NATO after the Cold War

Values in action

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The subject of the thesis is NATO and how the values that the Alliance claims to be at its core have affected its actions after the Cold War ended. The primary sources used in the thesis are the publicly available strategic concepts and summit declarations from 1988 to 2018. The method of analyzing the material is content analysis.

The theoretical framework of the thesis is constructivism with an emphasis on Alexander Wendt’s ideas and the theory of security communities by Karl Deutsch and others. Constructivism places and emphasis on ideas and values in shaping behavior and actions and it makes sense to examine values through it. Security community -theory is relevant due to its emphasis on the international political and security system that NATO is a part of. The concept of The West is discussed because it directly relates to NATO and the values that are commonly described as Western.

The analysis tracks the use of the value terminology though the material from summit to summit and goes deeper into the texts to find out how values are presented as potentially motivating factors for the actions of NATO taken since the end of the Cold War. The findings suggest that the enlargement of the Alliance and the shift towards crisis management operations as well as implementation of various United Nations Security Council Resolutions are at least partially influenced by values. The thesis includes a brief case study of the NATO air war in Kosovo as an example of important Alliance actions after the Cold War. Other perspectives to the evolution of NATO are briefly presented as well.

Keywords: constructivism, crisis management, enlargement, NATO, values.

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1. Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949 in a world just recovering from its Second World War. The alliance that was formed to fight against the Axis powers did not endure after the victory was achieved and in fact the rift between the two emerging blocs did not appear suddenly after the cessation of fighting but started to take shape as the war turned to favor the Allies. When exactly the Cold War started is not the question at hand though. Some of the Western allies, led by the United States, entered into a military alliance with each other. The North Atlantic Treaty, the founding document states the following as the foundation of the Alliance:

The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. (The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO 1949)

The purpose of NATO was to counter the Soviet Union in Europe and for a long time the division of Europe and in fact the World seemed to be the perpetual state of affairs, until it wasn’t: The Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. NATO faced a new situation with its long-term adversary and, according to some, the purpose for its existence (Forsberg 2002, 37; Karvinen & Puistola 2015, 75). But continue it did, now in a different security environment and new challenges and problems. The field was also shared by other organizations such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This is not to say that the end of the Cold War was the first time NATO faced a changing security environment, but most would agree that it was the biggest paradigm shift so far.

NATO describes itself as a community of shared values, such as those quoted above in the North Atlantic Treaty. At the core of the organization is the Article 5 of the treaty which states that an attack on one member is an attack against them all. Indeed, territorial defense of the members and the security guarantees provided by said article have prevailed amidst changes in the political and military situations across the Alliances lifespan. What made me interested in looking at NATO is the emphasis it puts on values in its rhetoric.
One of the most important post-Cold War developments in European security environment and certainly one of NATO’s most significant moves has been the inclusion of new members into the alliance. These Central and Eastern European countries, in many cases former Soviet satellites and Warsaw Pact states have been some of the most active members in the alliance. One thing that most people would agree on, regardless of their position in the argument, is that the enlargement has been one of the biggest issues in the relationship between the Russian Federation and NATO and the West. At least until attention moved to the more acute situation in the Ukraine, and the relationship has been chilly to the point where some of the most eager have called this the “New Cold War” in the media.

Crisis management and global operations have kept NATO busy for decades now. These Out of Area Operations started in the Balkan crisis where NATO air power was used in the wars in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). The Global War on Terror and particularly the war in Afghanistan became the new normal. NATO also took part in the Libyan conflict following the Arab spring in an effort to topple Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. An example of an increased effort to engage in the political spectrum is the Partnership for Peace program that in itself doesn’t necessarily mean much (Russia is in the PfP program), but for some can mean a first step to membership, or some kind of evolving advanced partnership as in the case of Finland and Sweden. NATO’s agency is the focus of my study, but I am also aware that the alliance is far from being the only actor dealing with the political and security issues today and in many cases, it is indeed quite irrelevant. I believe that the question (and challenge) of relevance has been quite important in shaping the actions of the alliance since the Cold War: few organizations want to be irrelevant.

Perhaps NATO is returning to its roots as a European military alliance concerned with the defense of its member’s territory and integrity. The Eastern European members who depend on NATO and the United States in particular to provide their security guarantees want their security concerns to have concrete effects on the planning and deployment of the alliance’s military assets. While the tensions may not be on Cold War levels, the situation has at least to some extent put European security back on the agenda for the USA which for a long time had shifted its attention elsewhere from Europe, such as Asia. Emphasis on the United States is essential and it central role is worth remembering when discussing NATO. The Alliance can be seen as a way for the USA to affect European politics (i.e. Lagerstam 2005, 115). This relationship is not one sided however, and to some extent it is a trade of some influence for security. This is of course a gross simplification, but the alliance is yet to forcibly annex states to be its members.
Picture 1 is an illustration of all the European members of NATO with the numbers representing the years when the Alliance has taken in new members after the Cold War. The dark colors without numbers are states that have joined before the Cold War ended. At this moment NATO has 29 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States are the founding members of the Alliance (1949). Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, West-Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. After the Cold War and the unification of Germany (marked as number 1) the Alliance admitted the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999 (marked as number 2). In 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO (marked as number 3). Albania and Croatia joined in 2009 (marked as number 4) and finally Montenegro in 2017 (marked as number 5). (NATO
I have only numbered the countries that joined after the end of the Cold War since this thesis takes that event as the starting point of analysis.

1.1 Research question

My research question is: *How have common values affected the actions of NATO since the end of the Cold War and how are they used in justifying them in the official documents?* NATO emphasizes in the summit declarations and strategic concepts that it is a community with common values (i.e. NATO 1999, 1), but it is perhaps not immediately clear how those values translate into the actions of the Alliance. Is it just empty talk or could there be something in the post-Cold War era that we could look at and say: “This is NATO acting on our shared values!”? Is it possible to interpret the role NATO assumed as a crisis management organization as being driven by values? Looking at the question from a constructivist perspective, my assumption is that this rhetoric is worth examining due to another assumption that the threats and challenges are socially constructed and influence action.

If we look at terrorism as an example of a “new threat” that NATO faced after the Cold War, it cannot be presented as a same kind of threat to physical existence that the Soviet Union represented. Yet the Alliance went to war over it for over a decade now. Is it just the ambiguity of the new non-state security challenges that makes NATO and others to use ambiguous terms like values? It is no obstacle for action, so perhaps it is driven by them. This subject is interesting to me because the discussion of international relations especially regarding the European security situation seems to be full of terminology such as “Western values”.

It will be necessary to find out what the values are that NATO declares to be shared and bound together. The values are declared in the official statements and publications so finding them from the text is not a great challenge. The bigger challenge will be to find out how they shape the interests and identities of the actors. This may mean the organization as a whole or individual members if they can be interpreted to be acting on behalf of or due to the influence of the organization. Other actors will be considered as well, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU in particular. When taking a constructivist approach to the question I do not completely abandon some of the more traditional realist assumptions of national interest and strategic goals that are at the core of (neo) realism but see if and how those interest and identities are constructed by ideas.
1.2 Sources and the execution of the thesis

I will look at a time period spanning from 1988 to the present day to cover the end of the Cold War and the developments that followed it. The reason for picking this timeframe instead ofgoing further back is in part because the role of NATO remained fairly static for a long period of time and that the official documents, the strategic concepts and summit declarations that I use as my primary source material were less frequent and often classified during the height of the Cold War. The fact that NATO now communicates these more openly is also meaningful and I assume that they are not made public because there is nothing important in them, but rather they are messages meant to be disseminated and heard.

Strategic concepts are documents that NATO produces that are meant to declare the alliances core tasks and general orientation to whatever challenges are topical. The alliance describes the documents thusly:

The Strategic Concept is an official document that outline NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces. (Strategic Concepts, NATO 2014)

The strategic concept of 1991 was the first unclassified one. This reflects the released tensions of the time immediately following the end of the Cold War, but before the Soviet Union officially ceased to be. The 1991 concept declares: “The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.” (NATO 1991). The second unclassified strategic concept was published in 1999 is meant to address the new threats that NATO had faced and was facing in the post-Cold War time. It also accepted a wider definition of security to include for example environmental and social aspects, as well as starting to define the alliances role in crisis management (Strategic Concepts, NATO 2014). The influence of the crises in the Balkans can be clearly seen in this document, but terrorism, although mentioned, was not the biggest issue yet. The next and so far, the latest strategic concept was published in 2010. The hot topics laid out in this concept are terrorism, as it had been ever since the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, and evolving partnerships and enlargement of the alliance as well as the now “robust” crisis management capability (NATO 2010.)
NATO summit meetings are not regular meetings but held when changes in the political and security situation call for the alliance to make changes or adjust to circumstances (NATO summit meetings, NATO 2014). From 1988 to 2016, 20 summit meetings have been held which is a fairly large number for an ad-hoc meeting and does reflect the evolving nature of NATO. For example, there were no summit meeting declarations between the years 1957 and 1974. It is to be noted that the summit meetings are meetings between the heads of state and government members and the activities of the Military Committee are not within this study (or indeed available).

Sources:

- Strategic concepts:
  o The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991)
  o The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999)
  o Active Engagement, Modern Defence (2010)

- Summit meetings and respective declarations / communiques:
  o Brussels, 2-3 March 1988
  o Brussels, 29-30 May 1989
  o Brussels, 4 December 1989
  o London, 5-6 July 1990
  o Rome, 7-8 November 1991
  o Brussels, 10-11 January 1994
  o Madrid 8-9 July 1997
  o Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999
  o Rome, 28 May 2002
  o Prague, 21-22 November 2002
  o Istanbul, 28-29 June 2004
  o Brussels, 22 February 2005
  o Riga, 28-29 November 2006
  o Bucharest, 2-4 April 2008
  o Strasbourg / Kehl, 3-4 April 2009
  o Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010
  o Chicago, 20-21 May 2012
  o Wales, 4-5 September 2014
  o Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016
  o Brussels, 11-12 July 2018

All of the official NATO documentation is available online at www.nato.int.

The choice of theoretical approach landed at social constructivism because it deals with the terminology that NATO itself uses: community, values, ideas and sharing all or some of these. Also,
it is often pointed out that realism has difficulties explaining in a satisfactory way why and how the Cold War ended. Constructivism does not accept that the international system works by some fixed laws or that there is some natural state of affairs fundamentally unchangeable. Regarding the end of the Cold War, Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander commented that: “...this historical event showed that there was nothing ‘natural’ in the state of world politics.” (Guzziini & Leander ed. 2006, XVII)

Content analysis is a suitable method for finding meanings from documentations, describing them and for drawing useful conclusions from the material (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 103). My analysis is to a large degree influenced by the theoretical framework and it determines how I see some parts of the source material to be more important and significant than others. This is necessary as the summit declarations and strategic concepts total up to a considerable amount of text. Finding the relevant themes and following them through the documentation in a chronological way will hopefully produce an overall picture that answers the research question and allows me to draw some conclusions from it. According to Tuomi & Sarajärvi, the objective of content analysis is to add to the informational value of the source material by breaking it into parts and reassembling it into a logically sound bigger picture (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 108).

The source material is presented and analyzed in chapter 3. The terms that have been identified as relevant for values are quantified Tables 1 and 2 for each document within the scope of this thesis. The purpose of this was to see if there is a clear variation to how much values are discussed in different times after the Cold War. After this I analyzed each document in more detail to see if there were things said or unsaid that would be interesting. The qualitative analysis is more important than the quantitative part.
2. Theoretical framework

Constructivism has challenged the dominant realist traditions of international relations theory. The question of the nature of anarchy is at the core of the discussion as well as the emphasis on ideas and values shared between subjects that constructivism sees as important factors in international relations. The type of constructivism presented in this thesis for the most part based on Alexander Wendt’s take on it which Dale C. Copeland calls a “unique brand of constructivism” that goes further in its critique towards realism than perhaps many others. (Copeland 2006, 1.)

Security community as a concept can be attributed to Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in the 1950’s (Deutsch 1957). Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett have continued that work in the 1990’s as the passing of the Cold War gave new life to non-realist theories (Adler & Barnett 1999). Security communities are a natural addition as the terminology and the interests are quite similar to constructivism such as interest in social interaction and values. The Copenhagen school is relevant to this study as one of their main arguments is that security issues are socially constructed (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998). Another key concept for the subject of the thesis is the West, what is it, how it has formed and by whom? (Browning & Lehti 2010). Sociological institutionalism is also presented in the context of the enlargement of the Western institutions (Schimmelfennig 2003).

2.1 Constructivism

There is no ‘logic’ of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy.

Anarchy is what states make of it. (Wendt 1992, 395)

Alexander Wendt makes this bold argument in his article Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics (International Organization, Vol 46, No. 2. Spring 1992, 391-425). The constructivist view of anarchy does not accept that it is an unchangeable natural state of things in a similar sense that classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes claimed human nature to be a deciding force (Wendt 1992, 395). States are the primary targets of Wendt’s analysis as they remain
as the primary actors in the international system: “...it makes no more sense to criticize a theory of international politics as ‘state centric’ than it does to criticize a theory of forests for being ‘tree centric’.” (Wendt 1999, 9).

A realist understanding of anarchy cannot for example explain in a satisfactory way why some state’s nuclear weapons are a threat to one and an assurance to another. Another example Wendt gives on how common understandings, norms and expectations that states have influence practice is the way the relationship between university students and their professors would change if we would forget what a university is. A very short explanation of why the Cold War ended in the same vain would be that it simply lost its meaning when the USA and the Soviet Union stopped seeing each other as enemies. (Wendt 1992, 396 – 397.)

Identities exist in relation to others and are in part based on historical experience of how one has been treated by those others and so identities form the basis of interests according to Wendt (Wendt 1992, 398). This means that interests are formed within a certain context and are formed as the actor is assessing the situation. Identity is what helps in this assessment and the lack of it would lead to great difficulty and confusion. Wendt again uses the ending of the Cold War as an example: The USA and the Soviet Union seemingly struggled to identify their interests without the context of an antagonistic standoff (Wendt 1992, 399).

Identities and interests are the building blocks of institutions. As actors form “collective knowledge” they become more than just a sum of their parts and so the institution may exist even as changes occur in its composition. Institutionalization in Wendt’s words is a “process of internalizing new identities and interests” (Wendt 1992, 399). The formation of the self – other division in a state of anarchy is affected by the actors’ identities individually and as a part of an institution. When the primary concern of an actor is its own security and self-preservation, we are talking about an institution of self-help, and the variations give anarchy different possible meanings.

Wendt describes three different examples of security systems depending on how actors identify themselves in relation with the other regarding their security: A competitive security system, an individualistic security system and a cooperative security system. If placed on a line, the individualistic system would position to the middle with the competitive and cooperative systems on either side. In the competitive system, the actors such as states exist in a very realist world where relative gains are sought after, and the constant possibility of back-stabbing prevents any meaningful cooperation. This is what Wendt calls a Hobbesian system in his 1992 article: a war (or at least the ever-present possibility of war) of everyone against everyone. The individualistic security system has
the states still seeking their own benefits, but instead of relative gains they view absolute gains as more important and thus are able to work together to some extent. Wendt sees this as typical for a neoliberal system. In a cooperative security system, the states identify with each other in such a way that makes common and shared security everyone’s responsibility. Collective means and solutions are seen as preferable ways of achieving the security goals. Strong positive identification among states makes this possible as opposed to the negative or indifferent identification of the competitive or individualistic security systems. (Wendt 1992, 400-401.)

Later in his book *Social Theory of International Relations* Wendt expands on these security systems calling them “Three cultures of anarchy” (Wendt 1999, 246). The Hobbesian system is accompanied by the Lockean and Kantian cultures describing varying degrees of cooperation found in each of them. In his 1992 article Wendt argues that without interaction between each other, states do not automatically act according to some law of nature, but instead only have what they know about themselves and their interests to rely on, emphasizing the context and later the history of their interactions as a shaping force for their identities in relation to each other. This is also a critique to neo-realism in presupposing only the competitive self-help system in international relations and a causal role of anarchy in dictating how actors interact with each other. (Wendt 1992, 402-404.)

If two civilizations were to meet for the first time without any previous knowledge about each other, they would not necessarily assume the worst-case scenario and act in such a way according to Wendt. Instead the decisions of how to act would be based on probabilities. In the example of an encounter with an extraterrestrial civilization our reaction would certainly be cautious, but taking hostile action before any indicator, however open to interpretation, would be nonsensical, although one of the main critiques of constructivism towards the traditional rationalist theories such as realism is that people don’t always act rationally. The first move in this kind of encounter would be important, but the real key is to understand the formation of identities and interests as a process that may lead into a Hobbesian system with its security dilemmas but could just as well lead into cooperative or individualistic systems.

This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a social act and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings. It advances the same way. The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other’s future behavior: potentially mistaken and certainly tentative, but expectations nonetheless. (Wendt 1992, 405.)
A predatory state is a state that has a tendency to act violently against others in the system. Perhaps the closest real-world example of this concept would be Germany under the national socialist regime. How does a state like that come to be? Both internal factors and systemic interaction may contribute to the birth of such a state. It is quite widely believed today that the First World War and particularly the way the peace was arranged had an effect on how Nazi Germany formed, as the peace terms after the Great War were quite vindictive and later made the soil suitable for the rise of national socialism. The way a predator is “born” is not indifferent as one formed by past victimization could potentially be reconciled with by the actions of others (Wendt 1992, 409).

Competitive, individualistic and cooperative systems supposedly act in different ways in a scenario where a predatory state is present in the international system. A competitive system, where the states are preoccupied by the concern of getting stabbed in the back by the others is less likely to produce perceptions of common threat or actions based on common interest. On the other hand, a cooperative system where the states identify quite strongly with each other and have some experience in collective action may prevent harm from coming to its members even if the threat is targeted to just one state in the community of states. It would be simplistic to reduce the interests of a “predatory state” to just violence and destruction though, and a warlike end is surely not the only way for a predator to disappear. In the case of a Cold War, where both sides saw the other to have predatory tendencies and yet the dichotomy came to a fortunately anti-climactic end. (Wendt 1992, 407 – 409.)

If it is human nature to hunger for power and dominance, not much can be done to shape anarchy by interactions between states. This would be convenient to a very hard realist view of the world that gives anarchy explanatory power. Another point that Wendt make, quoting Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, is that this kind of view requires one to “reify” or take something that is born from human actions and interactions, such as an international system of nation states, and treat it as something other or more than a human creation over which he has little influence (Wendt 1992, 410). Finally, Wendt claims that realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy: as states act on the assumptions that reinforce the other actors’ perceptions of each other’s interest, they create the competitive security system that is taken for granted (Wendt 1992, 410).

Why is the claim of the so called natural state of affairs so appealing then? From the constructivist view presented here, change is very much possible, but the actors still seem to resist change. Wendt give both systemic and psychological reasons for this resistance to change: systemic resistance to change means that a system born from interaction and reinforced perceptions of interests and identities punishes behavior that is not in line with the expected actions. For example, in a competitive security system one disarmed and pacifist state takes risks by not meeting metal with metal. Systemic
resistance makes it difficult or unappealing for states to maneuver and make choices that would contribute to change. Psychological resistance is about the identity of an actor and the need to preserve its integrity. For example, if a state sees itself as a defender of human rights, the uncovering of systematic torture or secret prisons would create a crisis. In this situation either the identity must change, or the actions are to be changed to better match the expectations that come with the identity. This cognitive dissonance creates strong resistance, but Wendt insists that as the security systems are created by the states, change remains a possibility as practices and conventions live and die according to how well the states or other actors validate them by actions. (Wendt 1992, 411.)

“Sovereignty is an institution, and so it exists only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty without an other.” (Wendt 1992, 412). Sovereignty as an institution creates expectations of conduct and predictability and also a degree of security. It cannot exist without some collective understanding of what it means. Sovereign nation states are a fairly new invention in world history however that really did not exist as we understand them just few centuries ago. Our great grandparents wouldn’t recognize some of the things that are claimed to be the natural state of being today. Concepts such as universal human rights and the equality of men were unthinkable as late as the 19th century.

When states tax ‘their’ citizens and not others, when they ‘protect’ their markets against foreign ‘imports’, when they kill thousands of Iraqis in one kind of war and then refuse to ‘intervene’ to kill even one person in another kind of ‘civil’ war, and when they fight a global war against a regime that sought to destroy the institution of sovereignty and then give Germany back to Germans, they are acting against the background of, and thereby reproducing, shared norms about what it means to be a sovereign state. (Wendt 1992, 413)

The quote could have been written today, but instead refers to the 1991 Gulf War and other conflicts of the time like the Balkans crisis that continued for a decade with external powers eventually intervening. The Rwandan genocide, and the decisive lack of international action to prevent it, were just around the corner as well as the intervention in Somalia. Recently the conflict in Libya following from the Arab Spring phenomena saw a NATO intervention in the form of airstrikes against the Gaddafi regime and in support of the uprising. On the other hand, the Syrian war seemed to be something that nobody wanted to intervene in for years, yet today there seems to be scarcely a state that is not in one way or another involved in the conflict that has spilled to the neighboring countries as well.
Factors behind decisions to intervene are many and complex, such as war-fatigue, economic situation and capability such as military assets to do so. In recent history, we have seen cases where the sovereignty and legitimacy of a state is put into question as an argument for an intervention. As an example, states such as the USA or Russia have conducted unilateral interventions with varying degrees of disregard towards the opinions of others or international law. Even France acted decisively in Mali. But if European union would use its Battlegroups\(^1\) for the kind of peace-enforcement missions that they train for, it would probably require a much stronger case to be made and political decisiveness that the EU definitely lacks compared to a nation state that has only its own population to convince, if that.

The crisis in Ukraine, including the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula is another case where the concepts of sovereignty, identity and citizenship are subject to debate and change. Even organizations such as the European Union challenge the traditional realist concept of state sovereignty. Citizenship can be used as a kind of strategic asset, like Russia has done: concern, valid or invented, over citizens in foreign countries may affect how the sovereignty of the state in question is respected. This has caused some concerns in states with considerable Russian minorities such as Estonia and the other Baltic states. Before the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, large amounts of Russian passports were distributed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, making new “citizens” to protect albeit against international law (IIFFMCG 2009, Vol 1, 18).

In his article, Wendt identifies two conditions for the formation of institutions of sovereign states: sufficient frequency of social interaction and will to change the current state of affairs. Frequency of interaction simply means that if states treat each other in a certain way often enough, it becomes the norm. Whatever international law or codification might follow from this, the legitimacy will last as long as the parties in question continue to respect and uphold the norm. (Wendt 1992, 414.)

 Territory and defined borders are integral to the modern concept of a sovereign state. The space that comes under the control of the state is something that is protected and controlled. No examples come to mind where a state would voluntarily and without coercion or pressure give up territory even if keeping it wouldn’t be the best solution for its security. If a state recognizes another state’s right to exist it does not go around grabbing territory that is within their ability to take because it would hurt the shared norm of sovereignty. Consequences for predatory activity like this would potentially be catastrophic for the norm-breaker if the other members of the community bring it back into the fold.

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\(^1\) The EU Battlegroups are multinational military forces that form the basis for the EU rapid response capability for crises around the world. Source: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/33557/eu-battlegroups_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/33557/eu-battlegroups_en)
forcefully. When this recognition of the others right to exist doesn’t exist, the same rules don’t apply either: colonial conquest and wars of extermination and genocide are examples of this. If states do interact enough to create a framework of social norms that they can rely upon, they will see that as an important factor in their security complimenting or even superseding military power. (Wendt 1992, 414-415.)

If a Hobbesian world is in a perpetual war of all against all, sovereignty is what transforms it into a Lockean world. Lockean world remains individualistic, but cooperation is made possible by the prospect of gains that would not be possible individually without a risk of unacceptable net loss, because the mutual recognition is not on its own enough to make two states cooperate for joint gains. Globalization can be seen as a factor in mutually beneficial opportunities rising outside the immediate geographical vicinity of the states, as well as global hazards and risks that concern everyone and thus call for more inclusive solutions. The ease and global reach of modern communications means more information flowing between and within the actors. (Wendt 1992, 415). The flow of information is something that Karl Deutsch (1957) also commented on, as we will see later.

Later in Social Theory of International Relations (1999) Wendt describes the Lockean system as one where enmity is replaced by rivalry. The self-other dichotomy remains as does the possibility of violence, but according to the norms of sovereignty the states recognize that the Other has certain rights. The historical moment connected with the Lockean individualistic system is the peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the turmoil in Europe that is known as the 30 Years War. Wendt recognizes the fact that after the peace the existence of small states was much more secure, as the normative framework came to treat states as equals. As the primary actors in the international system, states would have relatively free reign within their now consolidated borders and would grant that right to others as well. (Wendt 1999, 279.)

Constructivist approach to cooperation differs from game-theoretical approach in how the constructivism pays attention to the formation of identities via social interaction. This view is absent in the rationalist game-theoretical approach. Game theory takes interests as a given that would be too difficult to change and to consider. The example of European interest formation in the early 1990’s or the first decades of the 21st century regarding security is not the same as it was in the 1950’s, Wendt argues. “Game-changing” shifts in the security paradigm such as the end of the Soviet Union might force states to re-evaluate their interests and identities from the realist perspective as well, but the constructivist view would rather emphasize the changes that a long period of cooperation and interaction has had on the way states define what is important and what their interests are: “Four
decades of cooperation may have transformed a positive interdependence of outcomes into a collective ‘European identity’”. (Wendt 1993, 417.)

Wendt admits that a shift from competitive system to a cooperative one is challenging and unlikely without conscious effort by the actors to alter their identity. Changes that happen in established ways of interaction within long-held ideas of self would be exceptions and instead help the institutionalization and consolidation of the same old ways. Another large obstacle is “negative identification” and seeking of relative gains. (Wendt 1992, 418.)

The taking of identities involves a choice by the actor in the particular context, although it is most of the time decided by habit rather than a creative process. Completely new conditions may be required that the existing image of the self and familiar “tools” cannot cope with. The change must also appear to be better than an attempt to go on with the old ways and involves estimating the risks and rewards of this possible change. Wendt uses the example of Perestroika initiated by the Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev to illustrate self-reflection and the choosing of an identity and describes four stages of transformation as a competitive security environment is turned into a cooperative one (Wendt 1992, 419-420)

First stage assumes that the building blocks of the old identity are compromised in some way. For the Soviet Union, it would have been the dawning of the realization that the theoretical framework that the state was built on had not produced a winning product so to speak: The Soviet Union had exhausted itself in seeking to meet and overmatch the West in various areas with military taking the lion’s share of the resources. A driving thought behind this spending had been the assumption that war with the West was not only likely but nearly inevitable. Putting this assumption into question and the communication between the blocs reduced the perceived threat and made change possible. (Wendt 1992, 420)

Second stage involves the critical examination of one’s own actions and how they contribute to the existing state of affairs that is now accepted as undesirable. Wendt mentions the abandonment of the Leninist doctrine of the inherent and structural conflict between the capitalist and cultural worlds. This role of ideology in different times and under different leaders in the Soviet Union is quite a complex topic though and the debate about “correct” Leninism or Marxism is not the question at hand. Gorbachev took measures to reduce the aggressive political and military maneuvering. This is essentially recognition of one’s own role in the creation of the current system. (Wendt 1992, 421)

Changing one’s own identity can bear fruit only if the other I also incited into change. The concept of “altercasting” means that the actor seeking to change the others identity will treat the other as if it
already had the identity the actor wants it to have (Wendt 1992, 421). Wendt claims this third stage works due to the tendency of actors to shape identities according to the other’s practices, and in this case the change would work both ways: treating someone as if they were your friend – or at least not an enemy – may have a thawing effect if relations are cold. The biblical phrase “treat others as you would like yourself to be treated” is here a political move, a tactic rather than a virtuous proverb.

Unilateral actions that softly coerce the other to take similar action or put moral pressure to act in a similar way would be a continuation and the final stage of this transformation. If one side withdraws from a standoff or a stalemate of some sort, it places the other into a situation where continuing as before makes little sense or would appear questionable. Change of identity is encouraged this way as the old identity no longer makes sense (Wendt 1992, 421). This unilateral action can seem like wishful thinking, but Wendt doesn’t suggest it would be viable until towards the end of the described process and a lot of work would have to go into making this a viable option for parties in question. Providing a dignified way out of a stalemate is no small task.

Over time this kind of practices would be institutionalized and made into normal order of business. That is what would be required for the security environment to be cooperative. In hindsight, the Perestroika or “restructuring” had some unintended consequences (Kangaspuro 2010, 11-13). Mikhail Gorbachev enjoys a different reputation in the West, but in Russia today he is the man whose reputation is not as good, and he is sometimes blamed for the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well (Brown 2007, 327). The disappointment in the Yeltsin regime that followed the Soviet systems collapse (Brown 2007, 326-327) could be claimed to have worked as suitable ground for Putin’s Russia to assume an identity as a superpower under siege. The West in turn has not been successful in its altercasting measures and seems to be reverting to the “old game” again.

In his article on anarchy Wendt has made the case for the importance of identities and interests in the international system and that taking these questions seriously allows us to ask more questions that would be outside of the scope of some traditional theories that Wendt criticizes as “self-fulfilling prophecies” such as realism (Wendt 1992, 410). Taking some things as granted may be necessary though to bracket the problems in such a way that they can be reasonably tackled. Also, the questions should be the driving force behind the research according to Wendt. The relationship between states identities and actions is the main point of Wendt’s article and an important question for my thesis and something that is often taken as granted. (Wendt 1992, 424)

State-centrism is prevalent in this theoretical approach as they are in realism too, but allowing for change and progress, the state-centrism in this constructivist approach is less bleak than just a constant
state of nature and a Hobbesian war of all against all that is the underlying assumption in realism. Wendt argues that the field of international relations study is too much fixed on ontological differences and that, in order to make gains in the field of IR, the different theoretical approaches should shed light to the aspects that others ignore. (Wendt 1992, 425)

Frank Schimmelfennig has studied the enlargement of the European Union and NATO from the perspective of constructivism and sociological institutionalism. He claims that the enlargement of these organizations has been perhaps the most important political project for them in recent history. Schimmelfennig acknowledges that the enlargement itself has been the subject of many publications, but criticizes the literature for being descriptive, lacking in theory and also narrow in scope concentrating on single or limited number of cases. (Schimmelfennig 2003, 2-3.)

His arguments are that the enlargement of the West European institutions is a community-building method by which potential member states, particularly those in the category of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), are socialized and encouraged into accepting the norms and values that the organizations define themselves with and have institutionalized. Successful socialization leads to membership and unsuccessful does not. (Schimmelfennig 2003, 4.) This argument is interesting in comparison to the claim by Adler that these organizations create a security community largely as a byproduct of their normal tasks and goals.

Schimmelfennig presents the term rhetorical action which he defines as “the strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences.” (Schimmelfennig 2003, 5). Rhetorical action is the way the enlargement was made possible in the institutions where there was no consensus of whether or not they should expand due to the material cost and the existing ways they have to interact with the potential new members. According to Schimmelfennig, the aspiring members and those existing members who had egoistic interests in the expansion essentially shamed the resistance away by appealing to the values and the commitments they had made as well as historical examples of exclusion. Rhetorical action attempts to explain how egoistic motives translate into collective outcomes. (Schimmelfennig 2003, 5-6.)

The abandoning of community norms and identities as the sources of interest-formation is the biggest issue where Schimmelfennig deviates from the constructivist views presented before. He uses the term community environment to describe the arena where rhetorical action may be used to appeal to the normative framework of a community and to present issues as unfitting or fundamentally at odds with the principles and values that the members have subscribed to, potentially exposing them as bad members if they don’t comply. This allows collective outcomes to result even from egoistical
interests. Have the EU and NATO created strong enough community environments where these measures could work?

2.1.1 Criticism

Kaarle Lagerstam discusses constructivism and its relation to other theoretical approaches briefly and points out that there sometimes seems to be an irreconcilable disagreement between constructivism and realism and that the realist critique is often aimed at the idealism of constructivism. The way constructivist see reality as formed by thoughts and information makes it very different as well. The question of which power structures and social conditions bring about the changes in values is not explained well enough according to Lagerstam. (Lagerstam 2005, 7.)

Dale Copeland claims that Wendt’s criticism of neorealism overlooks the aspect of uncertainty that states feel about the intentions of others which according to Copeland is a major reason why the relative power of states is a significant consideration to them. Even if states are fairly sure that the other doesn’t have conflicting security interests at the time, they have no way of knowing if those interest will change in the future. This uncertainty limits and sets parameters to state behavior according to Copeland. (Copeland 2006, 2.)

Copeland argues that there is no need for the kind of predatory states that Wendt describes for conflict to arise, but the uncertainty that “good” states have about the present and future intentions of the others are enough to prompt actions that can then be misinterpreted by the others as aggressive even if they are merely seeking their own survival (Copeland 2006, 11). This can then lead to a situation where “…good states do bad things, even against other good states.” (Copeland 2006, 10).

Constructivism puts a lot of emphasis on the historical context and how the past shapes the behavior of states and due to this it has difficulty explaining and analyzing how leaders deal with future uncertainty. According to Copeland this arises from the impossibility of humans to read minds or to otherwise achieve certainty of others’ intentions. Lacking this knowledge, the material considerations become important factors that the states cannot ignore. (Copeland 2006, 19.) Copeland doesn’t outright deny the notion that ideas and social interactions shape the behavior of states but argues that there needs to be further empirical analysis as to when and how much this happens, something that he claims Wendt’s work does not provide. (Copeland 2006, 20.)
Maja Zehfuss criticizes Wendt’s concept of identity as a part of his constructivist theory. Because Wendt argues that anarchy is what states make of it, it is highly dependent on the identity of the state. Zehfuss argues that just like Wendt sees it necessary to take states as given, he also needs the identities to be both constructed and given. This then obstructs some aspects of the construction from examination. It is not even possible to make Wendt’s approach work by analyzing identities more carefully or in another way (Zehfuss 2006, 94.)

The unity of identity, which he needs for his approach, is imposed through exclusions. Wendt’s exclusions are not innocent methodological choices. That which he excludes threatens the very possibility of his argument. If the self cannot be defined apart from context, if identities are inherently contradictory, if identities depend on concrete articulations for their existence, as is argued here, then Wendt’s ‘via media’ might not be possible (Zehfuss 2006, 94-95).

2.2 Security communities

Karl Deutsch and his colleagues were among the first to write about security communities in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (1957). Their work aimed towards ending war as a social institution (Deutsch 1957, 1). Deutsch approaches the problem via historical examples of how war has been made very unlikely or even unthinkable in certain areas and political environments over time. The key concepts that are defined when talking about security communities are integration, sense of community and peaceful change. A security community is a result from integration which in turn is a result of a sense of community between actors who agree that the correct way to solve international issues is without physical force (Deutsch 1957, 5).

Alexander Wendt wrote his article on anarchy soon after the end of the Cold War and the book Social Theory of International Relations a few years later. Karl Deutsch and his colleagues were from an older generation that experienced the Second World War first hand and wrote Political Community and the North Atlantic Area little more than a decade from its end. At this time, it was becoming clear that the consequences of a nuclear war would risk the entirety of human civilization. This concern is articulated in no uncertain words: “...war is now so dangerous that mankind must eliminate it, must put it beyond serious possibility.” (Deutsch 1957, 3). The Korean war had ended just recently, and
the use of nuclear weapons had been on the table (Posey 2015). Europe was divided and the wars in Indochina, that would also include the United States, were underway. This work seems to be motivated less by optimism for the possibility of change and more by a sense of urgency and worry for the future.

Deutsch presents two types of security communities: amalgamated and pluralistic. The difference lies in the methods by which a security community is constructed. Integration is presented as the key factor in eliminating war as an option for states. Amalgamation means the joining or merging of units into one. In our case amalgamation would be a joining of several political entities into one i.e. a federation of formerly independent actors such as the United States of America. A pluralistic security community on the other hand is one where the actors are independent of each other, but enough integration has been achieved so that peace is somewhat certain. Deutsch claims that time has little meaning when it comes to integration and that it may happen in very short order as long as the result is an environment where no party prepares for or expects a war (Deutsch 1957, 6). I see a connection here to the “game changing” shifts in international system described by Wendt and brought up earlier in this thesis. Otherwise the constructivist theory seems to put more value in processes that take place over time and shape expectations and behavior that way.

Deutsch and colleagues limit the scope of their research geographically to the North Atlantic area because “all major powers of the free world” are located there (Deutsch 1957, 9). States under Soviet influence are excluded outright due to not being “free agents” and thus are outside the possibility for integration, except for East Germany, which wasn’t quite so isolated yet at the time of writing. Other options explored by the authors have been the members of NATO with some exceptions that were “ideologically and politically incompatible with the West.” such as Greece and Turkey (Deutsch 1957, 10). The 19 countries selected as potential members of the security community include neutral states like Sweden and Finland, although it is possible to speculate in hindsight about the extent of Western or Soviet influence on either of these examples. Nevertheless, it was considered to be within the limits for them to be considered free agents.

The methodological choice of using historical examples and experiences is made with the emphasis that history does not replicate itself or give ready answers, but that it is possible to identify parallels in different times that give broad indications or suggestions of what might happen. The goal of the study is in their words to look for the “minimum requirements for a peaceful political community. We are trying to see what is not needed for integration” (Deutsch 1957, 11).
The challenges that Deutsch and his colleagues identify in the historical approach have to do with the uncertainty of the causal relationship between the conditions and outcomes in distant times which makes it challenging to import any specific “models” into current times. Another point acknowledged is the development of human interaction from the old times to the new: the vastly increased speed of travel and information movement is recognized. Today we might call this globalization. Deutsch defends the historical approach:

But the fact that messages can be delivered more quickly to a person does not mean that he can read and understand them any faster. The speedup of transportation has not been paralleled by a comparable speedup in the human learning process. Our spans of memory and attention have not changed drastically. (Deutsch 1957, 11-12)

Memory and learning are discussed here in both human and state terms without distinction and it seems to be fairly accepted to do so. States and nations are thought to have memory, but it isn’t exactly like the memory and the learning capability of a human individual. Nations can remember and even selectively forget things beyond human capacity depending on what suits them best. I tend to agree that assigning human qualities to states and organizations can be useful and sometimes necessary, since it is humans who ultimately make up these institutions and organizations.

The selection of cases for the study includes instances where integration appears to have been successful as well as examples of failure. There are cases where a security environment has been established and those where it has not lasted. Finally, both amalgamated and pluralistic security communities are presented. (Deutsch 1957, 16). The research deals in probabilities of phenomena happening in certain circumstances. This is possibly the only way useful conclusions could be drawn, as recognizing historical patterns is already admitted to being difficult and the challenge of accounting for the right facts and nuggets of information from the vast amount of historical information is another challenge. Contradictory cases may then surface, but the general trend is what matters to Deutsch. (Deutsch 1957, 17.)

Nationalism as a phenomenon is not highlighted in the study and no great emphasis is placed on it when examining how security communities come to be. The role of sentiments (or values) such as loyalty and factors such as identities are not completely discounted, but they are not criteria for the success or failure of a security community. (Deutsch 1957, 19.) Why does the study concentrate on the North Atlantic area specifically if the greatest concern, a nuclear war and the end of human civilization as we know it, is the division of the world into East and West locked in a Cold War? The
answer seems to be that it is necessary to start small and that the integration of even the limited area of Western Europe was not always such an obvious state of affairs. Both World Wars had scarred the continent in less than one lifetime and ideas like a perpetual peace between France and Germany weren’t taken for granted yet. The first secretary of NATO Hastings Lionel Ismay is often quoted for saying that the purpose of the Alliance is “to keep the Russians out, Americans in and the Germans down.” (https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_137930.htm)

Values and expectations are ranked high in the essential requirements for amalgamated security community to form (Deutsch 1957, 46). Deutsch had found that it was essential for actors to have a degree of mutual understanding. It may also be required to marginalize and de-politicize conflicting values. One could for example see sectarian differences of religions as issues that are highly politicized and therefore appear as obstacles for integration. (Deutsch 1957, 48.) Sunni – Shiite division in the Muslim world today or the Protestant division in Northern Ireland could be examples of such differences.

The connection of values and institutions allows for bringing them from the abstract world into the political reality of the subjects or citizens. The three-way connection of values, institutions and habits form what Deutsch calls “way of life” (Deutsch 1957, 47). Another element of this phenomena is the contrast that apparently exists between this new way of life and the past that is now somehow undesirable. It is perhaps natural to assume that for change to effectively take place, a degree of unhappiness towards the old ways works in favor of change. (Deutsch 1957, 48.)

In contrast to the multitude of conditions that seem to be required for an amalgamated security community to function, Deutsch claims that pluralistic security communities require fewer preconditions to form, and that they survive harsher tests without disintegrating. Compatibility of values is again seen as the most important reason behind the success of pluralistic communities along with the responsiveness of the actors to each other’s messages, needs and predictability of behavior. This is only three conditions compared to the dozen or so required for amalgamated community to form and survive. (Deutsch 1957, 66-67.)

Values have a role to play in the spreading of integration movements through the way they are present in political appeals these movements use to gather support. These appeals are criticized for ambiguity in the values they are based on though such as liberty, justice and rights. The strongest appeals were found to be the ones calling for the defense of a certain way of life that consists partly of values as discussed above. Appeals that relied upon power and privileges were deemed less successful. (Deutsch 1957, 97,100.) The ambiguity of the term values can be seen as a weakness, but it may also
be its greatest strength as it is their politicization and instrumental value that achieves the greatest effects. The finding that promises and appeals based on gaining more power were found to be less effective is interesting, because it would seem like the most effective motivation from a realist point of view.

Deutsch identifies two values above others when it comes to the North Atlantic area and its potential for integration into a security community: democracy and a non-communist economic system. Rule of law and constitutionalism fall under the term democracy in this work. The category of “non-communist” is used to refer to a variety of different economic systems with varying degrees of state control and other variables. It is a more inclusive way of defining compatible systems than insisting on including purely capitalist systems if there is such a system in the first place. The democracy prerequisite is not entirely without issues either, since at the time of Deutsch’s work both Portugal is admitted to being clearly non-democratic and there were still questions of the future direction of West Germany. (Deutsch 1957, 123-127.)

The North Atlantic area defined by Deutsch encompasses 19 states, 13 of which are members of NATO. The alliance defines its value base in the North Atlantic Treaty with similar terms to what have been found common in this area by Deutsch and his colleagues (NATO 1949). Particularly the case of NATO troops stationed in foreign countries and submitted to a large degree to the host nations legislation is used as an example of fairly advanced integration of certain values like the principle of a fair trial (Deutsch 1957, 127-129).

The second essential part of integration along with core values is mutual responsiveness, meaning sensitivity to messages and interaction from and towards the other members of the community, a “process of social learning” (Deutsch 1957, 129). This seems very similar to the social learning that was described in the constructivist literature earlier. What did social responsiveness mean in practice in the time just after World War II? One way for Deutsch and his colleagues to measure international interaction is to measure the amount of mail and other correspondence flowing within and between states. It is quite reasonable to assume the increase in this traffic given modern information technology, but one must also remember that the change in means of communication matters little if one has nothing to communicate. Nowadays we seem to have a tendency to explain certain phenomena such as mass mobilization and social movements purely with communication networks and the nearly instant transfer speeds of messages, but mass gatherings and mobilization has happened before Facebook and Twitter as well.
Cases of good responsiveness according to Deutsch are the way Britain handled the growing international role of the United States and the changes regarding her various colonies that were taking steps towards greater autonomy and independence, making concessions and maintaining some influence rather than holding onto possessions that were eventually impossible to maintain. Contrasting this Deutsch brings up the French troubles in her colonies such as Indochina and Northern Africa. The formation of NATO is mentioned as an example of responsiveness with the Marshall plan and other post-war developments such as the European Coal and Steel Community that over time developed into the European Union we know today. Indeed, integration has been one of the outstanding goals of the EU and not entirely without success. In the 1950’s there was just an increasing trend of integration reported. (Deutsch 1957, 130-133.)

It is suggested that cooperation within the framework of NATO would lead naturally into wider range of social interaction and cooperation and that a military alliance would actually serve more than just a military goal (Deutsch 1957, 191). Deutsch quotes Lester Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada at the time of signing the North Atlantic Treaty and later Prime Minister: “This Treaty, though born of fear and frustration, must however lead to positive social, economic and political achievements if it is to live” (Deutsch 1957, 192). A similar comment towards the “secondary” role of the Alliance was expressed by the Secretary-General of NATO Ismay, seeing potential in its Article 2, which in its entirety reads:

> The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any and all of them. (NATO 1949)

The potential of NATO for purposes other than war have been recognized for a long time, even in the 1950’s, but under the precondition that the military security issue that the Alliance was created to address would remain a priority. The other soft functions were seen as hopeful possibilities for the future (Deutsch 1957, 193). Deutsch and his colleague note that military alliances in themselves are not particularly helpful towards either pluralistic or amalgamated integration, but the non-military implications that such alliances as NATO bring may be fruitful for this goal. One such path would be to develop the communications and responsiveness between states and that they would then be used to discussing matters with each other and create new habits that support integration. The authors note
that even though NATO is the prominent inter-state organization in the Euro-Atlantic area, other organizations may take up this role as well (Deutsch 1957, 202). It is interesting to think what kind of potential futures Deutsch had in mind and how the European Union and NATO of today fit into them.

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett continue the work of Deutsch and his associates in their book *Security communities* (1998). The popularity of realist theories in international relations during the Cold War is at least partly responsible for the lack of successors to Deutsch’s ideas. Adler and Barnett assume the task decades later as they see his work once again relevant as the end of the Cold War has allowed room for different IR theories and approaches. Adler and Barnett, like Wendt, are unsatisfied by the realist theories and counting them seems like and important motivating factor for their work. The significance of common values as an enabler of security cooperation is mentioned at the beginning as something even “hardened defense officials” recognize. The concept of security has also broadened since the 1950’s to mean more than just military matters. These are for example social, environmental and economic concerns as members of security communities no longer regard each other as military threats. (Adler & Barnett 1998, 3-4.) It is possible to get the impression that only being in a security community allows states to consider the wider security paradigm, but I do not believe this is their intention as these issues are now (nearly two decades later) seen as global phenomena cutting across regional divisions and communities.

Adler and Barnett focus on pluralistic security communities since they are recognized as more relevant to modern developments. Deutsch did at many occasions state that the pluralistic communities are formed with fewer prerequisite conditions, can take harsher tests and achieve their goals just as well as amalgamated communities. Deutsch’s work is also criticized for the choice of methods in evaluating transactions and communications and for not taking into account international organizations and various groups and factions within states. Another reason for the going out of fashion of Deutsch’s theory is thought to be the prevailing cynicism towards sociological ideas in international relations and particularly ideas of community (Adler & Barnett 1998, 8-9). The critique may be valid, but Deutsch did not entirely neglect these actors: he discussed NATO at many turns, acknowledged the still young European Coal and Steel Community and its potential and commented on the inclusion and participation of various peoples and groups into the politics of states. Many of the institutions that we have now were not there to be considered in the rather immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

The theoretical field of international relations concerned with the problem of abolishing war is mapped out in a figure where at one end lies neo-realism and in the other constructivism, the dividing
factor being the emphasis on normative and non-material forces respectively. Constructivism, as we have already established, places great emphasis on norms and values as building blocks of the international structure along with material forces, while the neo-realist and realist models would discount them altogether. The debate on the nature of anarchy is again presented as one of the key points of difference between the various theories. (Adler & Barnett 1998, 10-11.)

The contributions of a “Deutschian” approach to international relations according to Adler and Barnett are to bring into discussion the concept of community in the international system and the forces that exist outside of the state. The second contribution is to the discussion of states’ power in relation to transnational forces and security, meaning also discussion on the nature of sovereignty and what many have called the diminishing role of the state. However, one should not discount the state, as they still are the primary agents in the matters of external security. The third point is the effect of social interactions in the shaping of interests, identities and structures: the two-way influence between material and normative forces familiar to us from constructivist reading. Finally, the authors want to get rid of the idealist-realist division and introduce the possibility of structural change into the cynical, unchanging world of realist theory for some kind of middle ground and to support the wider constructivist research of IR. (Adler & Barnett 1998, 13-15.)

One of the most important goals of Adler and Barnett is to bring together and examine the roles that different organizations have for building peace. From the days of Karl Deutsch NATO is still on the field, joined now by various regional institutions such as the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the European Union (EU) as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). (Adler & Barnett 1999, 16-17.)

Adler and Barnett want to fix some of the shortcomings they saw in Deutsch’s methodology by mapping out the core terminology and concept as well as setting a framework for the studies in their book. Analysis is divided into three sections: First is the “precipitating conditions”, meaning factors that accelerate or help the development further. Second are the different variables such as transactions, communication organizations and social learning. The third part would be about mutual trust and collective identity. Finally, the authors seek to present a model of the development of security community in phases. (Adler & Barnett 1998, 17.)

Ole Wæver, one of the contributors to Adler’s and Barnett’s work, begins discussing Western Europe as a security community and claiming it is one. The actual problem lies with proving this claim and in finding out why it is perceived as one. Second problem would be to evaluate its resistance to
challenges and future longevity and finally what lessons could be learned from it. (Wæver 1998, 75).

One of the issues that Wæver points out is that because Western Europe, or some sub-region such as the Nordic countries, are quite widely accepted as being a security community, a wide range of theories seem to fit the description and claim credit for it. He points out that John Mearsheimer for example sees the bipolarity of the Cold War times as the keeper of peace in Europe and realists will always think of war as inevitable, however long they’d have to wait for it. The historical developments that seemingly by chance create conditions for today’s security communities are also an uncertain variable. This is why Wæver wants to steer away from examining the origins of this claimed community and concentrate on the factors that either uphold or undermine it. (Wæver 1998, 77.)

What distinguishes (national) identity is not similarity or actual connectedness but the self-conscious idea of a community. In line with this book’s constructivist redefinition of security communities: the community works when the actors choose to act as if there is a community. (Wæver 1998, 75)

Wæver wants to separate the discussion of identities from the discussion of loyalties. A sensation of community is one part that interacts with other aspects of one’s identity and so it is not a binary choice between being European vs. Finnish or Danish vs. Scandinavian for example. He claims that if it came down to a question of loyalty, the sense of broader community would probably succumb to the more strongly defined national identification and this would put the community effectively out of the picture. How the communal identity interacts and becomes a part of the national identity is an important issue in Wæver’s research. (Wæver 1998, 78.)

The concept of security in the way Deutsch and others saw it was very much tied to states and to military issues in particular. Ole Wæver’s big contribution to this discussion is the wider understanding of security as a dynamic practice rather than a sector purely dominated by states’ physical and material violence. Non-military issues may undermine security communities, so it makes sense to consider them from this point of view as well. Securitization refers to the process of giving an issue a meaning that make it about survival to some extent, lifting it above and beyond everyday challenges and warranting special measures. For example, in the times immediately following the Second World War, communism in the political life of Western European countries was highly securitized in conjunction with the threat of war from the Soviet Union, making normal political participation often impossible due to the concerns over insurrections and subterfuge. (Wæver 1998, 79-82.)
The security paradigm in Europe is organized by Wæver into periods marked by different trends in securitization: the times following WW2 until the 1950’s he calls times of insecurity (perceived threat, no countermeasures), security of the 1960’s when the nuclear stalemate made political goals unachievable by military means, desecuritization of roughly the 1970’s onward when the security concerns were fading out of the public sphere but remained as factors through institutions and experts specializing in security matters and finally the re-securitization of the 1990’s when new issues rose to the agenda. (Wæver 1998, 69.)

NATO is presented as one of the major stages of concrete cooperation between European states, both members and non-members. What makes NATO special in Wæver’s mind is the fact that it is “not only a paper alliance”. A rather unique development is also seen in the roles the militaries perform and their identities as transnational actors as opposed to the historical role as the embodiment of nationalism. (Wæver 1998, 88-89.)

The identity of Europe at the turn of the millennia according to Wæver has been influenced more by the regions own history rather than some external threat. If the definition of a security community is to make war between its members unthinkable, an external threat may not be a very critical component (Wæver 1998, 90). Deutsch and others have already established that security structures geared towards external enemies are not great vessels of integration or community formation. European identity distinct from Western identity really picked up wind in its sails when the Cold War policies indicated that the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA would move into bilateral direction under Ronald Regan, a prospect that according to Wæver caused some unease. (Wæver 1998, 90-91)

How do the wars in the Balkans fit into the idea of a post-Cold War European security community? These conflicts are a reminder that war as a possibility in Europe did not end with the Cold War. Wæver acknowledges the conflict but claims that it doesn’t fit the “Mearsheimer predictions” of the realist patters that try to explain why wars happen (Wæver 1998, 98). Wæver doesn’t go into detail about the causes behind the wars that erupted in the region at the splintering of Yugoslavia, and it is admittedly a very complicated conflict driven by various factors besides loyalty to a state: ethnicity, religion and different narratives of history. One important pattern or a mechanic of realism would be the balance of power among actors in a region. What the European Union does, according to Wæver, is to dissolve such “others” in favor of one empire-like center and its relationship to its own past rather than some entity behind an external border, something that Wæver argues Europe or even the EU doesn’t have. (Wæver 1998, 99-100.)
Europe has moved into a post-sovereign era according to Wæver. It has become a security community not just a non-war community, due to the wide spectrum of interaction that takes place at different levels of society among the states. This may have started within the framework of the Cold War as some of the traditions, institutions and groundwork for cooperation at various levels was founded then. Security concerns in Europe became increasingly involved with unity and fragmentation and the threat of its own past where sovereign states would measure off against each other with tried consequences. It is the “transactions” of Deutsch or “dynamic density” of Durkheim and Ruggie combined with the fairly limited area of Europe that has produced this post-sovereign security community. This requires for the concept of security to mean more than just state-driven military affairs. (Wæver 1998, 100-106.)

Emanuel Adler continues to look at institutions and particularly the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as an organization with the express purpose of building a security community. He makes an important distinction between the OSCE and the other institutions mostly discussed so far: the EU and NATO. These two have helped in creating a security community as a by-product of their primary task whereas the OSCE is a purpose-built effort to create common identity (Adler 1998, 119). A comprehensive security paradigm involving economics and the environment among others is again called for. In addition to comprehensive security, Adler presents indivisibility and cooperation as the pillars on which this new model of international security is based on (Adler 1998, 119-120).

NATO is given credit for attempting the same kind of functions with the OSCE with various institutions such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the perhaps most well-known Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) (Adler 1998, 120). Since its inception, the Partnership for Peace program has evolved in a way where some partnerships are more intimate than others and some more institutions have emerged with fluctuating success such as the NATO-Russia council that is not seeing much use due to the recent international developments.

The functions that the OSCE performs are aiming for long term effects and have a value of their own separate from the results (Adler 1998, 121.) In the example of OSCE performing an inspection to a military exercise in one of its member states, it is the act of inspection itself that carries more meaning than the actual results. Such actions repeated enough times are supposed to create practices and traditions that improve security. These are called confidence-building measures (CBM) (Adler 1998, 121). Instead of behavioral methods like the number of letters sent between states that Deutsch used and was criticized for, the success of the OSCE should be measured by “studying the direct impact
that a regional institution has on the way diplomatic, military and economic communities perceive and understand reality...” (Adler 1998, 122). Adler claims that a sense of community and we-feeling flows down from the elites to civil society, something that the OSCE is engaged with.

The norms that formed the basis of the OSCE, originally known as CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) are multi-party democracy, the rule of law, human rights and liberal economic systems (Adler 1998, 123). These norms were not completely met in many of the states participating in the process, but they gained more weight at the end of the Cold War and became the core values that would help form the security community that would hopefully follow (Adler 1998, 124). The universality of values such as democracy or rule of law as we understand them in the West has been questioned before, but the issue seems to be a hot topic today in particular. State leaders in Europe such as Victor Orbán in Hungary, a member state in both the EU and NATO, have questioned the very values these organizations see themselves based upon. Orbán has been quoted calling such values as human rights and tolerance “secondary” and “derivative” (Hungarian Spectrum, 2015). It goes to show, that there is no perfect consensus as to what European values even are.

OSCE is partly credited for the developments that took place at the end of the Cold War and the end of the Soviet Union. According to Adler the organization helped create a political climate in Eastern European Countries where people were organizing themselves and demanding changes towards the “goals” such as democracy and the rule of law that would be requirements if the relations towards the West would be normal again, as the states would re-define themselves and their identities. The Helsinki process is set as an example of peaceful change, a term also used by Deutsch. (Adler 1998, 127.)

The differences in the functions of OSCE and other organizations such as NATO and the EU are perhaps most importantly the way actors who do not belong to a certain community of shared values have been and are a part of the organization (Adler 1998, 133). It is arguable though whether or not all members of NATO and the EU fulfill the stated criteria for joining before being admitted in. NATO has accepted in military dictatorships (Portugal) and tolerated such as members (Greece) and the European Union has also shown considerable flexibility in the conditions on joining the union. This doesn’t make the premise of the OSCE less distinct in the way it builds a community from the inside out as Adler puts it (Adler 1998, 119).

It has already been mentioned that NATO does emulate some functions of the OSCE and perhaps the overlooking of deficiencies in the member candidates of the European Union can be understood with the rationale that it is easier to achieve the set goals as a member rather than while remaining on the
outside. Adler mentions the partnership program of NATO as a probationary period during which it is possible to assess the development of said partner in the fields that matter when it comes to membership (Adler 1998, 134).

Adler calls this aspect of OSCE’s community building model *socialization and teaching of norms* (Adler 1998, 133). This seems like a rather direct expression of what is essentially active spreading of certain values that are often called Western. It is not done by imposing, as that would create considerable push-back. States are after all still the primary actors and hold on to what sovereignty they have as the times change. This is also acknowledged by Adler, who makes the point that since normative structures the OSCE creates are usually morally rather than legally binding, states find the various functions easier to accept (Adler 1998, 137). This can be enough in the constructivist view, but the usual realist critique would be that lack of enforcement will make everything for naught. Perhaps both sides could agree, that in the field of international politics a moral obligation is often as good as it’s going to get, and that this argument can ultimately be seen as a part of the debate about the nature of anarchy.

As mentioned already, other organizations have adopted similar practices to the OSCE, including NATO. The alliances post-Cold War development in Adler’s view is marked with the adaptation of a wider definition of security and a broadening of its mission as well.

In other words, NATO has become Janus-faced, looking at realist power politics while betting on idealism and a security community. By adopting OSCE’s definition of cooperative security and many of its community-making practices and applying them to former Communist states, NATO is steering a two-track course between (a) basing security within the OSCE region on cooperation and dependable expectations of peaceful change and (b) keeping a strong defense capability as an insurance policy against Russia, should the latter turn against NATO. NATO enlargement to the East aims at fulfilling both goals. (Adler 1998, 143)

Keeping one foot in the old balance of power stance and the other in a cooperative and inclusive security community is not entirely uncomplicated. There is the issue of other actors perhaps understanding or agreeing with the cooperative and community approach. This shows both outside the alliance in the way Russia has objected the expansion seeing it as directed against her and it is perhaps not unreasonable to say that some new members have been motivated by the security guarantees against Russia when joining the alliance. There seems to have been a conflict between the
two tracks described above and this can explain some of the suspicion: A state may apply for membership for a different reason that the alliance gives for its expansion. On the other hand, there has been no interest in Russia to explore the reasons why so many of the former satellite states and Soviet republics have felt the need to apply for membership and integrate with the West with some urgency. The explanations offered are usually limited to russophobia, conspiracy, fascism etc.

Despite the double message being potentially confusing and conflicting, the community building efforts of NATO include the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security that the alliance signed with Russia in 1997 and the NATO-Russia council that was formed later (Adler 1998, 144). This institution worked until the recent crisis in the Ukraine led to its suspension and serves as an example that the “track A” included some serious effort from both parties and led to concrete cooperation in several fields such as counter-narcotics, support for the Afghan armed forces and countering piracy off the Horn of Africa (NATO 2013). Recent developments have shown that the mutual understanding and confidence that was built for over a decade did not withstand the test it was put through in Ukraine, but it would be pessimistic to discount the practices that were developed and their potential for the future. NATO-Russia council was not erased completely and there are still some efforts to resume talks.

The way security has been defined in Europe after the Cold War is partially the work of institutions such as the OSCE, and the change has been considerable compared to the Cold War. Even today when the security climate is cooler than in the previous decade, the understanding of security has not shifted back to the Cold War times overnight. The recent events cannot be explained away though, and war in Europe is not unthinkable at the moment. This development should not be understood as a “return to business as usual” though, as the concept of security community is stronger and more widely accepted than in Karl Deutsch’s time and the experience of ending one cold war is there. It would be wise not to forget those experiences.

Bruce Russett points out that new institutions are often born in the aftermath of great wars such as the Napoleonic wars and the Concert of Europe, First World War and the League of Nations and the United Nations after the Second World War. If the following peace seems stable, the position of the institution becomes stronger and more trusted. Russett sees the end of the Cold War in the same sense as an opportunity to create something. (Russett 1998, 383-384.) The community building power of the United Nations rests at least to some degree in similar methods as the “seminar diplomacy” introduced by Adler (Adler 1999, 138). The various international organizations that are either organs of or work with the UN teach norms and create practices that may create sense of community and influence even the actors that do not agree on particular points (Russett 1998, 381).
Creating a community at a global level is both a liberal institutionalist and a constructivist effort. The constructivist identity formation has in Russett’s view only been successful in the Western democracies. He remains at least slightly optimistic, as a constructivist would: “In some degree, however limited, we continually create the world we desire, and deserve the world we get.” (Russett 1998, 387). Michael Barnett and Emmanuel Adler point out in their edited work that has been discussed here that social communication has turned out to be more important than Deutsch had anticipated and that it has often manifested through institutions and organization that play big roles in the creation of shared identities and community feeling (Barnett & Adler 1998, 421).

Barnett and Adler add to the concept of power that for Deutsch meant the core around which the community would gather. They claim that the strength can be more than just fear in the traditional sticks & carrots scheme: it could be just the desire to identify with a seemingly strong actor. Example of this could be the security community that has developed in North America with Canada and the USA and even Mexico. Another important addition to what power means is the influence upon the identities and self-understanding of other actors and making them abide by the rules that are defined together. (Barnett & Adler 1998, 424.) This doesn’t have to be state power or subversion, but rather the teaching of norms and values that institutions and organizations conduct as community building efforts.

Barnett and Adler conclude by stating that even though the end of the Cold War made it possible for the idea of security communities and more widely the theoretical framework of sociological constructivism to gain position in the field of IR, they do not claim security communities as an eventuality that the world is on its way to. Just as they deny the realist idea that the world of anarchy and power never changes. Forming a security community is a multi-faceted process involving in no small part elements that are either unintended or happen by chance as well as concerted and institutionalized effort. (Barnett & Adler 1998, 435-438.)

2.2.1 The Copenhagen school and security

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde are the prominent scholars of the Copenhagen school of international relations whose work has concentrated on the widening on the concept of security from the traditional military-political sector to consider other aspects such as societal matters, the environment and economy. Ole Wæver’s contributions to the concept of security community have

The way they make sense of the wide understanding of security is to divide it into sectors, just one of which is the military aspect. The importance of one sector over another is a matter of debate. The division into sectors is an attempt to limit the target of analysis in a reasonable way and to avoid the incoherence that their critics have pointed out as a concern when security analysis has in their view exploded and spread perhaps too far. It is not their goal however to get rid of the traditional views altogether but claim that the other aspects or sectors can be meaningful on their own without having to do with war and military force (Buzan 1998, 3-4).

Sectors and securitization are the two ways Buzan et al. seek to take what they call the Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) further. The CSCT concentrates on the traditional questions of how to deal with the realist symptoms of anarchy like threats to their sovereignty and vulnerabilities in their near areas, but also acknowledges global connectedness. It is a “…set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.” (Buzan 1998, 12) It is noteworthy that a regional security complex is not very similar with the Deutschian security community. Division in sectors means that it is possible to move beyond the regional limits of CSCT approach: environmental issues for example may be both global and regional and not all security actors are static in the sense that modern states are. Sectors work as “arenas of discourse where a multitude of values may have security meanings. Securitization, as discussed before, has to do with framing issues as security or non-security issues (desecuritization) and who gets to define this. (Buzan 1998, 16-19, 45, 96.)

One possible implication of the wider understanding of security according to the authors is that a security complex would be created to face issues such as global warming or some of its symptoms. This kind of “top down” security complex that is not motivated by the actors’ action towards each other but instead by something outside of the international system or from a higher level (global v sub-system like a state) could create positive security complexes that Buzan and his colleagues liken to a security community or a -region as the actors would not consider each other as the threat but instead would be brought together. The possibility of top-down causality demands that the systems and structures are also considered as possible causes for security issues. (Buzan 1998, 199-200.)

In matters of security the Copenhagen school positions itself in the constructivist camp instead of being objectivist, but on social aspects they see themselves far closer to the centerline between
constructivism and objectivism. They see security as quality that is placed upon things by people, but social aspects and structures are considered quite rigid and less likely to change. Still they do not see these things as set in stone the way it is often the case with traditional security studies. (Buzan 1998, 204-205.)

The end of the Cold War has meant the demand and even some success for the wide understanding of security. Some security issues have re-emerged in Europe due to the recent conflict in Ukraine and for example the refugees coming into Europe have been securitized ranging from causing an existential crisis for Western civilization to less apocalyptic visions. On the other hand, there are attempts to desecuritize these issues as well, although securitization seems to be the prevailing trend for the moment. Even as some today talk about a return to the world of power politics as they were during the Cold War, the wider meaning of security is largely accepted now and useful for the modern challenges as well. (Buzan 1998, 211-212.)

2.4 The West

Christopher S. Browning and Marko Lehti deal with the concept of West in their edited volume *The Struggle for the West – A divided and contested legacy* (2010). For them the seminal moments in the discussion over the term have been the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the war(s) that followed. Their purpose is to present the various ways West is defined and constructed and what meanings are given to it and why. For Browning and Lehti the main question is about identity. (Browning & Lehti 2010, 1-4.) They argue that the supposed division of the West between Europe and America is too simplistic and that the West is such a fluid concept that the divisions should be looked for within Europe and America as well. This then opens the concept of Europe for definition. (Browning & Lehti 2010, 5.)

Another main argument in the book is that the West has often been defined from the outside instead of the more traditional understanding of self-definition in relation to an “Other”. If someone uses the West as the Other, it serves the purpose of keeping the West alive as an idea. It is possible to see connections between this idea and the way Wendt and others talked about social learning and identity formation as sometimes being a self-fulfilling prophecy: if one is treated in a certain way, actions and identity of that actor may then align towards those ways. Browning and Lehti describe the approach
of the book to being “constructivist-inspired” so such connections are not entirely surprising. (Browning & Lehti 2010, 5-6.)

In short, the West is a slippery concept. The question of whether the West is declining or even dying is therefore difficult to answer since it is unclear which West we are talking about. At the same time, however, it also illustrates the important point that, although attempts are frequently made to define the essence of the West and to fill it with cultural, social, political, spiritual, philosophical and economic content, at the root the West is a discursive and intersubjectively framed concept that has transformed across time. (Browning & Lehti 2010, 18)

After pointing out the various ways the concept of West is contested, Browning and Lehti discuss the different narratives or stories of the West as a civilization, modernity and ideology. The civilizational approach draws back the furthest when it comes to historical heritage as it relies on the significance of ancient Greece and Rome for many of the things we now easily call Western. West from the modernity approach has to do with the period of Enlightenment, colonialism, industrialization and such ideas as capitalism. This is a period when the global impact of the West is imposed upon the world. The authors link the ideas of Francis Fukuyama to this narrative of the West as a superior culture that other may imitate and join as opposed to the civilizational understanding that locks peoples into place more. The final narrative described is the political West of the Cold War period that Browning and Lehti see as institutionally grounded into NATO and the dichotomy with the East. (Browning & Lehti 2010, 21.)

They call NATO here a security community, but it is possible that they do not use this term in the same exact way as Deutsch, Adler, Barnett et al. who would perhaps contend that NATO itself is not a security community but may help create one either indirectly or by deliberate effort. Perhaps here the authors use the term just to describe an entity that is primarily concerned with security, although they mention security between its members, which would point to the way Deutsch defined the term. Getting rid of the West as a concept and building something new on its ruins is not the aim of the authors, but rather to find way in which it could be re-imagined or changed into a more open and inclusive direction. The role of the Other would be critical for this new narrative to be successful. (Browning & Lehti 2010, 30.)

In her chapter called The Russian dawn – How Russia contributed to the emergence of ‘the West’ as a concept, Peggy Heller examines arguably one of the most important Others in relation to the West.
The first point made is the quite short history of so called Western civilization and West itself as a conceptual framework instead of the many and competing ways history has been explained. The influence of historical Wests is not denied, but the idea that the Western civilization would descend directly from ancient Greece or Rome is not accepted. “...there was no stable category and no common term naming a single culture united by history.” (Heller 2010, 33)

The ambiguity of Russia’s position on the cultural, geographical and political East-West scale meant that it was West instead of Europe that turned out to be the more useful Other for Russia. Russians have generally had no interest in excluding themselves from Europe, and the European powers had no reasonable cause to exclude Russia completely. During and after the Napoleonic wars for example Russia was very much a part of the European political scene and a big player in the conflict. Another example is Russia’s expansion to the East and the conquering of the perceived barbarian threat there could be seen as something that European powers would do those days. However, the differences were numerable enough to merit using West as the comparison to define Russia. One such difference can be found in the religious traditions and the rift between the Catholic and Orthodox directions of Christianity. (Heller 2010, 34-36.) One sometimes runs into the term “third Rome” which refers to the Orthodox Church having moved from Constantinople to Russia when the Eastern Roman Empire finally fell to the Ottomans. This claim is not exclusive to Russia though, and it is contested by the Ottomans and the Holy Roman empire among others.

Viatcheslav Morozov writes from the contemporary Russian perspective towards West and discusses the concept of hegemony as well as the universality and ownership of values and ideas such as democracy. Morozov defends the usefulness of the West as a concept by pointing out that history did not end with the Cold War and that the West is not universal: the world according to him is as much a patchwork of ideologies and values as ever. States and other actors often use the term to define themselves as non-Western as well. The geographical ambiguity means flexibility in this case as was already noted earlier. The difference between the West and the rest is not absolute or set in stone: Morozov uses the example of the Cuban missile crisis and the fact that it was resolved without a nuclear war to point out that the two sides found some common ground when push came to shove. (Morozov 2010, 185-188)

Morozov introduces the concept of hegemony, basing on the work of Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, as power that is simultaneously accepted and resisted by identifying the source of the hegemony as oppressive and those that resist or oppose it as the victims of oppression, but with tat least a partial recognition of legitimacy that sets it apart from antagonism (Browning & Lehti: Morozov 2010, 188). The Western hegemony is based on the appeal of the ideas of democracy
and human rights and the fact that the Western states are, or go to great lengths to appear to be, some kind of models for them. According to Morozov, this keeps the resistance quite sparse as there has been no framework of concepts created that could compete with it and that could rally nations behind it in a similar way. (Morozov 2010, 188-189)

Russia’s position on liberal democracy is a complex topic. Some of the critique for example by Vladimir Pastukhov points out that attempting to “sit on the fence” by both admitting to a degree the benefits of liberal democracy and at the same time going along its own path on the matter (so called sovereign democracy). This, as quoted by Morozov, may lead to inconsistent and poor foreign policy in such cases as the Orange revolution in Ukraine and Russia’s reaction to that which is described as “total inability to deal with it”. It is worth noting that the reactions to the events of late 2013 and onwards, also called the Euromaidan Revolution, show that the Russian leadership was not on the fence so much anymore. Pastukhov continues that instead of having its feet on either side of the line, Russia should assert its right to determine its own political and cultural existence and abandon the “false universalism” of the West. However, a success in a project to fully go against the West would require some new alternative to liberal democracy as pointed out already. (Morozov 2010, 193-194.) Morozov does not see the demise of the Western hegemony as likely or even wish for its end, as there is no knowing what the “radical alternative” that would be able to surpass it would be like. When Morozov calls for the West to embrace its hegemony but abandon the white man’s burden, he means that the West should lead by example and not by exclusive universalism that forces others to either assimilate or be excluded from civilization or even the sphere of humanity. I interpret this as a call for West to accept difference better. Does it mean the kind of difference that Russia’s “sovereign democracy” is compared to actual democracy? To understand this, examples like China may be useful, where some parts of the Western model like market capitalism works, but others like multi-party representative democracy seems quite impossible. Turkey is another interesting case in light of the recent developments in its relations with the EU and as a member of NATO.

Patrick T. Jackson criticizes the “cottage industry” of literature regarding the decline of the West by claiming that they tend to lack historical perspective and have a non-reflexive relationship with theory (Jackson 2010, 53). The problem with historical perspective has to do with what the current state of the West is being compared to: if the West is in decline or collapsing, one expects to find a stable and ideal version of it somewhere in history: a golden age without decline or crisis. Instead Jackson states that the West “... was born in crisis, and has been in danger of decline ever since.” (Jackson 2010, 53).
The critique towards the theoretical shortcomings, as I understood it, accuses the scholars of being directed by political discourse and terminology, and that they take things at face value and assume that since politicians or other actors say “West” a lot, that means there is a concrete entity behind the term. In doing so they operate within a set discourse and are not capable of evaluating it critically. The question Jackson wants to focus on instead is how the constant references and talking about the West work to produce it (Jackson 2010, 54). He concludes with the statement that the idea of decline is a cultural tradition of the West that is a result of historical circumstances and now a part of what keeps the idea in the discussion and therefore alive (Jackson 2010, 68).

Europe does not do war at all, or if it does (as it did in Kosovo) it does a ‘Friedenspolitik’ – a peace policy, was as the continuation of peace by other means. It is all very confusing. It certainly makes it difficult to conceive of a single social imaginary of the West, which is why the West itself is a ‘contested concept’ (Coker 2010, 76-77).

Christopher Coker discusses the Western social imaginary and war in his chapter Rebooting the West – Can the Western alliance still engage in a war? For Coker, the idea of the West is born from the European wars like the Franco – Prussian war in the late 19th century and the world wars. He sees the Second World War and particularly the Atlantic Charter of 1941 as a key milestone for the development of the West as an alliance between the European democracies (many in exile at the time) and the United States against fascism first and later in contrast to the Soviet Union. (Coker 2010, 73-76.)

Coker uses Charles Taylor’s concept of “social imaginary” or the way large groups of people understand their social environment through stories and narratives and as the name suggests, imagine their existence (Coker 2010, 73-74). He then presents three different ways it has been theorized: liberal internationalism, cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. These three have different relationships to war: according to Coker it is an inseparable part of liberal internationalism in the effort to “make the world safe for democracy”. Cosmopolitanism on the other hand sees war as the continuation of international law instead of politics. Communitarianism is presented as the latest kind of social imaginary particularly in Europe and this is what Coker means by Europe not doing war. In this imaginary, the community is the source of people’s values and identities and that existence is defined by the boundary of inclusion and exclusion. In Coker’s words, it is the most interesting of the three. (Coker 2010, 76, 84.)
Coker’s article has some signs of what Patrick T. Jackson had criticized before, such as the historical approach that suggests some sort of ideal state of existence against which the different kinds of troubles are measured. For Coker, this “height of the Western moment in history” that he also calls the highest moment of American hegemony was when the ideas of “right to intervene” and the “responsibility to protect” were accepted by the United Nations in 2005 with the interventions of the 1990’s fresh in mind. The division of the West is also placed in the usual place between the United States and Europe. Coker concludes, that if the West should continue on the communitarian path, it may be moving into a direction where it is either unlikely or incapable of engaging in a war: “War was the West: it brought it into existence in 1917, and confirmed its credentials in 1941 with the signing of the Atlantic Charter. But the challenges that lie ahead may call for a very different response.” (Coker 2010, 88)

The findings of the authors discussing the concept of the West suggest that the West will not “end” as long as the concept is useful to enough people, even (or especially) to those who oppose it and categorize themselves as its mortal enemies (Browning 2010, 219.) The West is a changing and a fluid concept and it gets some of its resilience from that. Browning suggests some possible paths that the concept might take as he claims that changes are afoot: one such paths could be to return to a rigid inside-outside thinking that has little readiness to engage in dialogue and where different views represent a threat. Another possibility would be to view difference as the driving motor for dialogue and thus the development of the West. Third path would be to take historical lessons to heed and develop the future based on past mistakes towards something new that is most unlikely to repeat them. (Browning 2010, 227). To me it looks like unfortunately the first path would be most likely, but they are all quite simplified trends and meant as examples rather than hypotheses.
3. Values in official documents

Values are generally understood as goals for action as well as categories according to which the actions are judged, and the society is evaluated (Pirttilä-Backman 2005, 7). Shalom H Schwartz discusses values in the context of social psychology, but it may applicable here as well. Schwartz points out that while most people would agree that values such as peace, forgiveness, equality and justness are good things across the board, differences start to emerge when we ask who is forgiven and justice to whom? The question is how broad one’s moral universe is, or the sphere inside which these values are applied. A smaller morale universe would more easily exclude certain peoples or groups from other values that may be seen as completely universal by someone else. Schwartz also claims that values direct the actions of people. (Schwartz 2005, 216-217). It is clear how this is applicable to this study, particularly the question about the extent of the moral universe and what the values mean to different people. One common example of this would be the question of equality in for example Saudi Arabia, where a controversial law was recently passed allowing women to drive cars. This was portrayed as a big step towards equality (HS 26.9.2017). Not everyone seems to be held to the same standards, and that is the essence of the question about universality of values. Schwartz also examines the effect of democracy to how wide and inclusive people’s moral universes are and suggests that the more democratic a society is, the more certain values are seen as universal rather than only applying to a more closed group or a community (Schwartz 2015, 226-227).

How do values show up on the NATO strategic concepts, summit declarations or the founding treaty itself? The North Atlantic Treaty states that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations are one of the cornerstones of the Alliance and that its purpose is “... to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” (NATO 1949). Other expressions that I will consider as values include stability and well-being as well as preservation of peace and security. These are not explicitly called “values” in the founding document itself, but there is a clear need to tie the necessity and purpose of the Alliance into something immaterial and high-minded. In the documents analyzed in this thesis, the term “values” is outspoken in the more modern documents, but they appear with varying frequency in the documents. I believe that by looking at how NATO talks about values and comparing it to the Alliances activities, it is possible to ask questions such as how much they influence these actions. When have they been brought up more? Have they been shoved aside when so called “realpolitik” has taken precedence and only talked about when the going is easy?
Main phrases and expressions which frequent the official documents are:

- values
- democracy,
- rule of law,
- freedom / liberty,
- human rights.
- individual rights.

Simply mapping their frequency in the published material has little worth alone but putting it in the context of actual activities may be more useful. Naturally it is necessary to analyze the text deeper and to spot the principles and ideals that the organization claims are its shared foundations. It must be noted that these listed variables are not all values, such as the word “values” that is merely used as a reference to other parts or publications.

Table 1: Summit declarations

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In the summit declarations, democracy and freedom / liberty are most common values mentioned, whereas individual rights are rarely mentioned between 1994 and 2014. Human rights and rule of law are mentioned in most summit declarations as well. It is also noticeable how speaking of “values” by that name has only become very common after 2006. Mentioning democracy had a noticeable increase in the early 1990’s as well as 2014. Freedom / liberty was most often mentioned in the late 1980’s and again in the more recent documents. The documents from 2009 and 2012 to 2018 have a lot of mentions of values.

Table 2: Strategic concepts

<table>
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The Strategic concepts available for public and within the scope of this exercise are naturally fewer in number than the summit declarations. There is however an increasing amount of value-talk coming from the 1991 Strategic concept to 2010: Overall mentions of the phrases we are looking at doubled. Democracy and freedom once again come first in frequency. From just 3 reports it is difficult to see notable spikes, but the 1999 strategic concept has more about democracy than the rest.

These charts may indicate key moments in NATO’s history and the primary focus must be to explore the context in which they were written and then tracking those themes and topics across the timeline. The big event of 1989 is of course the collapse of the Berlin wall that came largely as a surprise and had massive symbolic value. However, the wall was not dismantled until November, while the declaration of the NATO summit meeting came about in May.

In our rapidly changing world, where ideas transcend borders ever more easily, the strength and accomplishments of democracy and freedom are increasingly apparent. The inherent inability of oppressive systems to fulfill the aspirations of their citizens has become equally evident. (NATO 1989, 3)
This can be seen as a claim that the Western values are superior to those of the Eastern bloc and that movement towards them, however small, is commendable and noted in the declaration. This is also interesting, since it is claimed before the total paradigm shift that the opening of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent unification of Germany presented. In the 1989 summit NATO also declares as its vision “a just, humane and democratic world...” (NATO 1989, 6) Democracy and human rights are seen as universal values by the Alliance. I am inclined to bind together the mention of justness to rule of law, even though it is clear that there are nuances and contexts where they are not the same. NATO uses “rule of law” both in the context of wider international system and when discussing specifics states or groups of states. An example of a value that is afforded primarily to the members of the group would be security in the traditional military sense.

When referencing the official documents, I am using the paragraph numbers that are marked on the official text instead of a page number. This is because the page numbers would only apply when the document is extracted from the NATO online library in PDF or other text format that might not be the same as I’ve used and therefore create a mismatch between this text and the source material.

3.1 Strategic Concepts

In the 1991 Strategic concept NATO states that the former adversaries of the Eastern Bloc have largely abandoned their ideologically hostile stance towards the alliance (NATO 1991, 1). In a way that resembles language used in the business world, the massive change in the security environment is not a challenge to the organization, but rather an “opportunity” to explore other options such as the wider concept of security. This wider security paradigm does not just mean the political in addition to the military aspect, but the social, environmental and economic aspects as well. NATO is not diving head first into the new age though: the possibility of the Soviet Union backpedaling the positive developments justifies maintaining parts of the old posture. New sources of threats arise from the instability that comes when a known and reliable enemy is no longer there. In addition to the new security environment and NATO’s stance towards it, the strategic concept outlines what its nature and the fundamental tasks are, what remains of the old and the future prospects (NATO 1991).

Concrete paths through which the new opportunities might be exploited are dialogue with the former adversaries both via diplomatic and military liaison, cooperation with non-members and crisis management as well as the traditional collective defense (NATO 1991, 28-33). Crisis management is
seen as important as the alliance sees greater opportunity in early resolution or prevention of crises that are much smaller than the previous “monolithic” threat, but also varied and unpredictable. The ambiguity of the new threats and the diverse effects they would have on member states naturally creates the challenge of tailoring a proper solution for each problem in order not to create more and bigger problems. This has obviously been a challenge since, as many times the results of an intervention are somewhat different from those predicted, or rather hoped for. Democratic institutions such as the CSCE, the United Nations and the European Community are viewed as important actors and potential partners in this type of action (NATO 1991, 31-33).

Militarily the European security paradigm has meant that NATO had to re-evaluate and adjust its posture in Europe. In practice this meant reducing the forward presence of conventional (non-nuclear) forces and overall reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in favor of a more flexible approach that reflects the new potential threats as mentioned above. NATO does maintain nuclear capability though, as it is seen as essential in a world where such weapons exist and insists that their role is political, which means that their main purpose is to keep the war from happening rather than affecting the outcome (NATO 1991, 38, 54-56). Reduction of the overall size of the forces and the other measures taken were meant to convince any observer that the alliances forces were purely defensive in nature, but it is easy to see that this is also an opportunity to save a lot of money, as for example maintaining large portions of many member states armies in foreign territory such as Western Germany had no doubt come at considerable cost.

All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome. (NATO 1991, 1)

The above quote from the 1991 strategic concept is interesting from the values and ideas point of view. It does not directly state that, democracy, rule of law and the other Western values prevailed in the Cold War but rejecting the ideological hostility towards them was what brought the standoff to an end. One realist view on the reason could be that it was the Soviet attempt to keep up with the United States in (military) technology in particular that bankrupted the Eastern bloc and made America (and the West) the winner. NATO’s statement leans more to the constructivist camp. Part of the reason may be, that in an alliance it is good practice to share the glory from the wins as well as
responsibility of the losses, therefore making this approach easier. This doesn’t necessarily make it less genuine and sincere as a statement.

In the next strategic concept from 1999 NATO congratulates itself for preserving the peace during the Cold war decades. The strategic situation from the alliances perspective has remained largely similar to how it was described in 1991: a direct attack on a member state by conventional means is seen as highly unlikely and it is emphasized that NATO does not see itself as an adversary to any country. (NATO 1999 2, 11.) The potential new challenges that were outlined in 1991 such as smaller conflicts arising from ethnic tensions, economic troubles or other reasons on the borders of the alliance were realized in the Balkans, and the emphasis on crisis management is greater in the 1999 strategic concept. There is also an emphasis on cooperation with other institutions in this field, such as the OSCE, WEU and the EU, and supporting these democratic institutions is something by which NATO contributes to the European security environment positively. The emphasis on dialogue, cooperation and partnership programs as well as the “European Security and Defence Identity” or ESDI can be compared to the security community theory of Karl Deutsch as well as Adler’s ideas about socializing and teaching (democratic) values (ibid., 31). Although it has been said before that according to Deutsch NATO, or any military alliance isn’t necessarily a security community in the sense he discussed it, the cooperation and dialogue as well as the support for democratic institutions such as the OSCE could be argued to be community building measures.

New aspects to the military tasks of NATO include “non-Article 5 crisis response operations” that must be understood in the context of the intervention and air campaign in the Balkans. In the 1999 strategic concept these operations are have great importance as some of the primary tasks of NATO. Preparing to conduct such operations is also seen as supporting the preparedness for the unlikely “traditional” attack on a member state, as they “may be as demanding as some collective defence missions” (NATO 1999, 49). Preparing to contribute forces and capabilities to a variety of missions not always led by NATO and the inclusion of partner nations is presented as a way to respond to various different security challenges (NATO 1999, 49). The argument for preparing to act more internationally and outside of member’s borders is the spilling over of the conflicts or other potential ways some member state could be affected (NATO 1999, 20).

To summarize, the military implications of the changed security- and political environment for NATO are the preparation to act outside of the alliances borders in operations that may or may not be as intense and involve violence to the scale normally associated with a full-scale war. Over-emphasizing
this could be slightly misleading though, as the strategic concept also mentions that the primary goal is the peaceful resolution of conflicts and that the political role of NATO is increased and it could be interpreted that the military means are complimentary and secondary to the political actions (NATO 1999, 11-12). The changes in the security environment regarding nuclear weapons is described in the following way:

Since 1991, therefore the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO’s sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-roled forces; and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO’s nuclear forces no longer target any country. (NATO 1999, 64)

This has significance from the constructivist value-oriented point of view as well due to the dramatic and political role of nuclear weapons as deterrence. Efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical weapons demand reciprocity as a basis for any treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) etc.

The security environment described in the new strategic concept of 2010 is again described as unpredictable and still lacking in reliable adversaries, but new emphasis is put on terrorism and cyber security. Argument for a more global role for the alliance is again the idea, that “Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.” (NATO 2010, 11). This is a set of challenges that would seems quite foreign to NATO of 1991, let alone during the height of the Cold War. It also highlights that the broad understanding of security has led to these issues being mentioned among the biggest threats faced by the alliance. Climate change is also mentioned as something that will have an effect on planning and operations (NATO 2010, 15).

By 2010 the alliance had accumulated over a decade of experience in crisis management starting from the Balkans to the long conflict in Afghanistan. Crisis management has established itself as a core task of NATO and is no longer referred to as “non-Article 5 operations”. In the 2010 strategic concept the learnings from these experiences is summarized briefly. Apart from the obvious statement that
crises are best managed by preventing them, things that are emphasized include the involvement of the civilian aspects of crisis management and what follows after hostilities are over. This means both cooperation with other institutions such as the UN and the EU, but also NATO's own civilian crisis management capability. (NATO 2010, 20-25.) In other words, it is not just about how to win the fight but how not to lose the peace.

Enlargement has a much bigger emphasis in the 2010 concept than in 1999 when it was only briefly mentioned as something that has been part of the founding charter in Article 10 (NATO 1949). In 1991 the idea of enlargement had not reached the strategic concept at all. The 2010 concept however sees the open-door policy and enlargement as essential tools in creating “... a Europe whole, free and at peace.” (NATO 2010, Preface). The criteria for a potential new member is broadly defined as a European democracy that shares the values of the community, and the end goal is to eventually include “all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures” (NATO 2010, 27).

The ability of a potential new member state to contribute to the security of the alliance must be understood from the broad definition of security, as the added military value that some of the newer and smaller members bring to the table is quite modest, but if integration and socialization / teaching of values are the goal, it does make sense. From a constructivist point of view this could be seen as a way for NATO to encourage certain kind of behavior that contributes to the kind of collective security where the actors’ security interests are mutually reinforcing, and they are seeking common gains rather than playing the realist zero-sum game of security. Being a part of a major Western institution can have major significance to the national identity.

Russia is described as an important strategic partner in fields such as missile defense, which incidentally has been one of the biggest issues in the relations between Russia and the West, as well as terrorism, counter-piracy and other fields. At this point the alliance seems to remain optimistic about the cooperation within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council despite some differences. (NATO 2010, 33-34.)

Based on the three strategic concepts, the most important changes in the role of NATO have been the increased significance of non-Article 5 operations and crisis management as well as the grown political role of the alliance that is also due to the broader understanding of security that was adopted after the end of the Cold War. The security environment changed into an unpredictable direction and the threats became more ambiguous. This has resulted in the broadening of the scope of NATO’s missions, as we saw the 2010 concept list things such as human trafficking and other criminal activities as challenges.
NATO is said to be based on common values in all the documents, but the 2010 strategic concept has the least hesitation in claiming their significance. The alliance is said to be based on common values in all of them, but as the Cold War seems to be in the past perpetually in the 1999 and especially 2010, the values of liberty, democracy, human rights and rule of law are clearly declared victorious: “These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them though unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.” (NATO 2010, 38). As already mentioned, being open to new members that meet the standards is one essential tool for NATO now, which is something that was not on the table in the 1991 strategic concept when the “ideological hostility” had just recently ceased, and the values that set West apart weren’t yet claimed to be universal.

Integration and sense of community are mentioned as key parts of a security community as Deutsch describes it (see chapter 2.2.). A pluralistic security community is one where the actors are independent but sufficiently integrated that nobody expects the others to have nefarious designs on one another. As also discussed before, a Deutschian security community is one where war amongst its members is inconceivable. The purpose of NATO isn’t to keep its members from fighting each other, but the integration through enlargement does make this scenario even more unlikely. From a realist perspective the close cooperation should at least increase predictability of the others’ intentions even if it can never be known for certain.

3.2 Summit Declarations

Summit declarations examined here begin from 1988 when the Cold War was still well under way and there was little reason to expect the Soviet Union to disappear either. The primary security concern is without a doubt a massive clash taking place in Europe between East and West. The reduction of nuclear and conventional arms is high on the list of priorities, as well as continuing and increasing efforts to find a dialogue with the Soviet Union. Values are not emphasized directly, but there is mentions of the respect and adherence to human rights as one key issue between the Soviet Union and the West among a few other points. For example, a positive sign in NATO’s view is the “greater openness in their relations with their own peoples and with other nations.” (NATO 1988, 8). To make further progress, arms control alone isn’t sufficient, but a lasting proper peace requires “full respect for fundamental human rights.” (NATO 1988, 16) as the basis for the future.
When put this way, the ideological differences appear to be centered around the Eastern bloc not respecting human rights, a core value for NATO. As far as the military aspect, Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and the military investment that NATO sees as being more than what is necessary for defense are the main points of contention raised in the declaration. The declaration does not go into detail as to how human rights are violated, and my purpose is not to argue for or against how these rights were or weren’t realized in the Soviet Union, but it is a powerful statement to make that the adversary needs to legitimize itself in the eyes of its own people and then the world. One can raise the question of double standards and how the human rights were an issue in certain members states. It may be that in the face of a monolithic adversary that seems to categorically oppose your values, it would be possible to look past issues that some individual members have and that as long as the system in place is not (Soviet) communism it passes for democratic and respecting of human rights. Another argument could be that members of NATO enjoy true autonomy and that their sovereignty is a more pressing value than human rights.

Positive development of the political atmosphere in Europe and the opportunities for the future are the main themes in the 1989 summit declaration. However, the military deterrence of both nuclear and conventional weapons is still seen as the only possible strategy to prevent war (NATO 1989, 12). One can argue, that building peace is not necessarily the same as preventing war, and this is not the claim here either. It is also re-affirmed that:

…the basis of our security and prosperity – and of our hopes for better East-West relations – is and will continue to be the close cohesion between the countries of Europe and of North America, bound together by their common values and democratic institutions as much as by their shared security interests. (NATO 1989, 20)

Overcoming the divisions in Europe requires a multitude of methods and if we read into the statement above, a similar relationship between European countries to the trans-Atlantic bond between the European NATO members and the United States (and Canada) would be the desired outcome. Maybe then there would be no need for an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional military capabilities? The means by which NATO seeks to further the positive development include supporting the CSCE process, introducing arms control proposals and other desecuritization measures, confidence-building by increasing transparency, nurturing the trans-Atlantic relations and increasing practical
communications and cooperation between the East and the West. The last point includes for example commerce but also proposals for increasing the knowledge of one another in the academic field with Soviet and Eastern studies as well as scholarship programs that would allow students to learn about the democratic institutions of the West (NATO 1989, 28). The practical cooperation is a way to “...demonstrate through increased co-operation that democratic institutions and economic choice create the best possible conditions for economic and social progress.” (NATO 1989, 28). In other words: prove in practice the superiority of the Western values.

“The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.” (NATO 1990, 4) In the 1990 summit declaration the Cold War seems to be considered as being over. NATO wants to move forward on the matters of arms treaties, CSCE process and reduction of its reliance on nuclear weapons. This is the time when the Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe were reduced and NATO sought to match that by reducing the number of troops and scaling back the readiness to what is called the appropriate minimum. (NATO 1990, 14-15).

In the 1991 summit declaration NATO continues to emphasize the need for a wide range of institutions to cooperate in Europe. The CSCE, the European Community, the Council of Europe and the WEU are called upon to work together for the prevention of such causes of potential crisis as violent nationalism and economic inequality (NATO 1991, 3). This institutional field might seem more convoluted compared to today when the European Union includes many of the previously separate institutions. On the other hand, this does not mean that the situation would be any less complex now or that the formation of the EU to what it is today makes inter-institutional co-operation or coordination much easier. Following the way NATO sees the institutional field of Europe and how the various organizations promote the shared values is important because there is clearly an interest not to step on anyone’s toes. If one of them drops the ball, would some other pick it up?

The Alliance proposes that the CSCE would take an even more prominent role in the future development of the European security environment (NATO 1991, 10). It seems that NATO at this time at least anticipated and hoped that the process would grow and be the main forum on which
European security challenges would be addressed. Increasing the role of NATO’s own political element would not be done to replace but to support it as it promotes the same values of political and economic freedom, democracy and rule of law that the Alliance subscribes to. NATO’s complimentary expertise would be in the security and military related issues such as the coordination of civilian-military co-operation on the transformation of defense industry to the civilian field as well as air traffic control coordination between the military and civilian needs. NATO’s so called Third Dimension includes scientific and environmental issues as a field of potential co-operation between the Eastern and Western countries and serves as an example of the Alliance’s adoption of a wider understanding of security. (NATO 1991, 12-13.)

Safeguarding and promoting the shared values of NATO is presented as one of the two reasons the alliance was founded for (NATO 1991, 20). It appears that the ending of the Cold War is seen as a general acceptance and then adoption of the Western values. Having conquered the unnatural division of Europe, the winning side seeks to consolidate its position.

“The Brussels Summit Declaration” of 1994 is more interesting than the previous documents as far as concrete new initiatives being introduced. The European institutions have evolved further, and, in many respects, Europe has moved properly into the post-Cold War and post-Soviet era. One of the most important developments has been the strengthening of the “European Security and Defence Identity” (ESDI) particularly after the Maastricht Treaty and European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU 1992, 8). The major new undertakings of the Alliance include the adaptation of its political and military structure for new missions and in response to the development of the previously mentioned ESDI, making it clear that the Alliance is open for new members, launching the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and to focus efforts on the proliferation of WMD’s. (NATO 1994, 1.)

The cooperation between NATO and the EU is of strategic importance and NATO presents the potential development of EU’s common defense as complimentary to the Atlantic Alliance. Or at least it hopes that it would be. Cooperation with the WEU in particular is outlined as essential, as NATO sees that as the cornerstone for EU’s military aspects. There is talk of making NATO assets potentially available to be used in other than NATO operations that have an effect on Alliance members security. NATO wants to develop “...separable but not separate capabilities” (NATO 1994, 3-6).
One outstanding statement is that NATO will be undertaking more and more missions that are outside of the traditional collective defense of its members. This, NATO claims, is due to the common transatlantic security requirements. Such operations could be for example peacekeeping under the authority of another institution such as the United Nations or the CSCE and also making assets and expertise available in EU/WEU-led operations with PfP members also able to take part in. (NATO 1994, 7-8)

The Partnership for Peace program could be seen as a kind of value teaching method, as the Alliance describes it as promoting the commitment to principles and values that NATO subscribes to, such as “democratic control of defence ministries” and to have these partners also take part in operations alongside NATO forces in “peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.” (NATO 1994, 14). With today’s knowledge of the partnership, we know that the other operations mentioned may include such cases as the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, which did not fit in the traditional understanding of a peacekeeping operation in the sense that there was (and still is) an adversary that did not put much stock on which ISAF soldier is a member or a partner of NATO. It could be argued that the involvement of partner countries in operations that fall under the mandate of a higher organization such as the UN have more legitimacy than a unilateral NATO effort. Of course, operating under such mandate is something that NATO also emphasizes. (NATO 1994, 7.)

The political developments in Russia at the time are welcomed by NATO and the establishment of democratic parliamentary elections, development of democratic institutions and the general commitment to democratic reform are commended as well. There is a mention of how welcome an equally democratic and nuclear weapons free Ukraine would be to the security environment. Less welcome is the news from Caucasus where unrest and conflicts had been brewing after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (NATO 1994, 20-21.) Things would get worse when the first Chechen war started later the same year.

The conflict in former Yugoslavia is discussed as well:

We reaffirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (NATO 1994, 25)
In the declaration the actions of the Alliance are very much tied to the United Nations mandate and NATO is a tool in service of something more, in this case the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The declaration concludes in the statement that the Alliance has adapted to the new security environment where some of the previously predicted security challenges have become reality. (NATO 1994, 26.) In addition to the air strikes, NATO fighters would also shoot down aircraft violating the no-fly-zone, all in support of the UN operation (UN 1996). The significance of the UN mandate for this action will become more apparent in the case of Kosovo when such a mandate didn’t exist for the intervention or Operation Allied Force.

A few years later in 1997 NATO claims to have made significant progress in the adaptation process of the Alliance: These achievements include the opening up of the Alliance to new members, enhancement of the Partnership of Peace program and the establishment of the NATO-Russia council. (NATO 1997, 1). Clearly the heads of state of the Alliance are pleased with how NATO has evolved to face the new challenges since the Cold War: “While maintaining our core function of collective defence, we have adapted our political and military structures to improve our ability to meet the new challenges of regional crisis and conflict management” (NATO 1997, 3) This has to be understood in the context of the Balkan crisis and the Western involvement there.

The building of a European Security and Defence Identity is again an important topic and it is mentioned every time that the Alliance builds this identity within NATO. The EU is mentioned as a strategic partner with shared goals, but in security matters the Alliance wants to remain as the primary forum. (NATO 1997, 2.) NATO emphasizes the cooperation between institutions such as the EU and the OSCE (formerly CSCE) as parts of the Euro-Atlantic community are in a state of instability and the peace is described as “fragile”. NATO’s response to this is to reach out and be active towards partners and “…free nations which share the values of the Alliance” (NATO 1997,4.) Expansion of the NATO itself is also described as a natural evolutionary step as well, and the Alliance promises that no European Democratic country would be excluded if they wished to join and it would contribute to the goals set out in the founding treaty of NATO. (NATO 1997, 7-8). This is a message that NATO has sent before, and by this time there are already several states that have expressed interest in joining (NATO 1997, 8). This kind of popularity could be seen as some kind of sign of success in NATO’s efforts to show itself as one of the most important Western institutions and that the core values it
promotes seem to resonate rather widely within Europe. It also doesn’t look like the Alliance is considered as obsolete at this point, and certainly not by the aspiring new members.

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation is celebrated as a historical achievement that would usher in a new era of cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic area, or at least in the NATO-Russian relations. According to NATO, a lasting peace is achieved by cooperation, inclusiveness and democracy. (NATO 1997, 11.) Ukraine is an important part of the inclusive peace in the wider European context as well: “…Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty are a key factor for ensuring stability in Europe. We continue to support the reform process in Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation with a market economy.” (NATO 1997, 12).

Democracy as a value as well as market economy, both arguably key Western values, are closely attached to the hopes that NATO has for the new partners in the East. The habit of bringing up these values combined with the new effort of reaching out to states outside of the Alliance could be seen as community-building and socialization (teaching) of values as discussed in the chapter about constructivism. Deutsch brought up the demand for mutual responsiveness as a necessary precondition for the creation of a security community (ibid., 23) meaning effective communication between the actors in the community. This is important from the constructivist point of view that emphasizes the transferal of ideas and values, but also from the realist perspective where the true meaning of messages and the potential for misinterpretation is a constant worry as mentioned by Copeland earlier (ibid., 18).

Institutional cooperation has also been improved particularly between the WEU and NATO in the field of crisis management and peacekeeping. The use of NATO assets and capabilities in WEU-led operations is mentioned. (NATO 1997, 20.) Even as NATO has shifted some of its focus on crisis management as a new mission and is reaching out to partners and other states and has put more emphasis on its political element, it still sees OSCE as the primary instrument of peace and the promotion of human rights and democracy in Europe largely due to its inclusiveness (NATO 1997, 21).

…we will contribute to building a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies – a community where human rights and
fundamental freedoms are upheld; where borders are increasingly open to people, ideas and commerce; where war becomes unthinkable. (NATO 1999, 3)

NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1999 and the above quotation suits a possibly a bit more ceremonious summit well. The language above is quite similar to what Deutsch and others used when discussing security communities. Earlier it has been stated that NATO does not necessarily claim to be a security community by itself in the same sense but would have an effect in creating one. Here it is articulated as a definite goal of the Alliance. This is further reinforced by the statement that “NATO is an essential pillar of a wider community of shared values and shared responsibility.” (NATO 1999, 8). The 1999 summit declaration is short and does not go into detail in describing the political and security environment of the day. The statements are perhaps vaguer than what we are used to, but some things like the statement that the Alliance would “...stand firm against those who violate human rights, wage war and conquer territory.” (NATO 1999, 7).

If we look at this in the light of the Balkan crisis and NATO’s air operation in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), “standing firm” meant shooting and getting shot at, something that could be taken as waging war as well. Conquering territory though the means of war has been unpopular in Western Europe for a while and certainly it had a bad taste to it after the Second World War. This and the idea of universal human rights are of course essential motives for the United Nations Charter.
Picture 2: NATO as a pillar of a security community. Source: Authors own.

The picture above is an attempt at illustrating my understanding of how NATO thinks about the Euro-Atlantic security community and its own part in it. The roof consisting of common values is held up by the efforts of international institutions and other entities that share the same values. The base of the structure could be arguably a more suitable place for the values from which the pillars of the community would rise from. Putting them in the roof suits the point of view taken in this paper that the values not only affect the actions of the various agents, but those actors are also active in supporting and promoting them. Under the roof created by these values the Euro-Atlantic security community can exist. Base of the structure could also be where the United Nations is located in this rough picture, as the Charter of the United Nations is constantly referenced in NATO communications.

The biggest themes in the 2002 Prague summit declaration are the expansion of the Alliance, terrorism in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The countries invited to join are the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. (NATO 2002, 2-3.) Ever since the Cold War ended NATO has talked about the need to reform and adapt to the new environments and challenges that may arise with a changing security
environment, and this continues here as well. A noteworthy development in this regard is the need NATO sees in having more capability to operate anywhere in the world:

In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives. (NATO 2002, 4)

It looks like NATO is making adjustments that reflect the post 9/11 security paradigm. The Alliance activated the Article 5 after the attack on the United States and became involved in Afghanistan from early on. However, the immediate response (attacks on the Taliban in Afghanistan) came very much from the United States with NATO’s role being much smaller than what one would maybe expect after the Article 5 is invoked. In an unexpected and fast development like the 9/11 attacks, NATO didn’t turn out to be the primary instrument of response to its premier member. However, the role in Afghanistan grew over time though as we will see. The concern over CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) threats in conjunction with terrorism is another rising theme as is the blurring of the line between a non-state and state actor, regimes or states supporting or engaging in terroristic activities and the “Axis of Evil” of the U.S. president George W. Bush. According to NATO the response to terrorism should be multi-faceted and comprehensive. (NATO 2002, 4.)

NATO says terrorism poses a threat to the populations, territories and military forces of the Allies (NATO 2002, 4d). This is interesting, because at a glance it would seem that this description fits a more traditional threat such as a state better than the “typical” terrorist organization such as al-Qaida. While it is certainly a threat to people’s lives (populations) and the forces fighting the terrorists, threat to territory is slightly harder to understand as before ISIS very few if any terrorist organizations managed (or even wanted?) to take and hold territories and form state-like structures. The point I’m making is that NATO at this juncture does not describe terrorism as a threat to the Western values at its core.

The new members of NATO are congratulated as having demonstrated their commitment to the values of NATO and the ability to contribute to the “full range” of missions (NATO 2002, 5). Taking part in the crisis management activities could be counted as this kind of contribution, and many small states have made comparatively large contributions to such operations. However, as it has been pointed out before, from a traditional realist point of view the inclusion of such states as Slovenia into
NATO does absolutely nothing to improve the collective defense capabilities of the Alliance when counting just how many soldiers and what war equipment the new member can bring to the table. Adding seven states with similar capabilities does add up though, but I think the point still stands. This is in no way critique directed at such states, simply a way to point out how narrow the realist perspective of “counting battleships” can be. If the angle that the collective defense is approached from is different though, it makes more sense: Cold War threats are gone, and in the new environment it doesn’t matter as much how big a country is or how many tanks it has, if the theatre of operations is largely political and the threats aren’t something that you can tackle with the traditional means of military force.

NATO has increased the role of its political element and adapted its understanding of security into a more wide and comprehensive approach. The desire of the former adversaries (whether of their own will or not) to join the Western institutions like the EU or NATO may appear as vindication to them and the shared values. It could be seen as the outcome of value-teaching, or perhaps it is the point from which the value-teaching truly begins. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Croatia are mentioned as potential future members in 2002 as long as they continue advancing democracy and commit to other reforms in accordance to the Western values (NATO 2002, 5-6).

When it comes to relations with Russia, the achievements of the NATO-Russia council are described as significant and that the members states are working there together with Russia as equals (NATO 2002, 8). To me this seems fine and even desirable from NATO point of view but comparing it to the Soviet Union when it would talk to the US or NATO or even the entirety of the Western bloc as equals, being equal partners with Belgium might seem like a downgrade.

Ukraine is discussed separately but in a similar fashion to the other Eastern European countries mentioned above, perhaps due to its closer ties to Russia. Ukraine too is commended for pursuing further Euro-Atlantic integration and reforms in political, economic and military fields, but it is reminded that: “Continued progress in deepening and enhancing our relationship requires an unequivocal Ukrainian commitment to the values of the Euro-Atlantic community.” (NATO 2002, 9).

The worst of the fighting in the Balkans has concluded at this point and operations such as KFOR (Kosovo Force) and SFOR (The Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) had many partner nations contributing. Continued cooperation with other international organizations such as the EU and the OSCE is again emphasized in the effort to create a democratic region where the rule of law prevails. The pace at which the region can reform is said to determine how quickly they can be
integrated to the Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO states its willingness to assist in this kind of reforms. (NATO 13.) Clearly NATO sees integration into common structures as an important goal.

NATO member countries have responded to the call of the UN Security Council to assist the Afghan government in restoring security in Kabul and its surroundings. Their forces constitute the backbone of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. (NATO 2002, 14)

NATO involvement in Afghanistan is discussed in remarkably short terms and indeed the Alliance's role in the war would grow over the years until the vast majority of foreign troops operated under the ISAF badge. But in 2002, despite NATO invoking Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, there operation in Afghanistan had plenty of room to grow. The summit declaration concludes by stating that NATO would continue to defend peace, democracy and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. (NATO 2002, 19.)

The next summit declaration in 2004 is much shorter (only 2 pages and lacking paragraph numbers) and concentrates on welcoming the new members and underlining that the Alliance is in a continuous process of change and evolving according to the new threats and challenges. This has indeed been the case ever since the end of the Cold War and the alliance even uses the aphorism “...transformation is a process, not an event.” (NATO 2004). One might criticize this kind of approach as it may seem like there is no clear direction to take and the organization is grasping at straws in finding a purpose in a world that is different from when it was created. On the other hand, one might say that the need to evolve, change and adapt can only be stopped when the world ceases to change. The Washington Treaty of 1949 does not put a shelf-life for NATO. To use another common saying, only change is permanent.

A key point made in the declaration is, that even though collective defense is still claimed as the main task of the Alliance, the threats come in many forms and arise from a much wider area than previously (NATO 2004). This must be understood in the light of the out-of-area operations that started from the Balkan crisis and then most notably in Afghanistan, where NATO has expanded its role since the last summit. NATO essentially claims, “Mission Accomplished!” as it ends its mission in Bosnia and lets the European Union take over as the SFOR operation is replaced by the European Union Force Althea
(EUFOR Althea) in 2004. (NATO 2004). This is a milestone moment for both the European Union in particular, and significant for NATO as well, but as pointed out by the BBC, on the ground it largely comes down to soldiers being issued new patches to wear on their uniforms as majority of the troops will be the same as before. (BBC 2004). This speaks of certain overlapping of EU and NATO military capabilities: same units and assets may be in both the EU and NATO pools.

NATO introduced many new members into the Alliance in 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are welcomed in what NATO calls the “most robust round of enlargement in NATO’s history.” in the Istanbul Summit Communiqué (NATO 2004b, 2). The communiqué is useful to look at since the declaration itself is very brief. The Open Door policy is celebrated as a success and it is also tied into the context of the European Union enlargement process. EU is described as a strategic partner and one part in the Euro-Atlantic structures that NATO sees as vital to the stability of the region. (NATO 2004b, 25.) NATO of course sees itself as the one providing the link to North America which is arguably one of the key points of contention in the disagreements over what the European security environment should be like.

The following describes NATO’s attitude to its own relevance and its message is mostly very similar across the source material:

> The North Atlantic Alliance has confronted challenge and change throughout its history, yet has always proved resilient in adapting to new situations. As we face a new era of danger and hope, NATO remains our vital multilateral bridge across the Atlantic, complementing a common political approach with its military capabilities. We renew our commitment to consult, deliberate and act together as Allies. We are confident that NATO will remain our indispensable instrument in defending our freedom and security. (NATO 2004)

The most interesting part in the quotation above is the prominence of the political aspect over the military capabilities. It makes it seem as though the political aspect of NATO and its role as one of the Euro-Atlantic institutions is primary to its role as a military alliance. To describe NATO as an instrument, a tool maybe amongst many, makes it seem like the actor is identifying as something else such as “the West” or other vaguer entity. For such vague entities it might be difficult to find other common denominators than shared values.
In the 2005 Brussels Summit statement NATO declares that the elections that were held in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Ukraine prove that the values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are shared by people all around the world (NATO 2005). The Palestinian election was to choose a president, not the legislative election a year later that was won by Hamas, a terrorist organization according the European Union among others. The 2005 document is also very short, and its paragraphs aren’t numbered so the references to it are unfortunately less precise.

Iraq would descend into sectarian violence by 2006 almost as a reminder of how the holding of elections alone should not be the only measurement of success when it comes to the acceptance of certain values within a population. It is always problematic to estimate how “real” the elections are when there is a considerable, often foreign, military force driving the effort. NATO’s role in Iraq at this time was the training of the Iraqi security forces (NATO 2005).

The Alliance’s vision for Afghanistan is a “stable democratic and multiethnic state.” (NATO 2005) that would have a “broad-based, gender sensitive... and fully representative government, integrated into the international community and communicating with its neighbours.” as described in the previous year’s summit communiqué (NATO 2004b, 4). Even a cursory examination of the social and political life in Afghanistan will tell one that simply having elections in the Western fashion is no doubt a difficult feat to accomplish, but also unlikely to work out of the box due to the recent past and the political culture of the country. Ukraine is again commended for the progress it has made in with democracy and rule of law and NATO pledges to keep supporting this Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO 2005). The Brussels statement concludes by again affirming that the Alliance will continue to evolve to meet new challenges and that it is the essential forum in which North America and Europe discuss security issues (NATO 2005).

From Afghanistan to the Balkans and from the Mediterranean Sea to Darfur, in six challenging missions and operations in three geographic regions, we are advancing peace and security and standing shoulder-to-shoulder with those who defend our common values of democracy and freedom as embodied in the Washington Treaty. (NATO 2006, 3)
The Riga summit of 2006 deals with the Alliance's various operations in some detail. Afghanistan is now seen as top priority as well as the general ability to conduct operations globally over distance and time (NATO 2006, 5, 24). The above quotation stands out because it directly ties the values of democracy and freedom into the military operations whereas the more common way so far has been to bring them up in the context of institutional integration, enlargement and reforms that support these values in various countries. This doesn’t necessarily represent a sea-change in the way NATO sees values, but it is interesting and perhaps a little revealing.

With the operation in Afghanistan growing, terrorism is also discussed in more length. The Afghanistan operation is described in terms of support to the Afghan authorities who should oversee security in the country struggling with insurgency fueled by narcotics. NATO also calls for more international support from other institutions and organizations such as the UN, EU and the World Bank as it “...cannot assume the entire burden” on its own (NATO 2006, 6). NATO seems to be the primary foreign actor in Afghanistan at this point, or at least sees itself as such. That is a noteworthy difference to the situation some 4 to 5 years before when NATO went into the country in the wake of the United States “kicking in the door”, albeit with a UN mandate. It seems like NATO was left to clean up after the US turned its focus to Iraq.

NATO’s role in Kosovo in 2006 is notably more supporting rather than primary. The KFOR operation is of course seen as vital to security in deterring any hostilities between the recently warring factions and developing the security forces and -institutions of Kosovo, but the main effort that of the United Nations. The political process that eventually resulted in Kosovo’s independence is simply referred as the “political process” in which the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari had a primary role along with the OSCE and the EU. (NATO 2006, 9.)

The Bucharest summit of 2008 continues the same themes but is perhaps more significant as many partner nations and other organizations were also present, such as the UN Secretary-General and is mentioned to be the largest summit thus far (NATO 2008, 4, 50). The ISAF mission in Afghanistan now has 40 nations participating and is called “top priority” to NATO (NATO 2008, 6). Kosovo and the KFOR operation are mentioned as well. The invitations sent to Albania and Croatia to join the Alliance continue the NATO policy of open doors and must be seen as a kind of milestone in the whole Balkan situation where open war was raging not too long before. The countries are complimented for having demonstrated their willingness to adhere to the common values of NATO.
and that their inclusion is another step towards the final goal of a “Europe that is whole, free and at peace.” (NATO 2008, 2).

The need for a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution is underlined again based on the experiences from Afghanistan and the Balkans. NATO’s own crisis management capabilities are a part of this approach. The United Nations is singled out as the most important actor and partner to NATO in these efforts and its role as the primary international organization in preserving peace is reiterated as well. (NATO 2008, 12, 16.)

The European Union is described as another key partner in crisis management operations and as an organization with the same key values and strategic interests. A stronger European defense structure is welcomed so long as it is mutually reinforcing and compliments the role of NATO (NATO 2008, 14).

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspiration for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. (NATO 2008, 23)

We know now that the situation would develop into a different direction with Georgia later that year when the Russo-Georgian war broke out. Euro-Atlantic aspirations here describe the desire of the Georgians to join NATO as soon as possible, but this was not agreed to by a number of Alliance members due to the ongoing territorial disputes regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the 1990’s. Furthermore, Russia used the recent independence of Kosovo as a precedent for their eventual annexation of the Georgian provinces. (Spiegel Online 9.8.2008.) It is fair to say that NATO would not want to inherit conflicts that could draw it in to a possible Article 5 situation straight away. What would this mean for countries that entertain the notion of applying for membership only when their security situation has already deteriorated? Was the goal of Russia to “freeze” the conflict and prevent Georgia from joining NATO?

The diplomatic and other “soft” efforts of NATO in forming partnerships in the global scale are high in the list of priorities for the Alliance. One of the key objectives of this approach is “…to advance shared security interests and democratic values.” (NATO 2008, 35). It could be argued based on this statement alone that values have - at least to some degree - advanced the development of NATO’s diplomatic efforts and its transformation process since the end of the Cold War. It is once again stated
at the Bucharest summit that transformation is an ongoing process and that the modern security environment is complex and dynamic. For example, the Alliance is giving increased attention to energy security as part of the comprehensive security approach and is setting up an internet-based TV channel and developing further the NATO Media operations Centre. (NATO 2008, 10, 48.)

The 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl summit declaration briefly comments on the global financial crisis that started in 2008. It states that security and stability that NATO helps to uphold are crucial to successfully tackling the financial crisis. The purpose of such a reminder could be to remind members of the necessity of NATO and their own defense funding even in hard times, but other than that the declaration offers nothing on the financial crisis. OSCE and EU are again described as having the same core values as NATO and the cooperation within these frameworks is emphasized. (NATO 2009, 2, 7.)

Afghanistan is once again the top priority for NATO and the ISAF operation’s growth to 42 participating countries is noted with the end goal being a stable, democratic country that can secure the human rights of its citizens (NATO 2009, 9). KFOR too is said to continue and as long as the UN security council sees fit. Additionally, the European Union’s EULEX operation or “European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo” is welcomed. Rule of law is, as mentioned before, one of the core values for NATO. Other global operations are mentioned as well such as the NATO training Mission in Iraq and Operation Allied Protector counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa (NATO 2009, 10-12).

The comprehensive security understanding that NATO has adopted in large parts due lessons learned in Afghanistan and the Balkans requires a combination of military and civilian means and capabilities. For NATO this means the development of its crisis management capabilities and fitting them together with organizations that might be better equipped and prepared for that aspect and to further develop the Alliance’s own “soft touch”. (NATO 2009, 18.)

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the part of the founding document that describes the possibility to invite any European country that would further the principles of the Alliance into joining (NATO 1949). This is again reiterated in the 2009 summit and the Euro-Atlantic integration of different countries, or their progress in the different stages of becoming a member, is complimented and commended. (NATO 2009, 23-28.)
The situation in Georgia is prominently present in this declaration as expected. NATO first encourages Georgia to continue its political reforms into a more democratic direction to support its “Euro-Atlantic aspirations” that mean membership of NATO. It seems like NATO is not taking a particularly hard stance towards Russia in this case and instead calls for support of the OSCE, UN and EU efforts to resolve the conflict and that Georgia’s territorial integrity and internationally recognized borders (that include South Ossetia and Abkhazia) should be respected. (NATO 2009, 31)

Russia’s recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence is condemned and Russia is reprimanded for violating the principles of the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council. NATO also urges the withdrawal of Russian troops as per the agreements mediated by the EU. However, is noteworthy that NATO emphasizes the importance of Russia as a “...partner and a neighbor.” (NATO 2009, 33-35.) This shows that the Alliance is at this point willing to maintain a relationship with Russia despite a war being fought against a hopeful member prospect that has contributed to NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan as well as US efforts in Iraq.

Our relations with Russia depend on trust and the fulfillment of commitments. Since our last Summit, dialogue and cooperation with Russia have suffered from profound disagreements on a number of issues. The alliance will continue to assess developments in relations with Russia. (NATO 2009, 33)

The statement above is as stern as it gets at this point and there is still faith in the NATO-Russia council and its potential (NATO 2009, 35). The Georgian situation is also mentioned in the context of other regional conflicts in Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan that the Allies “...remain concerned with...” (NATO 2009, 58).

Energy security features again on the agenda as NATO brings up the disruptions of the supply of natural gas in January 2009 that affected a number of allies (NATO 2009, 59). Diversification of supply is mentioned as a measure to increase energy security, and this must be understood as a call to decrease the dependency on the uninterrupted flow of Russian natural gas that might suffer from strategically timed “technical difficulties”. The High North and global warming are mentioned in passing as Iceland is hosting a NATO seminar discussing these matters and drawing the members attention into that direction (NATO 2009, 60).
NATO’s new strategic concept was adopted in 2010 as discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis. In the Lisbon summit of 2010 NATO has decided to further develop its approach to crisis management by diversifying capabilities in stabilization and reconstruction for example. Work with other organizations such as the EU is also critical to the comprehensive understanding to security and crisis management. The Alliance is also seeking a better and deeper interaction with Russia according to the opening statements of the summit declaration. (NATO 2010, 2.)

The declaration largely follows the same formula of the previous documents in reinstating the importance of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan and declaring that it is top priority to the Alliance. Afghan troops are supposed to take full responsibility of the country’s security by the end of 2014 as NATO enters a phase of transition in the operation (NATO 2010, 4). The KFOR operation in Kosovo is also in a state of change as it is trimmed down and adopting a “smaller, more flexible, deterrent presence” due to the improved situation in the country (NATO 2010, 5). Other operations mentioned are Operation Active Endeavour (Article 5 anti-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean), Operation Ocean Shield (anti-piracy off the Horn of Africa), support to the African Union mission in Somalia and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NATO 2010, 6).

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (later UNSCR 1325) is also brought up as something that NATO has been implementing over the decade since its passing and the Alliance is endorsing an Action Plan to implement it on a doctrinal level. This is described as important for the effectiveness of the Alliance. (NATO 2010, 7.) The resolution reminds UN member states of the particularly vulnerable position of women and girls in armed conflicts and calls for gender considerations and training to be actively incorporated into crisis management and peacekeeping operations. The resolution also encourages the appointment of women into leadership positions and their better representation on all levels. (UNSC 2000.)

Our operational experience has taught us that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. Both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments. (NATO 2010, 8)

Adopting a comprehensive and wider understanding of security since the Cold War could be said to have steadily increased the importance of crisis management operations to the de-facto most important mission type that NATO has at this point. The collective defense of members with (a
reluctant?) nuclear deterrent is always mentioned as the main goal, but such an eventuality is considered unlikely even when regional conventional conflicts rage in and around Europe. Like above, NATO continuously emphasizes the role of different international organizations’ (particularly those that it sees as sharing the same values e.g. the EU) input into operations and the security environment as a whole. It is a fair argument that simply the fact that NATO is engaged in crisis management missions is not the direct consequence of the core values such as human rights or freedom that the Alliance has taken to heart at the theoretical level at least. It could be that beggars can’t be choosers and since crisis management and peacekeeping is what’s available, that is what is done. Especially if the alternative is a descend to irrelevance. A pluralistic security community in the fashion of Deutsch needs integration to exist and I already suggested that the enlargement process could be understood as this kind of effort. Perhaps crisis management operations could be viewed through a similar lens as ways to deepen the integration through practical cooperation. On the other hand, a particularly controversial or difficult operation could put the integration and unity to a test and agitate differences and create rifts. The Kosovo case might work as an example of an operation that tested the unity of the Alliance.

If values like human rights, freedom and democracy are not at all affecting the decisions taken by the Alliance, why bother intervening on a genocide here or a famine there if they don’t pose a threat to Allied populations or forces? This is gross simplification of course, but other examples like the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 measures into doctrine and training is one of the stronger signs that values have an influence on the development and the role of NATO. Engaging in humanitarian efforts is also easy to understand though the constructivist point of view where ideas affect actions. A realist might argue that interventions could be just desperate attempts at staying relevant or have other motives inspired by relative power concerns.

The Western Balkans are again described as a strategically important region where “democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are important for lasting peace and stability.” (NATO 2010, 15). The Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries there are again commended and reforms to meet the right values encouraged. The relationship with Ukraine has changed at this point: In 2008 NATO stated, that just like Georgia, Ukraine would eventually become part of NATO as per its wishes, or “Euro-Atlantic aspirations”. In 2010 NATO declares that as always it will respect the right of each nation to choose their security arrangements and that Ukraine’s “non-bloc” status would be respected, and that Ukraine would have a Distinctive Partnership with NATO. (NATO 2010, 22.)
NATO-Russia council and a true strategic partnership between the two are important goals for NATO according to the declaration. There is a reminder of reciprocity that is expected in dealings with Russia, but otherwise the declaration seems to encourage and look for positives (like the transit of ISAF logistics through Russia) at least as much as condemn the transgressions such as the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the staying outside of the CFE arms control treaty. The NRC is still seen as a valuable forum even in topics where the two parties disagree. (NATO 2010, 23.)

“NATO’s partnership mechanisms have evolved substantially over the past 20 years and they, like NATO itself, would benefit from a focused reform effort…” (NATO 2010, 26). This is an interesting admission but understandable considering that the Alliance has constantly emphasized a need for transformation and keeping up with the times as the world and the security environment has changed (or more issues are considered security issues). An effort to review the NATO defense and deterrence posture is called and the evaluation of things like missile defense and nuclear threat and how they fit into the prevailing security picture with concerns over North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs as the probable source of concern. No conclusions or controversial hypotheses are presented though. More facets of the security situation are described towards the end such as energy security which we have already seen as well as cyber security and environmental effects. (NATO 2010, 30-31, 40-42.)

The Chicago summit of 2012 addresses the military intervention to Libya in 2011 during the civil war in the country. The Operation Unified Protector was the NATO answer to the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that authorizes UN member states “…acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements…” to protect civilians from the Gaddafi regime’s attacks (UNSCR 1973, 3). The NATO summit declaration declares the operation a success and points out the participation of partner nations as well (NATO 2012, 14).

The UN resolution 1325 gets further attention in the Chicago declaration NATO is reaffirming its intention in implementing it fully and integrating gender perspectives into its activities (NATO 2012, 16). NATO recognizes the “Widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations, …” and the lack of protection for women and children on the institutional level as serious problems and seems to have adopted this view into the comprehensive approach that was called for in the previous summit in Lisbon (NATO 2012, 16).
Different partnerships and institutional cooperation are again prominently present in the declaration and follow the same lines as seen in previous cases as well. Reflecting on the different relation NATO has had over the years, it states that the partnerships “...contribute to advancing our common values, ...” (NATO 2012, 22). Which has become apparent especially in the enlargement process as the Alliance has frequently encouraged and demanded things like democratic reforms that would help the partner or candidate in their “Euro-Atlantic aspirations”. Partners have also been invited to the NATO summit itself in Chicago for “… particular political, operational and financial contributions to NATO-led operations.” (NATO 2012, 24).

The situation in Georgia and NATO’s stance to it remain the same as do the paragraphs considering the Western Balkans, Kosovo and Serbia in particular, and Ukraine’s Distinctive partnership (NATO 2012, 32-35). Ukraine receives some criticism though for what NATO calls “…selective application of justice and what appear to be politically motivated prosecutions, ...” (NATO 2012, 135). This is most probably a reference to the prosecution of the former prime minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko who was arrested on charges of abusing her power in negotiations with Russia (BBC 11.10.2011).

The relationship with Russia remains much the same as described in previous declarations: the NATO-Russia council is now a decade old and NATO sees it as the forum for discussing the practical cooperation and the issues that persist between Russia and NATO. The declaration lists both positives and points to improve and overall it maintains a stance that seems optimistic looking at it from our current time. (NATO 2012, 36-38.) Cyber security that was brought up in Lisbon is featured in more detail in the Chicago declaration. NATO is increasing efforts and building capabilities in the face of cyber-threats that are increasingly sophisticated and numerous (NATO 2012, 49).

Other potential threats are mostly the usual ones: proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles (Iran and North-Korea), terrorism and the ongoing regional conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus region. Regarding energy security the Alliance states that the responsibility lies mostly with the individual governments, but that NATO is closely monitoring the situation and consulting member when necessary. (NATO 2012, 50-53.) Things like energy- and cyber security will be no doubt seen later in the context of hybrid threats, but that buzzword was not present at this time. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is more prominent as NATO declares an “Interim NATO BDM Capability.” (NATO 2012, 60). Meaning that there are intentions of further developing the “Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence” or ALTDBM and its various national and collective parts.
We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. (NATO 2014, 1.)

The Wales summit declaration begins by NATO conveys in no uncertain terms the turn for the worse in NATO-Russia relations and the security environment in general. The NATO Readiness Action Plan that the Alliance approved is directly stated to be in response to the challenged posed by Russia and it includes for example assuring the member countries that they enjoy NATO’s protection as well as adapting it’s the military strategic posture. NATO is developing its capability to respond to conventional military threats at a short notice by establishing a “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force” (VJTF) that has, as the name would suggest, shorter response and deployment time than the normal NATO Response Force would have. (NATO 2014, 8.) The 2014 shift in NATO-Russia relations has also been described as “NATO returning to its roots” (Karvinen & Puistola 2015, 33).

Hybrid warfare as a term is used for the first time in NATO summit declarations to describe a combination of “overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures.” (NATO 2014, 3). Disinformation campaigns as a way to sow discontent and break up the unity of the NATO could be argued to be an attack directed at the values that supposedly tie the West together. Michael Weiss describes the disinformation and hybrid warfare in the following way:

Russia combines Soviet-era “whataboutism” and Chekist “active measures” with a wised-up, post-modern smirk that says that everything is a sham. Where the Soviets once co-opted and repurposed concepts such as “democracy,” “human rights” and “sovereignty” to mask their opposites, the Putinists use them playfully to suggest that not even the West really believes in them. Gitmo, Iraq, Ferguson, BP, Jobbik, Schröder – all liberalism is cant, and anyone can be bought. (Weiss 2014, 5)

This description is published in the online journal The Interpreter that is “dedicated primarily to translating media from the Russian press and blogosphere into English...” and the article The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money is written with
the New York-based think tank Institute of Modern Russia that defines its mission as “...to foster democratic and economic development in Russia...” and to promote “…Russia’s integration into the community of democracies.” (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014, 1). The authors and the publications are quite firmly against Putin’s regime and the language makes it clear. I found their definition of hybrid warfare or the part of it that deals with (dis)information interesting because it uses the same concepts that are considered in this thesis such as human rights and democracy.

The Allies also agree to try to meet the NATO demand for defense spending that many do not meet. It should be noted that there wording calls for members “aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade...” and thus, gives quite a bit of political wiggle room (NATO 2014, 14). Calling for the members to spend more money on conventional weapons and warfighting capability is a strong signal that the shift in security environment has put the collective defense on the top of the mission list. It has always been mentioned first in official documents, but the source material has suggested that crisis management and other operations have been more important during the times when the threat picture didn’t seem to produce this type of missions.

Russia is accused of having a:

…pattern of disregard for international law, including the UN Charter; its behaviour towards Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; its violation of fundamental European security arrangements and commitments, including those in the Helsinki Final Act; its long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE); and its use of military and other instruments to coerce neighbours. (NATO 2014, 18)

This list includes most of the things that have already been mentioned in previous declarations since the Cold War as the points where NATO and Russia disagree, but have not been enough individually to sway the overall posture that the Alliance has had. Even directly after the war in Georgia there were reminders of the successes of practical cooperation and optimistic statements about the potential of the NATO-Russia council. After the war in Ukraine started the positives are no longer taken into account and it seems as though this has been a wakeup call for some and the general mood is shocked and appalled. The opening remark of this challenging NATO’s vision of European security is descriptive and shows that there is definitely a lack of mutual understanding on how the various European security structures should work. While expressing hope of a return to better relations, NATO suspends all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia. Ukraine’s political
process (after the Euromaidan revolution) and commitment to freedom and democracy is complimented. (NATO 2014, 22-25.)

The war in Syria is well and truly underway at this point and is also discussed in some length. The deployment of Patriot surface-to-air missiles in Turkey is NATO’s display of solidarity to the Alliance member (NATO 2014, 35). The political development of Turkey and its position in the war in Syria are not the subject of this paper, but it should be noted how the relationship with Turkey and many of the NATO allies as well as the European Union would develop in very interesting ways as the conflict progressed. As foreign involvement in the conflict increased the NATO allies Turkey and the United States found themselves nearly on opposing sides of the conflict due to the former’s long standing conflicts with the Kurds and the latter’s support of them in the fight against ISIS. Even the shooting down of a Russian military aircraft by the Turkish Air Force did not seem to stop Turkey from developing the kind of good working relationship with Russia that is now making both NATO and EU and the West in general uncomfortable. It might be facetious to point out that a good relationship between a NATO ally and Russia seems to be very much possible so long as that member isn’t overly bothered by the core values of the Alliance.

Since the Chicago summit in 2012, the Alliance has established a NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security and continued to implement the UNSCR 1325 principles in its structures and as usual, NATO will continue to review this progress in the coming summits and meetings (NATO 2014, 90). The Russian actions that have seemingly shaken NATO’s view of the security environment have not altered the Alliance’s stance on the “Open Door Policy” and enlargement. Georgia is again assured that it would become a member eventually and the democratic development and contribution to NATO operations is praised also. (NATO 2014, 92.) How much closer to NATO membership is Georgia at that point compared to the situation 6 years previously then? NATO assures that good progress has been made but strictly speaking a country either is a member or it isn’t. Right now, it looks like Georgia has hit a glass roof made out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia when it comes to actual membership, but this has not stopped it from developing NATO compatibility in other ways.

At a time when the values and principles that underpin the major institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area are being challenged, Allies emphasised the need to work together to ensure our shared goal of Europe whole, free and at peace. (NATO 2014, 100)

This statement was made regarding the meeting between NATO foreign ministers, the EU High Representative, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
The message is that the shared values that NATO, EU and the OSCE are based on are under attack. It is not an insignificant claim to make and further emphasizes the severity of the shift in their understanding of the current order of business. Could it be called a paradigm shift towards something resembling the Cold War, but not as clear-cut? Maybe the situation itself has not changed so much as NATO was surprised that the structures and institutions that were thought to be universally accepted were so easily disregarded.

Finally, the reforms that were called for in the Lisbon summit are looked at in very broad terms by noting that command structures, agencies, procedures and policies have been overhauled, streamlined and improved in efficiency. Work on this continues and progress reports are called for in the next summit meeting. (NATO 2014, 111-112.)

The Warsaw Summit Communiqué from the 2016 meeting is a comparatively lengthy document and the Alliance has a lot to discuss. The most interesting topics are the developments in the relationship with Russia, the instability in the peripheries of NATO including the fight against ISIL, the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and the UNSCR 1612 on protection of children affected by armed conflict. Naturally the ongoing operations are discussed as well and the perpetual change that the Alliance is facing.

NATO declares as its unchanged essential mission is “to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law.” (NATO 2016, 2). To this end, the tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security are all pursued as valuable and complimentary. The Wales summit saw a new emphasis placed on the conventional military capabilities and the collective defense mission driven by the events in Ukraine, and in the 2016 summit communiqué NATO claims that this mission has been reinforced further. The diverse and changing security environment is seen as increasingly unpredictable. (NATO 2016, 4.)

For over two decades, NATO has striven to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Russia’s recent activities and policies have reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability, and changed the security environment. (NATO 2016, 9)
The responsibility for the worsened relationship and the changing of the security environment is placed squarely on Russia as a result of the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and the war in Eastern Ukraine and the overall more aggressive stance to which NATO has then reacted by increasing its forward presence in the Baltics etc. No conditions for practical coordination in the context of the NATO-Russia council exist but the desire to return to “business as usual” is expressed. (NATO 2016, 10-15)

We remain committed to a continued coherent international approach, in particular between NATO and the European Union (EU). NATO’s response is in support of this overall effort, which includes sanctions as decided by the EU, the G7 and others, to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict and to address Russia’s actions. (NATO 2016, 22)

Here NATO is presenting the West as a broad and united front towards Russia and describes itself as a part of the rule-based international order that is under attack from the East and the South. The conflicts and unrest in the Middle East and North Africa and the regional instability caused by war and terrorism there is the Southern threat (NATO 2016, 27). NATO’s response has been to increase defense spending for the first time since 2009, but still only five members meet the 2% out of the annual GDP, 10 members spend the advised 20% of the defense budget on equipment and research & development (NATO 2016, 34). It could be argued that demands like an even 2% is arbitrary and looking at spending alone doesn’t tell the whole story of how a country prepares its defense. Spending money is probably not difficult for most militaries but making the most out of it is the challenge.

The Alliance seeks to project stability outside of its borders which would then have a positive impact on the security of the Alliance members themselves. Strengthening the defensive deterrence of NATO is the main effort and the support for the international community is how stability is projected outwards. NATO sees its partnership programs as another tool in this effort. The principles for the projection are the same as the values we have been looking at, such as “…commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law…” and close cooperation with actors like the UN, EU and OSCE (NATO 2016, 81). The refugee crisis is mentioned as well and the Alliance’s decision to allocate NATO maritime assets to European union and the most concerned countries. The threat here is the “…flow of irregular migration…” that the organizations are stemming together (NATO 2016, 92).

The partnerships that NATO has with non-members are essential in the formation of “…a broad cooperative security network.” that allows for flexible responses to various security challenges. Partnerships are open to anyone who shares the Alliances values. (NATO 2016, 98.) The security
network could be understood as a kind of security community where the actors are not necessarily institutionally connected such as the members of NATO but can be either completely separate or mostly identifying through other organizations such as the EU. Interpreted very broadly, this would mean that Australia and Finland were parts of this security community even without an immediately obvious direct contact with one another. Both have some sort of formal partnership arrangements with NATO and would be considered as parts of the “West” in political sense that relies on some kind of mutual understanding on certain values. NATO commends the various partners for their contributions to common security goals in the Warsaw summit communique and many partners are present in the gathering as a proof of the substantial cooperation and links that have been built (NATO 2016, 101).

NATO is an alliance of values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. These shared values are essential to what NATO is and what it does. Further incorporating them into all areas of our work will make NATO stronger. (NATO 2016, 129)

This statement on values as something that have agency is followed by the description on how UN Security council resolutions are implemented into NATO policy and doctrine and how promoting rule of law through good governance is a security issue. Corruption undermines democracy – a key value for NATO – and the Alliance has adopted a NATO Building Integrity Policy to promote transparency and accountability. The UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and its implementation is still under work, but already NATO is claiming good results with the work done so far. This includes a better representation of women on all levels of decision-making and also the measures that should be in place to prevent rape as a method of war and the training to make sure abuse does not take place in NATO operations. The protection of civilians from harm by NATO itself or other actors in a conflict is another topic that NATO addresses “Driven by our values and international law, …” by adopting a Policy on the Protection of Civilians which has been developed in cooperation with the UN and other partners (NATO 2016, 131-132).

Another UN Security Council resolution that NATO is now implementing into its structures and actions is the 1612 resolution concerning children in armed conflict. The Alliance has since the Wales summit established a policy that enables NATO troops to report violence and abuse of children as well as the use of children as soldiers. Training on this topic is also arranged including a special adviser in the NATO training mission to Afghanistan. (NATO 2016, 133.) The UN resolution expresses concern over the lack of progress in this field and one of the key points it makes is the importance of gathering information on the matter for the possible use of other bodies combatting the
problem (UNSC 2005). NATO is also consulting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the fight against terrorism where it sees its role as a provider of international platforms that allow members and partners to work together better and make use of capabilities such as NATO CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) expertise and information and intelligence sharing (NATO 2016, 134).

The 2018 Brussels summit declaration opens with the powerful statement that the rules-based international order is being challenged (NATO 2018, 1). Russia features prominently at the top of the list of destabilizing factors and the description of the threat picture. Other main challenges are the crises in the Middle East and North Africa that cause problems such as terrorism, immigration (and human trafficking) and regional instability that reflects on the Alliance as well. Hybrid threats that include “…disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities.” create increasingly varied challenges that NATO seeks to address with its “…360-degree approach to security…” (NATO 2018, 1-2).

I understand the 360-degree security approach as just a new way of describing the comprehensive approach that has been introduced in previous documents but the new wording does have a more geographic ring to it that, together with the new tendency to associate cardinal directions (East & South) with security challenges, makes it seem less comprehensive and multi-dimensional than the “comprehensive approach”. Hybrid threats have been in the vocabulary since at least the 2014 Wales summit declaration where they didn’t specifically mention disinformation campaigns. The increase in spending into the direction of the 2%-rule has held and the increased spending by non-US members is commended (NATO 2018, 3).

As mentioned, the relationship and stance towards Russia remains tense since the 2014 events in Ukraine. The broadest accusation is that Russia is challenging the Euro-Atlantic stability and reducing the predictability of the security environment. Russian and NATO ambassadors have met in the NATO-Russia council to discuss mostly the Crimean crisis and other topics and while very little to no agreement or trust exists at the moment, the fact that the communication exists is seen as a positive sign, albeit a small one. (NATO 2018, 6.)

Terrorism represents a direct challenge to the uniting values of NATO and the Alliance contributes to the fight against it while consulting and implementing relevant UN Security Council resolutions
such as UNSCR 2396 that for example addresses the foreign fighters returning from conflict areas to their countries of origin and the potential associated threats (UNSC 2017). NATO fights ISIL as a part of the global coalition and contributes for example by providing AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and air-to-air refueling capabilities, which help the coalition aircraft in their strikes against the terrorist organization. The fight against terrorism is pursued despite the strengthening the traditional defense and deterrence posture and both missions are seen as essential. (NATO 2018, 11-12.) It is noteworthy that NATO is merely a part of the more diverse coalition where much of the actual fighting is done by national actors that may or may not be members of international organizations like NATO or the EU. This is not to downplay the importance of the contributions because this kind of support is important or even critical to modern air operations.

Successive rounds of enlargement have enhanced our collective security and the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Euro-Atlantic integration advances democratic values, reform, and respect for the rule of law. NATO’s door is open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, … (NATO 2018, 62)

The enlargement process is still described as a one of the great successes of NATO’s history (NATO 2018, 62). At this time NATO is waiting for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to resolve its name issue with Greece before being invited into the Alliance and is commending the aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. Georgia is yet again assured that it will become a member of NATO and the Alliance recognizes the progress that has been made since 2008. (NATO 2018, 63-65.)

It is not mentioned what exactly is keeping Georgia from being invited, but as mentioned before it is most likely the situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Admitting Georgia as a member would either cement the status of the two provinces as not parts of Georgia or it would constitute such a breach of member sovereignty that it would draw NATO into an unprecedentedly tense situation with Russia. So, it is likely that Georgia will continue to be assured and continue making “good progress” towards membership without a hope of invitation before the crisis is resolved. Ukraine also finds itself in a situation where parts of the country are under occupation, and despite its “…restated aspirations for NATO membership, …” is unlikely to be invited as long as the situation remains as it is (NATO 2018, 66). Would Georgia be considered a part of a security community according to Deutsch? Perhaps yes, if we simply consider the possibility of war between it and any other Western state and how unthinkable it would be. However, this kind of security community hasn’t done Georgia much good as far as sovereignty and national security goes.
The implementation of the various UN Security Council resolutions could be seen as quite concrete examples of values directly affecting NATO activities and the role it plays in the international scene. The Brussels summit declaration concludes with a kind of summary of all these efforts as the Alliance claims that: “NATO leads by example in upholding the principles of democracy and human rights; doing so increases our operational effectiveness.” Leading by example means implementing the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, the UNSCR 1612 on the protection of children in armed conflict and NATO’s own military concept for the Protection of Civilians. (NATO 2018, 74.)

NATO evolution from other perspectives

Kaarle Lagerstam, who studied the NATO structural changes from an institutionalist / realist point of view, states that the United States (as the main muscle behind NATO security guarantees to new member states) benefits from the enlargement of NATO mostly on the political level, since the military capabilities of especially the smaller new members may be quite modest. He also points out that the new members obligated NATO to develop collective defense measures for them and added to the need to keep US troops in Europe. He also claims that Russian concerns were taken into consideration during the enlargement process but doesn’t go into details as to what was done. (Lagerstam 2005, 226.) Karvinen & Puistola describe the friction that the enlargement caused and that as compensation Russia was invited into the G7, making it G8, and was welcomed into the World Trade Organization (Karvinen & Puistola 2005, 134). This has not changed Russia’s stance that is firmly against the enlargement of NATO.

Lagerstam also says that, according to Bokarowski & Young, the development of NATO into a security-political organization has had a stabilizing effect on Europe (Lagerstam 2005, 126). Another view by Michael Mastaduno, presented by Lagerstam, that is quite interesting is that as a part of US geopolitical strategy in the 1990’s, the United States would try to stay ahead as a superpower by directing other emerging powers into favorable and non-competitive direction with the USA. This would be achieved by spreading US values through selected organizations such as NATO, WTO and IMF. (Lagerstam 2005, 119.)

I find the notion that NATO is involved in teaching and spreading values quite agreeable based on the analysis conducted in this paper. What I find harder to accept is the US ownership of these values that is implied and the cynical view of the organizations as mere tools to be used by Washington. This way of talking about values completely bypasses the difficult question of what the values even are.
and what different meanings they can have, but at least it assumes that they have some sort of function and suggests that they could affect behavior into favorable direction. Lagerstam points out that there are motives to develop NATO into an instrument of Trans-Atlantic cooperation where Europe has considerable power and that NATO is also an avenue through which the members can influence the USA and not just the other way around (Lagerstam 2005, 140).
4. Operation Allied Force: The NATO air war in Kosovo

NATO started its air campaign in Kosovo, named Operation Allied Force, on 24th March 1999, following the failures in diplomatic negotiations that were aimed at resolving the brewing conflict in the province between the Albanian and Serbian demographics and more precisely the Yugoslav governments treatment of the people in the province that had enjoyed a degree of autonomy before. There is no agreement of the reasons, but the negotiations were a failure and violence ensued. I will briefly look at this war as an example of NATO operations after the Cold War and as an important moment in the development of the Alliance. The objectives of the campaign were:

…to bring about:

- a verifiable stop to all military action, violence and repression
- the withdrawal from Kosovo of all military personnel, police and paramilitary forces;
- the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
- the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations;
- the establishment of a political agreement or Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

(NATO 2016b)

The Kosovo crisis had been brewing for a while and the war on the ground between the Serbians and the Albanians had been raging since 1998, but NATO’s campaign was started after a renewed and “systematic offensive” against the civilian population was launched by the Serbs (NATO 2016b). George Robertson, or Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, was the Secretary General of NATO from 1999 to 2004. In his report on the first anniversary of Operation Allied Force (OAF) he describes the NATO use of force as reluctant but necessary in the face of escalating repression and the refusal of the government in Belgrade to accept a political solution (Robertson 2000, 6).

Robertson describes the events leading to the crisis and points out President Slobodan Milosevic’s role and the reversal of the autonomy of the Kosovo province in the late 1980’s and the subsequent denial of basic rights and representation of the Albanian population by the Serbs. The attempts by the Kosovo Albanians to govern themselves peacefully came to no result and this led to the formation of
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – a product of Serbian oppression according to Robertson. (Robertson 2000, 6.)

The responsibility of the escalating violence in Kosovo is partly placed on the KLA, but the report places most of the blame on the Yugoslav regime forces. Robertson cites the 1999 OSCE report Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told in describing the various events and massacres and the blight of the hundreds of thousands of refugees that effectively ended the possibility de-escalation and effected further decisions to do something about it. The final straw were the failed negotiations at Rambouillet, France. Robertson accuses the Yugoslav government of not taking these efforts seriously and using this time to prepare for further offensives. NATO then was left without a choice but to use force in defense of human rights. (Robertson 2000, 8-10.)

NATO aircraft flew over 38,000 sorties of which 10,484 were strike sorties where aircraft were dropping bombs or otherwise employing weapons (NATO 2016b). A sortie is a flight conducted by one aircraft. The targets were selected both based on how they would affect and impede the ethnic cleansing going on, such as artillery positions and command posts as well as based on their strategic value and the overall effect on the Yugoslav military. NATO claims that no air crew fatalities were suffered during the operation despite considerable opposition and two aircraft being shot down. Robertson’s report condemns the use of civilians as human shields and admits to 488-527 civilian casualties based on the Human Rights Watch report, as opposed to the 1,200 to 5,700 casualties claimed by the Yugoslav regime. (Robertson 2000, 13-15.) Jyrki Karvinen and Juha-Antero Puistola quote a Human Rights Watch report THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO (2000) that describes the NATO bombing of a refugee column that was at times denied, downplayed, apologized for and explained in various ways that all together painted a confusing and negative public image and highlighted the responsibility to verify targets thoroughly (Karvinen & Puistola 2005, 165-167). In the end the Secretary General makes a strong statement for the moral justification of the campaign:

The abuse of human rights by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the humanitarian disaster which NATO’s intervention in Kosovo reversed, threatened to undermine the values on which the new Europe is being built… If NATO had failed to respond to the policy of ethnic cleansing, it would have betrayed its values and cast permanent doubt on the credibility of its institutions. By facing up to President Milosevic’s challenge, NATO nations confirmed that common values and respect for human rights are central to the Alliance and all the world’s democracies. (Robertson 2000, 22)
Pekka Visuri criticizes the use of human rights as a reason for NATO to conduct the intervention by pointing out the difference between the crisis in Kosovo and Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds that had more fatalities. Turkey, a NATO member, had not recognized even the existence of this conflict and apparently the human rights violations there did not matter. (Visuri 2000, 103.) Visuri also claims that leading up to the conflict there were close connections between the OSCE observers and NATO intelligence agencies and that before the bombings started there were no systematic and large scale ethnic cleansing operations underway, but rather smaller incidents of population dislocation and some human rights offences (Visuri 2000, 109-110).

The legality or illegality of Operation Allied Force is a highly debated topic. Visuri points out that there is no clear support for this kind of action in the UN Charter, OSCE documentation or even the North Atlantic Treaty: offensive action and waging war in any other way than self-defense (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 51 of the UN Charter) is generally forbidden. This problem had to be circumvented and one way to do it is to label the action as a “humanitarian intervention”, “crisis”, “conflict” or some other substitute for “war”. (Visuri 2000, 114.)

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s report seeks to address this kind of critique and argues that several factors make the lack of a UN mandate acceptable. For example, the North Atlantic Council considered the many breaches of earlier UN resolutions by the Yugoslav government, the fact that the UN Secretary General had warned about a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo and the unlikelihood that there would ever be a UN resolution sanctioning this kind of action. Also, the threat to peace and security in the region was acute. Robertson also argues that inaction would have had grave consequences. (Robertson 2000, 23.) Morality and values seem to have taken precedence over technically correct implementation of international law.

The NATO claim that all political avenues had been exhausted and that the ethnic cleansing was either under way or inevitable is also questioned by Visuri who examines the conflict from the framework of just war theory. Visuri doesn’t accept that the blame for the war is Slobodan Milosevic’s own and refers to the laws and referendums of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Milosevic’s defense that directed and / or restricted his ability to maneuver off the collision course with NATO. (Visuri 2000, 116-119.)

Visuri describes the war in Kosovo as an attack of a vastly superior military alliance against a sovereign state that must wage a total war in defending itself and as a part of that the systematic removal of the Albanian population from Kosovo was a “strategic counter-move that NATO planners should have taken into consideration.” and in an example of whataboutism he points at the United
States actions in Vietnam (Visuri 2000, 124). If NATO blames the humanitarian disaster on President Milosevic alone, Pekka Visuri sees NATO as the main instigator, also claiming that the plan for the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo that was uncovered was a fabrication (Visuri 2000, 129-130). This plan or “Operation Horseshoe” was an important argument that NATO used to make the point that the attack on the Albanian population was imminent and to claim that the Yugoslav government was not negotiating in good faith.

War crimes committed by “paramilitary units and other gunmen” are condemned by Visuri and described as a strategic mistake by the Serbian / Yugoslavian authorities that turned the popular opinion against them just as the Srebrenica massacres of 1995 had done to the Bosnian Serbs, but this too is something that NATO should have prepared for, and that it bears partial responsibility for as the instigator of the conflict according to Visuri (Visuri 2000, 131-132). Secretary General Robertson passes the responsibility of the escalation of the war to President Milosevic saying that NATO had “hoped, but never assumed, ...” that the threat of action and a more limited use of force would have been enough to deter further action by the Yugoslav regime to accept NATO demands, but instead the ethnic cleansing was escalated and NATO escalated in turn as a reaction to it (Robertson 2000, 13).

Tuomas Forsberg suggests that the failure of NATO to assist the Dutch troops protecting the “safe area” of Srebrenica was a major influence in the future decisions to act more independently, as the UN had not passed forward the Dutch troops’ calls for air support (Forsberg 2002, 94). Forsberg’s assessment of the Rambouillet negotiations is that they were short and there was little time in which to find a solution that the relevant parties could realistically support. The treaty is described as largely following the NATO draft and the Kosovo Liberation Army that represented the Albanian side accepted the treaty because they knew that the Yugoslav / Serbian side could not accept it, because it would have meant among other things a sizeable NATO force stationed in Kosovo. (Forsberg 2002, 99-100.)

Whether or not the ethnic cleansing was planned for or underway before the start of OAF, it is agreed among the authors that the attacks on the civilian population and the refugee crisis worsened after the NATO bombings started (Forsberg 2002, 101 and Visuri 2000, 128 and Robertson 2000, 10). The report by Robertson mentions that the North Atlantic Council reacted to the “massed forced expulsion” of civilians on April 12th and so avoids implying causality between the start of the bombings on March 24th. Forsberg points out that even though NATO can be seen as partially responsible for the severe refugee crisis, it was not the NATO bombings that the Albanian population was running from, but the Serbian persecution (Forsberg 2002, 105).
The war in Kosovo is a complex topic that the Alliance tends to deal with broad statements that underline the end result which was the negotiated peace that President Milosevic was made to sign and the return of the refugees to their homes is one of the great results of OAF and the subsequent KFOR operation (Robertson 2000, 15-16). OAF has been rightly criticized for the civilian casualties it produced directly and indirectly and its basis on international law was debatable. The “what if” question of what would have happened if the operation had not been conducted can’t be properly answered as is the case with such questions, but not many factors suggest that the conflict was going to de-escalate on its own without an intervention that first escalated it. The challenges of the KFOR operation to protect the ethnic Serbian population from reprisal attacks is another point of critique (Forsberg 2002, 105 & 107). Kosovo still requires an international military presence and KFOR is still in place. It could also be argued that the independence of Kosovo has had some negative consequences as the international community remains split on the matter (Karvinen & Puistola 2015, 165).

NATO didn’t engage in fighting directly during the Cold War, but according to Forsberg, the Falklands war between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982 and the first Gulf War gave the first hints of possible operations outside of the Alliances territory and a represented a certain shift in security understanding: instability and conflicts could have indirect effects on Allied security and thus possibly warrant action (Forsberg 2002, 90-91). It was as a part of the UN-led UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia where NATO saw its first action though and not Kosovo. The Alliance enforced a no-fly zone and conducted air strikes against the Bosnian Serb Army in operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force with the goal of protecting the UN troops and so called safe areas such as Srebrenica. According to NATO the operations helped shift the balance of forces on the ground in such a way that led to the negotiations and end to the war. (NATO 2017.) The Alliance’s part in bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table is not denied by Forsberg, but he points out to other factors too such as diminishing support for the Bosnian Serb Army from Yugoslavia, increased foreign aid in form of weapons etc. to the Croats and Bosniaks (Forsberg 2002, 96). In the case of Kosovo, the difficulty of establishing the causality of various events causes debate on the use of force but also makes it possible to assume a certain “end justifies the means” stance that NATO seems to have taken.
5. Conclusions

The challenges of analyzing official documents like the summit declarations and the strategic concepts is that due to their nature as the official communications of an alliance consisting of many sovereign states they are compromises that must be agreed on by all the parties involved. They show as little as possible of the inner frictions and conflicts that go on behind the scenes and the end result must be a document that portrays NATO as a united group of equals. They are NATO’s message to its members as well as the outside world and they do not reveal confidential material regarding military strategy etc. They are largely written while observing the styles and customs of international diplomacy which isn’t always helpful and sometimes the reader would appreciate a more matter-of-fact style. This does not mean that no useful information can be found in those documents.

The fact that they are a compromise agreed to by the members makes them one of the official voices of NATO and reflects the Alliances view of the world. This makes them useful when trying to find out how NATO sees and describes itself since the Cold War. NATO describes itself through values such as democracy, freedom, human rights and rule of law. These can be ambiguous terms, but describing an alliance consisting of 29 countries (and counting) calls for certain flexibility afforded by ambiguity. The heritage of NATO is rooted in the Cold War and much of the terminology is still the same as it was in 1949 when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by 12 countries from the Western bloc. The West as a political and cultural concept is also highly debated and it has been described in many different ways and from many different angles. It is probably fair to say that NATO is strongly associated with the concept of the West still even if the world appears more complicated today than it was during the Cold War.

By far the biggest event for NATO throughout its history was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the paradigm shift that it was for security and the world in general. This paper concentrates on the timeline from 1988 to present day to cover this shift and to illustrate how it was described in the official statements of the Alliance. The way NATO talks about values at the time of this monumental change is in terms of victory over lesser values as the ideological hostility is abandoned and the peoples of the Eastern bloc get the taste of and see the superiority of democratic values, market economy and the respect for human rights that NATO claimed the Eastern bloc was lacking. Institutions such as the CSCE (later OSCE) that the Alliance sees as sharing the same values have perhaps played a bigger role in the ending of the Cold War than NATO and maybe that is why it is easier to credit the ideas and concepts for a victory, if we can call it that.
The question of what NATO has done after the Cold War is essential to this paper. First of all, it has not ceased to exist. Instead it has grown in members and shrunk in the numbers of nuclear missiles. It has engaged in peacekeeping and crisis management operations outside of its area and waged air war on another country in the name of humanitarian intervention. Former parts of that country have later become its members. It has acted without a UN mandate but then implemented UN resolutions into its doctrine and training. It is also said to have gone back to its old mission it had during the Cold War.

NATO had to change its understanding of security after the old and reliable adversary was no longer there. The new and broader understanding of security came with an understanding that the threats and challenges of the new era were emerging from unexpected sources and were very diverse in nature. The need to adapt to the new and constantly changing environment has been a constant theme throughout the decades and seems to continue to the foreseeable future. It was and continues to be what NATO must do to avoid obsolescence until its members see no further use for it. As the threat of a state or state-like aggressor posing an existential threat to the Allies’ way of life receded, the mission of defending against such an attack eventually took the back seat to other measures that were better suited to the new kinds of missions. The big shift was towards enlargement and crisis management operations.

5.1 Enlargement and community-building

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the signing parties may invite any European state that furthers the cause of the Alliance to become a member (NATO 1949). NATO discusses enlargement and the integration into Euro-Atlantic structures in terms of values and constantly reminds those countries that have expressed the desire to join to commit to the shared values of the community and conduct reforms where needed. The summit declarations do not dissect the prospect members specific issues and problems for all the world to see, but even on a general level it creates a picture of enlargement as a tool for NATO to spread its values. NATO does ask its members to spend a certain percentage of their GDP in defense, but it cannot be seriously argued that the capabilities for violence that a prospective member has is the key to membership. Since for a long time NATO didn’t plan and equip for the Third World War, it also made no sense to have that in mind when inviting new members. I am mostly trying to look at it from the NATO point of view, but the country applying for membership has its own reasons to do so that may be somewhat different from NATO.
This could also be seen as the difference that the realist and constructivist theoretical approaches have: Is NATO a community where ideas and values matter, or just a tool for countries to gain more power with? In this paper I stay on the constructivist side, but it may be useful to briefly look what has been written from the realist point of view and if there are points that can be agreed upon.

I have tried to point out a few times in this paper the differences that Allied members have as far as their political situation and stance on some of the key values that NATO claims tie it together. The question of democracy in certain member countries today and in the past has been difficult to explain based on the picture that NATO tries to give in the summit declarations and strategic concepts. Developments towards authoritarian rule have not been openly criticized when it comes to members, but those hoping to join are constantly reminded of the importance of democratic reforms.

One could ask if NATO should expel members that do not meet the demand. However, it is again the ambiguity of the concepts that in this case would not probably form the basis for such a case. No doubt values would be bought up if this ever happened, but it would probably require something else to initiate the event. If at least one of the goals of the Alliance is to further democratic principles, closing a member out would surely have the opposite effect. NATO mentions integration as one of the important steps towards lasting peace and breaking that up would be counterproductive. If enlargement to some extent is aimed at teaching values to others, is membership the final exam or is it just a phase or even a start of the process? The partnership programs and other cooperation with states that are not members and may not have any intentions of joining could be interpreted as community building measures that allow for political maneuverability while having partners contribute to NATO activities. Partnerships and dialogue can exist without much regard to geographic constraints that might exclude some states from the community.

NATO associates the same values it upholds to organizations such as OSCE and EU and refers to the UN Charter on many occasions. On page 52 I presented my interpretation of the European rule-based security structure that NATO seems to describe. Using the term security community as described by Deutsch, Adler & Barnett et al. could be appropriate to describe the system where these organizations such as NATO, EU, OSCE, perhaps the UN and others that agree with their basic principles create an environment or a community where war between its members becomes unthinkable. After the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and the war in Ukraine NATO criticizes Russia for violating this community by breaking OSCE principles and other international norms, but naturally not for breaking NATO’s principles. Going against the norms has been described as a challenge to the values that are thought of as universal and superior. It seems based on the material analyzed here that enlargement could be one way that NATO is trying to build a security community, but it is not trying
to do it alone. Joining together with other organizations helps to legitimize the whole arrangement. NATO has emphasized the need to work together with these organizations especially in fields where it lacks capabilities and at the same time reminding that it has the military capacity that the others lack.

5.2 Crisis management

As NATO stated in the 1997 summit declaration, the Allied capability to deal with regional crises and conduct crisis management operations has been strengthened as well as the political element of the NATO that would help with cooperation with other institutions. The SFOR and IFOR operations were NATO’s first crisis response operations (NATO 2017) so it is probably a fair assessment that the crisis involved a lot of “learning on the job” and its failures and successes would be taken into account in the very near future. As was mentioned in the chapter about the Kosovo war, the decision to act without a UN mandate in this case was probably influenced by the failures in coordination with the UN in the Bosnian war. The 1999 strategic concept reflects the changes were seen in action in the Balkans. Smaller conflicts rising from a multitude of reasons including ethnic tensions are specifically mentioned as well as the necessity to operate outside of Alliance borders. The arguments in favor of such operations as the Kosovo campaign appealed to values such as human rights but the operation could also be seen as NATO’s attempt to stay relevant in light of how the various regional and global institutions (UN, EU, OSCE) failed to prevent a war in Europe which the Balkan events were.

The significance of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan grew over time to be one perhaps the most important NATO engagement that lasted or an unprecedented amount of time. NATO took leadership of the operation in 2003 and it concluded in 2014 when the official responsibility was handed over to the Afghan authorities (NATO 2017b). That year saw another monumental shift regarding NATO-Russia relations as a result of the events in Ukraine that took the spotlight over other topics in the Wales summit. The development of the Afghan operation thought the official documentation appears as something that helped shape the Alliance and seemed to cement its role as a crisis management organization. At its largest it had 50 different nationalities taking part and over 130 000 troops (NATO 2017b). By comparison at their height the IFOR and SFOR operations consisted of 36 nationalities and 60 000 and 31 000 troops respectively. SFOR was declared to be over in the Istanbul summit in 2004 when the EU Operation Althea took over. The sizes of those operations naturally changed over
time, but the difference is notable. On the other hand, so is the size difference of the countries in question.

When it comes to crisis management, NATO has mostly emphasized the cooperation between the institutions that it thinks should make up the security framework in the Euro-Atlantic area and perhaps the world. Just as the UN Charter is said to be one of the main inspirations for the Alliance, the mandates for missions in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Libya are readily mentioned, while in Kosovo it is argued that there were more pressing reasons to act without a mandate that might never come.

In the 2010 summit declaration NATO brought up the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and pledged to implement it into the structures, doctrines and training of the Alliance. Since then it has also promised to do the same regarding the UNSCR 1612 on the protection of children in armed conflict. I see these as quite tangible examples of how values like human rights affect the Alliance’s actions. They are described as measures that make the Alliance more modern and responsive better suited for its missions which are practical reasons. One could say that they are an effort to legitimize NATO though even closer association with the UN. This may be true, but the values are still undeniably present. Could it be that this kind of effort is ultimately a result of the crisis management mission that NATO immersed itself in after the Balkan wars? Civil wars are sometimes said to be the nastiest and most brutal kinds of conflicts and interventions and crisis management operations would bring the forces into contact with sexual violence and targeting children as weapons for breaking up communities.

5.3 Ukraine and beyond

It is clear based on the Wales summit declaration and the later Warsaw and Brussels declarations that renewed emphasis is placed on collective defense and making sure that the defense spending of the members stops its decline. The threats are also defined in geographic terms to originate mainly from the East and the South. NATO sees Russia’s actions in Ukraine (and retrospectively in Georgia) as a breach of the security arrangements of Europe. These security arrangements that are mostly based on the cooperation between NATO, EU and OSCE could be called a security community. As well as posing a potential threat to the sovereignty and integrity of NATO members particularly in the East, the values on which the community is built are seen as under attack. At the end of the Cold War NATO stated that the Eastern bloc has abandoned its ideological hostility towards the West. Calling
the current situation by the same term sounds too harsh or maybe the current situation is so much more complex and multi-faceted that the clear dichotomy seems too simple now. Russia is condemned for going against the values instead of just assuming that it categorically rejects them.

The 2010 strategic concept *Active Engagement, Modern Defence* is still the latest one and it remains to be seen if and when a new one comes out and what it will look like. If values had an effect in NATO’s role shift to crisis management, the return to collective defense has not reduced the rhetoric at all. On the contrary, there is more talk of values in the post-2014 documents than ever before. Trying to find the effects that values have is not a matter of simply counting words though. Hybrid threats are a popular and prolific term these days and sometimes seems to be used quite liberally. In the 2014 declaration it was described as “*…a wide range of covert and overt military, paramilitary, and civilian measures*...” (NATO 2014, 13) and in 2018 it is further defined to include disinformation campaigns (NATO 2018, 2).

I would argue that the clearest examples of values affecting NATO’s role change after the Cold War are the institutional cooperation with actors such as the OSCE and EU and the efforts in building a security community where the key values partly form the norms by which states are expected to abide. Another example that is perhaps more arguable is the shift towards crisis management as the de-facto main mission. The development that was required to make NATO capable to do crisis management in a multi-institutional framework of actors where complimentary specializations were needed required the Alliance to become more of a political organization that requires common denominators such as values for its heterogenous member base.

In Kosovo the Alliance appealed heavily to values as justification for its operation but on the other hand the lack of UN mandate for the intervention could be seen as a breach of the norms of the international community. On the other hand, it displayed that even if the EU, OSCE and UN do not act (wisely or unwisely) NATO can still get things done, for better or for worse. The North Atlantic Treaty refers to the principles of the UN Charter as its normative basis (NATO 1949). The implementation of UN Security Council resolutions that are aimed at promoting human rights is another example of values in practice.

Looking at the change in NATO’s role from the constructivist perspective, there are constant hints at their significance to the Alliance and its evolution since the end of the Cold War. I see one of the goals of the enlargement of NATO as the teaching and promoting of values that would help bring members into not just the Alliance but the wider security community. Values are by no means the only factor in the changing role, but they are there. They are what allow the 29 states with their
internal and external arguments and individual problems and motives to have some semblance of a united vision for how to arrange their security.
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