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THE KEY TO SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT
- BUILDING UP COHESION, CAPACITY AND CHOICES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
MIGRATION PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK

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This thesis examines how the European Union Migration Partnership Framework represents a partial shift in the European Union policies in a new direction, where migration and development policies are seen intertwined and mutually beneficial in order to manage migration in a sustainable manner that works for all partners. The European migration crisis has caused turmoil within the EU and its Member States, and the Migration Partnership Framework presents various tools that ought to affect the irregular movement of people to the EU.

The material of this research is compiled of the EU documents on the Migration Partnership Framework that was launched in June 2016. Since its launch, five progress reports and various additional papers on the implementation and experiences of the Framework have been published. The analysis of the material has been conducted by following the principles of theory guided content analysis and the chapters of analysis have been constructed based on the notion that policies configured on the idea of partnership are looking for a 'win-win-win' solution.

The choice of the EU to emphasise the notion of partnership and harness development for the purpose of managing migration invoked my interest to study the Framework through a neoliberal point of view, especially focusing on the theoretical debate concerning neoliberal governance. Due to the focus on the migration-development nexus, it is also relevant to discuss the relation between governance and development within this thesis.

This research into the European Union Migration Partnership Framework has revealed that even though there is a shift towards the empowerment of the partner countries in migration and development policies, the actions presented in the name of partnership are in fact characteristic of the forms of neoliberal governance. The tools presented in the Framework attempt to build up cohesion, capacity and choices, but in a way that is most suitable for the EU.

Avainsanat: migration, development, governance, partnership, European Union

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1. Introduction

'We are proposing a new approach for strong partnerships with key countries. Our goal is to support the countries that host so many people and foster growth in our partner countries. We are ready to increase financial and operational support and to invest in long-term economic and social development, security, rule of law and human rights, improving people's life and tackling the drivers of migration.'

Federica Mogherini 7.6.2016

The European Union (EU) has taken a new course in managing migration through carefully established partnerships with important countries of transit and origin. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has been under stress and the Member States have shown impatience due to the insufficient measures taken by the European Commission (EC) tackling irregular movement of people to Europe. Under the European Agenda on Migration, the EC has launched a new Partnership Framework with third countries and with this Framework the Commission attempts to establish a sustainable formula in managing migration and abolishing root causes of displacement in vulnerable areas.

In this thesis it is my aim to look into the Migration Partnership Framework and the ways in which the sustainable migration management paradigm is formulated under the framework of partnership, and its implications for the EU, the individual subjects in vulnerable areas and the partner countries. The migration crisis in Europe has brought to our attention the vast despair of people seeking asylum in Europe and migrating through lethal passages, and the policies the EU has proposed, attempt to confront the escalated situation by using a wide range of policy tools from different sectors. The Framework is presented as the newly formulated method for saving the lives of migrants and refugees and enabling safe routes to Europe and ensuring safe conditions in the countries of origin and transit. Its goals are divided into short-term and long-term goals, with the main focus on building and developing the capacity of countries of origin and transit, so that they are able to manage the flows of people in a more sustainable manner.

The complexity of the objective to abolish root causes of migration and the incapability of Member States to come up with common solutions to managing the irregular flow of people within the EU brought my attention to this issue in the beginning. The EU has been criticised for its inhumane actions on its Southern frontier in the Mediterranean Sea, for poor reception conditions within the Member States and for the dubious EU-Turkey statement from March of 2016. The policies within the EU and its Neighbourhood have made the commitment of the EU to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees questionable according to human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch (see Human Rights Watch 2016). The EU vows to act within the principles of international law and human rights norms, and its commitment to humanitarian obligations is emphasised within statements from the European Commission (see MPF0). The EU has to balance between the despair of people fleeing distress, Member States' demands for stricter control of the outer borders and unstable political conditions within the Member States and the Neighbourhood.

Despite the complexity of the issue at hand and the challenges regarding the establishment of common policies and practices concerning the irregular movement of people, the EU has managed to step up its operations. As one course of action, the European Union is attempting to hinder dangerous journeys taken by migrants and asylum seekers by giving more responsibility to the third countries in the Southern Neighbourhood. The attempt is to use a carrot and stick approach when trying to reach the goal of decreasing the number of people crossing the Mediterranean Sea without proper documentation or justified reason to enter the common area of the EU. The externalisation of border controls on the European borders is a topic well looked into, as well as the urge to externalise asylum processing to third countries (see Lavenex 2006; Carling & Hernández-Carretero 2011). The externalisation of border controls and asylum processing requires the cooperation of third countries, and it is acknowledged that this is one of the major objectives the EU is seeking to accomplish with its current policies.

It seems that the EU is hoping for the Partnership Framework to operate as the Holy Grail of migration management and it is in my interest to look into the ways in which the Migration Partnership Framework operates to create a sustainable migration management paradigm under the framework of partnership. The focus on the partnership approach has been evolving in the past decades, after international institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) steered their attention from the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s to approaches that were based on mutual understanding of the donor and recipient country (Joseph 2012, 247). The current focus on partnership operates through the formulation of packages consisting of various tools for immigration control and the goal is to find ‘win-win-win’ solutions that benefit the sending and receiving countries, as well as the migrants themselves (Kunz, Lavenex & Panizzon 2011, 2).

Is this Framework then truly an operable tool for tackling root causes of displacement and managing migration sustainably or is it just old policies disguised in a new framework? My main research question is '*To what extent is the Partnership Framework a viable solution for the basis of a paradigm change in sustainable migration management*'. This is a relevant topic, since the Framework was launched in June 2016 and has been leading the way for cooperation since then. The EC has been able to gain feedback on the Framework's success and limitations and several reports have been drafted and published. The Framework provides an insight into the future strategies of the European Union and addresses how the EU sees the future of its relations with third countries. My study reveals how the EU has formulated a framework that attempts to address the past weaknesses of its policies in third countries and reacts to the current views on meaningful policies based on partnership. Whether these partnerships are truly able to shift the ownership to the third countries, or chanting the songs of neoliberal governance, will be addressed in my research.

1.1. European Union Policies on Migration and Asylum

The international community has created a system of refugee protection to address situations where the state fails to provide the basic protection of human rights for its

citizens. The urge for this type of protection became evident in the aftermath of the Second World War. The idea of the ability to seek protection, even from one's own state, is widely accepted within the international community. (Betts 2013, 1.) The possibility to flee one's country of origin in order to seek the fulfilment of basic needs and human rights has been tested in the past and is now being tested during the migration crisis that became more visible to the wider public in the year 2015 and spread across Europe. The international refugee regime has relied on the fact that states are willing to help and bear responsibility for people who are fleeing persecution. Now we are in a situation where states, who would have the resources and stability to guarantee a safe haven, have come to the conclusion that people are better off close to their homes, since enabling routes to Europe is considered as a pull factor for other people in the same situation.

The policies of the European Union concerning migration and asylum have taken a turn towards attempting to limit the flows of people and transforming the EU into a common space in order to manage irregular migration and process asylum claims (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi 2014, 160). The governance of irregular migration expands to the Member States, the Schengen area, and now even to the third countries (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi 2014, 151). Different policy fields have been activated to support this process of limiting and controlling irregular migration, and these structures are deemed to deepen in the future. The objective of limiting the irregular movement of people requires a common solution and common procedures for all the Member States. Negotiations concerning the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) are expected to be finalised in the summer of 2018. (European Commission 2017; Kurri 2018.)

As Lavenex and Kunz point out, the EU has history with addressing issues of migration through the paradigm of the migration-security nexus. The shift towards the emphasis on the migration-development nexus can be explained with the changing international environment and deficiencies in the past policies concerning cooperation. (Lavenex & Kunz 2008, 439–440.) The migratory pressure towards the EU during the past few years has given incentive for the EU to reflect on past policies and harness a wide range of policy tools for the purpose of managing migration and

abolishing root causes of displacement in cooperation with all stakeholders. In the past, policies based on cooperation have struggled in a sense that they have not always been able to provide consistent solutions. The elusiveness of the third countries has caused inconsistencies when setting common objectives and the institutional weaknesses in third countries hinder the implementation of agreed measures, and on the other hand, might be ethically dubious due to human rights violations. (Carling & Hernández-Carretero 2011, 45.)

Reflecting the interests of the EU to show initiative in the common objectives of sustainable development and its will to update European migration and asylum policies, it is fair to say that the migration-development nexus has become one of the key focal points for European policies with regard to third countries and the external dimension of EU policies. Migration itself can be portrayed as occurring when there are differences in the level of development between countries or societies (see Nyberg Sørensen et al. 2003, 13). Taking this into consideration, the emergence of the migration-development nexus, where migration is comprehended as a tool rather than a problem, seems natural, but it has not always been visible in the policies of the EU.

In May 2015, the EU launched its Agenda on Migration and the focal point of the agenda is that a comprehensive approach to managing migration needs to be created. A year later, in May 2016, the European Commission (EC) presented several legislative packages reforming the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) and creating the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)¹. Later in June 2016, the Commission published a legislative package concerning legal migration to the EU and in July 2016, the Commission published the final proposals targeting better regulation of migration and the Migration Partnership Framework was also included in this package. All these legislative proposals presented by the Commission aim at the better management of people entering and exiting the EU and the provision of more extensive tools for cooperation with third countries. (European Commission 2017a.)

¹ Currently known as the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

1.1.1. European Union Agenda On Migration and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

The European Union Agenda on Migration relies upon mutual trust and solidarity between the Member States and the external partners of the EU. The goal is to avoid human tragedies on the borders of the EU and within, and to manage migration better. The agenda is divided into short-term and long-term priorities and the successful implementation of the agenda requires a multidimensional approach to managing migration. The short-term priorities include saving lives at sea by providing resources to maritime operations conducted by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and its partners, and tackling criminal networks that exploit people taking the dangerous journey to the EU. The long-term objectives include affecting the root causes of migration and enhancing development in the countries of origin and transit. The Agenda on Migration rests upon the four following pillars: reducing the incentives for migration, saving lives and securing the external border, enforcing common asylum policy and developing pathways for legal migration. (European Commission 2017b.)

Complementing the Agenda on Migration, the EU has several on-going processes within the framework of the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) that was established in 2005. These processes also rely on partnerships and policy dialogues with non-EU countries, and African states are defined as one priority area in this framework. The GAMM includes various instruments, for example policy dialogues, action plans, readmission agreements and operational support in order to tackle the issue of irregular migration and displacement of people. (European Commission 2017c.) The objective of managing migration through partnerships and policy dialogues is not new, but the EU has decided to launch a separate Framework of Partnership, instead of stepping up the on-going GAMM cooperation. Keeping this in mind, it is relevant to look into the new Framework and how it is conceived as the solution to sustainably managing migration through implementing new policy approaches related to development partnerships.

1.1.2. Towards a Global Compact on Migration

Managing migration is not only in the interest of the European Union, but also in the interest of the international community, since migration is a global phenomenon and requires global responses. In 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Migrants and Refugees and in this process it committed to developing a *Global Compact on Safe and Orderly Routes for Migration*. The process that strives toward a Global Compact on Migration (GCM) was officially launched in April 2017. Within this framework, governance on migration will be debated on the basis of striving towards sustainable development and taking into account the objectives presented in the *2030 Agenda*. (United Nations 2018.)

In this context, this Global Compact aims to mitigate the adverse drivers and structural factors that hinder people from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin, and so compel them to seek a future elsewhere. It intends to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities migrants face at different stages of migration by respecting, protecting and fulfilling their human rights and providing them with care and assistance. It seeks to address legitimate concerns of communities about migration and the demographic, economic, social and environmental changes their societies are undergoing. It strives to create conducive conditions that enable all migrants to enrich our societies through their human, economic and social capacities, and thus facilitate their contributions to sustainable development at the global level. (United Nations 2018, 2.)

The Global Compact on Migration has taken on as its guiding principles guidelines such as people-centred, international cooperation, human rights, rule of law and due process, sustainable development, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches (United Nations 2018, 3-4). These are principles that are also visible in the Migration Partnership Framework and the establishment of these agendas demonstrate the emphasis given to development as the cure for the migratory pressure to the developed societies. The role of the migrants as a resource for development has been acknowledged within these new policy frameworks, such as

the Migration Partnership Framework. Hence, the relation between the EU, migration and sustainable development is important for my research, and a short introduction will be included in the following paragraph.

1.1.3. Managing Migration in the Context of Sustainable Development

We recognize the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development. We also recognize that international migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons. Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience of communities hosting refugees, particularly in developing countries. We underline the right of migrants to return to their country of citizenship, and recall that States must ensure that their returning nationals are duly received. (United Nations 2015, 10.)

As presented in the previous quotation from the United Nations, the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* welcomes coherent responses to the management of migration related issues, such as creating the resilience of hosting communities, supporting the return of migrants to their countries of citizenship and harnessing the positive contribution of migrants for sustainable development. The 2030 Agenda continues on the work of the Millennium Development Goals and strives towards promoting human rights and the empowerment of girls and women (United Nations 2015, 3). Managing migration in a safe and sustainable manner is something that needs to be discussed simultaneously when discussing the 2030 Agenda.

The EU has adopted the objectives of the 2030 Agenda in its own policies and has praised support for the work of the UN. In its Communication on *Next steps for a sustainable European future*, the Commission highlights that the 2030 Agenda is drafted fully in the interest of the EU and that the EU supports all the actions

presented in the Agenda. The Agenda is formulated based on a partnership between all stakeholders, and the EU signs up to be a frontrunner in the implementation of the Agenda. The fight against poverty and inequality requires that different policy fields and financial instruments, as well as EU's external action, are harnessed to strive towards these common objectives. (Commission 2016, 2–3.) The EU has addressed the need for a common response to development in the light of the 2030 Agenda in its *European Consensus on Development*. The purpose of the Consensus is to provide a framework for the EU institutions and the Member States to operate with third countries within their competence (European Commission 2017e, 4).

1.2. Previous Research on the Promotion of Partnerships in Migration Management

1.2.1. Mobility Partnerships and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

The emphasis on partnership compacts in managing migration is not entirely a newly established approach when attempting to provide sustainable tools for sustainable migration management. Global policy dialogue concerning international migration management has been on top of the agenda for international institutions, especially from the turn of the millennium. Mobility Partnership (MP) is an essential feature of the Global Approach to Migration Management (GAMM) and they highlight the mutual benefits of policy dialogues. The Partnership Instrument itself belongs to the funding instruments of the EU². These instruments promote the core values of the EU in the global sphere through the work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) (European Commission 2016). Lavenex and Stucky suggest that the comprehensive and tangible approach of the Mobility Partnership was formulated due to the failure in unilateral repressive procedures attempting to manage migration. Regardless, Mobility Partnership is a multi-dimensional tool that needs to be operated accordingly and when this succeeds, it can truly represent a mutually beneficial form of cooperation. (Lavenex & Stucky 2011, 116–117.)

² Other funding frameworks include, for example, European Neighbourhood Instrument, EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, Asia Regional Programme, European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (MPF0/Annex3).

The popularity of Mobility Partnerships is connected to the era when the emphasis on migration-development nexus has prospered and policies regarding economic migration have been on the top of the European agenda. However, they do not focus that much on tackling irregular migration. The focus is more on the questions of readmission and migration control in third countries. (Lavenex & Stucky 2011, 117–118.) In contrast to the Mobility Partnerships, the Migration Partnership Framework is promoted as a comprehensive approach, where all aspects of movement are addressed, and tackling criminal activity is one of the key measures when reducing the irregular movement of people. The Partnership Framework is not intended as a replacement for the Mobility Partnership, instead, it is to compliment the previous schemes of cooperation between the EU, the Member States and the third countries. (MPF4, 11.)

Previous studies conducted on Mobility Partnership suggest that the approach focusing on partnerships is multidimensional, in a sense that partnerships are something viable in global relations when planning the actions to be taken, but when it comes to the actual implementation of the schemes, conditionality supersedes the concept of partnership. Lavenex and Stucky also see a relation between the distance of the countries involved and the willingness to use the concept of partnership in migration policies. In documents relating to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), conditionality prevails partnerships and fostering mobility is connected to the success in reducing irregular migration. It is also noticeable that in the documents concerning the Mobility Partnership, the repressive measures tackling irregular migration and promoting readmission agreements are clearly stated, but the measures promoting legal migration, development and mobility remain unclear. (Lavenex & Stucky 2011, 125–126.)

The focus on partnerships with third countries is no new strategy for the European Union, instead, the foundations for the Migration Partnership Framework have been established within the context of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is formulated on the basis of existing bilateral agreements and its focus is on promoting relations on the bilateral and regional level through various forms of cooperation. The forms of cooperation are not directly taken from the EU, but it is evident that the

forms of operation are stemming from EU policies and actions. Future membership is a carrot that is used to lure the neighbouring states to conform to cooperation and possible progress is monitored by the EU. (Gänzle 2008, 2.)

The concept of ENP was introduced in 2002, and at that time, the planned cooperation was targeted towards the Eastern neighbours, and Southern neighbours were left outside the plans. In 2004, ENP Action Plans were formulated and the goal was to set clear priorities that the EU would be aiming for. The European Commission released the first Progress Reports in 2006, and since then regular reports have been published on the progress of the ENP. (Gänzle 2008, 6–7.) The idea of ‘partnership approach’ has spread to various aspects of EU external policies, and during the migration crisis the EU stepped up the game and formulated a new framework for cooperation with neighbouring countries, though this time focus is on the Southern Neighbourhood.

1.2.2. Partnerships in the Context of Development

Partnership itself is a complicated concept that may consist of various elements and have multiple meanings in various situations. Rita Abrahamsen has focused on partnership in the context of development partnerships in Africa. She suggests that partnerships are consistent with the neoliberal political rationality and employ uniform technologies at the global level. Self-disciplined individuals and states are formulated through promoting freedom as a form of rule. Development aid and assistance are given, and in return the receiving party is obliged to manage the conditions within the society in a sustainable manner. Power relations might not be visible in these relations, but they operate through the notion of freedom of the African states. Assistance is directed towards cooperating and developable countries, and the willingness of African states to participate in this cooperation is greeted with satisfaction. (Abrahamsen 2004, 1462.)

Abrahamsen points out that in order to gain a comprehensive view on the effects of the ‘partnership’ ideal, partnership strategies and how they function as a form of power through constructing legitimate agency and action, need to be conceptualised. In the African context, partnerships do not solely operate on the notion of coercion,

but through promoting recipient states as agents of their own self-management. Voluntary participation in the partnerships and the plantation of the idea of ownership is seemingly making development more successful, and addressing the previous problems of development aid as imposing Western values. (Abrahamsen 2004, 1454–1456.)

It is suggested that partnerships work through the promises of incorporation and inclusion, besides the domination and imposition of agendas that are set elsewhere. Relying on the idea of partnerships, donor organisations no longer impose their own view of development on developing areas, instead they promote themselves as partners within the strategies that are formulated and ‘owned’ by the developing countries. North-South relations have supposedly changed their course and are now planned by Southern partners. ‘Ownership’ has become a key phrase in developmental operations, and this emphasises the shift from imposed strategies to home-grown strategies. (Abrahamsen 2004, 1455.) Whether these strategies are truly home-grown can be debated, but at least the inclusion of partnership in EU policies can be seen as an attempt to create new ways of operating with third countries. The Migration Partnership Framework might indeed be the long-awaited alternative to the outdated policies of international organisations and their operations related to migration and development.

1.3. Main Concepts and the Scope of the Thesis

The research material of this thesis is collected from the documents concerning the European Union Migration Partnership Framework. The Migration Partnership Framework as the topic of this thesis requires some variation in the words used. Hence, in this thesis I will refer to the Migration Partnership Framework as such, or as Partnership Framework or just Framework. When discussing a general framework, I will be using the word framework without a capital letter. In the chapters where I have included quotations from the Migration Partnership Framework, I have used the abbreviation MPF. The other abbreviations used in the chapters of analysis will be introduced in the third chapter of this thesis. In the following paragraphs, I will present the other choices I have made concerning the words used in this thesis.

The debate concerning migration management and European migration policies is coloured with vivid terms that get confused in the everyday life of European citizens and politicians. Keeping this in mind, I am a somewhat cautious about using these rather simplistic terms when addressing such a complex issue. Debates in the media get heated, and even regular migration gets confused with claiming asylum and being entitled to international protection. It would be worth another thesis to discuss, whether the current situation in Europe is, in fact, a migration crisis or merely a crisis of European and international politics. I have allowed myself to use the term migration crisis when referring to the situation in Europe during these past few years, since it is a widely used term and people associate it with the phenomenon of uncontrolled movement of people to and within Europe.

There are various words used to refer to the individual person on the move. These words include the concept of asylum seeker, refugee, migrant, economic migrant, and the phenomenon referring to the act of moving from one location to another can be depicted as a refugee flow, seeking asylum, an influx of migrants, migration, illegal migration or irregular migration. In this thesis, I will be using the rather simplistic terms migrant and migration, and irregular migration when referring to crossing borders without documentation (see International Organization for Migration 2018). Where it is meaningful to refer to a specific form of movement of people, such as seeking asylum, I will allow that to myself and to the reader. Though, the difference between seeking asylum and migrating based on a variety of reasons is not at the core of this thesis.

Alexander Betts has contributed to the debate on improving the conditions for migrants and refugees in a sense that migrants and refugees have potential that states hosting these individuals should embrace. Betts has encouraged states to approach the issue of migration as an asset rather than as a burden. He has made a difference between a migrant and a refugee by stating that migrants are lured by hope and refugees are fleeing fear (Betts & Collier 2017, 64). Despite this explicit difference between the two concepts and the difference in the legal status, I acknowledge the difference between these two statuses, but it is not relevant to my analysis to

separate these two concepts. Where necessary, I will refer to the movement of these mixed groups of people as mixed migration. The motivation for movement can vary throughout the journey and people confront similar threats, despite their status on the journey (UNHCR 2007).

The general notion is that the EU is not attempting to abolish the right to claim asylum, but to decrease the number of people migrating irregularly and exposing themselves to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation during this journey. Nevertheless, controlling the overall movement of people also makes it more difficult for people to move to safe havens to seek asylum. I justify the use of the simplistic terms of migrant and migration with the incentives of the European Union to manage the overall movement of people. This includes the irregular movement from third countries, the secondary movement of people within the EU, the readmission of illegally staying third-country nationals and legal migration pathways to Europe (see European Commission 2017a).

I have chosen a sensitive and current topic for my thesis and though the topic is captivating, it also causes challenges for me as a researcher. The policies within the Framework are adjusted as we speak and officials from the Member States are processing the legislative packages regarding the CEAS on a monthly basis. Processes within the EU tend to proceed in a leisurely pace, especially legislative packages concerning difficult topics such as migration, but a crisis can easily alter the policies of the EU rather swiftly. I also acknowledge that the issues of migration and development are approached on a wide front of different EU policy fields, but it is in my interest to focus specifically on the tools and actions presented within the Migration Partnership Framework.

After giving a brief introduction to the topic of my thesis and the Migration Partnership Framework as the topic of my research, I will continue to present the theoretical framework for my study. This thesis takes on from the theoretical debate concerning the migration-development nexus and governance performed within this nexus. Following this short introduction to the theoretical debate in chapter 2, I will present the research method I have used and all the relevant material will be

introduced in chapter 3. This will act as an introduction to the chapters of analysis of this thesis. After the analysis, which is divided in chapters 4–6, I will continue to the conclusions of this research in chapter 7.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this thesis it is my aim to look into the ways in which the sustainable migration management paradigm is formulated under the Migration Partnership Framework and what it entails for the EU and its Member States, the partner countries of Africa and the migrants themselves. I will connect the approach of the Partnership Framework to the theoretical debate concerning the change of paradigm in migration and development policies, and how the focus is shifting towards utilising the capacity and resilience that lie in the populations that are prone to migration. Regarding the topic of my thesis, essential authors in this field are Jonathan Joseph, David Chandler and David Harvey. The thoughts of Michel Foucault concerning governmentality are also important for my study. Within this thesis, I will present the ways in which the EU is attempting to address past defective policies concerning third countries and to create a new paradigm of sustainable migration management, and evaluate whether these approaches are a new resolution as the EU has stated.

This thesis takes on from the conception, that we live a neoliberal world order. According to David Harvey (2005, 19, 17) neoliberalisation can be described as a political project that is designed to restore the power of the elites, and at the same time, subjugate marginalised populations to surveillance and policing. Instead of setting nations and populations free, neoliberalism establishes re-regulation and oligopolistic privileges that are designed to impose market discipline on the weak and poor (Sparke 2006, 154, 156). Foucault points out that governing does not occur due to the markets, but for the markets, and the principle of liberalism as delimitating governmentality fits poorly this agenda (Foucault 2008, 121). Despite this, adherence to the regulations is monitored closely, and supervision is imposed on the poor and the weak. Even human rights norms are being ignored in the specially crafted spaces of exception for human rights norms (Sparke 2006, 175).

Several theories associated with globalisation comprehend globalisation as the reinforcement of neoliberal ideas stating that we are rational subjects taking responsibility for our own lives and monitoring our own behaviour (Joseph 2012, 8). Neoliberalism is supposedly setting us free and empowering people to live their lives to the fullest. This is something that the rationality of liberal governmentality takes use of. (Joseph 2012, 11.) Globalisation and neoliberalism are used to justify various policies that seek to present the logic of the free market and capital as the only possible alternative (Joseph 2012, 13). As a theory of political economic practices, neoliberalism suggests that the framework consisting of free markets, free trade and strong property rights is the key in promoting human well-being. The role of the state is narrowed down to ensure that the institutional framework is suitable for the liberation of individual entrepreneurial freedoms. (Harvey 2005, 2.)

2.1. Liberalism as an Art of Government

Liberalism can be described as an art of government, which recognises the limits of state power and at the same time determines to be left outside the political sphere, which itself is necessary for the art of government (Dean 2010, 64). The paradox of life as an autonomous domain, but on the other hand, as an object of administration (Dean 2010, 118) causes turmoil when debating the role of the individual under liberal governance. Foucault demonstrates that there are distinct, heterogeneous ways in portraying freedom. At the same time, freedom is conceived as independence from the governing, but simultaneously, as the act of possessing rights. (Foucault 2008, 42.)

The general concept of governmentality was first introduced by Michel Foucault, but he did not present a comprehensive definition of the concept, and thus various actions can be depicted as belonging to the governmentality discourse. The rather general definition of governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is focused on the individual level and on the subtle practices that are used to govern the population as a whole. These practices that are conducting social conduct, go beyond state power and operate subtle methods of power through a network of institutions, procedures and techniques. (Joseph 2010, 225.) It should be noted that Foucault did not aim at

the abolition of state sovereignty, but at the triangle of discipline, sovereignty and government. He was interested in the ways in which the disciplinary and governmental techniques of government affect sovereignty. (Joseph 2012, 23–24.)

Liberalism as a rationality of governance operates, according to Foucault, in a sense that freedom of the governed is respected, and that things ought to take their natural course (Joseph 2012, 25). Governance operates from distance and guides the population to make right decision and live their lives in a useful manner. Foucault's focus on the liberal element of rule separates the power presented in governmentality from other forms of power. The private sphere and civil society are harnessed to act as a disguise for the promotion of 'market discipline', and all this occurs in the name of freedom. (Joseph 2012, 26.) Governmentality itself is not something that acts, but it influences the actors who formulate various policies and implement programmes. It affects the steps taken, but it is also affected by actions, hence, the difficulty of defining governmentality in a comprehensive manner (Joseph 2012, 66).

Jonathan Joseph points out the problematic of the governmentality approach in societies that are not conforming to the characteristics of liberal societies. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund represent international organisations that are promoting governmentality in areas that are quite different from the areas where the ideas of governmentality first took place. The functioning of these organisations demonstrates the conflict between the neoliberal rationality of advanced liberal societies and the reality of divergent international situations. (Joseph 2012, 4–5.) In the situation where the governmentality approach is attempted to apply to an unsuitable community, the term 'failed governmentality' could become applicable (Joseph 2012, 50). Governmentality is useful when the goal is to understand the policies of international organisations, but these policies should not be considered as automatically successful. Drive towards governmentality and the actual practical consequences are two separate debates, and the contradiction between the areas where the practices have been formulated, and where their application is attempted, should be remembered. (Joseph 2012, 18.)

Joseph does not rule out the option that certain parts of the world could be capable of formulating their own kind of governmentality, but the will and eagerness of Western international organisations make this a difficult task. Practices carried out in the name of improving the well-being of the local people are highly dubious, since the civil society that they attempt to revive is not in keeping with its Western counterparts. The approach of 'building institutions for markets' might include viable options, but the concrete practices can be quite far from the ideals of improving local well-being. The variety of societies and communities is usually forgotten when implementing practices developed in different environments, and development is imposed from the point of view of advanced liberal countries. (Joseph 2012, 51.) The governmentality approach itself is harnessed to make use of the construction of global problems and portraying free markets and competitiveness as the solution (Joseph 2012, 73). The ability to step outside the traditional view is a prerequisite for developmental operations to succeed.

In my thesis, the idea of governmentality on the state level is sensible, since my attention is on the practices trying to hinder the irregular movement of people and save lives on these dangerous journeys, but in fact, the practices are targeted to mould the government practices. Joseph takes the European Union as an example of an institution that is governing through distance, through the regulation of state behaviour. The success of these practices should not be evaluated on the basis of their effects on the population, but on the basis of altered behaviour of governments and state institutions. (Joseph 2012, 19.) Joseph also points out that when looking at international organisations, it is more fruitful to evaluate the success of governmentality on the global level, rather than on the local or micro level. Governmentality on the global level, as a global form of regulation of state practices, brings more insight to the development agendas of international organisations. (Joseph 2012, 20.)

Governance itself is a big concept and attempting to define it or measure its success may indeed hinder our understanding of it (Joseph 2012, 257). Joseph (2012, 90–91) attempts to define it as following:

Global governance is a pluralistic concept, which appears to refer to governance on a wider scale, a scale that goes beyond the nation state and national authorities. Though, there is no world government and it is mainly based on political coordination and decision-making. One point of view to global governance is that it is the only alternative when addressing instability and risks that have an influence on us all.

2.2. International Institutions and Governance

International institutions, the World Bank and the IMF as examples, were established in order to gain some order and stability in the postwar and to regulate the economy. Neoliberal ideas and granting conditional loans for poorer countries in order to liberalise their markets were questioned at the end of the 1990s. More attention was given to the idea of good governance and securing the economic surroundings so that free markets could better operate. In this formulation of ideas, Foucault's view of neoliberalism as affecting the micro level operations became evident. Structural adjustment policies were no longer the viable solution, and instead, good governance and the inclusion of local governments became the recommended approach. Though, good governance is not different to other forms of governmentality and it, too, is regulating from a distance and supporting right policy choices and monitoring the implementation of these. Loans and other forms of assistance are tied to good governance, and it is expected that the markets will prosper in those conditions. (Joseph 2012, 96–97.)

Foucault focused on governmentality within populations, but several authors have pointed out the urgent need to expand the notion to include also actors beyond the state. Barry Hindess suggests that the government within states and the government of states within the international sphere are connected, and the state system itself conducts the conduct of states, but also the conduct of populations within states (Hindess 2002, 129). According to Jonathan Joseph, the logic behind the re-emergence of states as the main operator of development within international institutions can be credited for the structural conditions of global markets, security issues and global unevenness. Governance in this context has taken a step back from

going 'beyond the state', and focusing on the regulation of state, since the state is the prime actor when discussing the functioning of the markets, the removal of barriers for trade and labour, and encouragement to investment. (Joseph 2012, 66.) State officials implement various tools for monitoring the behaviour of the population and the risk-taking of the individuals, and introduce benchmarking systems to register the best practices (Joseph 2012, 74).

For international organisations, governance has meant that global issues are best resolved through cooperation, stakeholding and networking. According to international organisations, there is no such problem that could not be solved by getting all the parties around the one table. (Walters 2012, 66.) The partnerships between various actors, such as NGOs, social partners and private sector are considered as resources for the governance project that strives towards creating a knowledge-based economy (Walters & Haahr 2005, 121). In the Framework and generally in European policies we see this urge to harness partnerships and cooperation with the private sector to unite to combat problems of the global world. One of these problems is the unequal division of wealth, prosperity and possibilities between the North and the South. The framework of good governance has been summoned to assist countries in need to cope with problems connected with the globalised world. This includes approaches such as facilitating sustainable development and promoting social peace, democracy and the rule of law. (Chandler 2010, 1.)

Nevertheless, it is also summoned to respond to global issues such as the risk that underdevelopment poses. As Mark Duffield (2014, 7) has stated, the excluded and underdeveloped need to be under surveillance in order to control this risk that is associated to the underdeveloped. The poor need to be empowered into the allies and self-acting agents of liberal peace (Duffield 2014, 126). The process of developing societies necessitates the understanding that the measures to be taken are for the benefit of all. The view of global governance, regarding the future, needs to be absorbed in order for liberal peace to prosper. The problem with this ideal is that the poor cannot always be trusted to choose the right leaders to guide them through the necessary social changes (Duffield 2014, 127). The approach that the EU has chosen,

that is managing migration through partnerships, suggests that the EU is the ideal partner in helping countries of origin and transit to transform their institutions in order to tackle problems caused by the global economy and unequal distribution of wealth.

2.3. Development and Self-Reliance in Managing Migration

The risks and possible threats that are developing in the underdeveloped South are best confronted by liberal peace that is attempting to secure stability through development, partnership, self-management and participation. The idea of partnership emphasises the shared view that the propositions made by the North are for the best, and people in the South are embracing these new forms of acting, with the help of carrots and sticks. (Duffield 2014, 34.) Regulating individuals and helping them to exercise their liberties in a responsible manner, is a key element when discussing security in accordance with liberalism (Dean 2010, 139). Development is used to pursue security and security is needed in order to promote sustainable development (Duffield 2014, 37).

The emergence of development assistance has been associated with the Second World War and its aftermath in the form of the US Marshall Plan (Duffield 2007, 38). It was created as a response to the dislocation of European people and as an antidote to the Soviet power haunting Europe that was recovering from the war. According to developmentalism, development is for the benefit of all and that is why all states should contribute to it (Koponen 2009, 39). One of the problems concerning development is that it can refer to several different concepts and have various meanings. Development primarily interferes with the social processes of the society being developed, be it poverty reduction or modernisation. (Koponen 2009, 40.)

Debate on development policy has superseded the debate on development aid, and the tools of development are about empowering the people. Development policy includes aid, but is also composed of practices that promote economic development and the welfare of poorer countries. The concept of aid gives a more truthful insight

to the policies, since using the concept of cooperation mainly just fades out the power relations visible in development practices. (Koponen 2009, 38.) In addition, aid should not be used to replace government responsibility for its citizens, in contrast, it should build the capacity of the receiving government and include all stakeholders, so that development occurs for the benefit of all (Wiman 2009, 78).

The Marshall Aid was successful and the idea behind that was transferred to different contexts. In the case of Africa, development assistance is being used to address the problem of surplus population through a liberal and educative trusteeship (Duffield 2007, 45). Trusteeships and partnerships are the route the EU is taking with its African partners when tackling the migration influxes. Neoliberalism has cultivated the goal of development into the objective of promoting sustainability through self-reliance and proofing life against future emergency (Duffield 2007, 67). Achieving well-being through proper management of life requires the proper functioning of social institutions, the guarantee of access to basic services and security, and in addition, the fulfilment of social and environmental responsibilities that the public and private sector have (Wiman 2009, 73).

Development has long been associated with the objective of self-reliance but the concept of resilience has taken this a step further. Resilience as self-reliance in the context of adapting to permanent emergency, and the absence of state or social responsibility poses new qualifications on developing societies. (Duffield 2014, xxii.) It is no longer adequate to conform to the altered situation in the society, instead, life ought to be a project within the state of emergency, where it is not possible to gain permanent alleviation. For the migrants, this means the need to fight for basic needs in every day life and pursue better livelihoods at the same time. Sustainable development consists of the creation of choice and diversity, through which the people are able to make good choices about their lives and manage risks and gaining self-reliance (Duffield 2007, 115).

Amidst striving towards self-reliance and better livelihoods, migrants can also contribute to the conditions of their hosting communities. As Alexander Betts and Paul Collier (2017) have stated, there is extreme potential in refugees and migrants

and societies should be more eager to use this hidden capacity. The current EU response to the crisis is focused on the economic aspects of improving partner countries' capability to respond to the needs of the people seeking better opportunities. Aid is no longer poured into African countries, but instead, the emphasis is shifted towards emphasising the capacity-building of those societies and enabling development from within the partner countries. Technology has come a long way and the improvements in this field make development and new forms of engagement possible in developing areas. Is this Partnership Framework then the change of paradigm that is being suggested?

3. Conducting Research within the Migration Partnership Framework

3.1. Research Material

The research material consists of European Union documents concerning the Migration Partnership Framework and its implementation. The European Commission has released reports on the progress of the Framework and I will include the published progress reports in this research. In addition to the progress reports, I have also included other press material that has been published with the reports. I will not look into possible sources from partner countries, since it is the EU policy and the paradigm change within the Partnership Framework that is in my interest. The time frame of this research is narrowed down to the publication of the fifth progress report, that is, to September 2017.

By the end of April 2018, five progress reports concerning the implementation of the Partnership Framework have been published, and these reports are supplemented with country papers concerning the chosen partner countries of Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali and Senegal. The funding instruments of the Framework would have been an interesting complement to the material, but I have narrowed down their role, so that material of the European External Investment Plan (EIP)³ and the EU

³ The aim of the European External Investment Plan is to connect private investors with people with social needs and ideas to improve livelihoods. The EU invites private investors to participate in the

Emergency Trust Fund for Africa⁴ will be included to the extent that they are presented in the progress reports of the Partnership Framework. Both of these funding instruments complement the programmes targeting the abolishment of root causes of migration.

As a result of my research material consisting of various reports, press releases, fact sheets and country papers by the Commission, I have found it suitable to code these materials. Within this thesis, I will be pointing out the source by its abbreviation and code, instead of referring to the original title or the author. This will bring clarity into the text, since the European Commission is the author of these reports, and coding brings clarity into the classification of the materials. I have come to the conclusion that it is more relevant to connect my remarks to the actual document than just the author and year of the material. The full list of the material used in my analysis with the full titles and publication information will be presented in the bibliography. In the meanwhile, the codes used in the chapters of analysis are as following:

The Establishment of the Migration Partnership Framework June 2016

PR0	Press Release
FS0	Fact Sheet
MPF0	Communication of Commission
MPF0/A3	Annex 3
Sheet0	Managing the refugee crisis – a new framework for partnership, fact sheet

First Progress Report October 2016

PR1	Press Release
MPF1	First Progress Report
MPF1/A1	Annex 1
MPF1/A3	Annex 3
Sheet1	Managing the refugee crisis – a new framework for partnership, fact sheet
EIP1	EU External Investment Plan

promotion of sustainable development within countries outside the EU. (See European Commission 2017b.)

⁴ The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was established in 2015 at the Valletta Summit on Migration. The objective of the Trust Fund is to offer financial support for the implementation of the Valletta Action Plan and compliment other EU dialogues concerning migration, such as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility. Priority areas of the Trust Fund include, for example, economic development, migration management and governance. (See European Commission 2015; EUTFA4.)

Second Progress Report December 2016

PR2	Press Release
FS2	Fact Sheet
MPF2	Second Progress Report
MPF2/A2	Annex 2
Sheet2	Managing the refugee crisis – a new framework for partnership, fact sheet

Third Progress Report March 2017

PR3	Press Release
FS3	Fact Sheet
MPF3	Third Progress Report
MPF3/A1	Annex 1

Fourth Progress Report June 2017

PR4	Press Release
FS4	Fact Sheet
MPF4	Fourth Progress Report
MPF4/A1	Annex 1
EUTFA4	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

Fifth Progress Report September 2017

PR5	Press Release
FS5	Fact Sheet
MPF5	Fifth Progress Report

3.2. Research Method

Qualitative analysis is appropriate when operating with explanations and meanings that eventually lead the researcher to draw conclusions on the matter at hand. It enables the researcher to look into the real-life situation and dissect the various cause and effect relations of this situation. Research is about critical contemplation, instead of taking issues as given. (Metsämuuronen 2006, 88.) This research is based on the conception that social reality is constructed through speeches and actions, and that there is no reality as such. It is the social reality that is under investigation in qualitative research (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 63). In the case of the European Migration Partnership Framework, it is exactly the framework in question from which I have dissected the various elements that the European Union presents as

vital for the creation of a sustainable migration management paradigm. Next I will present the detailed method I have used to process the research material.

Theory guided content analysis is a method that draws its tools from the theoretical framework and guides the reading of the research material. Theory guides the observations made of the material and all other observations are left behind. These reduced observations are then categorised and used to solve the research question at hand. (Alasutari 2011, 32.) The point where theory comes to guide the reasoning of the researcher is completely dependant on the researcher's choice (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 200). Research consists of two phases that interact with each other during the work. First, making reduced observations from the material and secondly linking these observations with previous research and the theoretical framework (Alasutari 2011, 39). Within the theory guided approach, the researcher has to juggle between the material and the theory, and manage to fit pieces into a puzzle, sometimes with force. As a result, something new and unexpected might come up (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 97).

In this research, I have chosen to structure my analysis around the concept of partnership. The emphasis on partnerships in development cooperation and international migration management attempts to promote a 'win-win-win' solution in order to tackle the root causes of displacement. The parties in this 'win-win-win' framework are the sending and receiving countries and the migrants (Kunz et al. 2011, 2). In the case of the European Migration Partnership Framework, the parties in the 'win-win-win' solution are the EU and its Member States, the partner countries in Africa and the migrants. I will structure the analysis around these partners and divide my chapters of analysis based on this division. In each chapter, I will dissect the elements that the Framework focuses on, regarding each party, and elaborate the implications that these elements have on managing migration in a sustainable manner.

Within these three chapters of analysis I have formed sub-categories and combined them to categories, which entail the various suggestions of best practices that the EU has on each party of the Partnership Framework. From these categories I have

formed the solution to the research question *To what extent is the Migration Partnership Framework a viable solution for the basis of a paradigm change in sustainable migration management*, and in the conclusion of this thesis, I will continue with the evaluation, whether this approach to the migration crisis is, in fact, bringing something new to the relations with third countries.

Content analysis is a useful tool for analysing all kinds of textual material, but the problem with this type of analysis is that the researcher might end up just presenting the results of the analysis, without taking the elaboration any further and drawing conclusions from the findings (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 103). I have attempted to avoid this trap by interlacing my theory with the findings from the material from an early stage on. I have presented the theoretical framework relevant to my analysis in chapter 2, and now I will continue to the actual chapters of analysis focusing on each partner of the Migration Partnership Framework in more detail.

4. The European Union Searching for Cohesion

In this chapter, I am going to elaborate on the key elements that are essential for the European Union within the Migration Partnership Framework. As a part of the ‘win-win-win’ solution that the partnership approach is attempting to provide, the EU is reaching towards a beneficial framework in managing the migratory movement to the EU. It is not only the suffering of the migrants and the poor conditions in the countries of origin that are attempted to alleviate, but also the poor condition of the EU. The EU is amidst turbulent times and faces threats and instability within and outside the region. Brexit, rising nationalism, anti-EU policies in several Member States and financial instability have diminished the faith in the European project, so a common response to the migration crisis is a suitable opportunity to gather support and strive towards a common goal. The Migration Partnership Framework stems from the needs of the EU to regulate irregular migration and establish uniform practices in Member States, and hence the Migration Partnership Framework is more than significant for the EU.

The EU has traditionally acted as the donor country in developmental partnerships. According to the Commission, the EU is the world's largest humanitarian and development aid donor, giving more than half of Official Development Assistance (ODA) worldwide (FS0, 6; Sheet0, 3). The EU is now trying to struggle away from its position as the mere donor in development cooperation. The EU has realised that traditional development cooperation is not enough when it comes to pursuing sustainable development goals, and hence other tools are necessary to make the best use of limited funds (EIP1, 2). Dissecting the ways in which migration could benefit development, for example in the form of remittances to the countries of origin and transit, is one approach that has gained popularity within international organisations (Lavenex & Kunz 2008, 441). Development assistance is no longer the mere funding instrument of development policies, but the importance of private investors and migrants' own contribution is one of the focal points of the Framework.

One of the positive aspects for the EU is the establishment of a prolific economic environment in the partner countries. The technical assistance that is exported within the framework of the External Investment Plan (EIP) is targeted at improving the conditions of the local private sector in partner countries, so that the European businesses are able to invest and co-operate within those markets (EIP1, 3). This is one important incentive that the EU uses to gain Members States' support and contribution to the common objective of enhancing cooperation with third states.

By giving responsibility to the partner countries of Africa and enforcing the resilience of migrants, the EU can also be viewed as promoting its role as a global actor. The EU is no longer merely an internal project within the European continent, but a global actor that promotes its interests in the furthest locations of the world, since in a globalised world, distances have became shorter and shorter and crises in the remotest locations affect also the European Union and its Member States. It is no longer adequate that the EU takes action once the issues at hand affect the EU directly on its frontiers. Hence, the EU is balancing between its roles as a global actor and at the same time attempting to focus on issues that affect the Member States directly, since dissatisfaction towards the Union's actions has risen, and leaders need to gather support for the European project itself. The migration crisis offers a possibility to do

this, since it affects directly the Member States and is visible to the citizens of the European Union.

This first chapter of analysis is divided into two subchapters where the elements of the Framework are dissected. In the first paragraph, I will focus on the internal aspects of the Partnership Framework for the EU, and in the second subchapter concluding this chapter, I will focus on the external aspects. After this chapter of analysis focusing on the EU as a partner in this Framework, I will move on to the implications the Framework has for the partner countries of Africa.

4.1. The European Union Stepping up its Internal Policies

Within the EU Member States, there appears to be a wide scale of reactions when it comes to the increased migration flow to the EU. These views vary from Angela Merkel's '*Wir schaffen das*'⁵ to the Visegrád Group, consisting of the Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, who are stating that the relocation of migrants operates as a pull factor for irregular migration and increases the influx of people seeking asylum in the EU. According to the Visegrád Group, the EU should strive towards a result-oriented and effective approach to the migration crisis and this is also emphasised in the Commission documents concerning the Framework. (See Visegrád Group 2016, European Commission 2017a). Even though gaining control over the irregular flows of people is the common goal for the EU and its Member States, the view on the measures to be taken varies rather significantly depending on the country. It is thus a challenge for the EU to gather these various stances and negotiate a common approach that is accepted by all Member States. Cooperation and involvement of the Member States in the Framework is essential for its success (MPF1, 3). Formulating uniform, structured and systematic policies on asylum and migration is a key strategy for the EU to decrease the amount of irregular movement (MPF0, 5), but the negotiations concerning these policies are rather challenging.

⁵ During a press conference in August 2015, Angela Merkel stated that '*Wir haben so vieles geschafft – wir schaffen das*' as addressing the migration crisis that was facing Europe. Her opponents took the phrase as an open invitation for migrants and asylum seekers to come to Germany. According to an interview, Merkel only meant to reflect her guideline in life with that phrase. (Die Welt 2017; Delcker 2016.)

European Asylum policies are commonly thought to be based on the lowest common denominator, but Natascha Zaun has revealed that this might not be the case. In her study she proposes that the policies are formed according to the interests of strong regulating Member States that are situated in Northwestern Europe. Since the beginning of the cooperation in asylum policies, these countries have used the system to promote responsibility-sharing and subjugate their own protection standards on weaker regulators who tend to be the Southern states of the EU. A salient characteristic of a strong regulator is extensive expertise in the processing of asylum claims and well-functioning administration. Though Member States are criticised for a race to the bottom and national legislation on asylum procedures have indeed been reviewed, Zaun proposes that this race to the bottom is partially an illusion. Revision of national asylum legislation occurs independently based on the political decisions within that country though the revision might seem to be premised on EU legislation. (Zaun 2017, 13–16.)

Southern states, which are in the frontline when people arrive in Europe, are also in the frontline when common European asylum policies are being drafted. The negotiations are based on the will of the stronger states and for them the approach of the lowest common denominator does not cause trouble, since their asylum legislation already fills these requirements. The Southern states of Italy, Greece and Portugal, which are already under duress due to the influx of refugees, are then burdened with demands to improve and transform their asylum legislation in accordance with the standards negotiated by the stronger states such as Germany, France, Sweden, the UK and the Netherlands. (Zaun 2017, 13–16.) The strain caused by asylum seekers in different Member States varies quite clearly, and it is the Southern Member States that have been more eager to re-evaluate the burden-sharing and solidarity clauses of the EU (see European Commission 2017b). Solidarity among Member States is the aim of the EU, but the content of solidarity is under debate.

The Migration Partnership Framework is not directly connected with the Commission legislative proposals and processes attempting to improve the Common European

Asylum System (CEAS), but these proposals are promoted in the spirit of the Framework. During negotiations with third countries, the planned improvements concerning legal migration routes are used as an incentive for third countries to upgrade their actions. The Framework calls for the harmonisation of European policies on asylum and migration, and presents this harmonisation as the prerequisite for the success of the Framework. Member States will continue common action on the external dimension of the Framework, and simultaneously improve procedures and operations inside the EU (PR1). Based on the study Natascha Zaun has conducted, it is most likely the stronger Member States and their interests that will guide the negotiations on improved operations inside the EU. The role of the stronger regulating states has been seen as problematic, since the weaker regulating states are the first countries to be affected by the irregular flows of people to the European region. This causes distrust between Member States and makes a uniform response to the crisis challenging. Progress has been achieved in organising cooperation, but more could be done as the Commission states:

However, a coordinated and coherent EU/Member State approach has not materialised in all cases. More needs to be done to avoid lack of coordination and ensure full transparency and information exchange between EU and Member States on actions being prepared. Positions need to be better aligned, common messaging used, and EU-level efforts and bilateral cooperation need to mutually reinforce each other. (MPF4, 12.)

Despite the varying stances Member States have on the cooperation with third countries and on the tools to combat irregular migration, the EU and its Member States are encouraged to strive towards a common and coordinated approach and speak with a single, strong voice (MPF0, 7). When responsibility for the cooperation with third countries is given to the EU and its Commission, the responsibility and capabilities of individual Member States diminish in tandem with this development. The role of the Member States is presented as the role of the provider that brings the offers to the table and then the Commission operates based on these contributions, whether diplomatic, technical or financial (Sheet0, 1; PR0, 1). A common response to the crisis is the most effective response, and this provides the EU the opportunity to

wave aside the views of the individual Member States. The EU operates on a similar basis to neoliberal governmentality, where a common framework of action is used to build consensus among governments and institutions (Joseph 2012, 131–132).

When negotiating common views on the management of migration and EU policies concerning development, the various interests of the Member States and their competence needs to be taken into account. Migration has been one of the key priorities of EU development cooperation alongside issues such as security, trade and climate. In these various fields of development cooperation, the competence of the EU is exclusive, parallel or supplementary to the competence of the Member States. For example, the EU holds exclusive competence in the field of trade, but within areas such as climate change and development aid, the competence is shared between the EU and the Member States. (Maxwell 2016, 1; Faure et al. 2015,11.) The Partnership Framework enables these policy fields to be combined under the Framework and under the coordination of the EU. ‘All EU policies including education, research, climate change, energy, environment, agriculture, should in principle be part of a package, bringing maximum leverage to the discussion’ (MPF0, 9).

In addition to requiring the Member States to come to align the EU positions on migration, the EU demands the Member States to subordinate their productive relations to the use of the Partnership Framework. Some Member States have formed good relationships based on cultural and historic ties with third countries for decades, and according to the EU, these relationships are essential when delivering compacts with partner countries. (MPF0, 8; FS0, 4.) This use of bilateral relationships has been successful to a limited extent and the Commission invites more Member States to participate proactively in order to gain the best leverage (MPF4, 12–13). The EU appears to have different standards for different Member States and it puts the States with good external relations to a situation where they ought to endanger these relations for the common good.

4.2. The External Aspect of European Union policies

The European Union is a substantial actor in the international community and the Union has its own High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS), which was launched in 2011 following the Lisbon Treaty (European External Action Service 2016). The EEAS has an important role in coordinating cooperation with third countries and promoting the interests of the EU abroad. The current High Representative Federica Mogherini has been a visible figure when the Commission is taking its proposals concerning migration management to the public. The increased migratory pressure from 2015 onwards has enabled noteworthy investments in EU external relations and boosting the role of the EU as a global actor. Within the Framework, the EU invites other global actors to participate in the challenges brought by humanitarian crises globally. The success of sustainable migration management and the abolishment of root causes of migration depend on the actions taken by international institutions. As a global phenomenon, migration is to be addressed in a coordinated and sustainable manner in cooperation of all parties, including the private sector (EIP1, 1).

The EU has a history of contributing to the abolishment of the root causes of migration and promoting sustainable development. ‘Through its long-standing development cooperation, the EU has assisted African countries in a number of different sectors (governance, sustainable agriculture, infrastructure, energy, health, education, peace, security, trade, economic growth and job creation and migration) and has attained tangible results as regards the Millennium Development Goals’ (FS0, 6). Based on these priority areas, the EU continues to improve the implementation rate of its policies.

4.2.1. Sharing Global Responsibility

The EU has drafted programmes and policy guidelines to respond to the challenges migration has brought to the frontline of the EU but at the same time highlights that migration is a global phenomenon and requires a global response. Due to this, the EU invites UN and other international organisations, such as Interpol, International

Organisation for Migration⁶, the International Red Cross and other non-governmental organisations to participate in the project of managing migration in a sustainable manner. Besides NGOs and other organisations working with migrants, refugees and internally displaced people, the EU invites financial institutions and development banks, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), to contribute to the project. To a growing extent also the private sector is encouraged to view the African partners as an opportunity for future investment. (FS0, 4.) The Member States and other partners are invited to match the contribution made by the EU to improve business environment in the partner countries (PR0).

The EU emphasises that the current framework of funding development is not sufficient and new proposals from financial institutions are necessary (EIP1, 2). Within the paradigm of international statebuilding, the role of financial institutions is seen as the checks and balances. Addressing issues brought on by the globalising world, external expertise is required in order to establish functioning structures of good governance. International institutions are given various roles when delivering this external expertise. Financial institutions are necessary for reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development and external advisors are used in various fields, such as judicial reform and educational development. This external expertise is not necessarily operated on a formal level of international administration, but is nevertheless essential when good governance is embedded. (Chandler 2010, 103.)

International institutions assist with the appliance of rules that allow the expansion of the dominant economic and social forces. Simultaneously, they are keen to rely on exceptions when problematic situations occur, and rules are to be bent in various situations. It was already the Bretton Woods institutions that used conditionality to transform national policies in compliance with the goal of a liberal world economy. (Cox 1996, 138.) The current institutional pluralism is beneficial for the advocates of globalisation, since in the absence of a world government, they are able to bend the rules in more innovative manners (Gill 2002, 239). The ruling elites have advantage over the developing areas and they are able to impose regulation in favour of their

⁶ Cooperation and coordination with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has shown signs of intensification. For example, IOM has been contracted to implement the humanitarian repatriation and reintegration of migrants in Libya under the EU Trust Fund for Africa. (PR3, FS3.)

own needs. The formulation of the Partnership Framework is drafted as a response to the needs of the EU to gain control over irregular migration flows and it is calling other institutions to participate in this project.

4.2.2. Exporting Good Governance to Third Countries

For the past twenty years, the popular approach to promoting development in third countries has been the export of good governance practices, commonly understood as the democratic governance and other institutional features from advanced market economies (Booth 2011, 8). Also the EU has experience from this field of action, and it promotes good governance in its Neighbourhood within the Framework. David Chandler (2010, 94) has pointed out that the history, which the EU has, with policy interventions and projects including the export of rule of law and good governance, can be included in the framework of international statebuilding.

David Chandler states that the EU's external governance agenda represents the reproduction of a post-liberal discourse. Chandler has looked into the ways in which the EU's discourse of governance enables the use of regulatory power in Southeastern Europe, where countries like Albania and Macedonia are preparing themselves for their membership in the EU. Characteristic of this approach of the liberal paradigm is the establishment of administrative and regulative frameworks that are presented as the prerequisite for democratic choices. This enables the EU to export good governance and evaluate the capacities of the partner country in reaching the benchmarks the EU has deemed suitable. (Chandler 2010, 94–95.) Though the Partnership Framework is not about the accession of the African partner countries to the EU, the process of exporting EU know-how on migration management is comparable to the processes of trimming states that are keen to join the EU.

Within the European Union, the style of governance is promoted through encouragement and enablement, in the forms of 'partnerships' and 'fostering cooperation'. It should be noted that the style of persuasion works only when operated within a certain world-view, and that world-view is formulated by the EU and non-negotiable (Joseph 2012, 189.) However, this strategy of the European Union

is being exported to non-EU countries. It has been included in the strategies promoting security through partnerships, and now it is being implemented in operations controlling migration through partnerships. The role of the European Commission would be to define the agenda and encourage the ‘partner’ to commit to the goals of the agenda, and give assistance and technical support in order to reach the imposed goals, and monitor the adherence through benchmarking (Joseph 2012, 211).

The EU declares that support from the EU is conditional, and future aid and financing will depend on the level of cooperation and success of the partner countries. The EU monitors the fulfilment of requirements and steps that have been taken, and reaching benchmarks is controlled. One of the key areas that the EU is monitoring is the readmission and return of migrants. For example, visa policies with designated partners are used to boost the amount of actual returns. (MPF5, 2–3.) It is a relationship of control that is present in the Framework, but in the name of partnership. Within the post-liberal paradigm, the rights of the state are conditional and depend on the ability to absorb good governance, and from the individual’s point of view, dependent on the level of commitment to supporting good governance. (Chandler 2010, 92.) However, it is always the other that is formulating the concept of good governance and what benchmarks are chosen for control purposes. The partners have little say in this, if any.

Introducing benchmarking as a form of monitoring the progress of partner countries is one visible tool of the Partnership Framework. Tore Fougner has elaborated on the concept of benchmarking as a tool of governing and guiding the behaviour of states in a more rational direction. Reports that are promoted as providing objective knowledge of economic conditions of different countries may, in fact, be in a key position when it comes to the neoliberal rationality of government. Abundance of research has been conducted on governmentality in the context of populations, but also governmentality on the state level needs to be noticed and the research concerning benchmarking fulfils this void to some extent. Benchmarking can be described as belonging the neoliberal rationality of measuring the performance of

subjects, and transformed to governed objects in this process. (Fougner 2008, 303, 318.)

Benchmarking operates through introducing norms and standards that illustrate the intended objectives and best practices. Comparison and the set example are intended to function in a sense that countries then absorb the norms and standards in their daily practice and the goal of benchmarking is achieved. (Fougner 2008, 318.) Despite the function of benchmarking as persuasion, the imposing party does not resort to coercion when motivating states to improve their practices, instead, the party, who is introducing the measures, operates from a distance and encourages the states to govern themselves in a rational manner. Some countries have absorbed the neoliberal tune independently, but in many cases the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) make use of their ability to discipline states involved. The goal is to harness states to provide suitable conditions for mobile firms and capital (Fougner 2008, 321–323.)

The promotion of partnerships within the Framework is relying on cooperation with third countries and on the processes of development that stem within the third countries. Persuading the third party to cooperate and helping them realise that the European response is the best approach to be taken is visible in the Framework: ‘These relationships will be guided by the ability and willingness of the countries of origin to cooperate on migration management, notably in effective preventing of irregular migration and readmitting irregular migrants’ (MPF0, 6). Best practices from previous partnerships are used as catalysts for future cooperation. As an example, the cooperation with Turkey is used as a model example of mutual benefit, since the influx of vulnerable people seeking to cross the Aegean Sea has diminished, and in addition to that, there has been an increase in humanitarian assistance granted to Turkey and more legal pathways to the EU are being opened. (PR0, 2; MPF0, 2.) With these success stories the EU is promoting itself as the noteworthy partner whose suggestions should be taken into careful consideration and implementation.

5. The Promotion of Sustainable Migration Management Tools

The Migration Partnership Framework introduces policies and different tools for countries of origin and transit to reduce the flows of irregular migrants and improve the quality of life within those societies. Within the Framework, the EU has acknowledged the reality that '[t]he current situation means a heavy burden on natural resources such as water, the deterioration of relations between refugees and host communities and decreasing access to education, health services and jobs' (MPF1, 10). The EU uses this as an opportunity to persuade countries of origin and transit to cooperate with the EU and adopt EU priorities. Development projects in the partner countries are aimed at better managing migration and helping people build a future in their own country. From the European perspective, political, social and economic factors are essential when addressing root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration (Sheet0, 2). Supporting the management of irregular migration in the partner countries, in order to stem the amount of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea and arriving to Europe, is a key priority for the EU.

Capacity-building has a central role in the Partnership Framework, and the EU has adopted the definition of capacity used by the OECD, which states that "capacity' is understood as the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully' (Zamfir 2017). However, this focus on capacity-building processes is criticised for creating an elite that is the embodiment of international organisations rather than the people from the grass-roots level (Joseph 2012, 232). Traditional development and humanitarian aid have shifted their focus to creating processes that manage migration and keep people put in their countries of origin. As stated, 'projects supporting law enforcement entities and projects contributing to better migration management and facilitating return, to support consolidation of civil register systems and creating economic and employment opportunities in regions with high migration potential are in the pipeline' (MPF1, 8). In addition, the EU focuses on improving the technical and institutional capabilities of the countries of origin and transit, so that the state authorities in those countries are able to establish extensive records and procedures to track people and their activities. Also the

development of criminal justice systems is one key feature in the process of capacity-building (MPF0, 7).

This chapter of analysis will look into the ways in which the Migration Partnership Framework establishes sustainable and useful solutions for migration management in the partner countries of Africa. Responsibility is given to the individual and society in order to create more optimistic livelihoods close to home. The Framework vows to abolish root causes of migration and these root causes are mainly addressed through building up countries' own abilities to tackle irregular migration and ease the pressure towards Europe. This Framework introduces new programmes that make the most of technological leaps and provides us a new approach to the migration-development nexus. Experience will tell, to what extent these programmes are beneficial for the partner countries. In this first subchapter, I will first elaborate on the implications the Framework brings to the cooperation with partner countries regarding capacity-building. After this I will proceed to the second subchapter and dissect the role of economic development.

5.1. Building the Capacity of the Partner Countries

The European Union and its Member States are commonly known for their extensive population registries and functional institutions concerning security. The EU is attempting to export these well-operated and well-managed institutions to the partner countries of Africa. This is done through training and granting funds for the establishment of various systems and procedures that are essential for institutions to function in a sustainable manner. From this perspective, sustainable migration management presumes that migration ought to be controlled and processed in the partner countries in the same way it is done in the EU. Supporting state institutions that are responsible for the security sector is one key priority for the EU (MPF0, 15). At the same time, democracy education and peace-building are not on top of the agenda of the EU. This can be seen as promoting the idea of a neoliberal state. It favours government by executive order and juridical decision rather than having a strong democratic and parliamentary decision-making body (Harvey 2005, 66).

The European project itself is formulated around the idea of governmentality and the promotion of regulation and freedoms. Subjects are seemingly free, but regulation coming from EU is limiting the freedoms of these subjects. (Joseph 2012, 75.) This also occurs within the external relations of the EU. Partnerships and empowerment are used to lure external parties to the network of control and monitoring, where the EU is imposing its own policies and the external partner takes responsibility for the implementation of these policies (Joseph 2012, 99). Focusing on financial and technical support, and expertise in the name of partnership is one way of fading out the exploitative relations between the North and the South (Joseph 2012, 240).

Common goals are drafted, and development in various fields of cooperation is monitored with benchmarks. Partner countries are persuaded and bound to participate in the common agenda, and willing countries, which are able to reach the objectives, are rewarded with greater benefits. (PR0, 1; MPF1, 3.) This is familiar from the programmes of the World Bank and other international organisations that use the notion of accountability to further their agenda. Ownership in this sense is limited to following the instructions and advice given by the partner, implementing the given ideas and striving towards the common target. Governmentality concerning these states infers that partner countries are free to exercise their freedoms, but in fact, are regulated and monitored throughout their performance. (Joseph 2012, 249.) The assumption is that partner countries will come on board this agenda, but the EU has acknowledged that resistance to cooperation has re-emerged (MPF4, 2). Threatening to withdraw aid and donor support has been one of the leverages of international organisations in situations where programmes are not implemented in the way they should be (Joseph 2012, 249).

5.1.1. The Capacity to Monitor

One key characteristic feature of the Partnership Framework has been the eagerness of the EU to export monitoring and surveillance technologies and procedures to the partner countries. Better managing migration includes establishing functioning civil registries with fingerprint or biometric digitalisation as well as capacity-building on the borders (MPF0, 7; MPF1, 10). The EU itself is developing more extensive

mechanisms to monitor the movement of people within and to the European common area. Now it seeks to export these mechanisms to its neighbouring areas that are prone to migration. This capacity-building operation reflects the neoliberal doctrine that relies on coercive legislation and policing tactics, meaning that forms of surveillance and policing multiply (Harvey 2005, 77).

Within the EU Migration Partnership Framework, the EU is presenting various policy tools and techniques, which it has found suitable, to be implemented in third states. These include, for instance, the establishment of registries to monitor the flow of people and tracking down criminal networks (MPF1, 5). As Mark Duffield (2014, 7) has stated, the excluded and underdeveloped need to be under surveillance in order to control this risk that is associated to underdevelopment. It is the freedom of the migrant to act freely that is posing a threat to the European community. Managing and containing the non-insured life in the name of security is, from the liberal perspective, the main purpose of development and aid to underdeveloped populations (Duffield 2007, 24). The partner countries are supported in 'addressing gaps in their legislative and institutional framework to counter migrant smuggling, including ratification of and commitment to implement the UN protocol on migrant smuggling' (FS0, 3).

The models for these registries have been created within the EU and are now being exported to the third countries. Whether these registries are actually necessary for third countries, or whether they are being implemented in the third countries for the benefit of the EU, is debatable. When exporting technology and registries, one also needs to bare in mind the question of who has the entry to the databases. In Senegal, the EU has stated that also the consulates would have the access to the central fingerprints database, in order to speed up the identification processes (MPF4, 6). The importance of registries brings us to the question of the role of monitoring as the key to sustainably managing migration.

The European Union Member States have various registries where the biometric information of their citizens and people residing in the country are stored. As one aspect of the cooperation between the EU and the third countries, is the

establishment of civil registries and fingerprint or biometric digitalisation (MPF1, 8). The strengthening of these databases is a repeated objective of the EU, and the expertise of Member States in processing these registries should be exported to third countries that are dealing with migratory pressure. Enhanced registries are used to support the return operations of migrants and ease the issuance of missing travel documents (FS3, 3). It is a common practice among the OECD countries that ample investments have been made in order to establish and develop new technology to be used in gathering information of the population into various databases (Gill 2002, 178–179). Technological development within and beyond the EU is a crucial aspect of managing migration in a more sustainable way, since it enables the surveillance of individuals on the move.

Regional approaches, including cooperation among countries and state officials and information sharing in the targeted areas, are in the interests of the EU, since regional approaches to border management and control of mobility facilitate the recognition of smuggling and trafficking networks. Training local authorities at a strategic and operational level on border management and security (FS0, 6–7) builds up capacity of the authorities to control the irregular movement of people. The goal to locally manage populations efficiently from a distance can be described as a project that is attempting to legitimise the power of international institutions through imposing these regulatory practices (Joseph 2012, 104). It is the border procedures of Europe that are externalised to the neighbouring areas.

As the international security debate focuses on the armament of countries and competition of influence, surveillance technology is being developed without greater debate. Technology, used in any form, is not an objective tool in the current political context, instead, it is an essential element of the power structures that are being formulated under the supervision of the powerful states (Gill 2002, 250). Technologies that are used to monitor the population are, according to Stephen Gill's hypothesis, a component of the panopticon that is curbing the widening gap of inequality highlighted by neoliberal globalisation. China and East Asia being the exceptions, globalisation has not contributed to the eradication of inequality in an effective manner, instead, it has caused the wealthy to become wealthier and the poor

to become poorer. Structural adjustment programmes do not serve the most vulnerable people of the society, and women are the ones most likely to suffer. (Gill 2002, 255–256.) According to the EU, ‘development and neighbourhood policy tools should reinforce local capacity-building, including for border control, asylum, migrant smuggling and reintegration efforts’ (MPF0, 2). Capacity-building is mainly concerned with the control of people.

5.1.2. The Capacity to Support Communities and Non-State Actors

The neoliberal state is known for its attempts to shift the responsibility for care from the state to the individual and the civil society. This includes supporting local communities, non-governmental organisations, private contractors and the civil society itself in the field of providing public services. Solutions and innovations are to be established through entrepreneurship. (Dean & Villadsen 2016, 5–6.) The EU is harnessing private and civil society actors to participate in the project of managing migration and harnessing development. But it is not visible in the Framework, to what extent non-governmental organisations and movements on the grass-roots level are included in the programmes established through the Framework. In the case of Libya, a programme supporting resilience ‘will be carried out through existing local organisations and public service facilities. It will be implemented by a consortium of NGOs led by the Danish Refugee Council’ (EUTFA4, 3).

The objective to activate communities and regional actors is valuable, since it enables the communities to participate in the planning of these projects and take into account the various regional characteristics. As the EU has demonstrated, it has chosen in the beginning five partner countries with customised compacts in order to get the best practices running, and aims at expanding these compacts to new partners, such as Guinea and Bangladesh (MPF5, 14). Jonathan Joseph rightfully criticises the attention that the talk about partnerships, networks, NGOs and local groups has gained, since this emphasis on new progressive politics fades away the debate on where the power lies (Joseph 2012, 103). The progressiveness of the partnership approach can be questioned as the continuation of old policies and not truly shifting the ownership to the African partners.

Jonathan Joseph (2012, 226) has dissected the importance of local empowerment when building social cohesion:

The idea of country ownership requires that each country should be able to direct its own development agenda and should encourage the participation of its citizens and local groups. Partnership with stakeholders means coordination between government, donors, civil society and other groups. This focus on civil society, social capital and local empowerment is seen as the most effective way of bringing people together and building social cohesion.

International organisations have had the tendency to impose practices of governmentality from the outside on several countries without grasping the social conditions in those countries. The varieties of social capital between Western societies, from where governmentality is imposed, and partner countries is not taken into account, and the true potential of local networks and social conditions remains discarded. (Joseph 2012, 215, 224.) The Partnership Framework operates from a Western point of view and perspective of civil society and its dynamics. For example, the role of religious leaders is not addressed in the Framework as such, though they could possibly provide for essential support in empowering local communities and the civil society.

Communities and NGOs are welcomed to participate especially in the reintegration of returning migrants. Return and readmission operations are one key aspect within the Partnership Framework and successful reintegration is seen as vital, in order to prevent the need to migrate again. The EU is funding projects that 'mainly focus on providing protection and assistance to vulnerable migrants and internally displaced persons in communities and detention centres, as well as enhancing community stabilisation and countering migrant smuggling'. In addition to supporting communities that are prone to migration, the EU has stepped up the financial assistance for host communities that are reintegrating returning migrants. (MPF1,

12.) The creation of employment opportunities for local communities and migrants in the host communities is an essential feature of the Partnership Framework (MPF2, 11). These employment opportunities could include brick-making and production of jewellery as previous experience from transit centres has taught (MPF3, 3).

The EU is supporting third countries to find local solutions for deficiencies in livelihood opportunities. ‘Countries of origin face the need to help people find livelihoods and stability at home, and to manage migration locally’ (MPF0, 6). The role of diaspora has been harnessed for this purpose. Remittances play a significant role in the migrant economies in developing areas, and the EU has addressed this in the Partnership Framework. For example, in Ethiopia remittances constitute a significant part of the revenue and, in addition, Mali and Senegal have the similar tendency in their revenues (MPF1, 8–9).

5.2. Breaking the Barriers to Economic Development

The Partnership Framework portrays economic development as the key to managing migration more efficiently in the countries of origin and transit. Both public and private investment in the partner countries abolish root causes of migration as the Commission has stated:

A particularly important role should thus be played by the full range of innovative financing mechanisms that can be deployed and developed to leverage loan and grant financing, encourage public-private partnerships and crowd in private investment. If deployed intelligently, leveraged use of the limited budget resources available will generate growth and employment opportunities in source as well as transit countries and regions. The removal of bottlenecks to investment in SMEs and sustainable infrastructure should address some of the root causes of migration directly, given the high impact of such investments in terms employment and inequality reduction. (MPF0, 11.)

The answers to root causes of migration lie in private business and its investments in the developing areas that are prone to migration. Promoting development is no longer the exclusive responsibility for states that are contributing to development and humanitarian aid, but also the obligation for private businesses. Whether this brings more effective results in the empowerment processes, and reduces the migratory pressure to the EU, is to be seen in the future. Regardless the outcome, arguments questioning privatisation, marketization and responsibilisation are deemed outdated, and the objective is to increase the role of the market and normalise the monitoring of our behaviour (Joseph 2012, 147).

Though economic development is seen critical for the improvement of the quality of life in developing areas, giving responsibility to the markets to improve the situation is not the solution, as Chandler has pointed out. The problem lies within the institutional forms that are not able to function with the global capital. Hence, it is not the world economy that is causing the poor conditions of these people, but poor governance and failing institutions that need transformation. States and societies ought to become more resilient and sustainable so that they are able to conform to challenges connected to the world economy. (Chandler 2010, 7.)

David Harvey (2005, 33–33) has pointed out that the financialisation of everything is characteristic to neoliberalisation. The Partnership Framework focuses on transforming traditional development aid to supporting businesses that bring economic opportunities for migrants, refugees and their host communities. Supporting self-employment and improving the skills of young people, so that they are ready to participate in the labour market, are included in the programmes that seek to create alternative income opportunities to the people who have entered the smuggling industry (MPF2, 4). One of the most interesting observations has been that the role of education and literacy has not been emphasised in the Framework. Instead, the focus is indeed in the possibilities that lie in the employment and business opportunities in the developing region.

The World Bank is a substantial actor in providing support for developing areas and improving possibilities for better livelihoods in countries of origin. The operations of

international organisations, such as the World Bank, are criticised for their attempts to transform the structures of developing countries to better suit the Western ideology that focuses on the markets. Countries ought to provide opportunities for investment and guarantee the protection of private ownership. (Gill 2002, 201.) These structures are not naturally born, so they have to be imported from the outside and international financial institutions have remarkable power in enforcing these structures (Gill 2002, 207). Partner countries are opened to the influence of private investment that affects the internal structures of that country.

6. Building the Self-Reliance of Migrants

The objective of the European Union is to demolish root causes of migration and build developing societies so that people would have the possibility to a safe and decent life close to home (Sheet0, 2; Sheet1, 1). Less and less people would then have the urge to migrate to Europe. Building self-reliance within communities that are prone to emigration is a priority for the EU and the EU is harnessing various policy fields to tackle the irregular movement of people from these fragile communities. Policies being implemented are encouraging people to stay close to home and care for themselves and their communities. Possibilities for irregular migration are tackled through maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea and fighting traffickers' and smugglers' networks in the Southern frontier (Sheet0, 3). The message from the EU to the possible migrants living in fickle conditions is that becoming self-reliant and learning to make the most out of what the surrounding community has, is the best the EU can offer.

As the external migratory pressure has become the 'new normal' for the European Union and its partners (Sheet0, 1), the EU is concerned with the pull and push factors of migration. For example, maritime operations are seen as a pull factor, since people, who are embarking dangerous journeys in the Mediterranean Sea, will most likely be saved and brought to the common area of free movement of the EU (Tardy 2017, 4). The key to managing migration is the abolition of push factors for migration. According to the EU, these push factors include 'food insecurity combined with a

rapidly growing population, pressure on natural resources, lack of employment opportunities, and lack of governance and political freedoms.' (MPF1, 9.) The EU is attempting to tackle these challenges that are testing the living conditions of migrants in partner countries. These are also challenges that have no simple or rapid solution. The formulation of a sustainable migration management paradigm requires that the livelihoods of migrants are viewed as entities.

The empowerment of the human is at the core of the Migration Partnership Framework and its policies that are aiming at managing migration in a sustainable manner. Affecting root causes of migration improves the well-being of all parties, that is the migrants, countries of origin and the EU and its Member States. Empowerment is the key in this process, and the policies of the EU are focused on action that promotes empowerment. It is a warmly welcomed approach compared to the traditional approach of merely relying on aid, as Alexander Betts has pointed out. Regardless of the usefulness of this new approach that is focusing on empowering people, it has shortcomings as David Chandler has pointed out. 'Posing economic and social questions as problems of empowerment, of a lack of democracy and a lack of capacity, does not give agency to the marginalized and excluded; rather it places upon them the moral responsibility for the problems of the world' (Chandler 2013, 154). Hence, the question is raised, whether the people in developing areas are obliged to become empowered for their own sake or for the sake of the EU.

In order to attain long-term success in managing migration, the EU has chosen a partnership approach that entails solutions for the benefit of all parties. With regard to the Migration Partnership Framework, the EU, the partner countries of Africa and the migrants are the parties of this 'win-win-win' solution. In this last chapter of analysis, it is therefore in my interest to look into the ways in which the Partnership Framework addresses the role of the migrants in enhancing livelihoods close to home. Do the policies presented in the Partnership Framework succeed in shifting the ownership of development policies and practices to the migrants and their communities or are they the deemed as the dependent party in this partnership approach? After this final chapter of analysis, I will continue to the conclusions of this

research and present possibilities for future research topics as a continuum for this thesis.

6.1. Transition of Ownership to the Civil Society

The evolution of the development paradigm has taken a turn towards the responsibilisation of the civil society and agents within the society. Development strategies have evolved through decades, from the starting point of the 1950s and 1960s, when the focus was on state bureaucracy. From the 1970s onwards, the focus on basic needs strategies evolved, and the role of the civil society and community started to gain interest during this period of time. In the 1990s, the aspirations towards increasing the role of the civil society, local governments and the individual became obvious. ‘Ownership’ and ‘stakeholder-ship’ entered the development vocabulary. (Faist & Fauser 2011, 15.) Local agency of the civil society, and the role of diaspora as vital instruments for development have become the norm rather than the exception. As one example, ‘a support fund for investments financed by the Senegalese diaspora is a tangible demonstration of how the diaspora can help to create employment opportunities in Senegal and thus contribute to provide domestic perspectives for young people’ (MPF3, 6).

In the Partnership approach, development is used to create productive individuals who are becoming less and less reliant on development and humanitarian aid. Responsibility to strive towards better livelihoods is given to the migrants, but does the dependency on outside help truly vanish in the process of becoming self-reliant. The concept itself is from a Western point of view and the view on life in these partner countries is disregarded in the process of creating programmes to boost resilience and self-reliance. In order to create sustainable management tools for migration, the foundation of individuals, households and communities ought to be understood. The reasons behind migration are utterly researched, but the reasons behind the decisions made in individual households remain a mystery to the EU, and attempting to affect these reasons is based on guesses (Fratzke & Salant 2018, 2).

The transition of ownership in a way that enhances livelihoods is complex, since the responsibility for oneself is given to the migrants, but not the freedom to take the necessary action that the migrants see fit to develop their capabilities. The EU is concerned with migrants ignoring rules laid down by the EU (MPF0, 5) and gaining migrants to respect these rules and norms presented by the EU is great concern for its credibility as a global actor. Development ought to happen within the framework the EU has laid down and not in the manner that migrants and their communities see fit.

The possibilities presented for the migrants to enhance their livelihoods include local empowerment, but also 'legal pathways to the EU, notably through the recognition of qualifications and circular migrations, facilitation of intra-African mobility, investment in critical infrastructure and creating economic opportunities and employment in key sectors such as agriculture' (MPF1, 7). The EU requires the resources of Member States to provide for legal migration pathways to Europe and these pathways include seeking international protection, seeking work, education, research or investment opportunities (MPF0, 5). Education mobility is seen to benefit the migrants and their countries of origin, since the know-how gained in Europe could be used for the benefit of the third country. Though, it is acknowledged that the increased level of education might in fact be a push factor for migration (Fratzke & Salant 2018, 7).

6.2. Development as Freedom

Amartya Sen describes development as the removal of barriers to freedom, that is, the removal of sources of unfreedom. Freedoms can be limited by tyranny, poverty, social deprivation or poor economic opportunities. (Sen 1999, 3.) The markets are portrayed as a key component, since the entrance to the markets, and the lack of it, is a major factor in development. One crucial challenge for developing countries is the access of labour to the markets. The access to markets affects also other spheres of life. (Sen 1999, 7.) Economic freedoms are important also in a sense that economic deprivation makes people prone to dangers and insecurities, and to further violations of freedoms (Sen 1999, 8). Women and children are, in many circumstances, the most

vulnerable individuals, and they are prone to abuse and human trafficking, so their economic unfreedom is one risk factor for exploitation.

Sen (1999, 10) presents five empirically established perspectives to freedom. These consist of political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. These are, to some extent, inseparable and these perspectives are complimentary to one another. When these instrumental freedoms prosper, the capabilities of the individual can achieve its true potential, and with sufficient social opportunities, individuals are able to shape their destiny and help other people to do the same (Sen 1999, 11). The goal of removing unfreedoms in order to achieve development is visible also in the development assistance strategies of the European Union.

The discussion on development as freedom has drawn our attention to differences in the international sphere and the understanding of development has taken an individualistic form. This individualised understanding of development produces development policies that are targeted at building up capacities of individuals, so that they are able to make effective and sustainable decisions. This entails the notion that there is no universal form of development. Hence, there are various social and economic contexts that need to be taken into account when looking into the aspirations and needs of the individual. This individualisation of development can be depicted as critique to the top-down approaches of development, but Chandler points out that this does not go hand in hand with neoliberal advocacy, since markets are not able to find solutions to development and are instead dependant on the institutional framework. (Chandler 2010, 19.)

From the perspective of international statebuilding, freedom itself is the problem. The objective of democratisation is not to promote the freedom of people but to build the capacity of individuals so that they are able to make use of their freedom and autonomy in an unproblematic manner. For this project to succeed, civil society intervention is in the interest of the statebuilder, because people lack the understanding of what the sustainable and productive use of autonomy is. (Chandler 2010, 3–4.) From the Western perspective, it is the lack of a functioning institutional

framework that prohibits individuals to live their lives to the fullest and strive towards prosperity. Autonomy within the poorly functioning institutional framework causes barriers to economic growth and inhibits the access to the benefits of globalisation. (Chandler 2010, 5–6.)

Development aid is targeted towards enhancing the economic self-reliance of the people prone to migrating. Shifting responsibility to the actors and operating through the ideas of responsibility, partnership and ownership is peculiar to liberal governmentality practices. These include the creation of ‘free subjects’ who are able to exercise their freedom in a proper way. (Joseph 2012, 211–212.) As Chandler points out, freedom is encouraged but only to the point where it benefits the EU and its strive towards managing migration. The possibilities for human freedom are narrowed down in the name of solving the problems of insecurity, development and conflict. In this paradigm, the problem appears to be the human itself, and not the external world surrounding the subject. (Chandler 2013, 2.) The EU has long tried to control the flows of people to its territory, and the immigration qualifications have been tightened to almost an impossible level to achieve. Combatting illegal migration to the EU in the partner countries of Africa is possible due to the promises of legal migration opportunities. People seem to have a possibility to choose Europe freely, but this necessitates the fulfilment of strict qualifications.

6.3. Development and Self-Reliance

The emphasis of the EU is fostering ‘the resilience and self-reliance of forcibly replaced people as close as possible to refugees’ country of origin’ (MPF0, 4). The EU sees its role as supplementary to the role of the UNHCR and its programmes that promote self-reliance (MPF2, 6–7). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has defined the concept of self-reliance as following:

Self-reliance is the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity. Self-reliance, as a programme approach, refers

to developing and strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external assistance. (UNCHR 2006)

According to this definition, self-reliance is both a social and an economic ability of an individual, a household or a community. The approach that the EU has chosen relies heavily on the economic self-reliance of the individual, and the Partnership Framework appears to lack the means to social self-reliance that are emphasised in the UNHCR *Handbook for Self-Reliance*.

Development has shifted its course and it is now used to promote the economic self-reliance of migrants so that they are able to function within the markets in countries of origin and transit. The Framework and its policy tools aim at creating functional institutions for the markets, as I have in the previous chapter presented. Economic self-reliance is compatible with the neoliberal doctrine, since the society ought to be a forum where individuals act as entrepreneurs and promote their own abilities. It is crucial that participants in these free markets take responsibility for their own well-being. (Treanor 2005, 9.) The keys to wealth and innovation lie within private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative, and free markets combined with free trade are seen as a fundamental good which eliminate poverty domestically and worldwide (Harvey 2005, 64–65). Freedoms in the neoliberal state reflect the interests of private businesses, financial capital and multinational corporations (Harvey 2005, 7). These models, and the idea of capital accumulation, are being exported to the countries of origin in the Migration Partnership Framework, in order to decrease the incentives for migrating to Europe by improving the conditions in the origin and transit countries.

From the European point of view, it is beneficial for the migrants and their countries of origin and transit to adopt ideals of entrepreneurship and job creation in order to become self-reliant. This approach is visible in the Framework due to the focus on the economic aspect of improving the livelihoods of migrants. In Senegal, addressing root causes of migration include:

projects supporting job creation for youth adopted under the EU Trust Fund for Africa, which support 600 local businesses and farms with tailor-made technical assistance, create up to 20,000 direct and indirect jobs, and give 12,000 young people access to professional training in sectors such as agroindustry, forestry, tourism and fisheries. (MPF 2, 6.)

The urge to create jobs for the increasing youth population has been addressed in the Partnership Framework, but population growth itself has been passed. The EU appears to presume that the population growth will decelerate due to better job opportunities and education.

7. Conclusion

The starting point of this thesis project was the aftermath of the migration crisis in Europe. An unprecedented amount of people entered the EU to claim asylum and the Common European Asylum System was strained. This triggered the evaluation of the current procedures concerning asylum, legal migration and development policies amongst the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Member States. The actions of the EU have curbed the amount of third country nationals on the external borders of the EU, but work regarding the root causes of migration continues. The Common European Asylum System is being recast, pathways for legal migration are being drafted and new investment mechanisms are being established. Various policy fields of the EU are being harnessed in order gain the best momentum in the fight against root causes of migration, and the Migration Partnership Framework is one of the new responses that have been generated in order to react to the challenges posed by irregular migration.

To respond in a meaningful way, the EU must use all means available and set itself clear priorities and measurable objectives. Development and neighbourhood policy tools should reinforce local capacity-building, including for border control, asylum, counter-smuggling and reintegration efforts. All actors – Member States, EU institutions and key third countries – need to work together in partnership to bring order into migratory flows.

In parallel, work is needed to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement by applying sustained, medium and long term policies and to better use existing processes and programmes. All of this work must take place in a context which fully respects international law and fundamental rights. This is the idea of a new Partnership Framework. (MPF0, 2.)

As such, the Partnership Framework will not only help respond to crises through immediate and measurable results, but also lay the foundations of an enhanced cooperation with countries of origin, transit and destination with a well-managed migration and mobility policy at its core. (MPF0, 2.)

Based on these objectives presented by the EU, it has been my aim to look into the European Union Migration Partnership Framework and its attempt to create a formula for sustainable migration management. Managing migration has tended to occur in a manner that benefits mostly the EU, and the migration-security nexus has been the focal point of the debate, as mentioned in the introduction of this thesis. The shift towards the emphasis on the migration-development nexus has been established, and the idea that migration can affect development in a positive manner and vice versa has been embraced. The Migration Partnership Framework is a framework that fits this agenda.

As presented in the beginning of this thesis, this research is based on the notion that a well-managed migration and mobility policy is created by establishing a ‘win-win-win’ solution (Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon 2011, 2). This ‘win-win-win’ solution entails that migrants are acknowledged as partners alongside the sending and receiving countries in establishing sustainable policies for migration management. Policies concerning development and migration are no longer for the benefit of the receiving country, but also for the benefit of the sending country. This requires the EU to acknowledge the interests of the sending countries in order to establish a productive relationship for cooperation (Lavenex & Kunz 2008, 443).

Due to the selected approach of a partnership embarking a ‘win-win-win’ solution, the chapters of analysis were dissected into chapters containing the ‘win’ for each partner in the Migration Partnership Framework. The chapters elaborated on the implications that the Framework has on the partners in order to make well-managed migration work for all. The objectives of the Framework itself are quite ambitious and the abolishment of root causes of migration is hailed in several occasions. This has led me to make some challenging choices, since my personal stance towards the Framework has been rather critical. Making migration and mobility work for all is a noble goal, and within this research I have considered the ‘wins’ as the best practices for partners to adopt in order to gain benefit from migration management. The analysis into the Framework revealed that the ‘wins’ of this Framework are not comparable and have different meanings in different contexts, but are in any case relevant to the development of new strategies.

The objective of my research was twofold. First, the objective was to dissect the elements of the Migration Partnership Framework that are essential for sustainable migration management. Secondly, the aim was to look into these elements and see whether these are representing the new way of managing migration. The EU introduced the Partnership Framework as a framework that builds the basis for enhanced cooperation with third countries, and it has been in my interest to look into these elements that could be establishing these new forms of cooperation and catalyse empowerment within populations in developing areas that are prone to migration.

For the EU, the Framework enables the EU to build cohesion between the various policy fields, its competence and the Member States. In addition, the Framework allows the EU to promote its role as a global actor and export good governance to third states. For the third countries presented as partners, the Framework enables the development of state institutions, making the control of people and management of migration and illegal activities, such as smuggling, easier. Moreover, the Framework enables migrants to gain tools for building their self-reliance in a sustainable manner. In the next paragraphs, I will conclude with the notions I have made during my research concerning the Migration Partnership Framework. After

this, I will conclude this thesis with some remarks on the research process, its successes and deficiencies and present some possible ideas for future research.

7.1. The European Union Building up Cohesion, Capacity and Choices

Building up Cohesion

Based on this research, the task of managing migration sustainably requires the EU and its Member States to act in a coherent manner and speak with one voice. The Member States are expected to use their profitable bilateral relations with third countries as leverage when negotiating measures on migration management. The EU admits using a carrot and stick approach with the third countries, but in fact, carrots and sticks are also used when negotiating with the Member States. '[M]ake clear to partners that this is a process which will need a comprehensive and sustained commitment from all if it is to succeed for the long term. The commitment of Member States at home is equally key for delivery. As recalled by the European Council, it is essential that political engagement by national Ministers remains steady.' (MPF2, 16.) The migration crisis and the strain it poses on the Member States is used as a tool for bringing the Member States and their actions on migration closer to one another, but at the same time, migration remains an issue that causes division between the Member States.

Engaging the partner countries of Africa for the common mission of managing migration requires resources from the Member States and the EU uses the art of bargaining with the Member States. Bargaining with the third countries is a commonly known fact, but the eagerness of the EU to gain Member States' commitment to the project is an interesting discovery. The competence of the EU agencies is boosted; and as Joseph (2012, 146) has stated, on the European level governance is operated through the establishment of new institutions, agencies and commissions. During this research, it has become more evident that the policies of the EU are more focused on the internal affairs of the EU, rather than the global actions concerning the abolishment of root causes of migration, even though the sphere of external action has become more visible.

The European Union has a history as an important player in the field of development and through the European External Action Service it operates in the global sphere with global phenomena. Traditionally, development and conflict prevention in the third countries have been used to curb excessive migration to Europe. The importance of improving security conditions in third countries has been acknowledged, but policies have mainly been focused on preventing immigration to the destination countries. (Nyberg Sørensen et al. 2003, 5–6.) In this sense, the shifted focus to the partner countries is welcomed. Positive incentives, sanctions, bargaining processes, persuasion and learning processes are typical for governance approaches (Risse 2013, 87), and they are also included in the tool kit of the Migration Partnership Framework.

Building up Capacity (and Control)

Development based on cooperation and partnership is the approach that the EU is taking in its Migration Partnership Framework. ‘In the long term, the Commission is proposing to fundamentally reconsider the scale and nature of traditional development cooperation models’ (PR0, 2). Societies are being developed through partnerships with selected partners and more responsibility is given to the African partner. However, the prosperous functioning of partnership is a painful process and requires giving space to the other and learning in response (Swartz 2009, 34). It is the learning process of the partner that is visible in the Framework, but it has been left unspoken, to what extent the EU and its operations are included in this learning process. However, the five progress reports that have been published indicate that the EU is reviewing its own operations and their effectiveness in order to improve its procedures.

In the partnership approach the concept of ownership and its transition from the EU to the partner country is crucial. As Chandler points out, shifting ownership to the partners is a welcomed turn in the relations between the European and African partners. Though, difference ought to be in the limelight of the European project, since there is no one solution for all the partner countries and that each partner

country consists of a unique relation between the state and the society. The role of outsider is then to export rule of law and good governance and hope that the society takes its course towards improvement. (Chandler 2010, 190.) The EU has taken into account the variety of the partner countries through addressing each country with a compact that is drafted based on the special needs of each country.

The EU has managed to establish tailor-made responses to the needs of the partner countries. However, these technical responses are mainly focused on ensuring the success of return and readmission operations by establishing registries and databases for the purpose of monitoring. The technical assistance from the EU in the process of enabling these monitoring techniques benefits the partner countries, but it is from the European point of view that these are being installed. These can be considered as tools for sustainable migration management, but as Joseph (2012, 240) has stated, placing technical expertise and support in the focal point of partnership is used to fade out the exploitative relations between the North and the South.

In order to create a formula for sustainable migration management, the discrepancies between the societies of the EU and African partners needs to be taken into account. Though the Framework is now taking a new point of view on development and the establishment of self-reliant societies, the Framework is formulated from the European point of view and its success in the long run could be overshadowed by this deficiency.

Building the capacity of the partner countries is visible in the projects that attempt to establish local employment opportunities so that people would be able to stay close to home and improve their livelihoods in a way that benefits both the migrants and their communities. For the communities, capacity-building is targeted towards improving the capabilities of the communities to reintegrate migrants after an unsuccessful attempt to migrate elsewhere. Employment opportunities are provided in fields such as brick-making and jewellery, which implies that migration to Europe is not an alternative with skills such as these. Sustainable migration management entails that local communities are able to take care of their own people so that no one would be tempted to migrate.

Building up Choices (and Constancy)

For the individual, the best practice in the process of managing migration is the realisation of the possibilities that lie in the communities close to home. Entrepreneurship is given as a good example for becoming self-reliant and supporting the well-being of the self and the community. People are encouraged to take societal responsibility upon themselves and their communities in the name of empowerment and capacity-building, which operate through new forms of governance (Chandler 2013, 12). Managing migration requires for the communities to take part in programmes that offer alternative livelihoods, so that resorting to the smuggling industry is no longer profitable.

Within these local frameworks, the migrants are able and encouraged to fulfil their potential as entrepreneurs and innovators. Regimes of governmentality are used to product certain kinds of freedoms (Death 2010, 28). Migrants are supported to find better livelihoods within their communities and regional approaches to migration and development are favoured. Individuals are seemingly taking responsibility for their own livelihoods and becoming less dependent on foreign aid, but embracing new education and employment opportunities happens in a framework formulated by the EU and the needs of the Member States.

The options present for the individual migrant are essential for sustainable migration management in a sense that there ought to be more choices for the migrants within the local communities. Difficult living conditions call for perseverance and taking responsibility for one's own well-being and migration is not be considered as a cure for misfortunes. Freedom ought to be operated within the framework that the EU finds most suitable and going beyond that causes disorder in the management of migration.

Change of Paradigm

Thinking about migration and development in a new way has been in the interest of the EU since it has become painfully obvious that previous policies have not reached the objectives they were deemed to achieve. Many authors have addressed this urge to rethink the relationships with third countries and promote consistency. Stability and democratic projects have been the focal points for projects concerning Africa for decades, and the withdrawal of foreign aid has been predicted to cause a migration crisis (Tanner 2009, 160). Now that the migration crisis has reached the European Union, it has come the time to adjust development and migration policies in a manner that makes migration work for all.

The endeavour to promote innovative actions and activity within the EU Member States and the partner countries is the gist of the Framework. Though the EU is articulating to give more responsibility to the partner countries and the migrants themselves, the role of EU as the governing and ultimately responsible actor in the implementation of better migration governance does not fade away, even though the rhetoric of partnership is in the limelight. The concept of partnership can thus be viewed as a technique of governance, in which the EU turns responsibility for the management of people to the countries of origin and transit. The role of the EU is to monitor and guide these partner countries.

Despite the role of monitoring and benchmarking, the emphasis on the partnership approach is welcomed, and empowering the local communities to become self-reliant is a good start for this paradigm change. Though, partnerships are never value-free or neutral tools for impacting the third countries (Death 2010, 86). Within the Migration Partnership Framework, the EU is the partner who has chosen the priority countries and programmes to which it channels funding. It is also the EU that has left the impact of the characteristic features of the local communities unstated in the Framework, though taking into consideration the communal and religious aspect of the local communities could have a significant positive impact on local empowerment. The role of the African partners in this Framework is left to the level that the EU accepts and deems suitable.

7.2. The Reflection of the Research Project and Suggestions for Future Research

One of the stumbling stones for me as a researcher has been the difficulty in narrowing down my interest and approach. During my internship with the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU, I reported from the field of Justice and Home Affairs and became familiar with the difficult relationship between the EU and migration. The choice of research material was clear to me from the beginning, since the nature of the Partnership Framework as the 'Holy Grail of migration control' raised my interest, and the publication of the Framework suited well with the timetable of my research. The research material could have been broader, and expanding it to include also the funding instruments and the Agenda on Migration crossed my mind during this research project. However, narrowing down the material only to the reports concerning specifically the Partnership Framework is justified, since the topic needed some trimming.

The topic would have enabled several theoretical approaches and research questions, but due to the will of the EU to focus on partnerships, I chose to analyse the Framework based on the 'win-win-win' approach. The difficulty of this vast approach was that it leaves the chapters of analysis on a rather vague level. It would have been possible to focus solely on one of the partners instead of including the EU, the African partners and the migrants in this research, but that would have faded out the significance of partnerships. Despite the difficulties and deficiencies the broadness of this approach has caused, this research is able to present a good overall look on the topic and on the development of the relations between the EU and the third countries with regard to managing migration in a sustainable manner. A more thorough look into these elements would require future research, and in the next paragraph I will present some of the ideas that have crossed my mind during this project.

Based on the findings of this research, it would be relevant to look into the ways in which the individual subject is formulated under EU policies concerning migration and development. The EU prioritises economic development and creating job

opportunities locally in order to affect the root causes of migration. However, the decisions that lead to migrating are not straightforward and are not uniform. When focusing on the individual, it would be relevant to include a wider spectrum of material, for example, including the funding instruments in the research material. At the beginning of this project it was indeed the individual migrant that was my main interest, since the contradiction between the rhetoric and the actual propositions of the EU concerning the migrants drew my attention to this topic.

Despite the challenges that have occurred during this research project, I have managed to provide an extensive presentation on the elements that are visible in the EU Migration Partnership Framework and how they represent a shift in the relationship between the EU and the third countries. The Partnership Framework provides an optimistic view on the possibilities for cooperation and partnership between the European Union and the partner countries of Africa, though the oppressive measures of the EU are present in the Framework. Developing sustainable migration management tools is vital for the EU and the international community, since migration is a phenomenon that is not coming to an end. Making migration and development work for all is indeed an end worth pursuing.

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