flagrantly reminiscent of Hayek's critique of socialism in his book, *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) where he forcefully argued that any form of state intervention is interpreted as a slippery slope to totalitarian (Hayek, 1994, p.17; Caldwell, 1997).

This is not the case, however, because central planning does not irretrievably culminate in totalitarianism. It is rather that planning inadvertently involves some kind of errors which call for more control but not totalitarianism. And this is the same obfuscation that Foucault (perhaps unwitting) also inexcusably perpetuates. I have no interest in absolving the Nazi regime from blame. What interests me of course is that to claim that central planning, state intervention —to name but a few— necessarily lead to totalitarianism is a flawed and convoluted logic. To be sure, my fundamental discontent with this persistent, widespread and risible mischaracterisation is that it provides historical and intellectual context for the proponents of the neoliberal creed to make a general case against any form of state intervention as unwarranted, otiose

and misleading in promoting free market. It should be noted that there are at least two issues which in fact remain central for this supposed invariant truth of Nazism argument. On one level, it provides a perfect arsenal to the neoliberal ideologues to simplistically and fervently advance their state phobia views that the only function or relevance and basis of legitimacy of the state is to promote a free market and nothing more, for example. By contrast, the second issue this raises is more disturbingly worrying: the exorcism of the ghost of the cold monster state sufficiently supplies them with plentiful opportunities to simultaneously present a new basis for the state and in doing so, *ideally* consign the state and its so called excessive power to the museum of history: "the state under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state" (Foucault, 2008, p.116).

From Foucault for instance, one could discern very significant conclusions from "Ordoliberals" transpositions which apparently verges on the analysis of neoliberalism. He stresses that "Ordoliberals" tradition efface and differ considerably from the earlier liberal political rationality of the market/competition and state/government obfuscation and binary as entirely different and irrevocably delimited axes without leading to laissez faire. Increasingly, Foucault demonstrates that the constructivist and anti-naturalistic thrust of "Ordoliberals" logic must be viewed against the background of the acute historical situation in post-War Germany and this in his reading contributed in no small measure to the fundamental transformation in liberal thought (Lemke, 2001, p.196).

It is suggested here that "Ordoliberals" transpositions of the *theoretical problematic* tellingly construe the economy not in naturalistic but it is steeped in constructivist terms (Kangas, 2014, p.2). What the market constructivist politics of German neoliberalism for example, entails is a radically new perspective of the market which rearticulates, reinserts and re-inscribes liberal governmentality by means of a *strong* state as the political form of market liberty, of competition, of entrepreneurialism, and of individual self-responsibility (Bonefeld, 2015; Foucault, 2008; Mirowski, 2009). In striking contrast to the liberal presumption of the ontological givenness or quasi-natural phenomenon of market rationality which serves as a limit to the state when best left to its own devices, "Ordoliberals" claim is that the state has a *crucial* role to play in fostering and redefining that market rationality (Kangas, 2014; Ptak, 2009). By this token the state's legitimacy as Foucault concisely notes, is therefore productively indexed from its market constructivism which must be created, produced and reproduced by dint of benign political interventions and orchestration.

The typical dominant line of reasoning of neoliberalism uncritically pathologised by the left or the anti-globalisation movement: as retreat of the state or "anarcho-capitalism" which was reflected in the characteristically pro-market neoliberal reforms as crystallised in adjustment programmes of the 1980s – rationalised by the Fund and also proselytised by the Bank (Adaman & Mandra, 2014). As we have seen, this is surely at odds with German neoliberals formulations which is forthrightly inspired by the necessity for more markets, but heavily influenced by the market not been controlled by the State. The Ghanaian case compellingly shows how in fact adjustment

programmes evident in this study are typical neoliberal (liberalisation, deregulation, etc.). My claim is that they per chance came into being through political decisions from the IMF and the World Bank due largely to the debt crisis. Indeed the crux of the matter is that these programmes did not simply emerge *ex nihilo* but came into being because of the ruling power of the economy: they were chiefly a product of profound strategic cum politico-economic decisions: the debt crisis and the necessity to solve those problems purportedly occurred by reason of the predatory, paternalistic, vampire and rent seeking behaviour of the state to put it somewhat bluntly, is dangerously beside the point and grossly misunderstood. Rather, the neoliberal market was constructed and cultivated by neoliberal governmentality through the policies of the IMF and the World Bank *qua* the reconfiguration of the state and its functions to surreptitiously govern its subjects through market-like incentives rather than direct coercion (Foucault, 2007b, p. 20 & 71-72; Read, 2009). I want to argue that neoliberal economic policies are increasingly perceived as no longer naively restricted to economic issues (it is the case that this assertion has theoretically been deconstructed and publicly undone. In fact the fundamental rationale underpinning the basic principle of neoliberal governmentality is not "power of economy", but "economy of power" (Lemke, 2008, p.73) a development which clearly describes the extent to which the economy has been de-and re-territorialised and subsequently nationalised.

Now on this backdrop, it seems to me that "Ordoliberals" re-articulation and rephrasing of the relation between the market and the state challenges our traditional view of how to govern that appear to characterise our contemporary times. Truthfully, "this is the comprehensive biopolitical and neo-liberal governmentality that is formulated in Germany, and it is this German model, not the "Bismarckian state socialism, Nazi autarchic planification, or Keynesian interventionism which is being diffused, debated, and forms part of our actuality" (Foucault, 2008, p.192). The upshot is quite curious. Indeed to the extent that Foucauldians are showing a surging interest in "Ordoliberalism" as a political rationality potentially signals a *renaissance* of "Ordoliberalism" in many guises —or so the story goes. Similarly, in an interesting twist of irony, the Bretton Woods Institutions have begun to re-position, re-politicise, re-embed and re-Christianise the State as a new biopolitical logic of governmentality (Foucault, 2008; Burchell, et al., 1991; Donzelot, 2008; Lemke, 2002) in the face of the now largely discredited "Washington Consensus" (policy reforms based on the uncritical faith in market) without assertively invoking it as "Ordoliberal" (Biebriche, 2014, my emphasis).

But more decisively, at issue, in fact — is that for me — and contrary to the populists and simplified readings that in the neoliberal States there is a turn away from the States and towards markets, a stronger consensus emerges that it is something that can only ever be a myth or chimera within the modern governmental logic. Succinctly put, free market needless to say, indispensably needs the protection of strong States. It needs their powers of enforcement in our modern view on politics as government. Apart from anything else, the minimalist State, I presume, is hopelessly utopian, it exists nowhere in space (Fougner, 2008). For Foucault, the State in the contemporary

times – that is, for our present –is subjected to an increasing 'governmentalisation' of power mechanisms as the role of the State (Foucault, 2007, p.109) has been defused and radically reconstituted into different circumstances (Dean, 1999,p.102-111). As Foucault puts it,

> The governmentalisation of the state has nonetheless been what has allowed the state to survive. And it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it is precisely thanks to this governmentality that is at the same time both external and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state's domain, what is public and what is private, what is and is not within the state's competence, and so on. (Foucault, 2007, p.109)

According to Rose and Miller, "the state can be seen as a specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified, a way of dividing a 'political sphere', with its particular characteristics of rule, from other, 'non-political spheres' to which it must be related, and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.176-177; Lascoumes, 2004).

In these senses, Foucault's concept of governmentality provides us with an analytical axis which makes it possible to effectively decode the neoliberal programmes of a "retreat of the state" as a technique of governance. By all accounts, Foucault more than any one person must posthumously be rewarded for positively recognising and rediscovering "Ordoliberals" record: by alerting us that our modern idea of market has become increasingly denaturalised, a factor which tends to remain heavily underappreciated but potentially significant. And finally, the flipside of the coin is that perhaps, it becomes all the more urgent and intensely pertinent to investigate whether or not this approach at all articulates and provokes a genuine alternative that problematises the epistemic of economisation and ontologises the neoliberal project in an exceedingly compelling way.

4.3.2 American Neoliberalism ("Anarcho-Liberalism")

> *Liberalism in America is a whole way of being. It is a type of relation between the governors and the governed much more than a technique of governors with regard to the governed (Foucault, 2008, p.218-224).*

The second case study Foucault develops in his in *The Birth of Biopolitics,* is that of American neoliberalism a. k. a "Anarcho-liberalism" (broadly Chicago school). In putting the German neoliberalism in its proper context, Foucault sharply contrasts it with the Chicago-style economics school to show how their work also reverses the logic of classical liberals where the state is regulated by unencumbered market economy (Lemke, 2001). Foucault here mostly refers to the work of Chicago School

economists such as Simons, Schultz, Friedman, and Stigler, but most notably Becker. American version of neoliberalism emerged in a context that is quite strikingly similar and yet distinct in many ways to that of German neoliberalism. Referring most vividly to Henry Simons, *A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire*, (Foucault, 2008, p.216) Foucault was fascinated and intrigued with the unprecedented fashion with which American neoliberals pushed this formula to the extremes which invariably bordered on an invertebrate aversion for Keynesianism, state interventionism and dirigism quite similar to that of "Ordoliberals" (Kiersey & Weidner, 2009, p.356; Oskala, 2013, my emphasis). Thus, Foucault acknowledges that "both schools were linked from the start to classical liberalism insofar as they were forms of "critical governmental reason, "or political rationality that theorized government as immanently self-limiting by virtue of its primary responsibility for supporting the economy" (Trent, 2009, p.41). Regardless of this, Foucault suggests that unlike Germany and France, liberalism has been at the heart of political debate in US for centuries and therefore has had a long history of acute allergy and antagonistic aspirations toward the hegemony of the Keynesian welfare state (Feher, 2009, p.37).

What becomes apparently clear is that compared to its German variant of neoliberalism Foucault consistently insists, American neoliberalism is increasingly pervasive and much more radical in nature and structure: as it extends radically to every sphere of "subjectivity, affectivity, and intimacy" (Sven-Olov, 2013, p.27) and "the relationship it envisages between markets and society" (Flew, 2012b, p.29). It is in line with this thought that it explicitly seeks the radical extension of the economic analysis both to previously unexplored economic domains (e.g., the theory of human capital), and to domains which were not exclusively or not primarily economic (the family and the birth rate, for example, or delinquency and penal policy" (Foucault, 2008, p.323): thus eliding any difference between the economy and the social.

To a very large extent this tendency as Foucault observes, is prevailingly characterised by an "unlimited generalization" of the market form (Foucault, 2008, p.243). Foucault's point in other words, is that it turns the whole idea of the economic rationality of the market into a general "grid of intelligibility" (p.243) "as well as a principle of decipherment for social relationships and individual behavior" (Oskala, 2012, p.67) far beyond its ordinary economic context. As such, market understood as the grid of intelligibility decisively makes it possible not only for epistemologically understanding human action: but at the same time, for understanding non-economic processes, relations and behaviour of a number of formal and intelligible relations (Oskala, 2012, p. 67). In this vein, Foucault concisely notes with good reason that American neoliberalism far from seeking to cushion the counterweight of the market rather sought to "generalise the economic form of the market throughout the social body, including relationships that were not conducted, and therefore not usually analysed through monetary exchanges" (Foucault, 2008, p.243). Put very simply, Foucault's analysis shows how American neoliberals radically extend the market into a universal frame of government. For whereas "Ordoliberals" thought is characterised by governing society in the name of the economy, American neoliberals by contrast comprehensively

generalised the scope of the economy to the extent that social relations and individual behaviour can be discerned by using economic criteria and within economic terms of its intelligibility. Foucault's central point is that while classic liberalism had called on government to respect the form of the market, in neoliberal approach, the market is no longer the principle of self-delimitation by the government, but instead, the principle against which it rubs, or "a kind of permanent economic tribunal", Foucault summarily concludes (Foucault, 2008, p.247).

Foucault described illustratively these claims through neoliberal analysis of the conception of "human capital" which takes its cue from a critique of the treatment of the problem of labour within economic theory. The theory of "human capital" was developed by neoliberal theorists of the Chicago School associated with the *Journal of Political Economy* most prominently Gary Becker, Theodore Schultz, Jacob Mincer among others in the 1960s and early 1970s, (Oskala, 2013, p.67; Flew, 2012b; Gertenbach, 2010, p.113-114). Whilst intriguingly, the inherently technical understanding of "human capital theory seems to bear some striking commonalities with the work of Marx, Foucault insists that these authors "practically never argued with Marx for reasons that we may think are to do with economic snobbery", however (Foucault, 2008, p.220). And yet the commonalities in their works far outweigh the differences. At any rate, despite this theoretical ignorance, it is not too difficult to grasp how they relate to Marx (Flew, 2012b).

But of course, "the distinctive mark of the notion of "human capital", Theodore W. Schultz clearly writes in 1961, "is that it is a part of man. It is human because it is embodied in man, and it is *capital* because it is a source of future satisfactions, or of future earnings, or of both" (quoted in Foucault, 2008). Here it is the biopolitical implications of what we might call the "economisation" of quotidian life that are the key concern that draws Foucault's attention. Put more radically, the kernel of the theory of "human capital" was to reconfigure and recast the contours of labour in terms of human capital by "focusing on economic principles of rationality for determining decision-making processes and action" (Trent, 2009, p.42). The first crucial step Foucault identifies is that classical economic theory dismally failed to radically think labour to any significant degree.

To this end, Foucault explores how American neoliberalism instead, suggest how labour ought to be rethought in terms of an enterprise of himself: "the individual deploys his or her human capital in the prospects of earning a profit upon it". Labour understood in this way, crucially corresponds with wages as income earned from the expenditure of "human capital" (p.42-43). Because "human capital" theory substantially transforms labour into a truly economic category, the labourer in Foucault's thought thoroughly becomes a uniquely economic subject. It is irrevocably excluded and effaced from being human to an economic man. The idea is that this tendency on the part of neoliberals to radically recast, rearticulate and reconceive labour as an economic agent significantly implies varied ways of governing individual subjects (Gertenbach, 2010, p.137). This is exactly what invokes and especially shows the governmental meaning of neoliberalism. Coolly and objectively, neoliberal concept of

human capital to say the least, progressively and qualitatively interpellates individuals as a rational and calculative monad in every sphere of life (Gertenbach, 2010, p.117; Mandra & O¨zselcuk, 2010, my emphasis). As Foucault aptly summarises, the reconfiguration of the neoliberal subject, understood in this way, undeniably amount to "an inversion of the relationships of the social to the economic" (2008, p.240).

This lends itself quite nicely and epitomises the central idea of what Foucault appropriately reads as the return of new form of "homo economicus" or entrepreneurial subject (Foucault, 2008, p.243). What shines through Foucault's analysis is what forms a key distinction in neoliberal governmentality: where the economic man is now no longer merely someone who engages in exchange as in the case of classical liberalism but characterised as "an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself.... being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of (his) earnings" (Foucault, 2008, p.226) "who is in need of being set free to freely compete" (Gudmand-Høyer & Hjorth, 2009, p.120). It follows, for me, that the option for agency and autonomy simply imply an individualised understanding of social bonds which subsequently repudiates and refabricates the alleged social solidarity, ethics and aesthetics (Pühl, 2008, p.107, my emphasis). This forms an important tool in Foucault's attempt to radically rethink "the conception of the individual's culture as a form of capital, and the individual's body as involving genetic capital, the object of a new biopolitics" (Gane, 2009, p.360).

On the one hand, the concept of the economic agent "as someone who pursues his or her own interest" and "who must be left alone" (p.270) became the "grid" of intelligibility (Ibid) through which governments began to organise social life— social life becomes individualised in the typical neoliberal logic. But on the other hand: if we read Foucault's genealogy of "homo economicus" not as a representation of the anthropological truth of the social subject but rather as the "grid of intelligibility" — "the surface of contact between the individual and the power exercised on him"(Foucault, 2008, p.252-53) — of the biopolitical mode of governmentality: then this forcefully suggests that the state of the subject cannot merely be deduced to the notion of an entity who is "eminently governable" (p.270): that understands and responds only to the language of economic incentives, but also functions as a conceptual component of a decentralized framework for the "the restriction, self- limitation, and frugality of government" (p.271).

The figure of the celebrated "homo economicus" is in fact the bedrock assumption of all neoliberal analysis which is intrinsically and originally tied to what Foucault referred to as rational-choice theory (Feher, 2009, p.32). The decisive fact is that it would appear that Foucault's "work takes up exactly what writers on neoliberalism find to be so vexing: the manner in which neoliberalism is not just a manner of governing states or economies, but is intimately tied to the government of the individual, to a particular manner of living"(Read, 2009, p.27). Underlying this aim is to demonstrate how the neoliberal model constitutes "a new regime of truth, a new mode of "governmentality" a manner, or a mentality, in which people are governed and govern themselves— a new way in which people are made subjects"(p.28-29). Apparently, as

Dillion and Reid (2009,p.25) suggest, what essentially characterises the central conception of governmentality in Foucault's accounts "was less with class and the teleology of history, which occupied traditional Marxists, than with the emergence of a novel problematization of rule, and a new form of governance whose organizing principle was that of political economy". This perspective thus presupposes that economic theory regrettably failed to squarely situate the radical encoding of the social as economic within the horizon of the reconfiguration of the neoliberal subject as an entrepreneur of him/herself in charge of optimising the use of their "human capital" and ultimately to make sense of it (Foucault, 2008; Lemke, 2001; Read, 2009, my emphasis). To be clear, Foucault's "analytic of the new problematic of governing posed by the introduction of political economy" (Dillion & Reid, 2009, p.27) unquestionably highlights the ways in which the Chicago school economists thinking of government is no longer located within economic imperialism, but rather the production of a suitably responsible subjects through a series of techniques by partaking in the constitution of her own subjectivity. The bottom line is that neoliberal subject as a disembodied "Homo economicus" in a precise sense is the subject which biopolitics relentlessly seeks to create, individuate, targets, control and reproduce. Exemplary of this logic of thinking underlies the typical policies of International Monetary Fund and World Bank neoliberal conditionality contained in structural adjustment policies: which include but certainly not limited to the reductions of government spending; removing of subsidies; removing tariffs, general deregulation of the economy; market liberalisation; privatisation that states like Ghana were "ill-advised" to pursue in order to become globally competitive (Heywood, 2011, p.371, my emphasis). And indeed, the overarching objective in this respect was inspired by radical economic individualism, responsibilisation and self-conduct based precisely on the understanding that individuals are calculative and calculable (Adaman & Mandra, 2014; Joseph, 2010b) – which in turn presumably, also limit the state's influence on its population.

To quickly sum up the foregoing, although "Ordoliberalism" and the Chicago school adopt different approaches to neoliberalism, the substantial differences among them notwithstanding, they all have certain implicit affinities for market. Thus, market rationality in the Chicago school is markedly similar to that of "Ordoliberalism" constructivist idea of the market. Or, in other words, they all share a mutual aversion in this respect in vilifying "state-controlled economy, planning, and state interventionism on (...) those overall quantities to which Keynes attached such (...) importance" (Foucault, 2010, p.79). The way Becker fiercely and persuasively extends the economic grid to theorise the rational behaviour of the labourer, of individuals trying to accumulate human capital by rationally allocating means to ends, such as education to children (Adaman & Mandra, 2010) incontrovertibly amounts to a form of market constructivism. The underlying implications of this transformation are profound. It has been my contention that applying cost-benefit calculus aggressively and exhaustively to labour and human capital, but also to fertility, marriage, allows for reformatting and reshaping all problems of social and personal life through market logic (Ibid). clearly then, all aspects of thought and activity that were formerly not

seen as such have become the universal model of all social behaviour - or, more precisely, in configuring the subject herself into an object of her calculations and choices regardless of the ubiquitous constraints.

However, the differences between Chicago school and "Ordoliberalism" should be explicitly acknowledged. It is claimed that American neoliberals have a more radically grounded conception of the market compared to its German predecessor. More specifically, they understand market constructivism in a starkly different way. "Ordoliberals", on one hand, primarily relies on a reciprocal tolerance understanding of market according to which market is not reducible to the state because it must form its constitutive condition: American "Anarcho-liberalsm understanding on the other hand, radically reconstructs virtually every form of non- economic phenomenon using the market grid of intelligibility.

As signalled above, by pinpointing how in American neoliberalism the market has been transformed into a grid of economic intelligibility for understanding non-economic behaviour, Foucault's analysis thus potentially leaves open the field of possibility and visibility that set neoliberalism apart from the modern liberal view. Yet for Foucault—the anti-naturalistic and *constructivist* view of the market must specifically be understood as a distinctively "new art of government" (Foucault, 2008, p.176). I thus suggest after Foucault that neoliberalism has to be read as a signature technique of governing in which rational economic action is suffused and remarkably orchestrated through the subject's conduct toward him or herself — a biopolitical object of governmentality (Oskala, 2013). Unlike those who have epistemologically interpreted the works of Becker as economics imperialism (Fine & Milonakis, 2009), I would argue that for Foucault, the most dramatic consequence of this de-essentialisation and denaturalisation notion of market is not primarily epistemological but quintessentially governmental.

It is thus my submission that using Foucault (2008), if we want to understand the specific forms that the extended application of the market frame takes in contemporary times then certainly, we need a careful analysis of the new ways in which the social world is governed and becomes governable. By such an analysis, Foucault exposes the shifts in the relation between the market and how it rearticulates, reinstall and re-ensemble our governmentalities. In classical liberalism, the power of the market lies precisely in the fact that it explicitly presented a limit to what government does and do. In neoliberal governmentality, the market becomes a concurrential mechanism through which the governing practice of government can be rationalised (Cotoi, 2011, p.113). Close to Foucault's heart, which is germane to my analysis is that in neoliberal art of government the market rather than providing a panoptic view, "becomes a sort of permanent economic tribunal that claims to assess government action in strictly economic and market terms" (Foucault, 2010, p.247). All of these developments accurately reflect what Foucault meticulously identified as the crux of the liberal governmentality which circulates and permeates within the state and its agencies.

Thus far, the claim here is that Foucault's close and not unsympathetic reading of neoliberalism intellectual evolution is terribly important in addressing the utter confusion associated with the popular representations encountered in the intellectual history of neoliberalism. Yet, a caveat is called for here: On the face of it, Foucault unfortunately appears to re-echo the common understanding that run right from Freiburg through to Chicago by way of hyperbolic exaggeration of Mont Pèlerin Society. But the way he appropriates this idea is crucially different, however. Whereas Foucault presented a picture that draws out "Ordoliberals" connection, he does not depict the intellectual history of neoliberalism seamlessly, unproblematically and unprecedentedly as one long march. Thus, Foucault does fundamentally depart from the too obvious biographical connections between Freiburg and its most comprehensive version in the Chicago: instead he rather analytically denotes the two approaches as an expression of distinctively similar governmental patterns. Even though he gives a persuasive and a systematic account of how the two schools share a tendency for the primacy for market constructivism, his account makes it visible to understand in all its complexities, its underlying discontinuities, its promises and its contradictions. Neoliberalism he unsurprisingly argues is not simply describable as one of ideologically wedded philosophy, an economic theory or a bundle of policies but rather, it is firmly rooted in a fundamental question gestured toward "novel problematisation of rule" (Dillion & Reid, 2009, p.25) which I contend is unmistakably cast in the mould of West German and an American one, whose political-historical development served as examples for Foucault. Let me conclude by making it explicitly clear that Foucault's analysis transparently helps in disentangling and demystifying the more simplistic, parochial and bourgeois perspectives of neoliberalism as class or non-class agenda (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; 2011; Harvey, 2005; 2009; Castree, 2009; Koechlin, 2006). And so while Foucault's genealogy to reiterate the Foucauldian mantra is refreshing in its attempt to bring critical perspectives to the debate on neoliberal reasoning and its technologies of power: it is my impression that it still remains an open and a matter of dispute if indeed Foucault's unflinching position towards what he enthusiastically characterised as neoliberalism could wholly be applied to the uniquely changing conditions that confront us in our historical present (Behrent, 2009, my emphasis) — admittedly, I cannot conclusively settle here—that certainly would be another project in its own right

4.3.3 Governmentality and Development in International Relations

After presenting basic points about the notion of governmentality, I now consider the analytical power of Foucauldian forms of governmentality pertaining to development discourse and practices. In recent years the applicability and utility of Foucault-inspired theorising in International Relations (IR) has been heavily criticised, especially concerning 'the question of the concept global scalability"(Kiersey, 2017, p.1). A number of scholars are skeptical as to whether Michel Foucault's overwhelming interest in power - that is, governmental power concerned with shaping the 'conduct of conduct"and turning human beings into subjects - is compatible with

International Relations (Albert & Lenco, 2008, p.256; Chandler, 2009; 2010; Joseph, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2012; Selby, 2007). Some critics such as James Ferguson (2010) speak of the specific problems that are inexorably prone to arise when the concept of governmentality is applied in non- western contexts such as Africa. Despite the fact that policy measures such as structural adjustment programmes sponsored by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the 1980s, as a technology of government were set out to foster self-regulated subjects, he argues they merely reflect "an old-style laissez-faire liberalism in the service of imperial capital" (Ferguson, 2010,p.173). In particular, that Foucault was —a theorist whose focus was primarily the "domestic'social arena"(Selby, 2007, p.325) 'and therefore cannot be "scaled"up to address the international domain (Joseph, 2009, p.414) with any analytical precision (Kiersey, 2015). This notwithstanding, in the past few years, IR scholars have made attempts to explain international development in developing countries like Africa through Foucauldian governmentality.

Although Ferguson is critical of the applicability of governmentality analytics in African situation, yet his work has been influential for the exploration of governmental rationalities and practices inherent in development in Africa and the impact this has had upon international regimes of governance. For instance, Ferguson and Gupta throughtout their works have been concerned with a specific articulation of the changing understandings of the relations between the state and population in Africa. This transformation is conceptualised by Ferguson and Gupta as transnational governmentality which denotes "modes of government that are being set up on a global scale' (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p.990). The general point of Ferguson and Gupta is the claim that the sovereignty, state borders and the formal political power of many African states have been globalised, diffused or are disolved. Their central claim is that with "transfer of economic sovereignty" (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p.992) a new a rationality of government was engineered, which allows international governing institutions such as the IMF to impose their repressive policies. Analysing global governmentality and other complex networks of international governmental and non-governmental organisations, they show how it operates at multiple scales, which provides a chance to reflect upon many ways of exploring and situating the shifts and competing rationalities in virtually every field of government. This way 'globalizing governmentality' (Frazer, 2003, p.169) provides an ideal lens that force us to drastically reevaluate and reconsider the shifting boundaries of the state by viewing it necessarily as the expression of increasingly globalising of liberal forms of rule; highlighting complex dynamics of dispersed, flexible and autonomous networks of global forces and institutions (Ibid).

Theorists like Jonathan Joseph drawing adeptly on the Foucauldian governmentality analytic as a critical theory (2012, p.6) argues that contemporary forms of governances and dominant rationalities of governance are expressions of neoliberal governmentality (p.132). Joseph arguments are illustrated with an analysis of cases that engage with the modes of governance of organisations like the EU and the World Bank. Joseph analysis seeks to develop a theoretically informed critical approach to

international relations, and in so doing shows how social ideas are influential in theory and in practice. By extending Foucauldian governmentality studies to the discipline of international relations, he critically presents a useful way of understanding global governance in critical IR theory while criticising the confusingly and imprecise usage of the concept. Governmentality, "... is notoriously unclear in Foucault´s own work" (p.16). Apart from the clear and thoughtful exposition of these theoretical notions, what distinguishes Joseph work is the very insightful application of these specific ideas to practical approaches to neoliberal practices of global governance in the developing strategies of international institutions and donor countries, World Bank or the IMF to the EU into the developing programmes in Africa countries (p.183-4). Jonathan Joseph tries to develop an understanding of the nature of the international and considers whether sociological ideas developed in the West can be applied in very different global contexts.

Theories of global governance and the increasing emergence of non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society organisations far from providing useful conceptual tools for understanding our contemporary world order, they nevertheless tend to effectively align with different political rationalities and technologies of governmental practice, and thereby unwittingly legitimise and reinforce the very phenomena they analyse (p.92-5 & p.262-5); and second, key tenets of these theories particularly become manifest and constituted as areas for governmental intervention in the governance practices and discourses of international organisations like the European Union (EU) and the World Bank, albeit with different effects.

In fact, while neoliberal forms of governmentality aim at rational, responsible, free, entrepreneurial conduct and the well-being of populations in those areas that might be characterised as having an advanced form of liberalism (2010, p.224), in the developing countries targeted by the World Bank Joseph suggests, are shaped to a large degree by cruder "disciplinary" forms of neoliberalism without genuinely advancing the desires and aspiration of the population (Joseph, 2012, p.251). Against this idea, Joseph believes that more 'meaningful' and reflective engagement with Foucault approach can be dealt with adequately if we, first and foremost, focus on a specifically neoliberal rather than function as an overall explanatory grid for governmentality (p.29); and that governmentality accounts ought to be placed within the dynamics of 'broader structures' and social relations of capitalist (re)production and geopolitics that together dominate and shape our contemporary social and political reality(p.60-1). Approaching governmentality from this angle can clarify the how, but not the why' (p.15) of power and governance.

Thus Foucaudian ideas of governmentality and the role of discourses should be situated within more critical, Marxian-inspired analyses (p.14). With such an appreciation of governmentality in mind, we can better illuminate various ways that capitalist valorisation and regulation, as well as changing hegemonic projects, post-war historic blocs, and the unevenness of socio-economic development shape our political present (Ibid). Related to this is the idea that the rise of neoliberal governmentalities (including rationalities and techniques of empowerment, partnership, local owner-

ship, benchmarking and others within the World Bank discourses, are necessary make up and are deep-rooted neoliberal political strategies that influentially act upon the reality to make market liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation that have helped to unravel the welfarist-Keynesian post-war that emerged in the 1980s (p.258).

Many social and international theories insights regarding globalisation, networks, global governance or risk society as the fundamental dynamics of late modernity, as Joseph explains, have been notoriously obscured by their argument regarding 'logic of capital' (p.263) and 'power politics'. The apparently relentless march of global governance, in the view of Joseph, inverts actual historical developments as it is irreducible to the changing nature of capitalist (re)production and control, sublimated into the incentivising and individualising strategies of neoliberal governmentality (p.258): "global governance ... rather than a powerful empirical reality ... is a rationality guided by the power of global capitalism that filters down to ... the micro level of everyday practices' (p.97).

Joseph insists that it is particularly through certain state-sanctioned institutions and Western-dominated international organisations that neoliberal governmentality strategies are refracted, reinforced and reproduced. He thinks that contrary to approaches that may perceive State and the States system as increasingly circumscribed, what is in fact occurring is the governmentalisation of the state and its different practices of governing (p.215). A more decentralised way of governing through different networks of power institutions; one mostly concerned with the States and its political apparatuses as the constitutive basis upon which power relations are codified through new governmental projects and modes of calculation (Jessop, p.150). Joseph claims that new forms of governmentality deconstruct and re-shape the meaning and modes of operation of the State, yet this is not simply Western domination of a passive State. He argues, and I agree, that States rather than its alleged populations themselves) are also the main objects of targets of critical evaluations and monitoring performance, made in reference to a standard—i.e. benchmarking for assessing the socio-economic condition of the population, neoliberal governmentality in the global South (p.260-1). The deployment of such techniques by the State dominated international organisations within the context of contemporary international aid relationships are what Michael Merlingen calls "the international conduct of the conduct of countries". In other words, international governmentality as Joseph (2010, p.46) has demonstrated elsewhere targets States but is deeply underpinned by "the claim to be concerned with the health, wealth and well-being of the local population". Global governmentality is, in this fundamental sense, "a complex ensemble of institutions, procedures, analysis and tactics that has the state as its target, and a political economy of poor populations as its main form of knowledge" (p.48).

As the work of Joseph shows, the post-Washington consensus rather than "building institutions for markets" were deeply embedded in the principles and policies of neoliberal capitalism which entails getting countries to open up to global capital, and accordingly implement market friendly policies aimed at governmentalising the State from a distance while encouraging local participation and responsibility (p.259-60).

With all global governance theorists claim that government is no longer the sole actor of governance in the contemporary structure of the societal system, Joseph suggests that organisations like the World Bank and the IMF can only operate with a significant degree of freedom of autonomy from the State.

A forceful case is made that that civil-society involvement, partnerships and Peer Review initiatives in post-colonial Africa driving the rationality behind new forms of global governance, externally imposed by the most influential international organisations, are doomed to failure, and therefore better seen as window dressing for coercive and exploitative North–South relationships vis-à-vis the EU governance discourse (p.249). Put differently and more generally, the success and/or failure of governmental practices and techniques on the ground in developing countries could sometimes not be found just parts of it.

Best (2007) and Abrahamsen (2004) analysis, too, bring an important dimension on the discussion on post-Washington Consensus by focusing on the increasing use of non-juridical tools. Specifically they highlight how benchmarking, metric indicators, monitoring systems, etc., are deeply implicated within post-Washington Consensus in producing and perpetuating compliance from poor countries with international norms through the promotion of an ethos of self-responsibility has drawn upon the work of Michel Foucault, especially his notion of governmentality. Similarly, Ansell et al., (2012) focus on Malawi with specific reference to the youth policy as a case study. Drawing on the analytical framework of governmentality to elucidate the emerging modes of intervention in the lives of citizens in developing countries, they explore how the youth policy in Malawi seeks to produce suitable neoliberal subjects.

In thinking particularly about international interventionist policies and practices in the expansion of liberal policies and liberal practices of government, a number of International Relations scholars have extended the concept of governmentality to the 'international'. This has entail attempts to construct 'governance states' that was conducive to promote regulatory and liberal project' beyond 'the West' (Harrison, 2004). These studies, quite tellingly, reflect on how various World Bank's development interventions and 'good governance' practices in the developing countries– through state- and civil society initiatives – have aimed to shape liberal interventions in Africa in the course of the years. By and large, these studies pay attention to how and under what kinds of conditions the decisive shift within these international governing organisations have enabled them to incorporate African related issues into their policy mandates in the way they did.

In *The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics: Liberalism, Governance and Sovereignty* Williams David sought to analyse how liberal understanding of social and economic transformative agenda and the nature of contemporary forms of governance are firmly rooted in the shifting development discourse and practices of the World Bank (Williams, 2008). This transformative liberal intervention and assistance Williams argues, necessitated a change in the World Bank's policy, practices, attitudes and beliefs in the 1990s and took the radical position that the "wicked problems" of festering poverty and governance become seemingly coexten-

sive: and that strengthening governance is an essential precondition for improving the lives of the poor (World Bank, 2002, p.271). In fact, however, these crucial elements are important not only to understand contemporary forms of governance: rather as he argues, it is to apprehend their connection with projects and programmes that seek to improve and shape the social, political, and economic life of borrower countries as they become progressively accepted as a key mechanism of the World Bank's policies and practices for the management of the problems and threats that are thought to emerge from developing countries (Williams, 2008, p.69). In that spirit, and as a basis for such exposure and engagement, Williams raises the question: why the World Bank came to see discourse on 'good governance' as an effective instrument of global governance. To answer the question, he evaluates what the World Bank is doing to improve the governance of poorest States.

In reflecting on, and considering the changing World Bank's development policy and practices since the late 1970s, he teases out a concern with 'good governance' agenda as having originated out of the problems it experienced over the reified, mystified and unerring structural adjustment lending conditionality, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (p.8 & 48). Whilst providing an account of the early years of the World Bank through to the 1990s, he also systematically relates the policies and practices as constructing a liberal political imaginary of the State as evidenced through 'good governance' phenomenon (p.8).

In dealing with the World Bank therefore especially in it lending to Ghana which became the dominant mode of relationship between external institutions of global governance and recipient States, he highlightes what the attempt to improve governance and their associated rationalities look like in practice (p.12). These debates are inherently related to how Ghana became the explicit target of a huge variety of development programmes in World Bank's policies (p.97). Thus, 1980s for example, neoliberal programmes of structural adjustment policies were designed by the World Bank as a response to the economic precariousness of many developing countries; a reality further exacerbated by the stresses and strains of neoliberal development and modalities (p.48). Ascribing the origins of the World Bank's thinking in the notorious Berg's Report of 1981 report on the economic development crisis in African countries, Williams claims that its development is securely strapped to the landmark report on the crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. For Williams, the contradicted and the hallucinatory effects of structural adjustment thoroughly animated the Bank's concern with issues of global governance (1989). This in important ways was reflected in the increased role of non-state institutions as doubts on the pernicious reign of conditional lending became evident. In its essential points Williams thesis is that the rise to prominence of the 'good governance' phenomenon introduced by the World Bank according to the Washington Consensus during the 1990s, was proposed as a purported panacea for underdevelopment and poverty. From the early 1990s, Williams observes, the liberal approach to social transformative agenda has increasingly shaped a new discourse of governance and aroused interest in the World Bank's approach to global governance perspectives (p.6, 8, 15, 15, 47). But out of these very concerns and

tendencies, Williams shows that the more engaged state–economy interactions, was no longer analysed solely in terms of structural reform: "the good governance agenda ... requires the construction of an intricate institutional framework to govern and encourage market-based economic transactions" (p.87).

Williams also invoked the concept of civil society to illustrate the ways in which they have become key agencies in the context of reshaped, shifting forms, mechanisms and discourses of 'global governance regime' (p.19). In this reasoning, civil society as an expression of characteristically liberal political thought was socially engineered to hold the State accountable, democratic, scrutinise errant governments, and ultimately pressure the State to pursue economic development (p.18 &19). Civil society organisations and institutions, we are continually informed, would also be a cohesive force for reconstructing and integrating the attitudes and behaviour of subjects within institutions and structures of transnational or external institutions of global governance as an important part of the more ambitious interventionist liberal project in the post- colonial world (Ibid).

Using Ghana as an exemplary point of reference, Williams provides an exhaustive analysis of how the World Bank's approach to neoliberal social transformation works out in practice; and how these are intimately connected with concrete forms of governmental logics, rationalities, and technologies aimed to improve governance in the country. His analyses have been influential and also have explanatory power regarding the dominant policy framing of interventionist agendas of the World Bank's in respect of Ghana (and this applies reasonably to other developing countries). A particularly critical development has been the way various cases of World Bank's interventions and bundle of practices aimed to improve governance have been foisted on the Ghanaian state to pursue certain policies and specific development models. And, to a large degree, these governmental interventions and policy prescriptions have been promoted by the construction of a variety of "institutional frameworks, regulatory practices, and imposition of brutal forms of economic discipline, accepted as international best practices" (p.119). In the case of Ghana, these are related to the privatisation and commercialisation of state-owned enterprises, public finance management, land administration, decentralisation and local government development, institutional development in the financial sector, development of micro and small enterprises, and civil-society building through community water and sanitation projects, rural development projects and literacy and functional skills projects. And in fact, when seen through the lens of governance tools and discourses, these kinds of programmes are not at all unique to Ghana— but they do illustrate how the more regulatory external interventionist approaches have become institutionalised and ligitimated and routinised part of contemporary international development to such an extent that "there is now not very much left of the idea of a sphere of "internal affairs" over which (these) governments have sole authority" (Williams, 2000, p.573). As Williams goes on to show, this has led to a hollowed out version of sovereignty in which the "IFIs are prepared to intervene in almost all aspects of economic, politi-

cal, and social life... many governments are now no longer in effective control of the national economic project"(Ibid).

Williams's analysis increasingly sketches the importance of the pervasiveness of World Bank activities as well as their intention to construct or reconstruct some form of supranational geopolitical imaginary of the State: the economy, civil society and the behaviour of individual citizens in Ghana as an expression of interventionist global liberal governance agenda (Sörensen, 2012). Most obviously, Williams's findings inexorably point to the fact that the World Bank's emphasis on liberal frameworks of governance has trumped the sovereignty of post-colonial African states (p.32) so much so that one can hardly speak of these countries possessing de-facto independence in any meaningful sense.

Sovereignty, in the liberal sense, is nothing more than the "freedom for the nation or society to pursue its ends without external control or intervention" (p.36). Williams conclusion with the World Bank's interventions in the case study of Ghana addresses the question of exactly how it has produced "a wholesale disregard for the idea that there is a realm of internal affairs over which the government should be considered sovereign, and over which external agents, as a matter of principle and a matter of practice, should not have any authority. Sovereignty has lost its significance as an institution that structures relations between states like Ghana and outside agencies...It is clear that sovereignty is no longer a guiding or constitutive norm in contemporary international politics, at least for a significant number of states (p.118).

From a different perspective David Plank reaches similar conclusions to Williams regarding how "increasingly overt and extensive intrusions by outside agencies into what had been viewed as the extensive purview of sovereign governments ... (had) ... thoroughly discredited traditional notions of sovereignty in many parts of Africa" (1993, p.407-30). In a similar vein to David Plank, Whitfield and Fraser build upon this, suggesting that sovereignty defines "a realm of political action free from foreign influence" (p.7).

What is most apparent is that the World Bank's undisguised intrusiveness has ensured that government intervention even under crucial circumstances was outlawed. And so it is within this emerging global governance regime that William asserts that since 1990s, there has been normative shift in the way the territorial sovereignty of the world's poorest states has been unnecessarily circumscribed, defied and severely compromised—as a political institution for which powerful western states and development agencies are deeply implicated— and what's more further simply erode the capacity of governments to enact and implement policy effectively. From this perspective, he stridently criticises the recent attempts to reform governance in developing countries and further suggests that they represent "the seemingly boundless arrogance of Western agencies who believe themselves to be in possession of truth about social life for everyone" (p.123).

Graham Harrison's *The World Bank and Africa* in making a fascinating contribution to this debate respectively argues that since the so-called African "crisis" or the African tragedy, virtually development practices in relation to the interventions of

external forces like the World Bank have demanded the rearrangement of the entire social body of post-colonial African states. Involved in the second phase of structural adjustment was a radical shift from promoting a "reduction in the scope of state action' to an emphasis upon the 'nature of state action" (Harrison, 2004, p.18). As Harrison mentions, constructing the state as an "embedding agent" and sovereign frontier' (p.67) rather than a territorial trap is particularly relevant and useful for understanding the strategy and policy practices of an increasingly wide range of powerful international financial institutions as legitimising a global political economy with its own designs, various mechanisms and institutional arrangements for fixing the various development challenges posed by the African region. He reminds us that "governance states represent a manifestation of a grander and profoundly historical problematic: the politics of the encounter between the institutions of global capitalism and African nation-states" (p.6).

Of greater concern is the way that "the concept of sovereignty necessarily posits a state of self-containment or inviolateness that exists before intervention..." (p.25). Harrison's claim is that sovereignty is "...empirically too provisional and theoretically too contested' to be of use in analysing Africa" (p.24-5). He supports the assertion that broad frameworks of development intervention by the World Bank incredibly blurs the distinction between state economy and state society boundaries to rearrange the entire social body between state and society, and society itself (Harrison, 2010, p.32): typical of liberal forms of governmentality. In this framing, Harrison clarifies that "external-national distinctions become less useful" (Harrison, 2001, p.657). The nature of the World Bank's intricate, intrusive and detailed interventions in the sovereign frontier – appears to reveal much about the on-going attempts to instil a vastly expanded new global governance regime, discursive intervention, political and economic reforms, conditioned and routinely characterised by liberal norms and discourses of government. For Harrison, as for Chang, "these days, there is virtually no area on which the Bank and the Fund do not have (often very strong) influence – democracy, judicial reform, corporate governance, health, education, and what not" (2006, p.24).

It would seem that lurking in the background of this vision of the World Bank has been a never-ending list of "new" reforms, "benchmarks" and performance criteria which amounts to a transformation of states (via "governance states") and societies (through social engineering as "embedding neoliberalism") into an "ideal" and stable type conforming the basic fantasies and values of neoliberal ideology in general and the World Bank's current development model in particular (Harrison, 2004, p.128). The argument is that the new intimate relationship is a product of the "ascendance, or victory, of neoliberal fundamentals" (p.22) led by the World Bank's project to embed... neoliberal interventions in the sovereign frontier" (p.66). The result has been 'internalised neoliberal reform' (p.75). The implication, as a consequence of this is that we are left with the impression that such a project, initiatives, programmes and techniques necessarily lead to the presentation of "success stories" in a continent associated with belligerent regulatory reform failure. If anything, the history of devel-

opment policy is replete with initiatives and programmes, which turned out to have several ambiguous or simply bad implications. Or it might be more accurate to say has led to obviously bad outcomes. In fact, as shown by Harrison, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania, who have become "star pupils" in the World Bank's new good governance aid fad, have today shown signs of governance deterioration.

In Sub-Saharan Africa the upshot has been interventions by the World Bank that responds robustly and consistently to the more complex and diverse context of regional government structures. He pushed the argument further, arguing that "donor influence is certainly a reality, but it does not necessarily work against a state, and the state itself does not necessarily have any distinct opposition". Moreover, in line with the problematic assertion that aid, as a particular form of external influence, affect policy autonomy of poor African States, Harrison makes the following statement: "the donor-state relation is too intimate and interrelated to be understood as a dichotomy. Donors do not just impose conditionalities; they also work in a routinized fashion at the centre of policy-making" (Harrison, 2001, p.670-671).

The illuminating way with which Graham captures the complexity and the diversity of the debate that situates recent interventions by the World Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa within the context of regional government structures and patterns prompts consideration of the role of liberal techniques and rationalities and forms of government within the international arena. As Neumann and Sending put it, "the meaning and role of sovereignty are largely defined by governmental rationalities that now increasingly operate on the global level" (Neumann & Sending, 2010, p.6). What this analysis of 'governance states' in Africa by Graham Harrison productively does then is that it unmistakably provides some of the most robust critiques which in turn is intimately linked to the shaping of a new terrain of very visible and undisguised development intervention by the World Bank that has most evidently been informed by the emerging global governance regime. Hinging critically on 'a profound global project of socio-political engineering' and micro-management (2004, p.3), his case study on Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique, may insightfully serve as a fertile ground to probe the technocratic state institution building approach of an array of powerful external actors with the final objective of ensuring that agency of transformation within various state ministries, departments and agencies 'internalise' the reform agenda (p.89 & 93). In this account, Graham's key point is to claim that "aid technicians and high-level civil servants have articulated the language of international development into their own policymaking and discussions with external agency representatives" (p.111).

Importantly, however, critical perspectives while sympathetic to liberal interventions in Africa points of challenging disagreement, differences, and varying emphasises. Whitfield and Fraser for instance pointed out that "even whilst arguing that sovereignty has been 'lost' claim 'African governments almost always have a degree of choice over whether or not to accept aid from a particular source at a particular time" (p.27–44). Thus, like Whitefield and Fraser, Brown and Harman (2013) suggest that liberal rationalities of governing do rely upon and even foster various forms of African

agency; such a rationality of governing draws attention to active and even leading role of States. In the same manner, Brown strenuously rejects the predominant assumption that African states sovereignty and self-governance have been unduly curtailed by development assistance, and strikingly reaches the conclusion that States are not only the central constitutive subjects of the international realm (Brown, 2013, p.3) but are also increasingly heavily endow with the autonomy with which to contest and engage in negotiations over the terms of aid relationships (Ibid). All in all, an important consequence of the emergence of the so-called 'governance states' and the new emphasis on 'governance with government' has been an increasing intensification of deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of global politics: in that the discourse and practices of development have deproblematised, relegitimised and normalised the ever increasing interventions of a plethora of external actors in terms of addressing the development problems of aid-recipient countries through ambitious projects of social and political engineering.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the theoretical "toolkit" and the conceptual key that will help to think through structural adjustment discourse as a form of a new rationality of governance. I have shown that while neoliberal narratives represent itself as an omnipresent, omnipotent, all-encompassing, or dominant ideological rhetoric, admittedly, justifiable to some degree in analysing international economic relations and global governance, it can be viewed as imprecise and ineffective as exemplified by Hayekian economic rationalism and "Freidmanaic" monetarism. Foucault's rendition of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality distinctly differ from most prevalent conceptualisations that merely reduce neoliberalism to a set of a radically free markets policies or to the eulogists of the Marxian tradition readings that define it as a class or hegemonic project (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; 2011; Harvey, 2005; 2009; Castree, 2009, my emphasis). These referents inadvertently failed to capture the *political rationality* that both undergirds these policies and reaches beyond the market. And so, it seems entirely plausible to assert that not only is neoliberalism through the lens of Foucault complex, nuanced and innovative and so too is it that it powerfully offers a point of departure which has emerged as transmutations of liberalism in our contemporary times.

I have dealt with one of the crucial elements of Foucault's analytics of governmentality, namely the ways in which governmentality functions as a specific form of power and how we cannot isolate power relations from the resistant and contestations elements that incessantly saturate them. I have clarified how a governmentality approach contributes to understanding regulatory, technologies, object-subject formation more classically conceived as crystallised and rearticulated in a historically different matrix of governmental rationalities and strategies. And yet simultaneously reproduce contestable, seemingly heterogeneous and unstable forms of power. Here my preoccupa-

tion however, is on Foucault's analysis of manifestations of power relations working through technologies of the self and the processes of subjectification this involves rather than techniques of domination (Foucault, 1994, p.340-345; 1991, p.261-266).

Foucault's analysis of power proves particularly helpful in appreciating the technologies of power at play in international economic governance which regulate these relationships. Going beyond Foucault's allegedly Eurocentric analysis of inter-states governmentalities, I propose how we could examine the realm of supranational institutions where political power at the international and inter-state forms have deeply enmeshed and tangled up with each other to structure the policies that are constructed and implemented by these institutions — the Bank and Fund (not discussed by Foucault). I intend to show by empirical analysis how Ghanaian Structural Adjustment Policies were resisted, subverted and countered not by being explicitly "against" (Helle, 2012) but on the logics of "ownership" through simulation of home grown policies, so to say (Ibid). Or put slightly differently, at a point where technologies of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination. At its best as Foucault (1997, p. 45) shows, "the art of not being governed quite so much". Yet I do not in the least deny that the repressive and dominant forms of power incarnated by SAPs were completely absent. Quite the contrary.

I have a paid particular attention to American "Anarcho-liberalism" and German neoliberalism through a thorough recasting and reconstruction of Foucault's concept of biopolitics and crucially, how they chime with many contemporary global governance concerns that involve us. It seems to me that this analysis has several insights which bring into sharp focus new ways of critically rethinking about exercise of government. Above all else, as we will see in the coming chapters, I will utilise neoliberalism as governmentality to maximum effect to interrogate the emergence of the ideologically arrogant policy measures that were undemocratically forced on African debtor states in the 1980s and early 1990s by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank incarnated by structural adjustment policies (the emergence of the doctrine of conditionality) which functions as a regulatory instrument — how it was developed, deployed and articulated as a neoliberal governmental technology of economic governance to structure, restructure, code and recode the behaviour of African debtor states: through the production of a market willing, self-regulating, competitive and entrepreneurial form of subjectivities (Weidner, 2013) by shaping its aspirations and promoting specific norms of conduct and explicit policy-related techniques (Li, 2007, my emphasis). And indeed, it is within this context that I take a profound exception to Ferguson's (2010, p.273) insistence that "neo-liberalism-as-rationality" does not apply to Africa as not only grossly misconceived but also profoundly unacceptable and manifestly not borne out of reality: the coming chapters however, examine to what extent this claim holds.

I have attempted to demonstrate how the appropriation of Michel Foucault's thoughts on governmentality has had considerable imprint on the opening and critical reinterpretation of IR theory by presenting a selection of rich contributions to the discipline that has been inspired by his scholarship. Of particular interest, for this

project is the impact of these contributions on policy intervention and problematic forms of governance agenda of the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s, aimed at developing the situation in Ghana: those of liberal 'governmentality' and of liberal 'biopolitics'. My approach will help to critically map out the fact that governmental technologies and rationalities emerging from structural adjustment regime proselytised and operationalised by the IMF and the World Bank in the case of Ghana in fact, neatly fit the prevalent understandings of neoliberal modes of governance.

CHAPTER FIVE

Neoliberalism: The Emergence of a Dominant Paradigm?

5.1 Introduction

What I hope to do in this part of the thesis is to first present and discuss thoroughly a set of political and economic ideas commonly called neoliberalism. The linchpin of the neoliberal dogmatic theology is the idea that basically recommends that the market mechanism should primarily be allowed to make major social and political decisions —the belief that the involvement of the state in the economy should and must voluntarily "roll-back", ostensibly to ensure individual freedom or economic efficiency—and some of the pronounced confusions and remarkable disagreements which have become emblematic with the definition of neoliberalism. While recent scholarship has sufficiently provided sound starting point to approach neoliberalism as theoretically and conceptually elusive, I am a bit hesitant and ill at ease to blindingly join the bandwagon or this tradition. My main point is that inasmuch as I recognise the polycentric and multiscalar nature of neoliberalism, the simple fact of the matter is that it is fruitless to engage in polemics surrounding neoliberalism for the same reason, before I try to make some sense of the popular narratives about neoliberalism. This does not in any way mean that it is not worth pursuing. However, central to the analysis of this thesis is a shift from the existing critical literature that frames neoliberalism through it's "homeostatic" (Reid, 2013, p.108-109) narratives which as I see it is overwritten and stale.

Following on from the above, I will try to present some more detailed outlines of neoliberalism's rise and changing context and to be more specific, how it has been effected and legitimated in spite of its apparent incongruence. Ultimately, I argue that locating neoliberalism within its crisis of legitimacy will conceivably make it easily distinguishable and powerfully enable us to critically consider how the project that was discursively supposed to represent an extremely progressive agenda for change has conversely become utterly retrogressive in its disciplinary force.

5.2 The Concept of Neoliberalism

In recent years, neoliberalism has commonly been conceived as an alternative label which has come to irreversibly alter the uncanny relations between market and the state. Broadly speaking then, it is typically viewed as a policy agenda, mode of governance or ideology that favours the market over the state (Steger & Roy, 2010). Or, to put it another way, it has become a byword where market has been highly patronised against the state (Plehwe, Walpen; & Neunhöffer, 2005). More specifically, it is basically saying how market has infiltrated politics and government as the be-all and end-all and in its wake has immensely displaced the state and to borrow a wonderful phrase by Bourdieu (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009), has become the "pensée unique" of our times (Bourdieu, 1998) which is apparently not in dispute. Ong (2006), states that it has become a project of an economic tsunamic market reforms and class rule. Rachel Turner shows how "markets for neo-liberals, have become "sacrosanct to the functioning of the economy" and is now "part of the natural spontaneous order of civilised values and mutual cooperation that sustains capitalism" (Turner, 2008, p.24).

Rachel Turner (2008, p.26), further explains:

> Neo-liberals advocate that the liberal state should be strong but minimal: it should embody political authority but at the same time be constitutionally limited. Its roles and responsibilities should be determined by the public interest. Neo-liberalism has modified the principles of pure laissez-faire so as to afford the state the primary responsibilities of securing law and order, providing public goods and preserving the constitutional rules that safeguard the market order.

Preston (1997, p.256), concurs when he states that:

> Their central claim is that the free-market capitalist system is maximally effective in producing and equitably distributing the economic, social, political and intellectual necessities of life in a developed society. The free market comprises of atomistic rational individuals who know their needs and wants and who contract with other individuals through the mechanism of the marketplace to satisfy those needs and wants. Based on classical methodological individualist notions, neo-liberal theorists argue that these needs and wants motivate self-interested actions. Consequently, self-interested individuals active on a free market within and beyond their national boundaries become the most competent agents of development because the free market is able to enhance their economic status and that of their nations as a whole. The state must therefore retreat from management of the economy. Its legitimate role is only to provide a basic legal and security system to underpin the individual contractual pursuit of private goals. According to this school, this model represents the essential character of all human economic activity in society. (Preston, 1997, p.256)

Similarly, Stallings provides a wonderful rationalisation of the shifting remits of the state thus:

> Two major policy measures were advocated in furtherance of the retreat of the state. The first concerns reducing the state's role in the economy. To achieve this deregulation and privatisation of state assets were prescribed. This required the liberalisation of the market typified by reduction in government planning and regulation of economy, and the abolition of tariff regimes, a more hospitable approach to foreign investment regulations and curbing of trade unions. The second measure was the achievement of macroeconomic stability. This required a state reducing its fiscal deficits, and this could be done by the abolition of various subsidies, restriction of government spending especially on social services. (1995, p.12).

Fundamentally, neoliberalism holds that government interference is a total waste and misuse of resources (Edwards, 2002, p.38, 42, 43, 45, 78; Hill, 1996, p.98). More putatively, the term neoliberalism has come to represent in the view of some political theorists "a lamentable spread of global capitalism and consumerism, as well as an equally deplorable demolition of the proactive welfare state in Western Europe, and most prominently, the political theories used to justify these changes" (Bourdieu, 1998; 1998a; 2001; Chomsky, 1999; Touraine 2001; Harvey, 2005; Hermansen, 2005; Saad Filho & Johnston, 2005; Hagen, 2006; Plehwe et al., 2006; Garbo, 2008; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Steger & Roy, 2010; Nilsen & Smedshaug, 2011).

5.3 Neoliberalism: An Incongruent Concept?

Paradoxically, it is somewhat difficult to disengage neoliberalism if indeed one wants to know the reification of the politics of market in the contemporary political thought. Consequently, practically it also seems quite inevitable to refer to neoliberalism without getting bogged down or mired in the deepening labyrinth of an unnecessary and avoidable controversy and arguments (Moslet, 1984; Fogh Rasmussen, 1993; Norberg & Bejke, 1994; Norberg, 2001; 2003; Hartwich, 2009). The reason is not far-fetched. Neoliberalism has proven to be both conceptually and theoretically elusive and ambiguous in terms of its definition (Hartwich, 2009; Turner, 2008). Peck (2010, p.13), in describing how contradictory, overloaded and elusive neoliberalism has become writes:

> Crisply unambiguous, essentialist definitions of neoliberalism have proved to be incredibly elusive. ... It would be (wrong) to reduce neoliberalism to some singular essence... (because) it is contradictory and polymorphic.

Rachel. S. Turner (2008, p. 2), has advanced similar arguments thus "neo-liberalism is a term that has come to be used with a lack of precision in contemporary political debates. What it stands for and what it explains is both confused and confusing" (Turner, 2008). Jessop (2001), has also equally weighed in on the question of the unwieldy nature of neoliberalism, building upon the idea that "neoliberalism" itself has become an "increasingly popular but confusingly polyvalent concept". Strident critics such as (Mudge, 2008), describes it as "an oft-invoked but ill- defined concept". In the view of Brenner et al., (2009, p.2), neoliberalism seriously suffers from "a perplexing mix of overreach and underspecification". Even though neoliberalism has become "omnipresent and promiscuous" (Clarke, 2008) and yet it's meaning and understanding "seems to alter its shape from paper to paper" (Castree, 2006). The first step in addressing these dilemmas is to acknowledge that "the process of neoliberalization . . .is neither monolithic in form nor universal in effect"(Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.384).

As Reid (2013, p.108-109) quite rightly emphasises, neoliberalism "is not a homogeneous nor are its particular forms of dogmatism homoestatic". That is to say, neoliberalism has no monolithic pattern and it is an ill-defined concept or more precisely, it cannot be defined in an unequivocal way. McCarthy and Prudham, (2004) corroborate this line of argument by asserting that neoliberalism is too nebulous and fuzzy to determine and further maintain that it is very difficult if not impossible to define. Ha-Joon Chang describes neoliberalism as "born out of an unholy alliance between neoclassical economics and the Austrian-Libertarian tradition" (Chang, 2003, p.47), while James Ferguson describes how: "perhaps in the strictest sense, neoliberalism refers to a macroeconomic doctrine" (Ferguson, 2010, p.170). Accordingly, in many contexts it is left literally undefined, assuming that the audience knows what it entails (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009). For instance, some accounts of neoliberalism such as those put forward by Susan Watkins and David Harvey present it as an all-encompassing hegemonic ideology, without specifically defining what the term "neo-liberalism" really stands for (Susan, 2004; Harvey, 2005). Also, regardless of the voluminous scholarship on neoliberalism, the problems related to understanding what we mean by neoliberalism have hardly been resolved —at least not in a way that would be commonly agreed by the scholars involved.

The matter is not helped, either, as for instance, more recently, anthropologists Catherine Kingfisher and Jeff Maskovsky in their review (2008, p.123), cynically, confessed a temptation "to abandon the term altogether "and they are not alone. Barnett (2010) also holds the same unfortunate view when he notes that there is no such thing as neoliberalism. In any event, apart from neoliberal incoherence and contradictions, what is even more than problematic is that it is conflated and deployed under different phenomena within a common rubric. Equally, James Ferguson (2010, p.170) maintains that "there is (now) huge variation in the way the word "neoliberalism" is used in contemporary scholarship". And yet, perhaps curiously, despite the fact that neoliberalism is polysemous and has myriad referents, there is a fairly consistent manner in which academic analysts at least commonly agreed on one key element which

gives it distinctive character; that is how overwhelmingly the state's sovereignty has surrendered—which invariably means that differences among academic analysts in finding a proper semantic content and structure for neoliberalism seems to me is a matter of degree and not nature.

Indeed, as Rachel Turner notes:

> However, regardless of these differences in interpretation and "lack of consensus in defining neoliberalism" (Springer, 2012, p.135), two themes emerge: the importance of guiding policy by a clear and credible set of rules determined by the market order, and the importance of keeping in check monopolistic, regulatory and bureaucratic forces which hamper the spontaneous order of the market and economic growth. These two themes are at the core of the neo-liberal ideology espoused by Ludwig von Mises, F. A. Hayek and others". (Turner, 2008, p.116)

It can thus be said that these strikingly different patterns of definitions are pertinent in understanding how "homoeostatic" (Reid, 2013, p.108-109) neoliberalism has become, theoretically and conceptually. To be clear as possible, my intention here is not to take issues with the already existing popular narratives on neoliberalism in an attempt to proffer a grand alternative definition or argument that addresses its elusiveness, ambiguities and complexities or to *dabble* in sterile speculation which is quite certainly overdue and moot and may amount to a futile endeavour as "pure" neoliberalism does not exist and that to attempt a grand narrative is pointless: neoliberalism's development throughout the last few decades of the twentieth century has been fraught with theoretical tensions arising from conflicting schools of thought and practical tensions resulting from its implementation in a variety of contexts, making it a "complex and varied ideology"(Turner, 2007, p.5). And I am not also by this I hasten to add, in the least suggesting that there cannot be a *priori* definition for neoliberalism. Far from it, but rather to make a case that why neoliberalism seemingly does not lend itself to precise definition is to a large extent our poverty to appreciate and grasp the distinguishing feature of neoliberalism as constituting at its core, a discursive politics of market which is glaringly missing from the perspectives of the research of this tradition. As such, neoliberalism significantly does not readily lend itself to any identifiable political ideology, but at best a complex ideological system (Turner, 2008). Concomitant to this is neoliberalism's discursive nature as a political project (Achterhuis, 2010).

At a fundamental level, I would argue that one of the obvious way to appreciate and grasp the discursive qualities and elements of neoliberalism is to re-read the original text of the key neoliberal theorists which involves extrapolating from the text deeper meaning and interpretations and contextualising the circumstances under which such ideas *tentatively* emerged in order to revitalise critical approaches (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009) "to counter problematic notions of neoliberalism as an unstoppable force"(Springer, 2012, p.135). In this regard, by surveying the histori-

cal conjecture, trajectories and contours of neoliberalism through the works of key neoliberal theorists its "polysemous", "homeostatic" and "polyvalent" nature could be somewhat rendered understandable, knowable and simplified. The second and the most important would be to see neoliberalism as coherently articulating discursively a *new* grander vision of government. My task in this thesis is to show how Foucault's philosophical account of neoliberalism is useful in deciphering the discursive politics of market in what he terms a dramatically new *political rationality*. Foucault's notion on governmentality, I contend without any equivocation, is *key* and distinctive in deciphering the so-called challenge posed by neoliberalism. Foucault's thoughts on governmentality I claim again is apt, instrumental and offers a *matured* understanding in helping to elucidate, re-evaluate, explicate and reconceptualise neoliberalism, the philosophy consistently extol by the Washington-based institutions as the best alternative to economic development.

5.4 Neoliberalism: Standard Narratives

As I have already alluded to above, until now it is *difficult* to discern a clear and easy definition for neoliberalism despite the flurry of academic interest it has generated, provoked and a lot of seminal work done by many academic heavy weights. Put very differently, as dominant as the concept of neoliberalism has become for classical political thought, public intellectuals and for policy makers more generally, it is intriguingly *somewhat* difficult to define. "There almost appears to be an inverse relationship between the volume of scholarship produced on neoliberalism and the agreement over exactly what it means" (Ward & England, 2007). However, following the economic sociologist Stephanie Mudge (2008), I am compelled to ask "what is neoliberalism" for there are a lot of compelling reasons to reconsider and rethink the relevance of the term neoliberalism, rather than to leave it behind (Mains, 2012; Kipnis, 2007; Goldstein, 2012).

Over the past 30 years or so, neoliberalism has been defined in a variety of different ways and from different perspectives. David Harvey in his touchstone book, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, offers an elegant and an all-encompassing definition of neoliberalism. Harvey's definition presents a concise and precise synthesis of all the explanatory theories of neoliberalism and simultaneously gives an overview of all the salient features investigated. David Harvey agrees that neoliberalism is heavily inflected with class politics, and offers the following touchstone definition:

> Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political-economic practices that propose that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate for such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and

> integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit .(2005, p.2)

Four distinctly yet overlapping features emerge from Harvey's definition: privatisation, financialisation, the management and manipulation of crisis, and state redistributions. The underlying assumption is that public assets are to be corporatised, commoditised and privatised within the orbit of neoliberal project. Public utilities such as water, telecommunications, transportation), social welfare provisions (social housing, education, health care, pensions), public institutions (such as universities, research laboratories, prisons) and even warfare have all been privatised to some degree throughout the capitalist world (p.44).

According to Mitchell:

> As a political philosophy of governance, neoliberalism is an on-going formation with different moments and sites in its evolutionary trajectory. Although it is articulated and implemented in different ways depending on the context, most scholars across disciplines concur that it is a philosophy premised on a mantra of market rationality and on the active encouragement of laissez-faire economic systems worldwide. (2004, p. 389)

Palley argues just as Mitchell that "contemporary Neoliberalism...emphasises the efficiency of market competition, the role of individuals in determining economic outcomes, and distortions associated with government intervention and regulation of markets" (2005, p.20). Sewpaul and Holscher observe it is:

> an increasingly undisputed primacy of economic over other forms of rationality, where complex political, social and cultural constellations seem to have been reduced to economic issues, where policy decisions appear to make very little sense unless they make economic sense, and where the concept of welfare seems to have been reduced to the limited version of economic welfare. (2004, p.3-4)

Neoliberalism as explained by Saad-Filho and Johnston further elaborates more fully the above outlined definitions by identifying neoliberalism as "part of a hegemonic project concentrating power and wealth in elite groups around the world, benefiting especially the financial interests within each country, and US capital internationally"(2005, p.1). To them, neoliberalism is an ideological project for the restoration of naked class power (2005) and a mechanism "which has evolved to protect capital(ism) and to reduce the power of labour" (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005, p.3) and also add that "it is not difficult to recognize the beast when it trespasses into new territories, tramples upon the poor, undermines rights and entitlements, and defeats resistance through a combination of domestic political, economic, legal, ideological and media pressures, backed up by international blackmail and military force if necessary"(2005, p.2). In this context, Saad-Filho and Johnston largely see neoliberalism as a project of authoritarian capital.

In their attempt to define neoliberalism, Kim England and Kevin Ward (2007) define neoliberalism from four overlapping vantage points; viz, neoliberalism (1) as an ideological hegemonic project, (2) as policy and program, (3) as a state form, and (4) as governmentality:

> the places and the peoples behind its origins that are involved in its apparent uptake in geographically discrete but socially connected parts of the world. In this work political (and indeed cultural) dominance is exercised through the formation of class-based alliances — elite actors, institutions, and other representatives of capital — at a variety of spatial scales, who produce and circulate a coherent program of ideas and images about the world, its problems, informed by gendered and racialised power hierarchies. (England & Ward, 2007, p.11)

Firstly, the central idea is that neoliberalism as a hegemonic ideology drives particular forms of programmes which are *collusively* rationalised, *proselytised* and operationalised by elite actors and dominant groups organized around transnational class-based alliances in which states are unwilling accomplices. Second, the understanding of neoliberalism as a policy and programmes means the transfer of ownership from public to the private sector through privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Klepeis & Vance, 2003; Martinez & Garcia, 2000). The policy discourse uses the freedom of the market, public choice, *competition,* and efficient management as the logic underpinning policy change. To this end, both national and international policy actors are intimately involved in espousing the policy shift to neoliberalism (England & Ward, 2007). Third, neoliberalism as a state form means the emasculation of the state in terms of it economic role, where there is a reformulation, construction and reconstruction — indeed, the "redrawing the boundary between civil society, market, and state" (p.12) where "economic management systems, and invasive social agendas centered on urban order, surveillance, immigration issues, and policing"(Simon, 2012, p.137) are effectively "rolled out" (Peck, 2001; Peck & Tickell, 2002).

The fourth dimension of neoliberalism is a mode of governance what Michel Foucault tellingly refers to as governmentalities which *articulate* a new grander vision of government rooted firmly in entrepreneurial values where the individual is responsibilised,(re)imagined, (re)interpreted and (re)assembled to influence forms of knowledge through the *conduct of conduct* (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996; Brown, 2003; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Larner, 2003; Lemke, 2002) or to manage his or her affairs with minimal state interference. Corollary to this is Bob Jessop (2002a) explanation of neoliberalism as the hegemonic ideology at the global level. According to Jessop,

> The resurgence of liberalism in the form of neoliberalism is often attributed to a successful hegemonic project voicing the interests of financial and/or transnational capital. Its recent hegemony in neoliberal regimes undoubtedly depends on the successful exercise of political, intellectual, and moral leadership in response to the crisis of Atlantic Fordism– a crisis that the rise of neoliberalism and neoliberal policies has exacerbated. (Jessop, 2002a, p.455)

Globally neoliberalism as a hegemony has enabled powerful multinational corporations say International Monetary Fund and the world Bank and other influential policy institutions like Cato institute to rationalise and proselyte neoliberal agenda in the form of adjustments policies among others since 1990s (Jessop, 2002a). Jessop's explanation significantly *accentuates* the Marxian-inspired literature by situating neocolonial domination and *dependency* appropriately within the international rather than internal analytical frame given that market reforms across the globe are associated with the external imposition by *powerful* global actors such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Peet, 2003).

Similarly, Martinez and Garcia (2000), poignantly showcase neoliberalism as: a set of economic policies that have become widespread during the last 25 years or so. Although the word is rarely heard in the United States, you can clearly see the effects of neoliberalism here as the rich grow richer and the poor grow poorer ... Around the world, neoliberalism has been imposed by powerful financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank ... The capitalist crisis over the last 25 years, with its shrinking profit rates, inspired the corporate elite to revive economic liberalism. That's what makes it "neo" or new (cited in Ross & Gibson, 2007, p.12).

Prechel and Harms in their seminal study (2007) beautifully identify five processes of neoliberalism: ... expand markets by eliminating government policies interfering with markets, cut taxes to simultaneously reduce the resources of inefficient government and channel them to private investors for capital formation, privatize by selling public properties to private economic actors, commodify things that were not originally produced to be exchanged in the market (e.g., health, education, pollution), and eliminate social programs to establish personal responsibility (p.5).

Farahamandpur (2005), succinctly define neoliberalism as:

> a corporate domination of society that supports state enforcement of the unregulated market, engages in the oppression of nonmarket forces and anti-market policies, guts free public services, eliminates social subsidies, offers limitless concessions to transnational corporations, enthrones a neo-mercantilist public policy agenda, establishes the market as the patron of educational reform, and permits private interests to control most of social life in the pursuit of profits for the few ... It is undeniably one of the most dangerous politics that we face today. (as cited in Kumar, 2009, p.146)

Dean (1999), no less sees neoliberalism as:

> problematization of the welfare state and its features of bureaucracy, rigidity and dependency formation. They recommend the reform of the individual and institutional conduct so that it becomes more competitive and efficient. They seek to affect this reform by the extension of market rationality to all spheres, by the focus on choices of individuals and collectives and by the establishment of a culture of enterprises and responsible autonomy. (p.268)

As Dean writes, under neo-liberalism, the role of the state to provide welfare services has been grossly insignificant and limited while the market now forms the basis for regulating the economic and social activity.

5.5 The Meteoric Rise of Neoliberalism as Development Orthodoxy

In order to appreciate neoliberalism as a dominant ideological construct, it requires a critical appraisal of its recent developments within the broader contemporary political discourse. Over the last three decades, the rise of neoliberalism has been steady and its monumental impact can readily be observed in every fabric of our social endervour. The neoliberal theorists choice for economic liberalism is that this is the only surest way to ensure efficiency, sustained growth and *human freedom* as people are able to engage in transactions voluntarily and in their own interest without any let or hindrance (Bell & Head, 1997, p.34; Foldvary, 1998, p.145, Harvey, 2005, p.2; Hodgson, 2005, p.548; Slaughter, 2005, p.35 & 39; Friedman, 1962; Bauer, 1981; Lal, 1983; Layard, 2005). Milton Friedman (1990) states:

> In a free world, as in a free market economy in any one country, transactions take place among private entities—individuals, business enterprises, charitable organisations. The terms at which any transactions take place are agreed on by all parties to that transaction. The transaction will not take place until all parties believe benefit from it. As a result, the interests of the various parties are harmonized. Co-operation, not conflict is the rule. (p.51)

Neoliberal economic thought and its attendant modes of governance gained prominence and momentum in the 1980s as a reaction to the crisis of the welfare state and post-war Keynesian Consensus on the goals of macroeconomic policy (primarily full employment and has since come to dominate the global economic system (Gamble, 2006, p.22; Harvey, 2005, p.20-21). It was first put forth and popularised by the right wing economists who took their inspiration from classical liberal political economy scholars such as Adam smith. It is worth highlighting that neoliberalism triumphed *largely* because of the economic crisis that resulted from the adoption of Keynesian developmentalism in the aftermath of World War two. In other words, the widespread problems associated with Keynesian fiscal policy of nineteenth century marks the resurgence of liberal thought as the guiding rationality for governing (Hartwick & Peet). The Keynesian model was essentially a model of the management of the national economy by the state (Amin & Malmberg, 1994, p.242). Keynesianism profoundly emphasised the interventionist role of the state in the macroeconomic management of the national economy (Eatwell et al., 1987, p.47; Quiggin, 1997, p.9). Although the Keynesian model to a certain extent succeeded in achieving some macroeconomic stability through increases in aggregate demand and public sector led employment generation, this however, was ephemeral. The oil crisis of the 1970s created economic shocks that worsened the macroeconomic positions of most countries both the global North and South respectively (Castell & Henderson, 2005, p.29; Slaughter, 2005, p.27; Turner, 2006, p.96).

The neoliberal agenda was given its first experiment in 1973 as a mode of governance in the small Southeast Asian country of Cambodia. Indeed, the infamous military putsch of dictator General Augusto Pinochet that ousted the leftist democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973 was reprehensibly orchestrasted by the United States backed troops (Davidson Hardson & Schugurnsky, 2009; Klein, 2007). The overthrow of Salvador Allende was followed by a variety of market friendly measures, such as the deregulation and liberalisation of markets or the privatisation of formerly state run introduced by General Pinochet through the recommendations of the "Chicago trained boys" with unquestioned loyalty to Milton Friedman and his disciples, who "equated *free* market with social and political freedom" (Klein, 2007). These unfettered marketisation policies recommended by the "Chicago trained boys" were implemented literally at the point of gun (Harvey, 2005; Davidson Hardson & Schugurnsky, 2009, p.13; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb; 2002; Klein, 2007; Valdés, 1995). As Boas and Gans-Morse (2009, p.150), elegantly put it: "Pinochet's 1973 coup emerges as something of a watershed in usage of neoliberalism", "as the United States Department, several large American corporations, and the Ford Foundation introduced varying degrees of neoliberal academic programmes in Latin America, such as the "Chile Project " which *effectively* helped to train Chilean economic students strictly in line with free market principles (Steger & Roy, 2010, p.100). And this was to be the pattern throughout Latin America. The Argentina military junta that illegally captured power from the democratically elected govern-

ment in 1976, just like the Chilean example, also maintained a close alliance with the "Chicago Boys" (Valdes, 1995).

The fall of the military regime and subsequent economic changes provoked a new form of neoliberal economic policies such as deregulation measures in order to promote trade and privatise the state owned industries — the national oil company, the post office, and public utilities, for example (ibid). Market oriented ideology received its boost and boom in Southeast Asia, in the early 1990s where Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese President, had already taken realistic and pragmatic steps to liberalise the communist-ruled economy in 1978 (Harvey, 2005; Oksala, 2013). He offered an economic paradigm shift, state socialism cum-market, leading to efficiency, productivity and competitiveness. At the heart of Deng's regime was privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and dramatic economic restructuring. Hence, the gap between urban and rural workers increased steadily in China as a result of massive economic restructuring. Exchange rates were liberalised whilst State Owned Enterprises were open up to foreign ownership "in order to increase the competitiveness of its global exports" (Steger & Roy, 2010, p.87).

Among other things, the election of Britain's Margaret Thatcher and America's Ronald Reagan in 1979 and 1981 respectively changed the face of international relations vis-à-vis the role of the state as these leaders were neoliberal ideologues (Rick, 2009; Elmar, 2009) whose ascendency to power culminated in the adoption of *austerity* measures and severe market economic and liberal political reforms (Harvey, 2007). These conservative governments "dismantled their welfare states in response to the global economic crisis of the 1970's, the rising costs of labor in Europe and USA, and the rapid development of capitalism in newly industrialised countries (NICs) of Asia that led to increased competition, reduced profit rate, and the crises of overproduction" (Ekanade Olumide, 2014, p.15). For instance, Margaret Thatcher, the then Prime Minister of Britain justified this on "there is no alternative" (TINA) to neoliberal reforms mantra. In her quest (Thatcher) to solve the stagflation that has characterised the British economy she sought refuge in neoliberal development project in line with Hayek and Friedman's political and economic discourse (Friedman, 2000, p.104-105; Harvey, 2005, p.22).

Indeed Thatcher was adept in brutally promoting what Harvey terms a "seductive possessive individualism" which "forged consent through the cultivation of a middle class that relished the joys of homeownership, private property, individualism, and the liberation of entrepreneurial opportunities" (Harvey, 2005, p.21). Roberts and Peters (2008, p.14), argue that Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1981), placed heavy emphasis on economic policies based on "free" trade and established the "open" market during 1980s. However, Kotz, notes that in as much as these measures might have largely "helped to bring back some stability into the British and American economies; they also caused serious fundamental shifts in the structure of these economies as well as class relations in the various societies" (Kotz, 2010, p.10). For example, "one of the fallouts of those (neo-liberal) reforms was the preference of financialisation over manufacturing" (p.11).

Moreover, the assumption of power of these ideologues particularly in their unrepentant pursuit of monetarism characteristically marked the consequential dominant outlook of the former Keynes's twins: the International Monetary Fund and World Bank as these two key institutions unabashedly shed their Keynesian toga and cosily embraced monetarist principles (Nwoke, 1994).

As well, in the 1980s and 1990s, economic reforms packages were blindly imposed by the triumvirate of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the United States Treasury through sdtructural adjustment processes upon an unwilling and vulnerable "Third World" in the naïve belief that it is the most efficient way of solving global economic problems (Kawachi & Wamala, 2007, p.6; Harvey, 2005, p.93). Thus, the involvement of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was deemed " as conspiratorial centers and quasi universal, thought police" for the propagation and enforcement of" (Oskala, 2013, p.56, my emphasis) "free market fundamentalism" and "neoliberal orthodoxy" (Harvey, 2005, p.21) — "forms of ideology with highly questionable scientific rigor". This unprecedented involvement of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in world economy marked the beginning of suffocating loan conditions which excercabated the economic situation of developing counties .Thus, the rallying cry which was presupposed to improve the developing countries access to global finance capital was to free the market from *un*necessary governmental interventions. To ensure economic growth and development, the basic neoliberal policy must religiously be followed by rich and poor countries alike. The indiscriminate and blanket imposition of privatisation and structural adjustment agenda across the globe whether in Africa, Asia, Latin America or post-communist Europe have led to declining economic activity and social dislocation on a massive scale unbeknown in the history of the world (Klein, 2007).

As Shamsul Haque (1999, p.197-218), interestingly shows, these neoliberal ideas face intractable problems and have abysmally failed to live up to expectation. Neoliberal cult policies have ineluctably plunged counties into havoc and depression with calamitous consequences in the face of crunching misery and abject poverty in the poor countries with it attendant gaping gulf between the rich and poor in the rich countries (Klein, 2007). These developments adumbrated above, not least have been ascribed a significant role and rightly so in serving as a backdrop to the spectacular rise of neoliberalism and neoliberalisation process as a catalyst to free market fundamentalism in our contemporary times.

5.6 Concluding remarks

In my exposition of this chapter, I begun by presenting a set of ideas commonly called neoliberalism. I try to highlight how quite apart from the fact that neoliberalism is a reification of the politics of the market, its rise and application have had the most devastating and profound impact on the state. In it, I describe how right from the get go, neoliberalism has been statist phobia and was akin to the criticism of the state. Under

the shadows of the epithet of "more markets, less state account of neoliberalism, the decisive turnaround to the market has implicitly been the thoroughgoing withering away of the nanny state's power and legitimacy which has been replaced by a more conventional, "night-watchman states" and subsequently made it utterly irrelevant however conceived. As noted from the preceding discussion, it should be abundantly clear by now that there is no definite meaning to the concept of neoliberalism. In fact the basic and the simplest definition anyone can offer as far as the definition of neoliberalism is concerned almost invariably calls for additional conditions as the case may be. To be sure, standard narratives as discussed barely ever provide a glossary definition of neoliberalism and even if it does, on a closer inspection, is at best imprecise and at worse convoluted at describing the defining constituent elements of the concept. Again, as we saw, the various popular narratives of neoliberalism share one thing in common; they all recognise how the power of the market has unmistakably "rolled back" the role of the state.

At the same time however, there are a number of striking distinguishable patterns and quite considerable overlaps that neatly run through these definitions. These apparent contrasts manifest themselves in the way neoliberalism at every different turn may be defined as a policy, hegemonic ideology or a mode of governance. At this conjuncture, one may wonder then by asking what neoliberalism is as I have deliberately avoided in offering any tentative definition of my own like a bubonic plaque as one needs to tread cautiously here. At the risk of sounding blasé or indifferent then, the most principled answer is that following Julian Reid (2013), there is what one may possibly say, neoliberalism is, "homeostatic" and therefore there is no unequivocal or definite meaning to neoliberalism. The discursive turnaround of neoliberalism occurred against the backdrop of a profound historical and economic twist and turn in the 1970s that triumphantly heralded the end of the epoch of an embedded liberalism which doubtlessly required a new political outlook — indeed, the articulation of new political rationality (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010). In the first place, it appears to me that neoliberal cult policies of free market as it turns out, despite the entire blitz, the razzmatazz and clamour that ushered in with its inaugurations, has visibly not inured to the benefit of the society. In sharp contrast, to a very large extent and strictly speaking, brought nothing but havoc, ruin disaster and senseless avoidable human suffering (Klein, 2007).

Unfortunately, virtually every serious account of neoliberalism today unfortunately (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010) contains appendices of the intimate association of neoliberalism with atrocious authoritarian regimes. This notion is found prominently in Naomi Klein's (2007) excellent book, *The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, which is quite instructive. In this fascinating book, Klein, in her moving account, elaborates the idea of how neoliberal fundamentalism has led to the complete destruction of the democratic state. The upshot of Klein's account is that there are potpourris of example as far as the self-destruct and vicious tendencies of neoliberalism are concerned. She does so by inserting how the fanciful neoliberal reforms introduced by General Pinochet's dictatorial regime—which became the political vanguard of neo-

liberalism and Milton Friedman's devious personal involvement are a text book reference. Equally, one could easily points at the neoliberalism of China's or Singapore's authoritarian regimes (Harvey, 2005) or the neoliberalism of then Mubarak's Egypt and even today (Mitchell, 2004). The list is endless and could be extended to include post-Apartheid South-Africa, Iraq, Palestine, Israel, the Gulf and Africa or South America (Khalidi & Samour, 2011; Klein, 2007; Nitzan & Bichler, 2002; Peet, 2002; Whyte, 2007). In Brown as well as Harvey's view, in the United States, the political space created by neoliberalism opened up the state to authoritarian moral politics of neo-conservatism.

Still now, more than ever before, we have many reasons to doubt the efficacy of neoliberalism. If anything thing at all, the economic policies it prescribes are at best palliatives. Under neoliberal game, irony of ironies, instead of promoting human good at least in the weak sense among all and sundry, we have far more losers than winners which dangerously threaten the survival of all species (Susan, 1999; Tabb, 2005, p.50; Stiglitz, 2002; Gill, 2003). On the whole, it is high time we invoked the prophetic message of Polanyi which graphically depicts the dangerous agenda the world has signed on to which has ominously become the common sense way of how people interpret and understand the world (Harvey, 2005, p.3). To wit, "to allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment... would result in the demolition of society"(Polanyi, 1945, p.73).

CHAPTER SIX

Neoliberal Discursive Formations: of Regimes of Knowledge, Subjectivity, Technologies, and Techniques of Good Governance in Ghana

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is motivated by a Foucauldian discourse analytic to examine key discourses, power-knowledge dynamics and production of subjectivities as packaged in the neoliberal 'good governance' development paradigm supervised by the officials of Bretton Wood institutions. More specifically, the chapter examines the 'good governance' effervescence as an exemplar of a particular, neoliberal form of governmentality. This chapter unfolds as follows. First, I begin the chapter discussing the politics of 'good governance' within the broader problematique of orthodox structural adjustment. In this section I point out that the development critique on the failure of structural adjustment reforms to bring development at the end of the 1980s is closely related to the surfacing of contemporary notion of the 'good governance' fad. Second, I argue that we must look to policy texts to make visible key statements that cohere around discursive practices such as 'good governance', and in so doing, explore the (dis)connection of regimes of knowledge, subjectivities, technologies, and techniques that make these statements visible in the first place to think through how neoliberal development paradigm seems to have a particularly illuminating instance of Foucauldian governmentality perspective. Subsequently, the following section examines 'good governance' within the Ghanaian context. I argue that 'good governance' can be understood as a form of governance and to suggest how it constructs a domain of unassailable knowledge regimes, technologies and techniques coagulate under neoliberal subjectivation (Springer, 2010). And last, I further seek to develop and give an indication, of how narratives of resistance are imbued within discourses. Such indication, I argue, is not to exude another totalising objective portrayal of problematising and contesting dominant discursive and oppressive apparatuses of power and create space for subjugated knowledges; but rather it is also I believe, and not incidentally, aligns with what Foucault (1990) aptly calls —"reverse discourse" and— "tactical polyvalence". In doing so, I closely attend to the ruptures and recapitulations within policy and practice to elucidate and encapsulate the conditions and conditioning of the possibilities that policies create; how they evoke an important shift in the configuration of the examples of neoliberal policies and rationalities.

6.2 'Good Governance' Discourse and the Problem of Structural Adjustment

In this section I trace the historical provenance and consolidation of 'good governance' discourse as prioritised issues of the international development agenda to the dismal implementation of structural adjustment. The main thrust of this section is to show the complex contradictions and discontinuities within the continuity particularly in relation to narratives and discourses of development and 'good governance' embraced by agents of neoliberal hegemony (Ruckert, 2006) and lay bare its essentially neoliberal agenda. In other words, I resist the characteristic focus of much of the previous critical scholarship to quantify the effectiveness of 'good governance' agenda (Aryee, 2008; Grindle, 2008; Hulme et al., 2014; Jomo Kwame & Anis, 2011; Melissa Thomas, 2010; Okwechime, 2015); rather, this section offers a reading of postcolonial African development "crisis" or "tragedy" as been characterised by competing ideas integral to governance discourse of 'global development regime'.

Defined in simplest terms, 'good governance' discourse to development is imbued with the proposition that institutional, political and administrative apparatuses do matter in policy matters as a precondition to enhance the competitiveness of the sub-Saharan African state in the global market place. Nevertheless this account is overly narrow without an understanding of the politico-economic and ideological context that shaped the conditions for the rise of 'good governance' discourse within the paraphernalia of development thinking and practice. More succinctly, the reform proposals that precipitated the evolution of 'good governance' paradigm in the contemporary development discourse become clearly discernible in the drastic re-conceptualisation of the "Washington Consensus" ideals under the aegis of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Leftwich, 1993, p.607; Rodrik, 2006).

Quite clearly, the growing concerns among the apostles of market-friendly policies to establish an elaborate connection between structural adjustment and governance was largely driven by the desire to reverse the despair, disillusionment and Africa's development haemorrhage represented by politics of adjustment (Olukoshi, 1998; Stein, 2009a, 2009b). Good governance agenda historically speaking can be linked to two broad interconnected momentous developments: one intellectual and other explicitly linked to the fortuitous demise of the Cold War structure. 'Good governance' at stance of the World Bank and donor communities at global level was decidedly influenced by these auspicious moments. Within the intellectual context, organisations operating majorly within the political economy/public choice theoretical approach emerged in the period from the second half of the 1980s heavily criticised the neoliberal structural adjustment agenda which set the tone for much of the early debate on structural adjustment. Furthermore, the continuing unremitting stagnation and deterioration of free market reforms received growing international concern typically epitomised by the pioneering work of UNICEF in 1987 with the plea for adjustment with human face (Cornia et al., 1987).

Thus the major claim I advance is that during the structural adjustment regime, the critical question of the political economy and issues of governance or the participation of its citizens were complacently overlooked by the major world powers and international agencies— such as the IMF and the Bank. This is highly hypocritical and puzzling because when placed under critical scrutiny, because adjustment model has its own specific political-ideological baggage that serves to preserve and maintain the power and privilege of some authoritarian African political elites by the officials of the multilateral financial institutions to stave off any resistance to the adjustment agenda. However, the Bank's concern with "good governance" agenda, a condition deemed to be the panacea to address the sluggish development in Africa begun in earnest with the end of the Cold War geopolitics; well over a decade after the implementation of market-based reforms (World Bank, 1989).

Initially, the Bank officials and neoliberal political economists in responding to criticisms about the failure of the magical forces of the market-led reforms to stem Africa predicament, refused to fall from their ideological pedestal as supervising experts and dismissed the difficulties that persist as temporary (Zeleza, 2010). Simply stated, as the corrosive effects of structural adjustment became more evident, the blame was shifted to African governments for making some very ill-intentioned economic choices and policies deriving from the necessities of postcolonial nation-building; or because of the supposedly "corrupt", "rent-seeking" African politicians who were allegedly reluctant to reform and give up their "illicit" privileges accumulated under the excessively interventionist model of development (Ibid). For such reasons (unfortunately accepted as major impediments to development) that the common sense notion of 'good governance' which is the antithesis of 'bad governance' was seen as a magic bullet solution (*deus ex machina*) and fad *du jour* to bringing about neoliberal development.

6.3 Considering Foucault: World Bank and 'Good Governance' Reform Agenda

Grimly faced with the wobbly and recurring decimal failure of its structural adjustment programmes, the authoritative 1989 World Bank report proclaimed that a 'crisis of governance' underlies 'the litany of Africa's development problems' (World Bank, 1989, p. 60). Consequently, in 1989, the Bank became a leading votary of 'good governance' discourse whereupon "structurally adjusting its own programme of structural adjustment" (Green, 1993, p.61). As far as the Bank is concerned governance is defined as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (World Bank, 1992, p.1). In dealing with the authoritative report for the establishment of the neoliberal 'good governance' agenda, the data are drawn from the 1989 World Bank report on *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, its prominent 1992 document on 'good governance' entitled *Governance and Development*, 1997 *The State in a Chang-*

ing World and 2002 *Building Institutions for Markets* reports. This section builds on these empirical materials and makes an argument for a Foucauldian discourse analysis. As the most powerful, indeed influential global development agency, while also being the preeminent single actor in the "development industry" (Ferguson, 1990), the World Bank serves as a significant empirical grounding to study how contemporary notions of and logic of the discourses surrounding development are articulated and animated. My ambition is to carefully identify the Bank's discursive *practices* and array of *representations* to elicit the enunciative modalities from which the discourses derive; inscribing a regime of production of truth(s) and set up consensual conditions recurrently evinced within Africa in general. The analysis is also informed by archaeology to ascertain which particular knowledges are privileged by 'good governance' proponents and which subject positions are subsequently constructed in order to map out alternatives that challenge the conventional neutral-free proposition of neoliberal 'good governance' reforms. As illustrations, this section is developed around eight sets of discursive objects which underpin the World Bank's conception of 'good governance' agenda. These are discussed below.

6.3.1 The 'truth' of a crisis-prone Sub-Saharan Africa that must be managed for the sake of markets

By representing the underdevelopment situation of Africa as a 'crisis' of 'governance' requiring "political renewal" (World Bank, 1989, p.60), the Bank's report marked the inclusion of the political sphere into the realm of development interventions. Since then, argues Nanda (2006, p.269), 'good governance' reforms set the discursive contours within which the Bank construct regime of truth through the reproduction and incitement of state of "crisis" to first and foremost, pathologise Africa's situation as requiring special social, political, and economic structures to solve her "developmental problems". As we read:

> The failure of public institutions is "a root cause" of Africa's weak economic performance. The quality of government has deteriorated with bureaucratic obstruction, pervasive rent seeking, weak judicial systems, and arbitrary decision-making". Red tape and corruption impose heavy costs on the private sector, undercutting its international competitiveness. The breakdown of the judicial system scares off foreign investors who fear that contracts cannot be enforced. Such an environment cannot readily support a "dynamic economy". "A deep political malaise stymies action in most countries". (1989, p. xii, 3, 22, 30, 60-62, 192)

According to Schmitz (1995, p.68) "governance" in developing countries at least from the perspective of the World Bank was considered "as the primary source of the problem (explaining the lack of success of past benevolence), and as the basis for solution (justifying new conditions and limitations on this benevolence"). As observed by Schmitz (1995, p.67-68), 'good governance' model has been shown to be largely con-

structs by and for the purpose of starving off attention away from the ailing neoliberal project and their reification through critical discourse. Often then, the neoliberal paradigm instead of promoting long-term development, is overshadowed by shifting attention from systemic international capitalist order, namely that of "adverse conditions, unfair markets or inappropriate economic reforms," to the local "lack of proper institutional capacity to manage the necessary processes of adjustment" (Schmitz, 1995, p.67-68).

The prevalent discursive practices that imbue the Bank's text are about what kind of institutions are 'best' suited for crisis-prone Africa (Ganahl, 2013; Williamson, 1989). The report claims that the predatory politics, 'bad governance', 'corruption' and other evils are causes of continuing troubles (and failures) in Africa societies. In the end, the Bank's economic rationale regards 'good governance' as "an essential complement to sound economic policies" (World Bank, 1992, p.1). Good governance in the view of the Bank aims to "establish the rules that make markets work efficiently and (...) correct market failure" (Ibid). This type of grand narrative depicts institutional governance infrastructure of the Bank as contemporary kernel of truth-knowledge and are in fact universally-accepted norms to cure the continent's ills; and closes off possible alternatives discursive space in producing, reproducing, legitimising and maintaining good governance model as the best or perhaps the only available alternative to SSA predicament. The result is a reconceptualising of political categories to fit economic forms of understanding evinced within the Bank's policy document. Both economic and political spheres seem to have been characterised by the pre-eminence of a certain interventionist approach, rather than by other characteristics. "Thus, 'administrations', 'institutions' and even 'governments' become non-political and open for intervention as soon as they are connected with 'efficiency', 'development' and especially 'structural adjustment and economic reform" (Polzer, 2001, p.11).

6.3.2 The will to construct political legitimacy for SAPs

It is important to point out that the Bank's obsession in controlling 'good governance' discourse is to fictitiously conjure a technocratic consensus-oriented approach (Bøås, 2001; Beckham, 1990) in which information may legitimately contribute toward finding the "truth" and opens the way for a wider portfolio of policy options" (Fine, 2001, p.11); to concomitantly perpetuate and reinforce the *status quo*. As the report explains, "whatever the political vantage point, there is a broad understanding". The remaining problems in the Bank's own account are essentially "technical" which "professionals will continue to debate" without in any way diminishing the "broad consensus on objectives" and that "there is no place for fundamentalism" (World Bank, 1989, p.185). This approach presupposes to project a picture of "political consensus" (p.193) around the idea of the liberal market model of development, where disagreements are seen as purely technical; which in the end seek to conceal the ideological and political arbitrariness of the report in enforcing SAPs in the face of intellectual and growing popular discontent.

The flipside of this argument is that "presenting these shifts as vaunted consensus is vital for legitimating them as the new source of expertise for governance in Africa and the third world in general" (Sheppard & Leitner 2010, p.187); and in turn, impose unobtrusively their own "will to truth" which is inexorably linked with the discursive power dynamics that beget, disseminate, sustain, and concomitantly are evinced within the discursive construction of 'reality'. From a Foucauldian perspective, it appears that certain enunciative modalities and formations (i.e., the Bretton Woods institutions) have been privileged to speak authoritatively on the "truths" about development) while others such as those explicitly expressed in the Lagos Plan of Action (OAU, 1980) and the Abuja and Khartoum Declarations (ECA, 1988) it is claimed, have been displaced, discredited, refuted and silenced altogether. Of course, an aspect of every discourse is how it can "limit the scope and forms of expressibility: "what is it possible to speak of? What has been constituted as the domain of discourse...? What has been designated as the subject; what has one wished to make a descriptive science of" (Foucault, 1978, p. 14-15).

In yet another respect, speaking from these privileged enunciative modalities, the Bank is allowed, through discursive practice to develop influential concepts to systematically shape public policies— in the process introducing new forms of governmentality. Meanwhile, African leaders' modalities to repeat, continued to be discursively disregarded, demonised and framed as threats to the developmental well-being of their people (Gathii, 1999). When Foucault talks of the positioning of the subject in the suppressive discursive impositions in which they are increasingly dislodged and marginalised, he lends further credence to my point. What is argued here is that the postcolonial State has become subject of the discourse informing what can be thought, said or done (Foucault, 1972) by reproducing these "truths" — and not others.

6.3.3 The politics of blame

Responsibility is a central theme running through the Bank's report and arguments. As a scapegoat and excuse to particularly blame the victim for the failure of their programmes to live up to its promises, the Bank's report seemingly assumes that state-led, nationalist development ideology has been the principal enemy to the development thinking in Africa since independence. Africa's independence political elites, says the Bank, uncritically embraced "inappropriate", "foreign models" (World Bank, 1989, p. 3). Most governments drew up "comprehensive five-year plans" and invested in "large, state-run core industries" (World Bank, 1989, p.16, 37-38). This claim is hugely overstated. This overstatement finds ample evidence in the attenuated attempts of the Bank to re-construct and reshape the relationships between the 'irrational', 'inane' and politically 'inert' African States and the neoliberal market economy (Isoe & Keraro, 2015, my emphasis).

Painfully frustrated by the "hesitation and procrastination" to wholeheartedly "internalise" (World Bank, 1989, p.62, 192-3) the proclaimed supremacy of the SAPs and market reforms, the Bank was inclined in this report to variously represent postcolonial States and its political elites as 'weak', 'kleptocratic', 'vassal', 'vampire', 'receiver',

'prostrate', 'fictitious', 'collapsed', 'predatory', 'parasitic', 'neopatrimonial', 'lame leviathan', 'rentier' , and so on and so forth (Olukoshi, 1995, p.14; Kelsall & Booth, 2010, p.3). Within such discursive representations, "the vested interests that profit from the present distorted incentives and controls" (World Bank, 1989, p.192) are positioned as "narrow", and "selfish" who appropriated the machinery of government to serve their own interests" (p.192). This problematisation of Africa leaders' as "narrow", "selfish" and incompetent is implicitly ingrained in the contention that self-serving incorrigibly corrupt African elites, cynically enough lack knowledge about values necessary for ensuring progress in their well-being and therefore should be whipped into to line, through an array of "rationalised" technologies of power evasively imposed on them. Interestingly enough, however, what is never questioned is the Bank's own religious fidelity to the fundamentalist ideology of the market (Ghaaal, 2013). In the same tenor, Robert Wade (1996, p.34–35) points out that "the Bank's legitimacy depends upon the authority of its views; like the Vatican, and for similar reasons, it cannot admit fallibility". Likewise, the inexorable impact of Cold War and the location of the continent in the fringes of the international capitalist order seem to have largely faded away altogether in the Bank's report. Or better yet, the historical, contextual, political, and economic roots to the "African crisis" are largely absent, underestimated and neutralised. My impression is that the simplistic stereotypes, exaggerated images and derogatory epithets of postcolonial State (Gathii, 1999) cynically deployed and represented in 'good governance' debates, as Foucault argues in a different context, perhaps lurk beneath the unstated aim to pre-empt and delegitimise any form of popular resistance in the short to medium term to neoliberal prescriptions (Beckman, 1990); and to subtly present the postcolonial State as inherently "ineffective" and "illegitimate".

6.3.4 The restructuring of the postcolonial Africa State

Interestingly, one other prominent discourse that is most "celebrated" in World Bank 1989 report is based on the romantic idea to redimension with the aim of creating what could be viewed as a smart or 'modernised' postcolonial African state. This aspect of 'good governance' discourse is clearly profoundly connected to the Bank's own reshaped strategies and sanitised accounts that SAPs cannot work without a "better", "effective" and "efficient" State. The Bank states that "the fundamental weakness in these programs is the lack of local capacity, both private and public, in their design and execution" (World Bank, 1989, p.62). In order to deal with this constraints, the Bank suggests that there is the need "not just less but better government" —government that concentrates its efforts less on direct interventions and more on enabling others to be productive" (p.5). Thinking along these lines, the postcolonial State according to the Bank must be institutionally empowered, putting in place an "enabling environment that fosters private investment" (p.15). For this purpose, postcolonial States have to conform to the 'best-practices' and inner logics of the Bank — operating seamlessly under the contextual "truth regime"; and thus contingently come to be part of what is aspired to. This discursive logic deems States without such universally accepted institutional prescriptions as "corrupt and inefficient" (Gathii,

1999, p.77) by deliberately neglecting the analysis of the very mechanisms that produce such results, for example. Several questions arise: what does it mean to have a "better" State? Are there States that are "better" and others that are not? In any event, better for whom? An obvious discursive reality is related to the fact that private sector and market-competitive governance must be regarded as a universally efficient tool for planning and regulating every economic activity (Rose & Miller, 2010).

Flowing from this, the Bank's discourse emphasises a "public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public". In doing so, the Bank sought to 'professionalise' civil service by encouraging public sector management (PSM) and this was given further impetus as well as context in the *Governance and Development* publication. The rationale underpinning the Bank's agenda in this regard is that "when the capacity of the public sector to manage the economy and deliver public sectors is weak, the prospects for development are poor" (World Bank, 1992, p.12). Recasting or reframing the role of the State moreover, means that it will generally contribute to well-functioning political and socio-economic institutions. Crucially, what is very important to state is that such a discursive switch is not simply about a plea for a return to the Keynesian-oriented paradigm in development economics (Haque, 2001a; Johnston & Callender, 1999) — a prior development approach— paradoxically, supported by the Bank in the 19960s. Quite the contrary, such pious proclamations to include the State is amply illustrated by configurations of unassailable knowledge production and power relations— which, one way or another, have been inscribed into the rationality which has come to encompass 'good governance' fad. How then, can this cynical reorientation be explained, especially in the light of the Bank's new policy imperatives? It needs noting that this supposed reconfigurations of the State— and ultimately of the subjectivities— present rationales and rationalities pertaining to making them most attractive to the largely neoliberally inspired constructed global marketplace; a proposition once foreclosed and considered unimportant for achieving sustainable economic growth (Tamatea, 2005).

Once more, I do want to emphasise yet again that this discourse, in the same spirit, reflexively reinforces and fertilises the arguments that the State in an idealised neoliberal 'good governance' schematic of governing the economic in pursuit of development must intensively assume an active role. The rationale the Bank suggests (1989, p. xii, 1, 4, 55, 59) is to "release private energies and encourage initiatives at every level". The Bank also warns that— African States should abide by rather than resist "the world-wide trend towards privatisation" (p.5). The practices of governance inscribed within the Bank's report elaborately give consideration to the presuppositions for shaping the corresponding political-economic rationalities in postcolonial African States (institutionally and nationally). Interestingly, the central objective is to steer the State away from being an entrepreneur so that market can become the central organising and regulative principle underlying the State. In these statements, a Foucauldian analysis indicates that African States are constructed as conduit or pur-

veyors to propel, reinforce and legitimise the neoliberal rationalities of Adam Smith's free hand of the market place.

6.3.5 Governance and state capacity

Within the structural adjustment regime, state intervention in the free-market reforms was actively discouraged because it was deemed to be synonymous with oppressive bureaucracy and predatory intentions of the state apparatus. In other words, to the extent that the post-colonial African state by its nature and definition is predatory, the IFIs warn that its involvement in developmental agenda must be discoraged. While the old Washington consensus overly relied on market forces with its emphasis on anti-state discourses, evolving post-Washington consensus from mid-90s onwards, signalled a policy shift towards institutional reform and 'good governance' (World Bank, 1997). Conceptually, this involved recognition that the state institutionas had a major role to play in economic development and poverty reduction. Much of the new post-Washington consensus recommends restoring confidence and transforming public sector institutions capable of implementing public policies. In the words of the World Bank, "market driven development could not succeed without a strong social and institutional infrastructure, including a strong state" (World Bank, 2000a, p.38). By implication the shortcomings attributed to governance, can be related to fundamental institutional weaknesses combined with inappropriate policies and unenforced legal frameworks as opposed to market failure.

This recent rethinking was expressed in the Bank's 1997 *World Development Report* (WDR) titled *The State in a Changing World. World Development Report* 1997 suddenly became the vanguard for state-interventionist policies as a desideratum for sustaining market reforms and a marked stepping-stone in the mainstreaming of good governance. 1997 *World Development Report* can be seen as a device to ensure growing recognition of the importance of the State in the policy-making process of poor countries. It argues against rolling back the State and recommended the need for strengthening State and its institution's in LDCs — without which economic, social and sustainable development is impossible. The report correctly points out that a "strong" state, not only a "minimal" one, is needed to economic and social development, but more as partner and facilitator than as director (p.18). Given the challenge, the report asks " how some states have been more effective than others at playing a catalytic and sustainable role in economic development and the eradication of poverty".

The report was largely "devoted to the role and effectiveness of the state: what the state should do, how it should do it, and how it can improve in a rapidly changing world". The report emphasised on the one hand, the importance of state capability defining it as "the ability to undertake and promote collective actions efficiently" (p.3); and, on the other, it suggests ways to improve the state's capability by re-invigorating public institutions. To argue, as *World Development Report 1997* does, that improving the administrative and the chronic lack of state capacity simply because it will enable the African State to initiate and implement market-based economic reforms as an essential element of the quest for good governance. Such a mode of gov-

ernment inevitably operates within the logic that reformulates the role of government not as a locomotive of "development", but rather to create the enabling environment and provide policies whereby development becomes possible.

This shift, in the new post-Washington consensus was, however, a critical element of laying a basis for re-conceptualisation of the orthodox, structural adjustment or neoliberal reform. The concern here is with efficiency-enhancing, market-compatible policy now endlessly asserted as prerequisite for institutional reform (Williamson, 1999; Naím, 2000). The presumption in all these is the thinking that governance and institutional reform are best served by reliance on market mechanisms as the 'engine' of economic development. To be sure, according to the post-Washington consensuses rhetoric, sound macroeconomic fundamentals will inevitably address the endemic poverty and pervasive underdevelopment of the region. In this context, the trend toward macroeconomic stabilisation policies is perceived as offering a huge potential for greater sustainable development. A salient point that should be emphasised here is that while "first generation" reforms or orthodox, structural adjustment policies, designed by the Bretton Woods institutions and subsequently the Washington Consensus aim at rolling back of the state from the involvement in the economy activity (Harrison, 2010, p.81; Naím, 1995), the "second generation" economic reforms, insisting on reforming the state spin out narratives concerned with the nature of state action (Harrison, 2004). The effect is to turn this to the promise and hope that institutional capacity building, finance management, technical assistance and a whole range of policy imperatives under the good governance regime are an antidote to the restrictions of government regulation in the economy (Harrison, 2004, p. 18-20, my emphasis).

"What the state should do, how it should do it, and how it can improve in a rapidly changing world" is increasingly recognised in explaining economic performance in Africa. This is a lofty idea. No one would disagree. In fact, I insist fully on this. What is telling is that in consistent with most analysis on the State, the report does not ask the obvious and most essential question. That is to say the report in its diagnosis seems relatively unaffected by what does not work rather than what works, and in themselves fail to recommend on the "what" rather than the "how". The implication is that while there is oft-stated commitment on institutional reform in the interest of promoting markets, *World Development Report* 1997 given its ideological position fatally failed to explicitly problematise and or question the underlying assumptions underpinning free markets theology as threats to its market reform (Joseph, 2010). In African context, many of problems have less to do with its disengagement than its historical and contemporary integration into the global economy. The economic reforms packages imposed by the IMF and the World Bnk through structural adjustment policies for instance was chiefly pre-occupied with delegating some tasks of the State to the market thereby further undermining the institutional capacities of these States. This is precisely because the old consensus patently failed to "infuse itself into the state as the founding logic of public action; it also generated destabilising effects on African societies', the IFIs therefore became key agents in a larger 'global

regime of crisis management' that has emerged in response to the African crisis, such that they now concern themselves with 'institutional capacity building; civil service (or more broadly public service) reform; the introduction of new forms of information technology, finance management and human resource management; technical assistance and the facilitation of public participation in policy monitoring, evaluation and the facilitation of public participation in policy monitoring, evaluation and development"(Harrison, 2004, p.4 & 18).The result has been more emphatically the demand for external intervention to maintain a sufficient level of sovereign governance over this chronic instability, undertaken through the construction of the 'governance state'(Harrison, 2004).

As with the new consensus recognition for a more institutional approach to development often assumed to be embodied in good governance agenda, Joseph Jonathan (2010) draws attention to the fact that it should be understood as legitimating and perpetuating neoliberal reform project. In other words, the exclusive obsession for 'institutional and easy technical fixes' provide the legitimising principle for what governmentality theorists already understand as reinvention of the neoliberal development agenda (Ibid). Quite obviously, the new aid architecture appears to consolidate and perpetuate an erroneous form of thinking that tends to transform the political and contested nature of reform into "technical or scientific aspects of policymaking" (Harrison, 2010, p.24). It is increasingly asserted that such thinking depoliticises development discourse through the shaping of state institutions and the re-conceptualisation of complex and political-economic problems into non-political, neutral and technical, which leads to a much more jaundiced view of the role of the State in the economy. This is a perspective informed by the belief that the new aid architecture disavows the problematic and contentious conception of policy which involves heady mix of divergent interests, continually competing visions, priorities; and policies on how best to organise society for specific social projects (Joseph, 2010). As argued by Joseph Jonathan, this is characteristic of governmentality and compatible with a technocratic understanding of policymaking with its concern regarding "the health, wealth and well-being of the local population" (p.46).

6.3.6 The logic of institutions-building and markets imperatives

World Bank governance discourse in post-colonial Africa has evolved from a clear set of economic policies primarily concerned with market deregulation agenda reminiscent of the old Washington Consensus to an increased focus on building sound, capable and strong institutions for poverty reduction and development. In line with this the World Bank's sustained engagement with institutional building efforts has been underpinned by the belief that "weak market-supporting institutions can hurt the poor disproportionately" (World Bank, 2002, p.9). The Bank's works in this area was traditionally predicated on the assumption that a key element in the African crisis is the absence of effective institutions to promote market-led reforms. Given this, strong institutions are critical to carefully manage market through sound policies and government policy making (Chandler, 2010, p.147). Indeed, the *World Development*

Report 2002 of the World Bank was titled: *Building Institutions for Markets.* It sets out the challenges of improving institutional governance in the emerging global economy by providing "a diagnostic framework for understanding how institutions support market activity" (p.4). The report also " provides guidance on how to build new institutions, modify existing ones, and create the forces for change" (p.26). In this context, *Building Institutions for Markets* report (2002) addressed the issue in a more direct fashion. According to the World Bank, market-supporting institutions do much to promote growth and reduce poverty. The 1997 WDR builds on past reports, especially *World Development Repo*rts 2000/2001, which called attention to how "effective market supporting institution" (p.4) with it emphasis on promoting growth as well as providing economic means for poor people and the underprivileged. In other words, it signifies a significant shift in policy thinking from the perspective of "getting prices right". In concrete terms, getting prices right suggests that market order will emerge spontaneously or endogenously (Hayek, 1945). However in the *World Development Report* 2002, there is an alternative view which considers the role of complex set of institutions which will ultimately support the functioning of markets.

World Development Report 2002 focuses on what institutional, political and economic reforms do to promote and facilitate market development that provides benefits for all—"inclusive and integrated markets" (World Bank, 2002, p.5)—markets that provide equal opportunity, that reduce risk, and that enable investment in higher-return activities "by suggesting how to build effective institutions"(p.4). The reports maintains that "understanding what they do is the first step in building effective institutions" (p.8). The report builds on this policy frame by arguing that "good policies are not enough, rather " institution building matter for growth and poverty reduction" (p.4). Therefore, building effective and strong institutions to "support growth and poverty reduction—often referred to as good governance—are essential to development" (p.115). Also there was the claim that " provision of a regulatory regime that works with the market to promote competition" (p.99) as competition is an "important force bringing about economic development" (p.144). This therefore places emphasis on "the provision of sound macroeconomic policies that create a stable environment for market activity" (p.99). *World Development Report* 2002 tried to rigorously show that "income from participating in the market is the key to boosting economic growth for nations and to reducing poverty for individuals" (p.3).

What is on the contrary most important is that the subject of wide-ranging institutional building and reform in post-colonial African economies has generally been neglected in the practice and economic reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. Expressed differently, the Washington consensus misguided policies during the 1970s and 1980s repeatedly disregarded the analysis of institutions and failed to assess how state institutions can be reformed effectively to make public policies more responsive to poor countries and particularly poor people's needs. Obviously the anti-statist stance of the development paradigm under the aegis of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s by and beyond was post-colonial African states with considerably poor, with relatively weakened institutional capacity and credibility. I suggest that utopian

policy prescriptions for institutional building reform and state capacity, so prevalent in the contemporary policy-oriented literature, therefore needs to be viewed from the broader perspective of ambitiously interventionist agendas of the Bretton Woods institutions in promoting new forms of governance in post-colonial African states. As Harrison (2004, p. 128) argues in the case of World Bank's governance agenda in Africa, the substantive economic reforms, benchmarking, performance indicators and target-setting in many ways amounts to a transformation of states (via 'governance states') and societies (through social engineering as 'embedding neoliberalism') into an 'ideal' and stable type conforming the basic fantasies and values of neoliberal ideology in general and the World Bank's current development model in particular

Crucially, the report addressed some basic priorities such as the securing of property rights, on regulation aimed at promoting competition, the effect of macro-economic policies for stimulating market activity, and on the fight against corruption as tasks of a well governed state (p.99). While in some respects the report simply helped revive interest in the ideas associated with basic needs and sustainable development, it almost reduced the festering challenge in fighting poverty to a micro-economic issue: it would simply involve creating opportunities and incentives for poor people to make use of markets "and enabling poor and rich people to make the best use of their assets" (p.9).this incredibly reveals a problematic lack of understanding of the causal relationship between development and structural changes. What is proposed here is that development and structural changes though of great importance, are only part of the issues for poverty elimination. To assess the impact of development on poverty reduction, if feasible at all, would then require a radical structural transformation of the society's economy. Broadly, I conclude by stating that the shift in perspective from market reform to commitment of market development entails an urgent need to redress the major gaps " inhibiting market development or leading to certain market outcomes" (p.10).

6.3.7 The cross-over between State and civil society

More and more, in broadening the evolving process on 'good governance' discourse in post-colonial African societies also inclined towards the neoliberal strategy of "rolling back" the State to 'liberating civil society and empowering the people', since, according to the 'good governance' debate, viable civil society constitutes key agencies to counter-balance governmental power (Beckman, 1991; Chabal, 1992; Rothchild & Chazan, 1994; Lewis, 2009). As the Bank emphatically states:

> Ultimately, better governance requires political renewal. This means a concerted attack on corruption from the highest to the lowest levels. This can be done by setting a good example, by strengthening accountability, by encouraging public debate, and by nurturing a free press. It also means empowering women and the poor by fostering grassroots and non-governmental organizations, such as farmers associations, cooperatives and women's groups. (World Bank, 1989, p .6)

Governance and Development publication for instance, describes 'civil society' organisations as new relays in the governance tissue with the vibrancy to make up for the excesses of the neo-patrimonial State in determining economic growth and development (World Bank, 1992). In this context, support for civil societal actors has been presented as a radical shift from and an improvement upon the conventional development practices and discourses of the World Bank (Chabal, 1992; Rothchild & Chazan, 1994). However, the underlying concern here lies in 'strengthening institutions of civil society' to stimulate reforms which will make African States governable in certain ways.

In the *World Development Report* 2002, NGOs and civil society organisations were ascribed an important role in the intractable ascendance of good governance agenda. NGOs and civil society organisations, together with market mechanisms and the private sector, are seen as one of the providers of provision to complement the State's role. However, like the State, NGOs and civil society organisations also embody contradictory tendencies and processes which its uncritical equation with democracy conceals. The point here is that *World Development Report* 2002 for the most part, overlooks the fact that 'neoliberal civil society' (Harrison, 2010, p.52) also exhibits anti-democratic proclivities and the tendency to oppose it to the state in the wholesale, one sided manner hardly helps to deepen our insights into the ways which the two interpenetrate. It must be noted that the mere existence of NGOs and civil society organisations independent of the State does not ipso facto imply that it will be supportive of good governance in Africa. I stress that there has been massive research output, which includes numerous empirically-based studies on the politics of diverse and highly heterogeneous constellation of NGOs and civil society organisations in various African countries which suggest, in fact, that they could, and can be parochial, contradictory, and exclusionary in character. This is not simply to suggest that all NGOs and civil society organisations are problematic but it is also worth critiquing how such powerful yet non-transparent, unaccountable and unelected members should come to occupy such a crucial place within the contemporary development discourse.

6.3.8 Good Governance within the new "feel-good rhetoric"

The key strategic thrusts in the policy rationales of the Bank's governance and development agenda evoke norms seductively wrapped in appealing discourses: mechanisms of state capacity building, local ownership, beneficiary participation etc. (World Bank, 1989; 1992). Within this regime of rationality, 'capacity building' needs and in fact requires to be pursued at every level of government (World Bank, 1989, p. xii, 5, 15, 54-59). The governance position espoused by the Bank implicitly presume that capacity building is but another "missing link" in addressing the crisis of African development (Olukoshi, 1991). This way, the key stakeholders led by the Bank, zealously had to devote a substantial proportion of their time and resources in expert training programmes and projects aimed at promoting various forms of capacity and capabilities on the continent. This was accompanied by the establishment of Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) in Harare, Zimbabwe. Capacity build-

ing (simply small or efficient state) repeatedly evinced in the Bank's 'good governance' project is preoccupied with the necessity of a highly competent African bureaucracy (referring to administrative and technical competencies), presumably seen unproblematically as promoting 'good governance' in South Sahara Africa. In contrast, capacity building is genuinely and fervently envisioned as neoliberal technology to provide a framework within which market-oriented governance, as opposed to public management of the economy can be promoted: thereby obscuring the discursive reality germane to the historical imperatives of 'capacity building'. An associated objective of 'capacity building'— is in line with or is the necessary complement to the promotion of local 'ownership' of neoliberal reforms of structural adjustment.

In *Governance and Development*, beneficiary participation was understood to generate "voice"(World Bank, 1992, p.26) which is tied to attempts at restructuring the State as well as human agency, particularly that of consulting "the poor" (Easterly, 2007, p.144).

In apparent response to the criticisms that development programmes and projects have become irresponsive to the needs of recipient governmntes and people, the World Bank made 'participation' an essential ingredient and good governance development the cornerstone of its 2002 *World Development Report*. But as with the treatment of civil society, *World Development Report* 2002 seriously re-evaluates the extent to which participation serves as a critical constraint on State actions. In order to ensure effective policy implementation, 'participation' has meant that subjects or targets of a policy comply with its aims and objectives (Cooke &Kothari, 2001; Mohan & Stokke, 2001).

This is equally as elusive as "the poor" concept given the fact that the Washington Consensus-oriented 'good governance' project (Mehmet, 1997), for a variety of reasons rhetorically promotes participatory development initiatives only within preordained and predefined economic programmes to "deliver 'political sustainability' for neo-liberal policies" (Schmitz, 1995, p.24). Indeed, exhilarating rhetoric such as popular participation, local ownership, civil society, new public management and capacity-boosting programmes which have been central to the Bank's governance practices, for all intents and purposes, is the attempt to reconstruct an alternative political legitimacy and a favourable ambience of acceptance backed by a requisite and efficient administrative capacity by distancing itself to avoid taking on the commensurate amount of responsibility for the negative experiences provoked by previous Washington Consensus reforms. This, of course, does not ruled out the possibility that the seductive language of (participation, local ownership, civil society, capacity-boosting programmes, etc.) on the face of things, are not potentially beneficial (even praiseworthy rhetoric) in making the 'best' of the impoverished people's economic situation. That nevertheless, the Bank's governance programme is in fact socially and economically disenfranchising. This is simply because it problematically neglects cultural constructed norms and socio-political particularities in relations to discourse of development.

The widely embraced World Bank's 'good governance' as it is claimed is masqueraded under the realm of technicality and dubious "neutrality" with no clarification about what is meant by the use of the term. However, as conceptualised, encapsulated and envisioned by Foucault, neoliberal rationality of competition and the need for African States to become successful is vested with the insignia of responsible neoliberal subjects (Joseph, 2010b); which intimately signifies the perseverance of a discursive economic rationality. My argument on 'good governance' relies upon a particular reading of the problematic of representation and practices which, could be read as a laudable rhetoric (ideologically laden concept, a romantic idea) intended to enhance the donor structural adjustment model (Stein, 2009); by essentially depoliticising the political nature of development in favour of ostensibly technocratic solutions. A Foucauldian analysis indicates that the development challenge persists in this context because the Bank propagates the "truth" claim that development can only be defined through managerial populism (Brown, 2011) and supreme good governance rhetoric (Hindess, 2005).

6.4 Reorienting Development Policies: 'Good Governance' in Neoliberal Ghana

This section provides an exploration of development changes parallel to a shift in the Washington Consensus-informed structural adjustment policies in Ghana. It contends that rather than a neutral, novel inclusive-neoliberal development, 'good governance' reform agenda in Ghana, can be conceived of as a primary legitimising embodied discursive product appropriated as a vehicle in building consensus to accept the 'wisdom' of the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism and the continued administration of Bretton Woods institutions. In arguing for Foucauldian analysis, I examine discursive assemblage and knowledge formations to show how power-knowledge nexus coagulates under neoliberal subject formation (Kendall & Wickham, 1999) have been internalised, legitimised, reproduced and discursively resisted (Ibid).

6.4.1 Fields of visibility

The catalyst for the development of 'good governance' agenda grew out in Ghana against the background of the spectacular failure of SAPs in the late 1980's as evidenced in devastating, unenviable debt problems, deepening poverty, socioeconomic inequalities and unemployment. In response to criticisms of the negative impacts of structural adjustment programmes, the Bank argued repeatedly that 'bad governance' is responsible for Ghana's uncured problems and introduced 'good governance' reform which contains the following benchmarks aimed to achieve economic growth, and thus successful development: Civil Society Organisations (CSOs') inclusion especially Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); accountability; transparency; ownership, active participation, decentralising administration; New Public Manage-

ment; and empowerment (World Bank, 1992; UNDP, 1997b) with a host of measures to minimalise the role of the State.

Civil Society Organisation inclusion under the 'good governance' discourse has been widely recognised as an essential element in demanding greater 'transparency' and 'accountability' from public officials. "Aware that they are being monitored by citizen groups, public officials know that they may be held accountable for budget discrepancies or failure to deliver adequate services" (World Bank, 2006, p.vi). This unique position illustrates very well and linked to the Bank's focus aimed at broadening decisive participation of civil society in driving policy-making and implementation. For instance, in 2000 the then World Bank country director in Ghana is quoted as saying that CSOs' are now increasingly viewed as strategically important actors in socio-economic policies in local development (Williams & Young, 2009). The "Washington consensus" concept of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1990s even though was focused on marketisation of the public sector; but it was also linked to the fact that it strengthens civil society involvement in the area of new institutional economics revolution (Hood & Jackson, 1991, p.5; Rhodes, 2003, p.48). Potential for CSOs' participation in monitoring and promoting development is particularly evident in the Bank's support for Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) (World Bank, 2000). The Bank whilst developing Country Assistance Strategy report with the Government of Ghana elicited the opinions of local organisations to provide the means and the impetus for its successful implementation (Whitfield, 2009). To render inclusion a feasible and achievable goal, the Bank employs NGO liaison officers to closely participate in it sponsored Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI).

At the heart of the notion of 'accountability' has been the renewed interest of successive governments in consulting citizens and CSOs' like the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA), Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), IMANI Ghana to mention but a few, to provide overarching policy framework in considering public opinion in the formulation of appropriate policies and decisions for national development (Aryee, 2008; Hearn, 1999, p. 6). All recent attempts of ensuring the spirit of 'accountability' led the Government of Ghana to launch drastic New Public Management Reform Programme (NPMRP) (Adzroe, 2015; Lawson, 2011) in alignment with the Bank's public sector governance agenda. Typically, New Public Management Reform has been key in introducing competitive and market-driven ethos into public sector (Lawson, 2011) to "effectively" and "efficiently" deliver public services. And relatedly, not only can public management reform improve financial accountability, but, included in the process could be, and can be 'capacity building', parliamentary scrutiny and 'transparency' in policy decisions in public sector governance, generally (Rhodes, 1997, p. 49). The principle of 'transparency' a key element of bureaucratic 'accountability' which entails making available for public scrutiny all audited public accounts in the gargantuan fight against 'corruption' and administration misconducts have left an indelible imprint on the development practices in Ghana.

Participation, a recurring leitmotif of 'good governance' mechanisms draws on an idea that when recipients themselves are intimately involved in the decision-making and implementation processes, it enhances the effectiveness of doing development (Nyendu, 2012). Enhanced 'participation' and representation are an acknowledgement of the importance of responding to the needs of the extremely poor and socially excluded into the political decision-making and development process at local levels. In parallel to popular local 'participation' in decision-making, is rooted strongly in the ambivalent notion of 'decentralised' state with power rested in local communities. Decentralisation has become a catalyst to foster continuing interactive interventions and interactions forms of governing (Aryee, 2008, p.234; Rhodes, 20003, p.63; World Bank, 1989). As Ahwoi rightly points out, "the decentralization policy has necessitated a change in the national planning process from the centralized "top-down" system to a decentralized "bottom–up" planning system" (Ahwoi, 1994, p.18). This frame of governance principle is primarily a development strategy to promote a sense of broader local 'ownership' and 'empowerment' (self-organisation) by progressively transferring authority and responsibility from the central government agencies to sub-national government structures (Nyendu, 2012). To achieve this objective Article 240 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462) provide the legal regime for decentralisation of state power in Ghana. Interest in combating 'corruption' has featured prominently in the public management reform efforts in Ghana particularly with reference to quality, inefficiencies and malfeasance. This interest has reflected in the progress toward institutionalisation of policies like Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC), anti-corruption training modules and the preparation of a national anticorruption plan and procurement reforms have increasingly become the standard policy instrument to overcome the pervasive culture of political patronage and abrasive 'corruption'.

6.5 The discursive production of knowledge /truth

Foucault's governmentality of discourse is premised on the political rationalities and technologies at work in regimes of government. It focuses as well as problematises power rationales which are assembled and put to work in order to govern different aspects of social reality; wherein it asserts practices of truth, legitimation and the inextricable connection between power-knowledge couplets dynamically produced within the contemporary regimes of government. For here—rather than unearthing some teleological narrative—Foucauldian perspective provides a means of 'diagnosing the present' by demystifying and disrupting the constructed 'knowledge' through which good governance agenda emerges in Ghana (Howarth, 2002, p.128, my emphasis). Rose (2000, p.27) notes this arguing that, "to govern, one could say, is to be condemned to seek an authority for one's authority".

Although the mythical mantra of country 'ownership' and 'country-driven' development are substantially built on the basis of altruism and utilitarianism, yet the World

Bank establishes and maintains pervasive global discourses of development planning to objectify, discipline, normalise and govern its clients governments through codes of ethical practice and behaviour (reflected in prescriptive training manuals, various training programmes and workshops to improve the management 'skills' of bureaucrats and policy makers). Predictably, the importance of this was accentuated due to the Bank re-branding itself as a global Knowledge Bank and 'expert' of particular forms of development economics. This is especially true for a country like Ghana whose ministries, municipalities and agencies have insipidly and distressingly come under the tutelage and the disciplinary 'gaze' of the Bank to meet benchmarked forms of governance. Again, it is stressed that armed with specialist 'knowledge' and epistemological arrogance —the Bank has been naturalised as authoritative centre and paragon of moral agenda and enforces normative standards of conduct which like a virus, is inherently cultural and privileging. Through further semi-formalised development institutions, forms of knowledge, concrete practices are consolidated, normalised and constructed around which new "truths" about African development are actually produced (Abrahamsen, 2000; Fougner, 2004).

The language underpinning the Bank's discourse is pervasive and powerful, not only by words and deed; but it is also impregnated with values and ethics which insinuate a dichotomy between the 'corrupt' and the 'good' state institutions, public servants etc. (in this case Ghanaian public servants): and finds resonance with the discursive trajectory which lies deep and fundamentally integral to the production and reproduction of embodied subjects that constitute, inhabit, and maintain the neoliberal 'good governance'. As for such a view, Susan Rose-Ackermanm (1978, p.9) enthuses that "normative statements about corruption require a point of view, a standard of 'goodness'. Significantly, given the "othering" nature and complexity of corruption discourse (Polzer, 2001), it is unsurprising that the Bank exerts individualising control, extending its tentacles of crusading codes of conduct by taking on authoritative position, and championing such claims, articulated as a model of absolute "truth" ("good") that ethically should be replicated, by simplemindedly expressing the irrationality of corrupt systems (Ibid). Euben (1989, p.230) steadfastly challenges this view. As he writes, "to call a regime corrupt is to say something about the speaker's preferences, not about the regime itself". In other words the discourses of corruption are assembled and internalised by constructing 'consensus' in order to sustain and legitimate the discursive contours by giving corruption a "truth" canopy (Polzer, 2001). This in Foucauldian senses is, but another product of a discourse: "by production of truth I mean not the production of true utterances but the establishment of domains in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent" (Foucault, 1981, p.9). It is for this reason that Foucault (2000) suggested that "truth" should not be seen as empirical-scientific knowledge or transcendental; but grand attempts to make visible the pervasive technologies infused with relations of power that constituted "truth" and its subjectivities.

The Bank's avowed ideological predilections and its hegemonic knowledge as 'universal' epistemology are steeped in its interventionist tactic of a calculating and

rationally maximising individual in this discursive game. Despite however, alternative regimes of "truth", such as, culture, values and possible knowledges or political understandings of corruption, with the aim to offer fresh perspectives are erroneously and purposefully considered as naive, specious and indeed useless arguments made by parasitic and self-serving corrupt politicians. Appropriately, as echoed by Gadbaw and Richards (1997, p.3), "in country after country in all regions and among all major cultures of the world, this cynicism (of cultural relativism in defining corruption) seems to have been swept away" by overwhelming "evidence" of the "magnitude and scope" of the "problem". Distinctive form of expert knowledge is to establish "standards" and "best practices". In tandem, to be considered as an expert, encapsulates formalisation of rules seen prerequisite to govern the production of true statements within the expert field (Foucault, 1972). This in turn potentially opens up new possibilities to enhance the ability of this form of 'expert' knowledge to render Ghana classifiable and manageable and contribute to the construction of a form of "governance" or governmentality, which ultimately, constitutes the technical "know-how" that informs governmental practices. What we should ultimately bear in mind is that the political technology of 'good governance' project has been humanised and framed as normatively unobjectionable and desirable thus acknowledging it as a pervasive and immensely influential policy imperative for the economic development of peripheral areas.

6.6 Production of subjectivities

The 'good governance' project evasively, albeit poignantly, permeates the discursive constitution of a specific form of political subject, autonomous self-regulating agent that is governable— which by no means can be described as "technologies of the self" (Foucault, 2010). By this, I understand Foucault to mean that political subject is the one ready to accept neoliberal "truths". The rhetorical shift of 'good governance' paradigm of the BWIs has emphasised national 'ownership' with significant degree of policy freedom and self-governance as a means for achieving economic development. The main assumption contained in this particular aspect of the recent seeming policy shift is the belief that local 'ownership' is central to the redefinition and reconfiguration of the development policymaking landscape to include non-state actors— and as a corollary to address the shortcomings of SAPs. In the case of Ghana, this is particularly evident in Community Water and Sanitation Projects (CWSP) with a great deal of emphasis on the provision of water and sanitation services, community development, 'grassroots empowerment' and 'capacity enhancement' in the Bank's policies (World Bank, 2004). This approach provides a rationale which is in sharp contrast to previous World Bank's water supply projects which have been of a top-down, hierarchical ideal that rejects any indigenous 'participation' within the radius of development (Williams & Young, 2009).

It bears mentioning again that the promotion of 'partnerships', 'participation', 'capacity building' and local 'empowerment', it is alleged will generate and concomi-

tantly constitute a *sine qua non* requirement which reveals its productive connection with neoliberal policies and programmes associated with Community Based Rural Development Project (World Bank, 2004), which the project document indicates, improve 'good governance'; but more importantly in the interest of 'empowering' the poor by exhorting them to play a pro-active role in issues which affect their economic lives (Ibid, p.4-5). Under World Bank-style 'empowerment' approach to poverty reduction, poor people are not directly managed and controlled, but rather become object of development programmes and central agency for development. Or, put another way, a decisive move towards the axioms of what some have called "inclusive" neoliberal model (Craig & Porter, 2006). The foregoing perspectives are critical in understanding neoliberal globalisation in Africa as exceptionally produced through a form of governmentality and Ghana does not constitute an exception to the rule.

We need to recognise that it is not only individual subject that is discursively constituted as entrepreneurial, self-regulating subjects (Medovoi, 2007, p.54); nation-states themselves are reciprocally embodied in the rationalities of governmental terrain. In fact, nation-states are produced as political subjects that should be driven by the market spirit of competitiveness in shaping the policies and the future of the country. Accordingly, beneficiary countries that are the target of authoritative discourses endemic within development programmes under pious rhetorical considerations are supported to take 'ownership' of their development, and constantly encouraged to be prime agents of change. Foucault (2008, p.269), provides a succinct account namely that "neoliberal subject is one that is "eminently governable" (p.270) on the basis of its "rationality"; "rational conduct (being) any conduct which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the environment and which responds to this in a non-random way, in a systematic way". Primarily, the neoliberal subject Foucault (2008, p.269) argues, is one "who accepts reality". Understandably, how that socially constructed reality emerges, reified and gets widely circulated in a particular form of governance is crucial. This line of argument is best evinced and further reinforced by the way they primarily function as a form of governmentality thus, inevitably, governing subjects and spaces. This is especially true for Ghana whereby government departments, highly structured and growing local NGOs presence, are concerned with their commitment to "excessive proceduralism", benchmarks and standardised practices to perpetuate 'good governance' agenda.

In alignment with the above considerations, regimes of government produce and disseminated through plural and multiple free subjects constructed and normalised under the contextual regimes of "truth" invisibly imposed on them. My argument is that subject formation needs not however, apply only to individuals, it extends its scope to both state and non-state actors who shape and perform governmental tasks (Sending & Neumann, 2006 p.668). Within this framework, a state-centric paradigm fails to capture the wider context and encompass a thorough re-appraisal of the constitutive and productive element of power relations. On the one hand, these subjectivities could find its distinct place within the rational and calculating neoliberal notion of "homo economics" (Foucault, 2008) of neoliberal regime and on the other hand,

subjectivities such as non-governmental organisations, international organisations, civil societies, and other autonomous social institutions which invariably lend support to particular governmental rationalities. Norms and practices incessantly embedded and embodied in 'good governance' (in the Foucauldian sense), serve as an impressive example to govern recipient States. This insight as well also poses profound political implications for interlocking networks of governing agents and agencies, such as quasi-governmental institutions, political actors, NGOs, community partners, and even international agencies (Joseph, 2012b; Neumann & Sending, 2010) within the contemporary global governance system. In fact —non-state actors of all kinds— IMANI Ghana, Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG), Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA), Third World Network Africa (TWN) etc.— have all contributed to this tendency of extensive governance structures allegedly outside the State within the Ghanaian body politic.

Central to the new aid partnerships increasingly found in the field of both International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy(IPE) is to internalise norms and practices of 'good governance', and this ambition is best captured in the values of 'accountability' and 'transparency' in African policymakers: the inculcation of these values have become the dominant frame of reference in Ghana (at least rhetorically) whereby the various discourses that overtly or covertly suffuse development policymaking are evinced and realised. Of crucial importance, therefore, is the "production of modern, self-disciplined citizens and States that can be trusted to govern themselves according to liberal democratic norms" (Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 1454). And so, while many hard-nosed critics view the pre-eminent emphasis on the myth of 'partnership' as actually diminishing African control and agency, 'partnership' Abrahamsen (2000, p.1454) cogently argues, are "techniques of cooperation and inclusion" to re-enforce the dominance of the neoliberal market forces. Ultimately, then, attempts by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to zealously secure the expansion of the neoliberal mode and structures had become necessarily tied to the implementation of market-friendly policies in return for receiving funds (Mawuko, 2014).

6.7 Technologies and techniques

When the rules that govern discourse are contingently implicated in power relations, "truth" and knowledge are born. Regimes or "politics of truth" (Foucault, 1980a) however, do not just simply constitute a certain sense of "reality" within the discursive mosaic in which they are bolstered and transformed; but rather, it is regarded as being discursively implicated within the bodies of the subjects involved. Foucault (1990) makes this point when he asserts that bodies are regulated through discourse through specific technologies of power or what he refers to as 'bio-power'. Within these arenas, "truth" effect is tinkered with and inflected through a complex proliferation of governance by non-state actors which yield to power effect. Thus, it suggests a mode of directing the conduct of subjects which in tum, have the potential to restructure

and construe new roles for governments (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Indeed, agents of change much emphasis on the governmentalisation of global civil society is related with market-influenced biopolitical strategies and technologies to structure global governance in which development is prioritised (Foucault, 2003c). As far as political technology is concerned, it is regarded as juridical code, increasingly formalised and productively fit into a "regime of truth" and points toward civil societies subject construction and insertion in the biopolitical formulations and concerns (Ripinsky & Bossche, 2007).

The catch is that governmentalisation of civil society has been so far entangled in aid-dispensing industry and therefore they are able to construct powerful discourses and deploy civil society as a political subject and its insertion into mechanisms of governance. Within this milieu, best practices and benchmarks are involved in attempts to centrally impose prescriptions and mores on states to evasively entrench and institutionalised 'participation' by civil society groups. All of this is to suggest that the notion of civil society has seemingly become ubiquitous while at the same time exemplifying a form of governing structure within an increasingly deterritorialised global society (Nelson & Wright, 1995). Their discourses and practices are institutionally sanctioned and have been immensely prominent and pervasive with it moulding effect profoundly influencing Ghanaian policymakers regarding development issues. As Mohan (2002, p.125) points out: "an active civil society, it was believed, would enable choice, scrutinize errant governments, and ultimately lead to regularized, plural democracy".

Sheppard and Leitner (2010) whilst acknowledging the neoliberal logics of economic government that inform the civil society as catalysts for development, extensively talk about the decided shift and rationalities that set the discursive frame within which the "Washington Consensus" of the 1980s and the so-called "Post-Washington Consensus" of 1990s advocated primarily by Joseph Stiglitz, were inaugurated, enacted and pursued. However, despite the shifts regarding the specific policies that are regenerated and reconfigured, there exist a number of deep continuities within and around the developmentalist agenda in the periphery. Such a construction allows for a glimpse into how developmentalist projects are the result of the creation and (re) production of a spatiality of difference based on a form of binarism by development organisations that exert power and impose their own form of mystified knowledge and 'expertise' produced within the so-called West and the rest. It is in this respect that the immense contribution of civil society for neoliberal governmentality gradually materialised and reconstituted as it is regarded as a potent means to scrutinise and sanitise a particular country's level of development within the global economic order.

Equally important, however, is the fact that the persistence in promoting civil society as a pivot of participatory development is circumscribed within the neoliberal logic espoused by the World Bank to produce a complex chain of stakeholders in developmental projects— whereby the aim is on increased 'transparency' and 'accountability' which are not explicitly interlinked to the necessity to address issues considered fundamental to development policy implementation in general. Given this

all-encompassing framework, participatory development divulges the covert micro-technologies of power (Foucault, 1977): one that aims to target political subjects such as civil societal agencies, and concomitantly shape the conduct of other subjects—with the emphasis placed upon countries which are the object of governmental intervention in the form of development. It needs noting however that the role of civil society pertaining to neoliberal political can be characterised as a portmanteau and overlapping in the sense that while civil society is seen as inherently distinct from the state and formal political institutions, it is at the same time seen both as constituted by and constitutes the agent of governance. It is important to realise that participatory development and the interplay of power relations that saturate such a discourse, can in a way be seen in how the poor are responsibilised through rationalities and technologies of what Weidner (2013) calls the development-participation-governance stitched together in a paradoxical discursive assemblage (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).

Simultaneously, it will be possible to explicate and expose in what ways power effect of the discourse of governance can clearly be seen from a range of political technologies covertly expressed through the crude New Public Management reform package (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p.20 ; Reinicke, 1998) ; and it is, therefore, power effect of this version of the governance discourse which currently constitutes and reflects a radical transformation of the public sector from its primordial state into a new realm of a more efficient operational structure based on neoliberal practices of commoditisation and corporatisation. The point, here, is that the 'good governance' agenda with emphasis on country 'ownership' and or 'participation' can be defined and analysed according to wide-range of neoliberal sponsored technologies and rationalities perceived and interpreted to confidently produce eminently responsible, self-governing subjects within a biopolitical economic order (Foucault, 2000, p.298-325). It is therefore, pertinent here to reiterate Foucault who while studying neoliberal principles of government in the works of F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, provides an insightful account into neoliberalism: "as a body of knowledge, strategies, and practices of governance that seeks to divest the state of paternalistic responsibility by shifting social, political and economic "responsibility" to privatised institutions and economically rationalised "self-governing individuals" (Nadesan, 2008, p.32). In other words, the individualistic gaze is directed according to Foucault at invisibly governing individuals (Lemke, 2001 p.201). "By stressing "self-care", the neoliberal state divulges paternalistic responsibility for its subjects but simultaneously holds its subjects responsible for self- governance" (Nadesan, 2008, p.33). All these elements, I argue provide useful framework to analyse broader mechanisms of international economic policies pursued by supranational actors —such as International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which direct us toward a richer understanding of contemporary geometry of power through which construction of the subject and the discursive power-knowledge matrix is framed and spotlighted.

6.8 Politics of resistance: ruptures and recapitulations

This section focuses on the mobilisation of grassroots-based social movements, which are engaged in counter-hegemonic subaltern struggles in an attempt to challenge and provide an alternative against mundane, quotidian hegemonic neoliberal order (Osei kwadwo, 2006, p.85). I draw on the case of Ghana, a country widely considered as the "star pupil" of market friendly, neoliberal poloicies in the African region, to reflect critically upon the link between the implementation of neoliberal policies, social movements activism, and domestic politics. Here I discuss the case of the enforcement of a policy of Value Added Tax (VAT) as part of the neoliberal economic orthodoxy. Drawing on Foucault's analysis of the practices of effective resistance as tactical reversal I illuminate the nature of opposition to neoliberal discourses in a country in which these discourses have become dominant and hegemonic.

In May 1995, a series of protests and clashes against the imposition of the Value Added Tax of 17.5 per cent, externally imposed by agents of neoliberalism, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund culminated in the anti-adjustment coalition. Within the context of the neoliberal policy agenda, Value Added Tax could be seen as one of the cornerstones of the Public Financial Management Reform Programme and the 'good governance' agenda imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions on Ghana. On 11 May, a group from the anti-adjustment coalition, the Alliance for Change (AFC) and existing pressure groups, such as the Trades Union (TUC) Congress, the Civil Servants Association(CSA) capitalised on growing popular discontent and organised a massive public demonstration in Accra to fiercely resist what they considered as crude and ruthless neoliberal restructuring of the economy. The demonstration, code-named "Kume Preko" (*kill me at once*) marked the most militantly anti-government march since 1990s. Everywhere, the new tax was deeply denounced as anxiety and public anger rose. In short, demonstrations were a defiant statement of insurmountable resistance against unbearable hardships precipitated by the so-called economic reform package. The government trapped in an uncertainty about the long-term consequences of mounting public outcry and discontent, was forced to withdraw its implementation at the end of May. Remarkably, in spite of VAT's demise, other forms of widespread resistance also emerged against the economically repressive orthodox adjustment policies, code named "Sieme Preko" (burry me at once) and "Wieme Preko" (finish me at once) held in Kumasi and Takoradi, the second and third largest cities respectively.

The governmentality approach helps to explain Foucault's account of interconnectedness between structure-agency and power-resistance derived from his vision of power but in important ways goes beyond these binary oppositions (Cadman, 2010). Foucault's conceptualisation of power is best expressed by his notion that "where there is power there is a resistance" (Foucault, 1975, p.27). There cannot be power relations without critical possibilities of effective resistance over the fact of domination —indeed— if there are no such conditions and conditioning of possibilities of changing "intolerables", then it is states of domination but not power. Power relations,

Foucault tells us, is characterised in the following way: "mobile, reversible, ubiquitous, dispersed, flexible, circulating and unstable" (Foucault, 1984, p.292). These characteristics, Foucault observes, give room for the possibility of resistance as strategic reversal to modify it thereby paving way for new power relationships. And so, resistance is immanent to power relations and not opposed to them. Such an approach suggests that power and resistance are sufficiently dialectical or, perhaps it is better said, are mutually constitutive. Foucault says that practices of resistance consistently reflect and found forceful expression in local, strategic struggles inescapably conditioned and rationalised by techniques and material effects of power in our immediate circumstances, rather than being directed towards a vaguely utopian ideal notion of power widely (Ibid). For Foucault, it is through acts of resistance that the subject produces herself more autonomously than is intended by power itself essentially at the points of tension, sudden breaks and ruptures to legitimise a certain rationality of government. Foucault's (Brent Pickett, 1996, p.462) fundamental idea is that it is the "strategic codification of common points of resistance" that make radical change and reversals possible. The point of such a narrative is to reveal that resistance may assume an affiliation not only to the present exercise of power, but also to events which in this case are implicated in the production of one's subjectivity through specific logics, content, and manifestation at a given period. This characterisation enables us to analyse the model of resistance locally, at points of rupture, struggles and innumerable tensions; one that is firmly rooted in the historical conditions that made the present modes of resistance possible (Hoy, 2004).

Rather than imagining resistance merely as "antimatter", Foucault (O' Malley et al., 1997, p.505) suggests that it something that is integral to the shaping of power relations that allows a conception of politics as "relations of contest or struggle which are constitutive of government. Thus, on Foucault's analysis, practices of resistance can act as external blockage which frustrate, nullify or counteract, among other things, unproblematic and successful implementation of governmental programmes within the "fine meshes of power"(Foucault, 1994, p.122). Indeed, the possibility for governmental programmes to fail because of the obstacles and struggles that are put in its way I want to suggest here, plays an important role in a radical Foucauldian politics. It is vital, Foucault (Stenson, 2008; Li, 2007a; McKee, 2009; Lemke, 2007) has suggested to acknowledge the constitutive and integrative role of resistances, contestations, and antagonisms as they become increasingly diffused into governmental rationalities and technologies. I am suggesting that this is precisely the stuff that Foucauldian resistance is made of, classically conceived here as the "strategic polyvalence" or "reversibility" to which rationalities of neoliberal government are disposed (Binkley, 2009).

Foucault statements on practices of resistance and power as elaborated in his *Power-Knowledge*, *History of Sexuality (vol. 1),* and *The Subject and Power* — I want to suggest— in Foucauldian terms may have proven particularly helpful for Alliance for Change (AFC) to replicate the activism of their counterparts of the 1990s in resisting the implementation of market logic of neoliberalism. My own sense is that the notion of resistance within the analytic framework of Foucault might have determined the

counter "space" and the chemical catalyst in unleashing popular discontent and contestation from "below" to Ghanaian adjustment. Moreover, it reveals albeit implicitly, the tensions within broader debates on developmentalism which the discursive ethos of neoliberalism so to say had subtly and obliquely obscured. If resistance can totally reverse, not just modify, a major economic reform measure, as Foucault correctly believes it is, then the conditions which foster resistance should be promoted— thus concomitantly leading to new forms of subjectivity.

6.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that the neoliberal 'good governance' reform agenda by the Bank cannot be properly understood without an adequate understanding of the intricately complex socio-politico-economic and historical provenance that gave birth to it. I have shown that the development critique on the epic failure of structural adjustment reforms to bring robust economic growth at the end of the 1980s is closely connected to the surfacing of contemporary notion of the 'good governance' fad. Thus the past two decades of rigorous market logic neoliberal reform provide a historical context in which to analyse and evaluate 'good governance' in Africa. Far from the fervent claim that the rhetorical inclusive-neoliberal development discourse represents a shift from the discursive parameters of the market-oriented economic policies of structural adjustment, I have suggested that they are largely powerful motors to propagate neoliberal reforms inconspicuously imposed and proposed by the 'benevolent' Western countries on the "others": whereby postcolonial states are "discursively fabricated" as irrational, inefficient, "narrow", "selfish", non-modern "others" of the West, highly 'corrupt', passive receptacles of development and crucially, are recognised as being so as to justify their incorporation into the suffocating global economic order.

My analysis has clarified that what repetitively emerges from the Bank's embedded practices of representation on 'good governance' is a crisis-ridden south Saharan Africa; and, by so doing, shape postcolonial state and its leaders' subjectivity (Foucault, 1982); one that is increasingly supportive of the entrepreneurial and market-driven spirit of competitiveness. In fact, I have called into question the material effects of the Bank's discourses which multifariously operate as pervasive technologies of power that produce and sustain unassailable knowledge and "regimes of truth" that are inscribed within it (Foucault, 1977). But, more critical still, these prevalent "regime of truths" are indicative of the ways in which development thinking and practices have been historically and to date significantly predicated on "pathognomonic orientation" (Jordan et al., 1997, p.85). I have empirically approached the so-called World Bank's report - *Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to Sustainable Growth*, *Governance and Development*, WB 1997 *The State in a Changing World and 2002 Building Institutions for Markets* reports governmentally; focusing on the ensemble of knowledge, material practices, presuppositions, statements, rationales, prescriptions, strate-

gies, objects, subjects that were historically produced and represented such that 'good governance' discourse emerged as an inevitable and indispensable tonic for aid-receiving governments.

I have examined how universal code of the 'good governance' agenda in the Ghanaian body politic is littered with laudable rhetoric assemblage of transparency, accountability, capacity building, enhanced participation, civil society, ownership, empowerment, decentralised power sharing and public sector reforms. This pronounced, yet ambivalent discursive shift as part of the good governance-oriented development assistance is materially inscribed in a particular regime of knowledge, "truth", micro-technologies of power and the concomitant constitution of subjectivities that starkly emanate from those who bolster and legitimate these practices (Dean, 2007; Curry, 2003). In much the same way the shift in the Bank's governance agenda in Ghana can also similarly be understood as emerged neoliberal forms of governmentality.

Last but certainly not least, Foucauldian resistance despite the insights it offers, critics still charge is dubiously unable to give normative reasons why resistance is preferable to submission (Fraser, 1981); I feel, on the contrary, that Foucault's ideas on the practices of resistance can provide powerful analytical lens for explaining how discontenting grassroots social movements act to resist, reverse and discursively dismantle the neoliberal present (Guma Karakire, 2015). Such is, I believe, an indispensable component of forms of agency (Foucault, 1977). At any rate, the ethical-political choice, however, is as Foucault (1984, p.256) continually admonishes us, "is to determine which is the main danger" every day and incessantly struggle against it in an urgent and politically progressive ways. This, as fervently envisioned and explicated by Foucault spawns and engenders possibilities of insurmountable resistance and reversibility in the neoliberal present. I have used this principle in the case study of Ghana to explore possible ways in which grassroots social movements have the capacity to counter the negative effects of neoliberal globalisation through disrupting and unmasking hierarchical power relations.

As far as I can see, the extent to which pervasive discourses can subjugate actors —whether states or individuals—and render them susceptible to the effects of power is by itself contingent on how they (actors) envision alternative discursive practices from "others" worldview or discursively resist them. It is the contention of this study that the pervasive 'good governance' agenda more generally, must be examined and analysed within a broader discursive space (Taylor 1997, p.25)—only then does it make sense to speak of critical space of contested, restricted and often multiple confrontations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Rehabilitating the Centaur State: Structural Adjustment as a Disciplinary Technology

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter I direct attention towards the examination of the techniques of "disciplining" power enacted by disciplinary technologies of structural adjustment regime. In the following, I will attempt to present Michel Foucault's relational, situational and 'productive' conceptualisation of power: that of the production in which considerable freedom, possibility and autonomy are exercised by the subject in the practice of his/her own individual subjectivity. What this chapter seeks to analyse is how the circumscription of state regulatory authority in domestic policy space within the structural adjustment framework transformed subjects into passive objects as apprehended in and highlighted through Foucault's concepts relating to disciplinary mechanisms. I am concerned, however, to note how Ghana became amenable to external policy prescriptions within structural adjustment regime to be constituted into objects to grasp how development has been discursively deployed in the discipline of International Relations (Mitchell, 1995): arguing, in the Foucauldian vein that structural adjustment regime can be understood as a technique of "normalisation" that shows characteristics of power as "discipline" and as governmentality (Foucault, 1991). In closing, and by way of illustration, I will briefly offer 'non-compliance' as one possibility into what Foucault terms "counter-conducts" or "dissenting conducts" within the context of neoliberal governmentality.

7.2 Disciplinary Power of Structural Adjustment

> *The chief function of the disciplinary power is to 'train', rather than to select and to levy; or no doubt to train in order to levy and select all the more...The success of disciplinary power derives no doubt from the use of simple instruments: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it —the examination —Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish, 1977).*

This section will pursue the claim that disciplinary mechanisms are a characteristic feature of structural adjustment regime and then highlight the ways in which they function to normalise neoliberalism in the Ghanaian context. The pernicious structural adjustment paradigm—in all of its expressions, is a totalitarian boa constrictor and a narcissistic project. It repressed where it should have fostered, enervated rather than strengthened. There has not been any systematic overview of the predicaments of the African continent (particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s) without a look into the role of the Bretton Woods institutions. While there are sufficient reasons for such critical perspective in their assessment to be negative, they undeniably provide an invaluable resource for appreciating how the policies of these institutions have increasingly shaped the economic and political behaviours, and implicated themselves on the life of the societies in which they operate. It will be suggested that forms and mechanisms of interventions are not necessarily limited at the level of the State, but it also reverberate at the much lower levels, especially at the level of everyday practices and experiences where the outcomes of vile macro-economic policies are felt (Best, 2007). And as said, it is on this level that higher-level policy interventions are reanimated and reinvigorated into practice, domesticated and stabilised in the way in which individuals and social groups whose ways of life it assaults with intentions actively strive to reclaim and re-enact everyday life. It would be argue that it is the ordinary, the unremarkable, and the mundane encounters within the locus of the everyday life, (Springer, 2014, 2015, 2016) that the deeply problematic world of structural adjustment regime – at least in its unrefined orthodox versions – that it is dangerously ingrained into the non-problematic experiences of everyday reality. In Lefebvre's (1984, p.24) terms—it is the quotidian that on the contrary it is literally taken-for-natural, rarely questioned and even cursorily addressed. With the vantage point of hindsight, I argue that neoliberal structural adjustment regime by insinuating into people's quotidian life in many ways fosters and feeds on deeply rhetorical emancipatory discourses.

Today, it is hardly even a provocation to suggest that structural adjustment regime has had a perculiar constitutive effect on the social 'reality' of post-colonial African state; thereby contributing to an ontology that renders the post-colonial African state governable in certain ways. There is an overwhelming way whereby its ideas seek to ultimately capture, pervade and destabilise realities of everyday life (Barnett, 2005; Birch, 2015; Lewis, 2009; Ong, 2007). In structural adjustment discourses, at stake is the attempt to play on a strongly held yet ambigious view that it is the sole source of objective superior scientific knowledge necessary to solve specific set of policy problems on our social world — as though there is no counter discourse that could appropriately be offered to weaken its edifice (Springer, 2014). I make the case that structural adjustment regime can therefore be conceived as a very distinct epistemological project: one that enacts, enables and entrenches development aid; and unmistakably reinforces the conditions for its reproduction and resonance. Structural adjustment as a very distinct epistemological project operates to eargely instil itself in legitimising discourses which in a more Freirean (1970, p.29) sense are full of eman-

cipatory pedagogies bandying around buzz-words; namely, "popular participation", "ownership", "capacity-building", "empowerment", "transparency" and "poverty alleviation". Essentially this was part and parcel of the development-governance adjustment implementation matrix in Ghana. Such seductive discourses in their apparent value free posturing some what paradoxically make all forms of criticisms against the order of things innocuous. The key point about such emancipatory pedagogies under the neoliberal economic structural adjustment project is that they can be grasped and reflected upon through rich assemblage of complex, varied and heterogeneous network of practices; practices ultimately constituting a prime motivating force behind a massive shift in the regulatory norms of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These practices, it appears increasingly sustains, accompanies and echoes in many of the themes of the global biopolitical rationalities of liberal governance control over the borrowing target countries.

This is so much so that this neoliberal governmentalising rationalities and impetuses of the adjustment economic reforms were assiduously and enthusiastically absorbed by the adjusting states to "transform their environment by their own praxis" (Rahman, 1993, p.13). I take the view that the process of token inclusiveness or sterile rhetoric of wider participatory policymaking (whatever that may mean), continuously invoked by notions of "freedom" rather than direct domination and imposition influentially, and powerfully reshaped the modalities of states' engagement with the external economy (Abrahamsen, 2004). A word of explanation is in order here: actively reinstating states arising from self-regulatory principle through subjective freedom in discipline manner (Deleuze cited in Dillion & Reid, 2001; Dean, 1999, p.121-2) in the territorialised populations plainly enhances and perpetuates the transplantation of neoliberal adjustment policies. The concern is not merely with the regulatory discipline of the doctrine of conditionality, but more crucially through the reproduction of omnipresence of a normalising model of adjustment rationalities by the recipient counties (or political elites) within its own jurisdiction. Adjustment rationalities are concerned with ensuring that State elites internalise (good political practices) and thus be made amenable, gradable and calculable to the logic and the imperatives of the social and economic policies underwritten and championed by its apostles. The underlying fact was to ensure that the coercive apparatus of conditionality and stabilisation programmes are complied with (Best, 2007).

But much more important than this is that the internalisation of policy by the political elites of structural adjustment states in all appearances, is exactly what the ontology of global governance, *inter alia*, takes its inspiration and insidiously aims to encourage (Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Fritschtak, 1994; World Bank, 1994). And of course, it is within this orientation that James Rosenau (1992) excellently remarked that global neoliberal governance thus very much appears to govern without government which informs regimes of governmentality. In fact, remarks like this justify me in saying that structural adjustment can be considered as *sine qua non* of govermentalising strategies insofar it is articulated in terms of the neoliberal market-driven technologies, where the freedom and autonomy of the governed are encouraged by

urgently appealing to the ideas of responsibility, self-awareness and self-regulation (Foucault, 2008, p.147).

This thesis seeks to question this moment. A moment which inaugurates, entrenches and legitimates an illusion. The illusion in question is Ghana in the context of structural adjustment regime. Let me illustrate this with a concrete example: within the neoliberal structural adjustment model, Ghana was not clearly defined as a normative or an essential ontological register. In fact, Ghana does not have any sense of ontological virtue—it was described as, "a self-contained" (Cruch, 1995, p.14-15) and a bounded social entity. What Foucault (1975, p.184) refers to, tellingly enough as, "a material artefact of power" versus a, "cheerful illusion" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999, p.24). They may be illusions, but they are very powerful and compelling illusions—in proof of which validate the exposure to the discourses that conscript the space of external intervention of power (Escobar, 1984-85, p.387). It will be explained here that the misguided structural (mal) adjustment policies as an instrument of a will to power of neoliberal practices and policy discourses are intimately tied to the attempts at constructing 'reality' which also creates the institutional frameworks that are necessary for its reproduction and resonance. And for that one should aim at unpacking and exposing the Orwellian designs and disruptions conceptualised and defined through structural adjustment, which seeks to forward alternative epistemological frameworks.

Over the years, many attempts have been made at various academic and institutional level in rejecting the infamous "Washington Consensus", namely economic liberalism and 'good governance'. Unfortunately, these radical intents of the many different approaches framed through the critique of the old "Washington Consensus" have either remained sterile or petered out at the level of implementation. I maintain that this is so because paradoxically the tactics deployed to fight the neoliberal order do no more than reinforce it hierarchies. It thus in some ways appear to impoverishe the complex realities in ways which have tended to recoup and reproduce the epistemological imperialism through which structural (mal) adjustment insinuates itself in people's everyday life. Its narrow view of the much more international project appears increasingly emptied of hegemonic 'certainties' which frame and give coherence to each one of the elements that are critiqued (Bockman, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011). My analysis will focus on the "disciplinarisation" of Ghana with reference to the process of "normalisation". I will therefore, content myself with three levels of analysis viz. the reinvention of governable social actors, permanent visibility of the country and the rationalisation of knowledge of the country as the key instruments of power.

7.3 "Normalisation" and the Bretton Woods Institutions: The Foucauldian Gaze

From Foucault's point of view, the very nervous system of biopolitics is normalisation. The techniques of normalisation and control work in such a way as to make social actors internalise norms and willingly (naïvely) comply with directions that are imposed on them from outside to regulate their own behaviour. In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault (1977) shows how disciplinary power operates through a process of normalisation to produce power-knowledge regime in society. I propose that this is in tandem with the structural adjustment programmes as a biopolitical form of governmentality which frames the normalisation process within which the government of Ghana wilfully internalise the 'all seeing gaze' of Bretton Woods Institutions without being aware of it. Foucault's concept of normalisation is best understood in the way in which he forged an irrefutable connection between increasing disciplinary power on the one hand, and the figure of Bentham's panoptic model on the other (Hoffmann, 2011). Indeed, I argue that one aspect of Foucault's work which can be more appropriately applied to the operation of power of the Bretton Woods institutions is his depiction of the Benthamian idea of the panopticon (Foucault, 1995). The exercise of power through space and hence, through the spatial shifting of the neoliberal state is made possible by the "panoptic" technologies of control (Foucault, 1977, p.200-208). Foucault's explication on the importance of the "nornmalising judgement" in the function of normalising power does not entail the use of coercion, but through the construction of normalised subjects. Of course, "in this ritual, the modern form of power and the modern form of knowledge – that of individuals in both cases – are brought together in a single technique" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.158). What is of interest in this particular context is that inefficient States are placed against an arbitrarily constructed notion of normality and by implication, the "normalizing gaze" places development practice and thinking "into a complex power-knowledge web in which power is exerted over states, whether or not in their (best) interests" (Foucault cited in Marshall, 1996, p. 129). Here the normalising gaze 'opens up a field of visibility that facilitates the construction of "multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an organization in depth of surveillance and control, and intensification and ramification of power" (Debrix & Barder, 2012, p.100). It is here that rituals of "truth" are established in which knowledge circulates.

As Ghana's move to access SAP has extensively been discussed in this thesis, at this point, it suffices to say it was bleak and steadily depressing economic conditions and political irrationality in the early 1980s which led Ghana to access structural adjustment policies and programmes which has had its own torrent of high-profile criticisms and rebuttals. That said, it is my view that whether overt, covert or unwitting it is futile to attempt a top-down analytic optic and the grossly essentialist view of structural adjustment policies. In other words, it is no part of the present study argument to quantify the effectiveness of neoliberal adjustment policies and programmes. As reiterated many times throughout thesis, such an approach tends to exaggerate the

inevitability and "the unstoppable nature" of neoliberalism (Joseph, 2012, p.172). My attitude is that in order to develop an understanding of the inherently nihilistic and totalitarian nature of neoliberal project, the task at hand is to explore the moment when Ghana began to be 'disciplined'.

Disciplinary technology of power takes several forms: incessant regimes of visibility, the reinvention of governable social actors, and the rationalisation of knowledge on the country—which reinforces certain standards of behaviour of the states in question. The importance of these three elements can hardly be overstated: in the subsequent sections, I aim to make sense of how these aforementioned elements have been bound to the universal framework of the nation-state articulated discursively in a specific (modern) technique and technology of power for governing populations (Hindess, 2000)—in what can be termed in the Foucauldian insight as the 'process of normalisation'. SAP more than a grand project at correcting structural economic imbalances, in all its diverse manifestations is a normalisation project. It is incessant regimes of visibility, the reinvention of governable social actors, and the rationalisation of knowledge as they appear in the country that constitutes the major mechanisms of 'discipline' on which a new social reality is constructed and reproduced. It is specifically concerned with the legibility of local space for external intervention in a wide range of issues such as development et cetera. In Foucault's language we are dealing with technologies of power which, in this instance, are institutionally framed by rationality of SAP.

7.3.1 Reinventing governable social actors: the making of the homo economicus

At independence in 1957 the ideal of public service was variously considered as dominant political ethic in promoting socio-economic development. Public service was viewed as the best including its human resources, in terms of capacity far exceeded that of the now famous Asian Tigers (Ohemeng, 2014, p.471). For approximately eleven years, the Ghanaian public sector was the driving force behind the formulation and implementation of decisions with regard to serving the people. Civil servants were assigned the role of using their talents to facilitate and accelerate a form of development that was intended to be reflective of African values and priorities in an attempt to supplant anything lacerated by the ravages of colonialism. In other words, the intent unmistakably lays in reconstructing, reordering and remoulding the new nation-state towards the communitarian principles of African political culture (Cooper & Packard, 1997, p.12) that had been deliberately dislocated by unspeakable social malefactions and irreconcilable schisms in the bygone era of colonialism.

Accordingly, public service administrative superstructure was virtually inculcated with nationalist and socialist understanding and consciousness to economic and social activity—unencumbered by Adam Smith's notorious *laissez-fair* economic theorem and policies of individual self-interest (Becker, 1962; Friedman, 1953); and of sad legacies of "economic Darwinism" which is characteristically associated with "free" enterprise (Ayee, 2008; Lewi, 1998; Chazan et al., 1992, my emphasis).

Civil servants were urged to cultivate the culture of altruism, honesty, moral turpitude as well as ethical values; they had to respect public goods and seek political and not material reward for their efforts. This reinforces and dovetails neatly with Dr.Kwame Nkrumah's aphorism —he was the inimitable Ghana's first postcolonial president—that "seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added" (Marais, 1972, p.204). In many respect civil servants were optimistically envisaged to be faithful implementers of policies which will bring about accelerated and sustainable national development; and usher Ghana unto the plane of effective developmental state (Hutchful, 1995; Mkandawire, 2001). Many observers and commentators do pass a certificate of commendation to Kwame Nkrumah-led Convention Peoples Party government. But to be absolutely candid, such commendation was not only conditioned by the adopted ideological leanings, it was identifiable by Nkrumah's brand of nationalism and exquisite political leadership: uncompromising rejection of ruthless and reprehensible exploitation of majority by the minority and moral degeneration which the colonial and imperial apparatus had insidiously bequeathed to the country (Ohemeng, 2014, p.474; Botwe-Asamoa, 2005). In fact, in all his early political speeches, Dr. Nkrumah passionately argued for humanistic values and an egalitarian mode of production to formulate a new socio-economic system for post-independence Ghana. One has to understand that it is not so much capitalist economic exploitation and oppression with its antagonistic sharp class cleavages that worries him; but rather its insidious individualistic ethos which had destroyed intrinsic vital values of Africans commitment to communalistic ethos. The characteristics of such views not only provide the ideological framework and plan of action for the Africanisation of the civil service but they were also an indispensable step toward developing a new orientation, a sense of mission and urgency to enable them to eliminate all tendencies towards brazen corruption, inefficiency, ineptitude and the politics of "scratch my back I scratch your back" (Watson & Hickman, 2012) that had been allowed to fester for decades.

Regrettably, however, these positive acclamations notwithstanding, the public service ideal was vehemently challenged on many occasions for what Kwame Ninsin (1991, p. 220) described as a supposed "creeping dictatorial" tendencies of Nkrumah's CPP seen as the primary intractable obstacle—especially at the heart of quotidian everyday life and national affairs. The visionary Kwame Nkrumah's intent to rid the public service of "its ecclesiastical tradition of medieval Europe" (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005, p. 152-156) was countered as an impetuous and blatant appropriation of the civil service. Nkrumah's regime—critics argue—whether real or merely perceived indoctrinated and subjected the civil service to his CPP government as he became megalomaniac tyrant. However, my personal impression is that such assertions reek of hegemonic project of the neo-colonial conspiracy to implicitly perpetuate, monopolise and to obscure master-servant relationship in a post-independence Ghana.

Needless to say by the end of late 1970s the entire civil service (especially) its top echelons became embroiled in widespread dissatisfaction with alienation from government and public institutions (Ohemeng & Anebo, 2012; Ohemeng & Ayee, 2014)

after the CIA-backed overthrow of Nkrumah's regime. According to certain critics, the service was bedevilled with the problems of inefficient governmental machinery, a steep decline in the social and economic infrastructure, unqualified staff and a corrupt establishment. Matters came to a head when Provisional National Defence Council led by Jerry John Rawlings with it populist anti-bureaucratic nonsense came to power. It is worth emphasising that the ugly days of Jerry John Rawlings' PNDC regime gave rise to profound despair in the public service as an institution. Various factors— incidences of (terror tactics of intimidation, arbitrarily dismissals on political grounds, disruptive junior staff militancy, forced retirement, coercion, and brute force)—conspired to convulse the public service and so by the time the neoliberal assault began, the public service was in the state of comatose and severely demoralised.

In seeking answers to economic crisis in Ghana the predominant explanation to emerge among International Financial Institutions is that public service culture is ill-equipped to manage the postcolonial political economy. This marked a new tenor in the run-up to a series of measures aimed at rehabilitating and restructuring the Ghanaian state and its public service—providing the overarching disciplinary framework necessary for the successful implementation of standard "Washington Consensus" economic model. Undergirding all these is the view suggesting that the 'developmentalist' aspirations of postcolonial States are detrimental to its economic success (Mkandawire, 2001). To conclude that State intervention is deleterious to development planning is purely simplistic and—in a double sense—seriously flawed. In the first sense, such assertion ignored completely complex histories, political economies, institutions, challenges and needs of the State that emerged after independence. In the second, and at least the final sense, it implies a departure to nullify social protections which reveal a productive relationship between neoliberalism of the IMF's and World Bank's economic techniques of governing populations. Following this, public sector reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, therefore, have focused on a broader set of issues: changes in the internal structure of the public service, economic reforms that seek to purify the relationship between State and market, reconstitute the relationship between government and citizen usually in the context of shrinking the State. All this supposed a strategy to get the economy out of crisis—focusing on neopatrimonial regimes characterised by rent-seeking clientalistic chasse gardee —and until relatively recently 'transparency', 'ownership', 'public accountability' and the rest of it that underpinned 'good governance' paradigm.

The dilemmas of the market-oriented economic reforms of the type formulated in most countries in the continent in the 1980s underlines the need for a new political legitimacy for their success. As a matter of fact, encapsulated in SAPs was its own 'up-to-date', 'genuine' and 'ideal' public service. This radical public service 'ideal' however, was patently a revolt and vengeance against the paternalism of the developmental welfare state, expressly embodied in euphoric postcolonial years. It is important to underscore, however, that this point of departure is actively embedded in and drawn ideologically from the reductionism and essentialism of neoliberal political rationality. By neoliberal political rationality I mean a particular biopolitical subject of

power-knowledge as represented in the figure of *homo economicus* consistent with the neoliberal economic theory that Foucault identifies with the Chicago School. Accordingly, this rationality is concerned about the individual rights and freedoms not as exchangers in natural markets but as self-entrepreneurs in artificially constructed markets (Foucault, 2008; Mirowski, 2009). In this understanding, the accompanying ethics to the neoliberal essentialist and reductionist view of human nature effectively usurped whatever was left of public sector altruism and rationality with the logics of the market and competitive spirit (Odysseos, 2010): and essentially conditioned and mediated by setting free the entrepreneurial energies of the public sector in achieving the goal of development. Particularly glaring in the SAPs institutional apparatus of economic incentives is its meritocratic baggage and entitlements to establish a new profile of public service as a norm. Seen in this way, eliciting a construction of a rational subject makes it more susceptible to be receptive to the "regime of truth"—reproducing itself or firmly taking root on local context and reality. It is in this context that the centrality of Nkrumah's "new man" in the Ghanaian psychology was rudely disrupted and severely curtailed by SAPs *Homo consumens universalis* (Amin, 1980, p.175).

But there are interesting parallels that could be drawn between Nkrumah-CPP and Bretton Woods institutions ideal of public service. The first obvious parallel is characterised by integrity of the public service for the sake of political goals. There are nonetheless good reasons to assume safely that this ideal became merely mobilisatory technique to the institutional context within which both ideologies predominantly operated. The second parallel is that in stark contrast to the Nkrumah's "new man" who had to choose between the altruism and his natural preservation instinct, here the classical rationalist assumptions of the so-called *homo economicus*: that is, the autonomous, self-maximixing, a (radically) opportunistic individual is faced with the choice between the literal maximisation of his own benefits, while also being acutely aware of the sacrifices which were necessary for "market friendly" conditions. As Lemke (2001, p.201) aptly and colourfully points out, liberal governmentality "aspires to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain sort as opposed to other alternative acts". In this sense, both cases boil down to deep-rooted normative context within which social actors operate. In the case of Nkrumah-CPP, the politics of patronage upon which the distribution and exercise of power was based opened up possibilities for its abuse. And in the case of SAPs, it is structurally linked with existing centrally-directed; patron-client networks which actually foster corruption as the prevalent or viable modes of governance. Structural adjustment agenda in the Ghanaian situation for example, created necessary discursive preconditions for the establishment of institutionalised frameworks for the emergence, legitimation and sedimentation of the figure of an "inventive" social actor. Let me highlight two tendencies for these necessary preconditions. The first, primarily subjective, indirectly gives legitimacy and or encourages individualism against social demands that are made on social actors. The second necessary precondition is structural in the sense that it reverberates with the

sermonising discourse of the advocates of neoliberalism to detach the *dirigisme* State from its traditional roles within the framework of disciplinary and normalising forms forms of power in order to subject it to a panoptic field of visibility (Foucault, 1995, p.202–203).

7.3.2 Visibility of country

Panopticism as a political technology highlights how visibility functions as a central disciplinary technique to reproduce power relations. The mode of operation of disciplinary power was not deduction, but objectification. Foucault (1977, p.187) evinces that "in discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen ... it is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection". Foucault's concepts of biopolitics and discipline are visible in his emphasis on the panoptical mode of surveillance. Panoptical mode of surveillance allows for a greater transparency of postcolonial states which open them up to intensive forms of critical scrutiny. To Foucault, the panopticon induces a sense of "permanent visibility that ensures the automatic functioning of power" (Foucault, 1977, p.201). This phenomenon of ubiquitous pressures of surveillance and self-correction hinges on what Foucault understands as "the gaze". An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself" (Foucault, 1980, p.155). In the panopticon, the subject of power, as confirmed by Foucault, must be visible from outside and anonymous inside. Foucault argues that "he who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection" (Foucault, 1977, p.202-3). In many ways, techniques and technologies of SAP consist of supervision, examination, standardisation, hierarchical observation, homogenisation, differentiation, and uniformisation—all geared at making distant States readily visible to the Bank and the Fund to bring them in line with a predetermined set of norms. This in short, unveils and continuously perpetuates the dynamics of wider practices and technologies of discipline inherent in structural adjustment framework.

Within the disciplinary discursive practices of SAP include 'capacity building' 'transparency' and 'country ownership'. The rhetoric of 'capacity building', 'country ownership' and 'calculating metric of 'transparency' (Best, 2007, p.102), are recast in the seductive terms of development, but, the paradox is that such caricatures of humanistic acts of generosity are less in pursuit of rendering the State efficient and institutionally functional. In reality, it is powerful discursive restraining instrument concerned with the possibility of rendering the country overtly comprehensible and intelligible to Bretton Woods institutions (Harrison, 2010) to compare how well countries have managed in relation to one another. Little wonder that 'capacity-building' in the words of Mkandawire (2002, p.155) "have more the character of cloning than the production of people with hardly critical analytical skills".

The root of any SAP is embedded in the economy of numbers—that is to say, acquiring the ability to hierarchize, categorise, individualise, calibrate, quantify and classify a country in numbers. SAP is only as good as the "political arithmetic" (i.e., statistics devices) which allow for the exposure of borrowing countries' to a visibility that quantify, classify, categorise, "measure, appraise, and hierarchize" (Foucault, 1990, p. 144) as governmental rationalities for the purpose of managing the conduct of conduct. Statistics as Foucault ingeniously puts it, is "etymologically, the knowledge (*connaissance*) of the state, the knowledge of forces and resources which characterise a state at a given moment" (Foucault, 2007, p.280). Statistics in this sense serves as an apparatus of what Foucault has termed modern "technological knowledges" (p.275) that represents a reality—which in turn enables production of knowledge of the subject and as sites of intervention (Bennett et al., 2014).

A case in point is Ghana where appeals to the modernisation and transformation of 'credible' data collection techniques and treatment of statistical data have engendered calculable approaches to 'development' and rhythms of development steeped in 'scientific rationality' according to the one-best-way logic of SAP. In Ghana, as many client countries, the considerable premium placed on production and dissemination of timely, objective, reliable and 'robust' statistical data have reduced the reality of these countries to 'economic calculation' (Mitchell, 1988, p.33). To stress the importance of statistical data as a powerful tool within the regulatory web—since the introduction of SAP, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), relevant government bureaucracies, departments, municipal districts and agencies (MDAs), policy makers and planners, parliament, civil society organisations, otherwise independent experts and private sector alike—have all been energetic in its statistical activities. Thus, for have half a century or so, Ghana simply has been reduced to data producer, collector, collator and disseminator through the sophistication of its statistical measures which she voluntarily brings forth in its quantificatory frenzy allowing for the comparison and categorisation of the Ghana's performances. Interestingly, this is how statistics act as a tactic of disciplinary power, operating as panopticism. And so, it is not surprising, therefore, that the so-called World Bank statistical capacity benchmarks and performance indicators have always rated Ghana highly in their ratings.

The logic of quantitatively reducing a country to numerical 'facts' which are socially ordained (perhaps using make-believe normal distribution curves, graphs, charts etc.) is not so much that it focuses on providing the basis of an analytical framework to respond adequately to economic challenges. Rather that the aim of the ensuing intervention is techniques of 'normalisation' to produce measurable, manageable, governable and transformable state (Brivot & Gendron, 2011). Through disciplinary mechanisms perpetuated via a hierarchical mode of routine observation and normalising judgement, the Bank and the IMF standardise, ritualised and routinize (Dean, 1999, p.31) development priorities most emblematic of one-size-fits-all, nomothetic policy prescriptions of structural adjustment. This technique of 'normalisation' (Foucault, 1977, p.177) uses disciplinary technologies such as internationally-promoted 'best practices' deafly promulgated by accredited development 'experts' (Rose, 1999,

p.147), whose diagnosis and treatment are outside the domain of political debate (Foucault, 1991, p.266-267). Indeed, and as Best (2007, p. 94) expounds, 'best practices', while often presented as neutral and technical, actually involve "defining the norm in a given area—judging what is both good and normal". Thus any minefield of contentious issues or debate is technicised, uniformised, depoliticised, disembedded, and neutralised—it is distinctly within the purview of 'development experts' also firmly rooted in neoliberal governmentality, and by extension its economic rationalities (Rose, 1999, p.152). Ong (2006, p. 3) makes this point best. He argues, and I agree, that "neoliberalism can also be conceptualized as a new relationship between government and knowledge through which governing activities are recast as nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions". The significance of this in the Ghanaian context is that problematic technicalisation and depoliticisation of issues allow the Bretton Woods twins to blatantly keep their insensitivities and to ignore with impunity the herculean needs, pressing problems, specificities and peculiarity of the country into which they intervene.

I posit that nothing does this better than standards rationalised through the homogenising quality of numerical data. Statistically numbers are cold, factual, unsympathetic, impersonal, insensitive, and hostile and in fact dry—such that they do not carry any emotions whatsoever. It is worth mentioning that in this game of numbers, when predicaments of vulnerable and disadvantaged people are quantified into intimately muddled numeric values—indeed, they become business as usual and mostly tokenism—perhaps because what obtains is nothing short of just numbers — aiming to make life manageable and knowable. The preceding is not to underrate the place and relevance of statistical data in policy development. However, what is essential to remember is that in and of statistics as a mode of disciplinary power, BWIs become and remain instrumental in infiltrating everyday social, economic and political life (Ferguson, 2006, p.5) in the peripheral State of the global economy "without appearing to be intervening, interfering, or imposing" (Harrison, 2001, p.542).

The normalising 'laws' of numbers and their associated calculations, I claim, constitute the primary strategic organising principle and ethos of this liberal governmentality; 'structuring the field of action' (Foucault, 1991a), creating hierarchical gaze and fields of visibility through the establishment of a specific 'regime of truth'. Another twist to the argument is that the supposedly 'natural-scientific' method and 'positivist' approach to numbers where everything and anything can be measured and uncertainty apparently eliminated is hardly simply a reflection of complex, nuanced and intricate African economic and political realities—the rigid, romantic and obsessive investment with parochial calculative practices as an indicator and regulator of economic performance, completely obfuscates, mystifies and often belies short-term efficiency for long-term effects by its apologists. The prevalence of data for the purpose of surveillance and as disciplinary mechanism have tended to uncritically underrate or indeed conveniently fail to recognise other forces at play—as it dubiously assumes that only what counts can be counted. But, and perhaps more importantly is the fact that countless are the situations where not all that can be counted counts.

The problem at bottom is that rigid statistical quantification and measuring are decidedly given far more credence through a narrow fixation on the purportedly all-powerful quest for sustainable development and poverty eradication. The drive for "calculating and statistical measuring" (Lemke, 2011a, p.38-39), far from being a discrete, monolithic and coherent whole, as is often thought —well there is, I like to think, the likelihood that the 'wrong' things could be measured. Worse, if, rightly or wrongly, 'wrong' things could be measured, then it stands to reason that such errors points to the urgent need to increasingly question an overly simplistic reduction of complex, nuanced and intricate realities of life to a matter of mathematical and voodoo statistical measurements—where data is narrowly subjected to the misguided determinism of universally acclaimed norms, global standards of conduct and objective rules. It seems to me that the one-sided, one-dimensional and the calculating performativity of statistical data (Porter, 1995), give false impression about the brute fact of existential conditions, and of course, the contingent nature of economic and political realities of Africa where the minutiae of everyday life articulation of reality is in intimate conversations with ever yawning fissures. Foucault is pellucid on this point— "reality always escapes the theories that inform programs and the ambitions that underpin them" (1991, p.11).

Strictly speaking whatever the merits of the obsession for politics of calculation (Elden, 2007), the crucial matter is that should sustainable development or poverty eradication fail to materialise, then the BWIs could conveniently issue a "disclaimer" (Collins, 2011, p.3)—relieving them of their biopolitical responsibility—by spuriously assigning blame to the inability of the 'inferior others'—the structurally 'maladjusted', the highly indebted, aid dependant state—(Tan, 2011) targeted by development initiatives (IMF-World Bank initiated structural adjustment programmes, etc.) to unshackle itself from constrictive practices such as 'bad governance' that impair, jeopardise and self-perpetuate the debilitating structures of underdevelopment. On this reasoning, those pathologised as 'inferior' and an undesirable 'other' simply ought to embrace the sterile rhetoric of 'good governance' as the best alternative to social change as having been perfected in the prescriptive West. Only by so doing can the 'inferior others', per the distorted lenses and prejudices of apostles of neoliberalism—would be quantitatively, not qualitatively forward looking—and that all hand must be on deck to aggressively defend and disseminate this façade of development blueprints around the globe—inextricably bound tightly to ostensible biopolitical concern not to 'contaminate' the rest—pure and simple.

Michel Foucault explores the contemporary configurations of power manifested in the preoccupation of authorities, such as the bureaucratic apparatuses of State to count its resources through the lens of biopolitical techniques of power. These resources are defined purely in relation to its human potential all the way to the natural and material potential of a given territory to optimise and facilitate the productivity of the population (Dillon & Reid, 2000; Dillon & Reid, 2001). The strategic objectives and the founding principle of this biopolitical management of the population hinge upon the simplistic reduction of a territory to numbers—put otherwise, to statistically rig-

orous calculative practices "which make life amenable to particular ways of governing, of "systems of belief and cultural propensities or what one might want to call 'ways of life' (Foucault, 2007; Grayson, 2008, p.384). And these mechanisms, these modes of governance, these 'new techniques' constitute one of the most efficient and intrusive ways of social control—the most pernicious and pervasive means "around which the organisation of power over life was deployed" (Foucault, 1991, p.261-262). The biopolitical normalisation and apparatus to a large extent, tend to reflect a way of making social 'reality' it suggests ostensibly exist more visible in a certain manner that allow the comparison with others' performance or behaviour with a specific 'norm' to 'standardise' policy making processes (Brivot & Gendron, 2011) that are conducive to a larger neoliberal project. And —this is the interesting point however—that the realisation of this 'reality' no less provides the impetus for client countries to be objectified, defined, named, categorised, individualised, classified and seen in accordance with the normalising standard (Duncan, 2007, p.2) of those who fall short of excellence in this regard (Brivot & Gendron, 2011; Neu & Graham, 2006). It is on the basis of such general categorisation, classification and objectification which, provides the enabling moment for IMF and the World Bank to 'progressively' and deliberately institutionalise their unrelenting one-way traffic intervention (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992; Miller & Rose, 2008).

The use of statistics regarding techniques of surveillance as part of BWIs working practices is "effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory control—bio-politics of the population" (Foucault, 1991, p.262-63). The inherent biopolitical nature of statistics in the global liberal governance can be appreciated when one considers the IMF increasing reliance for example on gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation. This example is certainly not an objective, neutral or value free exercise that reveals the weakness or vigour of the Ghanaian economy. It is inherently political—it aims at structuring fields of visibility—which constitutes a vital part of the many forms through which biopolitical power is exercised over Ghana. In short: where Ghana is to be located on the artificial hierarchy of countries, what kind of advice, recommendations and recipes it needs—and in fact, how it can be defined as a terrain for ceaseless intervention. A Foucauldian approach suggests how biopolitical strategic discourses and practices, have been engendered by the the creation of imposition of a marginalised status on those deemed pathological (the degenerate, undesirable or the abnormal)—which captures the individual "within a form of visibility, a gaze, rendering the individuals actions and thoughts knowable" (Townley, 1998, p.203)—it is normalising gaze *par excellence* (Foucault, 1977, p.183). Tan writes, 'conformity with the status quo is assured by excluding those states which fail to play by the rules, not through force but through the evaluation of their willingness to be subjected to "universally" recognised policy objective' (Tan, 2011, p.1042). Thus biopolitical strategic discourses that are exercised in the regulation of States are undoubtedly implicated within problematic operations of power as governmentality.

It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the process of producing maximum visibility of the country is a basic staple of these institutions where the tendency has

been—and remains—actively indifferent to the important structural dimensions of poverty and blithely ignoring historical elements, the political context and such international dimensions as debt and commodity prices. In spite of the ever-heaping pile of debts Ghana owed to the international financial institutions—in fact, precisely because of it—the Bank and the IMF, consciously and unconsciously was interested less in knowing why for example, the country was unable to honour its suffocating debt overhung. My argument, therefore, is that the numerical data and statistics of these institutions have wholly neglected the unfriendliness of the international economic order in their so-called complex measurements and computational models. And of course, the reason why this is the case has less to do with any explicit or implicit ideological construct located at the imperial metropoles—but rather has everything to do with their assertively bureaucratic procedures which bear directly on rationalisation of standards, classifications, categorisations and dishing out policy straightjackets which peripheral sites like the African continent are fated to imitate.

The world in the neoliberal biopolitical narrative seems in fact to be a simple place in which, strangely enough, not social action is important, but rather the ability to adhere to the logic of norms, standards and 'universal' values in return for receiving aid (Tan, 2011). However, it is my view that such "simplistic psychologism ... takes insufficient account of the social and political dynamics of change and lacks an adequate conception of the relationships between ideas and actions, between culture and social structure" (Hartmann et al., 1989, p.23). Implicit within heightened visibility is the claim that it nurtures and sustains the disciplinary and normalising discourse associated with structural adjustment devised by BWIs whence they can safely shape and guide a preferred way of being.

7.3.3 Towards the analysis of knowledge rationalisation

By conscripting governable social actors and capturing the domestic (political) space; it creates an immanent and unavoidable discursive boundary where it becomes possible for SAP to act directly on aid-receipient governments and states. This is crucially important because for Foucault space is crucial in any exercise of power. Indeed, as Rose puts it captivatingly, 'to govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised" (Rose, 1999, p.36). By remodelling the "public" sphere of 'politics' (Picciotto, 2000, p.161-163) 'aid-recipient' States can be moulded and shaped according to its strategic, transcendental Cartesian mode of thought and functionalist interest (Amin, 1980;2006; 2010; Ferguson, 1990; 1999; 2006). From this vantage point, aid-recipient States are made knowable—manageable and hence governable (Collier, 2009, p.96; Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1996; Lemke 2001) to the World Bank and the IMF. The rationalisation and operationalisation of knowledge inside these institutions are made manifest in this rendering, through the exceedingly complex institutional ideological networks that operate in a way that conceals the exercise of power. Experts of all sorts, specialised cadre of consultants, an armada of expatriate policy advisors, special desks, Bank's external affairs department, seminars, flood of reports, workshops, pamphlets, manuals, etc. (Gutto, 2006; Mkandawire &

Soludo, 1999) are conceptualised, sustained and further reified through dominant discourse on development. The result is that dossiers, state of or trends on Ghana emerge, collected, assembled, harnessed and circulated, giving reality to the numbers which the Ghana Statistical Service, the Centre for Investment Promotion, the Centre for the Promotion of Exports, National Development Planning Commission etc. feverishly bring forth in their quantificatory drive.

Since the neoliberal assault, the World Bank and the IMF have tended, quite uncritically to establish themselves as the most important and reliable source of 'expert' knowledge in Africa's development regimes.With that James Wolfensohn, the then president of the World Bank was able to muster the chutzpah to egregiously and superciliously claim that the Bank commands enormous influence over "knowledge" (World Bank, 1996). What is even more striking is that the BWIs over the years have sought to reach countries who are made to forfeit their identity—rather like 'Zombies' (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999) to have little access to its alleged knowledge 'expertise'. Their press desks produce and reproduce knowledge about the social, political and economic life of the client countries; and their experts preponderantly assert themselves as the gate-keepers of knowledge production in the Ghanaian economy (World Bank, 2004f). The World Bank devotes a significant amount of intellectual energy to knowledge exercise which focuses on: publishing information (literally thousands of documents, such as project documents, country and regional surveys, analytical and advisory work, evaluations, formal and informal research papers, and pushing annual reports and books. In fact the Bank devotes so much effort, funds and personnel to think tank activities through the Global Development Network (GDN). The GDN is explicitly intended to be an important vehicle to potentially operationalise and strengthen this new discourse of knowledge and consequently create the global 'public good' of quantity and quality policy relevant research (Squire, 2001). The myopic assumption is that 'the generation of local knowledge which when shared with local policy makers will ultimately lead to the solution of local problems' (Stone, 2003). As already noted the GDN is an intervention to facilitate both the increased and improved supply of a global public good; development research about 'best practice' (Stiglitz, 2000; Squire, 2000).

The Bank's tedious, regimented and habitual recourse to routine review relies on the regular performance examination (assessment) based on benchmarks indictors set out in the Economic and Sector Work assessments reports (World Bank, 2005d, p.30). Performance assessment reports as technologies of government allow the deployment of a "regime of truth" concerning appropriate policy-making and implementation, a strategy which reinforces normalising power of discipline for which Ghana provides an excellent illustration. This notion of performance assessment consist of a knowledge that is "no longer about determining whether or not something had occurred; rather it was about whether an individual was behaving as he should, in accordance with the rule or not, and whether he was progressing or not" (Foucault, 1994b, p.59). In the view of Miller and Rose, 'technologies of government' seek to translate thought into the domain of reality, and to establish 'in the world of persons

and things' spaces and devices for acting upon those entities of which they dream and scheme" (1990, p.8). In Ghana, the Bank's Economic and Sector Work (ESW) assessments surveillance activities cover wide range of highly specialised areas of which the guiding principles are economic. Various examples of these include Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA), Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) or a Development Policy Review (DPR), Public Expenditure Review (PER), Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA), and a Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR); which also includes issues such as Investment Climate Assessments (ICAs), Corporate Governance Assessments (ROSCs), Education Sector Reviews, Financial Sector Assessments (FSAs), Health sector Reviews, Energy-Environment Assessments, Risk and Vulnerability Assessments, Rural Development Assessments, and Institutional and Governance Reviews (IGRs) (World Bank, 2006); which are undertaken to reshape and regulate government in order to subordinate all its activities to macroeconomic discipline (World Bank, 2005e, para 6). My understanding is that the techniques of economic and financial information-gathering—'follow-up' through an all-pervading monitoring, routine forms of rigorous reviews, gathering up-to-date reports, thorough appraisal of successful development policies, and normative assessments of compliance on Ghana fulfil the goal of making Ghana 'real' to these institutions: an ideal representations of panoptic schema of the prison.

The practices and tactics of external inspection of the Bank instrumentalise and institutionalise governance from a distance and subjects states and governments to 'metropolitan monitoring, intervention and regulation' (Duffield, 2002, p.1066)—thereby reducing the need for overt forms of disciplinary practices. In Foucauldian understanding, the objective of liberal governmentality is 'its own self-limitation insofar as it is pegged to the specificity of economic processes' (Foucault, 2008, p.297). Processes which I maintain in turn are mutually constitutive of reality as it concomitantly allows the BWIs to impose their frozen representations and dominant discourses of Ghana as the internationally recognised norms of behaviour and 'regimes of truth' that must be hailed, and repeatedly drawn upon. What needs to be recognised is that the cannons of knowledge production held by the Bank and the Fund have triumphantly become invincible, universalistic and uncompromisingly singular discourse —a 'regimes of truth', that is—the only exceptionally best guides, and certifiers of authoritative source of attaining information on the true 'reality' of the country. But, in point of fact, the BWIs claim that they produce research that is 'rigorous', self-evident and objective (Broad, 2006, p.398) and therefore have the forensic credibility and epistemologically-secure truth status in providing technocratic solutions to African development challenges, in my view —tend to be enveloped in the decadent and myopia of Eurocentricism— in so far as it is so deeply entrenched in fundamentalist, teleological certitudes and dogmatism.

These institutions have been particularly adept at using certain forms of knowledge to foster and install networks and programmes that organise visibilities for external corrective intervention: so much so that, it makes the exercise of discursive or ideational form of power possible and calculable (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.62). This has

become an effective tool which perpetuates and sustains hidden agendas, vested interests, or the habitus of one-best-way logic of development. To put the matter somewhat bluntly: the Bank's claim as the technocrats with credentials, credibility and arrogating to itself eternal superiority to craft workable solutions to Africa's development problems is nothing short of epistemological pretensions, linear, totalising and unidimensional narratives. And by extension—it fatally marginalises and excludes I believe—the articulation of countervailing epistemic and epistemological knowledge within a supposedly inclusive mainstream development setting. An exploration of the notion of "counter conduct" approach to resistance which seeks to destabilise and even reinforce the discursive rationalities, strategies, practices and technologies of power, and it is to this that the next section of this thesis now turn to.

7.4 Resistance to neoliberal governmentality: Terra Incognita?

Despite the valuable insights Foucault's nuanced conceptualisation of governmentality offers; critics charge it lacks any real possibility of resistance to 'great economy of power' (McKee, 2009). As critics would have it, resistance to the strategies and technologies of neoliberalism and by extension the mode of its governmentality, which emerge as critique of previous rationalities, have barely been linked to a 'critical politics' (O'Malley et al.,1997) and that, if anything governmentality is crippling, totalising and colonising offering no space for agency (Amin & Thrift, 2002, p.128-108). This claim is refutable if we take into account widespread resistance to neoliberal governmentality in the form of 'counter conduct' by those who refuse to be governed 'thusly, like that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them (Foucault, 2007b, p. 75; Foucault, 2004, p. 66-79).

> In the face of and as counterparty, or rather, as both partner and adversary to the arts of governing, as an act of defiance, as a challenge, as a way of limiting these arts of governing and sizing them up, transforming them, of finding a way to escape from them or, in any case, a way to displace them, as an essential reticence, but also and by the same token as a line of development of the arts of governing, there would have been something born in Europe at that time, a kind of general cultural form, both a political and a moral attitude, a way of thinking, etc., and which I would very simply call the art of not being governed, or better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost. I would therefore propose, as a very first definition of critique, this general characterization: the art of not being governed quite so much. (Foucault, 2002, p.37)

the central defining feature of this art is a refusal by borrowing member states to comply with the doctrine of conditionality and who consequently conduct themselves in ways that, subvert, or even challenge, while at the same time unwittingly acknowl-

edging its domineering power (Davidson, 2011; Death, 2010). Meanwhile, critically oriented International Relations (IR) scholarship that has drawn on Foucault has lamentably failed to acknowledge or broadly neglected sites of contestation to the practices and technologies of neoliberal governmentality, inadvertently making neoliberal governmentality appear as though it is a 'noncontestable' reality (Lemke, 2001; Miller & Rose, 2008). This lacuna in the scholarship is all the more surprising given that Foucault emphasises how, "the analysis of types of governmentality is inseparable from analysis of corresponding forms of "counter-conducts" (Foucault, 2007, p.389).

In 1 March 1978, Foucault gave a lecture at the *College de France* in which he continues to analyse resistance, not merely theorised and conceptualised as 'where there is power, there is resistance,' but as an equally specific set of technologies and techniques leading to movements that seek 'to escape direction by others and to define the way for each to conduct himself' (1978, p.195) which he calls "counter-conduct" (i.e., "in the sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others") (Foucault, 2007, p. 201). Resistance, Foucault maintains is intimately correlated to the functioning of governmentality. Focussing in particular on the neoliberal technologies of governing used to conduct aid-recipient governments towards economic reform, what I want to clarify here is that relations between donors and aid-recipient governments are far from a one-sided relationship between a mere passive and suppressed African object and an all-powerful supra state institutions subject (Collins, 2011). Moreover, contrary dominant narratives, aid recipient governments (in various ways) have challenged or opposed (passively as well as actively) policy practices or reforms they agreed to carry out (Ibid). Three things from Foucault's reading of "counter-conducts" need to be singled out here: firstly, it enhances our understanding of the complex relationship between practices of governance and resistance; secondly and correlatively, it provides us with insights to grasp the relationship between oppression and agency; lastly, and this is the crucial point, it provides us with the tools to explore and elucidate previously marginalised subjectivities being generated by "counter-conducts". This observation helps to produce—at least conceptually—a counterbalance discourse to challenge the scholarship within the field of IR taking for granted that within the context of neoliberal reforms, disciplinary practices of lending conditionalities associated with structural adjustment programmes, are inevitable, unavoidable and irreversible—given the impression that any resistance is inherently futile (Bishop, 2014). In light of this insight, I will reflect upon Foucault's notion of "counter-conducts", as illustrative of resistance to regimes of governmentality through 'non-compliance' by the PNDC government, a government hailed as one of the icons of success of the World Bank and the IMF's adjustment policies, which can both undermine and simultaneously reinforce domineering power (Death, 2010).

7.5 Governing principles of BWIs: the logic of policy conditionality

In the 1980s, majority of countries in sub Saharan Africa (SSA) turned to the Bank and Fund and other international financial institutions (IFIs) for loans to reverse economic distress. Typically, these loan arrangements have come with intrusive policy reforms (conditionality) as part of an overarching structural adjustment programme (Kentikelenis et al., 2016) to reshape and regulate the behaviour of client countries. Arguably more importantly, the Bank and Fund support for balance of payment disequilibrium are operationalised through a number of techniques and disciplines, not least explicit commitments on the part of member countries to implement intensive and painful economic reforms and adjustment that the Bank and Fund deem as a necessary policy for ameliorating the borrowing country's external debt problems. In principle, Bank and Fund-mandated policy reforms—so-called conditionality—is a practice by which "actions, or promises to make policy changes—by recipient governments only at the insistence of aid providers—measures that would not otherwise be undertaken, or not within the time frame desired by the providers" (Allegret, 2007; Killick, 1998, p. 6). For instance, according to this approach, Bank/Fund-designed reforms generally demand more privatisation, trade and financial liberalisation, and the marketisation of social policies (Kentikelenis et al., 2016). In doing so, the Bank and Fund impose severe fiscal and restrictive monetary measures on the Ghanaian society. Neoliberal conditionality packages typically entail structural adjustments—namely, reductions of government spending; removing barriers to international trade; removing tariffs, quotas and other restrictions on the import and export of goods; general deregulation of the economy; market liberalisation; privatisation; and devaluation of the exchange rate to encourage exports and reduce imports (Heywood, 2011, p.371; Williamson, 1993). Taken collectively, these policy reforms embedded in a nest of conditionalities have become known as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). The logic of Bank and Fund conditionality is to monitor behaviour and provide incentives for compliance with the policies that are part of its programmes. From this point of view, I suggest that the logic of conditionality represents the ideal typification of an intrusive form of disciplinary framework in the transformation of the nation states 'complex of men and things' (Foucault, 1991).

7.5.1 The PNDC's counter-conduct

The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) under Flight-Lieutenant Jeremiah John Rawlings counter-conduct follows the pattern of revolts of conduct Foucault describes in *Security, Territory, Population* lecture series. Neoliberal restructuring under Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) and the Structural Adjustment Programme from 1983-2000 reveals that Ghana, a show-case of adjustment, achieved a remarkable degree of compliance with Fund conditions (Akunnor, 2006). The IMF's Corbo and Fisher (1995, p.25) for instance, believes that "Ghana ... has been the most successful of the African adjusters" —and that Ghana was a "good client" who did not resort to criticising the Fund or Bank when reforms run into difficulties" (Mosley

et al., 1991, p. 184). However, I will adopt Foucault's "counter-conduct" approach to show instances of resistance to neoliberal governance through 'non-compliance' with several key IMF policy conditionalities, relating to monetary and fiscal outruns (Akunnor, 2006).

Under considerable pressure from the Bank and the Fund, the PNDC in January 1986, announced a 50 per cent devaluation of the Cedi (C), to a new rate of 1.00 U.S. dollars= 90 Cedis, as part of its to avoid the overvalued effects of a currency on economic performance. In addition, there was to be a 28.6 per cent increase in the daily minimum wage from 70 Cedis to 90 Cedis, together with strategic reduction of marginal income tax rates to cushion workers from the excruciating effects of devaluation. Because of the associated costs, the government was set to face stiff opposition from thousands of workers in protest at the devaluation of the national currency in what they felt to be gravely irreconcilable with the hike in the minimum wage. As faithful as the PNDC apparatchiks was to structural adjustment, its response to the growing labour unrest was to brazenly destroy the existing IMF conditionalities by granting wage and benefit increases to workers, to assuage the disturbing and biting effects of the devaluation of the cedi. For example, wages and salaries bill was increased from C 14 billion in 1985 to C 30 billion, well above the IMF target. The granting of wage and benefit increases to workers can be exemplified as a form of "counter-conduct" to neoliberal governmentality through non-compliance in the sense that by refusing to be governed 'thusly, like that, by these people, at this price' (Foucault, 2007, p.75), the PNDC leadership succeeded in undermining the IMF/Bank backed devaluation reforms. Yet, paradoxically while the counter-conduct of the PNDC leadership succeeded in challenging the legitimacy of IMF/Bank backed devaluation reforms, it simultaneously fed back into domineering power of IMF when the PNDC leadership later cunningly sought to attribute the significant increase in wages and salaries on arithmetical anomalies. This resulted in a promise to meet certain key policy conditions that deal with budgetary discipline, standby credit arrangement of 81.8 million SDRs over a 12-month period. This was accompanied by a major reduction a 25 per cent pay cut on civil servants in June 1986 and cancelation of most allowances to civil servants during the last quarter of 1986 (Financial Times, 1986, p.20). By being forced to work within the parameters set by the Fund, resistance that aims to subvert, prevent or challenge neoliberal governmentality through non-compliance continues to effectively reinforce the status quo (Death, 2010).

The year 1992 (the election year) marked the third phase of the Bank/Fund supported adjustment programme. The year also saw Ghana's re-engagement with political pluralism and constitutional arrangements crystallizing in popular opinion for presidential and parliamentary polls in November and December respectively. 1992 brought in its wake immense political cost for Jerry Rawlings and the PNDC (Akunnor, 2006). In 1992 a combined union of doctors, nurses, workers of the Cocoa Board, railway employees and civil servants embarked on serious strike action. These spate of strikes by every account, sought to undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Ideally, then, with the presidential and parliamentary elections due in November and

December respectively, the government retreated from its radical posture to placate the suffering and the precarious position of labour and rural population. To be sure, in 1992, the Rawlings regime introduced income rationalisation policies to check the unprecedented disparities between the civil service and the rest of the public sector. The restructurings aim to compensate for and mitigate the potential effects of standard IMF-adjustment conditionalities. The civil service share of the state's recurrent expenditure increased to about 80 per cent of the nominal payroll, effective as of July 1, 1992, whereas households were correspondingly granted large transfer payments as part of general salary increase. A similar picture emerges for recurrent expenditure where accumulated retirement and end of service benefits that had been reversed since 1990 were pay out (Leite et al., 2000, p.36). The domestic banking also resorted to increasing borrowing by as much as 30 per cent compared to a 22 per cent decrease estimated by the Fund (Leite et al., 2000, p.30). Within this period, central government expenditure in rural development projects grew exponentially. Green (1995) for instance, reckons that among the reasons why the Rawlings government launched a National Electrification Scheme in 1992 was ensconced in shoring up its electoral fortunes even though the project has been on the drawing board since 1989. Green's study captures how 100 towns and villages were added to the national grid, and the way rural patronage benefited from the shifts in policy towards water supply, feeder roads and school construction (Akunnor, 2006; Green, 1995, p.578–580). The combined effect of these developments was significant increase in money supply of 51 per cent, more than the IMF target increase of 12 per cent (Ghana's Budget, 1993, p.2, cited in Akunnor, 2006). As a result of the PNDC's regime expansionary fiscal policies, the budgetary balance cumulatively switched from 1.8 per cent as a percentage of gross national products (GDP) to a fiscal deficit of 177 billion cedis (4.9 per cent as a percentage of GDP) (Akonor, 2006). In other words, Ghana's cumulative balance of payments simply recorded a massive fiscal deficit of $124 million in 1992, less than the IMF projected surplus of around $140 million (Ibid). Viewed through a Foucauldian lens, this form of counter-conduct entailed President Jerry Rawlings and his team activating "technologies of the self" (Foucault, 2003,p.145) through 'expansionary fiscal policies' in order to challenge the forms of subjection and resist what they perceived to be standard IMF-adjustment conditionalities a discriminatory discourse behind this neoliberal governmentality which was in marked contrast to the IMF conditionalities in eliciting labour and rural support in particular and the general population respectively

Notwithstanding all the pledges to maintain fiscal discipline, the government continued to maintain an expansionary fiscal stance which blatantly violates IMF conditionality. A close examination of the government expenditures in 1996 indicates a large fiscal overruns of about 78 billion cedis (Ghana's Budget, 1997, p.5, cited in Akunnor, 2006) even though IMF conditionality requires that government capital outlays should not exceed 3.9 per cent of GDP (with road construction programmes taking the biggest cuts) (Financial Times, July 9, 1996, p.5). However, the bulk of the increase in government capital spending was skewed towards rural infrastruc-

ture investment. Government unbudgeted capital spending in 1996 on rural roads for example increased astronomically to 0.5 per cent as a percentage of GDP which contrast sharply with the Fund's requirement (Leite et al., 2000, p.39). Despite the Fund's objections, the total budgeted expenditure in 1996 saw a dramatic increase by 20 per cent. At the same time, capital spending in all major categories exceeded their projected amounts (Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 1996, p. 23 cited in Akunnor, 2006). The PNDC's delay in petroleum tax collections led to lower government revenue which was against the core assumptions of IMF conditionality. A system set up, in June 1996, to a strict implementation of the automatic adjustment price formula for petroleum products for variations in the price of imported oil. It required government to remove all subsidies on petroleum products. The system was suspended, when it became evident that it effect will disproportionately impact on the poor and disadvantaged (Leite et al., 2000, p.39) thereby causing a drop in petroleum excise duties by 17.2 billion cedis less than the recommended target of 300 billion cedis by IMF in September 1996 (Ghana's Budget, 1997, p.4, cited in Akunnor, 2006). Due to these excessive fiscal and monetary policies, the government's domestic primary surplus sharply declined from 1.5 per cent as a percentage of GDP in 1995 to 0.3 per cent in 1996, leaving the government with no other obvious option than to reduce its indebtedness through borrowing. The recourse to borrowing to finance indebtedness led money supply to increase by 38 per cent, which crossed the critical 5 per cent threshold of IMF by the final quarter of 1996, an 33 per cent increase. The non-compliance can be understood as a form of counter-conduct to strategies and technologies of governmentality because they asked, "not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles... and by means of such procedures" (Foucault, 2007, p.44). However, while President Rawlings non-compliance largely represents another clear example of resistance to neoliberal governmentality as by appealing to donors that fiscal excesses that had characterised election years would not happen again, it provokes the reinvigoration of oppressive power of neoliberal governance they originally sought to undermine. For instance, President Rawlings speaking before the parliament on January 18, 1996, had this to say: "Some observers . . . have assumed that since this is an election year, the government will relax control of economic management in order to pander to sectional interests. Let me assure . . . we have no intention to subordinate the nation's economic interests to political expediency. . . . We shall pursue our policies and programs with increased vigor and follow up our promotion of private investment." What is more, Kwame Peprah, Ghana's finance minister when presenting the 1996 budget, also states that, "we do not intend to play election year politics with the economy . . . we have to take responsible actions and that in spite of electoral year risks, our responsibility to the longer term interests of our people must remain supreme" (Ghana's Budget, 1996, p.1-42, cited in Akunnor).

Despite the verbal commitments to tighten fiscal policy, the government, again, succumbed to electoral pressures and engaged in the fiscal irresponsibility reminiscent of 1992 and 1996 by boosting expenditure spending in the second half of 2000 and veering the IMF programme "sharply off track" (IMF, 2001, p.9). When presenting

the 2000 budget to parliament, Kwame Peprah, the finance minister, emphatically states: "we must resist the temptation to play political football with the economy in an election year. Populist demands, populist rhetoric, blackmail threats, wild cat strike all combined to wreak havoc on the progress of our economic forward march during the two previous elections in 1992 and 1996" (Ghana's Budget, 2000, p.83 cited in Akunnor). However, the government wage bill ceilings exceeded IMF targets. In particular, the government granted a 20 per cent across-the-board civil service salary increase, as well as further 20 per cent increase in the salary of Polytechnic teachers. The persistently high salary increases contributed to a significant increase in a fiscal deficit of 6.9 per cent of GDP, against the IMF target of 4.2 per cent (IMF, 2001, p.9) .The ceiling on net domestic financing of the government was also missed by a wide margin. Reserve money growth jumped from 18 per cent to 36 per cent by the end of June 2000 due to unrestrained expenditure. None of the fiscal and monetary targets set by the IMF were met by December 2000 (ibid). The PNDC act of not consenting to the terms of conditional lending set by the IMF was a clear form of counter-conduct, as it involved the regime resisting and explicitly refusing to comply with the regimented routines and the disciplinary force of neoliberal governance. A pertinent question arises, therefore, as to whether the PNDC was a Foucauldian strategist or a neolocolonialist stooge.

7.6 Conclusion

It is largely thanks to quantification, comparisons, categorisation with its rigid discursive forms of disciplinary surveillance (Brivot & Gendron, 2011) via statistical reports that the Ghanaian State is increasingly enmeshed within the panoptical gaze and grip. By instilling 'programmes of conduct' viewed as 'the attempts to regulate, reform, organize and improve what occurs within regimes of practices' (Dean, 1999, p. 43), the government of Ghana has been objectified by stringently enforcing practices of self-control, self-responsibility, self-assessment, self-improvement, while simultaneously allowing greater scrutiny by the BWIs—much like 'inmates of a panopticon' (Foucault, 1977, p.88). When viewed through a neoliberal lens, the BWIs tactics of governance constitute an individualising, an array of disciplinary technologies to render aid receiving subjects visible—and furthermore measureable (and so governable) and in the process the sort of unmitigated and grim description of normalising society or disciplinary supervision of societies of Michel Foucault is fully actualised with its purported sophistication. Thanks largely to the link between power and the gaze of "surveillance" identifiable in Foucault's analysis of the panopticon—and thanks to techniques of observation and supervision or pervasive monitoring carried out by personnel and consultants during Bank's missions and consultancies—the aid recipients are enjoined to constantly monitor their own performance so as not to depart from a pre-determined global norms or practices espoused by the BWIs.

By deploying the concept of "counter-conducts" in the case of Ghana, I have provided evidence that even those who lastingly live on the margins of society uncritically depicted as 'powerless' subjects are capable of creating a space for certain subjectivities to emerge, and the ways in which they conduct themselves to counter the patterns of behaviour promoted by neoliberal forms of governance through 'non-compliance'. Governmentality, that so engaged Foucault, is represented most clearly by what subjects fundamentally do to themselves as what is done to them. Or, as Peters (2011, p.1) has incisively put it "government in this sense only becomes possible at the point at which policing and administration stops; at the point where government and self-government coincide and coalesce".

CHAPTER EIGHT

Reflections and Concluding Thoughts: Revisiting the Main Issues

8.1 Introduction

I started my PhD process by constructing an analytical framework which drew selectively on Michel Foucault's neoliberal version of governmentality as a diagnostic device from which to diagnose the particular configuration of regime of power relations that feed into or underpin the practices, norms, rationalities, technologies and techniques of contemporary mode of governance; in particular looking to examine it in the context of Ghana and the Bretton Woods institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The thesis has been concerned with providing an important space for alternative interpretation to the more conventionalist modes of analysis in conceiving and understanding neoliberal structural adjustment apparatus within the context of Ghana. This has involved explicating and exploring the "fine meshes of power" inscribed within the neoliberal adjustment regime which works through apparent autonomy of "free" subjects, and yet how this "freedom" is also the very condition of (im) possibility for the production of subjectivities and their self-regulation. My task in this concluding chapter is the following. First, I provide a summary of the thesis, outlining the main findings of each analytical chapter. Second, I briefly discuss the contributions made by this thesis to scholarship and finally, I then provide my final thoughts which sums up the broad outlines of this thesis.

8.2 Summary and key findings of the research of this thesis

8.2.1 Chapter Summaries

Chapter 1 was devoted to describing the deepening economic and governance crisis that engulfed the postcolonial Africa states over the last two decades. This provided a historical context for understanding the socio-economic-political realities and vicissitudes which precipitated structural adjustment experience in Africa in general and Ghana in particular. By so doing, I acknowledged the significance of historical provenance and set the contextual framing and basis for the subsequent analysis. In Chapter 2 critical examination was given to Foucault's conceptual nuances of an analytics of relations between power-knowledge regimes and discourses, and the method of problematising and perspectivising subjectivities in the latter. I indicated

that subjectivities are constructed by discourses, because discourses are infused with power-productivity. This section thus allowed me to highlight that at its core, power-as-productive representation stresses the importance of knowledge in (re)producing a specific kind of subjectivity insofar as it affirms individuals' power of generating their own discourses and practices to resist external or so-called perennially dominant and authoritative discourses and practices within which development policies are foregrounded, formed and realised. It was seen that the construction and rationalisation of policy discourses take place in a discursive space where power and knowledge are located, repetitively articulated, circulated and maintained (Foucault, 1984). This study also found that subject-object formations of postcolonial African states (including Ghana) as they pertain to policy discourses are contingent on western models of power and knowledge which are part and parcel of our taken-for-natural beliefs and assumptions. Foucault's explanation of the way in which power-knowledge grid dynamically and reciprocally interact to construct dominant regimes and rationales of 'truth' give us a basis to analyse different ways in which the postcolonial African states have been discursively constructed and represented in policy documents. These discursive constructions and representations signal a need to reflect upon and challenge the ontological and epistemological truth claims of development policies as part and parcel of legitimate technologies of governing life.

Chapter 3 was a critical review of the political economic philosophy of Frederick von Hayek and Milton Friedman, typical stooges in the "neoliberal thought collective" (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009) in an attempt to comprehend and adequately map out the intellectual pedigree of neoliberalism. A careful re-reading of the text revealed that the intellectual duo of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, conveniently equated with the Mont Pèlerin Society (established in 1947), without exception appear to be the main intellectual impetus of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Plehwe & Walpen, 2005). By analysing political and economic theories proposed by the two classic icons of neoliberalism I have sought to foreground and further derive a more nuanced understanding of neoliberalism that better capture the spirit of its peculiar nature. In other words, the foray into the systematic overview of neoliberalism's historical and intellectual origins was to arrive at a more satisfactory account through which its polyvalent applicability can be simplified and rendered understandable. To be certain, Hayek and Friedman's interpretation of neoliberalism is deeply ingrained in a particular concept of more pro-market and anti-government view of the world as the best way to guarantee the maximum individual freedom, economic efficiency and economic well-being. Taking a closer and a more a critical look at the political economy of Hayek and Friedman, it becomes ever more clear that what unites them is that they appear to invoke similar sense of neoliberal utopia fantasies of free market dreamland. My claim is that Hayek and Friedman's utopian vistas have for all intents and purposes been most enduring and influential in reshaping and popularising our contemporary neoliberalism. That said, to single out Hayek and Friedman as intellectual godfathers of neoliberalism, to be sure, would be a malicious oversimplification and a historical overstatement after all, the intellectual heritage of neoliberal-

ism have many roots and many branches of which the neoliberal-ness of their views are just two possible representatives (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Plehwe et al., 2006).

In the first part of Chapter 4, I clarified how Foucault's idea of governmentality offer a productive interrogative horizon to an understanding of broader range of mechanisms and technologies more concretely rearticulated to historically altering complex governmental rationalities and strategies. My central preoccupation with governmentalities— or, more accurately, the of arts of government, was to show just how Foucault's analysis of manifestations of power relations working through the idea of a rational, calculating and autonomous conduct of "free" individuals, and the processes of subjectification this involves rather than techniques of domination. Drawing on the well-known lecture of 1978-79 at the *Collège de France*, published under the title *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008), the second part of the chapter represented critical engagements with Foucault's spectacular analysis of classical liberalism and neoliberalism as forms of a governmental rationality to provide a solution to the utter conceptual and seeming theoretical impasse that lies at the heart of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism Foucault tells us fits perfectly with a particular and historically specific governmental rationality, which emerged in the eighteenth century and was then expressed in the neoliberalism of the so-called Gary Becker's Chicago-style economics, and the work of Ordoliberalism (German neoliberals) in the second half of the twentieth century to delineate a German and American neoliberal governmentality. I have emphasised that Foucault's profound rearticulations of neoliberalism built around the idea of the discursive politics brought one crucial insight to the fore. Besides doing more justice to the discursive nature of neoliberalism, he most explicitly offers conceptual and historical account of governmental rationality of liberalism that is fundamentally demarcated from its conventional conceptions. More specifically, Foucault's genealogy of neoliberalism as a distinct type of governmentality evidently tackles one of the most pressing problems of the highly acute accounts of neoliberalism head-on, which is to unmistakably destabilise and seriously challenge the existing liberal view of government. To be even more specific, Foucault presents a highly original reading of the contemporary neoliberal version of our governmentalities which clearly departs from the old-fashioned conceptions of liberalism. Nevertheless, my attitude to Foucault's innovative and productive accounts of contemporary neoliberalism in this study is a rather ambivalent one, since it still remains an open and a matter of dispute if in fact Foucault's unflinching position towards what he enthusiastically characterised as neoliberalism could wholly be applied to the uniquely changing conditions that confront us in our historical present (Behrent, 2009).

In chapter 5, I discussed and offered the various debates and definitions of neoliberalism that attest to its elusiveness and vagueness. I noted that the concept of neoliberalism poses a peculiar challenge to modern political and economic thought. There is nonetheless broad consensus among adherents of neoliberal policies, in that they agree that it is clearly quite useful to best characterised neoliberalism as notoriously opaque and foggy. One might even suggest that despite neoliberalism's intractable ascendance, intellectual impetus and exuberance, it defies easy definition and

it is quite hard to classify. Neoliberalism, I pointed out is perhaps best thought of, then, as a discursive type of politics. Approaching neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics I suggested, challenges and opens up new ways of re-imagining, rewriting and recasting our view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. This thesis has established that it is by reconceptualising neoliberalism as a particular discursive project or strategy that we can appreciate it seeming nebulous nature. Taking such a close reading therefore constitutes a significant entry point not only— or even primarily —for rethinking neoliberalism, but also for advancing a potentially powerful and a vigorous critique in destabilising the imagery of neoliberalism an as all-encompassing discourse now so pervasive in popular accounts.

In chapter 6, drawing on discursive analysis informed by critical, genealogical and archaeological insights developed by Foucault, I sought to question the representations and subject positions of postcolonial African states as have been constructed and disseminated by the pervasiveness of the world Bank's development discourse and embodied discursive *practices* emanating from 'good governance' policy package, which emerged in the 1990s and deepened in the 2000s as an aspect of structural adjustment neoliberal market agenda. Reference is thus made to the Bank's authoritative policy documents on the underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa: *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, Governance and Development,* the World Bank 1997 *The State in a Changing World* and *2002 Building Institutions for Markets reports.* My intention being to expose and divulge the interactions of "micro-technologies of power"; question the deep-rooted politico-economic institutionalising"truth-regimes" of policy discourses, the problematic subjectivities it seeks to generate, practices legitimated and the cherished orthodoxies that are inscribed and thoroughly entrenched within official policy documents.

Bretton Woods institutions policy narratives are loaded with representations and constructions with far reaching consequences for development policy and agendas. Notwithstanding the fact that 'good governance' reform agenda purports to represent an ideological and rhetorical shift from the previous parameters —the top down approach of the structural adjustment regime, it must hastily be added that this however is not an unproblematic shift as increasing amounts of evidence suggest that it is more explicitly a reinvention of the cookie-cutter neoliberal development paradigm rhetorically disguised and embellished within the Bank's development policies. In tandem, vestiges of mainstream development discourse and practice, based on the overbearing effects of the so-called technico-scientific knowledges, have sought to produce and reproduce 'Western' constructions of postcolonial nation-states and other regions of the global South to standardise, naturalise and rationalise a seemingly Eurocentric hegemony. The reformulation and the reconfiguration of mainstream thinking about development it has been argued, crystallised and furthered how the postcolonial nation-states have been discursively and scornfully construed and represented in very unflattering and pejorative ways by development agencies within the contemporary development episteme.

It was evident that 'good governance' literature which became an indispensable component within an overall governmental technology conjure up and deeply committed to reinforcing the problematic and contentious construction of postcolonial societies in terms of the inferior and exoticised Other of the *supposedly* progressively superior 'West'. From a discursive point of view, such pathological representations and constructions of postcolonial nation-states functioned to reproduce and maintain discursive power relations, and consequently, try to universalise and perpetuate specific policy interventions with the aim of restructuring its (postcolonial nation-states) internal affairs in furtherance of market-driven "regime of truth".

As this study has illustrated, one crucial element in the discursive assemblage of the universal code of 'good governance' mechanism was to silence, delegitimise, foreclose, suppress, obscure and inevitably encumber to a measured extent countervailing optic that would examine historical conditions and context within the discursive terrain; as well as to mask, yet evasively perpetuates the complicity of the ineffective and regressive economic programmes enthusiastically promulgated by the Bretton Woods institutions to spread its goodies around the globe. The evidence presented here suggests that development apparatus, more generally cannot be technically, culturally and ideologically neutral, innocent, apolitical and value-free. This is by no means utopian, naïve, illusory and ultimately misleading. Critically, what we should bear in mind and grapple with is that apparatus of development more generally powerfully resides and inevitably operates to arbitrarily construct certain values that are discursively constituted within immutable and transcendental truths — which are epistemically located within the dominant section of society. Certainly, discursive (re)constitution of 'reality' is a corrosive means of power that renders development agenda always already political issue. Equally interesting but also disastrous, is that in doing so, it fatally elicits deficient or erroneous constructs to depict artificially simulated 'reality'.

I adopted the position that policies in important ways do not exist in a vacuum. What I mean by this is that policies reflect underlying discursive practices within development, and it is indeed this Foucauldian discursive practices that are materialised and reconstituted via governmentality—a formidable mechanism through which the 'unruly character' of the postcolonial societies are shaped, policed and constituted. This study illustrates and confirms that 'good governance', as a technology of neoliberal rule, provides a comprehensive 'grid of intelligibility' within which potentially every aspect of postcolonial nation-states can be governed on the basis of logic of development in contemporary world politics. Discourses and practices of development agenda as suggested by Foucauldian reasoning, are the veritable vehicle through which hidden operations of neoliberalism are masqueraded and conceptualised amidst dubious "neutrality", validated and envisaged through "commonsense" crude rhetoric of 'good governance'. What was evident in the analysis was that discourses, practices of development and 'good governance', on this reading, are encapsulated and deeply embedded on a fundamentally flawed set of assumption: namely that neoliberal free market dreamland proselytised by self-proclaimed neoliberal "maestros" ostensibly constitutes a silver bullet to solve all problems on issues of development.

And this is imperceptibly implicit in the way Ghanaian political elites — and other regions of the global South wittingly and/or unwittingly, continue to be entrapped in succumbing to donor or externally driven policy prescriptions as dominant 'common sense' in our contemporary world order, thus rendering them prodigiously susceptible to the pervasive effects of power (Foucault, 1990, p.291). This made me suggest that 'good governance' regime might in fact be usefully understood and regarded as invariably enmeshed with the power-knowledge grid which provided the desirable discursive landscape within which development has been conventionally predicated, and this, in turn, ultimately exposes the discursive linkages and interactions inherent in them.

Reflecting on the particular illustrative example of Ghana, I elucidated the ways political technology of 'good governance' emerged most pre-eminently as a mode or technique of governmentality. A Foucauldian lens of analysis established that 'good governance' agenda in the context of Ghana procreates domain of knowledge; it enables governable subjects and effective modes of behaviour, and deploys technologies and techniques to produce the desired governmental objectives — forming discursive nodes and modes to firmly entrench, maintain and reinforce the neoliberal political-economic epistemic condition. Using Ghana as an exemplary point of reference enabled a development of some empirically exuberant conclusions regarding the extent to which the rhetoric of post-Washington consensus phase of governance claim to have left behind one-size-fit all model, totalising ontology of orthodox structural adjustment work to perpetuate neoliberal policies under a different guise.

That means that the prevalence of discourses and practices within neoliberal policies, pertaining largely to the development architecture in an important way, were reconfigured towards more subtle governmentalising interactions, targeted at transforming and shaping the government of Ghana into a self-disciplined and self-regulating, neoliberal subject under the guise of local "ownership", "partnership", "transparency", "accountability", active intervention of civil society, "capacity-building" and, above all, "empowerment discourse".

As well, in this chapter using a genealogical approach, I critically unmasked alternative discourses by examining how localised grassroots social movements' have articulated the possibility of resistance to the imposition of reforms by donors. For Foucault, resistance

> is coextensive with (power) and absolutely its contemporary. (...) As soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance. We are never trapped by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy. (Foucault, 1977, p.224)

Foucault makes exactly this point when he argues for the explicit connection between power and resistance. 'I think that resistance is a part of this strategic relationship of which power consists. Resistance really always relies upon the situation against which it struggles' (p.168). Despite policies that reinforce the established order, I have augued and demonstrated in the Foucauldian vein how disaffected and vociferous

grassroots social movements act to resist, reverse and discursively dismantle the existing neoliberal practices and rationalities. Simply, by activating and articulating practical case of grassroots social movements rigorous challenge against the pervasive and dominant discourses to effect policy change not only served as an exemplary moment in showing how spaces of resistance is possible in restructuring power relations, but also cast new light which requires some reflection to see why the persistent objection that Foucault's work allegedly completely paralysis rather than promote practices of effective resistance, is to say the least misguided, disingenuous and badly misleading.

In the seventh and final chapter, I developed my argument by drawing on Foucault's idea of practices of 'discipline' and disciplinary mechanisms, coupled with an exploration of technologies of normalisation, and stressing their interaction with discourse of 'governmentality' to analyse the intimate symbiosis between strategies of 'discipline' and neoliberal structural adjustment apparatus. Doing so allowed me to demonstrate how neoliberal disciplinary regime and practices seek to mobilise idealised schemata of "social reality" to produce states and governments who construct itself through their own autonomy, self-regulation and self-subjectification or shape their own conduct through what Foucault calls the "technologies of the self" (1988, p.18). In other words, states and governments who voluntarily embrace particular economic choices, and perform in certain ways which are normatively desirable in promoting market-friendly neoliberal reforms. The above observations encapsulate the view that structural adjustment typifies a specific form of neoliberal governing rationalities.

Empirical study on the case of Ghana demonstrates that embedded in the disciplinary practices and regimes of structural adjustment apparatus and rationales is an ubiquitous normalising discourse constituted through global standards of conduct by which a balance sheet can be made to constantly scrutinise the degree to which different countries have fared better in meeting satisfactory performance targets and which can be used to blame countries when these standards are not seen to have been achieved.

This thesis thus argued that heavily enmeshed in neoliberal governing practices and discourses are diverse combinations and productions of normalised truths, expert knowledges and policy techniques not imposed but are applied using a complex process of benchmarks and performance indicators, pervaded by calculus of compliance, supervision, target setting which reflect a rationality of governing from a distance according to an established set of certain 'global best practices' and standards. Jeremy Bentham's idea of Panopticon was invoked to illustrate a Foucauldian understanding of monitoring as surveillance, most tellingly prevalent in the structural adjustment framework to show the applicability of the Panopticon which Foucault famously stresses in his genealogical magnum opus *Discipline and Punish* (1977). This thesis has described how statistically determined standards are tied up with disciplinary practice that represents technologies of disciplinary power which act as a biopolitical normalising power through which BWIs produce regimes of development knowledge about the government of Ghana. The findings also indicate that this is made actionable and thinkable within a governmental reason overtly constructed, formulated and opera-

tionalised to control, transform and shape the conduct of conduct of the government of Ghana from a distance, 'the international conduct of the conduct of countries' (Merlingen, 2003, p.367) through the "freedom" and autonomy of individual actors.

The analysis has shown that with the biopolitical tactic of neoliberal government call for certain rationalities to be subjected to 'rigorous' statistical measurement with a whole set of related quantitative and qualitative calculation practices, emphasise precisely the need for inquiring more profoundly into many of the strategies of disciplinary and panoptic forms of power in the contemporary world. This was reflected most visibly in examination, standardisation, target seeting, benchmarking etc., which underpin, legitimise and enable biopolitical intervention.

Within such a framework, this study suggests that neoliberal biopolitics in concert with dominating governmentalities provide the fertile ground for conceptualising and exploring how normalising technologies systematically operate to objectify the government of Ghana as self-regulating entrepreneurial subject of neoliberalism. I have demonstrated that liberal governmental logic of biopolitics more clearly outlines that BWIs governed through "freedom" and disciplinary normalisation, producing self-governing aid-dependent subjects who needed to conform to the imperatives and technologies of neoliberal ethos of government.

That implies that governmentality perspective provides new methodological and theoretical credentials for reconceptualising and reconceiving structural adjustment policies in Ghana as in other countries where it was implemented, as establishing particular ways of governing the self through increasing disciplining and surveillance on the one hand , and the scrutinisation of the self that have contributed to and are still contributing to the everyday understandings of neoliberal discourses as a way of life, on the other. Attending to these formations also means that governmentality, is but another critical perspective to demonstrate how Ghana became disciplined biopolitical subject of a neoliberal structural adjustment apparatus through an array of "rationalised" technologies of power (Crichlow & Northover, 2009, p.286) which compelled her to inculcate and perform particular economically-responsive subjectivities (Dardot & Laval, 2014).

In drawing upon Foucauldian understandings of neoliberal "counter-conduct" within the framework of governmentality study, I have examined how the road towards neoliberal governmentality is fraught with defiance and possible frictions. Whilst governmental strategies and tactics of power try to govern the everyday life of individuals, understood as the arts of conducting conduct — paradoxically such rationality constructs subjects that self-reflectively govern themselves or attempt to resist normalised conduct and subjugating discourses and practice. The Foucauldian analysis performed in this thesis has revealed how 'non-compliance' as a transgression to the dominance of neoliberal political technologies and rationalities showed themselves in the formation of "counter-conduct" such as that of the PNDC regime. Yet it also inadvertently reinforces and legitimises dominant power structures as has been illustrated in the case of PNDC regime. Thus, by recognising the implicit contradictions and fractures intrinsic to discourses of neoliberal governmentality, it

avoids naively assuming that aid-dependent governments supinely accept normalising discourses of imposition. This thesis has made clear that the aid-dependent governments rather recruit alternative discourses to productively and strategically resist neoliberal subjectification has been instrumental in highlighting the fact that there is always the possibility for reversibility of the status quo. The analysis of PNDC's 'non-compliance' with IMF conditionality instantiates the way in which aid-recipient governments have more effectively resisted their docility by opposing (passively as well as actively) policy practices or reforms (Collins, 2011). The decision to engage with Foucault and his observations of "counter-conduct" was an attempt to locate Foucault's insatiable concern with 'thoughtful indocility' and 'desubjectivisation' manifested at the critical reflection of his notion of critique: "how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of principles such as that, in view of such objectives and by the means of such procedures" (Foucault, 2002, p.384).

8.3 Contribution of the research: neoliberal governmentality, structural adjustment and neoliberalism

My findings have a number of valuable insights and contributions in the context of empirical and theoretical research for several strands of the Foucault-inspired governmentality literature. For the purposes of the overall research question, they contribute to the contemporary debate on burgeoning literature on governmentality beyond the territorial and juridictional confinement of the nation-state constituted and re-constituted through the IMF and World Bank which in general has largely been ignored. I try to fill this disappointing gap and to deliver starting points for further analysis of neoliberal governmentality on a supra-state level by asking: *To what extent can Foucauldian governmentality perspective be applied to International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment programmes in Ghana's contex?* While I was reflecting upon the dynamics of the governing principles of the IMF and the World Bank policies for Ghana and using the concept of governmentality, I find that neoliberal adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank in the example of Ghana work through the mechanisms, discourses, techniques, a set of practices and rationalities of power which neatly fit in with and form an *ineliminable* part of the governmentality of neoliberalism explained by Foucault, that is to say, a form of governmental technique understood as the conduct of conduct or governance without government. This is interesting precisely because it is the same complex array of techniques, calculations and tactics (Foucault, 2007, p.108) that are used by the IMF and the World Bank through their adjustment programmes.

The richness of this thesis contribution revealed how the use of a governmentality perspective remarkably allows an investigation of power dynamic between donors and aid-recipient gvernments. This study conceived of power as productive, empowering and constitutive as opposed to a visibly repressive and centrally originated form of power. Such a reflection may help to destabilise and disrupt the paralysing idea

of techniques of domination; one in which donors impose their priorities on poor African countries in order to analyse the subtle yet insidious ways in which power is exercised and rationalised through practices of freedom (Death, 2011, p.3). This, I think, is perfectly consonant with Foucault's vehement appeal "not to look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality" (1998, p.95).

At many point throughout this study I have presented evidence suggesting that the relations between donors and recipient countries is characterised by a neoliberal mode of governance : namely, that attempt to shape and reshape the government of Ghana's behaviour as a subject through specific strategy or mechanism of power — construct a neoliberal "regime of truth" upon which discourses that construct social reality, modes of control (norms, values, standards, devices and techniques), properly function or rather operate through, rather than against, eliciting different ways in which recipients' subjectivity is formed. I have also presented evidence suggesting that this form of mentalities or rationalities of government—the art of rendering social reality visible, knowable, governable, administrable and manageable (Collier, 2009, p.96; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1996; Lemke, 2001, my emphasis) typically target African borrowing governments. This thesis thus suggests that the position, taking by some IR theorists like Jonathan Joseph (2010, p.224) who argues that 'contemporary forms of governmentality can productively be applied only to those areas that might be characterised as having an advanced form of liberalism', I would propose, is mistaken and grossly erroneous , no less - and no more. His dogmatic insistent on the contrast between the 'effectiveness of governmentality in advanced liberal societies"and its failure in societies at different levels of development"(Joseph, 2012, p.5 & p.16) that neoliberal forms of govermentality require is deeply problematic. Because relying heavily on the characteristically uneven' and unequal distribution of neoliberal governmental practices between the developed and those societies perceived outside the developed West, it presupposes the study of govemmentality, a field traditionally focused on internal conditions as discrete entities and spaces to our politics.

Joseph's rather seemingly superficial analysis inevitably ignores the genealogy of neoliberalism Foucault outlined in his lecture series *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008) or those substantial contributions by governmentality scholars that have highlighted non-liberal (e.g. post-colonial or post-socialist) societies as reverberating specifically with the neoliberal political rationality (Jeffreys, 2009; Ferguson, 2010; Ailio, 2011; Collier, 2011; Death, 2013; Kangas, 2015, p.482). Indeed, by holding on to a supposedly suffocating separation between liberal governmentality on the one hand, and illiberal governmentality on the other, Joseph's understanding of neoliberalism tends to be over determined, problematically reductive and unreflective of his own uncritical engagement of neoliberal narrative. Contra Joseph, the analytical dichotomy between domestic-international, micro-macro-levels and the advanced liberal societies and the so-called non-advanced liberal context) in many dominant scripts, obviously limit our overall understanding of the way in which the world is contemporarily ordered and governed (Kangas, 2015, p.483). If anything, it seems just entirely plausible to suggest that the key concern is to provide generic analytical tools for IR enquiries.

Governmentality as a general analytical grid of ideas that give form to programmes, techniques, rationalities and strategies of governance, is implicated in the production, reproduction, and circulation of power showing how through everyday routines, banal and most mundane practices which are associated with "governance" structural adjustment, predictably, govern to foster as well as (re)produce specific liberal modalities of subjectivity and social relations necessary to sustain the logic of neoliberalism through biopolitical tactics.

This thesis links with the broader literature on structural adjustment policy analysis offering cutting edge insight into the intimate relationship between neoliberalism, governmentality, and biopolitics. To be clear, this thesis has made a modest contribution to the literature for future studies on structural adjustment policies in the Ghanaian and in African contexts where there is a paucity or dearth of theoretical research which has apply Foucault-inspired governmentality perspective to structural adjustment policies.

Another significant theoretical implication that can be drawn from the present study is that it has made a worthwhile contribution to some of the shortcomings within the mainstream IR theoretical traditions in comprehending and explaining debate in scholarship on neoliberalism. In particular, neoliberalism is framed within this discussion as a form of governmentality and discourses (England & Ward, 2007; Larner, 2000; Lemke, 2001; Springer, 2012c). More accurately, following Foucault, I have defined neoliberalism as an art of government that renders and normalises a certain understanding of social and political reality knowable. In this regard, we must recognise that governmentality perspective allows an analysis which transcends the simplistic and simplifying understanding of neoliberalism in terms of typical hegemonic top-down model, hierarchical and monolithic imperative—albeit deployed conterminously, increasingly overlap and become blurred together. Stated otherwise, the governmentality perspective eschews and readily disavows the kinds of analysis that reduce neoliberalism to a set of free market policies (i.e., privatisation, trade and financial liberalisation, deregulation and so on), or the Marxian political economy narrative which often tend to designate neoliberalism as ideology that seeks to justify or generate support for those policies (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; 2011; Harvey, 2005, 2009; Castree, 2009).

I have read neoliberalism as an intricate web of various forms of knowledge, subjectivities, political rationalities and techniques devised for exercising various forms of power over people—the central concern of Foucauldian *biopolitics* — rather than as an ideological rhetoric or a political economic reality. The result was to suggest that these distinctive and evolving governmental rationalities create the conditions that encourage, and indeed inexorably make possible, a whole range of governmental technologies, strategies, calculations and tactics that grease the wheels of "variegated global neoliberal hegemon" (Springler, 2014, p.158) that suffuse the quoditian aspects of our lives (Kiersey & Weidner, 2009, p.354).

This thesis has shown that the utility of a governmentality approaches in particular gives due deference to new critical insights. Indeed, this study found the governmen-

tality approach very promising as it it qualitatively reinvigorates a potent interrogative frame for epistemological propositions to unpack and deconstruct what Foucault (1997) forcefully calls "politics of truth" which implies and even explicitly marks a radical rupture with a reification of ideologies, ideas and concepts. Instead of analysing ideas, ideologies, concepts and theories that problematically and simplistically reinstates the binary poles of true or false statements, this thesis has contributed to this knowledge by investigating *how* prevalent "regimes of truth" are imbricated in the production and reproduction of corrosive power technologies which also work on the supra-national level. The Foucauldian aim in relation to particular regimes of dominating rationality and practice, our own and those of others, as I see it, would simply be to end it by constantly and diligently unveiling, unmasking and rearranging them in order to construct critical "ontology of ourselves" in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge" (Foucault, 1984, p.315-317) and of our historical reality.

Hence this study has sought all along to question and critique the taken-for-granted assumptions and contextual "regimes of truth" propagated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund considered as best templates for global development which leave very little room for counter-narratives or alternative strategies that will benefit aid-dependent governments. The analysis revealed how these transcendental "truths" advanced by these institutions are implicated in pervasive and insidious power-knowledge relations but are not inherently true. It is neither Foucault's intention nor mine to disavow and/ or reject the problematic and contentious nature of truth-claims as such; it is certainly Foucault's intention, as is well known, to suggest that we should consistently be careful about the precarious nature of 'truth claims'; precisely because it is discursively constituted within a particular and historically contingent frame of reference of the so-called 'champions of reforms'. Implicit in this view is the idea that long arduous, but elusive search for the 'truth' is unknowable and unpredictable (Foucault, 2007). On this note, to argue that commonly accepted "truths" advanced by these institutions have largely operated to serve other interests and these need to be robustly interrogated by those who engage with them to open up possibility for reconfiguration is exactly Foucauldian in spirit. This thesis is a modest but serious contribution to that critical interrogation and further reflection by the repertoire of governmentality studies.

8.4 Concluding reflections

> *The past does not repeat itself in the present, but the present is played out, and innovates, utilising the legacy of the past (Robert Castel, 1994, p.238).*

The perspective articulated in this thesis is far removed from offering the cynical nature of the Bretton Woods institutions—it seems not—that would be overly simplistic and utterly naïve. In terms of this thesis, I am *primarily* concerned with the

quest to produce critical diagnostics in order to rethink our present history from a very specific illustrative example. And in doing so, I revisited structural adjustment policy in Ghana with greater depth and nuance. This has involved emphasising the *logics* that have become suffused with belligerent regulatory practices, technologies, techniques and rationalities spectacularly connected with an illustrative example which few scholars have disappointingly and insufficiently addressed. Be that as it may, it is my candid view that the overarching influence of such a logic speaks to a situation where domestic policy space has effectively been conscripted as targets for governmental techniques. The argument raised here is not, however, simply to retell and to historicise *the* past. But then, I have done so in the hope to contextualise post-colonial developmentalism in order to adequately grasp, deeply problematise and perspectivise more explicitly the key discursive shifts, phases and structural underpinnings that are generally invisible and unobtrusive, albeit pervasive in mainstream canons of orthodox development.

I have been wryly skeptical about the old and discredited notion that development aid is an instance of an evil plan to impoverish the periphery. Here I would go as far as to argue that structural adjustment agenda is emblematic of a social project which articulates itself in discursive and institutional practices, or worse still, masked in the 'disciplining' and pre-dominant rotten ideology of the "free" market rhetoric applied to the development of countries in the global South. From this point of view, I follow Foucault in suggesting that for all their rhetoric and pronouncements of structural adjustment agenda as a moniker to address the seemingly endemic poverty and pervasive underdevelopment, I insist structural adjustment regime is in fact a continuation of domestic politics, and one that is integral in the promulgation of a particular vision of the industrially advanced North with other means.

This claim, of course, does not mean that structural adjustment as a policy package is inherently bad or good. Yes, I am in entire agreement with the idea that structural adjustment policy corresponds to a real messianic impulse to seemingly 'alleviate' or bring about 'the end of poverty in our lifetime' (Sachs, 2005). Yet, sadly, when I look through the unfathomable depths of disciplinary rationalities, strategies, technologies, and techniques, actively embedded in such a social project, one cannot help but come to the conclusion that the logic behind such messianic impulse is somewhat ironic—mere pretence—at best phoney and hypocritical nonsense at worst.

Structural adjustment regime with it discriminatory policy reforms startlingly reveal that it quite simply, cannot stabilise or materialise development in a number of countries beyond rhetoric (Ghana for example) where the banality of neoliberalism is riven by exacerbated poverty and marked increase in inequality. Now it does seems to me that structural adjustment agenda in many ways is deployed to aggressively and deafly serve the dominating structures of capitalism at the global level, and this further explains its evangelical zeal and excessive romantic desire in containing the risk which the so-called global South poor such as Ghana poses to the 'stability', 'order' and security of countries of the global North rich as well as market fundamentalism. The question as to whether Ghana would have been better off without struc-

tural adjustment policy is conceivably less convincing, moot and as far as I am aware, hardly sustainable. I strenuously reject the idea that Ghana and indeed other post-colonial African countries would have been better off without structural adjustment policy. There is no denying the fact that Ghana, as indeed most developing countries, needs structural adjustment policy.

More troubling (and deeply disqueiting) for me though is how such countries should acquire the ability to create new critical space spawned by contestation and emancipatory politics enmeshed within the powerful structural forces and micro-practices in which they find themselves. I think of this critical space in terms of discursively 'imagined' and re-visioned – wherein they could inexorably transcend, subvert, tramp and crush the logic of the superordinate regulatory-knowledge ensemble (and intervention)—that often pervades the mundanity of neoliberal rhetoric and its unabashedly "depoliticised and technocratic fetishisation of the market" (Venugopal, 2015, p.166). My argument here, put simply, is that such a new critical space (however defined or articulated) can be legitimately and meaningfully be found in the way in which global South countries like Ghana, revalorise indigenous (indeed, endogenous) knowledges and erased epistemologies, which is of crucial importance in the quest for crafting 'alternative development' thinking and practice beyond the regnant neoliberal credo : "a virtual break which opens a room, understood as a room of concrete freedom, that is possible transformation" (Rose et al., 1996, p.5).

It is telling here, I would suggest that to understand the ways in which the postcolonial states have been represented in neoliberal times is to acknowledge the nebulous discursive reality underpinning development practices (*see* chapter 6) not only in terms of explicitly rejecting it, as Foucault (1972) poignantly points out; but the crucial point, therefore, is to critically challenge and dismantle the tranquillity with which they are accepted. And pertinently for me here, our collective failure to subvert and jeopardise "regimes of truth" consolidated, neutralised and naturalised (at least in my mind) corroborates and perpetuates the historical imperatives of development thinking; thereby making it more difficult to resist the variegated discursive confinements towards transformative change. Among the points I wish to emphasise here is that the power of development discourses, in it different guises, constitute a profound, albeit an opaque and obscure, discursive entrapments or impediments that unless demasked, deformed, disrupted and troubled, it will always continue to undermine and subvert any attempts towards change.

It is worth some pause to reflect this idea that in considering the specific case of World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the concept of governmentality is better at explaining practices, specific techniques and technologies of power framed through the notion of normalisation that underlie dominant forms of contemporary governance (*see* chapter 7). Reading Foucault from Ghana, it strikes me that this line of thinking is more tenable and perhaps opens up new analytical possibilities and critical tools we can develop to re-conceptualise and offer fresh perspectives to undress or critique development. Often the predominant view is that international development policy and practices are marked by some kind of omnipotent leviathan, of course, not

the kind Hobbes suggested, though. However, the deepest problem with this common view is that while correct, I would like to suggest is (at least) somewhat naïve, as it seems oddly unaware of the contradictory and complex processes of mutual constitution of the making and breaking of boundaries, evinced in the contested flows and counter flows of practices, rationalities and discourses — derived from various spatial and temporal configurations — which specifies the productivity of power as distinct from techniques of domination.

From this standpoint Foucault's constructs of governmentality as a 'specific' and "complex form of power" (Foucault, 1988, p.18) conceptualised and explained in terms of the multifarious and often conflicting discursive constructions of political rationalities and related subjectivities, strategies, techniques and technologies of governance adroitly provide an erudite account in understanding the contemporary world order. This, I would contend, is the reason why, as has been pointed out, the conceptual architecture of governmentality is suited to all sorts of inquiries into particular governing and governmental practices: thereby opening up ways of analysing the shifting boundaries, overlapping and competing rationalities in all sorts of areas of government that constitute the problematic of the political present.

While I concede that it may be particularly challenging in appropriating modes of governmentality as fitting for explaining the global workings of power in say Ghana which exemplifies a non-Western or advanced liberal context, at the same time, I also wish to state that we cannot ignore it continually unfolding vibrant potential. To my mind, the proclivity, obsession and penchant to "tame and provincialise Foucault"(Merlingen, 2011, p.189, emphasis mine) constrains its productivity and mystifies any serious engagement with it. My concluding suggestion is that governmentality thesis transcends disciplinary borders and accounts for both micro and macro workings of power which unravel as neoliberalism becomes "a standard of reference against which all forms of life (individual, communal political) can be assessed according to modern conceptions of civilisation and order" (Vrasti, 2013, p.64). Indeed, as Foucault suggests, in terms of scale of application, governmentality is — not confined by definition to a precise domain determined by a sector of the scale, but should be considered simply as a point of view, a method of decipherment which may be valid for the whole scale, whatever its size"(p.183). As such, Foucauldian IR theorists should critically foreground various dimensions of particular practices, contingent ways and conditions of possibility that not only shape, but constitute objects of critical inquiry at particular local sites in a particular time. This is exactly what I have attempted to do by providing illustrations of the ways in which changes generated by IMF and World Bank structural adjustment regime in Ghana can be understood as characteristic feature of actual practices of neoliberal governmentality. I suggest that the theoretical strength of governmentality is that it has the possibility to offer critical diagnostic framework as well as open up new ways of understanding our contemporary political reality.

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